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1903.

THE

Parliamentary Debates,

DURING THE

FIRST SESSION OF THE THIRD PARLIAMENT

OF THE

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT-BRITAIN AND IRELAND

AND OF THE

KINGDOM OF GREAT-BRITAIN THE TWENTIETH,

Appointed to meet at Westminster, the Twenty-eighth Day of August, One Thousand Eight Hundred and Six; and from thence continued, by Prorogation, to the Fifteenth Day of December, in the Forty-seventh Year of the Reign of his Majesty King GEORGE the Third, Annoque Domini One Thousand Eight Hundred and Six.

VOL. VIII.

COMPRISING THE PERIOD

BETWEEN THE 15th OF DECEMBER, 1806, AND THE 4th OF MARCH, 1807.

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AND J. ARCHER, DUBLIN.

1807.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE present Volume comprises the period between the Opening of the First Session of the Third Parliament of the United Kingdom, on the 15th of December, 1806, and the 4th of March, 1807. In the pages immediately succeeding the Table of Contents, will be found a correct List of the Ministry; together with a List of the Members returned for the New Parliament in December, 1806. The Papers relative to the Negociation with France are given at page 92; and the Appendix contains the whole of the Tables and Calculations relative to the New Plan of Finance, proposed to Parliament in January 1807, by Lord Henry Petty, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Annual Financial Accounts, will be given in the Appendix to the Ninth Volume.

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LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS AS IT STOOD AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION, DECEMBER 15, 1806.

Cabinet Ministers.

Viscount Sidmouth	President of the Council.
Lord Erskine	Lord High Chancellor.
Lord Holland	Lord Privy Seal.
Lord Grenville	First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister).
The Right Hon. Thomas Grenville	First Lord of the Admiralty.
Earl of Moira	Master-general of the Ordnance.
Earl Spencer	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Lord Howick	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Right Hon. William Windham	Secretary of State for the Department of War and the Colonies.
Lord Ellenborough	Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench.
Lord Henry Petty	Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer.
Earl Fitzwilliam	(A Seat without an Office).

Not of the Cabinet.

The Right Hon. George Tierney	President of the Board of Controul for the Affairs of India.
Earl of Derby	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Lord Auckland	President of the Board of Trade.
Right Hon. Richard Fitzpatrick	Secretary at War.
Right Hon. Richard Brinsley Sheridan	Treasurer of the Navy.
Earl Temple	Joint Paymaster-general.
Lord John Townshend	
Earl of Buckinghamshire	Joint Paymaster-general.
Earl of Carysfort	
Right Hon. Nicholas Vansittart	Secretaries of the Treasury.
William Henry Fremantle, Esq.	
Sir William Grant	Master of the Rolls.
Sir Arthur Pigott	Attorney-General.
Sir Samuel Romilly	Solicitor-General.

PERSONS IN THE MINISTRY OF IRELAND.

His Grace the Duke of Bedford	Lord Lieutenant.
Right Hon. George Ponsonby	Lord High Chancellor.
Right Hon. William Elliott	Chief Secretary.
Right Hon. Sir John Newport	Chancellor of the Exchequer.

AN ALPHABETICAL LIST
OF
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS:
AS RETURNED FOR THE NEW PARLIAMENT,
Which met on the 15th of December, 1806.

[THOSE PRINTED THUS * ARE NEW MEMBERS.]

Abbot, right honourable Charles, Speaker, Oxford University, Heytesbury
Abercromby, honourable Geo., Clackmannan-shire
Acheson, lord viscount, Armagh county
*A'Court, sir W. P. A. bart.; Heytesbury
Adair, Robert, Camelford
*Adam, Wm., Kincardine-shire
Adams, Charles, Weymouth, and Melcombe Regis
Adams, William, Totness
Addington, right honourable John Hiley, Harwich
Althorp, lord viscount, Northampton county
Andrews, Miles Peter, Bewdley
Anson, George, Litchfield
*Anstruther, right honourable sir John, bart.; Craill, &c.
Antonie, William Lee, Bedford borough
Archdall, Mervyn, Fermanagh
Ashley, hon. Cropley, Dorchester
*Atherley, Arth., Southampton
Aubrey, sir John, bart.; Aldeburgh, Suffolk
Babington, Thomas, Leicester borough
Bagenal, Walter, Catherlogh county
Bagwell, William, Clonmell
Baillie, Evan, Bristol
Baillie, George, Berwick-shire
Baker, John, Canterbury
Baker, Wm., Hertford county
Bampfylde, sir Charles W. bart.; Exeter
Bankes, Henry, Corfe Castle
Barclay, George, Bridport
Barclay, sir Robert, bart.; Newtown, Hants
Barham, Joseph Foster, Oakhampton, Stockbridge
*Baring, Alexander, Taunton
*Baring, Henry, Bossiney
*Baring, T., Chipping Wycombe
Barlow, H., Pembroke borough
Barne, Snowdon, Dunwich
*Barnett, James, Rochester
*Barry, John, Cavan
Bastard, Edmund, Dartmouth
Bastard, John Pollexfen, Devon
Bathurst, right hon. C., Bristol
Beach, Mich. Hicks, Circencester
Beaumont, Thomas Richard, Northumberland
*Beckford, William, Hindon
*Bennett, honourable Henry Grey, Shrewsbury
Benyon, Richard, Wallingford
Beresford, lord George Thomas, Londonderry county
Beresford, John Claudius, Waterford county
Berkeley, honourable George C., Gloucester county
*Bernard, lord visct., Youghall
*Bernard, Scrope, St. Mawes
Bernard, Thomas, King's County
Bertie, Albemarle, Stamford
*Bewicke, Calv., Winchelsea
*Biddulph, Robert Myddelton, Denbigh borough
Blackburne, J. Lancaster county
*Blayney, lord, Old Sarum
Bligh, Thomas, Meath
Bond, right hon. Nathanael, Corfe Castle
*Bonham, Henry, Leominster
Bootle, Edward Wilbraham, Newcastle-under-Lyme
Bourne, Wm. Sturges, Christchurch
*Bouverie, hon. B., Downton
*Bouverie, hon. D. P., Downton
Bouverie, honourable Edward, Northampton borough
Boyle, lord visct., Cork county
*Boyle, hon. C., Bandon Bridge
Bradshaw, hon. A. C., Honiton
Bradshaw, R. Haldane, Brackley
Brandling, Charles John, Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Brodie, James, Elginshire
Brodrick, hon. W., Whitchurch
Brogden, James, Launceston
*Bromley, Hen., Worcester city
Brooke, Charles, Chippenham
*Brooke, H. V., Donegal
Brooke, lord, Warwick borough
Brooke, Thomas Newton, Lanc.
*Browne, Anthony, Heydon
Browne, right hon. Denis, Mayo
Browne, Is. Hawk., Bridgenorth
Bruce, lord, Marlborough
Bruce, Patrick Craufurd, Rye
Buller, Edward, East Looe
Buller, James, Exeter
*Buller, James, West Looe
Buller, John, East Looe
Bullock, John, Essex
Bunbury, sir Thomas Charles, bart.; Suffolk
Burghersh, lord, Lyme Regis
*Burrell, sir Charles Mer., bart.; New Shoreham
Burton, Francis, Oxford city
Burton, hon. Franc. Nath., Clare
Butler, honourable C. Harward, Kilkenny city
Butler, hon. J., Kilkenny county
Byng, George, Middlesex
Calcraft, John, Rochester
Calvert, J., Huntingdon borough
Calvert, N., Hertford borough
*Callander, sir John, bart.; Berwick upon Tweed
*Campbell, Arch., Renfrew, &c.
*Campbell, George, Carmarthen borough
*Campbell, H. F., Nairnshire
Campbell, lord J. Argyll-shire
Campbell, John, Inverary, &c.
Canning, right hon. George, Newtown, Hants
Canning, George, Sligo borough
Carew, right hon. R. Pole, Fowey
*Carew, Robert Shapland, Wexford county
Cartwright, William Ralph, Northampton county
Castlereagh, lord viscount, Plympton Earle
Caulfield, hon. Henry, Armagh county
Cavendish, lord G. A. H., Derby county
*Cavendish, G. H. Compton, Aylesbury
Cavendish, Wm., Derby borough
*Cawthorne, John Fenton, Lancaster borough
*Champernowne, A., Saltash
Chaplin, C., Lincoln county
Chester, Chas., Castle Rising
Chichester, lord Spencer, Carrickfergus
Cholmondeley, Thomas, Chester county
Clements, Henry John, Leitrim
*Clinton, W. H., Boroughbridge
*Clive, lord viscount, Ludlow
Clive, hon. Robert, Ludlow
Clive, Wm., Bishop's Castle
*Cochrane, lord, Honiton
*Cocks, hon. Edw. C., Reigaet
Codrington, Chris. Tewkesbury
Coke, Daniel Parker, Nottingham town
Coke, Edward, Derby borough
Coke, Thos. William, Norfolk
Colborne, Nicolas William Ridley, Malmesbury
Colclough, J., Wexford county
Cole, hon. Galb. L., Fermanagh
Combe, Harvey Chris., London
Cooke, Bryan, Malton
*Cooper, Edw. S., Sligo county
Cornewall, sir George, bart.; Hereford county
Cornwallis, hon. William, Eye
Corry, right honourable Isaac, Newport, Hants
*Cotes, John, Salop
*Cotterell, sir John Geers, bart.; Hereford county

*Cotton, Stapleton, Newark
Courtenay, John, Appleby
Cowper, hon. E. Spencer, Hertford borough
*Craufurd, Charles, East Retford
*Cripps, Joseph, Cirencester
Curtis, sir Wm., bart.; London
Curwen, John Chris., Carlisle
Curzon, hon. Robert, Clitherow
Cust, hon. John, Clitherow
Dalkeith, earl of, Marlborough
Daly, right honourable Denis B., Galway county
Daly, James, Galway town
Daniell, Ralph Allen, West Looe
Dashwood, Sir Henry Watkin, bart.; Woodstock
Davenport, Davies, Chester county
Dawson, Richard, Monaghan
*Denison, William Joseph, Kingston-upon-Hull
Dent, John, Lancaster borough
*De Ponthieu, John, Helleston
Dickinson, William; Lostwithiel, Somerset
Dillon, hon. Henry Aug., Mayo
*Disbrowe, Edward, Windsor
*Doyle, sir John, bart.; Newport, Hants.
Drake, T. D. Tyrwhitt, Agmondesham
Drake, Th. Tyrw., Agmondesham
Dugdale, Dug. Stratford, Warwick county
Duigenan, P., Armagh borough
Dundas, Charles, Berks.
Dundas, honourable Charles Lau., Richmond
Dundas, hon. Lau., York city
Dundas, hon. R., Edinburgh-shire
Dundas, right hon. William, Sutherland-shire
Ebrington, lord visct., Barnstaple
*Eden, hon. W. F. Elliott, Woodstock
*Edmonstone, Charles, Dumbarton-shire
Eliot, hon. William, Liskeard
*Elliott, honourable Gilbert, M. K., Ashburton
Elliott, right honourable William, Peterborough
Ellison, Richard, Lincoln city
Erskine, right honourable Henry, Lochmaben, &c.
Estcourt, T. Grimston, Devizes
Euston, earl of, Cambridge University
Everett, Thomas, Ludgershall
Eyre, Anthony Hardolph, Nottingham county
Falkiner, F. J., Dublin county
Fane, Francis, Dorchester
Fane, Henry, Lyme Regis
Fane, John, Oxford county
*Fawcett, Henry, Grampound
*Fawkes, Walter, York county
Fellowes, hon. Newton, Andover
Fellowes, Robert, Norwich
Fellowes, William Henry, Huntingdon borough
Ferguson, James, Aberdeenshire
*Ferguson, Robert, Fife-shire
*Ferguson, Ronald Crauford, Burntisland, &c.
Fetherstone, sir T. bart.; Longford
Finch, honourable Edward, Cambridge town
Fitzgerald, right hon. Jas., Ennis
Fitzgerald, right hon. M., Kerry
Fitzgerald, lord Rt. S., Kildare, Tralee
Fitzharris, lord viscount, Horsham, [dble ret.]
Fitzhugh, William, Tiverton
Fitzpatrick, right honourable Richard, Tavistock
Fitzroy, lord Charles, Bury St. Edmunds
*Fitzroy, lord William, Thetford
Fleeming, hon. C., Stirling-shire
Foley, hon. Andrew, Droitwich
Foley, Thomas, Droitwich
Foljambe, F. Fer. Higham Ferrers
Folkes, sir Martin Browne, bart.; King's Lynn
Folkestone, lord viscount, New Sarum
*Forbes, lord visct., Longford
Forester, Cecil, Wenlock
Foster, right hon. John, Louth
Francis, sir Philip, Appleby
Frankland, Wm., Queenborough
Fraser, Alex. M., Ross-shire
Frederick, sir John, bart.; Surrey
*Fremantle, T. F., Sandwich
Fremantle, W. H., Harwich
French, Arthur, Roscommon
Fuller, John, Sussex
Fydell, Thomas, Boston
*Fynes, Henry, Aldborough, Yorkshire
Gamon, sir R., bart.; Winchester
Garland, George, Poole
Garlies, lord visct., Haslemere
Garrow, William, Callington
Gascoyne, Isaac, Liverpool
*Gaskell, Benjamin, Malden
*Giddy, Davies, Bodmyn
Giles, Daniel, East Grinsted
*Goddard, Thomas, Cricklade
Godfrey, Thomas, Hythe
Gooch, Thos. Sherlock, Suffolk
*Gore, William, Leitrim
Gower, Edw. Leveson, Truro
Gower, lord Gran. Leveson, Stafford county
Graham, sir James, bart.; Ripon
Graham, James, Cockermouth
Graham, Thomas, Perthshire
Grant, Charles, Inverness-shire
Grant, Francis Wm., Forres, &c.
Grant, right honourable sir William, Bamff-shire
Grattan, rt. hon. H., Dublin city
*Greenhill, Robert, Thirsk
Grenfell, Pascoe, Great Marlow
Grenville, right hon. Thomas, Buckingham borough
Grimston, hon. J. W., St. Alban's
Grosvenor, Richard Earle Drax, Chester city
Grosvenor, Thomas, Chester city
*Hall, Benjamin, Totness
Hamilton, lord A., Lanerkshire
Hamilton, sir H. D. bart.; Airshire
Hamilton, Hans, Dublin county
Hammet, John, Taunton
*Harbord, honourable Edward, Yarmouth, Norfolk
Harvey, Eliab, Essex
Hawkins, sir Christopher, Grampound, Penryn, and Mitchell
*Hawkins, Hen., Boroughbridge
*Headley, lord, Ripon
Heathcote, sir Gilbert, bart.; Lincoln county
Henderson, Anthony, Brackley
*Henderson, sir John, bart.; Culross, &c.
Henniker, lord, Rutland
Herbert, hon. Charles, Wilton
*Herbert, Henry Arthur, Kerry
*Herbert, hon. Wm., Hants
*Heron, Peter, Newton, Lanc.
*Hibbert, George, Seaford
Hill, sir George Fitzgerald, bart.; Londonderry city, Coleraine
Hill, hon. Wm., Shrewsbury
Hinchingbrook, lord viscount, Huntingdon county
Hippisley, sir J. C. bart.; Sudbury
Hobhouse, Benjamin, Hindon
Hodson, John, Wigan
Holdsworth, A. H., Dartmouth
Honyman, Robert, shires of Orkney and Zetland
*Honywood, William, Kent
*Hood, sir Samuel, Westminster
Hope, hon. A., Linlithgowshire
Hope, hon. C., Haddingtonshire
Hope, W. J., Dumfries-shire
*Horner, Francis, St. Ives
Horrocks, Samuel, Preston
Howard, Henry, Gloucester city
*Howard, hon. Wm., Morpeth
Howick, lord viscount, Northumberland
*Howorth, Humphrey, Evesham
*Hughan, Thomas, East Retford
Hughes, Wm. L., Wallingford
Hume, Wm. Hoare, Wicklow
Huntingfield, lord, Dunwich
*Huntley, Marquis of, Eye
Hurst, Robert, Steyning
Huskisson, Wm., Liskeard
Hussey, Wm., New Sarum
Hutchinson, hon. C. H., Cork city
*Irving, John, Bramber
*Jackson, John, Dover
*Jacob, William, Westbury
Jeffery, John, Poole
Jekyll, Joseph, Calne
*Jenkinson, Charles, Dover
Jephson, Denham, Mallow
Jervoise, J. C., Yarmouth, Hants
*Jocelyn, lord viscount, Louth
Jodrell, Henry, Bramber
Johnes, Thos., Cardigan county
Johnstone, George, Heydon
Jolliffe, Hylton, Petersfield
*Jones, Gilbert, Aldborough, Yorkshire
*Jones, L. P., Horsham [dble ret.]
Keck, G. A. L., Leicester county
Keene, W., Montgomery borough
*Kemp, Thomas, Lewes
*Kenrick, William, Blechingly
Kensington, lord, Haverfordwest
King, sir John Dashwood, bart.; Chipping-Wycombe

Kingston, John, Lymington
*Knatchbull, sir Edward, bart.; Kent
*Knight, Robert, Wotton Basset
Knox, honourable George, Dublin University. Dungannon
*Knox, hon. Thomas, Tyrone
Ladbroke, Robert, Malmesbury
Lamb, hon. Wm., Lauder, &c.
Lambton, R. J., Durham city
Langston, John, Bridgwater
Lascelles, hon. E., Northallerton
Latouche, D., Catherlogh county
Latouche, Robert, Kildare
Laurence, F., Peterborough
Leach, John, Seaford
Lefevre, Charles Shaw, Reading
*Leigh, Charles, New Ross
Leigh, Jas. Hen., Great Bedwin
Leigh, Robert Holt, Wigan
Leland, John, Stamford
Lemon, John, Truro
Lemon, sir Wm. bart.; Cornwall
Lennox, Charles, Sussex
Leslie, Ch. Powell, Monaghan
*Lethbridge, sir John, bart.; Minehead
Lethbridge, T. Buckler, Somerset
Leycester, Hugh, Milborne Port
*Liddell, sir Thomas H., bart.; Durham county
*Lismore, lord, Lostwithiel
Littleton, sir Edward, bart.; Stafford county
*Lloyd, sir Edward Pryce, bart.; Flint borough
*Lloyd, James Martin, Steyning
*Lockhart, W. E., Selkirk-shire
Loftus, Wm., Tamworth
Long, right hon. C., Haslemere
*Long, Richard, Wilts
Longfield, Mountifort, Cork city
*Longman, George, Maidstone
Lovaine, lord, Beeralston
Loveden, Edw. L., Shaftesbury
Lowther, James, Westmorland
Lowther, John, Cumberland, Cockermouth
Lubbock, sir John, bart.; Leominster
Lushington, sir Stephen, bart.; Plympton Earle
*Lushington, Stephen, Yarmouth, Norfolk
Lygon, hon. Wm. B., Worcester county
*Lyttleton, hon. Wm. Henry, Worcester county
Macdonald, James, Newcastle-under-Lyme
Macdowall, Wm., Renfrewshire
*Mackenzie, hon. J. S. W., Bute-shire
*Mackenzie, John Randoll, Wick, &c.
M'Mahon, John, Aldeburgh, Suffolk
Macnaghten, Edm. A., Antrim
Madocks, Wm. Alex., Boston
Magens, Mag. D., Ludgershall
*Mahon, lord visct., Wendover
*Mahon, hon. S., Roscommon
Maitland, John, Chippenham
*Maitland, lord visct., Camelford
Mann, sir Horace, bart.; Sandwich
Manners, lord Charles Som., Cambridge county
Manners, lord Robert, Leicester county
Manners, Robert, Cambridge town
*Manners, Russell, Grantham
*Manners, sir William, bart.; Ivelchester
Manning, William, Evesham
Markham, John, Portsmouth
Markham, Osborne, Calne
Marsham, lord visct., Hythe
Martin, Henry, Kinsale
Martin, James, Tewkesbury
Martin, Rich., Galway county
*Mathew, honourable Montagu, Tipperary
Maule, hon. Wm., Forfarshire
Maxwell, W., Wigtown-shire
May, Edward, Belfast
Meade, hon. John, Down
Mellish, William, Middlesex
Metcalfe, sir Thomas Theophilus, bart.; Abingdon
*Metge, John, Dundalk
Middleton, sir W. bart.; Hastings
Milbanke, sir Ralph, bart.; Durham county
Mildmay, sir H. P. St. John, bart.; Winchester
Milford, lord, Pembroke county
*Miller, sir Thomas, bart.; Portsmouth
Mills, Chas., Warwick borough
Mills, William, Coventry
Milner, Sir William, Mordaunt, bart.; York city
*Milnes, Robert Pemberton, Pontefract
*Milton, lord viscount, Malton
*Mingay, James, Thetford
Monckton, honourable Edward, Stafford borough
*Monson, honourable William, Lincoln city
*Montagu, Mat., St. Germans
Montgomery, sir James, bart.; Peebles-shire
*Moore, lord Henry, Orford
Moore, Peter, Coventry
Mordaunt, Charles, Warwick county
Morgan, Charles, Monmouth county
Morpeth, lord viscount, Cumberland
Morris, Edw. Newport, Cornwall
Morris, Robert, Gloucester city
Mostyn, sir Thomas, bart.; Flint county
*Mozley, sir Oswell, bart.; Portarlington
Muncaster, lord, Westmorland
Mundy, E. M., Derby county
*Murray, sir Patrick, bart.; Edinburgh city
*Neale, sir Harry, bart.; Lymington
*Needham, hon. Fran., Newry
Nepean, right honourable sir Evan, bart.; Bridport
Newark, lord viscount, Nottingham county
Newborough, lord, Beaumaris
Newport, right hon. sir J., bart.; St. Mawes, Waterford city
Nicholl, sir John, Hastings
Noel, Gerard Noel, Rutland
Northey, W.; Newport, Cornwall
*Nugent, sir Geo., Aylesbury
O'Brien, sir Edw., bart.; Clare
*O'Callaghan, James, Tregony
Odell, Wm., Limerick county
*Ogle, Henry Meade, Drogheda
O'Hara, Charles, Sligo county
O'Neill, hon. John, Antrim
*Onslow, hon. T. Cranley, Guildford
Ord, William, Morpeth
Osborn, John, Bedford county
Ossulston, lord, Knaresborough
*Paget, lord, Milborne Port
Paget, right hon. sir Arthur, Anglesey
Paget, hon. Charles, Carnarvon borough
Palk, sir Laurence, bart.; Devon
Palk, Walter, Ashburton
Palmer, John, Bath.
*Palmerston, lord viscount, Horsham [dble ret.]
Parnell, Henry, Queen's County
Parsons, right hon. sir Laurence, bart.; King's County
Patteson, John, Norwich
Paxton, sir William, Carmarthen county
Peele, sir Robert, bart.; Tamworth
Peirse, Henry, Northallerton
Pelham, hon. Charles Andrew, Great Grimsby
*Pelham, hon. George Andrew, Great Grimsby
Perceval, honourable Spencer, Northampton borough
Percy, earl, Launceston
*Percy, hon. J., Beeralston
*Perring, John, New Romney
Petty, lord Henry, Cambridge University
*Philipps, R.M., Stafford borough
Phipps, hon. Edm., Scarborough
Piggott, sir Arthur, Arundel
Pitt, Wm. Morton, Dorset
Plumer, Wm., Hertford county
*Plummer, Thomas William, Yarmouth, Hants
Pole, sir Charles Morice, bart.; Plymouth
Pole, hon. W. W., Queen's County
*Ponsonby, hon. Frederick, Kilkenny county
Ponsonby, honourable George, Cork county
*Popham, sir H., Shaftesbury
Porcher, J. D., Blechingly
Porchester, lord, Cricklade
Porter, George, Stockbridge
Portman, Edw. Berk., Dorset
*Poulett, hon. V., Bridgwater
Powell, John Kynaston, Salop
*Power, R., Waterford county
Poyntz, W. S., St. Albans
Praed, William, Banbury

Price, sir Charles, bart.; London
Price, Richard, New Radnor
Primrose, lord visct., Cashell
*Prittie, hon. F. A., Tipperary
Proby, lord viscount, Huntingdon county
Pulteney, sir J., bart.; Weymouth and Melcombe Regis
Pym, Francis, Bedford county
Pytches, John, Sudbury
*Quin, hon. W., Limerick county
Raine, Jonathan, Wareham
*Ramsay, honourable John, Aberbrothock, &c.
*Ramsbottom, Ric., Windsor
*Rancliffe, lord, Minehead
Ridley, sir Matthew White, bart.; Newcastle-upon-Tyne
Robarts, Abr., Worcester city
*Robinson, hon. Frederick, Catherlogh borough
Robinson, John, Bishops Castle
Robson, R. B., Oakhampton
Rochfort, Gustavus, Westmeath
Romilly, sir Sam., Queenborough
*Roscoe, William, Liverpool
Rose, right hon. G., Christchurch
Rose, Geo. Hen., Southampton
Ross, sir C., bart.; Lanerk, &c.
*Royston, lord visct.; Reigate
Russell, Matthew, Saltash
Russell, lord William, Surrey
Rutherfurd, J., Roxburgh-shire
*Ruthven, E. S., Downpatrick
Ryder, hon. Richard, Tiverton
Salusbury, sir Robert, bart.; Brecon borough
Savage, Francis, Down
*Saxon, Nathanael, Ivelchester
Scott, right hon. sir William, Oxford University
Scudamore, R. P., Hereford city
Seymour, lord Robert, Orford
Shakespeare, Arthur, Richmond
*Sharp, Richard, Castle Rising
*Shaw, James, London
Shaw, Robert, Dublin city
Sheldon, Ralph, Wilton
Shelley, Henry, Lewes
Shelley, Tim., New Shoreham
Sheridan, right hon. Richard Brinsley, Westminster
*Simeon, John, Reading
*Simmons, James, Canterbury
Simpson, hon. John, Wenlock
*Simson, George, Maidstone
*Skene, George, Kintore, &c.
Smith, George, Wendover
Smith, John, Nottingham town. Midhurst
Smith, Joshua, Devizes
Smith, Sam., Leicester borough
Smith, Thos. A., Andover
Smyth, right hon. J., Pontefract
Smyth, William, Westmeath
Sneyd, N., Cavan. Enniskillen
Somerset, lord A. J. H., Monmouth county
Somerset, lord Charles Henry, Monmouth borough
Somerset, lord R. E. H., Gloucester county
Somerville, sir M., bart ; Meath
Spencer, lord Francis Almarick, Oxford county
Spencer, lord Robert, Tavistock
Stanhope, Walter S., Carlisle
Staniforth, John, Kingston-upon-Hull
Stanley, Lord, Preston
Stanley, Thos. Lancaster county
Steele, Robert, Weobly
Steele, right hon. T., Chichester
*Stephens, Samuel, St. Ives
Steward, Gabriel Tucker, Weym and Melcombe Regis
Steward, Richard Tucker, Weym and Melcombe Regis
Stewart, hon. Charles William, Londonderry county
*Stewart, hon. Edward Richard, Wigtown, &c.
Stewart, sir J., bart.; Donegal
Stewart, James, Tyrone
Stewart, hon. Mo. Gr. J., Stewartry of Kircudbright
Stopford, lord viscount, Great Bedwin
*Stopford, hon. Robert, Ipswich
Strachey, sir Henry, bart.; East Grinsted
Strahan, Andrew, Wareham
Strutt, Joseph Holden, Malden
Stuart, lord William, Cardiff
*Sumner, G. H., Guildford
*Sutton, C. M., Scarborough
*Swann, Henry, Penryn
Symonds, T. P., Hereford city
Taylor, Charles William, Wells
*Taylor, Michael Angelo, Rye
*Taylor, William, Barnstaple
Temple, earl, Bucks.
Templetown, lord, visct.; Bury St. Edmunds
*Thistlethwayte, Thos., Hants.
Thomas, George, Chichester
Thornton, Henry, Southwark
Thornton, Robert, Colchester
Thoroton, Thomas, Grantham
Thynne, lord George, Weobly
Thynne, lord John, Bath
Tierney, right hon. G., Athlone
Tighe, William, Wicklow
Titchfield, marquis of, Bucks.
Topping, James, Thirsk
*Tower, Alexander, Berwick-upon-Tweed
Townshend, lord John, Knaresborough
Townshend, hon. W. Aug., Whitchurch
*Tremayne, Jno. H., Cornwall
*Trench, F. W., Mitchell
Tudway, Clement, Wells
*Tuffnell, Wm., Colchester
*Turton, sir Thomas, bart.; Southwark
Tyrwhitt, Thomas, Plymouth
*Vane, sir Frederick Fletcher, bart.; Winchelsea
Vansittart, George, Berks.
Vansittart, right hon. Nich., Helleston. Old Sarum
Vaughan, hon. John, Cardigan borough
Vaughan, sir R. W., Merioneth
*Vernon, G. G. V., Litchfield
Vereker, Chas., Limerick city
*Vyse, Richard, Beverley
Walpole, lord, King's Lynn
Walpole, hon. G., Dungarvan
Ward, hon. J. W., Petersfield
Wedderburn, sir David, bart.; Cupar, &c.
*Wentworth, Godfrey, Tregony
Wharton, John, Beverley
*Wharton, Rich., Durham city
Whitbread, S., Bedford borough
*Whitmore, Thos., Bridgnorth
Wickham, right hon. William, Callington. Midhurst
Wigram, sir Robert, bart.; Wexford town
*Wigram, Robert, Fowey
Wilberforce, Wm., York county
*Wilder, Francis John, Horsham [double ret.] Arundel
Wilkins, Walter, Radnor county
Williams, Owen, Great Marlow
Williams, sir Robert, bart.; Carnarvon county
Williams, Rob., Wotton Basset
Willoughby, Henry, Newark
*Wilson, Richard, Ipswich
Windham, right hon. William, Norfolk. New Romney
*Wingfield, William, Bodmyn
*Wood, James Athol, Gatton
Wood, Mark, Gatton
*Wood, Thomas, Brecon county
Woolmore, John, Westbury
Wortley, J. A. S., Bossiney
Wright, J. A., Oxford city
Wyndham, Hen. Penrud., Wilts
Wyndham, Thos., Glamorgan
Wynn, sir W. Williams, bart.; Denbigh county
Wynn, Charles W. Williams, Montgomery county
Yarmouth, earl of, Lisburne
Yorke, right honourable Charles, Cambridge county
Yorke, sir J. S., St. Germans
Young, sir William, bart.; Buckingham borough

COBBETT'S
Parliamentary Debates,

During the First Session of the Third Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Kingdom of Great Britain the Twentieth, appointed to meet at Westminster, the Twenty-eighth Day of August, and from thence continued, by several Prorogations, to the Fifteenth Day of December, in the Forty-seventh Year of the Reign of His Majesty King GEORGE the Third, Annoque Domini 1806.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, December 15, 1806.

THIS being the day appointed for the meeting of the New Parliament, the lord chancellor came to the house about two o'clock, and acquainted the house, that his majesty, not thinking fit to be personally present this day, had been pleased to cause a commission to be issued under the great seal, in order to the opening and holding of the parliament.—Then four of the lords commissioners, viz. the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord chancellor, the earl of Aylesford, and lord Walsingham, being seated on a form placed between the throne and the woolsack; the lord chancellor commanded the gentleman usher of the black rod to let the commons know, that the lords commissioners desired their immediate attendance in that house to hear the commission read. In a few minutes the commons appeared at the bar in great number, preceded by the black rod, and by the senior, and other clerks of the house. The lord chancellor then said,—"My lords, and gentlemen of the house of commons; His majesty not thinking fit to be present here this day, in his royal person, has been pleased, in order to the opening and holding of this parliament, to cause letters patent to be passed under his great seal, constituting us and several other lords, therein named, his commissioners, to do all things in his majesty's name, on his part necessary to be performed in this parliament: this will now fully appear by the letters patent themselves which will now be read."—Then the letters patent were read by the clerk; after which, the lord chancellor said:—"My lords and gentlemen of the house of commons; We have it in command from his majesty to let you know, that, as soon as the members of both houses shall be sworn, the causes of his majesty's calling this parliament will be declared to you; and, it being necessary that a speaker of the house of commons should be first chosen, it is his majesty's pleasure that you, gentlemen of the house of commons, do repair to the place where you are to sit, and there proceed to the choice of some proper person to be your speaker; and that you present here such person whom you shall so choose, to-morrow, at twelve o'clock, for his majesty's royal approbation."—The commons immediately withdrew, and the lords commissioners retired to unrobe. As soon as prayers were over, the lord chancellor was first sworn singly; and afterwards all the peers present took the usual oaths and their seats.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, December 15.

[CHOICE OF A SPEAKER.] The new parliament met this day, pursuant to his majesty's proclamation. At 12 o'clock the earl of Aylesbury (lord steward of his majesty's household) came down, and, assisted by Mr. Ley, the principal clerk, and the other clerks of the house of commons, proceeded to administer, in one of the antichambers, the usual oaths to such members of the commons as were attending to be sworn. After taking the oaths, the several members repaired to their seats in the house of commons, to wait the summons of the lords commissioners, to attend at the bar of the house of peers, to hear the commission read. About a quarter past two, a message by Mr. Quarme, deputy usher of the black rod, announced, that the lords commissioners, by virtue of his majesty's commission, desired the immediate attendance of that house in the house of peers, to hear the commission read. In consequence, a great number of members attended Mr. Ley, the chief clerk, according to the usual practice, to the upper house, where, after the commission was read in form, the lord chancellor, as one of the commissioners, acquainted both houses that his majesty would defer declaring the cause of calling this present parliament, until the members of both houses should be sworn, and the members of the house of commons should have chosen a Speaker. His lordship accordingly acquainted the gentlemen of the house of commons, that it was his majesty's pleasure that they should retire to the place where they usually sat, and choose a proper person to be their speaker, and that they should present the person so chosen, at 12 o'clock tomorrow for his majesty's royal approbation. The members then returned to their own house, where, as soon as they had taken their seats,

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* rose and addressed Mr. Ley, the senior clerk, as follows:—I rise, sir, to call upon the house to exercise one of their most ancient, most undoubted, and, in many respects, most important privileges, and without which our functions would be interrupted, and our deliberations embarrassed. The nature of those functions and those deliberations suggests the necessity of selecting some person from among ourselves, properly qualified to be the voice of the representatives of the people, both in their intercourse with the other house of parliament, and in the exercise of their collective authority over individuals; a person whose peculiar duty it will be to watch over their invaluable privileges, to alarm the jealousy of the house against the encroachments of the other orders of the state, and who, by his authority, wisdom, and experience, will contribute to maintain consistency, order, and regularity in their own proceedings. The great increase of parliamentary business, both of a public and private nature, occupying, as it does, so large a portion of the year; the constant and numerous attendance of the members of the house on all important questions, unexampled in modern times at least; the habit of animated, protracted, nd frequent debate, have all tended to render the discharge of the greater part ofthe duties imposed on the person selected to fill the chair as arduous to himself as they are important to the public. The just application of the various precedents standing upon the recorded authority of our proceedings, as well as of the no less established, though unwritten forms and regulations, which constitute the law of parliamentary usage, is a task difficult in itself, and of the last consequence to the house to have it well executed. With respect to the former, the right hon. gent. whose name I shall presently mention, has been the first to support them. I could allude to many illustrious instances, when high and distinguished characters, unhappily now no more, have shewn that those written records, and parliamentary usages, are the best bulwarks of our rights, and constitute that impartial law, which, like the forms of the constitution itself, conciliates liberty with order, and, from an apparent discordancy of parts, produces an harmony of the whole. The talents requisite for a due discharge of the arduous duties of a speaker of the house of commons are not of an ordinary description. It is necessary that he who is invested with that high office, should possess an impartiality that secures confidence, a dignity that commands respect, and a temper and affability that disarm contention. These qualities are, however, only the concomitants of others equally important; a sound judgment, a cultivated understanding, a knowledge not merely of parliamentary forms, but of mankind and the world, are indispensable to the constitution of the authority of the speaker of this house. To a person possessed of these qualifications the house cannot but be disposed to entrust the full exercise of their power, because they must be assured that they will be exerted for the general good. The object of their choice will derive from that power the means of relaxing, where occasion demands, the severity and strictness of their rules and orders.—Having thus, sir, described, however imperfectly, some of the requisites of the speaker of this house, I am aware of some others which ought to be possessed by the person who should fill that chair, and I should scarcely venture to propose any gentleman to a situation which requires so many qualities to fulfil it, on any impressions, or on any judgment of my own;

but I am confident the house will go before me on this occasion. [Hear! hear!] It will be disposed to select for the chair a person rather from experience of the past, than from the recommendation of any individual. If, sir, the sight of that chair reminds me of the duties attached to, and the requisites to fill it, I am persuaded it will call to the recollection of the house the manner in which it has been filled. The difficulty under which I labour, consists not in the apprehension of what will be the collected sense of the house. In detailing the duties of a Speaker, and in proposing Mr. Abbot as a fit person to fulfil them—[a general cry of hear! hear!] the difficulty I feel, consists not in my apprehensions of an uniformity of opinion, but in the recollection of the very superior manner in which that right hon. gent. was proposed and supported in a former instance, by a learned gent. (sir William Scott) whom I do not now see in his place. But, I console myself with the reflection, that the experience of Mr. Abbot's public character, and the general extension of that wisdom and knowledge he has evinced from his first taking his seat, make it less difficult for the house to dispense with ability on the part of the person who again proposes him. I am the less anxious concerning my own deficiency, in the manner I have stated the duties of the situation of speaker, because I am convinced the house will refer to the high character of the gentleman I have proposed, and give me credit for having passed by many topics of eulogium to which he has a just claim. I am not only conscious that the conduct of the right hon. gent. I have named, justifies a much higher panegyric than I have passed upon him; but I am free to declare, that Mr. Abbot has exhibited a more perfect model of the office itself, than ever I had formed an idea of in the abstract. There are other topics of praise to which he is equally entitled. In speaking of the general duties of the office, I have passed over, with reference to Mr. Abbot, the facility of private intercourse with, and access to him on matters of business; I have omitted to notice his dignified hospitality, which conforms so well to the wise munificence of parliament. These are qualities which have been well known, and often experienced by those present, who were members of the late parliament. But I might also have adverted to that indefatigable industry, with which he has applied himself to public business in general, and particularly to that enquiry into the state of the Public Records of this house, which was instituted on his own suggestion. Through this enquiry, the public will have the benefit of those stores of ancient wisdom, which were hitherto confined to private and individual research. The same comprehensive mind, and the same application of great talents, are as peculiarly required for the higher duties he has to discharge, and the success and ability by him displayed upon the subject to which I have alluded, is a pledge of what may be expected from him on every occasion which relates to the proceedings of this house, and the general advantage of the public. It is upon these considerations, as well as upon many others, I feel it my duty to move, "That the right hon. Charles Abbot do take the chair of this house as speaker." [Hear, hear!]

Mr. *Wilberforce* said, that in seconding the proposition of his right hon. friend, he felt the embarrassment of the situation in which he placed himself, by venturing to prescribe to the house, in the most remote degree, any course that it was to adopt on so solemn and important an occasion. At the same time he confessed, that he was considerably relieved from this embarrassment, by the manner in which he perceived the proposition, just submitted to them, had been received by the house. It often happened to a member of parliament, that he felt himself obliged painfully to discharge certain duties, from a sense of public principle, though contrary to his private feelings, because there must always be a sacrifice of private considerations to public duties. But he had then the satisfaction to say, that he was about to discharge a duty which, whilst it accorded with every private feeling, was, at the same time, equally consistent with the most scrupulous regard to public duty. His right hon. friend had well pointed out some of the leading qualifications for the office of speaker, as well as the great importance of that high and confidential situation. But he that would calculate all the important duties of the speaker of the house of commons, would undertake a great and difficult task indeed. It was an office commensurate with all the functions of parliament, and consequently identified with the existence of parliament and the freedom and happiness of the people. The qualifications of a speaker were great and numerous, and, perhaps, it was difficult to form an accurate estimate of their real value, on account of the quiet times in which we had lived. It was a common disposition of the public mind to imagine, when matters went on quietly, that they went on of themselves, and without any actuating impulse; but those to whom he was addressing himself knew, that although the principle of action was kept out of view, it was that principle which directed the whole machine, gave it motion, and preserved the order and harmony of all its parts. Undoubtedly it was not to be supposed, that, because we had lived happily in times when the public liberty was secure, and the privileges of this house unendangered, that it was therefore unimportant to choose a man as speaker of the house of commons, who was intimately acquainted with all the parts of the British Constitution. In the exercise of this privilege, they should not shut out from their view, that the happiness of the people, and the interests of the empire, depended in a great degree, on their choice. They should not merely, because they happened to live in quiet times, leave objects of such magnitude to accidental events. They should, by the wisdom of their choice, guard against the possibility of future evils. It was peculiarly necessary that he who was placed in the chair of the house of commons, should be intimately acquainted with the constitution of the country, in order that he might be sensible of those slight deviations, which in the end introduced great and material alterations. It was only by such an intimate acquaintance that any man could estimate the importance of small changes, and know how in the first instance to check and repress them. Therefore, among the qualifications of a speaker, a perfect acquaintance with the constitution of the country was a first and indispensable one. Whoever was intimately acquainted with the constitution, could not but become more and more attached to it, and in proportion as he developed its secret springs, contemplate it as the source of public happiness. Unquestionably too, an extensive acquaintance with the history of the country, and a perfect knowledge of its constitutional, or parliamentary history, was requisite. It must also be obvious to every one, that the speaker of the house of commons should be a man who had sagacity and penetration to decide on the instant; that he should be possessed of an uncommon degree of recollection and memory, a soundness of judgment, a temper not to be ruffled, and a suavity of manners. It was unnecessary for him to mention how peculiarly the right hon. gent. who had been proposed was gifted with all these qualities. The recollection of those who had known him during the late sessions would supply abundant instances in which they had been conspicuously exerted. He might mention various other qualifications, but they had been alluded to by his right hon. friend. There was one with respect to which he could not avoid saying a word or two. He referred to those peculiar qualifications which characterized the proposed speaker for what, by rather a misapplication of the term, was called Private Business. Certainly, compared with those great questions which constantly occupied the attention of the house, it might with propriety be denominated private business. The house was always engaged upon subjects of national importance; but there were matters of private business, which, although they did not attract observation, were no less essential to the interests of the public. It was not merely the value of the property at stake, though it would excite astonishment if he were to state the amount of the property decided upon by the committees of the house, but there was something in such decisions even of more importance than any pecuniary sum could give an idea of. It was, that the character of parliament itself was in a considerable degree concerned in the variety of questions that arose concerning the property of individuals. Of those questions he was well persuaded no person was better qualified to judge than the right hon. gent. who had been proposed as speaker. If those questions were decided in a summary way, without a just sense of the importance of adhering to principles of law, he knew nothing that would be more likely to infuse into the public an alienation of mind with regard to the house of commons; therefore it was desirable that the house of commons should be known and acknowledged as a place where the rights of the subject were always safe. It was equally important that the person in the chair should be considered as the guardian of the weak, and the protector of the poor. The opulent and powerful would attend to their own interests, but upon all questions where the private property of individuals was concerned, whatever their situation might be, it was important and requisite that there should be a man to inspect and watch over them, who would see that precedents were carefully adhered to, and the true principles of legislation not departed from. He had dwelt the more upon this topic, because he had witnessed the many instances in which Mr. Abbot had applied his knowledge and experience to this desirable purpose, whereby he had sustained the character of parliament, and endeared the house of commons to the warmest affections of the people of England. It was, therefore, with singular satisfaction he seconded the motion made by his right hon. friend; and, as he had just observed, it was not from the ordinary habits of his life and pursuits that the house was warranted in conceiving he would fill the chair with ability and dignity, but from the experience that he had done so already, and consequently would do it again. It was impossible not to know, that, even before he had been raised to the chair, he had given a pleasing anticipation of the patriotic feeling by which he intended to be governed; that he had rendered services to the country, which must have endeared him to the house; that he had sat at the head of a committee appointed to investigate and examine into all the public offices of the kingdom, with a view to the adoption of a system of economy. For his own part, there was no man who considered with more satisfaction than himself the elevation of that right hon. gent. to the situation and rank of first commoner of the empire; but he should have contemplated it as a public robbery, if he had been placed there before he had had an opportunity of rendering to his country those services he had performed, and of pointing out to his successor the means by which similar honours were to be attained, and shewing him, that, in order to merit such a distinguished pre-eminence, he must become, like himself, an upright independent member of parliament, the true friend to the constitution of the country, and the faithful guardian of the liberties of the people. It was for those qualities he had been raised to his situation, that his principles might act with fuller effect.—He begged pardon of the house, for having detained them so long; but it was natural to expatiate upon a pleasing theme. He had the satisfaction of knowing that he spoke to those who approved of the proposition of his right hon. friend. It was gratifying to him to feel that what was wanting in his expressions of admiration and esteem, was more than made up by the universal approbation of the house. This reminded him of another qualification, perhaps the most essential of all, and certainly one that could not be possessed by any person who had not filled the situation of speaker. It was not merely that the house had the experience of past years, but they knew that the right hon. gent. proposed to honour their chair would possess the confidence and attachment of the house, and nothing was of greater importance than that he should possess it. It was an assurance that he would vindicate the rights of parliament on the one hand, and prevent the disposition of members to extend those rights too far, to the prejudice of other branches of the legislature. He had but one word more. There was one quality he possessed in a most eminent degree. It was, that at the same time he had shewn his love of public liberty, true constitutional liberty, he had manifested a due sense and proper regard of the privileges of parliament. He had shewn that true greatness of mind which impelled him to consider it as equally dangerous to the constitution, that the commons should attempt to strain their privileges beyond their due bounds, as that they should not assert them when they were attempted to be violated. It required a great mind to be invested with extensive powers, without being, at the same time, disposed to overstrain them. The house were sensible that the right hon. gent. was possessed of all these qualities. He therefore concluded by saying, that to second the motion of his right hon. friend, gave him the most perfect satisfaction, and the greatest possible pleasure.

Mr. *Abbot*.—In rising to address the house this day, it is impossible for me not to feel the deepest sense of gratitude for the general favour and kindness with which this proposition has been received. Many, very many of the commendations which my honourable friends, by their partiality, have been pleased to bestow upon me, I dare not flatter myself with having merited; and although they are pleased to suppose that my former experience in the chair of this house may afford an argument in favour of their choice, yet that same experience has left on my mind a very different impression; for I am persuaded that whoever aspires to understand and execute the duties of that high and important office, will readily acknowledge its various difficulties, as well as his own insufficiency. Nevertheless, custom long established, and a just respect towards the house, forbid any person whose services have been already tried in that office from insisting or dwelling much at large on his own demerits. I do therefore commit myself wholly to the pleasure of the house, with an earnest hope that the event of their choice may not be injurious to its interests, or detrimental to its honour.—Mr. Abbot was then conducted to the chair by Mr. Bragge Bathurst and Mr. Wilberforce; and when seated therein, he again rose and thus proceeded:—Since it has been the pleasure of the house to place me again in this chair, I have to make my most grateful acknowledgements for this proof of its high and distinguished confidence, and to assure the house, that while I have the happiness to possess that confidence, every moment of my life, both within and without these walls, shall be constantly and faithfully devoted to its service.—The speaker having seated himself in the chair,

Mr. *T. Grenville* rose and said, that on an occasion so solemn and important as that of selecting a speaker, it had been not unusual to allow some of its members to express those sentiments which he rejoiced to see were so unanimous. He freely stated, that, on the present occasion, he did not feel it necessary to offer any apology for obtruding himself on the attention of the house. If the business they had so happily concluded had been one which required high talents in the person who offered his congratulations, he should have known himself better than to have offered a single observation; but, in presenting himself the first to congratulate the house, he was only expressing those sentiments which were common to all who heard him. To have a strong sense, and to express it, of the benefit the country had derived from the right hon. gent.'s being placed in the chair; to augur happily of the future by the grateful recollection of the past; to anticipate the services the country would receive; to indulge in the memory of those already conferred; to reflect that by his being placed in the situation in which fortunately he was placed, the house would assure to itself the exercise of a steady and temperate authority, an impartiality and integrity not to be shaken, a rich fund of constitutional knowledge, and a just dispensation of those wise and enlightened opinions which actuated him—these were topics so pleasing to dwell upon, so natural to expatiate upon, that he was persuaded the house would indulge him in pursuing such themes; but yet from those topics he felt himself reluctantly compelled to abstain. When he recollected that the person who was the object of his eulogium, was the person he was addressing, he was compelled by motives of delicacy not to dwell upon the subject, grateful as it was to him. He should conclude by saying, that he did most heartily congratulate the house, the country, and the right hon. gent. himself, on the choice that had been made.—He then moved, that the house do adjourn, and the house adjourned accordingly.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, December 16.

This day at twelve o'clock four of his majesty's commissioners, namely, the lord chancellor, the earl of Aylesford, earl Spencer, and lord Walsingham, took their seats in the usual form. Mr. Quarme, the deputy usher of the black rod, was sent to the house of commons to require their attendance. A great number of the members of the house of commons, preceded by Mr. Abbot, in full dress, shortly afterwards appeared at the bar.

Mr. *Abbot* addressed the lords commissioners as follows:—My lords, I have to acquaint you, that in compliance with the commands of his majesty, and in the exercise of their undoubted privilege, the commons of the united kingdom, in parliament assembled, have proceeded to the choice of a fit and proper person to fill the high and important situation of speaker to their house. As the object of that choice, I now submit myself for the approbation of his majesty, with due and sincere humility, deeply impressed with a sense of the many and undeserved favours I have already received from his hands, and fully confident of my inadequacy to fulfil the duties of this high situation in a manner correspondent with the dignity and importance of so sacred a trust. But of this I am convinced, that should his majesty conceive the present choice of his faithful commons not consistent with his own and the public interests, they will immediately proceed to the election of some more suitable and proper person to fill that important and dignified situation.

The *Lord Chancellor* in the name of the commission said, Gentlemen of the house of commons; We have it in command from his majesty to signify his most gracious approval of the choice you have made in the important appointment of speaker to your house. For my own part when I reflect on the great and comprehensive talents, on the perfect acquaintance with the forms and precedents of parliament, of the gentleman whom you have honoured with your choice; when I reflect on that high character for learning and wisdom for which he is so pre-eminently conspicuous; it is unnecessary for me to say any thing further than merely to express that his majesty fully approves of the object of your choice.

The *Speaker* then said,—My lords; His majesty having been most graciously pleased to confirm the choice of his faithful commons, my first duty, after returning my most grateful acknowledgements for the kind manner in which the performance of my duties have been accepted and approved; and after expressing the strong conviction I feel of the indulgence his majesty has ever manifested to unintentional error, is to lay claim, in their name, and on their behalf, to all their ancient rights and privileges; particularly that their persons, estates, and servants, may be free from arrest, and all molestation; that they may enjoy liberty of speech in their debates; that they may have access to his majesty's royal person, whenever occasion may require; and that all their proceedings may receive from his majesty the most favourable construction. For my own part, I do entreat, that whenever any thing in the shape of failing or error may occur, it may be attributed to myself only, and not to his majesty's faithful commons.

The *Lord Chancellor* in his majesty's name replied, that the accustomed privileges of the house of commons would be continued to them, and that the most favourable construction would be put upon all their acts.—The commons then withdrew, after which the house adjourned during pleasure. At three the house again met, and sat till four, during which time several peers took the usual oaths and their seats.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, December 16.

The Speaker came to the house at 12 o'clock. Soon after this, Mr. Quarme, deputy usher of the black rod, appeared at the bar, and summoned the house to the house of peers.

The *Speaker* accordingly went up, followed by a number of the members. On their return he addressed the house thus;—I have to acquaint the house, that I have been in the house of peers, where his majesty, by his commissioners, has been graciously pleased to approve and confirm the choice of this house, in the election they have made of me to be their speaker, and that I have there laid claim, by humble petition to his majesty, to all our ancient and undoubted rights and privileges; and more especially, freedom from all arrests or molestations, for ourselves, and our servants; freedom of speech in debate, free access to his majesty's royal person, as occasion may require, and that all our proceedings may receive the most favourable construction. All which his majesty has been pleased to allow in as full and ample a manner as has ever been done to any of my predecessors. And now I have again to return you my warmest and most grateful thanks for the high honour which you have been pleased to confer upon me, assuring you, that it is my purpose to act in all matters with the strictest impartiality; and I have, at the same time, to entreat the house to afford me their constant support in maintaining the established rules and orders, all which have been found so necessary for the dignity of our proceedings, and the dispatch of business. I have now only further to remind the house, that the first thing to be done upon the present occasion, is, for the several members to take and subscribe the oaths of supremacy, abjuration, and qualification as the law requires.—The speaker himself first took the usual oaths. The members then came to the table by parties, and were sworn in the usual manner. This business continued till 4 o'clock, when the house adjourned till to-morrow.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, December 17, *and Thursday, December* 18.

On these days the lord chancellor took his seat on the woolsack at three, and the clerk continued to swear in the peers till four.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, December 17, *and Thursday. December* 18.

At 1 o'clock the speaker came down to the house. Several members present took the Oaths, and made and subscribed the Declaration, and took and subscribed the oath of Adjuration, according to the laws made for those purposes; and such of the said members as are by law required to deliver in to the clerk of the house an account of their Qualification, and to take and subscribe the oath of Qualification, delivered in such account, and took and subscribed the said oath accordingly.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, December 19.

[THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.] This day at 4 o'clock, his grace the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord chancellor, the earl of Winchelsea, and earl Spencer, being robed, took their seats on the bench in front of the throne, and Mr. Quarme, deputy usher of the black rod, was then dispatched to order the attendance of the commons, who forthwith, with the speaker at their head, appeared at the bar. The royal commission, authorising certain peers therein named, or any three or more of them, to open the parliament, was then read. After which, the Lord Chancellor delivered the following speech to both houses.

" *My Lords and Gentlemen;*

" His majesty has commanded us to assure you, that in the difficult and arduous circumstances under which you are now assembled, it is a great satisfaction to him to recur to the firmness and wisdom of his parliament, after so recent an opportunity of collecting the sense of his people.—His majesty has ordered the papers which have been exchanged in the course of the late negociation with France, to be laid before you. His majesty has employed every effort for the restoration of general tranquillity, on terms consistent with the interest and honour of his people, and with that inviolable good faith towards his allies, by which the conduct of this country has always been distinguished.—The ambition and injustice of the enemy disappointed these endeavours, and in the same moment kindled a fresh war in Europe, the progress of which has been attended with the most calamitous events.—After witnessing the subversion of the ancient constitution of Germany, and the subjugation of a large proportion of its most considerable states; Prussia found herself still more nearly threatened by that danger, which she had vainly hoped to avert by so many sacrifices. She was therefore at length compelled to adopt the resolution of openly resisting this unremitted system of aggrandisement and conquest. But neither this determination, nor the succeeding measures, were previously concerted with his majesty; nor had any disposition been shewn to offer any adequate satisfaction for those aggressions which had placed the two countries in a state of mutual hostility.—Yet, in this situation, his majesty did not hesitate to adopt, without delay, such measures as were best calculated to unite their councils and interests, against the common enemy. The rapid course of the calamities which ensued, opposed insurmountable difficulties to the execution of this purpose.—In the midst of these disastrous events, and under the most trying circumstances, the good faith of his majesty's allies has remained unshaken. The conduct of the king of Sweden has been distinguished by the most honourable firmness. Between his majesty and the emperor of Russia, the happiest union subsists; it has been cemented by reciprocal proofs of good faith and confidence; and his majesty doubts not that you will participate in his anxiety to cultivate and confirm an alliance which affords the only remaining hope of safety for the continent of Europe.

" *Gentlemen of the House of Commons;*

" His majesty looks with confidence to your assistance in those exertions which the honour and independence of your country demand. The necessity of adding to the public burthens will be painful to your feelings, and is deeply distressing to his majesty. In considering the estimates for the various branches of the public service, you will best consult his majesty's wishes, by combining all practicable economy with those efforts which it is necessary to make against the formidable and increasing power of the enemy.

" *My Lords and Gentlemen;*

" The long series of misfortune which has afflicted the continent of Europe, could not fail to affect, in some degree, many important interests of this country. But, under every successive difficulty, his majesty has had the satisfaction of witnessing an increasing energy and firmness on the part of his people, whose uniform and determined resistance has been no less advantageous than honourable to themselves, and has exhibited the most striking example to the surrounding nations. The unconquerable valour and discipline of his majesty's fleets and armies, continue to be displayed with undiminished lustre. The great sources of our prosperity and strength are unimpaired; nor has the British nation been, at any time, more united in sentiment and action, or more determined to maintain inviolate the independence of the empire, and the dignity of the national character.—With these advantages, and with an humble reliance on the protection of the Divine Providence, his majesty is prepared to meet the exigencies of this great crisis; assured of receiving the fullest support from the wisdom of your deliberations, and from the tried affection, loyalty, and public spirit of his brave people."

The commons then withdrew, and the house adjourned for a short time to unrobe. Having again assembled, his majesty's speech was read by the lord chancellor, and afterwards by the clerk at the table.

The Earl of *Jersey* rose to move an address to his majesty. In thus rising to address their lordships for the first time, he felt himself in a situation of considerable difficulty, and hoped for their lordships' indulgence. In adverting to the topics contained in his majesty's speech, the first to be noticed was, the negociation between this country and France. As the papers respecting this subject would shortly be laid on their lordships' table, it would not now be regular to enter into any detailed discussion respecting the progress and result of that negociation; it must, however, be evident to their lordships, from what had already transpired, that the negociation had broken off in consequence of the imperious conduct and exorbitant demands of France. His majesty, anxious that peace should be restored, if that could be attained consistently with the honour and interests of the country, had ordered the commencement of a negociation, the main business of which was transacted by a man (Mr. Fox) than whom no one was more fit, whose great and comprehensive mind was admirably calculated to embrace all the interests of the country, whose candour and manliness of character were exhibited in the most striking manner, in the frankness, the clearness, and precision, with which he communicated with the French government, whilst, at the same time, he did not give up one jot of the interests or the honour of his country, but asserted them with all the firmness and energy which so important an occasion required. The negociation then commenced under the most favourable auspices, and, notwithstanding the lamented death of the great man to whom he had alluded, was carried on in the same spirit. That it had failed in producing peace, was to be attributed to the enemy. We certainly had no right to expect, that the French government, under all the circumstances in which it was placed, would consent to any degrading concession; but we were in too proud a situation, and had too much reliance on our own energies, to consent to any humiliation: if the French government would not consent to treat upon equal terms, the fault was theirs. We had deeply to lament the heavy calamities which had fallen upon Prussia, but, at the same time, it was no small satisfaction to us, that the councils of Prussia had not been precipitated into rash measures by the advice or instigation of this country. It was scarcely possible for their lordships to find in all history an instance of a great power so totally overthrown, he might almost say annihilated, in the course of a few days. Prussia, who had made sacrifice after sacrifice to France, apparently with the view of averting war, at length rushed precipitately into hostilities, and met with an unexampled fate. Her example would afford an awful lesson to other states, and would convince them that security was not to be attained by making humiliating sacrifices. It was, however, a source of great satisfaction that this country, when Prussia actually made an effort against the common enemy, did not hesitate immediately to step forward to afford her every assistance which circumstances would permit. In the midst of the calamities which had occurred on the continent, it was highly gratifying to witness the conduct of the king of Sweden, who, whilst he had opposed the enemy by every means in his power, had displayed a firmness and an energy which conferred the highest honour on the character of that monarch. The contemplation of the conduct of our faithful ally, Russia, also afforded the utmost satisfaction; nothing could be more gratifying than the close alliance which subsisted between this country and Russia, an alliance, of her fidelity to which Russia had given repeated proofs, and particularly in her recent refusal to ratify the rash and inconsiderate act of her minister at Paris. These instances of good faith on the part of Russia, were the more gratifying, that power being now almost the only ally of this country left, and therefore the cultivation of our alliance with her, became so much the more desirable. That in our present situation great sacrifices must be made, was evident, but when the great object we had in view was contemplated, these sacrifices must sink in the comparison. He was convinced that there was not a man who bore the envied name of a Briton, with all the blessings and privileges attached to that title, who would not cheerfully come forward to make those sacrifices which were required to maintain the honour and the dignity of the country, our laws, our constitution, and all that was dear to us. Let us, said the noble earl, rely upon ourselves, and put forth all our energies. It was true we had, in the course of a twelvemonth, lost two men of pre-eminent talent, but there was still ability amply enough left, to direct the energies of the country with the best hopes of ultimate success. He had no doubt that the parliament and the people would be unanimous in supporting his majesty's government by every exertion in the prosecution of a war, until a peace could be obtained, consistent with the honour of the country, but which we could never consent to obtain by making humiliating sacrifices. The valour which had continued to be displayed by his majesty's fleets and armies, was an amply sufficient pledge of our superiority; our little army, if he might call it so, in Calabria, had bravely and victoriously sustained the British character, whilst our fleets had every where maintained their accustomed superiority. With all these advantages, and with the great sources of our prosperity and strength unimpaired, we might look forward with confidence to the result. Relying upon ourselves, and united in sentiment and in action, we might set our enemy at defiance, and finally, he trusted, bring this great contest to a successful and glorious issue. The noble earl concluded with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty;" which address was, as usual, an echo of his majesty's speech, and nearly the same as that which we insert in this day's proceedings of the house of commons; see page 39. After the address had been read by the lord chancellor, and again by the clerk at the table,

Lord *Somers* presented himself to their lordships. He rose, he said, to second the address which had been proposed by the noble earl. Concurring as he did with the noble earl in the sentiments which he had advanced, he felt considerable difficulty in following him upon the same grounds after the ability which the noble earl had displayed. It was his wish to support the present administration; conceiving, that though it combined different parties, those parties were united upon public and patriotic principles, and that it also combined so large a portion of the talent and ability of the country, that every reliance might be placed upon their exertions. In noticing the topics adverted to in his majesty's speech, he should scarcely be able, after what had been said by the noble earl, to avoid repetition: he thought it, however, necessary in seconding the address, to comment briefly upon some of them. With respect to the negociation, he would abstain from entering into any discussion, as that subject would come regularly before the house, when the papers respecting it were laid upon their lordships' table. The calamities which had befallen Prussia were deeply to be lamented, although it was a consolation to us that this country had no share in producing them. It appeared to him, however, that it was highly laudable in his majesty's ministers, the moment they found a disposition in Prussia to make an effort against France, to seize the opportunity of offering such support and such assistance to Prussia as circumstances might require. It afforded the greatest satisfaction to witness the conduct of Sweden, and of our faithful ally Russia, of whose good faith we had received the most gratifying proofs. The valour of our fleets and armies was a theme for the highest praise, and bade us despise the threats of the enemy, although no means ought to be omitted in order to guard against a possible attack. In this point of view he highly approved of the measures which his majesty's ministers had brought forward for increasing the military force of the country, and although it had been said, that they had damped the spirit of the volunteers, he believed that very few of that highly meritorious body of men had quitted their standards. At a crisis like the present, he trusted, that the house would set an example of unanimity, in pledging themselves to a firm and vigorous prosecution of the war. Our present situation called for the exertion of all the energies of the country, with spirit and unanimity, and, he had no doubt, that that spirit and unanimity would be displayed both by the parliament and the people.

Lord *Hawkesbury* said, he should not think he had discharged his duty, if he allowed the address to pass without offering some observations on the speech which occasioned it. He would first embrace the opportunity of expressing his satisfaction at the able manner in which the address was moved by the noble earl, of whose friendship he was happy to boast. He agreed with his noble friend in every general sentiment which fell from him. They, as well as the manner in which they were delivered, called for the approbation of both sides of the house. No party-spirit should ever induce him to withhold his concurrence and applause from sentiments befitting the great crisis in which we were placed, and particularly when they were expressed by a nobleman, for whom he had the greatest personal regard. There were, however, circumstances connected with the speech from the throne, to which he could not avoid calling the attention of their lordships. The first point upon which he should observe, was one not openly mentioned in the speech, but indirectly alluded to; he meant the dissolution of parliament. It was not his intention to question the king's power to dissolve parliament; that part of the prerogative he allowed in its fullest extent and plenitude. He admitted that it was a prerogative which was inherent in him in its strongest sense. If it were possible that parliament could acquire legal permanence, for ever so short a time, independent of the crown, there would be no security for the monarchy. But this, like every part of the prerogative, should be exercised with a wholesome and sound discretion. If it should be found to have been exercised with levity, or without a due necessity, it was a measure for which ministers would incur a very weighty responsibility. What was there in the state of the country to have justified the late unexpected and premature dissolution of parliament—of a parliament which had only sat 4 sessions, and which had nearly three years to run? From the passing of the septennial act in the year 1715, almost 90 years ago, except in the precedent of 1784, upon which he should say a few words before he sat down, there was no instance of a parliament being dissolved under six sessions. There was no instance, he would repeat his assertion, except a demise of the crown, and the one he had mentioned. The dissolution of 1784 was one to which there could be no objection; it was unavoidable. At that time a misunderstanding subsisted between the crown and the house of commons, with respect to the government. Whenever such an unhappy difference did arise, there was but one way of composing it; either the crown must yield, or dissolve the parliament. But had any circumstance recurred to justify the late dissolution? Far from it; and yet ministers, without a cause assigned, or indeed assignable, took upon them to advise a dissolution, for no other object that he could discover, than that, to them, no doubt, a most urgent one, of a little convenience. He could find no cause, except that which he had just stated, to warrant such a measure. The most probable was, that of the rupture of the negociation with France; but let their lordships see how that question stood. Whatever difference of opinion might have existed with respect to many of the measures pursued by ministers, on no subject which ever engaged the attention of the country had there been such complete unanimity as in regard to supporting his majesty in the prosecution of the war. Upon other questions there might have been a difference of opinion, but upon this vital subject there was none. Whatever shade of difference there was, was on the part of those who disapproved of the other measures of ministers. Their opponents were supposed to be more earnest for the prosecution of the war, than his majesty's government was. There was also another measure of ministers, of which he could not approve; he meant the Declaration which had been issued pending the suspension of parliament. The country was not in a condition to judge of that declaration, except it were accompanied by the documents upon which it was founded. If the rupture of the negociation overwhelmed ministers with any apprehension or difficulty, the fair mode would have been, not to have dissolved parliament, but to have called the existing parliament together, and submitted the whole grounds of the negociation to it. He would not accuse ministers of any intention to deceive the country, but the dissolution certainly had the effect of surprising it. In corroboration of what he had advanced, he would only call to their lordships' recollection, an address which had been published in the county of Norfolk. In that address a right hon. gent. (Mr.

Windham), who was the last person in the world he should suppose capable of deceit, had told the county, that, as far as he knew, there was no intention to dissolve the parliament. The consequence was, that the whole kingdom was led to believe that all reports to that effect were unfounded and premature. Subsequent to this a proclamation appeared, in which a day was fixed for calling parliament together for dispatch of business; and yet, notwithstanding these repeated assurances, a dissolution was announced, to the surprise and astonishment of the whole kingdom. The persons who advised this measure had much to answer for.—Notwithstanding the silence of the speech, he could not avoid saying a few words upon the military measures to which the noble baron who preceded him, alluded with so much satisfaction. When the persons composing the present administration, lamented the inadequacy of the measures of their predecessors, it was naturally to be expected that they had a system of more energy and efficiency to propose. But what did they do? They began with overturning the whole of the ancient system for keeping up the army; they proposed measures, the instantaneous effect of which was to damp the spirit of the volunteers; they proposed measures which were productive of an enormous expence, and which, he would venture to assert, had entirely disappointed even the expectations of those from whom they were supposed to originate. One of their measures, the Training act, was never carried into execution; nor an attempt was made to put it in force. He was glad there had not; for of that measure, which had been brought forward with so much parade, and upon which such reliance appeared to be placed, he had but one opinion; namely, that it was either impracticable, or that it would only be carried into effect with a degree of vexation and inconvenience totally repugnant to the natural feelings of the people. —With respect to the regular recruiting, he wished to know how far the new system had been more productive than that which was so improvidently superseded by it. What, then, he would ask, had those new military measures produced? it was notorious that the military defence of the country was not now near so considerable as it was 12 months ago. But all these, notwithstanding the silence of the speech, must be the subject of future discussion in parliament.—There were also some other topics not alluded to in the speech, to which he should call the attention of their lordships. He would say nothing at present of the expeditions which sailed from the enemy's ports, two of which had committed such devastation in the West Indies; but he could not be silent on the subject of the expeditions which had been fitted out from this country. One of these remained three months in the Downs—a delay perfectly inexplicable to him, but for which however it was possible ministers, when the subject came to be discussed, might be able to adduce sufficient reasons. Causes had been assigned for this delay by rumour which could scarcely become the subject of debate in that house, but to which he could not avoid alluding. It had been said that difficulties had arisen in consequence of the appointment of an officer to the chief command of a rank inferior to that from which officers for commands in chief were usually taken. This was a point which he could not argue in that house, but when such men as general Spencer, and sir Arthur Wellesley, officers who had been engaged in service in almost every part of the world, were passed over in order to give a command to an officer of inferior rank, it naturally excited some surprise, and might not exactly accord with the feelings of officers of superior rank, who had been engaged in a variety of service; not that he meant to insinuate that the officer appointed to the command to which he had alluded was not perfectly fitted for that situation by talents and military skill.—He would next come to the most material point alluded to in the speech from the throne. With respect to the disasters which had fallen upon Prussia, he agreed with his noble friend, that there could be but one feeling in the house. With respect to the cause of those disasters, it was impossible that any two men could differ. It arose from the narrow policy in which Prussia had encircled herself. Had his Prussian majesty, or those who advised him, consulted history, they would have discovered that they who lent their aid to have others devoured, would be at last devoured themselves. He approved as much as any of his majesty's ministers, of the proceedings which had been adopted towards Prussia on account of her unjust aggression upon Hanover, and the measures which she submitted to against the commerce of this country. He approved also of the manner in which we suspended our particular quarrel, when she was on the point of being involved with France, though he could not account for the delay which took place in communicating with her. No direct communication with Prussia appeared to have taken place until hostilities were on the eve of commencing. This was to him a subject of great regret. He lamented that a communication with her had not been opened sooner; that no disposition had been manifested to assist or encourage her, when it was evident that a war between her and France was not to be avoided. It was not until October that ministers had thought proper to endeavour to open a communication with Prussia, and the noble lord (Morpeth), to whom they confided this important mission, than whom they could not have selected one more proper, was, from the unhappy events which occurred, unable to fulfil it. They afterwards thought proper to send out a military mission, at the head of which was a noble lord (Hutchinson), a member of that house. This, however, was not until 3 weeks after the return of the noble person who had preceded him, at a time when it was uncertain whether this expensive military mission would be able to discover the Prussian head-quarters or even find out a port to land in. As to the negociation, he should say nothing upon it, until the papers were laid before parliament. Whatever difference of opinion might exist as to particular parts of it, with respect to the main question there could be but one general and unanimous sentiment, and that was to concur in giving his majesty every support, that should enable him to prosecute the war with vigour and effect. As to the address proposed by his noble friend, it was not his intention to give it any opposition. He assented to it, because it did not pledge their lordships to any of those points, which might possibly become the subject of future enquiry.

Lord *Grenville* rose, and spoke to the following effect:—In asking your lordships to support the address which has just been moved, I must begin by assuring your lordships, that if I claim for it that general approbation which I am confident it will obtain in this house, and throughout the whole country, it is precisely because it is free from that sort of ambiguity which the noble lord who just sat down has more than insinuated it possesses. The address has been conceived in terms which must appear to every one unobjectionable, and no conduct would, in my opinion, be more unworthy than an attempt to entrap this house, if such an attempt could ever be successful, into a general approbation of the past conduct of government, or a promise to support future measures without due deliberation. But in fact this address pledges your lordships to nothing but what appears plainly on the face of it, and contains nothing which can preclude that free, fair, and impartial discussion, which ought to take place on every great public question. When I have said this much, I think I have answered every word the noble lord has uttered in relation to the subject of the address. With respect to the other topics to which the noble lord has alluded, if I can feel any difficulty in answering them, it is not on account of any argument which has been founded upon them, but from the impossibility of comprehending how they can be brought to bear on the present question. However, laying that consideration aside, since the noble baron has thought fit to introduce these subjects, and has pressed them so strongly on your lordships' attention, I shall take the liberty of just briefly noticing them. The first point, in the order of the noble baron's speech, was a proposition which I was surprised to hear come from the mouth of any noble lord in this house, namely, that you should discuss whether his majesty had been well or ill advised in dissolving the last parliament? I do not, my lords, mean to say that the advisers of the crown are not responsible for the advice they give, and that their conduct is not at all times liable to be questioned by parliament; but this I do say, that if there be any one branch of the royal prerogative on which your lordships ought to exercise a peculiar reserve, it is that which relates to the dissolution of parliament. When, however, the noble lord objected to that measure, I did expect that he would have stated some reasons to prove that it was improper, before he thought of putting it on his majesty's ministers, to vindicate it. I shall not dispute the noble lord's chronology, the accuracy of which I am, however, not altogether disposed to admit. The noble baron, after a very solemn declaration of the inestimable value to the constitution of the prerogative vested in his majesty of dissolving parliament, and of the free indisputable right which his majesty has to exercise that right at all times, has not scrupled to enter into a long detail of reasons why the prerogative ought not to have been exercised, as it has recently been exercised by his majesty. I should have been surprised at any noble lord in the house standing up in his place to question the exercise of a prerogative so clearly inherent in his majesty, and so indubitably useful; but that a noble baron should, after a preface so magnificent as to the value of this prerogative, of its sacred quality, of its being above all question—make a direct charge against his majesty's ministers for having advised the exercise of it, is really what I cannot reconcile with any rules of rational conduct. For myself, sacred as I hold every prerogative of the crown, I feel that his majesty's servants are answerable for the advice which they give his majesty for the exercise, or for abstaining from the exercise of every one of them. In no case do I conceive the exercise of this undoubted prerogative to have been more wise, more salutary, or more attentive, on the part of his majesty, to the feelings of his people, than the dissolution which lately took place. When a negociation, by which his majesty's endeavour to restore the blessings of peace, not merely to the people of Great Britain, but to the nations of Europe, had failed, it was surely a wise measure in his majesty to appeal to the sense of his people, to refer to them the conduct of his servants, and thereby to call upon them to pronounce, in the eyes of the world, their sense as to the further prosecution of the contest. If at any moment of our history the exercise of this prerogative was wise, proper and discreet, it was upon the late occasion, and the empire has gained this great and important advantage from the measure, that the degree of unanimity which has been manifested by the people from one end of the united kingdom to the other on the subject of the war, on the determination to persevere in the struggle, on the necessity of vigorous exertions, and in the approbation of the steps which have been taken by his majesty's servants, has given strength, confidence, and spirit to the government; and has given a noble example to the world of the vigour of a people who understand the blessings of independence, and who are determined to maintain it. But the noble baron, after disclaiming all intention of disputing the right of his majesty to exercise his prerogative at all times, without question, has not scrupled to say that, with the exception of one solitary instance, it has not been exercised since the year 1715, at shorter intervals than 6 years. I am inclined to doubt the accuracy of the noble baron's chronology. I think that, upon looking back, he will find himself deceived in his calculation. But, however that may be, the fact of dissolution at periods of 6 sessions, would totally destroy the reasoning of the noble baron; for if his majesty can thus dissolve unquestioned at the end of 6 sessions, when the legal period of the parliament is 7 years, he may as well exercise the right at the end of 4 sessions. Or, on the other hand, if his majesty, or rather his ministers, are to be questioned when this prerogative is exercised oftener than at intervals of six sessions, then the prerogative is no longer of the quality which the noble baron has extolled so highly—a prerogative to be freely used at all times when his majesty judges it necessary to the well-being, or to the safety of the constitution. The noble baron's reasoning is not at all in unison with his facts, and I think that if the noble lord will refresh his memory, he will find that his facts are not entirely in unison with history. Does not the noble lord know that there has been such a notion as triennial parliaments since the period he quoted? and does he not happen to know that last year, it was in the contemplation of a government with which he was personally connected, to dissolve the parliament at the end of three years?—(hear! hear!) This I have heard, and I have reason to believe that the rumour is well-founded. The noble baron next adverted to something which he wondered at not finding in the king's speech. Something, it seems, he thinks should have been said on the improvement of the military force of the country. I am at a loss to conceive what the noble baron could have expected to be stated on this subject. The wise measures which were adopted in the last session, have been followed up with success throughout the country, and nothing is now wished, but that the present parliament would permit the full and free operation of the laws which have already been made. It is this proper and necessary perseverance which the country expects from parliament. With regard to the measures which were repealed by the last parliament, it was a complaint against them, whether well or ill founded I have not now to consider, that they were in general inefficient; and it was admitted, that if they did occasionally add to our military force, it was at the expence of those principles and resources on which the permanent strength of the country rests. The measures, however, which were proposed as the substitutes of those which have been repealed, are not of this temporary nature, and are not to be judged by the success of the moment. With regard to the plan for limited service, it will be recollected, that when it came under the consideration of your lordships, I did not hold out any expectation of great immediate advantages being derived from it. I then said of that important measure, that it never would have its full effect until the sight of a soldier impressed upon the peasant's mind the idea of a service for 7 years, instead of a bondage for life. In this opinion I still remain, and I must now say, that whether it has yet been successful or not, he knows little of human nature, and entertains views much too narrow for a statesman, who founds any argument on the result of the operation of this measure within the few months since it began to be carried into effect; but the house will recollect what was the effect of the measure which was repealed, to make way for the plan of limited service. When its inefficiency was objected to at the end of 9, of 12, and even of 18 months, we were still desired to wait, and assured that its operation was only commencing, and would rapidly improve. Is it not rather singular then, that we should now, at the end of a few months only, be called upon to give an account of the success of the plan for limited service? But the merit of that plan rests upon quite another ground, and it is of no importance to form an average calculation of its result, or to enquire whether it has produced more men in one month than in another.—I shall proceed now to the next topic; for the noble lord has favoured us with a long table of contents, of the various chapters which are to be brought into discussion in the course of the session. It seems, we are to be asked, whether the military force for the defence of this country, is not now less than it was at some former period. I do not understand, however, how the noble lord proposes to view this question. If we mean, by the force for the defence of the country, the number of troops in this island, that number, it is obvious, ought to depend not upon the amount of our disposeable force, but upon the prudent use which may be made of it. A greater number of troops might be necessary for home defence under other circumstances; but if the noble lord wishes to institute a comparison with respect to the general force of the British empire, I can assure him, that that force is at this moment larger than it ever was at any former period. With respect to the volunteers, I am far from concurring with the noble lord in the observations he has made on that description of force. The regulations which were adopted for that description of force, were calculated for its improvement, and I cannot admit, that any thing which has been done by parliament, has had a tendency to damp their spirits, or check their patriotic ardour. The noble baron has remarked, that he has not heard of the Training bill having been any where put in force: if he means by put in force, that the men are not yet trained, it certainly, according to his ideas, is not in force, for the preparatory measures must necessarily occupy a considerable time before the training can commence; and I am sure, that to any one who is acquainted with the nature of the militia laws of this country, the delay, which is unavoidable in a measure of this kind, can create no surprise. The act, however, has begun to operate; and I can assure the noble lord, that there is not a corner of the country in which it has not already been acted upon.—The next topic which the noble lord adverted to, was very remarkable. He thinks that his majesty should have been advised to tell you (an advice, by-the-bye, which I think his majesty would not have been easily prevailed upon to adopt) that a French fleet had escaped from a port of France, and returned safely to that country. In point of fact, no French fleet has returned safe to port, and I am therefore at a loss to conceive why the noble lord should wish his majesty to make such a declaration. As to the escape of the French squadron, to which the noble lord alluded, from port, I shall not enter into any discussion upon that point; but if he asks what measures were taken to intercept it, I will tell him that every exertion was made for that purpose. Can the noble lord point out any time at which a French fleet ever was so vigilantly pursued, either with respect to the total amount of the force, or to the number of detachments employed against it? If no instance of equal exertion to overtake an enemy's squadron can be found, this chapter of his enquiries will not suit the purpose of the noble lord in a future period of the session.

But his majesty has sent out expeditions at an improper season of the year! The noble lord, perhaps, wishes that his majesty should tell him why and where he has sent these expeditions; for until he is made acquainted with those circumstances, all his arguments respecting the period of sailing can have no weight. The noble lord has also objected to the appointment of certain commanders of these expeditions; but I must appeal to him, whether he really thinks that a subject which is fit to be discussed in this house? Would it be becoming or constitutional in your lordships to enter into an investigation of the talents of certain officers, and to enquire whether A, B, or C ought to be appointed to a particular command? If, however, the objection of the noble lord is only to the rank, not to the want of experience or talents in the person to whom he has alluded (General Craufurd), it is certainly very ill founded; peculiar circumstances in the life of that officer have precluded him from the rank to which, by his merit and services, he was justly entitled. If the noble lord thinks that it ought to be established as a principle, that none but officers holding a certain rank ought to have the command of an expedition, I would wish him to turn to the page of Wolfe or of Nelson. Had such a principle been regarded by my lord St. Vincent, we perhaps, should not this day have had to glory in the battle of the Nile. Is there any one in this house who will say that this or that officer in lord St. Vincent's fleet, who held a superior rank to lord Nelson, ought to have been sent in pursuit of the French expedition to Egypt, or give a vote of censure for the preference which was given to the hero, by whom the great victory of the Nile was achieved? Let it not, therefore, be said, that the officer alluded to is unfit to command on account of his rank. I can venture to pledge myself that his appointment will never disgrace those by whom he was chosen, nor prove disadvantageous to any service on which he may be employed.—I must now take notice of what has fallen from the noble lord respecting Prussia. I assure him he is very much misinformed if he supposes that, previous to the mission of lord Morpeth, there existed any means of communication between this country and Prussia. This assurance I must repeat so as not to be misunderstood: from the moment of his majesty's Declaration against Prussia, until lord Morpeth proceeded to the continent, there remained for his majesty's government no means of communicating or of acting in concert with Prussia. At the same time, had there been any disposition in the court of Berlin to communicate with this country, means were not wanting for that purpose on its part. The Prussian minister was encouraged to stay until the end of August, when he was recalled by his court purposely that the communication through him might no longer exist. The noble lord then surely does not mean that we ought to have sent a minister to Prussia, when we knew there was no disposition in the cabinet of that country to receive him. The plain fact is, that Prussia had gone on from year to year, from month to month, and at last from week to week under the same illusion as to her safety from France, and still pursuing the same selfish policy, until she found that she was placed in a situation of the most imminent danger. Then she displayed as much precipitancy as she had before evinced of indifference to the fall of Europe, and acted with that want of caution which had brought on all her disasters. If I state this much respecting Prussia, it is not for the purpose of reproaching that power, nor for drawing a parallel between her conduct and that of other countries. But as observations on this subject have been made for the purpose of withdrawing the confidence of the people of this country from his majesty's ministers, it becomes a duty I owe to my own character, and to the character of those with whom I act, to throw off all disguise, and to avoid those imputations which concealment only could sanction. At the first moment when there appeared a serious disposition in Prussia to co-operate with Russia against the common enemy, his majesty's ministers thought it their duty to shew that this country would not be wanting in fidelity to its ally, or in any efforts which might be advantageously made for the support of the general safety of Europe. —But with this subject I have done, except as to one point, which I feel I ought to advert to in justice to the character of others. It has been asked, why lord Morpeth was not sent on his mission until October, or if it was right not to send him until then, why did he not remain—why did he return in November? Why he was not sent until October, I think I have already sufficiently explained; and as to the reason of his return, I must ask, why ought he to have remained? The king of Prussia did not remain, his army did not remain. Is it thought that lord Morpeth ought, merely for the glory of the affair, to have staid on the field of battle? The fact however, is, that not only before the battle of Jena, but even after it, lord Morpeth found it impossible to get any satisfactory answer from the king of Prussia or his ministers on the subject of his mission.—With respect to the late negociation at Paris, the noble lord has, I think, very properly declined to enter into any discussion on it. He was right in abstaining from any observations on a subject which will soon come regularly under the consideration of parliament; and I am perfectly disposed to follow his example. All I shall say is, that I am fully convinced there is not one individual in or out of parliament by whom peace is desired on any other terms but those which shall be honourable to the country itself, and strictly consistent with that fidelity which we owe to our allies. If this proposition be true, as I conceive it is, then I rely, for the justification of his majesty's government, on the conclusion to be drawn from its application to the papers which will soon be laid on the table. Whatever inclination some persons may evince; whatever efforts may be made to place his majesty's servants in an unfavourable light, and to produce false impressions respecting their conduct, I am sure there now prevails throughout the country a union of sentiment and feeling hitherto unexampled in any nation. The people are convinced that the times are critical, and that the dangers they have to encounter are great; but they are also convinced that it is only by their own valour and resolution that these dangers can be averted. They are convinced, by contemplating the ruin of that great fabric, whose demolished fragments are now employed to injure us, that it is only by energy and firmness that this country can be saved from a similar ruin; they are convinced, that it is not by yielding to their enemy, but by resistance, that they can have any chance of salvation; they are convinced, that if, after all their efforts, they should at last sink under the contest, they would, even then, have the satisfaction of avoiding the self-reproaches which those must feel, who, while they were degrading and humbling themselves before their enemy, returned nothing but insults and aggressions where conciliation and gratitude was due, and yet, notwithstanding all their shameful submissions and humiliations, have not the less been overwhelmed and trampled on by the common foe of Europe. To have fallen after a manful and honourable struggle, would have been glorious to Prussia, but her conduct will never be imitated by this country, which, in spirit as well as resources, is fully competent to the contest in which she is engaged.

Lord *Hawkesbury*, in explanation, begged leave to observe, that not a word had fallen from him in the least disrespectful to lord Morpeth: on the contrary, he had the highest opinion of that noble lord's merits; and was fully convinced that in the execution of his mission he had used every endeavour that was compatible with the nature of his instructions.

The Earl of *Radnor* rose just as the question was about to be put, to suggest that a clause or an amendment should be incorporated in the address, for the purpose of expressing how much their lordships condoled with his majesty, in consequence of the loss his majesty's family had recently sustained on the continent, by the lamented death of that illustrious man, their near relation, the duke of Brunswick. This was a mark of respect, which he thought due to the royal family.

Lord *Grenville* said, that the subject to which the noble earl had alluded had already been under his consideration, and he had consulted the Journals in order to be satisfied how he ought to act, and he was convinced that such a proceeding as that suggested would be contrary to the usage of parliament. From his examination it appeared, that there was no instance of an address of condolence being presented to the sovereign on the death of a relative not born in this country, except one to queen Anne, on the decease of her husband, prince George of Denmark; but that was a particular case. It was of importance that the usual ceremonial of parliament should not be departed from; for if an address was in the present instance resorted to, the exclusion of others from a similar compliment would appear a sort of disrespect.

The Earl of *Radnor* said he was perfectly satisfied, since he knew that his majesty's ministers had considered the subject. He was only afraid it might have escaped their attention.

The question was then put on the motion for an address, which was carried *nem. diss.*, and a committee was appointed to prepare and bring in the same. The committee retired *pro formâ*, and returned with the address, which, being adopted by the house, was ordered to be presented to his majesty to-morrow, by the lords with white staves.—On the motion of lord Grenville, lord Walsingham was re-appointed chairman of the committees of the house.—Lord Grenville gave notice, that on Monday next he would move the thanks of the house to sir John Stuart, and the troops under his command, for the glorious victory obtained by them in Calabria.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, November 19.

At 4 o'clock, Mr. Quarme, yeoman usher of the black rod, appeared at the bar, and in the name of the lords authorized by virtue of his majesty's commission, required the immediate attendance of the commons in the house of peers, to hear the commission read. The speaker, and nearly all the members present, attended. On their return, the speaker having declared that the clerk of the house had, according to custom, prepared a bill to prevent clandestine outlawry, the bill was read a first, and ordered to be read a second time. The grand committees for religion, for grievances, for courts of justice, and for trade, and the committee of privileges, were appointed, and the due powers given to them. The customary resolutions relative to the term of limitation for petitions, complaining of undue returns to the internal regulations of the house, &c. were passed.

[The Lords Commissioners' Speech.] The *Speaker* reported, that the house had been at the House of Peers, at the desire of the Lords Commissioners appointed under the great seal, for opening and holding this present parliament; and that the lord high chancellor, being one of the said commissioners, made a speech to both houses of parliament, of which, to prevent mistakes, he had obtained a copy. He then proceeded to read the speech from the chair, for which we refer to our report of the proceedings of the house of lords (see p. 15). After the speaker had finished reading the speech,

The Hon. *William Lamb* (son of lord viscount Melbourne) rose. He said, that unfortunately the gloom cast over the meeting of parliament by the continuation of the disturbance of that system, under which Europe had enjoyed the highest tranquillity and happiness, was by no means either novel or extraordinary: a disturbance, which sufficient experience had ascertained, went to the complete destruction of ancient and venerable estates, at least to a degradation of them so humiliating as to leave little choice between that and their complete destruction. But, although every successive disaster prepared the mind in some measure for the present state of affairs; yet it was not without the utmost awe and inquietude that we could behold the period, so long menaced, at length arrived: a period when the power of the enemy was predominant and unlimited over the greater part of Europe, and when Great Britain, with the exception of two powerful allies, was left unsupported and compelled to rely for its security on those resources, on which, he was confident, we might rely implicitly—the natural courage and the unparalleled spirit of the people. It was impossible, therefore, not to consider the meeting of a new British Parliament, under such trying and arduous circumstances, as a most important event. Their deliberations would be looked to by their country, by their enemy, and by their allies, with the utmost anxiety. By their country, with the expectation that their proceedings would be distinguished by consistency and resolution; by their enemy, with the hope—disappointed as he trusted it would prove—that in their councils might be detected an auspicious prognostic of alarm, wavering, and disunion; by their allies, with the anticipation of increasing confidence and co-operation.—In his majesty's most gracious speech, which had just been read from the chair, their attention was principally drawn to two topics. The first was the fruitless Negociation with France. Nothing could be further from his intention than to touch on any subject which in the remotest degree might tend to revive political differences, now almost lost in the disastrous events in which we were so nearly interested; but he thought, without any hazard of such a revival, he might say, whether the pacific system so strongly recommended during the last war was practicable or not, that when the advocates for that system came into power, it was at a time when their hopes of carrying that system into effect must have been considerably diminished. In the event of peace with France, and of the mediation of other powers, to produce that event, it was necessary, indispensably necessary, that we should be strong ourselves, and backed by strong and formidable allies and mediators, to whom we might make an effectual appeal, and from whom we might expect effectual assistance. To go to war might be merely the effort of despair, but to become a mediator and an abritrator among nations, required strength to support the award. It followed, therefore, that although at an earlier period France might have been successfully resisted by the pursuance of a pacific system, yet it became a far different case when so many rivals lay at her mercy; when their resources were exhausted; when their territories were dismembered; when their armies were overcome; and when their spirits were abashed and dismayed before the overwhelming superiority of France.—Under these inauspicious circumstances, so little calculated to produce a pacific disposition on the part of France, or to induce a corresponding inclination on the part of other powers; under these inauspicious circumstances, the negociation was begun. It was begun because ministers advised his majesty to take advantage of the opening presented by the enemy; because it was deemed advisable to endeavour to put a stop to those encroachments of which experience had too fatally shewn that a state of hostility was the increaser; and because it was so desirable an object to collect what might be termed the relics of the continent, and by peace give to various powers the opportunity of recruiting their strength, with a view to future exertions for self-liberation from the oppression under which they groaned. But it was soon discovered that if any peace consistent with the honour of this country could be made, France would soon find it her interest to break it, or at least to indulge in farther aggrandizements, which must eventually lead to its rupture. His majesty's ministers, therefore, having, in the first place, so far relied on the good sense of the people of this country, that they would not allow themselves to be buoyed up by false hopes, made the attempt at pacification; but finding that those terms alone on which a peace ought to be concluded, could not be obtained, they preferred war, with all its calamities and burthens, to a peace which, by the abandonment of our allies, must eventually prove more destructive to the country than successive years of active warfare. This attempt, however, sufficiently shewed the pacific disposition of Great Britain, and the restlessness and inquietude of France. His majesty had been graciously pleased to order the papers relative to the negociation to be laid on the table of the house. It would therefore be premature to enter into any minute discussion of the subject, but assuredly, enough had appeared in the partial statement of the enemy to prove the equivocation, the insincerity, and the subtlety to which they had the meanness to resort, and the true wisdom, the ability, and the plain manly good sense, by which that equivocation, that insincerity, and that subtlety were combated. Enough had been discovered to make the house confident, that when the whole of the transaction was fairly on the table, it would indubitably appear that the best means had been taken for security against the further aggrandisement of the enemy; that nothing had been abandoned which ought to have been retained; that the interests, neither of the continent, nor of our own country, had been endangered; and that not a particle of honour had been compromised. On this high ground, having made every reasonable concession for peace, yet at the same time, maintaining the dignity of Great Britain unimpaired, ministers had a right to claim their most honourable reward, the support of that house and the approbation of their country. The failure of the negociation had, it was too well known, produced a series of most disastrous events, succeeding each other with unexampled rapidity. In the present state of circumstances, it was unnecessary, perhaps it might be ungenerous, to comment on the conduct of Prussia, which had led to that state; but at least, it was some satisfaction to know, that however desirous the British government might be to afford every assistance to the king of Prussia, they were in no degree responsible for the proceedings at the commencement of the Prussian war, or for the manner in which that war was carried on. If our eyes were directed to another quarter, it would reasonably be permitted us to hope, that although Russia might not be able to reconquer kingdoms, and re-establish thrones; she might yet have the power of setting a boundary to that inordinate ambition which had swallowed up every government within its reach. From the contemplation of foreign affairs, which he allowed was comparatively painful, he would turn to that which ever had afforded, which did afford, and which he trusted, ever would afford, a most pleasing picture; a picture, which the contrast rendered more pleasing: he meant the internal state of Great Britain. On the blessings which we enjoyed, it was unnecessary to expatiate; they were justly understood, they were fully appreciated, they were warmly and enthusiastically beloved, not by that house alone, or by the superior classes of society, but by a great majority of the meanest and most illiterate of the people. Dearer did the menaces of the enemy render these blessings; notwithstanding that the acknowledged superiority of our navy, the bravery of our army, and the high and united spirit of our population, warranted us in setting those menaces at defiance. As to the enemy's attempts to destroy or injure the commerce of Great Britain, he flattered himself, that those hopes would be completely disappointed; and that, secure in our capital and our credit, we might deride the vain efforts of an implacable foe. Adverting to that part of his majesty's speech, in which the necessity of enduring great burthens was lamented, he observed that, deeply as the weight of those burthens must be felt, he was convinced that with that feeling would be mingled throughout the country a firm conviction of the necessity which existed of imposing them, of bearing them with good humour, and of making those sacrifices which, under the present circumstances, a great nation was called upon to make. With these advantages, he could not believe that the house would, for a moment, hesitate in adopting the only line of conduct which, as it appeared to him, they could with propriety pursue, namely, to pledge themselves to meet the exigencies of this great crisis with firmness, and to make provision for calling the strength of the country into energetic exertion. We might then oppose the enemy with a confidence not vague or baseless, but founded on the solid grounds of a real and extensive force, directed by experience and wisdom, and determined to fight to the last extremity for the happiness and honour which Great Britain had to preserve, and against the misery and disgrace which she had to avert.—The hon. gent. concluded with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to return his majesty the thanks of this house, for the most gracious speech which the lords commissioners have read to us by his majesty's command; to assure his majesty, that his faithful commons embrace, with the utmost satisfaction, the first opportunity of humbly testifying to his majesty those sentiments of duty and attachment to his majesty's person and government, and of zeal for the honour of his crown, and the interests of his dominions, which will uniformly direct all their proceedings:—To offer to his majesty our humble thanks for having directed to be laid before us copies of the papers which have been exchanged in the course of the late negociation with France, which we will not fail to take into our most serious consideration: to express to his majesty our firm conviction, that a general and permanent tranquillity can only be established on terms consistent with the honour of his majesty's crown, with the interests of his loyal people, and with that inviolable good faith towards his majesty's allies, by which the conduct of this country has always been distinguished:—That we deeply and sincerely regret, that his majesty's benevolent endeavours to obtain this desirable end should have been disappointed, and that, in the same moment, a fresh war should have been kindled in Europe, the progress of which has been attended with the most calamitous events:—That we learn, with regret, that no adequate satisfaction had been offered to his majesty by Prussia for those aggressions which had placed the two countries in a state of mutual hostility; but that we sincerely applaud his majesty's generous resolution to adopt such measures as might be best calculated to unite the councils and interests of the two powers against the common enemy:—That we observe, with sincere pleasure, that, in the midst of the disastrous events which have followed, and under the most trying circumstances, the good faith of his majesty's allies has remained unshaken; that the conduct of the king of Sweden has been distinguished by the most honourable firmness; and that the happiest union continues to subsist between his majesty and the emperor of Russia:—That we trust these reciprocal proofs of good faith will have the happy effect of strengthening and confirming an alliance which affords the best remaining hope of safety for the continent of Europe:—That, whilst we acknowledge, with gratitude, the gracious expressions of concern with which his majesty observes the necessity of adding to the public burthens, and sincerely partake in the same sentiment, we humbly beg leave to assure his majesty, that we will, upon all occasions, carefully keep in view the wishes which his majesty's paternal goodness has induced his majesty to express, of combining all practicable economy with those efforts which it is necessary to make against the formidable and increasing power of the enemy:—That we are impressed with the deepest sorrow at the long series of misfortune which has afflicted the continent of Europe, and which could not fail to affect in some degree, many important interests of this country; but that we observe, with the truest pleasure, that the great sources of our national prosperity have remained unimpaired:—That we feel the utmost confidence, that, under every difficulty, his majesty will still have the satisfaction of witnessing an increasing energy and firmness on the part of his people; and that the valour and discipline of his majesty's fleets and armies will continue to be displayed with the same undiminished lustre which has distinguished them during the whole of the present contest:—That, with these advantages, and with an humble but firm reliance on the protection and support of Divine Providence, we are prepared to meet all the exigencies of the present crisis, and to second, to the utmost of our power, the paternal efforts of his majesty, to secure the honour and independence of the British crown, and the prosperity and freedom of his brave and affectionate people."

Mr. *John Smith*, in rising to second the address, observed that, in the present crisis, and at a period so big with new and extraordinary events, the satisfaction which his majesty was pleased to express at meeting his parliament, must be equally felt by every member of that house; for there never was a moment when the collective wisdom of parliament was more imperiously called for, than in the present unexampled state of public affairs: and he was persuaded that the deliberations of that house would be so conducted as to merit the confidence which his majesty had been graciously pleased to repose in them. The house must see with concern that his majesty's recent endeavours to restore peace to his subjects, had been disappointed by the failure of the late negociation; and they must recognize in this proceeding of his majesty, the same benevolent disposition which had so often led his majesty in circumstances equally discouraging, to leave no means untried to put an end to the calamities of war.—His majesty having ordered the papers relative to the late negociation to be laid before the house, it would be premature to enter into the discussion of the subject. They would, in course, have an early opportunity of doing so. But from the state of that transaction, published by the enemy, false and mutilated as it had been, he thought he might venture to pronounce, that the good faith, sincerity, and plain dealing of those noble persons to whom his majesty entrusted the conduct of the negociation, were no less conspicuous than the insincerity, double dealing, and duplicity, almost approaching to chicanery, of the French negociators. In the one, was plainly manifested British rectitude and British character; in the other, that evasive and varying policy which had been the never-failing characteristic of French negociation, in all times and under all circumstances. Indeed there could be no great expectation of a favourable result, when, at the very moment that the French government were making the most pacific professions, they were taking those very measures, which, as his majesty has been pleased to inform us, compelled the king of Prussia to engage in that calamitous struggle, the consequence of which we must all deplore. This resistance, which at first sight seemed ill advised, and ill timed, appeared now to have been the result of imperious circumstances. France demanded of Prussia, not only the sacrifice of her trade and commerce, and the dissolution of her best and wisest alliances, but cessions of territory were insisted upon, evidently calculated to weaken her barriers, and in the final result to render resistance impossible, and to compel that unhappy country to submit without the power of striking a blow. Her fate, if it could now operate as a warning to Europe, ought to be felt as an encouragement to Great Britain, whose conduct had been the complete reverse, and whose magnanimity had hitherto preserved her power undiminished. We had seen Prussia, almost from the commencement of the French revolution, crouch to every one of those despots, under whom the country had by turns fallen, and this, too, at times when the exertion of her arms in the common cause might have turned the scale, and insured the deliverance of Europe. And, what had been the effect of her base and abject submissions? Driven to contend, single-handed, with the whole force of the enemy, and overwhelmed, he feared, for ever, with a rapidity unequalled even in modern times; and at last to fill the cup of her misery, in the answer of the French government to the manifesto of the king of Prussia, who to a generous foe would now be an object of compassion, that unhappy monarch is cruelly and insolently taunted with the degrading submissions and temporizing policy, which his unfeeling tyrants had so long exacted from him. In the midst of these disasters, it was truly consolotary to find that the king of Sweden and the emperor of Russia were animated with such just views of their duty and their interests. And the house would doubtless attend to the recommendation of his majesty, to cultivate and support a close connexion with those powers. With regard to our own particular situation, it was evident that in a contest so important, and for the preservation of every thing that was dear to us, we must necessarily be called upon to support additional burthens. But it was with extreme satisfaction, indeed, that he heard that part of his majesty's speech which pointed out the necessity of the most economical use of our resources. The attack of the enemy was now openly aimed at the vitals of the country. In defence of these the country was ready, nay, desirous to make whatever sacrifices were necessary; but, with a view to the continuance of the war, of the speedy termination of which no one could now indulge a hope, the careful application of our resources and means of defence, was more than ever become an indispensable duty, and he was happy to believe, one of the favourite objects of the noble lord (H. Petty) now below him. The flourishing state of the revenue and of public credit, must be a source of exultation, in the present state of Europe. He thought he might venture, without fear of contradiction, to attribute it to the wise and vigorous system of finance, established by that immortal statesman (Mr. Pitt), whose loss was so deeply deplored, whose virtues were indelibly engraven on the hearts of his countrymen, and whose splendid talents would be the admiration of posterity. But he was far from wishing to withhold his tribute of applause from those who had succeeded him, and who had manfully and vigorously upheld and supported his system of finance. With regard to the state of our commerce, it must be expected that partial inconveniencies would be suffered, at a moment when the whole power and force of the enemy were directed against it: but we had his majesty's assurance that the main sources of our prosperity were unimpaired, and he might venture to say, would long continue so, notwithstanding the present blockade of the British isles. A blockade by a country who had hardly dared to trust a ship out of the protection of their batteries, against a country which commanded the seas, and could, if it thought fit, intercept the commerce of the whole world. The arrogance of this threat of blockade could only be equalled by its absurdity. The consequence of the declaration only had been well described, by a person, whom it might hardly be decorous to name in that house, by the vassal king of Holland. He, in his address to his unfortunate subjects, himself told them that the prohibition of the trade of neutrals would give a death-blow to the already-expiring commerce of Holland.—With regard to the general situation of the country, there could be no doubt but that the spirit and vigour of the people were fully equal to any situation in which they could be placed; and he had observed with admiration, the firmness and fortitude with which they had supported all the expences of the war, and all the pressures of the times; and that ardour and promptitude which they had uniformly manifested in defence of their country and constitution.

Mr. *Canning* declared that he never rose with more lively sensations of anxiety than on the present occasion, both because he felt the unparalleled importance of the crisis, and the duty which bound him, in common with every member of the house, and every subject of the realm, to state his real opinion of the situation of our affairs, and of the best means which remained for their extrication from the peril in which they were involved. But in doing this, the greatest difficulty was to avoid that which, above all other things, he was most solicitous to avoid; namely, to appear to damp the spirits of the country at a period when it was so necessary that firmness and confidence should prevail. He begged, therefore, that the house would be candid enough to believe him, when he declared, that he entertained a perfect and sincere confidence—a confidence founded not on rashness, but on the most mature reflection—a confidence founded on the experience of the past, on the review of the present, and on the anticipation of the future—that there existed in this country resources amply sufficient to meet and brave all the difficult struggles, and to avert all the impending dangers with which we could possibly be threatened. He trusted, that all which it might be necessary for him to say in the course of the observations which he should take the liberty of submitting to the house, might be considered with a reference to this declaration. But, with whatever confidence he felt himself justified in looking to the resources of the country, he also felt how incumbent it was on him and on the house to look seriously to the situation of the country, to examine, to deliberate, and to determine, whether all that had passed in the conduct of the state had been without error, or whether some reflections on what had been done, might not have a favourable influence on what was still to do. Assuredly it was in the power of any man, who had turned his attention more particularly to public affairs, even of such an humble individual as himself, to throw out suggestions to government without the slightest intention of thwarting it, or without the most remote feeling to the members of which it was composed. For many of those members he professed to entertain the highest consideration. Were it possible that it should enter into the imagination of any man, at such a crisis as the present, to set himself to a perverse opposition to government, he must be thought not only insensible to public affairs as they then stood, but to all that had passed under a late administration; the history of the 15 last years of which, sufficiently shewed that was not the course of opposition that ought to be pursued, or that was likely to produce beneficial effects; he alluded to the conduct during the last war, of the gentlemen who then sat on the bench which he and his friends now occupied. Both the hon. proposer and the hon. seconder of the address (and here he begged leave to remark the distinguished performance at the present time, and the flattering promise for the future, which their speeches afforded) dwelt on the necessity of unanimity. Unquestionably the situation of the country was calculated to produce unanimity. But of unanimity there were different degrees. There was a description of unanimity which blinded every man's judgment to every thing that was wrong, and thus made him the passive instrument of any ministry. But there was another and a superior species, the professor of which, while he insisted on his right to investigate measures, and consider results, would yet give his cordial support to the government, in spite of the errors to which he would not allow himself to be wilfully blind. If at any time this latter course of proceeding was justifiable, when the judgment of every man who possessed any judgment ought to be exercised, it was the present. The situation of the country divided itself into two considerations, our relative situation to the world, and our internal situation. With regard to the former it was impossible that any thing more just or more eloquent could be said upon it, than what had been said by the hon. mover of the address. With regard to the latter, it afforded matter for deep meditation. A new parliament had been assembled, and they were now for the first time about to review the transactions of an administration, composed of men of great talents, who entered upon office not ten months ago, with this particular and distinct declaration, that all those who had preceded them had been in the wrong; that they had "clubbed the battalion;" that every thing required correction and amendment; that nothing was in its place; that our resources were exhausted, our credit destroyed, our faith violated, and that we were unable to maintain our own rank among the nations of Europe, much less to assist others in regaining that which belonged to them. What followed? At the end of ten months, these very gentlemen say that the resources of the country *remain* unimpaired. Those who but ten months ago, exclaimed that they were in a state of the utmost dilapidation, now tell us—not that they have been retrieved, not that they have been re-established,—but that they *remain* unimpaired. That is, that they never have been impaired. It was certainly very satisfactory to every man that there should be even this stale tribute paid to those who had been formerly loaded with censure. But surely it would be too much to expect that any man who had ever regulated his conduct by, who had followed the footsteps of, or who had considered the name of Pitt as connected with the glory and happiness of England, could pass this part of his majesty's speech unnoticed. Amidst the accusations that had been vented against the late administration, those against their foreign connections were not the least virulent. It had been said, that the continent had been lost by the confederacies which England had so ill put together. But what was the nature of the system that had been substituted? It seemed as if those who had happened to hear that a confederacy was a bad thing, had determined to repel every ally that might, by opposite conduct, have been attracted to us. But of this new system it would be worth while to trace the operation as well as the cause. On the first day of the first session of a new parliament, during whose existence the fate of the world might probably be decided, in whose time a struggle would, in all likelihood, take place, that would terminate either in total destruction, or complete safety, such a discussion was assuredly most important and most proper. The speech and address, which, at such a period as the present, were any thing but mere matters of form, might be considered in two distinct views. The first was as a mutual pledge between the sovereign and his people. Had it been possible to confine the speech and address to a description of the dangers of the country, and an enumeration of the best means of deliverance from those dangers, he would have been well content that the address should have gone up without a whisper of remark. But there was another view of the subject. The present was the constitutional opportunity afforded for both houses of parliament to express their opinion not only of the relations of government with foreign states, but of the relations of government with the country. Of this he begged to be understood that he was fully satisfied, whether when the official documents should be laid on the table it might or might not appear that there had been any remissness, or want of dexterity, or blameable attention to delusive promises, that the cause of this country against France would not admit of the smallest question. The only matter in dispute was not whether or not the cause was sufficiently strong, but whether or not the cause had been prosecuted in the best manner, and at the most proper time. If it could be proved (which he did not in the least degree mean to insinuate), that the negociation had wilfully failed, he should be sorry that that circumstance should lead to the slightest hesitation in giving the most unqualified support to the war. In prosecuting his consideration of the subject, he could not acquit the late house of commons of an act of inconsiderate confidence. And here he must observe, that with every man in the house, he sincerely lamented the absence and loss of that great man, with whom, in politics, he had so frequently differed; but the memory of which differences ought no longer to exist. Those who were in habits of private friendship with that great man might deplore him more feelingly, but it was impossible that they could admire more than himself his transcendant talents—talents, the strength of which was sufficiently evinced by the awe and fear which his presence inspired in the breasts of his political opponents. Having stated thus much, he trusted he should be acquitted of any disrespectful imputation in what he was about to say. In order to judge correctly of the situation in which the country now found itself, it was necessary to revert to the last confederacy. After the dissolution of that confederacy, and considering the state in which Prussia and Russia stood, what was the clear and obvious policy of France, and what was the clear and obvious policy of England? He would state it fairly. No man could hesitate in saying, that unfortunate as that confederacy was, broken and disjointed as it might be, yet were its scattered limbs not without life and vigour. It was the clear and obvious policy of England to unite those divided parts, and to endeavour to produce an energetic whole. On the other hand, it was the clear and obvious policy of France to effect a complete dismemberment of the confederation, and if that could not be completely accomplished in reality, at least to accomplish it in appearance. Now, what had been the conduct of the two powers? Prussia signed a treaty of access to the confederacy just previous to its dissolution; an unequivocal proof of the disposition of the court of Berlin, manifested still more strongly by the declaration since published. Subsequently, however, Prussia was forced into measures, which brought upon her the prompt resentment of this country. But at the time that the house of commons approved of that resentment, did they know that a negociation was carrying on with France, for the restoration of that which Prussia had seized? There were two distinct questions. If it were simply asked, would you go to war for the recovery of that unjustly wrested from you? the answer would be, yes; but if a negociation were carrying on to obtain the same object in another quarter, then the war would be superfluous. Even were this principle doubtful, yet, coupled with the certainty that it was the interest of this country to preserve Prussia, to retain her as an enemy to France, and to put up with, or overlook any conduct that might involve Great Britain in a contest with her, it became established and irresistible. The house would see what were the dreadful consequences of an original error in this respect; consequences which were now felt too late. While we were in the incongruous situation to which it gave rise, a war commenced between Prussia and France, undeniably instigated by the demands made by this country, through her negociator at Paris. It was true, Hanover was not the sole cause of this rupture, but it was the main one, as the subsequent declaration of Prussia proved. The conduct of Great Britain to Prussia was therefore thus: Prussia, unable to resist the power of France, encroached upon us; we had however the option to pass over the just cause of complaint which we possessed in consequence, and leave untouched the only power in Europe which appeared capable of being the germ of an alliance hostile to the ambitious views of France. But the conduct of his majesty's ministers had been the converse of their policy. By that conduct, Prussia had been compelled to act without our advice and assistance, and to plunge into a war, of which, if our advice could not have prevented it, our assistance might at least have meliorated the termination. He did not mean to cast the slightest imputation on the diplomatic character of the noble lord employed by government on this occasion (lord Morpeth); no man was better fitted for the office, both from the qualities of his head and heart, and because no man had been a more constant advocate for the justice of the cause of this country: but would any man of common reflection say, that if the restoration of Hanover were the sole object, it was worth while to make war against Prussia? The British government had continued at war with Prussia as long as the Prussian resources were unimpaired, and her strength unexhausted; but as soon as there seemed the prospect of a war between France and Prussia, an ambassador was dispatched to Berlin, with instructions adapted to all possibilities, except that which was most probable, namely, that war had actually commenced; for that no provision had been made, an event of which the most common information might have shewn the likelihood. As soon, however, as lord Morpeth returned, our government began to perceive their error, and to think that there was really something like war between France and Prussia,—from the trifling circumstance that the Prussian army was annihilated! They then sent a few military men to their aid, and when the Prussian monarchy shall be destroyed, they will perhaps send an army! When the gentlemen opposite to him came into power, they exclaimed, that nothing was more shabby than the foreign diplomacy of Great Britain. It was even said, that there was not a man at a foreign court capable of writing a letter. As it was an undoubted right possessed by the good people of this country to canvass the conduct of their statesmen; he remembered to have heard it asserted in one of these political assemblages, that all our ambassadors in future were to be Ajaxes, Ulysses, and Phœnixes. Now it so happened, that there had been only one remove. Mr. Adair had succeeded sir A. Paget at Vienna. Of course as he was single, he must be the phœnix! But, in our diplomatic intercourse with foreign courts, we were taught to look for perfect frankness, sincerity, and openness; freedom from trick and intrigue, and a sort of pellucid simplicity. Now, what was the first tangible proof of this simplicity? Why, a minister at Paris negociating for peace, and another at Berlin instigating war for the same object! Such conduct might be dextrous, it might be able—it might be any thing but frank, open, and undisguised.—As to that passage in the speech and the address, which congratulated the country, that in those councils which preceded the war between Prussia and France, his majesty had no share, he was astonished that such a topic of consolation could have entered the head of any minister. Instead of shewing that they had attempted to prevent evils, ministers called for approbation, on the ground of having abstained from any interference! But he believed neither Berlin nor Vienna, nor even London could be thus consoled. It ought to have been our care that the difference between France and Prussia should not have been too suddenly blown into a flame, lest it should have been too suddenly extinguished. In this part of the address it was therefore impossible for him to concur: he by no means meant to imply doubt of the justice of his majesty's quarrel with Prussia; but if France, by a nominal and illusive transfer of Hanover to Prussia, could plant a cause of dissention between Prussia and Great Britain, was not this a contrivance of the enemy which nothing but the plain and simple diplomacy adopted by our government could be blind to? France found Great Britain and Prussia in amity; with a tendency to coalesce. What was her object? To divide them; and by a pretended transfer to Prussia of the hereditary dominions of the king of Great Britain, to create a war between the two countries.—With respect to the negociation with France, this was not a time to discuss it, although some observations made by the hon. mover of the address might justify some strong comments upon that negociation. But it would be better to reserve these until the papers relative to the subject should be in possession of the house. He thought, however, that it would be but fair to state to his majesty's ministers what, as far as the documents had transpired, appeared to him to be the defective parts of their case. The British declaration contained three unproved allegations. The first was, that the overture for peace had come from France; and as this was also insisted on in the speech, he had no doubt that ministers had something to produce, which would give an entirely new colour to this part of the transaction. He denied, however, entertaining any opinion that had the offer of peace proceeded from England, ministers would have been culpable. Had peace been a desirable thing, it mattered little in what quarter the proposal for it originated.—Adverting to Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, he observed, that there were fifty other and better ways in which the intelligence which it contained might have been communicated, and he condemned most strongly the reception which the answer to that letter experienced. The assertion that the British government were beginning a new course, as illustrated by the transaction alluded to, was false. Never had the British government been the stimulators of assassination. Had he held the situation which the late right hon. gent. occupied, he should have thought it his duty to repel the accusation with contempt and indignation. The second unproved allegation, contained in the British declaration, related to the basis of the negociation, which was asserted to be the *uti possidetis*; now throughout the negociation the basis referred to was that stated in Mr. Fox's letter, the mutual honour of the countries; a basis no more like the *uti possidetis*, than it was like the *propria quæ maribus*. The third unproved allegation, which he had no doubt that the French government had completely misrepresented, was, that we had refused to treat except in conjunction with our allies. Now, from the partial documents that had been published, it appeared that that had been the case in the first instance, but that afterwards the British government had treated alone. He had no doubt that this would be satisfactorily cleared up, as the address stated in high terms of panegyric, the great care of his majesty for his allies. The particular mention of Russia and Sweden, was proof that some misrepresentation existed.—Having thus stated the points which it was necessary for his majesty's ministers to elucidate, and having considered the state of this country with respect to foreign relations, he proceeded to examine our domestic situation. It was impossible but that he must look at our means of internal strength with the utmost seriousness. We must examine the physical force, and the spirit by which it was actuated. Our internal policy was intimately connected with this contemplation. And first, with regard to the dissolution of the last parliament; there was a great difference between questioning the exercise of an independent prerogative, and questioning the propriety of exercising it at such a period. If the dissolution were prompted by party views, with the hope of giving a triumph to ministers, and if, for these purposes, they created and revived party differences, at a time when they loudly called for unanimity, their conduct was highly culpable. But he had no doubt that ministers had some great public advantage to gain; for he could not suppose that they merely wished to obtain a few supporters in parliament, at least this he was sure they would not avow.—Another class of observations would apply to the practical means of defence and attack which the country possessed, and the mode in which those means had been managed and applied. Now, it was most extraordinary that in reading the speech, and the history of the last year, no one could suspect that the country was at war. There was not a feature of war in the speech, nor an act of war during the last year, in which government could assume any credit. There had not been even a single warlike plan, much less any warlike achievement. As for the internal defence of the country, a most laboured scheme had been brought forward last session, and when the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) by whom it had been produced, had been repeatedly questioned whether or not it was intended to put it in execution, the answer was uniformly in the affirmative. In no single parish, however, had the slightest step been taken towards this end; and yet it was a reliance on this scheme that had been held out to induce parliament to allow the volunteers to crumble away, the militia to be diminished, and the regular army to be sent experimenting. And what kind of experimenting? We had heard of a great statesman, who stripped the country of troops, which he employed on various active services, and then boasted that he defended it at a distance. Could the gentlemen opposite make a similar boast? After orders, and counter-orders, and confirmations of orders, and revocations of confirmations, and countermands, &c. &c. &c. an expedition actually did sail from the Downs, and arrived—where? at Plymouth! Certainly a place not very well provided with means of defence; and had this same expedition proceeded to some possession of the enemy not superior in strength to Plymouth, they very possibly might have succeeded in taking it. But perhaps this was meant as an experiment. It might have been said, "We'll sail from the Downs, land at Plymouth, and surprize the dockers." It is prudent to try to swim upon a table, before committing oneself to the waves. The right hon. gent. was not accustomed to salt water, and he wished to begin with fresh. But could the country forget the loudness of his accusations against his predecessors for what he termed their supineness and neglect? Yet what had he himself done? When war was raging in Prussia, our peace minister was on his return! The whole amount of the right hon. gent.'s campaign was a fire-work before Boulogne, and—(yet that wanted confirmation)—an embarkation on the Paddington canal. But for the uncommon openness of the weather, it is probable that his army would have been frozen up at Uxbridge—(a laugh). But these were not the heaviest charges against the right hon. gent. That right hon. gent. had declared it as his opinion, that in all military establishments, it was not the form, but the soul, the spirit, the nice sense of honour, that were to be cultivated and encouraged. Now, was not that right hon. gent. aware, that by partial measures, he had disgusted and dispirited the army more than he had improved their character by the monopoly of shoulder-knots and cockades? The report of their discontent must have reached him. If not, it was time that he should be told of it. Let him recollect the recall of officers who had nobly fought and conquered for their country. Was sir John Stuart's being superseded by the brother of a secretary of state (Gen. Fox), calculated to give animation and enthusiasm to the army? And when an expedition was ready for embarkation, were not the hopes of many gallant officers who already anticipated victory at the head of their brigades, disappointed, because the rank of a favourite of that right hon. gent. (colonel Craufurd) to whom he meant no disrespect, was not entitled to command them?—He had before observed, that in the speech, all notice of war seemed studiously to have been passed over, and yet some debts of gratitude remained to be paid; some acts of heroism had been displayed, which, had it been for no other purpose than to shew that the British army already possessed the character which the right hon. gent. only wished it did possess, might surely have been mentioned. To the records of parliament, the historian looked for his materials. It was cruel to deprive the hero of the honourable reward of his military achievements, and it was disgraceful that government should dislike to sprinkle over the gloom of despondency with some of those achievements. It was true, they might say, that these achievements were not of their planning; but this was a period when party feelings should not withhold every glorious incitement to great actions. On these grounds, on the deficiency of that which ought to have been recorded in the speech, it was impossible for him to satisfy his feelings with the continuation of that omission in the address. The usual form in similar instances, had been to endeavour to render the answer to the speech a vehicle for such sentiments as it might be wished to add; but the present speech was so contrived, that there was not a niche in which the additional sentiments of parliament could be properly placed, although many important points had been disregarded. There were many topics on which amendment to the address might be introduced, so many that he preferred substituting a new address altogether, leaving it to the option of the house which to adopt. He therefore proposed, by way of amendment, to omit the whole of the address subsequent to the words "his majesty's commons," and to introduce the following:—"To assure his majesty that it is with increased affection, attachment, and loyalty, that his majesty's faithful commons meet his majesty in this ninth parliament of his majesty's assembling. And that amidst all those evils and pressures of war, and those tremendous and unparalleled successes of a formidable and unrelenting enemy, which render the present crisis peculiarly awful and alarming, the first and most fervent prayer of his majesty's faithful commons is, that it may please Divine Providence to grant to this favoured country the prolongation of a life and of a reign, the value and the blessings of which, each succeeding year teaches us more highly to appreciate.—And to express to his majesty our unshaken determination to stand by his majesty throughout all the difficulties and dangers of the times; in defence of the laws and liberties of this realm; in defence of his majesty's sacred person and government; and of a throne endeared to all classes of his majesty's subjects by the virtues of the sovereign who adorns it.—To offer to his majesty our humble and affectionate condolence on that share of the public calamities of Europe which has come home to the personal and domestic feelings of his majesty and his royal family, by the death of that gallant and illustrious prince the late duke of Brunswick, a prince connected by such near alliances with his majesty's royal house, and with the throne of these kingdoms.—That while we most sensibly participate in the deep and poignant grief with which his majesty contemplates the issue of the late campaign on the continent, we studiously abstain from suggesting to his majesty, as a topic of consolation, what we well know his majesty's intelligence and magnanimity would disdain to receive as such—the interruption of his majesty's intercourse with the court of Berlin during the last eight months, which precluded his majesty from any knowledge of those counsels by which the war between Prussia and France was so unfortunately precipitated.—Satisfied as we are of the justice of the original grounds of his majesty's complaints against Prussia, we are yet unable to refrain from deeply deploring their consequences.—We are not furnished with any means of judging how far those complaints were capable of being adjusted, without recourse being had to actual hostilities; or how far any discussions which may have taken place subsequently to his majesty's gracious message of the 21st of April, were directed to that object.—But we cannot but lament that the obvious artifice of the common enemy, in making a fraudulent and nominal transfer of his majesty's electoral dominions to the king of Prussia, should have been so far crowned with success as to have involved his majesty in war with the only state in Europe whose resources were yet unimpaired; and whose arms might, at some happier hour, have been employed with effect in a new confederacy against France; and that the too successful policy of the enemy in amusing this country with an insincere and protracted negociation, should have obtained for France the opportunity of goading Prussia (by unmeasured and accumulated injuries) to that premature, unconcerted, and unassisted effort, which has terminated in the overthrow of that powerful monarchy, and in the complete subjugation of its dominions.—We cannot but express our regret that the policy which appears to have been ultimately adopted towards Prussia should not have been recognized and acted upon until the occasion was gone by; and that his majesty's plenipotentiary should have arrived only in time to be an helpless witness of that prodigious ruin and destruction which a more timely interposition of his majesty's advice and assistance might possibly have averted or alleviated.—To acknowledge his majesty's goodness in having directed to be laid before us the details of the negociation so long carried on at Paris.—We entertain the fullest conviction that the just and moderate sentiments by which his majesty has proved himself to have been animated in the several preceding negociations for peace with France, have alike actuated his majesty on the late occasion: and while we look with anxious interest for the developement of those circumstances which can have deferred for so long a period that termination of the negociation which it is evident, as well from notorious facts as from the language of his majesty's declaration, the artifices and pretensions of the enemy rendered from the beginning almost certain and unavoidable; we doubt not but we shall see, in the whole course and tenour of the proceedings on the part of his majesty, fresh instances of that desire for peace, and of that sincerity and good faith in the pursuit of it, which have so often been frustrated by the ambition of the French government; as well as fresh proofs of the expediency of adhering to the policy of treating for general peace, and only in conjunction with our allies.—That we receive with the utmost satisfaction the assurance of his majesty's uninterrupted concert and good understanding with the emperor of Russia; trusting that neither in war nor in negociation, his majesty's councils will be separated from those of our ally, distinguished alike by perseverance and good faith.—The continued prosecution of the war being necessarily imposed upon his majesty, we rejoice in the assurance that it is intended to prosecute it with vigour: earnestly imploring his majesty that no apprehension of embarrassing the conduct of a negociation by acquisitions made during its progress, may ever again be suffered to relax for a moment the military and naval operations of this country.—That if we have not the triumph and satisfaction, as in former years of war, of offering to his majesty our congratulations on any signal and decisive victory by sea, we nevertheless reflect, with just pride and acknowledgement, on the several distinguished instances in which the skill, valour, and intrepidity of British officers and seamen have been displayed in their usual lustre, and with their accustomed success, over equal or superior squadrons of the enemy. But we cannot help lamenting, in justice to the naval service, as well as to the interests of the country, that supineness or mismanagement, by which the predatory squadrons of the enemy have been permitted to range, unchecked, among our West-India colonies, and to escape with impunity, and by which our commerce has been exposed, to a degree of annoyance highly injurious to the interests and discreditable to the maritime superiority, of Great Britain.—With equal sorrow, and with no less astonishment, we have observed those delays and uncertainties, and that apparent perplexity and fluctuation of councils, which have marked the conduct of the war department of the state, which have hitherto prevented the execution of those measures which ministers persuaded the late parliament to enact, and upon which they themselves professed so greatly to rely for the internal defence of the empire; and delays which have so long confined our expeditions within our own ports, and have rendered the military preparations of this government at once ineffectual to the annoyance of the enemy, and a just ground of dissatisfaction and disappointment to the nation at large.—We rejoice in the opportunity of congratulating his majesty on the capture of that valuable and important settlement, the Cape of Good Hope, by those distinguished officers, sir D. Baird and sir H. Popham. We have however, the consolation and gratification of being able to recall his majesty's attention to acquisitions and achievements in the course of the present year, by which, notwithstanding the apparent inactivity of his majesty's present servants, the credit of his majesty's arms, by sea and land, has been sustained in the different quarters of the globe. We congratulate his majesty on the signal advantages obtained by his majesty's arms in the expedition under sir H. Popham, and general Beresford, against the Spanish settlement of Buenos Ayres; advantages which, if seasonably supported and diligently improved, must be in the highest degree valuable to this country, opening fresh channels of commercial enterprise, and affording new and increasing encouragement to British manufactures and navigation; advantages doubly important at a moment when the other markets of the world are attempted to be closed against us.—We enter, with heartfelt exultation, into the sentiments so justly expressed by his majesty, on the brilliant victory obtained on the plains of Maida, by his majesty's land forces, under the gallant and able conduct of sir J. Stuart, over a French army, superior in numbers. We feel with his majesty, the full value of the seasonable check given, by this splendid achievement to the overweening confidence of the enemy; and of the proof which it affords that the character and constitution of the British army were not inadequate, upon their ancient footing, to maintain, unimpaired, the lustre of the British name, and the military glory of our ancestors.—That we shall nevertheless examine, with due attention and solicitude, into the effect of that new system which the late parliament were induced to adopt, for improving the character, as well as augmenting the amount of his majesty's regular forces; willing to hope that we shall have the satisfaction of discovering an improvement so striking, and an augmentation so rapid and abundant, as at once to have supplied all the deficiencies arising from the disuse of such measures as have been either abolished or suspended, and to compensate for the certain, permanent, and large addition which they have necessarily occasioned to the military expenditure of the state.—We shall investigate with equal care, the state of our other military establihments, and particularly that of the volunteers, the cheap, efficient, and patriotic defence of the united kingdom; we trust and believe that we shall find them, in spite of all discouragement and discountenance, neither abated in zeal, nor, as yet, materially reduced in numbers, at a period when it appears but too probable that their services may be more than ever essential to their country.—That we are fully sensible of his majesty's paternal affection for his subjects, manifested in the regret which he expresses at being compelled to call upon them for sacrifices of so great an extent as may be necessary in the present crisis of affairs. That however painful the duty of imposing fresh burthens upon the people, we shall, however, not shrink from discharging it; satisfied as we are of the prevailing determination of all ranks of the community to submit with cheerfulness to the indispensable necessity of providing means for the continuance of a contest, in the issue of which public safety and private happiness are alike inseparably involved.—That it is a consolation to us as to his majesty under the pressure of this inevitable necessity, to learn the flourishing state of public credit, and the productiveness of the several branches of the revenue: and that we agree entirely with his majesty in attributing these salutary effects in a great measure to the system so wisely begun, and so properly persevered in, of raising a considerable proportion of the supplies within the year, a system which has happily disappointed the predictions of the external and internal enemies of his majesty and his government.—That we earnestly wish it were in our power to close our address here. But we feel that we should be wanting as well in duty to his majesty as in fidelity to that people, in whose name and on whose behalf we are proffering sacrifices unexampled in magnitude and indefinite in duration, if we were to disguise from his majesty the deep and general sentiment which prevails respecting the measures which preceded and accompanied the late general election.—Far be it from us to question his majesty's undoubted prerogative. But we cannot reflect without concern and disapprobation upon the circumstances of surprise and deception which attended the sudden exercise of that prerogative in the dissolution of the late parliament; and particularly of his servants to mislead upon the irreverent use of his majesty's royal name in a proclamation summoning the late parliament to meet on a fixed and no distant day, issued at a period, when the measure of dissolving that parliament must already have been in contemplation.—Connected also with this subject, we cannot forbear to notice rumours which strongly prevail throughout the country, of the most improper and unconstitutional interference of his majesty's ministers in the course of the late Elections: rumours at once highly discreditable and injurious to his majesty's government, and to the independent character of parliament.—We hope that upon enquiry and examination they may be proved to be utterly unfounded.—But, convinced as we are, that the tendency (though we trust not the effect) of such interference, as is alledged, must have been to revolt and disgust the well-affected part of the community, and to sow distraction and discontent in place of that unanimity which is so loudly called for, at a moment when the prosperity of the British empire depends upon the consenting and cordial co-operation of all orders and descriptions of the people; convinced also, that it is our peculiar duty, as it is the common interest of all those who prize, as it deserves, the inestimable blessing of a free form of government, to mark with our strongest reprehension a perversion of power which would be too well calculated to favour those delusive and dangerous theories which stigmatize the house of commons as an inadequate representative of the people.—But while we feel this most unpleasant duty forced upon us, in vindication of our own independence, and of the rights of those whom we represent, we humbly and earnestly intreat his majesty to be persuaded, that neither this, nor any other misconduct of his majesty's ministers, can essentially affect the firm and settled purpose of this house and of the great body of the nation, to unite in that general cause, and against that common danger—in comparison to which all other considerations, however important in themselves, are at the present moment, unfortunately, inferior and subordinate.—And we venture confidently to assure his majesty, that great and unexampled as are the difficulties and dangers which surround us, his majesty possesses in the wealth and prosperity of his dominions, in the loyalty and firmness of his parliament, in the bravery of his fleets and armies, and in the affection, zeal, and courage of his people—resources, which, if wisely called forth, and diligently and judiciously applied, are yet amply sufficient to ensure the safety and honour of the British empire; and to maintain the only remaining hope, under Divine Providence, for the restoration of the liberties and happiness of mankind."—Mr. Canning added, that those gentlemen who thought that in the address to his majesty the house ought to overlook all our naval and military achievements, would, doubtless, prefer the original address; but those who thought with him, that what was cheering and consolatory should not be sunk into the shade, would, he trusted, approve of the amendment which he had just read. Apprehending, however, that the tendency of pressing his amendment would be to cause a division of the votes between the two addresses, and anxious that nothing should be occasioned, on his part, which might have a tendency to throw a damp on the spirit of the country, it was not his intention to press his amendment to a division. The speaker then put the question, "That the words proposed to be left out, stand part of this question." Upon which,

Lord *Howick* rose. He was certainly not surprized that the very extraordinary motion of the right hon. gent. should be thought of such a nature as not to require that it should be read from the chair; but he certainly was surprized that the right hon. gent. should have thought proper to submit to the house not only in this motion, but in many parts of the speech with which he prefaced it, assertions of facts unfounded in truth, and that he should have built on those facts, unwarranted conclusions, without investigation or enquiry, without having recourse to the authority of any document whatsoever. On such grounds, the hon. gent. had brought forward an amendment, charging his majesty's ministers with the most grave and momentous derelictions and deficiencies in the management of the army, of the navy, and of the foreign relations. The hon. gent. accused them of having excited universal discontent and disturbance in the army by an improper distribution of patronage; he accused them of prostituting the sacred name of his majesty, by dissolving parliament at a time when it was actually summoned to meet for the dispatch of business. The amendment proposed by the hon. gent. contained matters which, if founded in fact, ought to be referred to a committee to ground upon them articles of impeachment against his majesty's ministers. The hon. gent. thought it necessary to offer an apology for himself for being in opposition. The hon. gent. wished for unanimity, but when that unanimity would amount to an acquiescence in faults destructive to the country, it would be a dereliction of his duty to make it an invariable rule. The hon. gent. therefore contented himself with that qualified concord which, while it marked whatever was wrong, gave a general support to government. How far the hon. gent.'s speech agreed with the principles he had thus laid down, it was for the house to judge. As to the principles and character of the opposition that he himself had joined in, the popularity which that opposition had enjoyed for 15 years was the most satisfactory proof of their justice and propriety. It was an opposition of principle, and never could allow itself to give way to the low hostility of vexing and harassing by a warfare of details. The hon. gent. needed not to have gone back to the length of these 15 years to illustrate, by contrast, the nature of the opposition which he had resolved to enforce, after that painful struggle, in which he was so desirous to support the government, if duty did not sometimes compel him to oppose. The experience of the late general election might have told him, how far this opposition was popular, the public sentiment having been so strongly manifested with respect to it, and that when it stood forward proposing to vindicate the injured rights and wounded independence of the people. The hon. gent. accused ministers for their conduct in the recent negociations, and brought forward against them the promise they had made to substitute a direct and manly system of diplomacy, for former artifice and cunning, and the result of that promise. The hon. gent. also taunted ministers with those pretensions of great talents, which, however they may have been put abroad by others, were never once urged by ministers themselves. Yet, disclaiming all pretensions for himself, he for one was ready to say, that before the fatal stroke which had laid Mr. Fox by the side of his late illustrious rival, and he trusted united both in the mercy of God, the administration of which Mr. Fox and lord Grenville were the chief members, was the one which possessed the greatest share of knowledge, information, experience, and ability. Much of these great qualities was now in the grave; but, with the exception of the individual who was now addressing the house, without any disparagement to the hon. gent. who as well as many of those about him would, he allowed, be a valuable acquisition to any administration, he might challenge any one to look round, and state from what men an administration could be formed with better claims to the confidence of the country. The present ministers were told they were on a "bed of roses," they were told so by a noble lord (Castlereagh) who acknowledged that the continent was in a very "unsatisfactory" situation; they were told so after the battle of Austerlitz. Was it possible for the present ministers to remove all the distresses that had come upon the country in 15 years pregnant with calamities, during the time of the late administration, though perhaps without any blame to that administration? All that could be done was, to offer the best advice and aid in their power. That had been done. When the hon. gent. spoke in glowing colours of the calamities of Prussia, and of the evils extended to the world, in consequence of the destruction of that power, he had only to say, that no part of those misfortunes was caused by his majesty's ministers. The misfortunes of this case required none of those exaggerations the hon. gent. was so prone to. History recorded many instances of armies destroyed and empires ruined; but the destruction of the Prussian empire was sudden and complete beyond parallel. A mighty monarch, possessing a vast army, distinguished for military reputation, was in one day reduced to seek safety in a precipitate flight, accompanied but by a few faithful followers of his broken fortunes. The hon. gent. had introduced into his speech the melancholy fate of the duke of Brunswick. That gallant prince, after receiving his death wound, was carried into his palace, in a litter; but when all means of ease and safety were denied him there, he was carried beyond the frontier;—he could go no further, and his brave heart burst. But persecution did not stop here. Cæsar was merciful when the battle was over, and those who had fallen, opposing his ambition, were sure at least of honourable burial. But the son of this brave prince was refused permission to deposit his venerable father's remains in the vault of his ancestors. This melancholy event had been omitted, only because there was no precedent for mentioning it in the king's speech. It was not want of feeling; for who that read in remote history of things like this, was able to withhold the tribute of a tear? And how much more naturally did that tribute flow for distresses which happened in our own time, and which we almost saw with our own eyes! When, to use the words of the poet, we see "Darius great and good, fallen from his high estate and weltering in his blood;" what heart could be so callous as not to melt with sympathetic grief! When the calamities were real, and happened in our own time, their affliction must fall upon us with a double weight. And was it to be supposed that those who were charged with the weight of government should be peculiarly insensible, when deprived of the stays and supports which they should otherwise reckon upon, when their best hopes were lost? Their affliction was, indeed, most poignant; but it was some consolation to them to be exempt from the bitter reflection that it was brought about by an interposition of theirs, or by any delay of their timely aid.—With regard, continued the noble lord, to the hon. gent.'s allusions to Hanover as the sole cause of the declaration of war by this country against Prussia, I am astonished that the hon. gent. could hazard such an unfounded statement. Indeed, if the hon. gent. had taken the trouble of looking at the terms of the declaration itself, he would have there seen, that, so far from Hanover being the only cause, the shutting of the rivers in the north of Germany against our commerce was the principal alleged ground of hostility, and upon that ground the house voted the address to his majesty, which approved the course pursued by government upon that occasion. But even supposing that the ports in the north of Germany were not closed against our shipping, was not the detention of Hanover by Prussia, upon such grounds as that power alleged, of such a nature as this government could not subscribe to? Was it not such a claim, indeed, as our government could not allow any power to insist upon in a negociation, or to maintain without interruption? Would the hon. gent. say that it was? But, combining the detention of Hanover with the shutting up the ports I have already stated, would the hon. gent. as member of a cabinet, hesitate to advise his majesty to declare war against the power which should be guilty of such aggressions; or would he advise his majesty to conclude peace with a power which, under such circumstances, should insist upon withholding Hanover? Then, if the hon. gent. would not do so, what becomes of all the empty, and, I must say, trifling declamation which the house has heard from him? The hon. gent. has thought proper to condemn the time at which our government declared hostility against Prussia, triumphantly asking, whether it was wise and becoming in his majesty's ministers to make war upon Prussia for those measures which she had taken in compliance with the wishes or directions of France, at the time when we were engaged in a negociation with the latter power, one of the objects of which was to do away those measures, and the consequences resulting from them? But on this I shall only observe, that the question itself demonstrates that the hon. gent. has not taken much pains to consider the question. For upon reviewing even the selection of letters published by the French government upon the subject of the negociation, he must have seen that there was no negociation pending with France at the time his majesty's declaration appeared against Prussia; that selection alone furnishes enough to shew that the assertion of the hon. gent. was unfounded. The second letter of Mr. Fox to the French minister, which communicated the resolution of this country not to enter into the negociation but jointly with Russia, was dated the 26th of March, and to this letter no answer whatever was received until June. In the interim, that is, on the 23d of April, his majesty's message, relative to the Prussian war, was laid before this house. I would ask, then, whether, as no answer was returned to this letter for so long a period, it was not very natural to conclude that the propositions of his majesty's government would not be complied with, and that the negociation was wholly at an end? Such being the case then, how can any candid man, will even the hon. gent. himself, maintain, that the causes urged in his majesty's message did not form a justifiable ground of war? Why, how did the case stand? France refused to negociate with us upon such conditions as, consistently with our character, interests, and security, we thought it our bounden duty to demand, and Prussia, upon a most preposterous plea, affixes to her dominions the territory of Hanover, which was unjustly seized upon by France; and, in addition to this, Prussia orders our shipping to be excluded from the north of Germany. In the address which the hon. gent. has read to the house, I perceive that there are very many professions of personal attachment to our sovereign, and of anxious wishes for his interests. I would wish to know, then, from the right hon. author, or advocate of all these professions, whether he, as a minister, would conduct a negociation, and conclude a war which should alienate from that sovereign an hereditary possession, wrested from him originally on account merely of a war between this country and a foreign enemy—and in which war that hereditary possession had no concerns? Of the separate interest of this country and Hanover, I have read and heard much. Into the discussion, however, I do not now mean to enter; but, thinking as I do, that honour is the most valuable possession of any state, I have no hesitation in stating, that it would be highly injurious to the interests of England, because inconsistent with its honour, to leave Hanover to France or her allies, under such circumstances as I have already described. When Hanover was taken possession of by Prussia, it will be recollected that it was transferred to her by France, with whom she was in the closest alliance, and when this was connected with the original cause of the invasion of that electorate, I would appeal to this house and to the world, whether it could be reconciled with any sentiment of magnanimity, honour, or justice, to allow its lawful sovereign to be deprived of Hanover in consequence of a war between Great Britain and France. I think I have fully answered the hon. gent.'s observations upon this head. But there is another charge of the hon. gent.'s which he has dwelt upon as the most serious, and to which I shall take leave to apply a few remarks. The hon. gent. makes this heavy accusation, that we did not send timely assistance to Prussia. But how soon had we reason to suppose that Prussia was at all disposed to enter into hostilities with France? At the time we declared war against her, she was in close connection with the French government. But notwithstanding our declaration, she had opportunities enough of communicating to our government any intention she entertained with regard to France. For, although war against Prussia was declared in April, baron Jacobi did not leave this country until the 15th of August. Of course ample means of communication with our government was open to Prussia. But still nothing transpired to indicate to us the disposition of that power to break her connections with France, and to commence actual war. No sign of the separation appeared. But as soon as it became evident to us that Prussia determined on war, I venture to say, that not a moment was lost to afford that power every aid the nature of the case admitted, notwithstanding the relation in which we stood to her; and until the sincerity of Prussia in her opposition to the views of France became very manifest, I am sure that no rational statesman would have advised us to act, certainly not to send British troops to the continent: least of all could such advice be consistently given by those gentlemen who had last year sent forth a publication not at all calculated to encourage confidence in the character of the Prussian court. No man can feel more disinclined than I do to speak of that court, in its present situation, in terms at all approaching to harshness. But, I must observe that, under the impression generally prevalent as to the character and policy of the Prussian cabinet, and under the total ignorance in which this country was placed, as to its views respecting France, until almost immediately before the war commenced, his majesty's ministers were not fairly liable to the slightest degree of censure. For what was the fact that served to warrant any suspicion of hostility between Prussia and France? In the month of September, M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador, was recalled from the French court, in consequence of his becoming disagreeable to Bonaparte, and baron Knoblesdorff was appointed in his room, upon the express recommendation of Bonaparte himself. When that ambassador arrived at Paris, did his arrival serve to betray, or did he himself intimate to lord Lauderdale, who was then there, any change of disposition, on the part of Prussia, towards France? No, nothing whatever. And, in point of fact, the first communication which his majesty's ministers had as to the intentions of Prussia, was in a letter received from Mr. Thornton, our resident at Hamburgh, inclosing a letter from baron Jacobi, expressive of his (that nobleman's) wish to come to this country in something of an undescribed character (*sous un caractère quelconque*) in order to treat with us upon the subsisting differences between the two courts, and upon other matters of importance. Immediate measures were taken to facilitate the journey of baron Jacobi. That no intimation of the views of Prussia had been sooner received by our ambassador at Paris, was not at all attributable to any want of diligence, ability, and activity displayed on the part of the noble lord who conducted that mission in a manner so eminently worthy of his character, and so well calculated, had an appropriate disposition existed on the part of the enemy, to bring it to an amicable conclusion. But no opportunity offered to that noble lord to ascertain the altered views of Prussia. When, however, the intelligence of the alteration reached this country, ministers were not slow to act upon it. Baron Jacobi, whose proposals to this country turned out, after all, to be quite unsatisfactory, did not reach Hamburgh until the 1st of October, nor arrive in London until the 10th; nor communicate his propositions to his majesty's ministers until the 11th; and the battle of Auerstadt, it will be recollected, was fought on the 14th of that month.—From this statement, the house and the country will be enabled to appreciate the hon. gent.'s censure upon the conduct of his majesty's ministers in this transaction. That the conduct of Prussia towards the British government was not such as allowed the latter the least opportunity of affording her any timely or effectual assistance, must be obvious. But still more unaccountable was the course pursued by that court with regard to Russia her ally, who was pledged by treaty to assist her. The resolution of Prussia actually to commence hostilities was first communicated to the Russian government, by count Krusemark, who was dispatched with that intelligence to St. Petersburgh, which he did not reach until the 30th of September. The moment the tidings were conveyed to the magnanimous sovereign of Russia, orders were issued to set the troops in motion, and on the 5th of October an army was marched off under general Benigsen. Such was the procrastination of Prussia, even towards a court with whom she had no differences to adjust, from whom she had a right to call for immediate aid, and such was the course that rendered not only this country, but Russia, unable to afford her any effectual assistance! Upon all the points referred to relative to Prussia, I believe I have satisfactorily replied to the hon. gent. I will add, that it was the inclination and purpose of ministers to afford every assistance and advice in their power to aid the cause and to restore the interests of Prussia. The hon. gent. has said, that we have sent a minister to that court when the war was over. But I beg it to be remembered, that we could scarcely have expected that the battle of Auerstadt would have produced such direful consequences as have since arisen. I also beg to state, that the delay which took place in the departure of a noble lord (Hutchinson) was owing to two causes, first, that the noble lord was not in England when it was deemed adviseable to send him to the continent; and secondly, that he did not clearly understand my first message to him. But when the mistake was removed, no time was lost in his lordship's departure, and I feel confident that the selection of this nobleman for such a mission, is a measure not likely to be found fault with by any man.—Now, as to the hon. gent.'s remarks upon the negociation, he has declined to enter fully into the subject, but yet in stating, professedly with a view to inform ministers of the points upon which he should feel it necessary to require further explanation, he has not declined to indulge in a strain of animadversion very well calculated to produce an undue opinion of the case. Without waiting for the further explanations which he professed to think necessary, he has thought proper to assert, that the statement in his majesty's declaration relative to the first overture for a negociation coming from the French government, appeared to be unfounded. Does the hon. gent. mean to argue that the first letter of my late right hon. friend which related merely to the assassin, and which did equal honour to the head and heart of that illustrious person, had any reference whatever to a negociation for peace? No, not a word about it. The right hon. gent. has also animadverted with some severity on Mr. Fox for not having disclaimed the compliment paid exclusively to himself on the subject of this assassin. Every one who knew him was sensible, that exalted man was ever anxious and eager to defend the character of friend or foe when assailed by base aspersions. He had done so at the court of France during the interval of peace, and when Buonaparte intimated to him, that my right hon. friend near me (Mr. Windham) was the abettor of a conspiracy against his life, he openly declared to him, in the presence of his whole court, that it was a false accusation; that he was sensible and confident it must be so, for that Mr. Windham was, to his knowledge, a gentleman possessing the highest sense of honour, and altogether incapable of so base a design. Then why should the letter of my distinguished predecessor, be subject to the interpretation attached to it? But as to the circumstance of making the first overture for peace, I perfectly concur with the hon. gent., that there is nothing dishonourable in the thing itself, provided circumstances call for it. So far, indeed, am I from entertaining any such opinion, that were a promising opportunity to offer, and any change to appear in the pretensions of the enemy, I should not be slow to make an overture for negociation, from any fear of the reprehension that it might incur, particularly on the score of false pride. But with respect to the late negociation, I am warranted in asserting, that when the person at the head of the French government told one of his assemblies that the first overture was made by this country, he stated that which was untrue. The correspondence published by the French government is imperfect in a material point as to this part of the case. Only one letter in answer to the first letter of Mr. Fox appears in this publication, and a second letter, by which it was accompanied, is altogether omitted. In this second letter, which is by much the more material, Talleyrand writes somewhat in these terms, "Probably you would desire "to receive news from this country. I "send you the emperor's speech to the legis- "lative body, in which you will perceive "how pacific his sentiments are. I do "not ask what is the prevailing inclination "with you: but if the advantages of peace "are duly appreciated, you know upon "what basis it may be discussed." Now, this letter being suppressed, the hon. gent. and others, who think with him, are of course incompetent to judge upon this point, with regard to which they seem disposed to form such a positive opinion. But this letter will be laid before the house, accompanied with some private communications upon the same point, which we received through lord Yarmouth, and which neither this house nor the public have yet seen. From these communications this country and Europe will be able to judge upon what conditions we proposed to treat; also what points the French minister acceded to, and what points he afterwards retracted.—As to the proposition of the *uti possidetis*, that will be fully explained by the correspondence which we have to lay before the house. In the French publication of the papers, you will observe an immense chasm from the month of June till the arrival of lord Lauderdale: during that interval, lord Yarmouth was at Paris, not, to be sure, as an accredited minister, and therefore no formal notes were interchanged; but we have his dispatches regularly transmitted to us, and which elucidate the nature of his communications with the French minister, particularly relative to our demand of negociating in conjunction with Russia. This is a demand from which we never swerved, until the treaty of M. D'Oubril rendered it unnecessary for us to persist in that condition. But, even then, we consented only in order to prevent farther delay, to enter into a provisional negociation, until the opinion of the Russian court should be ascertained. That the fidelity of that government could not be shaken, was soon made evident. Our disposition to make an adequate return for such fidelity, cannot in any part of this transaction, be for one moment questioned. When the object of the negociation, and the peace to which it was once expected to lead, was to cement our alliance with this great and honourable government, to check the farther aggrandisement of French power, and to restore and secure what remained of independence in Europe, among others of course, the states of Prussia, I am astonished that the right hon. gent. should manifest such a decided temper of hostility to that negociation, and to an address which proposes to thank his majesty for commencing and pursuing it with such benevolent, wise, and exalted views. But, the whole history of this negociation will form the most complete answer to the hon. gent.'s objections, and the best antidote to the unbecoming sarcasms which the hon. gent. has thought proper to deal out, particularly against the conduct of my illustrious predecessor, who is most unaccountably censured for a want of that simplicity and manliness of character which are most strikingly obvious in his letters. That my right hon. friend made no concealment of a negociation with France at the time he brought down the message relative to Prussia, because in fact no negociation was then on the tapis, and that his conduct was in this, as in every instance of his life, plain, open, and manly, a simple statement of the fact may fully demonstrate. The hon. gent.'s attack, therefore, is powerless with regard to my deceased friend. But the attacks of the hon. gent. are general. Among the rest, he has thought proper to level his shafts at me; not, however, in his speech. He reserved me for his address, where he complains of predatory squadrons being allowed to maraud without interruption, among our West-India colonies. He has not, however, stated the amount of these squadrons, the amount of the mischief they have done, nay more, the means by which they were able to get out of port. Now, the fact is, that the squadrons alluded to by the hon. gent., were at sea before I was appointed to the admiralty. One squadron sailed in Oct. 1805, and the other on the 11th of Dec. following: and when I came to the admiralty there was not a scrap of paper to be found that could inform us as to the destination of those squadrons. We had nothing whatever to guide our judgment, we were left to our own enquiry, and we could only send out squadrons in pursuit of them in every direction where they were likely to have steered, or where any mischief could be done. Things remained thus till I got intelligence of the fleet, after which sir John Duckworth went in search, and the event of his 8 months gallant cruize in search of them is well known. Those fleets of the enemy did certainly reach the West Indies, and very much interrupted and injured our commere there and on the coast of Africa; but this is in no degree imputable as any blame to the present administration. Since they came into power, not a single squadron has escaped from their own ports, except one, and out of that, 4 or 5 of the frigates which composed it have been taken; our fleets at present block them up in every port along the whole extent of the coast. The fleets which formerly escaped from these ports, have been mostly scattered and dispersed in different quarters of the globe; some of them have been so fortunate as to reach home again, by separating, and by single ships stealing into their own ports in the night, in the same clandestine way in which they had stolen out. Some of them are now blockaded in the American ports, where our ships are waiting to watch their coming out, and if they shall dare to do so, I have no doubt we shall have a good account of them. The last we heard of, had, to avoid our ships, sailed into a port, where a ship of her size had never been known to enter before; and there is every reason to hope and believe, that the winds and sea will beat her to pieces before the winter is over.—I next come to the embarkation that the hon. gent. seems to think we ought to have prepared on our first coming into office. The expeditions that he doubtless means to suggest that we ought to have sent out, would be for the West Indies. But has he considered, that if, as soon as we had been in office, we had prepared such an expedition, it would not have arrived at the West Indies until the latter end of May, or the beginning of June? and that, surely, is not a time for beginning military operations in the West Indies: [lord Castlereagh said across the house, not to the West Indies.] O, then, I suppose it is meant that we should have sent an expedition to some part of South America. They should however, suppose that the novelty of such an expedition, and the extent of the operations on that continent, would be of a nature to require at least some time to consider and prepare. Whatever success we have obtained in South America, his majesty's ministers do not pretend to give themselves any credit for. On the 21st of Sept. they gave an order that the transports should return from the Cape empty. The first notice that the present government ever received of such an expedition, was by dispatches that they received on the 24th of June, dated from St. Helena in the month of April. At that time it was a matter of serious difficulty to know what to resolve upon. If they had sent out a strong fleet, and that fleet should find that sir Home Popham's expedition had sailed, they would not have known what part to go to. His majesty's ministers were not, however, negligent. They sent the Sampson man of war, and a convoy which sailed under her protection, as soon as the wind would permit. If a more considerable reinforcement was not sent, the hon. gent. must acknowledge, that there might be other services which appeared more pressing, and that in the situation the continent then was, it was extremely desireable to keep a considerable disposable force at home, to take the advantage of any favourable opportunity on the continent. Sir Samuel Achmuty's squadron sailed for Buenos Ayres on the 9th of Oct. which was only a month after it was known the place was in our possession, and if it did not sail sooner, it was merely because it was detained by unfavourable winds. As to the discontent that the hon. gent. states to have been produced by general Craufurd's appointment, I must only observe that he certainly knows nothing of the nature or the object of the expedition which has been confided to gen. Craufurd. His majesty's ministers have certainly a right to select those officers whom they may think most proper to execute those particular things that are entrusted to them. But why are we to suppose that this selection of gen. Craufurd has given great offence? We have never heard, neither does the hon. gent. now allege, that the selection of sir Home Popham ever gave any offence, and yet sir Home Popham has at least as many superiors in the navy, as gen. Craufurd has in the army. He is only the 160th upon the list of captains; and yet who ever heard that the navy were discontented, because sir Home Popham was employed, while many of his seniors were unemployed? We are charged with having superseded sir John Stuart, sir Home Popham, and sir David Baird. As to sir John Stuart, it certainly is not fair to say that he was superseded. At first, 7000 men were placed under his command for the defence of Sicily; afterwards, that number had been increased to an army of 16,000 men, who were commanded by gen. Fox. This was not superseding sir John Stuart, but making his division a part of a much larger army. It cannot be said, that we think lightly, or wish to speak lightly of the services performed by sir John Stuart. Nobody holds them in a higher light than I do, nor feels more proudly, as an Englishman, at the glorious event of the battle of Maida; but if the hon. gent. had had but the patience to wait for a few hours longer, he would probably have heard from my right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) a notice of a motion for the purpose of returning thanks to sir John Stuart, and those officers who distinguished themselves in that action. I believe, if he considers a little, he will not suppose that it was merely for the purpose of giving gen. Fox a high command, that the additional army was sent to Sicily. As to sir Home Popham and sir David Baird, I freely confess that I was one of those who advised their recall, and upon the ground that they did without orders, and upon their own judgement and responsibility, undertake the expedition to South America. In prosecution of their scheme, they did not even leave a single ship of the line to protect the Cape of Good Hope. They even obliged a frigate that was sent out to India with money for the payment of the troops there, to desert the destination that it was intended for and go upon this South American expedition. Such conduct as this I consider highly reprehensible, and were it to be overlooked, there would be an end to all discipline and subordination. I do not wish to dwell upon the misconduct of men in their absence: but there is one act of sir Home Popham's which I cannot hesitate to censure as particularly improper, and that is, his letter to the manufacturers. What his motives for such conduct were, I cannot say. Perhaps he wished to court some favour and protection against the censure which he must be conscious of deserving from government. Perhaps this letter to seek mercantile gratitude, while offending against professional duty, was one of the fatal effects to be apprehended from that mischievous system of rewards administered by the committee at Lloyd's, called the Patriotic Fund, a committee which is held out to the navy as giving greater reward and encouragement than the government of the country. I do consider the conduct of sir Home Popham, as highly reprehensible in a British officer, and, therefore, although I should be sorry to pronounce strongly on the conduct of any man until he has had an opportunity of justifying himself, yet I will say, that there is nothing in the first appearance of this transaction, which a British parliament can approve of. If such conduct as this appears to be, could be not only justified but approved of, it would then follow, that all our military governors, in the West Indies, in Gibraltar, and in every other part of the world, might totally disregard the instructions they should receive from government, and turn their whole forces wherever their private opinion, or wherever their interest might point out. This is a doctrine, which I am sure the hon. gent. would not wish to hold out to our army and navy. As to the changes in our ambassadors, and that to which he principally alludes, of sending Mr. Adair in the place of sir A. Paget, I must observe, that, after the very incautious publication of his correspondence by the late government, it is not extraordinary that we should think it proper that some other person should be sent out to succeed him.—As to the dissolution of parliament, it is by no means surprising, that, after the negociation had completely failed, his majesty's ministers should advise his majesty to recur to the sense of his people, as the means most likely to obtain that unanimity which is so desireable under the present circumstances. The dissolution was at a time when the public business was over, when the harvest was finished, and when it appeared that the election could be carried on without the least disadvantage to the industry and convenience of the nation. We are charged with abusing the name of the king on a former occasion; but to that charge I will simply answer, that his majesty's ministers had no idea of advising the dissolution of parliament until they heard of the complete failure of the negociation, and as soon as they were informed of that event they advised it. As to the charge of his majesty's ministers having used improper means to influence the election, I believe there have been complaints that government did not employ that influence which they fairly might have employed. I can take upon myself to say in the face of this house and of the public, that in no instance was a single shilling of the public money employed in any election throughout the country. For what reason the long amendment of the hon. gent. has been proposed, I know not; perhaps it was to answer the purpose of publication. Whatever may have been the motives, I think I have generally replied to it, and I shall be ready to meet the charges separately, and more in detail, whenever the subject is brought regularly before the house.

Lord *Castlereagh* assured the house, that it was not his intention to trespass on the time of the house, by entering at length into the consideration of the present subject, particularly as all the papers and documents relating to it had not as yet been laid on the table. He agreed with the noble lord, who had displayed great eloquence and very considerable talents in the vindication of himself and the rest of his majesty's ministers, that the proper time for considering the important question of negociation with France was, when the whole of the correspondence should be laid before the house. Coinciding with him thus generally on the subject of the negociation as to the fitness of the time for discussing it, he begged leave, however, to observe, that the course pursued by the noble lord and his colleagues in office was not founded in wisdom, nor the propositions of the noble lord borne out by sound argument. Before he undertook to shew the fallacy of the noble lord's reasoning on many of the general points contained in his speech, he should make a few preliminary remarks on the noble lord's reply and comments on his right hon. friend's amendment. Whence arose the noble lord's exultation and marked display of triumph at his right hon. friend's resolution not to press the question to a division? It would appear as if ministers thought themselves certain of the confidence of the house, and secure of a majority; but, leaving them to enjoy their own feelings on the occasion, he could not but applaud the view and object of his right hon. friend in not dividing the house under the present circumstances. In whatever light the amendment might be considered by ministers, he was sure that every impartial person who attended to it seriously, must acknowledge that it was founded on matter of fact, and not on opinions and assertions. His right hon. friend had not endeavoured to attack the government under a notice of a motion for an enquiry into their conduct; he did not thus impute blame to them, and suspend an implied charge over their heads. No! he exhibited his complaint in the first instance, supported by facts, boldly and unequivocally advanced, which gave ministers a fair opportunity of explaining themselves, and vindicating their measures. The noble lord had, in some parts of his speech, took credit to himself and his friends, for having uniformly acted in opposition from principle, and not from a spirit of teasing and harassing government unnecessarily. He could also assure the house that both himself and those who acted with him on the same side were influenced by no motive in their opposition but public principle. They felt it their duty to watch and revise the acts of ministers, in order to call them to an account. Such a thing might be deemed bad or reprehensible. On this ground therefore the opposition, of which the noble lord had formed a distinguished part, could not stand in competition, with respect to the discharge of public duty, with the present opposition; for his lordship must recollect, that he and his friends had turned their backs on parliament, and neglected all public concerns in the hour of distress and peril: when public duty required their attendance, they were not to be found at their posts; they had seceded and abandoned the cause of the country, and the trust reposed in them by their constituents. Having said thus much respecting the preliminary topics of the noble lord's speech, he should now proceed to call the attention of the house to some prominent points of the negociation, which was the main question; and first, he readily admitted, that the issue of the negociation was disgraceful to the enemy, and honourable, on the whole, to this country, even from the present blush of it; but, notwithstanding this admission, he felt much anxiety respecting many circumstances connected with, and arising out of it; but he trusted ministers would be able, when the papers were produced, to remove his present uneasiness. As he had already observed, there were many points of the negociation which required very satisfactory explanation. He was apprehensive, however, that in carrying on the discussions, ministers had deluded both themselves and Europe; it necessarily followed that the powers of the continent had their attention fixed on the progress of a negociation which lasted 8 months, and what naturally must have been the result, but that their disposition to co-operate against France had relaxed or produced indecision? It was to be shewn, therefore, what effect the negociation had on the rest of Europe; it remained for ministers to prove that their protracted pacific discussion had not exposed and endangered the interest and security of the continent. It might have induced Russia to enter into a negociation with the French government; it might have even led Prussia to make a premature demonstration of hostility against France, in order to assure both England and Russia that the cabinet of Berlin was determined to submit no longer to the humiliation and insults of the enemy. These circumstances, and many more which arose from the pendency of a negociation for 8 months, undoubtedly made the production of all the papers on the subject highly desirable and necessary. From the conduct of ministers during the negociation, it appeared as if they had been certain of peace; if they had not made sure of peace, was it possible, that during 8 months, while the discussions lasted, they should have laid up did without orders, and upon their own judgement and responsibility, undertake the expedition to South America. In prosecution of their scheme, they did not even leave a single ship of the line to protect the Cape of Good Hope. They even obliged a frigate that was sent out to India with money for the payment of the troops there, to desert the destination that it was intended for and go upon this South American expedition. Such conduct as this I consider highly reprehensible, and were it to be overlooked, there would be an end to all discipline and subordination. I do not wish to dwell upon the misconduct of men in their absence: but there is one act of sir Home Popham's which I cannot hesitate to censure as particularly improper, and that is, his letter to the manufacturers. What his motives for such conduct were, I cannot say. Perhaps he wished to court some favour and protection against the censure which he must be conscious of deserving from government. Perhaps this letter to seek mercantile gratitude, while offending against professional duty, was one of the fatal effects to be apprehended from that mischievous system of rewards administered by the committee at Lloyd's, called the Patriotic Fund, a committee which is held out to the navy as giving greater reward and encouragement than the government of the country. I do consider the conduct of sir Home Popham, as highly reprehensible in a British officer, and, therefore, although I should be sorry to pronounce strongly on the conduct of any man until he has had an opportunity of justifying himself, yet I will say, that there is nothing in the first appearance of this transaction, which a British parliament can approve of. If such conduct as this appears to be, could be not only justified but approved of, it would then follow, that all our military governors, in the West Indies, in Gibraltar, and in every other part of the world, might totally disregard the instructions they should receive from government, and turn their whole forces wherever their private opinion, or wherever their interest might point out. This is a doctrine, which I am sure the hon. gent. would not wish to hold out to our army and navy. As to the changes in our ambassadors, and that to which he principally alludes, of sending Mr. Adair in the place of sir A. Paget, I must observe, that, after the very incautious publication of his correspondence by the late government, it is not extraordinary that we should think it proper that some other person should be sent out to succeed him.—As to the dissolution of parliament, it is by no means surprising, that, after the negociation had completely failed, his majesty's ministers should advise his majesty to recur to the sense of his people, as the means most likely to obtain that unanimity which is so desireable under the present circumstances. The dissolution was at a time when the public business was over, when the harvest was finished, and when it appeared that the election could be carried on without the least disadvantage to the industry and convenience of the nation. We are charged with abusing the name of the king on a former occasion; but to that charge I will simply answer, that his majesty's ministers had no idea of advising the dissolution of parliament until they heard of the complete failure of the negociation, and as soon as they were informed of that event they advised it. As to the charge of his majesty's ministers having used improper means to influence the election, I believe there have been complaints that government did not employ that influence which they fairly might have employed. I can take upon myself to say in the face of this house and of the public, that in no instance was a single shilling of the public money employed in any election throughout the country. For what reason the long amendment of the hon. gent. has been proposed, I know not; perhaps it was to answer the purpose of publication. Whatever may have been the motives, I think I have generally replied to it, and I shall be ready to meet the charges separately, and more in detail, whenever the subject is brought regularly before the house.

Lord *Castlereagh* assured the house, that it was not his intention to trespass on the time of the house, by entering at length into the consideration of the present subject, particularly as all the papers and documents relating to it had not as yet been laid on the table. He agreed with the noble lord, who had displayed great eloquence and very considerable talents in the vindication of himself and the rest of his majesty's ministers, that the proper time for considering the important question of negociation with France was, when the whole of the correspondence should be laid before the house. Coinciding with him thus generally on the subject of the negociation as to the fitness of the time for discussing it, he begged leave, however, to observe, that the course pursued by the noble lord and his colleagues in office was not founded in wisdom, nor the propositions of the noble lord borne out by sound argument. Before he undertook to shew the fallacy of the noble lord's reasoning on many of the general points contained in his speech, he should make a few preliminary remarks on the noble lord's reply and comments on his right hon. friend's amendment. Whence arose the noble lord's exultation and marked display of triumph at his right hon. friend's resolution not to press the question to a division? It would appear as if ministers thought themselves certain of the confidence of the house, and secure of a majority; but, leaving them to enjoy their own feelings on the occasion, he could not but applaud the view and object of his right hon. friend in not dividing the house under the present circumstances. In whatever light the amendment might be considered by ministers, he was sure that every impartial person who attended to it seriously, must acknowledge that it was founded on matter of fact, and not on opinions and assertions. His right hon. friend had not endeavoured to attack the government under a notice of a motion for an enquiry into their conduct; he did not thus impute blame to them, and suspend an implied charge over their heads. No! he exhibited his complaint in the first instance, supported by facts, boldly and unequivocally advanced, which gave ministers a fair opportunity of explaining themselves, and vindicating their measures. The noble lord had, in some parts of his speech, took credit to himself and his friends, for having uniformly acted in opposition from principle, and not from a spirit of teasing and harassing government unnecessarily. He could also assure the house that both himself and those who acted with him on the same side were influenced by no motive in their opposition but public principle. They felt it their duty to watch and revise the acts of ministers, in order to call them to an account. Such a thing might be deemed bad or reprehensible. On this ground therefore the opposition, of which the noble lord had formed a distinguished part, could not stand in competition, with respect to the discharge of public duty, with the present opposition; for his lordship must recollect, that he and his friends had turned their backs on parliament, and neglected all public concerns in the hour of distress and peril: when public duty required their attendance, they were not to be found at their posts; they had seceded and abandoned the cause of the country, and the trust reposed in them by their constituents. Having said thus much respecting the preliminary topics of the noble lord's speech, he should now proceed to call the attention of the house to some prominent points of the negociation, which was the main question; and first, he readily admitted, that the issue of the negociation was disgraceful to the enemy, and honourable, on the whole, to this country, even from the present blush of it; but, notwithstanding this admission, he felt much anxiety respecting many circumstances connected with, and arising out of it; but he trusted ministers would be able, when the papers were produced, to remove his present uneasiness. As he had already observed, there were many points of the negociation which required very satisfactory explanation. He was apprehensive, however, that in carrying on the discussions, ministers had deluded both themselves and Europe; it necessarily followed that the powers of the continent had their attention fixed on the progress of a negociation which lasted 8 months, and what naturally must have been the result, but that their disposition to co-operate against France had relaxed or produced indecision? It was to be shewn, therefore, what effect the negociation had on the rest of Europe; it remained for ministers to prove that their protracted pacific discussion had not exposed and endangered the interest and security of the continent. It might have induced Russia to enter into a negociation with the French government; it might have even led Prussia to make a premature demonstration of hostility against France, in order to assure both England and Russia that the cabinet of Berlin was determined to submit no longer to the humiliation and insults of the enemy. These circumstances, and many more which arose from the pendency of a negociation for 8 months, undoubtedly made the production of all the papers on the subject highly desirable and necessary. From the conduct of ministers during the negociation, it appeared as if they had been certain of peace; if they had not made sure of peace, was it possible, that during 8 months, while the discussions lasted, they should have laid up all their military plans, and the whole system of internal defence and security? Upon what other possible ground was the General Training act suspended in a great measure? Why was the instruction for regulating the army according to the new system postponed till the return of lord Lauderdale? On what ground could the neglect of all military resources be accounted for, but on the certainty of peace, under the severest terms of an armistice? It was impossible to conceive a more general torpor than that which pervaded every branch of the army during the whole of those anxious 8 months. After having paid the closest attention to the subject, he could only discern that 3 regiments of the line had been sent up the Mediterranean, and arrived just in time to see our gallant troops abandoning the brave and loyal Calabrians, to whom our commander had promised every assistance. He begged likewise to remind the house, that not a man had sailed for Buenos Ayres till the return of lord Lauderdale was known. Under the circumstances of the case they should either have recalled general Beresford, or sent out a reinforcement immediately. They had left that valuable capture 4 months without any reinforcement; and if the gallant officer commanding at the Cape had not detached some of his troops, it would be impossible to tell the consequence. This, however, was not the only proof of their indecision; there was another equally strong in their conduct towards general Miranda. He did not mean to discuss the policy of forwarding that officer's projects, that was a subject which required consideration: but why had not ministers decided one way or other on a question obviously interesting to the British empire? So far was government from making up their mind on it, that our commanders were obliged constantly to reply to the applications made to them for support, that they would write home for instructions; and at last we contributed our aid by sending a few light armed vessels to convoy the expedition.—As another proof that ministers had relied on the certainty of peace, the noble lord mentioned the situation of our troops at Plymouth, where they had remained 4 months in a most deplorable condition, at the expiration of which time the half of them sailed for Sicily, where they remained locked up at the very moment when they should be ready at home to second our allies on the continent. It was evident that ministers could not commit such gross mismanagement if they had not literally duped themselves with the sanguine expectation of peace with Buonaparte.—Here the noble lord contrasted the confederacy of last year with the one formed this year, and inferred from the comparison, that the former, though unsuccessful, had displayed combination, energy, and wisdom, while the latter, as far as ministers were concerned, exhibited the utmost imbecility. With respect to the appointment of brigadier-general Craufurd, to the command of so large and important an expedition as had lately sailed, he concurred with his right hon. friend in saying, that it was naturally a subject which had dissatisfied many; to that officer, personally, he could not have the smallest objection, he had an opportunity of seeing his talents displayed in Ireland to the greatest advantage, and had no doubt whatever of his possessing great military skill; but it should be remembered, that he was only the fourth or fifth colonel in the service, and consequently, that if any thing occurred on the voyage, or on the arrival of the expedition at its destination, to prevent him from attending his duty, the command in chief must necessarily devolve on a lieut. colonel under him. This would be an unprecedented situation for the troops to be placed in. He saw no necessity of giving an appointment which had excited such surprise and disgust throughout the army. Surely, it was easy for the right hon. secretary (Mr. Windham) to have made a selection which would have given satisfaction, and have conducted the expedition with equal gallantry and success. The only merit his majesty's ministers could pretend to claim on account of the business in South America, was that of having given a considerable disposeable force to officers invested with a certain discretion. As to the dissolution of parliament, he highly disapproved of it. In lord Howick's letter to the lord mayor, dated the 8th of October, there was not a word of the dissolution of parliament, but upon the 10th, parliament was dissolved. This was a course of proceeding which was neither justified by precedent nor fair dealing. He considered it as an electioneering trick of government, and a measure not called for by necessity; and bestowed praises on the last parliament for the integrity of its proceedings. He contrasted the late dissolution with that in 1784, which he maintained to be a constitutional exercise of the royal prerogative; but here it was made use of from party motives, and for party purposes. He thought the amendment of his right hon. friend a perfectly manly mode of telling ministers wherein their conduct was to be objected to; but he was glad his right hon. friend did not press for a division. It was very different from the conduct of opposition for the last 15 years; for those gentlemen cared not to commit to writing their sentiments, but almost always dealt in general censure.—The original motion on the address was then put and carried, *nem. con.*

Lord *Howick* then rose and said, that he hoped to be able on Monday next, to lay the papers relative to the negociation before the house, as every exertion was making to have them prepared as early as possible.

Mr. Secretary *Windham* gave notice, that on Monday next he should move the thanks of the house to sir John Stuart, and the officers and men who had fought under him at the glorious battle of Maida.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Saturday, December 20.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Johnson from the office of the chief secretary of Ireland, presented the 3d and 4th reports of the commissioners appointed to enquire into the Fees, &c. of the public offices of Ireland.—On the motion of Mr. Hobhouse, the usual committee to enquire into Expiring Laws was appointed.—On the suggestion of lord Howick, it was resolved, that no petitions for private bills should be received after Friday, the 27th day of Feb. next.—It was also understood, on the intimation of lord Howick, and with the acquiescence of the Speaker, that public business should commence every day at half-past four o'clock.—The Speaker having enquired whether or not there were any Election Petitions to be presented, and having stated the order by which, according to the rules of the house, the several classes of those petitions ought to be arranged, the following were presented and read, and ordered to be taken into consideration on the days attached to them, viz.—From Horsham Jan. 8, Penryn Jan. 8, Saltash Jan. 13, Westminster Jan. 13, Tregony Jan. 20, Maldon Jan. 20, Aberdeen Jan. 22. The Westminster petition, presented by lord Folkestone, was from James Paull, esq. complaining of the undue return of R. B. Sheridan, esq. The petition stated, that, regardless of the laws against bribery and corruption, Mr. Sheridan had been guilty of those offences, by giving rewards, in various ways, to many of the electors who voted for him; that he had used threats to induce those who would otherwise have voted for Mr. Paull, to vote for him; that he had procured a considerable number of illegal votes, and that by such means he had obtained a colourable majority, and was returned, with sir S. Hood, as a member in the present parliament for the city of Westminster. The petitioner concluded by praying relief.

[THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS' SPEECH.] Mr. Lamb brought up the report of the address to his majesty, in answer to his majesty's most gracious speech. On the motion for its being read,

Lord *Howick*, unwilling that any thing which he might have said should mislead the house or the country, rose to explain two circumstances in the debate of the preceding evening. It was certainly not extraordinary, in the new and important situation in which he found himself placed, that his embarrassment should be productive of some error, however unintentional. He certainly had last night conceived and stated, that Mr. Fox's last letter, respecting any negociation with France in which Russia should not be included, was dated as far back as the 26th of March; but having since referred to the official documents, he found that the date of the letter to which he had alluded was the 20th April; and therefore so far the argument of the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Canning) carried with it more weight than in the other case it would be entitled to. Having said thus much in correction of his statement, he should proceed to the explanation of another point in dispute. Very heavy censure had been passed by the noble lord (Castlereagh) and the right hon. gent. against his late right hon. friend (Mr. Fox) for not having repelled the accusation of preceding administrations contained in M. Talleyrand's reply to his first letter. To prevent any misapprehension that might go forth, before the papers should be laid on the table of the house, he would distinctly declare, that his right hon. friend had repelled that accusation, though the French government, in the publication which they caused to be made of the correspondence, had thought proper to suppress that part of it.

Mr. *Canning* felt himself under the utmost obligation to the noble lord for the extreme candour, which prompted him to come forward and make the statements which he had done. With regard to the date of Mr. Fox's letter, it certainly had surprized him very much yesterday evening, when the noble lord declared the date which he had just corrected; but he did not see that the alteration of date made such a difference in the state of the argument, as the noble lord seemed willing to allow. He had contended, that not on one particular day alone, but that on every day the situation of this country, with respect to Russia, ought to have been present to the minds of his majesty's ministers, and to have influenced their conduct. With respect to the suppression by the French government of the defence, which it now appeared by the noble lord's statement, had been made by Mr. Fox, of the conduct of antecedent administrations against the foul charges preferred against them, it gave him great satisfaction to find that such a defence had been made. The house would recollect, however, that he had last night only reasoned hypothetically on this subject, declaring, that if the chasms in the correspondence which he had described should not be properly supplied, such and such must be the consequences necessarily to be deduced from that omission. In pointing out these chasms, he conceived that he had done a service to his majesty's ministers.

Lord *Howick* added to his former statement, that Mr. Fox in his letter declared, that what he did was with the direct approbation of all his colleagues.

Mr. *Perceval* said, he did not rise to oppose the address, but merely to notice one or two points which had been omitted in his majesty's speech to the house. There were a few topics also to which he wished to advert on the present occasion, just to let the noble lord who introduced them, see that his triumph was not as complete as he had induced himself to imagine. The noble lord had, in the course of his speech last night, drawn a comparison between the 15 years opposition, of which the noble lord had been a distinguished member, and the present opposition, which he characterized as factious and harassing, while he complimented his own, as one which had been uniformly actuated by principle. Allowing the noble lord all the enjoyment which he could derive from his retrospect, he should tell him, that however he might please to denominate the present opposition, he would find them at their post, attending to the progress of public business, and paying particular attention to the conduct and measures of ministers. If the noble lord thought that this kind of opposition, founded on public duty, was harassing, he frankly informed the noble lord in time, that he could not expect much indulgence or sound repose during the session. The noble lord had laid great stress on the term popularity, which he emphatically declared the present opposition did not possess. This was a point, however, on which he did not see that the noble lord had great reason to exult. Let him look to the result of the general election. A reference to the contests in those places where the largest share of popularity might have been manifested, would soon shew of what quality and description the popularity of the ministerial candidates was composed. Look to Norfolk and Southwark; come then to Hampshire; but of the election for that place he should not now take any other notice, than just mentioning that his lordship would hear more respecting it, before the end of the session, than might be palateable. The noble lord could not be ignorant of the sort of popularity which distinguished the treasurer of the navy (Mr. Sheridan) from the other candidates, at the election for Westminster. Observing that the right hon. gent. was not in his place, he should abstain, at present, from taking a view of ministerial popularity in that city. He would take the liberty, however, of asking a right hon. gent. (Mr. Tierney) whom he was glad to see in the house, what he thought of the point at issue? Why was he unsuccessful at Southwark, if the friends of ministers had been as popular as the noble lord would infer from comparison? The fact was, that as soon as the right hon. gent. connected himself with the negative quality of popularity which belonged to the present ministers, he found that he could not be returned.—With regard to the subjects referred to in his majesty's speech, there were many points which would be open to future consideration, when the official papers should be before the house. This, however, he wished the noble lord to believe, that in his opinion—and it was an opinion in which every man in the house and the country must coincide—were no papers produced but those already published by the French government, it would be no difficult matter to prove that England, during the whole of the negociation, had maintained her character for sincerity and honour. On the very face of those papers appeared artifice on the one side, practising on credulity, on the other. There was one occurrence in the progress of the negociation which, it struck him, required explanation. It appeared by the French publication, that there had been two notes written on the same day, the 14th of June, contradictory to each other. The argument in the longer of these notes, was completely opposed by the act in the shorter of them. They related to the rejection of any negociation, but in concert with our allies; but it seemed very probable that the communications from lord Yarmouth would clear up this at present inexplicable point. With regard to the omission in the address, of any condolence with his majesty on the death of the duke of Brunswick, if it had been possible to suppose that ministers could have contemplated that event without the proper feelings that it was calculated to excite, the impressive and pathetic manner, so highly honourable to himself, in which the noble lord had last night mentioned the circumstance, must completely have destroyed such a supposition. But the noble lord declared, that he had in vain ransacked the parliamentary records for a precedent. What precedent could he expect to find? Was there ever an instance of the brother-in-law of the sovereign, and the father of the princess of Wales, stripped of his dominions, and dying in battle, in defence of the laws and independence of Europe? Was there a precedent of such a fact? Certainly not; and certainly, therefore, there could be no precedent of such a condolence. He therefore did think, that in the address to his majesty, it would have been proper to express the feelings which the house of commons must entertain on such an occasion. But there were greater omissions in his majesty's speech, which he would slightly notice. For the first of these omissions, which respected the glorious battle of Maida, he felt himself totally at a loss to account; for that government were sensible of the value and importance of this victory, was evident from the notice given by the right hon. secretary for the war department, that he would on Monday propose to the house a vote of thanks to the gallant officers by whom it had been obtained. But why of an event so proudly honourable to the British arms, deprive his majesty of the satisfaction of declaring his sentiments of approbation? He believed that not a single instance could be found in the annals of our history, of a victory achieved during the interval between one session of parliament and another, and which victory was considered of sufficient importance by government to claim the recorded gratitude of the two houses of parliament, which had not been made a subject of communication from the throne in the speech with which every session was opened. Why all reference to the splendid victory to which he alluded had been avoided in the speech, he was at a loss to conceive; for he could not suppose that it was the wish of government to keep the king's countenance at a greater distance from the army than ever. —He was also desirous of knowing how it happened, that in his majesty's speech not a single word was said of the flourishing state of the finances and revenue of the kingdom? Were they not flourishing? He trusted and believed that there was no ground for any apprehensions on that score; but assuredly this was the first instance in which the crown had made a demand on the public purse, without taking the opportunity of at least affording to the people a pleasing and consolatory picture of the situation of public affairs. As to Buenos Ayres, his right hon. friend (Mr. Canning), understanding that the expedition, of which the result was the capture of that province, had been undertaken without the knowledge of government, had, very properly, confined his animadversions on the omission of any notice of that occurrence in his majesty's speech, to the omission of any statement of the advantages which the country must derive from such a valuable acquisition.—He supposed that the discussion which related to the commercial intercourse between Great Britain and America had not been brought to a close, otherwise it assuredly would have been mentioned from the throne. When he recollected the bills which were introduced into the house during the last session on this subject, when he considered their nature and principle, when he remembered that they went to the destruction of that on which our naval strength and superiority had been founded, and when he reflected on the character and sentiments of the persons who had been chosen by this country to carry on the negociation with America, he owned that he looked forward with considerable apprehension to the period when that negociation would terminate. He hoped he might be permitted to hint, that the blockade lately declared was a circumstance to which government should be watchfully attentive in their discussions and connections with neutral powers. It behoved them to take good care to come to some good understanding with those neutral powers, as to the interpretation which they might put on that blockade. This was a subject on which at present he would say no more. There remained an omission in his majesty's speech yet unnoticed by him. No mention had been made of the state of Ireland. He trusted that this silence might be ascribed to the total want of foundation for the alarming rumours that had reached this country. Ministers must unquestionably be the judges how far the usual prerogatives of the crown were sufficient to suppress insurrection or rebellion, in whatever quarter it might appear; the decision rested with them; he only begged them to consider that the protraction of the necessary day of punishment was not mercy; and the delay which allowed insurrection to proceed, until it became impossible to quell it without a considerable shedding of blood, was not kindness. He hoped that the omission of any notice of the situation of the sister island was occasioned by the absence of any necessity for an extraordinay exertion of the law. Should such a necessity unfortunately arise, and should ministers call on the house for an enlargement of the executive power, he could assure them that they should meet with no opposition on his part to any proper measure of vigour which they might think it expedient to propose. Having thus expressed his sentiments on the various subjects which had been agitated, he sat down, declaring that it was not his intention to oppose the motion for reading the report of the address.

Lord *Henry Petty* believed, that in the present state of the house, and in the present state of the information before the house, he should best consult the wishes of the house by adjourning the consideration of many of the points on which the learned gent. had touched in a speech, which, although certainly it was not a very long one, yet comprised an infinite variety of matter. He should not, indeed, have thought it necessary to rise at all, but for that part of the learned gent.'s observations which were directed at the department of government in which he had the honour to hold a situation, and which therefore might be considered a personal allusion to himself. The learned gent. expressed his wonder, that nothing had been said in the speech from the throne on the state of the finances. Nothing said! general expressions alone were to be looked for in documents of that sort, and it was distinctly, though generally declared, that "the great sources of our prosperity and strength were unimpaired;" a declaration calculated to satisfy every reasonable mind, and which it would soon be his duty in the committee of ways and means to prove, by entering into particular statements, was founded on just grounds. Let it not be supposed that he was unwilling to give all due praise to the solid system of finance, the result of the abilities of a late great financial minister; he should avail himself of the opportunity to which he had alluded, of doing justice to the merits of that system, and to those of its founder, and he should avail himself of the same opportunity to do justice to the merits of the noble viscount (lord Sidmouth), by whom, on the commencement of the present war, that system had been renovated, and firmly established.—The learned gent. had hoped that there was a good cause for certain transactions apprehended to have taken place in Ireland not having been mentioned in the speech from the throne. There was a good cause. The allusion to them could not have been attended with any useful purpose; and the house would perhaps agree with him in thinking, that had the learned gent. himself abstained from alluding to them, it would have been at least as well. What object had the learned gent. in his observation on this subject? For their conduct with regard to Ireland, ministers were responsible. From the faithful discharge of their duty they never would shrink. The learned gent. had noticed several other omissions, as he imagined them, both in the speech and the address. With regard to the omission in the address, of any condolence with his majesty on the death of the duke of Brunswick, after what had been said by his noble friend last night, no one could suppose that that omission originated in any want of proper feeling; but it was obvious that expressions of condolence must be governed by forms and habits of proceeding; a line must be drawn. If usage precluded the expression of a sentiment, was it thence to be inferred that the sentiment did not exist? But the omissions on which the learned gent. had dwelt with peculiar emphasis, were the omission of any notice of the capture of Buenos Ayres, and of the brilliant victory of Maida; but more particularly of the latter. No man could be more sensible than he was of the valour displayed by the British troops in Calabria on that gratifying occasion; but it must be recollected that they formed merely a detachment, a small body, not under the orders of a commander-in-chief, but of an officer who was himself commanded by a superior; and there was no instance on record, of any victory, however brilliant, however striking, gained under such circumstances, having been noticed in the speech from the throne. Let gentlemen refer to the events of the last war. One of the most brilliant victories gained on the continent, and precisely in the same circumstances as those in which he had mentioned the victory of Maida was obtained, was the victory of Lincelles; and yet it would be found that no notice was taken of this affair, or of the officers and troops engaged in it, in his majesty's speech which immemediately followed.—As to the subject of America, the learned gent. had indulged himself in an attack on the two noble lords, who were employed on the part of Great Britain in carrying on the commercial discussions with the United States. This, however, he would maintain, that if it were possible to find two persons better qualified, who possessed more general knowledge, more good sense, and more affable and conciliating manners, than any others, those noble lords were the men. But here the learned gent. only pursued the course taken by his right hon. friend yesterday (Mr. Canning). He anticipated censure, in ignorance of the facts; and at this early period, and before it was possible he could be in possession of the nature or progress of the discussions with America, the learned gent. augured an unfavourable result. He would not at present go at length into the learned gent.'s remarks on the popularity of government, as displayed at the general election; at some future period he should be happy to join issue with the learned gent. on this point, and enquire on what side the popular voice had been manifested; but he confessed that he was astonished to hear the learned gent. priding himself on the popularity of Mr. Paull, as—

Mr. *Canning* called to order, not conceiving it right to mention, in terms of indirect censure, the name of a petitioning candidate.

The *Speaker* said he did not know of any order prohibiting the mention of any name but that of a member of that house.

Lord *H. Petty* was glad to find he had not transgressed the rules of order in mentioning the name of Mr. Paull, by doing which he did not mean the slightest disrespect to that gentleman. He begged to assure the gentlemen on the other side of the house, that he did not intend to hurt their feelings by stating in the most indirect manner, that there was any similarity between their principles or their popularity; he knew they were quite opposite. He begged pardon for having occupied the time of the house with this explanation, but seeing that the right hon. gentlemen were sore upon this point, he thought it right to give them the full benefit of his testimony, and to exculpate them from any such political connection.

Mr. *Perceval*, in explanation, denied that he had imputed any want of information to the two noble lords who were engaged in the commercial discussions with America. What he had said was, that the manner in which the bills on that subject were introduced into parliament last session, evinced the bad principle on which the negociation with the United States was founded. As to the matter on which the noble lord had dilated at the close of his speech, he assured him that he had no idea of priding himself on the popularity of Mr. Paull, but the contrary. In alluding to the popularity of Mr. Paull at Westminster, he only meant to shew, that, comparing popularity with popularity, Mr, Paull had completely beaten the treasurer of the navy, until the government coursers were harnessed to the car, by which means the right hon. gent. got a-head of his rival. [Cry of Order! Order!]

Sir *J. Pulteney* entered into an eulogium on the victory of Maida. So few were the opportunities offered to our brave troops, of meeting the enemy on fair ground, that he sincerely regretted that notice of this victory did not make a feature of his majesty's speech, although whenever similar opportunities did offer, he was satisfied that similar results would ensue. Adverting to what the noble lord had said of Lincelles, he contended that it was quite a different affair from that at Maida. The victory of Lincelles was highly gallant, and highly honourable, but it was obtained by a mere detachment, who were sent to attack a post under the very eye of the commander-in-chief.

Mr. *G. Johnstone*, in addition to what had fallen from the hon. baronet, observed, that at the battle of Maida, general Stuart actually possessed the chief command in Sicily; for sir J. Craig had left that island, and the commander-in-chief appointed to succeed him had not arrived. The statement therefore made by the noble lord was by no means strictly correct. But had it been correct, it would by no means have justified the omission complained of. When lord Nelson achieved the splendid victory of the Nile, was he not under the command of lord St. Vincent? yet that achievement had been noticed in the speech from the throne. The omission of any allusion to the situation of Ireland had been attempted to be justified by declaring that no good was likely to result from such an allusion. This was very true; but ought not every thing important and connected with the interests of the empire to find a place in his majesty's speech without any qualification? He was happy to hear that government looked to the state of the finances of the country with such confidence, and he cordially concurred with the noble lord in the just praise he had bestowed on lord Sidmouth for his attention to this subject.

Lord *H. Petty* in explanation, allowed, that he found he had not been altogether correct in his statements, with regard to the precise state of rank which sir J. Stuart held at the time of the battle of Maida. Admitting this, he still maintained, that there was no distinct rule of proceeding; but that his majesty's ministers were bound to regulate their conduct by the various circumstances which different cases must necessarily present.

The report was then read and agreed to, and the address was ordered to be taken up to his majesty, by such members of the house as were of his majesty's most honourable privy council.—It was then ordered, that the speech of the lords commissioners to both houses of parliament, be taken into consideration upon Monday next; after which the house adjourned.

PAPERS

RELATIVE TO THE NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE; PRESENTED BY HIS MAJESTY'S COMMAND, TO BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT, 22*d December*, 1806.

No. I.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, Feb. 20, 1806.

Sir; I think it my duty as an honest man, to communicate to you, as soon as possible, a very extraordinary circumstance which is come to my knowledge. The shortest way will be to relate to you the fact simply as it happened.—A few days ago, a person informed me, that he was just arrived at Gravesend without a passport, requesting me at the same time to send him one, as he had very lately left Paris, and had something to communicate to me which would give me satisfaction. I sent for him—he came to my house the following day—I received him alone in my closet; when, after some unimportant conversation, this villain had the audacity to tell me that it was necessary for the tranquillity of all crowned heads, to put to death the ruler of France; and that for this purpose, a house had been hired at Passy, from which this detestable project could be carried into effect with certainty, and without risk. I did not perfectly understand if it was to be done by a common musket, or by fire arms upon a new principle.—I am not ashamed to confess to you, sir, who know me, that my confusion was extreme in thus finding myself led into a conversation with an avowed assassin: I instantly ordered him to leave me, giving, at the same time, orders to the police-officer who accompanied him, to send him out of the kingdom as soon as possible. After having more attentively reflected upon what I had done, I saw my error in having suffered him to depart without having previously informed you of the circumstance, and I ordered him to be detained.—It is probable that all this is unfounded, and that the wretch had nothing more in view than to make himself of consequence, by promising what, according to his ideas, would afford me satisfaction.—At all events, I thought it right to acquaint you with what had happened, before I sent him away. Our laws do not permit us to detain him long, but he shall not be sent away till after you shall have had full time to take precautions against his attempts, supposing him still to entertain bad designs; and when he goes, I shall take care to have him landed at a seaport as remote as possible from France.—He calls himself here Guillet de la Gevrillière, but I think it is a false name which he has assumed. At his first entrance, I did him the honour to believe him to be a spy. I have the honour to be, with the most perfect attachment, sir, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 2.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, March 5, 1806. Received March 19th.

Sir; I have laid your excellency's letter before his majesty. His first words, after having read it were, "I recognize here the principles of honour and of virtue, by which Mr. Fox has ever been actuated. Thank him, on my part." I will not allow myself, sir, to add any thing to the expressions of his imperial and royal majesty. I only request you to accept the assurances of my distinguished consideration. (Signed) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand.

No. 3.—Extract from a Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated, Paris, March 5, 1806. Received March the 19th.

It may be agreeable to you to receive news from this country. I send you the emperor's speech to the legislative body. You will therein see that our wishes are still for peace. I do not ask what is the prevailing inclination with you; but if the advantages of peace are duly appreciated, you know upon what basis it may be discussed.

No. 4.—Extract from a Speech delivered by the chief of the French government to the legislative body on the 2d of March, 1806.

I desire peace with England. On my part, I shall never delay it for a moment. I shall always be ready to conclude it, taking for its basis the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens.

No. 5.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, March 26, 1806.

Sir; The information which your excellency has given me of the pacific disposition that prevails in your councils, and of the basis upon which peace may be discussed, has induced me to lay that part of your private letter before the king.—His majesty has repeatedly declared to his parliament his sincere desire to embrace the first opportunity of re-establishing peace upon a solid basis, such as may be compatible with the interests and permanent security of his people: his wishes are uniformly pacific; but it is a safe and a lasting peace that his majesty has in view, not an uncertain truce, which from its very uncertainty would be the source of disquietude as well to the contracting parties as to the other powers of Europe.—With regard to the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, which are proposed as the basis of the negociation, it has been observed here, that this phrase has been interpreted in three or four different ways, and consequently, that further explanations would be necessary, which could not fail to produce great delay, even did no other objections exist.—The true basis of such a negociation between two great powers, equally despising every idea of chicane, would be the reciprocal recognition of the following principle; viz. That the object of both parties should be a peace, honourable for both, and for their respective allies; and at the same time, of a nature to secure, as far as is in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe.—England cannot neglect the interests of any of her allies; and she is united to Russia by such close connections, that she would not treat, still less conclude upon any thing, but in concert with the emperor Alexander; but whilst awaiting the actual intervention of a Russian plenipotentiary, some of the principal points might however be discussed, and even provisionally arranged.—It might seem, that Russia, on account of her remote situation, should have fewer immediate interests to discuss with France than other powers; but that court, so respectable in every point of view, interests herself, like England, warmly in every thing that concerns the greater or less degree of independence enjoyed by the different princes and states of Europe.—You see, sir, how inclined we are here to remove every difficulty that might retard the discussion in question. With the resources that we possess, it is most assuredly not on our own account that we need fear a continuance of the war. Of all the nations of Europe, England, perhaps, is that which suffers the least by its prolongation; but we do not the less commiserate the misfortunes of others.—Let us then do all in our power to terminate them, and let us endeavour, if it be possible, to reconcile the respective interests and the glory of the two countries with the tranquillity of Europe, and the happiness of the human race. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 6.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, April 1st, 1806. Received April 7th.

Sir; The very instant I received your letter of the 26th of March, I waited upon his majesty; and I am happy to inform you, that he has authorized me to send you, without delay, the following answer: The emperor covets nothing that England possesses. Peace with France is possible, and may be perpetual, provided there is no interference in her internal affairs, and that no attempt is made to restrain her in the regulation of her custom duties; to cramp her commercial rights; or to offer any insult to her flag.—It is not you, sir, who have displayed in many public discussions an exact knowledge of the general affairs of Europe and of France, who require to be convinced that France has nothing to desire except repose, and a situation such as may enable her, without obstruction, to give herself up entirely to the labours of her industry.—The emperor does not imagine that any particular article of the treaty of Amiens produced the war. He is convinced, that the true cause was, the refusal to make a treaty of commerce, which would necessarily have been prejudicial to the manufactures and the industry of his subjects. Your predecessors accused us of wishing universal conquest. In France, England has likewise her accusers. Very well! We only ask equality. We shall never require an account of what you do at home, provided that, on your side, you never require an account of what we do at home. This principle is reciprocally just, reasonable, and mutually advantageous.—You express a desire that the negociation may not terminate in a short-lived peace. France is more interested than any other power that it should be permanent. It is not her interest to make a truce; since a truce would only pave the way for fresh losses. You know very well that nations, similar in this respect to individuals, accustom themselves to a state of war, as well as to a state of peace. All the losses that France could sustain, she has sustained. This will ever be the case, in the first 6 months of war. At present, our commerce and our industry [se sont repliés sur eux-mêmes] have taken the channel dictated by the circumstances of our country, and are adapted to our state of war. Consequently a truce of 2 or 3 years would be the thing of all others the most opposite to our commercial interests, and to the emperor's policy.—As to the intervention of a foreign power the emperor might accept the mediation of a power possessing a great naval force, because, in that case, the participation of such power in the peace would be regulated by the same interests that we have to discuss with you; but the mediation you speak of is not of this nature. You do not wish to deceive us; and you are well aware there is no equality betwixt us in the guaranty of a power which has 300,000 men on foot, and which has no naval force For the rest, sir, your communication has a character of openness and precision, which we have hitherto never seen in the communications between your court and us. I will make it my duty to employ the same openness, and the same precision, in my reply. We are ready to make peace with the whole world. We wish to dictate to no one. But we will not be dictated to; and no one possesses either the power or the means of doing it. It is in the power of none to make us relinquish treaties which are already carried into effect. The integrity, and the complete and absolute independence of the Ottoman empire form not only the sincerest desire of the emperor, but constitute also the undeviating object of his policy.—Two enlightened and neighbouring nations would be wanting in the opinion they ought to entertain of their power and wisdom, should they call for the intervention of foreign and distant powers, in the discussions of the great interests which divide them: Thus, sir, peace may be treated upon and concluded immediately, if your court really entertains the desire of attaining it.—Our interests are reconcileable, inasmuch as they are distinct. You are the rulers of the ocean, your naval forces are equal to those of all the sovereigns of the world united. We are a great continental power; but there are many who equal our power by land, and your maritime preponderance will always place our commerce at the mercy of your squadrons, immediately after your declaring war. Do you think it reasonable to expect that the emperor should ever consent to submit himself to your discretion, in continental affairs also? If, masters of the sea through your own power, you propose being masters of the land likewise by a combined force, peace is impossible; for in that case you will be striving for an object which you can never attain.—The emperor, accustomed as he is to encounter every risk, which holds out the prospect of greatness and of glory, wishes for peace with England. He is a man; after so many fatigues he is desirous of repose; the father of his subjects, he wishes, as far as it is compatible with their honour and with security for the future, to procure for them the blessings of peace, and the advantages of a successful and uninterrupted commerce.—If then, sir, his majesty the king of England really wishes for peace with France, he will appoint a plenipotentiary to repair to Lisle. I have the honour of sending you passports for this purpose. As soon as the emperor shall be informed of the arrival of the minister from your court, he will appoint one, and will send him without delay. The emperor is ready to make every concession, which, from the extent of your naval forces and of your preponderance, you may desire to obtain. I do not think that you can refuse to adopt the same principle of making him proposals conformable to the honour of his crown and the commercial rights of his dominions. If you are just; if you desire only what is possible for you to obtain, peace will be soon made.—I conclude, by declaring that his majesty fully adopts the principle laid down in your dispatch, and offered as the basis of the negociation, "that the peace proposed should be honourable for the two courts, and for their respective allies." I have the honour to be, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 7.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, April 8th, 1806.

Sir; I did not receive until yesterday evening your dispatch of the 1st inst. Before I reply to it, allow me to assure your excellency that the frankness and obliging tone which prevail in it have produced the greatest satisfaction here. A spirit of conciliation manifested on both sides is already a great advance towards peace.—If what your excellency says respecting domestic affairs relates to political affairs, an answer is scarcely requisite. We do not interfere in such concerns in time of war, much less shall we do so in time of peace; and nothing can be further from the ideas which prevail here than any wish either to interfere with respect to the internal regulations which you may judge proper for the management of your custom duties and for the support of your commercial rights, or to offer insult to your flag. As to a Treaty of Commerce, England supposes that she has no greater interest in desiring it than other nations. There are many who think that such a treaty between G. Britain and France would be equally beneficial to the two contracting parties; but this is a question upon which each government must decide according to its own ideas, and the party rejecting it gives no offence, and is no way responsible to the party proposing it.—It is not my individual opinion alone, sir, but it must be acknowledged by every reasonable man, that the true interest of France is peace, and consequently that the true glory of her rulers ought to be placed in the preservation of it.—It is true that we have mutually accused each other, but it can answer no purpose at the present moment to discuss the arguments upon which those accusations were founded. Like you, we desire to treat upon equal terms. Assuredly we are not accountable to each other for what we do at home; and the principle of reciprocity that your excellency has proposed on this point appears just and reasonable.—It cannot be denied that your arguments respecting the inconveniences to which France would be subject by a short-lived peace, are well founded: but on the other hand, those which we should suffer would likewise be very considerable. It is perhaps natural, that in such cases each nation exaggerates its own dangers, or at least that she examines them more minutely, and with a more penetrating eye than those of others.—With respect to the interposition of a foreign power, one cannot refrain from observing, that in whatever relates to peace and war between England and France, Russia can never be considered a foreign power, in as much as she is in actual alliance with England, and at war with France. For which reason the interposition of the emperor Alexander was proposed in my letter not as a mediator, but as a party. Your excellency, in the last paragraph of your dispatch, acknowledges, that the peace "ought to be honourable, not only for England and France, but also for their respective allies." This being the case, it appears to us impossible, considering the close alliance subsisting between the two governments, that that of England can commence any other than a provisionary negociation, without the concurrence, or, at the very least, the previous consent of her ally.—As to what relates to the integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire, no difficulty can present itself, those objects being equally dear to all the parties interested in the present discussion. It is perhaps true, that the power of France on land, compared with that of the rest of Europe, is not equal to the superiority that we possess at sea, considered in the same point of view: but it can no longer be concealed, that the project of combining the whole of Europe against France, is to the last degree chimerical; besides, it is in truth carrying the apprehension of what may happen hereafter rather too far, to consider the alliance between England and Russia (the two powers of Europe the least calculated to attack France by land) as tending to produce such a consequence.—Nor can the intervention of Russia in the negociation, be considered as the formation of a congress, either in appearance or in reality, inasmuch as there will be only two parties, England and Russia on one side, and France on the other. A congress might be desireable in many respects, after the signature of preliminaries, in case all the contracting parties should be of that opinion; but this is a proposition that may be freely and amicably discussed, after the principal points shall have been arranged.—Thus, sir, I have laid before you, with all the clearness in my power, the sentiments of the British ministry upon the ideas which you have suggested. I entertain the gratifying persuasion that there remains only one essential point upon which we are not agreed.—As soon as you consent that we shall treat provisionally until Russia can take a part in the negociation, and from that moment, conjointly with her, we are ready to begin without the delay of a single day, at whatever place, and in whatever form, the two parties may judge best adapted to bring to a happy issue the object of our labours, as expeditiously as possible. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 8.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, April 16, 1806.—Received April 19th.

Sir; I have taken the pleasure of his majesty the emperor and king, before whom I lost no time in laying the dispatch which your excellency did me the honour of writing to me, under date of the 8th instant.—It appeared to his majesty, that, admitting as you do the principle of equality, you nevertheless still persist in requiring a form of negociation which cannot accord with that principle. When in a discussion between two equal powers one of them calls for the interference of a third, it is evident that she seeks to destroy that equilibrium so favourable to a fair and free discussion of their interests. It is manifest that she is not willing to content herself with the advantages and the rights of equality. I am ready to believe, sir, that in entering for the last time upon this discussion, I shall succeed in persuading your excellency, that, under no plea and on no account, should Russia be called upon to take part in the proposed negociation between England and France.—When the war broke out between the two countries, Russia was at peace with France. This war has produced no alteration in the relations which existed between her and us. She first proposed her mediation; and afterwards, in consequence of circumstances foreign to the war which divides us, a coolness arose between the cabinets of St. Petersburgh and the Thuilleries; the emperor Alexander thought proper to suspend his political relations with France; but at the same time declared in the most positive manner, that it was his intention to take no part in the existing disputes between us and England.—We do not think that the conduct which Russia has since held, has in the smallest degree altered this determination. She has, it is true, concluded a treaty of alliance with you; but it is easy to see from what has been made public of this treaty, from the object it had in view, and still more from the consequences of it, that it had no connexion with the war which has been carrying on nearly 2 years between us and England.—This Treaty was an agreement to take a part in a war of a different nature, more extensive and more general than the first. From this war the Third Coalition sprung, in which Austria was a principal and Russia an auxiliary power. It was only in intention that England participated in this war. We have never had to oppose her forces in conjunction with those of her allies. Russia acted only a secondary part in it. No declaration addressed to France informed us that she was at war with us; and it is only upon the field of battle where the Third Coalition was destroyed, that we have been officially informed that Russia was a party to it.—When his Britannic maj. declared war against France, he had an end in view which he made known by his manifestoes. This object directed the nature of the war; when, 18 months afterwards, his Britannic majesty formed an alliance with Austria, Russia, and Sweden, he had other objects in view. This was a new war, the motives of which must be sought for in the official papers which have been published by the different powers; amongst these motives, the direct interests of England are never mentioned. These two wars therefore have no common connexion; England in reality never participated in that which is terminated. Russia never took any part directly or indirectly in that which still exists. There is, therefore, no reason why England should not singly terminate a war, which she singly has waged against us. If his maj. the emperor were now to adopt the principle of negociating with England jointly with her new allies, he would implicitly admit the actual existence of the Third Coalition, the continuance of the German war, and the identity of this war with that which France sustains against England. He would implicitly accept for the basis of the negociation the conditions of M. Novosiltzoff, which excited the astonishment of Europe, and were revolting to the character of the French people:—and the conqueror of the Coalition, the emperor, would voluntarily place himself in the situation of the conquered.—At present the emperor has nothing to discuss with the Coalition. He is entitled to refuse the recognition of the relations which you have had with it; and in treating with you there can be no other question, than the object and the interests of the war which was entered into previous to your alliances, and which has survived them.—Notwithstanding only 6 months have elapsed since the veil which concealed the secret combinations of the last war has been removed, it is nevertheless true that the continent is at peace. Your principal ally, Austria, has made a separate peace. Prussia, whose armies were for sometime on the war establishment, has concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with us. Sweden is not worthy a remark. As to Russia, there exist between her and us direct proposals of negociation. Powerful as she is, she requires the protection of no one, and she cannot call for the intervention of any court to terminate the disputes between us. Her remote position places her so entirely out of our reach, and deprives her so completely of all means of annoying us, that the alteration in our respective connexions, occasioned by a state of war or a state of peace, is purely of a diplomatic nature. If in such a situation, the emperor were to accept the condition of negociating jointly with England and Russia, would he not resign all his advantages? Would he not admit the existence of a war which he has gloriously terminated? Would he not, in fine, abandon, in favour of England, the principle of equality already agreed upon between us? If, sir, you will only examine with the discernment which belongs to you the considerations which I have the honour to lay before you, you will agree that such a negociation would be far more prejudicial to us than war, and even than a congress.—In fact, in a congress, if England, Sweden, and Russia contended in support of the principles which formed the basis of the Third Coalition, Prussia, Denmark, the Porte, Persia, and America would protest against those principles, and would require equal laws for navigation and a just division of the empire of the seas. Doubtless, in this discussion, the diminution of the power of France would be frequently voted; but as frequently would the diminution of the power of England also be voted. The balance of power in the south of Europe would be demanded by some, but others would demand the balance of power in the north. Many would bring forward the balance of power for Asia; all would feel an interest in the balance of power on the seas; and if it were possible to hope that any result could be formed in the midst of such complicated and turbulent discussions, that result would be just, because it would be complete; and certainly his majesty has declared, under every circumstance, that he would have no repugnance to make sacrifices for the public tranquillity, whenever England, Russia, and all the great powers shall be disposed to recognize established rights, to protect the weaker states, and to adopt the principles of justice, moderation, and equality; but the emperor knows mankind too well to allow himself to be led away by chimerical ideas, and he feels that it would be in vain to seek for peace in a labyrinth of ten years of discussions, which during that period would perpetuate war, and would only have the effect of rendering its termination still more difficult and uncertain. It would then become necessary to change the system, and, as was done at Utrecht, leaving the allies to perplex themselves in vain and endless disputes, to enter into a separate negociation; to discuss, as was then done, the interests of the two powers and of their respective allies; at last to make peace for ourselves, and to make it so equitable and so honourable as to be immediately agreed to by all the powers concerned. This is the mode in which it becomes two such nations as England and France to terminate, not at the distance of 10 years, but immediately, the differences which divide them, and at the same time to establish the regulation of their rights and of the interests of their allies.—To resume, sir; I see in the proposed negociation, only 3 possible forms of discussion; negociation with England and the allies which she acquired at the time of the formation of the Third Coalition; negociation with all the powers of Europe, with the addition of America; negociation with England alone.—The 1st of these forms is inadmissible, because it would subject the emperor to the influence of the Third Coalition, which no longer exists. The emperor would have negociated in this manner if he had been vanquished. The 2d form of negociation would eternalize the war, if the unavoidable occurrences to which it would at every instant give rise, and the passions which it would let loose without controul, did not cause the discussions to be broken off with violence a few years after they should have been entered into. The 3d therefore is the only one which can be desired by those who really wish for peace. His majesty is confident, that the just and moderate dispositions which he has the satisfaction of observing in the tone and language of the ministers of his Britannic majesty, seconding, in conformity to his desires, the pacific sentiments of which he is more than ever determined to afford proofs to his allies, and even to his enemies, the nations exhausted by the efforts of a war, the interest of which it is as difficult to perceive as its real object is difficult to discover, will thus see a peace, which is called for by all their wants and all their wishes, result from the proposed negociation.—I request, Sir, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 9.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-Street, April 20th, 1806.

Sir; I received the day before yesterday your excellency's dispatch of the 16th inst. —After having repeatedly read it with all possible attention, I do not find in it any argument sufficient to induce our government to change the opinion which it has already declared, namely, that any negociation in which Russia is not included as a party, is absolutely inadmissible.—We wish for peace; but we cannot wish for any thing which may be injurious either to the dignity of our sovereign, or to the honour and the interests of the nation. But if we negociate without Russia, considering the intimate ties by which we are united with that power, we should conceive ourselves open to the reproach of having failed in that scrupulous fidelity to our engagements, on which we pride ourselves; whilst, on the other hand, by persisting in our demand that Russia be admitted, we do not conceive that we do any thing contrary to that principle of equality to which both of us lay claim. When the three plenipotentiaries are assembled, how can it be thought that any question could be carried by the majority of voices? or even that such an assembly could have any thing in common with a general congress? There would be in fact but two parties in it; on one side, France; on the other the two allied powers. Moreover, if it is thought so advantageous in an affair of this nature to have two against one, no objection would be made to your introducing whichever of your allies you may judge most expedient. —Sincerely desirous of avoiding useless disputes, I do not allow myself to enter into a discussion of the consequences which your excellency draws from the events of the last campaign.—I will only remark, that I do not see any reason why an alliance should be considered as null with regard to the powers who adhere to it, because a power who formerly belonged to it has been detached from it by the misfortunes of war.—With regard to the overture which Russia has made you, we have no knowledge of it; but, whatever may be the nature of it, we are persuaded that that court will never conduct itself so as to commit the acknowledged honour of its character, or to weaken the ties of friendship and of confidence which still subsist between England and Russia. To return to the point; your excellency mentions, that, in the proposed negociation, you know but of three possible forms of discussion. The first appears to you inadmissible.—According to what I have had the honour to write to you, you must be convinced, sir, that the 3d is incompatible, both with our fundamental ideas of justice and honour, and with our conception of the interests of our country. The 2d is not perhaps bad, so far as regards its principle; but besides the delays which it would occasion, it would scarcely be practicable in the present conjuncture.—It is therefore with much regret, that I am obliged to declare frankly to your excellency, that I see no hope of peace at this moment, if you should not be disposed to negociate in the manner which we have proposed.—I think myself obliged to add, that this form is essential to us, not only for the reasons which I have had the honour to explain to your excellency, but in so much as any other form might create suspicions that you really entertain the chimerical project with which you are charged (wrongfully as I willingly believe) of excluding us from any connection with the continental powers of Europe; and even, that such an idea is less revolting to us than it ought to be, and than in reality it is. It is not necessary to declare to a minister so enlightened as your excellency, that England can never consent to an exclusion which would degrade her from the rank which she has hitherto held, and which she believes that she may ever hold, among the nations of the world.—The affair, in fine, is reduced to one single point; Will you negociate conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes: but if you require us to negociate separately, we answer, No.—Although we have not succeeded in the great object which we proposed to ourselves, the two governments may well pride themselves on the candour and frankness which have characterized the discussion of their differences; and I owe to you, on my own account, sir, thanks for the obliging manner in which your excellency expresses yourself with regard to me. I am, &c. C. J. FOX.

No. 10.—Letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, 2d June 1806.—Received June 4th.

Sir; I have laid before the emperor the last letter, which your excellency did me the honour to write to me. I can only, by his orders, repeat to you, that to require of France that she should treat with you upon the principle of your alliance with Russia, is wishing to reduce us to a constrained form of discussion, and supposing us in a state of humiliation, into which we have never fallen. The enemies of France must not hope to dictate to her either the conditions of peace, or a mode of negociation contrary to the established usages. Such an attempt with respect to either of these points, would equally affect the French character; and I do not hesitate to say, that to overcome all our repugnance on this point, it would at least require that an English army should have invaded Belgium, and should be at the point of entering Picardy, by the mouth of the Somme.—I must, sir, again repeat to you, that his maj. is truly desirous of peace; and why should not I add, what we might have said, what we really have said at the rupture of every negociation for peace, that the continuance of the war has never been prejudicial to the grandeur of France, and that, in time of peace, a great nation can use its power only to maintain itself, and preserve in their present state its relations with the neighbouring countries.—France, sir, does not object to your right of choosing and preserving your allies. In war she has not the choice of her enemies, and she must fight them separate or united, as it may suit their convenience to concert among themselves, for the accomplishment of their views of aggression and resistance, and for the formation of alliances so little conformable to the real interests of their respective countries, that the first clause of them has always been a condition of secrecy.—Because we wish, in this case, to follow the form of negociation which has been customary at all times and in all countries, you conclude that we desire that you should have no connection with the continent. I do not conceive that we ever gave you any reason for drawing such an inference. We cannot hinder any government from forming an alliance with you, and we cannot wish either what is unjust, or what is absurd. It is one thing, that you should form alliances according to your own choice, but it is another, that we should concur in them, and aid you in contracting them. But to consent to treat upon the principle of your alliances, and to introduce them into the discussion of the direct and immediate interests that divide us, is doing much more than suffering and acknowledging them; it is in a manner consecrating, cementing, and guarantying them. I have already, sir, observed to you, that we cannot yield upon this point, because the principle is in our favour.—To leave, however, from henceforward, no room for any misunderstanding, I think it my duty to propose to you, 1st, To negociate in the same preliminary forms which were adopted during the administration of the marquis of Rockingham, in 1782; forms, which were not renewed with so much advantage in the negociations of Lisle, but which were perfectly successful in the negociations which preceded the treaty of Amiens: 2dly, To establish as a basis, two fundamental principles; the first, which I take from your letter of the 26th March, namely, "*That the two states "should have for their object that the peace "be honourable for them and their respective "allies, and at the same time of a nature "to secure, as far as is in their power, the "future tranquillity of Europe.*" The second principle shall be, an acknowledgement on the part of the two powers, of their mutual right of intervention and guaranty in continental and in maritime affairs. His majesty, far from being unwilling to make this avowal, delights in raising it to a principle; and, in thus explaining his real intentions, I think I have given you a decisive proof of his pacific dispositions. His majesty is at the same time persuaded, that, in preventing for ever all subjects of complaint, uneasiness, and remonstrance on this point, he has, in a case which is of essential interest to the good of human nature, done his duty as a man, and as a sovereign.—I should sincerely regret, sir, that a discussion, begun under such favourable auspices, should terminate without the attainment of its object. Should the hopes which I cherish vanish, I shall, at all events, have the consolation of thinking, that the fault cannot be imputed to France, who demands and wishes nothing but what is just and reasonable.—Accept, sir, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 11.—Letter from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated Downing-street, June 14, 1806.

Sir; I received a few days ago your excellency's dispatch of the 2d inst. I cannot understand how, in treating conjointly with England and Russia, you will acknowledge the *principle* of the alliance subsisting between the two courts; at most, you will only acknowledge the *fact*; much less can I conceive how you can consider yourselves in any degree lowered by this mode of treating. We do not by any means pretend to dictate to France, either the conditions of peace, or a mode of negociation contrary to the established usages.—In 1782, the epoch which your excellency alludes to in your dispatch, we did not think ourselves in a state of degradation; yet when M. de Vergennes informed us that it was necessary for the honour of his court, that we should treat conjointly with France, Holland, and Spain, we did not think ourselves in any degree lowered by adopting the mode of negociation to which that minister appeared to attach so much consequence. Your government is sincerely desirous of peace. In this country the same sentiment prevails; and yet I could very well say of England what your excellency says of France; namely, that the continuance of the war has never been prejudicial either to its glory or to its grandeur; perhaps indeed, it has been so to its real and permanent interests, but it has been equally so to those of France.—With respect to the secret conditions of our alliance with Russia, your excellency is too enlightened not to allow, that in what concerned the war and the propositions to be made to Prussia and Austria, secrecy was absolutely necessary. All that is now at an end; to act in concert for the establishment of the repose of Europe, and for its subsequent preservation, is the principal, and I may even say the only object of our present communications.—After the open disavowal which you have made of the intention falsely imputed to you with respect to our continental connections, no doubt can exist upon that essential point, and it would be the more distressing that difficulties in *form* rather than in *substance* should prolong a war which the two governments equally desire to terminate.—Let us now come to what your excellency proposes. The form of negociation which took place during lord Rockingham's administration is more particularly present to my memory, as I then held the same office with which his majesty has lately been pleased to honour me. Let France and England change situations, and the form you mention is exactly similar to that which I have proposed. We then treated with France and her allies. Let France now treat with us and our allies. The basis offered in your second proposition is exactly conformable to the views of our government, provided it be well understood that, whilst we mutually acknowledge our respective rights of intervention and guaranty with regard to the affairs of Europe, we also mutually agree to abstain from all encroachment upon the greater or lesser states which compose it.—I should regret equally with your excellency, that this discussion should break off. If we can only act so as not to incur the reproach of a breach of faith towards an ally, who for so many reasons deserves our entire confidence, we shall be content, and the more so as we know that an honourable peace would be no less conformable to the wishes of Russia, than to those of France and England.—I have the honour to be, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 12.—Communication made by the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated June 13th, 1806.

A few days after my arrival at Paris from the depôt at Verdun, M. Talleyrand desired me to call upon him; having done so, he told me that the French government had been looking out for some means by which a secret and confidential communication might be made, explanatory of the sentiments and views of France, as well as the outlines of the terms on which peace might be restored between the two countries.—Having mentioned the extreme desire of making this communication in such a manner that no publicity might in any case ensue, should the object of it not be obtained, M. Talleyrand proceeded to state, in a long argument, which it is useless to repeat, as it forms the substance of several of the French government's dispatches; the reasons which prevent their treating for a general peace jointly with Russia.—He said, that in a dispatch sent some weeks before to Mr. Fox, he had been ordered to name Lisle rather than Amiens for the negociation of a definitive treaty, in order to remove all former discussions, and to facilitate to England the possession of Malta.—I then took the liberty of interrupting M. Talleyrand, to say that however flattering the confidence he was ordered to place in me might be, yet that, feeling as I did, the interests, and above all the honour of my country, it was impossible for me to be the bearer of a communication having peace for its object, against which I should feel obliged to vote in parliament; and viewing the restoration of Hanover in this light, I could not receive any further communication till I had explicit declaration with regard to his majesty's German dominions.—M. Talleyrand then broke off the conversation, desiring me to return the third day after. At the expiration of this time I waited upon him again, when he informed me that, considering the extreme stress which appeared to be laid upon this point, Hanover should make no difficulty.—Authorised by the concession of that in which the honour of the king and that of the nation appeared most interested, I enquired whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said "*Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas; si nous la possédions, elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.*" [You are in possession of it, we do not ask it of you; if we possessed it, it might very much augment our difficulties.] Considering this to be very positive both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it improper to make further questions. "Nous ne vous demandons rien;" [we ask nothing from you] amounting to an admission of *uti possidetis* as applicable to his majesty's conquests.—M. Talleyrand mentioned strongly the recognition of the emperor and the different branches of his family as absolutely expected. On this I took occasion to state the solidity which the recognition of G. Britain would give to their establishment, and enquired whether the French government would guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire. The answer was yes, but it must be soon. "Beaucoup se prépare, mais rien n'est fait;" [a great deal is in preparation, but nothing is yet done.] Reverting to the first conversation, I desired to know whether a middle term might not be found at the same time to obtain the object desired by the French government, and that desired by G. Britain, of not treating in a manner unconnected with Russia. To this he answered that they were entirely ready to give every facility to the arrangement of the respective interests of the two powers, or that a British Minister should, being authorized by the emperor Alexander, stipulate for both.—The last words of M. Talleyrand were: "Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changés; l'aigreur qui caracterisoit le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus; et ce que nous desirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bon intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne."* (Signed) Yarmouth.

No. 13.—Note from Mr. Secretary Fox to M. Talleyrand; dated London, June 14, 1806.

Sir; I just write you a few words to express to you the pleasure which I feel at the desire you have manifested for place.

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* The sentiments entertained in France are entirely different from what they were. The asperity which characterized the commencement of this war, no longer exists; and what we most desire is, to live in harmony with so great a power as Great Britain.

I have only to add, that lord Yarmouth possesses all my confidence, and that whatever he shall say to you, you may consider as said by myself. In great haste, I am, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 14.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, June 19, 1806. Received June 21st.

Sir; I have the honour to inform you that, in obedience to your orders I made all the haste in my power to arrive at Paris as soon as possible; calm at sea however prevented my getting here till the afternoon of the 16th.—I immediately waited upon M. Talleyrand to deliver to him the dispatches you entrusted to my care, and requested to put off any conversation on the subject of my journey till next day. I intended employing this interval to endeavour to see M. D'Oubril if at Paris, and communicate with him previously to seeing again M. Talleyrand, or at any rate to obtain some knowledge of his motions.—Previous, however, to my leaving M. Talleyrand, he expressed to me that although the desire of peace was equally sincere now as it was when I quitted Paris, yet that some changes had taken place which he had hinted at the possibility of, when I last saw him, alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the emperor had received reports from his brother and the general officers under his orders, stating that Naples could not be held without Sicily, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island. I answered him, that, being ordered to require the restoration of Naples to the king of Sicily as a necessary article of peace, there would be no question of their separation.—I conceive Sicily to be the great difficulty, though perhaps, were there no other, it might be got over. M. Talleyrand often and seriously stated the absolute determination of the emperor not to consent to our demands of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, or to alienate any part of his Italian states to form a provision for the king of Sardinia.—Against cessions in the West Indies or elsewhere I solemnly protested; nor do I think they care sufficiently about these objects to give any sufficient continental equivalent for them.—M. Talleyrand often repeated that the emperor had enquired whether I had any powers? adding, "qu'en politique on ne peut parler même langue si on "n'y également autorisé;" [that in politics it is impossible to hold the same language, unless both parties are equally authorized;] and as frequently said that they considered that Hanover for the honour of the crown, Malta for the honour of the navy, and the Cape of Good Hope for the honour of British commerce, to be sufficient inducements to induce his majesty's ministers to make peace.—P. S. On Tuesday June 17, I waited upon M. Talleyrand, and began the conversation by alluding to the changes he had hinted at the night before, and desired leave to repeat the substance of what had passed at my former interviews with him, and which I had by his desire communicated. He agreed that the statement was accurate.

No. 15.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing Street, June 26, 1806.

My lord; I had the honour, on Saturday evening, to receive your lordship's letters of the 19th; and should sooner have answered them, if I had not been for these 3 days past totally incapable of attending to business.—I am very happy to learn that M. Talleyrand acknowledges your accounts of former conversations to be accurately correct; but when he does acknowledge this, I have no conception on what ground he can recede from what he said so distinctly to your lordship before, upon the subject of Sicily: "*Vous l'avez, nous ne* "*vous demandons rien,*" [you are in possession of it; we ask nothing from you,] are words that made the more impression on me, because those contained in the latter clause of the sentence had been used by his excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on the faith of the *uti possidetis* being to be strictly observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on which satisfaction had been given to your lordship, that his majesty was induced to authorize your lordship to hold further conferences with M. Talleyrand. Any tergiversation or cavil therefore on that article, would be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. To say that Hanover is an exception to the principle is in vain, inasmuch as Hanover is to be yielded expressly in honour of the crown; while, on the other hand, the recognitions proposed with regard to the French empire and its dependents, are not only in honour of the crown of France, but tend substantially to establish the solidity of her power. With regard to the complaint of the want of full powers; to avoid all pretence of cavil on that account, I am commanded by his majesty to transmit to you the instrument accompanying this letter. But your lordship should fairly state to M. Talleyrand, that you are not authorized to make any use of them formally until M. Talleyrand returns to his former ground with respect to Sicily. Your lordship is directed further, to acquaint that minister, that, if Russia offers to treat separately, it is only in the way in which we do; that is to say, separately in form, but in substance, in concert with each other. And here you will recollect that this very circumstance was canvassed in your former conversations with M. Talleyrand, when that minister expressed himself clearly that there would be no objection on the part of France to such preconcert.—The result of what I have stated to your lordship, is this: 1st, that Sicily is a *sine quâ non;* on which subject, if the French minister recedes from his former answer, it is in vain that any further discussion should take place. It is clearly within his first opinion delivered to your lordship; it is clearly within his last description of places which are reciprocally possessed by the two countries, and cannot in all probability be recovered by war.—If, according to the hope conceived by your lordship, this matter should be arranged, you may open your full powers; stating at the same time, the determination of this court not to come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia. You will of course again mention the questions of Naples and Istria. If we could attain either of them, it would be well; but if we cannot, your lordship will not state these points as conclusive reasons against agreeing on preliminary articles, provided such articles be considered as provisional and subject to the approbation of Russia.—With regard to the mode of provisional agreement, two suggest themselves to my mind: the one, to send the agreement we shall have entered into, either to Petersburgh, or to some authorized agent of the emperor Alexander, at Vienna, Paris, or elsewhere, for his approbation; the other, to copy the precedent adopted by lord Lansdowne and Dr. Franklin in the year 1782. At that time a provisional treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of G. Britain and the United States of America, with the reservation, that the said treaty should not have effect till a peace should be agreed upon between France and England. Of these two modes I should prefer the latter.—It does not appear that there has been any conversation between your lordship and M. Talleyrand on a point which was mentioned to you, and which appears to be of considerable importance; I mean, the future admission of Russia and Sweden to become parties in a definitive treaty. I do not say that this is a point that must be determined upon previous to your settling the basis proposed; but it is one which should not be lost sight of, but, on the contrary, urged as far as possible.

No. 16.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 1, 1806.—Received July 4.

Sir; I had the honour to receive on Saturday night, the full powers with which it has graciously pleased his majesty to entrust me, and your dispatch of the 26th of June.—I waited upon M. Talleyrand next morning, and stated to him in the strongest manner the impossibility of my conversing any further upon the general outlines of peace, until he should return to the former ground, and consider Sicily in its true and real situation, namely, a state not conquered by France, or likely to be so, and coming most strictly within the meaning of his own words; that it had been clearly expressed by him, and repeated to you in the first instance, that France did not intend to make Sicily an obstacle to peace. M. Talleyrand answered, that whilst the war continued, and till terms were actually agreed upon, change of circumstances were always to be considered as reasons for a partial change of terms; that Bonaparte had been but lately convinced of the facility of taking Sicily at some future period of the war; but that, above all, he felt more and more its absolute necessity to make Naples and the neighbouring territories tenable: that had any confidential overture been made 3 months ago, they would have been ready to settle the question of Naples in the manner most satisfactory to G. Britain; the same a month later with regard to Holland. Those subjects were now arranged, and the emperor would consider any retrograde measure as equivalent to abdication. I observed to that minister, that however much good faith may be necessary in every transaction of the world, yet that being more peculiarly so, when a communication is made secretly and verbally, I had a right to be doubly surprized at any change of ground. He defended himself by his former argument about altered circumstances, and said, that when no change of disposition was manifested towards G. Britain herself, as to the restoration of Hanover, or the possession of Malta and the Cape, he thought we might suffer them to possess themselves of a part of the states of their enemy, necessary to the tenure of the rest, which no consideration would now induce France to restore.—M. Talleyrand then asked, whether I had any powers. I told him that I must decline answering that question, until he should inform me that there would be no further discussion about Sicily; but that he might easily draw a conclusion that I had, from the honourable manner in which G. Britain endeavoured to remove every obstacle not in its own nature insurmountable.—The minister then mentioned his being obliged to go to St. Cloud, and asked, what I said. I answered, "That I was ordered to continue no "conversation till I should be informed that this new demand, changing entirely the proposed basis, should be "urged no more." He appointed next morning for me to receive an answer.—I accordingly returned to the office yesterday morning, when M. Talleyrand repeated the same demand, offering to desist from the recognition by G. Britain of any or all the new states, waving this concession to the honour of the powers created by France, and setting Hanover against Sicily, and pleading that, no such recognition being demanded, Hanover would then appear a fair equivalent for that island. He read the draft of an article to this effect: That G. Britain and France should not oppose each other's arms against such of the powers now at war, as should not be named in the preliminary articles.—To this I declined making any answer, repeating my orders not to converse further till he should abandon this proposition, and return to the former basis. I added that, unless he did so, I could expect nothing but your order to return to England.—M. Talleyrand wished to revert to the old topic, on which I repeated to him that it was impossible for me to converse on any part of the subject, till he should entirely relinquish every mode of seeking for the possession of Sicily.—M. Talleyrand desired me to inform you, that on the 29th of June the French troops were to take possession of Cattaro.

No. 17.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 1, 1806; *midnight.*—Received July 4.

Sir; After closing the dispatch I had the honour to address to you this morning, I went for the passport M. Talleyrand had promised to have prepared for the messenger's return.—Instead of giving me the passport, he made many excuses for its having escaped his memory, requesting me to wait till he should come back from St. Cloud.—When I returned, M. Talleyrand proposed to me to offer the Hans Towns as an establishment for the king of Naples, and that the British troops should occupy them the same day they retake possession of Hanover. On a little further conversation, I had little doubt that were England to provide in any other manner for his Sicilian majesty, the king might add the Hans Towns and their territories, in full sovereignty to his German dominions.—The proposition about the Hans Towns being entirely new, I promised to refer it without any comment to you for his majesty's consideration.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.

No. 18.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 5, 1806.

My lord; Your lordship's dispatches of the 1st inst. were received here early yesterday morning, and I lose no time in apprising you of his majesty's commands upon the present state of the discussion with the French government.—The abandonment of Sicily is a point on which it is impossible for his majesty to concede. Your ldp. has already stated unanswerably to M. Talleyrand, that this demand is inconsistent with his express declarations, and with the whole principle on which the negociation rests. It is, besides, a proposal in itself quite inadmissible. The king's troops occupy Sicily for its defence, but with no right to cede it to France. It is not easy to contend, that the possession of Sicily can be necessary to that of Naples; nor, if it were so, could that be assigned as a reason for his majesty's consenting to abandon that island, which he may justly hope his naval and military force will be able to defend against all attacks. The Hans Towns could not, in the present circumstances, answer the purpose of an equivalent for Sicily, even if there were not other obvious objections to such a proposal. Nor would it be possible that any solid basis for the public tranquillity of Europe could be established on the idea thrown out to you by M. Talleyrand, of leaving G. Britain and France at liberty to prosecute the war against the allies of each other; a state of things in which their respective fleets and armies would in fact be as much opposed to each other, as they are now, and the peace between them would be merely nominal.—It is, therefore, to be hoped, that the French government will revert to its original proposals with which your lordship was charged by M. Talleyrand. To that basis of negociation it must be your lordship's endeavour to recall him; and if, unfortunately, you should find this to be impracticable, nothing can remain but that you should state, in perfectly civil, but decided terms, that you are not at liberty to treat on any other ground, and must therefore desire your passports to return to England.—I have stated in my last letters the different ideas that had occurred here for combining our negociation with that of Russia; providing, at the same time, for the safety of Sweden and Portugal.—Until we are informed what other proposal is made in this respect by M. Talleyrand, I can only desire that your lordship will keep this subject in view, so as not to admit of any thing inconsistent with the principle of good faith to which his majesty must in substance adhere, but in such form as may best facilitate the great work of peace.—I am, &c.

No. 19.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 9, 1806.—Received July 12.

Sir; I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 5th inst. early yesterday morning, and as soon as possible after waited upon M. Talleyrand to communicate to him that the offer made by France was by no means admissible, and that I had no authority to listen to any proposals whatsoever for the restoration of peace till he should desist from all pretension to the island of Sicily.—M. Talleyrand not being willing to make any such declaration, I asked him to give me a passport to return to London; he desired me to wait one day till he should again have taken the emperor's orders.—I accordingly returned this morning, when he desired me to propose Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa, as an indemnity for the loss of Sicily to his Sicilian majesty; to this I answered that as the messenger was returning I should communicate this proposition, but that it by no means authorised me to expect any answer, and therefore I must beg leave to return to England.—Had M. d'Oubril not been here I should immediately have insisted on passports.—I must now inform you that on Monday M. Talleyrand took me aside and told me the telegraph announced the landing of Basilico, expressing at the same time a wish that the dispatches he would bring might lead to peace. I answered that I could expect no such result whilst France demanded Sicily; and added, that if I might believe public report, the emperor so far from shewing any pacific disposition, every day threw new obstacles in the way.—I then mentioned the changes in Germany. M. Talleyrand said that they were determined upon, but *should not* be published if peace took place. He has since repeated this to M. d'Oubril and myself, saying if peace was made, Germany should remain in its present state.—M. d'Oubril writes both to you and to the comte de Strogonoff; his letters will probably contain more than mine, as I conversed very little with M. Talleyrand. I felt on very delicate ground. Had I entered sufficiently into the question of indemnities for the king of Sicily, to obtain a precise idea to what extent they could be carried, M. Talleyrand might have formed an opinion that I had some instructions, and was prepared to abandon Sicily whenever I was assured of sufficient compensation.

No. 20.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 18, 1806.

My lord; Your lordship's last dispatches have been received, and considered with all the attention which their importance naturally demanded.—It is unnecessary for me to recall to your lordship's recollection that the demand of Sicily, in whatever shape it may be brought forward by France, is in express contradiction to the offers originally made to your lordship by M. Talleyrand. But it is material that this topic should never be lost sight of in the course of these discussions; and that your lordship should observe to M. Talleyrand, that whatever difficulty now obstructs the conclusion of the negociation, arises solely from this unexpected departure from the basis originally established.—An exchange is now offered for Sicily, and it is in that view, and not in that of an absolute and uncompensated cession, that the question is to be considered. In this shape of the business it is obvious that the value of that exchange must be to be judged of, not only by this country and by Russia, but also by his Sicilian majesty. As the king, whose troops were admitted into Sicily for its defence and protection, naturally feels insuperable objections to any proposal for abandoning that island, unless with the free and full consent of its sovereign, and in consequence of such an arrangement as should provide for his interests by a compensation really satisfactory both in point of value and of security. The plan of creating for him a new kingdom, to consist of Dalmatia, Ragusa, and Albania, does not appear likely to answer this description. Albania, which forms so large a part of this proposed sovereignty, is now a province of the Turkish empire; the dismemberment of which it is a principal object of the policy both of G. Britain and Russia to prevent: that province has indeed been frequently involved in the same sort of confusion which prevails in many other parts of that empire, but this circumstance only increases the difficulty of giving any consistence to a state to be formed out of such materials. It does not lessen the other objections to such a plan.—There are in like manner many and strong objections to that part of the proposal which respects Ragusa; an independent state whose territory has never been ceded to France by any treaty, and of which she can consequently have no right to dispose, her occupation of it being indeed of very recent date.—But even with Albania and Ragusa, and much more without them, his majesty sees no hope that such a power could be formed in that quarter as would, either in extent of territory or in amount of revenue, afford the means of opposing any barrier for Austria or Turkey, or even of maintaining its own independence.—What advantage then could be gained to the allies by creating a nominal kingdom, without any sufficient power either to reduce the countries of which it would be composed under any uniform system of government, or to defend himself against the first attack which may be made upon it from without?—If there could, with the consent of his Sicilian maj. be any question of an exchange for Sicily, by the creation of a new state in that quarter, it is obvious that this could no otherwise be done than by annexing to Dalmatia not only the whole of Istria, but also a very large proportion if not the whole of the Venetian states, including, if possible, the city of Venice itself. In some such shape as this it is possible that the proposition might be rendered not wholly unacceptable to his Sicilian maj. And although the interests of this country separately would be far less consulted by such a plan than by the continued occupation of Sicily, yet the sense which the Russian minister at Paris appears to entertain of the advantage which might result from it to Austria and to Russia from the recovery of Dalmatia, if it were well combined with future arrangements of defence, might induce his maj. to accede to proposals of this description; on the supposition above mentioned of a *bonâ fide* consent on the part of his Sicilian majesty.—There appears, however, so little probability of inducing France so to extend her offer, that any further discussion of it might scarcely have been worth pursuing, had not M. d'Oubril so strongly expressed his wish, that this court might rather seek to temporize than abruptly to break off a negociation now brought to a state which affords so little promise of success. It is only in compliance with that desire that his maj. has been pleased to direct your lordship to continue the conferences with M. Talleyrand, so as to ascertain whether any more practicable shape can be given to the proposal of an exchange for Sicily. If this cannot be done, your lordship's attention will then, of course, be directed to the object of recalling the French government to the basis on which the negociation was originally placed by themselves, and on which his majesty is still ready to conclude it.—M. d'Oubril has stated to count Strogonoff the proposals which have been made to him for the conclusion of a separate peace, and the inducements which, he thinks, might lead his maj. to judge such an arrangement useful to the general interests of Europe. His maj. has undoubtedly been at all times ready to make great sacrifices for those interests: but very little expectation is entertained here, that Russia could, in such course, obtain any effectual security for them, at a time when so much new danger is to be apprehended, and in so many quarters, from the projects of France with respect to Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Porte, Spain, and Portugal.—In the present circumstances of

Europe, the last hope of averting these dangers is to be found in the union of the only two powers on whom France has as yet made no impression, Great Britain and Russia.—And although the mutual good dispositions and confidence of those two powers should in fact remain (as his maj. trusts they would) unimpaired by the difference of the situation in which a separate peace would place them, yet it is obvious, that the enemy would build the most extensive hopes on that foundation, and would be more encouraged by that, than by any other circumstance that could be stated, to proceed in the execution of the plans already announced to your lordship and to M. d'Oubril.—His maj. therefore, directs that you should express to that minister how material it is in every case, that the two courts should continue to combine their measures both of peace and war, and that no expectation should be held out to the enemy, of success in any endeavour to conclude a separate peace with either of the allies; a line to which, as your lordship will have informed M. d'Oubril, his maj. has, on his part, strictly adhered.

No. 21.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 19; 12 o'clock at night.—Received July 22.

Sir; On the 10th, gen. Clarke was named plenipotentiary to treat with M. d'Oubril: they have since had daily conferences of many hours, yesterday of fourteen. I hear every where that peace will be signed to-morrow, between Russia and France. On the 17th M. d'Oubril admitted to me, that he had produced his powers, and that if conditions, such as he should judge necessary to ensure the repose of the continent could be obtained, he should sign a truce of ten months; and this night, on pressing him, and remonstrating both upon his conduct and the impropriety of disguising his intention, I drew from him these words, which I wrote down in his presence: "Que voyant le danger immé" "diat de l'Autriche, s'il pouvoit la sauver, "il croiroit de son devoir de le faire, "même par une paix particulière." ["That "being aware of the immediate danger of "Austria, if it was in his power to save it, "he should think it his duty to do so, "even by a separate peace."] All he now appears to claim is the return of the troops from Germany; and if he is willing to make peace on receiving an assurance that orders to that effect shall be sent, nobody can doubt, but that it will be signed, and probably not a battalion make a retrograde movement of 50 miles.—M. Talleyrand says, that M. d'Oubril is willing to abandon Sicily and Dalmatia, and even to engage to solicit the junction of the former to Naples, &c.—I have used every argument to dissuade M. d'Oubril from so unadvised and unwise a measure, I hope more than I believe, with success. Indeed, I feared, from the first hour I met him, that he was come, determined to make a peace, good or bad, with or without G. Britain. I may perhaps gain a day, which may be a great deal, if that day should produce dispatches from M. de Strogonoff.—On the 17th, at night, the new arrangements for Germany were finally determined upon. The princes and the ministers who signed were scarce allowed time to read the deed. —There is a considerable army forming at Bayonne; 30,000 men are there already. This army is ostensibly destined against Portugal, but will take Spain likewise. M. Herman, one of the secretaries of the foreign office, set off for Lisbon with a mission on the 13th.—All the officers of the army now in Germany received yesterday orders to join their regiments instantly. The court say, this is to have troops to occupy the states seized by the new confederacy. The public ascribe this measure to a desire to frighten the emperor of Germany; and myself, to a wish to hurry M. d'Oubril, who has shewn so much anxiety for the evacuation of Germany.—M. d'Oubril and M. Talleyrand have, as I have learnt, fixed upon Majorca, Ivica, and Minorca, for his Sicilian majesty, if they can prevail upon us to evacuate Sicily.

No. 22.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 20, 1806; 11 at night. —Received July 24.

Sir; At 9 this morning, having had the honour to receive your letters by Mr. Longuinoff, and written a few lines to you in addition to my dispatches of last night, I went to M. d'Oubril; and as I am happy since to find, anticipated the contents of your dispatch of the 18th inst.—I used every argument and means to obtain delay; engaged to break off, if he did; and, finally, authorized him to hold out hopes, that I would listen to propositions of indemnity in lieu of Sicily for his Sicilian maj. if proposed by him, and accompanied by a joint negociation.—I begged he would do nothing till after Basilico should have arrived, as I had learnt by the telegraph, that he had landed last night.—I did not find him disposed to listen to me; and, not being willing to be too communicative towards him at that moment, I went away.—At 12, I waited upon M. Talleyrand: he was not to be seen. At 4, I heard from good authority, that peace was signed. At 6, Basilico arrived. I then went to M. d'Oubril. He was said not to be at home; but, seeing his carriage, I forced my way. He admitted the fact, *peace is signed;* the conditions, the evacuation *instantèr* of Germany by the French troops; the integrity, &c. of the Ottoman empire; no attempt to be made upon Swedish Pomerania; and, by a secret article, Russia promises to obtain his Sicilian majesty's consent to an exchange of Sicily for Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica. Russia to use her good offices to restore peace between France and England. I have not seen the treaty; but I believe it contains nothing else material.—M. d'Oubril sends a copy to count Strogonoff, and goes himself to St. Petersburgh. I had no patience to listen to M. d'Oubril's defence of his conduct, so I did not claim his good offices. I must have asked him officially to stay, which I did not choose to do.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.

No. 23.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 21, 1806.—Received July 24.

Sir; I saw M. Talleyrand to-day. I can perceive that the terms of France are increased, but still not as much so as the sudden defection of Russia had led me to apprehend. Hanover, Malta, the Cape, and India, remain pure and unsullied; and I took an opportunity in conversation to protest, that, come what come might, these were points I never would suffer to be mentioned, but as points agreed upon.—M. Talleyrand demanded my powers. I did not think myself authorised, in the present circumstances, to withhold them.—Gen. Clarke is named to treat with me.

No. 24.—Full powers given to the Earl of Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 21st of July 1806, and exchanged with Gen. Clarke, the French Plenipotentiary, on the 23d.

George R.—George III. by the grace of God, of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland king, defender of the faith, duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, arch-treasurer and prince elector of the holy Roman Empire, &c. To all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting!—The flames of war having already raged too long in the different quarters of the world; it is the more incumbent upon us to re-establish the public tranquillity, by putting an end to so many quarrels and controversies. We have therefore judged it expedient to invest a fit person with full powers on our part, for the better carrying on this great undertaking.—Know therefore, that we, reposing especial trust in the fidelity, diligence, judgment, perspicuity, and experience of our trusty and well beloved Francis Seymour, esq. (commonly called earl of Yarmouth), have nominated, constituted, and appointed him, as by these presents we do nominate, constitute, and appoint him our true, certain, and undoubted procurator, commissioner, and plenipotentiary; giving to him all and all manner of power, faculty, and authority, together with general as well as special orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary), for us and in our name to meet and confer with the ministers, commissioners, or plenipotentiaries of any other princes or states whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether our enemies or our allies; furnished with sufficient powers for that purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly; and to consult and agree with them for the speedy restoration of sincere friendship and amity, and of a firm and lasting peace; and for us, and in our name, to sign all such matters and things as shall be agreed upon and concluded, and on the premises to form such treaty or treaties, or other instruments as shall be necessary; and mutually to deliver and receive the same in exchange, and to do and perform all such acts, matters, and things as may be in any way proper and conducive to the purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a manner and form, and with the like validity and effect, as we ourself, if we were present, could do and perform; engaging and promising on our royal word, that we will accept, ratify, and confirm in the most effectual manner, all such acts, matters, and things, as shall be so transacted and concluded by our said plenipotentiary, and that we will never suffer any person to violate the same in whole or in part, or to act contrary thereto.—In testimony and confirmation of all which, we have caused our great seal of our united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these presents, signed with our royal hand.—Given at our court at St. James's, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1806, and of our reign the 46th.

No. 25.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 24, 1806.—Received July 28.

Sir; I had the honour to send by M. de Longuinoff, dispatches acquainting you, for his majesty's information, of the peace signed between the Russian and French plenipotentiaries, and with as accurate a statement of the terms as I was able to obtain. M. d'Oubril himself set out for Petersburgh early on the morning of the 22d.—On the 22d I received the official notification of the appointment of gen. Clarke to treat on the part of France, (a copy of which I have the honour to inclose, marked A.) preceded by a private communication from M. Talleyrand, saying, that the Russian peace being signed, and the season of the year favourable to the accomplishment of the ulterior views of France, no arrangement, which might remove for some weeks, or even months, a definitive treaty, could now take place.—I answered the official note (marked A.) with one, a copy of which I inclose, (marked B.)—In the evening gen. Clarke proposed a conference for the following morning, at which we should mutually exchange our full powers. We accordingly did so; and I have the honour to inclose (marked C.) a copy of those of gen. Clarke.—This conference began by an historical recapitulation of what had previously passed, gen. Clarke saying, he had not yet received his final instructions on all the different points in discussion; it was therefore agreed to adjourn the conference to this day, when each should come prepared with a memorandum of the intentions of his government, founded on what had already passed; gen. Clarke at the same time declaring that a separate peace with Russia was to be considered equal or superior, in the present circumstances of the world, to any great success in war, and consequently as entitling France to terms much more advantageous than those to which she would have subscribed some days ago. This was accompanied by some animadversions upon the conduct of Russia, to which I could only answer, that I felt it my duty to abstain from any remark, and should, therefore, be entirely silent upon that subject; but that I could assure him that if an intention existed of making any change in the great points upon which we had such positive, though certainly not official, assurances, namely, his majesty's German dominions, Malta, and the Cape, I must consider the negociation as stopped *in limine*, and that there would remain only for me to return to England, and acquaint the king, that no peace, consistent with his majesty's honour or that of the country, could be made. Gen. Clarke reverted to his want of full instructions, and promised to meet me properly prepared, the next day.—At 3 o'clock this day, I again met gen. Clarke; when I read a paper, a copy of which I have the honour to inclose (marked D.), containing the abstract of what I had always stated to be the basis and terms on which his maj. could alone consent to treat. I did not, however, deliver it to him, considering it merely as the heads of past conversations.—Gen. Clarke then said, that as it was impossible I could be prepared with the assent of his maj. to the arrangement proposed by Russia for his Sicilian majesty, on which the terms might much depend, I must consider the communication he made, as not strictly official in point of form, but as depending only on that circumstance to make it so.—Gen. Clarke proceeded to state, that in the situation France was in at this moment, the emperor would feel authorized to withhold some of the great points; but that having repeatedly said the contrary, though not in an official manner, he would abide by it.—Gen. Clarke first conversed about his majesty's German dominions. On this subject, by secret articles, any thing his majesty thinks right may be stipulated: by the public article, the promise not to object to some acquisition of territory to be made by Prussia. I stopped gen. Clarke here to say, that his majesty never could consent to the king of Prussia's obtaining the Hans Towns. Gen. Clarke said, that it was Fulda, Hoya, and some other trifling principalities, over which it was proposed to extend the sovereignty of his Prussian majesty, but that the independence and present state of the Hans Towns should not be meddled with.—On the subject of Malta: Malta, Gozo, and Conino in full sovereignty to his majesty, with a clause in the article, declaratory of the dissolution of the order, and that the two powers "n'en connoissent plus l'existance," [no longer recognize the existence of it.]

Some pensions for the chevaliers and others, having "des droits réels dans l'isle," [real rights in the island.] This not to extend to foreign commanderies of the order, or to any claim not local.—The Cape in equal full sovereignty; as a condition it is desired, "qu'il y soit établi un port franc" [that there should be established there a free port] to all nations: either the port itself declared so, or a part appropriated to that purpose.—On the subject of the maintenance of the integrity of the territories and possessions of the sublime porte, gen. Clarke proposed an article, a copy of which I have the honour to send (marked E.). I told him the usual full clause would be sufficient; he persisted that I should send it for his majesty's consideration.—To the usual full clause of the integrity of the territories and possessions of his most faithful majesty, gen. Clarke weighed upon a proposed addition of the word "partout;" [in every part of the world] and when asked for explanation, said, he thought his Britannic maj. might occupy some of his most faithful majesty's foreign possessions.—The integrity of his Swedish majesty's dominions in the usual manner.—Having dismissed these points, gen. Clarke stated the demands of France: Pondicherry, St. Lucie, Tobago, Surinam, Goree, Demarara, Berbice, Essequibo.—The recognition in the usual words, "est reconnu," [is recognized] of the different branches of the reigning family; of the electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg as kings; of the new dukes of Cleves, Baden, and Darmstadt.—In discussing for many hours these demands, I never for an instant admitted the possibility of his majesty consenting to the cessions required. I sought, however, to ascertain to what extent, and in what manner they could be modified.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Paris, July 22, 1806.

My lord; I have the honour to inform your excellency, that, having laid before his maj. the emperor, the copy of the full powers from his Britannic maj. which you have done me the honour to communicate to me officially, I have received his majesty's orders to inform you, that he has made choice of his excellency gen. Clarke, his principal private secretary, to negociate and conclude the treaty which is to put an end to the present war, and restore at length to Europe, and to the commerce of the world, that peace and tranquillity which have been so long interrupted. I have just transmitted to gen. Clarke his majesty's orders, and I have no doubt that he will immediately arrange with your excellency the opening of a negociation, to the result of which are attached such important interests, and the prompt issue of which appears to me to be equally desired by both governments and both nations.—I request, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, Prince of Benevento.

Second Inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, July 22, 1806.

Sir; I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter, acquainting me with the choice made by the emperor of his excellency gen. Clarke, his principal private secretary, for the purpose of negociating and concluding the treaty which is to put an end to the present war.—I request that your excellency will be persuaded of the earnestness with which I shall enter into arrangements on this subject with gen. Clarke, as soon as his excellency shall inform me of his wishes in this respect. I request, &c. YARMOUTH.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of General Clarke's full powers.

Napoleon, by the grace of God, and by the constitution, emperor of the French, king of Italy, reposing entire confidence in the fidelity to our person, and zeal for our service, of the general of division Clarke, our privy counsellor of the cabinet, and great officer of the legion of honour, we have given to him, and do give to him by these presents, full and absolute power, commission, and special orders to agree upon, decide, conclude, and sign, in our name, and with the minister of his Britannic maj. duly authorized thereunto, such treaties, articles, conventions, declarations, and other acts, as he shall judge to be expedient; promising to agree to, to maintain, to accomplish, and punctually to execute, all that he the said plenipotentiary shall have promised and signed, by virtue of the present full powers; as also to have the letters of ratification prepared in due form, and to deliver them, in order that they may be exchanged within the time agreed upon.—In witness whereof, we have given these presents, signed with our hand, countersigned and sealed with our imperial seal.—At St. Cloud, the 21st July, 1806, in the 2d year of our reign. NAPOLEON.

Fourth inclosure (D.) — Extract from a paper read to Gen. Clarke by the Earl of Yarmouth.

The situation in which the two belligerent powers are now placed by the course of the events of the war, leaving few points of immediate contact between them, or on which they may not, according to all appearance, come now to an understanding, his Britannic majesty, animated no less than the emperor of the French, with a desire to put an end to the calamities of war, has authorized the undersigned (furnished with the full powers of his majesty) to discuss the basis, and to give full effect to this reciprocal desire.—The immense acquisitions made by France since the commencement of hostilities, and the direct and immediate influence which she has obtained, having entirely changed the political system of Europe, his Britannic maj. finds himself obliged to seek in the conquests he has made, and in the possession of Malta, a just and reasonable counterpoise. His maj. would consequently treat generally on the basis of the *uti possidetis*.—It is at the same time understood, that the German possessions of his Britannic maj. of which he was deprived from motives foreign to the war between the two powers, shall be restored to him entire.—It is likewise understood, that the peace shall secure the integrity of the territories and possessions of the Sublime Porte, of his most faithful majesty, of his maj. the king of Sweden, and the present state of Switzerland.

Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of an article proposed by Gen. Clarke to the Earl of Yarmouth for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The two contracting powers reciprocally guarantee the entire and absolute integrity and independence of the Ottoman empire. They will mutually oppose the pretensions of any power to any thing contrary to the usages, the rights of sovereignty, and the possessions of the Sublime Porte.

No. 26.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 26, 1806.

My lord; Your lordship's dispatches conveying the mortifying intelligence of the signature of a separate treaty between Russia and France, were received here yesterday; and his majesty's ministers have since had the opportunity of being acquainted with the precise terms of that treaty, which it appears had not in all respects been accurately represented to your lordship.—The king was most particularly struck with the great difference which was perceived between the actual arrangement made respecting Sicily, and that which had been described to your ldp.—In writing to your lordship, it is not necessary to dwell on the humiliating conditions to which M. d'Oubril has thought proper to bind his sovereign. Of that minister's misconduct your lordship appears fully sensible; and I doubt not you exerted yourself to the utmost to prevent it. When this was found impracticable, your lordship was naturally placed in circumstances of considerable difficulty, and for which every allowance is to be made. But it is necessary for me to say, frankly, that it would on the whole have been more satisfactory to the king's servants, if your lordship had waited to know the impression which this new event might create here before you had produced your full powers.—It was originally declared by your lordship to M. Talleyrand, that your full powers were not to be produced till the French government should have reverted to the basis of negociation originally proposed by themselves; that of the *uti possidetis* universally, with the single exception of Hanover. By subsequent instructions, your lordship had indeed been acquainted that, in compliance with the wish so strongly expressed by the Russian negociator at Paris, his maj. would not refuse to enter into the consideration of such proposals as might be made to him for a fair equivalent to be given to his Sicilian majesty in lieu of Sicily, with the full and free consent of that monarch. The proposal of such an equivalent, and its acceptance by his majesty's government, would have replaced the negociation on its original footing, that of a *uti possidetis*, to be departed from only by mutual consent, in those cases where any exchange for a reasonable equivalent might meet the ideas of both parties; and the case for the production of your lordship's full powers would thus have arisen clearly and unequivocally. Even as the matter now stands, it does not certainly preclude discussion. But this might have been continued unofficially. And it is apprehended that, by producing your powers on the very day after the signature of the Russian treaty, an impression may have been created very unfavourable to the further progress of the negociation.—In the situation to which the business is now brought, his majesty thinks it necessary to lose no time in taking every proper step for replacing the discussions between the two countries on their original footing.—The first proposals made by France were, that a plenipotentiary should be sent from hence with full powers to treat, and to conclude a separate peace with France and her allies. This was declined here, not from any unwillingness to enter into discussions for peace on just and honourable terms, an object which his maj. has uniformly expressed himself desirous of accomplishing, but because the king was bound by engagements to Russia, which precluded him from treating otherwise than in concert with that power. Subsequently to this, a proposal was conveyed through your lordship for the conclusion of peace on the basis so often referred to; and the intermediate communications received from Russia enabled his majesty, consistently with good faith, to entertain those proposals, and to express his disposition to accede to them, provided that, in the mode of treating and concluding, the most intimate concert should still be maintained with Russia.—The extraordinary step taken by M. d'Oubril has now removed all necessity of further reserve on this point.—His majesty, in this state of things, thinks it proper to combine together the two proposals which he has at different periods received from France; and, as the difficulty which before prevented the sending from this country a public minister, openly accredited, to treat for peace, now no longer subsists, and as an acceptable basis of negociation has been proposed to him by the enemy, his majesty directs, that your lordship should apply to M. Talleyrand for passports for a public minister so authorized and accredited, to whom it is his majesty's gracious intention to join your lordship, in the full powers to be granted by his majesty.—The great advantages which the king's service will derive from the employment of a person fully instructed as to the sentiments of his majesty's government on all the various points of discussion that may arise, cannot fail to strike your lordship in the same light in which they are seen here; and the king's servants entertain no doubt of your lordship's zealous and hearty co-operation in the execution of the joint instructions which such a person will bring with him. I have only, therefore, to add, that your lordship may assure M. Talleyrand, that as soon as the necessary passports are received, there shall not be an hour's delay in his setting out; and that his majesty's government continues ardently to wish for the conclusion of peace, provided it can be accomplished on the same grounds of national honour, which have never been lost sight of here.

No. 27.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, July 28, 1806.

My lord; Your lordship's dispatch of the 24th inst. was received here this morning, and as it is probable that, in the course of this day, or to-morrow at farthest, your ldp. will receive mine of the 26th inst., I do not think it necessary to do more at present, than to request that your lordship will assure M. Talleyrand, that, immediately on the receipt of the passports which you have been instructed to demand, the earl of Lauderdale, who has been humbly recommended to his majesty for this important trust, will be prepared to set out; and that he will, therefore, of course, be with your lordship in a very few days from this date. I need hardly observe to your lordship, that it is of the utmost importance, that, in the interim, your lordship should avoid taking any step, or even holding any language, which may tend in the smallest degree to commit the opinion of his majesty's government on any part of the matters now depending.

No. 28.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, July 30th, 1806.—Received August 1st.

Sir; I had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 26th inst. late at night on the 28th, and next morning lost no time in asking for blank passports for a person fully instructed with the sentiments of his majesty's government, whom it was their intention to join with me in the important commission of treating for peace. M. Talleyrand told me he must take the emperor's orders. I accordingly returned this day, when that minister informed me, that the emperor could consider this demand in no other light but that of unnecessary delay, because his majesty's secretary of state was actually in possession of a blank passport, which would enable any person or persons to come to Paris without the loss of time occasioned by this demand; but that "*pour surcroit de facilités*," [for still greater facility,] there could be no difficulty about giving more. I answered that I had no knowledge of this circumstance. M. Talleyrand said it was certain, because he had sent two entirely in blank, and that one only had been used, namely, that with which I returned.—It is unnecessary for me to add any thing to what I have already said in my former dispatches, relative to the signature of the Russian treaty; any inaccuracy in the statement of its contents, such as I was enabled to transmit them, may easily be accounted for by the circumstance of my not having seen the treaty itself, and by the unwillingness M. d'Oubril naturally felt to open himself to me on that subject; he informed me at the time that he should send a copy to M. de Strogonoff, who would communicate it to his majesty's ministers.—It is with pain, sir, proportioned to my zeal for his majesty's service, and to the fair and honest conviction of my having done nothing which the peculiar and trying circumstances of the moment did not require from me, that I have learnt by the same dispatch the expression of a wish that I had delayed the production of my full powers till I could know the impression which this event of the Russian treaty might produce in his majesty's councils, and the apprehension that by the producing them, so soon after the signature of the Russian treaty, an impression might be created unfavourable to the further progress of the negociation.—If the question regarded only my own personal feelings, I should not think myself at liberty to allot to it so large a portion of a public dispatch; but it may not, I conceive, be unuseful, with a view to the conduct of the negociation, that you should be apprized of some details which I have hitherto omitted dwelling upon, partly from the urgency of more important subjects, and partly from my desire not to trespass upon your attention to so great an extent. I trust, sir, that his majesty will see in these details wherewithal to justify my conduct in the difficult situation in which I was placed.—The fate of Holland and Naples was settled before I was honoured with his majesty's confidence.—My conversation here with M. Talleyrand soon convinced me that these were only preludes to still greater changes in the system of Europe. I saw at the same time a great desire of negociation, before the final execution of some of the emperor's schemes should have removed any hope of its being attended with success.—This opinion, not preconceived or lightly taken up, but gradually formed from a variety of circumstances, was confirmed by the nature of the offers held out, unofficially indeed, but in such clear and unequivocal terms, that it was impossible to entertain any doubt of the intention of this government to adhere to them.—The point which of all others was the most essential, and that on which satisfaction was due to the national honour and to that of his majesty, Hanover, would, I was assured, be given up without restriction; for I did not then know we should be asked to allow the king of Prussia to obtain the sovereignty of some of the lesser principalities.—I received similar assurances about Malta, and the Cape of Good Hope; nor have I any reason to doubt but that before Russia had made her peace separately, these terms might have been obtained, and the treaty have had solely for its basis the *uti possidetis*, with the sole exception in our favour of Hanover restored, and latterly indeed of some arrangements tolerable to all parties in exchange for Sicily.—M. Talleyrand held the same language to me, with respect to Russia, which he had before held with regard to the affairs of Germany. "You "have now been here a month; we have "been willing to converse with you, to "give you an insight into our views, and "to communicate them to the British go-"vernment. We told you, that if you had "the powers, and would enter into nego-"ciation, we would not sign the arrange-"ment of Germany. A reasonable time "was left for you to consult your govern-"ment; we had no answer. The arrange-"ment was signed, *et nous n'en reviendrons* "*jamais*, [and we will never recede from "it]. We now ask you whether you will "treat before Russia has signed, which "will not pass two days."—It cannot be necessary to state my answer to such a proposition. I will only add, that the treaty with Russia was signed within the time mentioned, and then commenced the difficulty of my situation. "Switzerland," I was told by the same authority, "is on "the eve of undergoing a great change. "This cannot be averted but by a peace "with England; but still less can we alter "for any other consideration, our inten-"tion of invading Portugal. The army "destined for that purpose is already as-"sembling at Bayonne. This is for the "determination of G. Britain."—But I confess, the point of all others the most decisive in inducing me to produce my full powers, was the language held respecting Prussia. "Prussia demands from us a "declaration respecting Hanover; we cannot consent wantonly to lose the only "ally France has had since the revolution; "the declaration once made *nous n'en* "*pouvons nous retracter,*" [we cannot retract]. Would you have us break "entirely with Prussia, when we cannot "even say that G. Britain will negociate "with us? Are you here only with orders to delay our measures till the season "of the year makes exertion impossible, "or can you treat? If so, is not the assurance we give you, that Hanover, Malta, "and the Cape, shall not be contested, sufficient to induce you to do so? Must we "lay before the British government our "exact terms, before they will even avow "a negociation with so great a power as "that of France? or shall we execute our "other projects, as we did those in Holland and Naples?"—Undoubtedly, sir, conversations of this sort, confirmed even as they were by the events passing under my eyes, could never have induced me to commit his majesty's confidential servants upon any point upon which I had not received their instructions, and which left no time to receive them; but I did not think myself at liberty to shift from myself the responsibility thus thrown upon me, at the risk of seeing Portugal and Switzerland share the same fate which Germany has just experienced, and Hanover confirmed to Prussia, until such time as his majesty's arms should recover the possession of it. The mode of proceeding of this government left me no alternative. Either to avow negociation, or shut up every opening to it, was my only option.—I felt that I pledged his majesty to nothing except the fact of negociation, already privately known to every court in Europe.—I carefully forbore giving any written paper, or admitting even the possibility of any other basis than that of *uti possidetis.*—I have ascertained the real extent of the pretensions of France; and I did consider myself to have prevented a great evil at small expence by having given time to yourself and his majesty's other confidential servants, to provide by the further instructions you might judge proper, for the interest of the powers, thus, for the moment at least, saved from the grasp of France.—I persuade myself that the motives here detailed upon which I acted at the moment, will place in a stronger light the difficulties of my position, and will on further consideration obtain his majesty's gracious approbation of the conduct which I thought myself obliged to hold in consequence.—His majesty's ministers would have relieved me from much painful responsibility, if they had commanded me to proceed no further, and wait the arrival of the person alluded to, and for whom I have the honour to inclose the necessary passport which I have this moment received.—Mr. Goddard, whom a long residence in France, independent of his abilities and correct information of what has passed here, renders entirely able to give his majesty's ministers every explanation they may wish for, is so good as to take this dispatch with him to England, where he is returning at the end of his long captivity in this country. I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.

No. 29.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-Street, August the 2d, 1806.

My lord; Mr. Goddard arrived here yesterday evening with your lordship's dispatch of the 30th July.—His majesty's servants always did justice to the motives which induced your lordship to produce your full powers, though the step is one of which it is not possible for them to express approbation, thinking it, as they do, likely to have given so much more countenance than was desireable to the new and increasing demands of France.—The full powers which lord Lauderdale carries with him, are drawn jointly in his name and your lordship's. In the present disposition of the French government, there is, I fear little probability, that peace can be concluded on such terms as are alone admissible. The trial should, however, be made with frankness and good faith; and it is with this view, that his majesty has been pleased to direct that the earl of Lauderdale should proceed to Paris, notwithstanding the present unfavourable aspect of the negociation. His instructions your lordship will consider as equally addressed to yourself, and as the rule of your conduct in any conferences which, in conjunction with him, you may have with M. Talleyrand or gen. Clarke; and, in any point of doubt that may occur, it is his majesty's pleasure, that your lordship should be guided by lord Lauderdale's opinion, formed, as it will be, on the fullest knowledge of the sentiments and views of his majesty's government. I am, &c. C. J. FOX.

No. 30.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 3, 1806.

My lord; I was unwilling to detain lord Lauderdale for the purpose of replying particularly to the unfounded allegations of M. Talleyrand, which you have recapitulated in your dispatch of the 30th ult. But some points are there mentioned which cannot be left without an answer, such, indeed, as I trust your lordship has already given to them.—It is true, as stated by that minister, that when the demand was made for lord Lauderdale's passport, there still remained here a blank passport, one of the two sent here some time before your lordship's arrival, when it had been proposed to us to treat separately from Russia. That proposal having fallen to the ground, the circumstance of our being still in possession of the passport was overlooked; but, even if it had occurred, some doubt would probably have arisen, how far it might be proper, in so different a state of things, to make use of it for lord Lauderdale, without some previous communication of such an intention. This whole matter is, however, very immaterial. The principal point to which I feel it necessary to advert, is that part of M. Talleyrand's language which imputes to this country needless delays in the negociation, and attributes to that cause the unjustifiable measures pursued by France in Germany, and elsewhere.—In the instructions given to lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France, during the negociation, are detailed. It is from thence alone that delay has arisen.—Your lordship truly states, that the offers made through yourself were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conference after your lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded. In the former offers, it had been distinctly disclaimed: "Vous l'avez—nous ne vous la demandons pas. Si nous la possédions, elle pourroit augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés." [You are in possession of it. We do not demand it of you. If we possessed it, the difficulties might be much increased.] This demand, therefore, could not have been foreseen, being in contradiction to their own assurances; and your lordship could only take it *ad referendum*. This produced a delay attributable solely to France. Our answer was immediate and distinct. The new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed basis in its most essential part. To obviate a cavil on the subject of full powers, they were sent to you; but with an express injunction not to use them, nor even to produce them formally, till the French government should return to its former ground respecting Sicily. Your lordship stated this to M. Talleyrand, and you received in return, a proposal, of giving to his majesty, or to the king of Naples, the Hans towns in lieu of Sicily. This being again a proposition entirely new, could only be referred for his majesty's consideration. On the very next day after it arrived, it was decidedly rejected here; and, so little were we disposed to delay, that the same dispatch conveyed to you his majesty's orders, if the demand of Sicily should still be persisted in, to desire your passports, and return to England.—Of this order your lordship informed M. Talleyrand, and its execution was delayed only by a fresh proposal of exchanges brought forward by France, and supported by the Russian minister, as affording the means by which his majesty might prevent, amongst other things, the changes meditated in Germany. M. Talleyrand, it appears, now represents this communication in the following terms: "We told you, that *if you had powers*, and would *enter into negociation*, we would not *sign* the arrangement in Germany." M. Talleyrand's real communication is to be found in your lordship's dispatch of the 9th July, in which he says, that those changes "*were determined upon*, but should not *be published* if *peace took place*."—That dispatch was received here on the 12th; and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, in whichever form they were conveyed, the German treaties were both signed and published.—They must of course have been prepared at least one day before. What M. Talleyrand therefore calls a reasonable time allowed to your lordship to consult your government, was, at the most, 24 hours, even supposing the utmost possible expedition to be made by the messengers to and from England, and no accident or delay to occur by land or sea. These dates will undoubtedly not have escaped your lordship's attention, and will have enabled you to refute, in the most decisive manner, the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part, the results of its own injustice, and repeated breach of promise.—The whole of our intercourse with France bears indeed so different a character from that of delay, and the whole of the king's conduct in this, as in every other instance, is marked by so many striking proofs of his desire to avert, even by the greatest sacrifices, such calamities as he is now accused of producing, that your lordship may perhaps have felt it less necessary to enter into a particular refutation of such a charge.—But after the experience which in this negociation we have had of the conduct of the French government, it is of the highest consequence not to suffer such imputations to pass unnoticed, and, by disregard, to acquire strength and currency.—Of the subsequent proceedings, no explanation can be necessary. It had not been decided here, that in the event of the signature of the Russian treaty, the negogociation on the part of this country should be pursued on any other basis but that of the strict *uti possidetis*, with the exception of Hanover. The resolution of admitting even the possibility of equivalent for Sicily, had been adopted only in consequence of M. d'Oubril's desire, and in order to maintain, if it had been possible, the union of council and measures between G. Britain and Russia. But by the production of your lordship's full powers, his majesty was in some sort pledged to continue the negociation. It was then judged proper that a fresh negociator should be added to your lordship, and not an instant has been lost in giving effect to that determination; nor has any considerable delay occurred on this side the water, except in the single point respecting the passport, which I have explained in the outset of this dispatch. I am, &c. C. J. FOX.

No. 31.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 6, 1806; 9 o'clock A. M.—Received Aug. 13.

Sir; The desire expressed by commodore Owen, in the uncertain state of the weather, to get off the coast of France as soon as possible, prevented me from detaining the boat for the purpose of announcing to you my arrival at Calais. After a very quick passage in his majesty's frigate the Clyde, I was put on shore on Sunday morning the 3d, about 11 o'clock. At Calais I received every mark of attention and civility from the magistrates and the commanders of the army, and of the marine, as well as from the inhabitants of the place, who were in crowds on the shore, expressing their wishes for peace. I have now to inform you, that on Tuesday I got to Paris about 12 o'clock; where I immediately sent the inclosed note, (marked A.) to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, from whom I soon afterwards received the answer, (marked B.) which I also inclose. At the hour appointed, I waited upon his excellency, with whom I had a short conversation, in which his anxiety for your speedy recovery formed the principal topic. He informed me that gen. Clarke was the person named by the emperor to negociate with lord Yarmouth and myself, and appointed this day at 11 o'clock for the formal exhibition of our powers. As the frequency of communication gives rise to false speculations in England, it is not my intention to send a messenger until I shall have something more important to communicate. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated August 5, 1806.

The earl of Lauderdale, appointed by his Britannick majesty, plenipotentiary at the court of France, has the honour to inform his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, of his arrival at Paris, and at the same time to request that he will have the goodness to inform him at what hour he may call upon him.

Second inclosure (B).—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated August 5, 1806.

The minister for foreign affairs has learnt with pleasure the arrival of the earl of Lauderdale. He will be happy to see him to-day at 5 o'clock. He has the honour to present to the earl of Lauderdale the assurances of his high consideration.

No. 32.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 7, 1806. Received Aug. 13.

Sir; In consequence of the appointment mentioned in my dispatch of yesterday's date, I called on his excellency, the minister for foreign affairs, at 11 o'clock, and exhibited the powers with which his majesty has been graciously pleased to invest me.—According to custom, I left with his excellency a copy of the powers, and he delivered to me a letter which I have the honour to inclose, informing me that gen. Clarke had been appointed to negociate with lord Yarmouth and myself.—To gen. Clarke I was introduced before dinner, at the house of his excellency the minister, and in the course of a short conversation with him, fixed our first meeting for 12 o'clock this day. I have reason to think that he did not wish it to take place so soon, though he certainly made no explicit objection when I proposed it. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Inclosure referred to in the preceding dispatch.—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Aug. 6th, 1806.

The undersigned minister for foreign affairs has lost no time in laying before his majesty, the emperor and king, the full powers which his excellency lord Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannick majesty, has done him the honour to communicate to him. He has the honour to inform lord Lauderdale, that gen. Clarke has been appointed by his majesty, and has received his credentials to treat for peace, and that it is with that minister that their excellencies, my lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, will have to enter into negociation on the subject of the present discussions, which the two governments equally desire to see happily concluded. (Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

No. 33.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 7, 1806.—Received Aug. 13.

Sir; I received in due time, and in their order; your several dispatches of the 8th ult. and the 2d and 3d inst. As no messenger has been dispatched from hence since the receipt of them, I have been obliged to defer, till now, replying to their contents.—It was with great satisfaction that I learnt by your dispatch of the 2d inst. the intelligence of lord Lauderdale's departure from England; as, independently of the advantages I must derive from communicating with a person charged with the latest and fullest instructions from his majesty, his arrival here afforded me the opportunity of evincing, in the clearest manner, that I had in no instance thought myself at liberty to depart from the basis, originally laid down as the only one on which his majesty's ministers could consent to treat with the French government.—It must be evident that whatever delays have occurred in the negociation are imputable to France, and to the perpetual variation of the terms proposed by her; and I had not failed before the receipt of your dispatch of the 3d inst. repeatedly to do justice to the conduct of his majesty's government in that respect.—As in the line of conduct which I thought it my duty to observe previous to the earl of Lauderdale's arrival, I had no other object in view than the fulfilling to the best of my abilities the mission with which his majesty had been graciously pleased to charge me, I can, under the present circumstances, have no other ambition than that of co-operating with my best endeavours in the negociation entrusted to us jointly, upon the same basis on which I had originally placed it.—I have the honour to be, &c. YARMOUTH.

No. 34.—Full powers given to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, which were communicated to M. Talleyrand on the 6th of August, 1806.

George III., by the grace of God, of the united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland king, defender of the faith, duke of Brunswick and Lunenburg, arch-treasurer and prince elector of the holy Roman empire, &c. To all and singular to whom these presents shall come, greeting!—The flames of war having already raged too long in the different quarters of the world, it is the more incumbent upon us to re-establish the public tranquillity by putting an end to so many quarrels and controversies. We have therefore judged it expedient to invest certain fit persons with full powers on our part for the better carrying on this great undertaking.—Know therefore, that we, reposing especial trust in the fidelity, diligence, judgement, perspicuity, and experience of our right trusty and well-beloved James earl of Lauderdale, and of our trusty and well-beloved Francis Seymour esq. commonly called earl of Yarmouth, have nominated, constituted, and appointed them, as by these presents we do nominate, constitute, and appoint them, our true, certain, and undoubted procurators, commissioners, and plenipotentiaries; giving to them conjointly or separately, all and all manner of power, faculty, and authority, together with general as well as special orders, (so that the general do not derogate from the special, nor on the contrary,) for us and in our name to meet and confer with the ministers, commissioners, or plenipotentiaries of any other princes or states whatsoever, who may be interested therein, whether our enemies or our allies, furnished with sufficient powers for that purpose, as well singly and separately, as aggregately and conjointly, and to consult and agree with them for the speedy restoration of a sincere friendship and amity, and of a firm and lasting peace; and for us and in our name to sign all such matters and things as shall be agreed upon and concluded on the premises, and to form such treaty or treaties or any other instruments as shall be necessary, and mutually to deliver and receive the same in exchange, and to do and perform all such acts, matters, and things, as may be in any way proper and conducive to the purposes above mentioned, in as full and ample a manner and form, and with the like validity and effect, as we ourself, if we were present, could do and perform; engaging and promising, on our royal word, that we will accept, ratify, and confirm, in the most effectual manner, all such acts, matters, and things as shall be so transacted and concluded by our said plenipotentiaries, conjointly or separately, and that we will never suffer any person to violate the same in whole or in part, or to act contrary thereto.—In testimony and confirmation of all which, we have caused our great seal of our united kingdom of G. Britain and Ireland to be affixed to these presents, signed with our royal hand.—Given at our court at St. James's, this 1st day of August, in the year of our Lord 1805, and of our reign the 46th.

No. 35.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 9, 1806.—Received Aug. 13.

Sir; Thinking it unnecessary to send a courier to England with the details of the mere matters of form which necessarily took place after lord Lauderdale's arrival, we have delayed writing till there appeared something of importance to communicate to you.—We have now to inform you, that lord Lauderdale, having exhibited his powers, and delivered a copy in the customary form, our first meeting with gen. Clarke, the plenipotentiary of the French government, took place at his house, on Thursday 7th Aug. at noon.—Our conversation commenced by gen. Clarke's observing that as lord Lauderdale had just arrived from London, with full instructions from his majesty, he had probably something new to communicate.—Lord Lauderdale in substance replied that it was his wish before intermeddling with the negociation now pending, distinctly to recall to the recollection of gen. Clarke what had already passed between his majesty and the government of France, and at once precisely to state the only footing on which his majesty could consent to treat. To effect this object, he informed gen. Clarke, that he had prepared a note (marked A.) which he begged to deliver to him as official.—Gen. Clarke read the note twice with great attention, and afterwards placed it in his portfolio, saying that he must take it *ad referendum.*—Very little passed at this meeting sufficiently interesting to merit being detailed; the general objected to the practice he apprehended lord Lauderdale meant to introduce of conducting the negociation by writing; and said that he was afraid the emperor would regard it as a means of endless delay, if a note was to be delivered upon every insignificant question which it might be necessary to discuss. The reply consisted merely in stating the distinction betwixt delivering a written note for the purpose of at once bringing to a point the basis on which the negociation was to be conducted, and resorting on every trivial occasion to that practice. The first, it was contended, must accelerate; the latter, it was admitted, would delay the negociation; and it would be therefore carefully avoided, as it was his majesty's wish that no delay should take place.—Gen. Clarke, with something like an insinuation that an unfair advantage was taken by the government of G. Britain, announced that as there had been two plenipotentiaries appointed by his majesty, it was the emperor's intention to do the same, and that the name of the person selected would be communicated to us.—It is proper to state, that in the course of this conversation lord Yarmouth recalled to gen. Clarke's recollection that in all the interviews he had had with him, he uniformly stated the *uti possidetis* as the only basis upon which he could possibly treat. Gen. Clarke in reply said, that he could make no answer to what lord Yarmouth stated, without alluding to conversations which he affected to consider as loose, calling them "des romans politiques;" [political romances;] at the same time by his silence he clearly admitted what lord Yarmouth most distinctly stated.—Our first interview terminated with an appointment to meet at lord Lauderdale's apartments on Friday the 8th at 12 o'clock, the general observing that it might be perhaps necessary to put off the appointment, as he wished to have full time to consider the note which had been delivered, and as the new plenipotentiary might wish to have an opportunity carefully to read the correspondence that hitherto had taken place. He promised at the same time, if this was the case, to give us notice by writing in the morning.—On Friday the 8th at 11 o'clock, the inclosures (marked B. and C.) were left at lord Lauderdale's apartments, and an answer was sent to general Clarke, stating that an appointment had been made by lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth to receive the Turkish ambassador at 4 o'clock, and requesting that the meeting should take place on Saturday the 9th at noon.—Gen. Clarke, and M. Champagny, minister of the interior, the newly appointed plenipotentiary, afterwards put off this meeting till 4 o'clock to-day, as the latter was obliged to attend the emperor's privy council at St. Cloud. Late on Friday night, lord Yarmouth received the answer to the note delivered by lord Lauderdale, a copy of which (marked D.) is inclosed, to which lord Lauderdale and lord Yarmouth immediately returned the answer, also inclosed, (marked E.).—Gen. Clarke and M. Champagny came to the meeting appointed at 4 o'clock, and a conversation took place which lasted for upwards of two hours. Into the details of this it is impossible now to enter. The general object of it was to engage lord Lauderdale to depart from the basis which he had insisted should be recognised, to prevail upon him to consult his government, or to take 10 or 15 days for consideration; but it terminated by lord Lauderdale's declaring that the last note was to be considered as a prelude to his demanding passports, for which he should apply to M. Talleyrand in the course of the evening. The letter, a copy of which (marked F.) is inclosed, was dispatched to M. Talleyrand half an hour after the departure of the plenipotentiaries, and it appears highly improbable that any proposition should be made which can alter our resolution of leaving France, the moment the passports arrive. We have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note delivered by the Earl of Lauderdale to General Clarke on the 7th of August, 1806.

"The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, previous to entering upon the negociation actually pending between his sovereign and the court of France, thinks it necessary briefly to retrace the circumstances in which it originated. At the same time, he conceives it consistent with that character of openness and sincerity, which, as his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, he is determined invariably to support, to declare the only basis upon which he can consent to treat, to be the principle which Fsance herself originally laid down; and to define the nature of the discussion into which he is about to enter.—The strong and energetic language in which the French government, a few months since, expressed its desire for peace, whilst it inspired his majesty with confidence in the real sincerity of the wishes of the court of France, left him only to regret that the proposal of treating with his majesty separately from his allies, appeared to prevent both France and England from profiting by that happy disposition of their respective governments; it being at that time impossible for his majesty, conformably with the good faith which he has ever evinced, to treat otherwise than conjointly with his ally the emperor of Russia.—Since that time, his majesty having found that circumstances which it is unnecessary to detail here, permitted his majesty to negociate separately: He received with great pleasure, the proposal of treating generally, upon the basis of *uti possidetis*, which was to be scrupulously observed except in the case of Hanover, which was proposed to be ceded to his majesty with all its dependencies. It is true, that this proposal was not made either directly, or through the channel of an accredited minister: of its authenticity, however, no one could entertain the smallest doubt. Independently of the authority which it derived from the character of the person employed to communicate it, it seemed to agree completely with what had been previously announced. For "The emperor desires nothing that England possesses," (an avowal made at the commencement of the correspondence between the two courts) was a natural prelude to such a proposal.—His majesty regarded the cession of Hanover as a proof of the spirit of justice in which the proposal was conceived, because this electorate, although occupied on account of a supposed identity of interests and of measures, in fact had no relation whatever with the disputes which produced the present war: and his majesty saw in the principle hitherto acknowledged as the general basis of negociation, a basis peculiarly adapted to the relative situations of the two parties, which he considered a proof that France was as sincerely disposed as Great Britain to put an end to an order of things equally prejudicial to the interests of both countries.—In fact it appeared to his majesty to be the only principle upon which it was probable that a negociation could be brought to a successful issue. From the nature of the interests of the parties engaged in it, there was but little hope that any satisfactory arrangement could be made on the ground of reciprocal restitution, by giving up their respective acquisitions; whilst, on the other hand, the principle of *uti possidetis* naturally presented itself, as the mode of terminating the unfortunate hostilities between the two nations, both of whom were in possession of conquests extensive and important in point both of territory and of influence; France on the continent of Europe, and Great Britain in other parts of the world.—This truth appeared still more striking to his majesty, upon reflecting that the state of possession in which the two nations held their respective acquisitions could scarcely suffer any important change by the continuance of the war; the superiority of the naval force of G. Britain being, according to all appearance, not less firmly established on the seas, than that of the armies of France on the continent of Europe.—It was under the impression which these ideas naturally produced, that his maj. accepted, without hesitation, the proposal of treating upon the principle of *uti possidetis*, with the reservation due to the connection and the concert that subsisted with the emperor of Russia; and, as a proof of his sincerity, his maj. fixed upon the person by whom the communication had been made, to announce the readiness with which he had acceded to the basis proposed for the conclusion of a treaty.—The undersigned is by no means disposed to conceal the satisfaction his majesty derived from these happy prospects of speedily restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, upon just and equitable principles, such as were conformable to the honour of his crown; nor the regret which his maj. felt, when, almost at the very moment of his declaring his acceptance of his proposal that had been made to him, it was signified that this principle was suddenly abandoned by the demand of the evacuation and cession of Sicily; a demand which has hitherto been modified merely by projects of indemnity for his Sicilian majesty which appear to be totally inadequate and inadmissible.—This demand, so incompatible with the avowed principles upon which the two powers were treating, was in itself sufficient to put an end to the negociation; but the anxiety of his maj. the king of Great Britain and Ireland to concur with his ally the emperor of Russia, and to secure to his subjects the blessings of peace, induced him to receive any new proposal for obtaining for his Sicilian majesty, in exchange for Sicily, a real and satisfactory equivalent, such as that sovereign should consent to accept.—No satisfactory proposal of this nature having yet been made, the undersigned must declare that he cannot consent to treat upon any other principle than that of the *uti possidetis*, as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France: At the same time he is desirous it should be well understood, that the adoption of this principle will not prevent him either from listening to any just and adequate indemnification to his Sicilian majesty for the cession of Sicily, or from accepting any proposition for the exchange of territory between the two contracting parties, upon just and equal principles, such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of the two countries.—The undersigned is well aware that since the *uti possidetis* was proposed by the court of France, peace has been concluded between France and the emperor of Russia, and that, in consequence, the relative situation of the two countries is no longer the same; but, on the other hand, he must also observe, that since that time France has acquired fresh advantages in consequence of the extensive changes which she has made in the constitution of the German empire; an arrangement, the preventing of which was represented by France to the court of G. Britain as a powerful motive for the immediate conclusion of peace on the basis of *uti possidetis*. If then this principle formerly appeared just to France, it cannot fail at present, according to her own views of the subject, to be more favourable to her interests than to those of the British empire.—The undersigned thinks it at the same time necessary to observe, that although France may have other important views upon the continent of Europe, his maj. the king of Great Britain and Ireland may very fairly form views in other parts of the world, of infinite importance to the commerce and to the power of his empire, and consequently that he cannot conformably with either the interests of his people or the honour of his crown, negociate upon any principle of inferiority either avowed or supposed. He can treat upon no other footing than the supposition, that the continuance of hostilities is equally disadvantageous to both parties. There can be no reason to suppose that the conquests which his maj. proposes to retain by the peace can be wrested from him by war; and the undersigned is persuaded that the best proof of the equity of the conditions upon which he proposes to treat, is to be found in the fact, that they were proposed by France herself at the first opening of the communications between the two governments, which have led to the mission with which his sovereign has been pleased to entrust him conjointly with the earl of Yarmouth. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from Gen. Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 8, 1806.

General Clarke requests their excellencies the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth will be pleased to postpone to 4 o'clock in the afternoon the conference which was fixed for 12 o'clock. Should the hour of 4 be inconvenient to their excellencies, gen. Clarke begs they will name one that will suit them. The general will wait upon lord Lauderdale with his excellency M. de Champagny, minister of the interior, who has been appointed by his maj. the emperor and king, to be his plenipotentiary conjointly with gen. Clarke, to negociate a peace with Great Britain. Gen. Clarke has the honour, &c.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 8, 1806.

My lords; I have the honour to inform your excellencies, that his maj. the emperor and king has judged it expedient to join M. de Champagny, his minister of the interior, as additional minister plenipotentiary, to the mission which hitherto had been entrusted solely to gen. Clarke, and that these two ministers are equally authorized to confer with your excellencies on the great object of conciliating the politics and the interests of the two states. I lost no time in acquainting them with the intentions of his maj., and I doubt not they will concert measures for the immediate prosecution of the negociation which gen. Clarke has had the honour to enter upon with your excellencies, and which his maj. hopes as well as desires to see terminate in a result equally advantageous and honourable to both nations. I request, &c. (Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, August 8, 1806.

The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has laid before his government the note transmitted yesterday by his excellency lord Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty. His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, could not see without pain, that a negociation which has already been the subject of so much discussion, which has occasioned the dispatching of so many messengers by both parties, which was, in a word, already brought to maturity, should have suddenly taken a retrograde direction, so as to present obstacles founded, not in the nature of the stipulations, but on the very ground on which that negociation was commenced.—The court of France has constantly refused to admit in the same negociation, the courts of England and Russia, and whatever desire his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, may have, to see a general peace shortly re-established, no consideration could induce him to violate that principle of his policy. The negociation which France had commenced at Petersburgh, had moreover convinced his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, that the English cabinet deceived itself with respect to the nature of its relations with Russia.—After several months of discussion, the cabinet of London yielded this point, and his excellency the Earl of Yarmouth arrived publicly at Calais, and afterwards at Paris, for the purpose of treating for peace. He had conferences with his excellency the minister for foreign affairs immediately after his arrival in this capital, having previously made known to him that he was duly authorized by his government.—Since that period Russia has concluded her peace with France. The undersigned has been appointed minister plenipotentiary to negociate with the plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, and the first step was an exchange of his powers with those of his excellency the Earl of Yarmouth, whom he was bound to believe, as is expressed in his excellency's full powers, authorized to negociate, conclude, and sign a definitive treaty between France and the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.—Very frequent conferences, most of them of several hours, have since taken place between the two plenipotentiaries, who, with good faith on both sides, endeavoured to do away the difficulties, and put aside every thing that could have tended to irritate their minds, or to embarrass and unnecessarily retard the progress of the negociation.—Instead of transmitting to each other notes, more or less ingenious, but which rather remove than approximate the object which it is wished to attain; instead of beginning those written controversies, which are not less injurious to humanity than open hostilities, and which prolong the miseries of nations; instead, above all things, of negociating peace in the same manner in which war is carried on, the plenipotentiaries had free conferences, in which his majesty the emperor and king granted all which he could grant, without losing sight of the dignity of his crown, his love for his people, and the interest of his allies.—His majesty will never be reduced to make further sacrifices.—Does not the method taken by his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, the new plenipotentiary on the part of his Britannic majesty, appear to announce that a multitude of notes will not be sufficient even to bring the governments to an understanding? And is not a risk evidently incurred, by adopting such a method, the abuse of which has been so manifest in our recollection, of being still further from a good understanding than we have hitherto been? If, on the contrary, it is only wished to form documents which may hereafter be presented to the parliament of G. Britain, his majesty the emperor and king has no similar inducement, it is peace that he desires; a peace equally honourable for France, for G. Britain, and for their allies, which the mutual and assiduous labour of the respective plenipotentiaries shall have rendered acceptable to both governments.—Nevertheless, that his love of justice, and the sincerity of his pacific sentiments may be manifest to every one, and that it may be truly known, to whom all hindrance to the progress of the negociation ought to be attributed, his majesty the emperor of the French has deigned to permit the undersigned to discuss here the vain question relative to the basis of this negociation, which was already advanced and on the point of being terminated.—In the letter written to his excellency Mr. Fox, on the 1st of April, by his excellency the French minister for foreign affairs, that minister declared that his majesty the emperor of the French entirely adopted the principle set forth in the dispatch of his excellency Mr. Fox, of the 26th of March, and offered as the basis of the negociation: "That the proposed peace ought to be "honourable for the two courts, and for "their respective allies."—In his letter of the 2d June to his excellency Mr. Fox, his excellency the minister for foreign affairs went still further; he proposed in the name of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to establish as a basis two fundamental principles, the first of them taken from Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March, namely: "That the object of the "two powers should be a peace honourable to themselves, and to their respective allies, at the same time that this "peace should be of a nature to insure as "far as should lie in their power, the future tranquillity of Europe." The 2d principle was, "an acknowledgement in "favour of both powers of the right of interference and of guarantee with regard "to continental affairs, and with regard to "maritime affairs."—Such was the basis adopted by the British government, and agreed upon with it. It could never have entered into the mind of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to take the "*uti possidetis*" as the basis of the negociation. If such had been his intention, he would have kept Moravia, a part of Hungary, Styria, Carniola, Croatia, the whole of Austria, as well as its capital—Trieste, and Fiume, and the surrounding coast would still be in his power, as well as Genoa and Venice. Hanover, Osnaburgh, and all the mouths of the great rivers of the north of Germany would be subject to his dominion; and, doubtless, his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, might then, without difficulty, have left his Britannic majesty in possession of the Cape, Surinam, Tobago, St. Lucia, Pondicherry, &c.—As to Sicily, in this very supposition his majesty the emperor and king would not have left it to his enemies; but his majesty would only have thought that the conquest of this island should have preceded the opening of the negociations; and while Prussia and Russia have either guarantied or recognized the changes which have taken place in the kingdom of the two Sicilies, is it to be supposed that England could have prevented the conquest of Sicily, which is separated from the continent only by a channel of less than 2000 toises?—And even supposing that the Cape, Surinam, and other Dutch possessions could have been finally detached from the kingdom of Holland, is it not certain that its existence as a nation would become from that very cause impossible; and that its incorporation with the French empire would have been the necessary consequence of a refusal given by England to restore to it its colonies? What, in fact, could be the means of maintaining a nation which would have nothing but debts, and from which the total deprivation of all commerce would take away the possibility of paying them? Whatever their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty may alledge, it is impossible that they should not be convinced, that it is a very different thing for G. Britain, to see the Texel and the mouths of the Rhine and of the Meuse in the power of the French revenue officers, or to see them in the power of the Dutch. Thus, therefore, Holland, without the restitution of its colonies, would necessarily become a province of the French empire; for, on accepting the crown of Holland, prince Lewis formally declared his intention of renouncing it, if the Dutch colonies were not restored at the general peace.—Let Hanover become a province of France; let Trieste, Fiume, and their territory likewise become provinces of the kingdom of Italy, and let G. Britain keep as a compensation, the Cape, Surinam, Malta, and Pondicherry, &c. France will consent to it, and the great principle *uti possidetis* will be applied in its full extent, both as to the present and as to the future.—Let the new minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, point out in the history of the world, a negociation terminated upon the principle of the *uti possidetis* between two great nations: Let him examine whether this principle does not belong rather to an armistice than to a treaty of peace? It is impossible not to say, that, in proposing to France the *uti possidetis*, particularly under the present circumstances, a strange idea must have been formed of the character of the emperor Napoleon, and it must have been believed that he was reduced to a singular state of humiliation and distress.—But, in demanding the *uti possidetis*, his excellency, the earl of Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty, without regard to the principle which he advances, wishes to change entirely the destiny of a continental state, which gave 25,000 men to England, and furnished her with a part of the means which she afforded in the 7 years war, and even in the war of the French revolution, to the armies of the north. Thus, therefore, it is wished to maintain the principle of the *uti possidetis*, in order to deprive France of all her commerce, and of all her establishments, and to ruin her allies; but it is wished to violate the principle of the *uti possidetis*, in order to oblige France to renounce her engagements, to break her treaties; in a word, to dissolve her whole continental system! Is not this to propose a peace a thousand times more disastrous than the longest war, and conditions calculated to excite the indignation of every Frenchman? What! shall France have conquered all the powers subsidized by England during three coalitions, to see imposed upon her conditions as unjust as they are dishonourable, notwithstanding the moderation and generosity which she has shewn?—His excellency Mr. Fox himself proposed, that "the peace should be honourable to both courts, and to their respective allies."—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, could not consider the peace as honourable, if, by one of its conditions, he was to lose a single subject, and of however little importance the colony of Tobago may be, it suffices, that it made part of the French empire at the time his majesty took the reins of the government, to prevent his ever signing a treaty in which the alienation of that colony, or of any other which belongs to him in the same manner, shall be comprised. No reasonable Englishman can have flattered himself with the contrary; and his majesty, in the position in which he stands, would, by consenting to it, lose the esteem of every brave and generous person, even among his enemies.—The undersigned is directed to declare, that his majesty the emperor and king considers as a disgrace the very idea of a negociation, founded on the *uti possidetis*. It is the more contrary to his principles, inasmuch as his majesty has restored his conquests, and that he should be now reigning over a population the double of that which he in fact governs, if, at the conclusion of the treaties of peace, which he made at the expiration of the several coalitions, he had taken the *uti possidetis* for his only principle.—The undersigned is also directed to declare, that the only conditions of negociation which his majesty the emperor and king is willing to adopt, are those proposed in part by his excellency Mr. Fox, contained in the letter which was addressed to him on the 2d of June by the minister for foreign affairs, and repeated in the 12th paragraph of the present note.—His majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, requires nothing of G. Britain which can be contrary to the interests of her allies. He is entitled to expect that nothing will be exacted of him, which can be contrary to the interests of his own allies.—The undersigned is directed to add, that he refers to what had been prepared by the mutual efforts of his excellency the earl of Yarmouth, and the undersigned.—If peace shall not be re-established, it is not France who can be accused of having changed, but England: although peace between France and Russia, and other events unfavourable to G. Britain have taken place since the negociation was entered upon and nearly brought to a conclusion, in concert with his excellency the earl of Yarmouth. The undersigned avails himself, &c. (Signed) CLARKE.

Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Gen. Clarke; dated Paris, August 9, 1806.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Britannick majesty cannot allow themselves to enter into a detailed consideration of the official note, dated the 8th of August, which has just been delivered to them on the part of his excellency gen. Clarke. From the manner in which the different points which form the subject of this note are treated, it would be impossible for them to discuss them with that calmness and that regard to propriety, which the character with which their sovereign has invested them demands. But the subject of this note is of a nature, so general and so foreign to the object under discussion, that it would be perfectly useless to take it into consideration at the present moment.—The undersigned the earl of Lauderdale, far from thinking that the manner of discussing in writing the fundamental points of a negociation can in any shape increase the difficulty of coming to an understanding, is, on the contrary, of opinion that he already perceives evident proofs of its utility, inasmuch as the official note presented by him since his arrival has brought the negociation to an unequivocal issue, and has put an end to those misunderstandings, without doubt real, which have taken place, and which never could have occurred if the same method had been adopted at the commencement of the negociation.—The undersigned the earl of Yarmouth finds himself compelled to recur to the manner in which it has been stated to him, that he landed at Calais invested with a public character to treat for peace. He only came to give in person, and *vivâ voce*, the answer to a communication that he had been requested to make to the English government, founded upon the basis of the *uti possidetis*, in conformity with the following words of his excellency M. Talleyrand: "We ask nothing from you;" accompanied with positive assurances that the restitution of the possessions of his majesty in Germany would meet with no opposition. The same sentiment also recurs in the letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox of the 1st April in these terms: "The emperor covets nothing that England possesses."—The earl of Yarmouth feels himself under an equal necessity of not passing over in silence the remarks made by his excellency gen. Clarke, on the subject of the delays of the negociation and of the frequent communication by messengers. The answers of his Britannick majesty have ever been frank and prompt: and if the number of messengers has been considerable, it can only be attributed to motives foreign to the wishes of his majesty.—The undersigned the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, can by no means subscribe to the opinion held out by his excellency gen. Clarke in the said note, that the negociation "had been begun and nearly brought to a conclusion" in the interval which elapsed between the time when lord Yarmouth officially communicated his full powers, and the arrival of lord Lauderdale; on the contrary, they consider the negociation as having commenced. The conversations to which allusion has been made, consisted, on the part of the French plenipotentiaries, in making demands which the undersigned the earl of Yarmouth has uniformly declared to be inadmissible; and on the part of lord Yarmouth in keeping strictly within the bounds of the *uti possidetis*, not having any instructions on the part of his government to admit any other conditions of negociation; conditions suggested by France in the communication made by the earl of Yarmouth, and previously announced in M. Talleyrand's letter of the 1st of April.—The undersigned earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth think it unnecessary in this place to repeat the motives set forth in the official note presented by lord Lauderdale, and which induced his majesty to consider the basis of the *uti possidetis* proposed by France peculiarly applicable to the respective situation of the two countries. It is to them a subject of deep regret that, by so absolute and decided a departure from that basis on the part of the French government, the hopes and expectations of the two nations must be entirely frustrated.—It only remains for the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to declare, that his majesty, ever ready to listen to just and honourable conditions of peace, relies with confidence upon the means which he derives from the loyalty and affection of his subjects. He will never listen to any proposals of negociation whatsoever upon terms incompatible with the honour of his crown and the real interests of his subjects. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, August 9th, 1806.—Half past 6 P. M.

The pretensions brought forward by the French government in the official note of his excellency gen. Clarke, so incompatible with the basis formerly proposed by that government, not leaving us any other alternative than that of returning to England, we have the honour to request your excellency to have the goodness to send the necessary passports for ourselves and our suite. We avail ourselves, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

No. 36.—Extract from a Dispatch from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 11th, 1806.—Received Aug. 13th.

Sir; In our last dispatch of the 9th inst. we had the honour of informing you, that on that evening we had applied for passports to return to England, and also for a passport for a courier we intended to have dispatched immediately. We have only now to mention that, on Sunday at 11 o'clock, we sent the inclosure (marked A.), renewing our demand; and that this morning, having received no answer to either application, the inclosure (marked B.) was sent to M. Talleyrand's house, Ruë d'Anjou. The courier Basilico, who carried the note, returned soon after to inform us, that he was directed at M. Talleyrand's house to go the foreign office, where he accordingly went, but was told that no communication would be received there till between 12 and 1. We then begged of Mr. Goddard to go himself to the foreign office, and deliver the letter. He found that the clerks had only just arrived, and that M. Talleyrand was gone to St. Cloud, not to return till 4 o'clock. At half after 5 we received from Messrs. Clarke and Champagny an official note (marked C.) Immediately upon the receipt of this note, we wrote the inclosure (marked D.) to M. Talleyrand, and received from him at 9 o'clock an answer (marked E.), which is also inclosed. The inclosure (marked F.) is the reply to the official note which we intend to send, the moment it can be copied.

Addition by the Earl of Yarmouth.

As the French government has in every instance admitted the exactness of the communications made by me, I beg leave, in addition to this dispatch, to remark that the intention expressed to me by the French government, as that which made them prefer communicating through my channel rather than on paper, was the expressing to his majesty's government their readiness to restore his majesty's German dominions *in toto*, but that for obvious reasons this could not be expressed on paper till every other condition of the treaty should be settled.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated August 10, 1806.—11 o'clock A. M.

The earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth have the honour to repeat to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, the demand which they had the honour to make to his excellency yesterday, at half past 6 o'clock in the evening, of passports necessary for them and their suite, as well as of a passport for a messenger who is now waiting for it, to proceedon his journey.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Aug. 11, 1806, 10 o'clock A. M.

Sir; It is your duty to repeat the demand which we have already twice made, of a passport for a messenger, and of passports for our return to England.—We think it right also to remark to your excellency, that these demands were made the day before yesterday (Saturday) at half past 6 in the evening; that they were renewed to your excellency yesterday (Sunday) at 11 o'clock, and that to the present moment we have not received any answer to them.—When your excellency recollects that near 24 hours have passed since we addressed ourselves for the second time to your excellency, and that, to say nothing of our own passports, we have been deprived in the interval, of the means of sending a messenger to England, you must be persuaded, that if we abstain from all remark upon a proceeding so extraordinary and so contrary to the established usages, it is from a desire to avoid as much and as long as possible, any thing that may occasion animosity, and change the nature and tone which have hitherto characterized the communications between the two governments.—We request, &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806.

The undersigned, ministers plenipotentiary of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, have read with attention the note dated the 9th of August, addressed to them by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of his majesty the king of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, in which they again propose the *uti possidetis* as the basis of the negociation. —The French plenipotentiaries know not, whether, by the adoption of this principle, England would obtain the right of exacting from the French government for herself and her allies, every restitution which may suit her convenience, without being bound to make any restitution to France and her allies of the conquests which she has made. This demand would be so extraordinary, that it would be equivalent to saying that France should sign all the conditions which it may please the English plenipotentiaries to commit to writing. One cannot suppose that such is really the intention of the English ministry. They have not sent over plenipotentiaries for the sole purpose of requiring the admission of an indefinite basis which would render them masters of all the conditions of the treaty. In a state of things so obscure, the French plenipotentiaries demand such explanations as may enable them to understand, and to proceed in the negociation. These consist in making known what are the conquests which England wishes to keep, what are those which she will restore to France and her allies, and what conquests of France she requires to be restored. This will unfold a system of compensation, which may give a clear idea of the principles and intentions of the British cabinet. The French plenipotentiaries will then know what engagements they contract in adopting the basis which is proposed to them; for they can certainly never consent to this adoption without knowing what is demanded of them.—In laying down the principle of *uti possidetis*, have the English plenipotentiaries had it in view to propose a means of exchange and of compensation? If this is their meaning, the emperor adopts it, because it appears to him conformable to the two principles already agreed upon by both parties, in the letters of the French minister for foreign affairs, and of the English secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, viz.—1st, To the principle laid down by Mr. Fox in his letter of the 26th of March last, "that the "object of both parties ought to be that "the peace should be honourable for both, "and their respective allies; and at the "same time of a nature to insure, as far "as should be in their power, the future "tranquillity of Europe."—2d, To the principle subjoined to the preceding by the minister for foreign affairs, in his letter of the 2d of June following, which consists of *an acknowledgement, in favour of the two parties, of the full right of intervention and of guaranty in continental and in maritime affairs.*—The undersigned take this opportunity, &c. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY. CLARKE.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806; half past 6 P.M.

Sir; We have this moment received a note signed by their excellencies M. de Champagny and general Clarke, to which under any other circumstances we should have immediately replied. But it is our duty previously to remark to your excellency, that we have remained since half past 6 o'clock of the evening of the day before yesterday, without any answer to our demand of a passport for a messenger, or to that of our own passports, although this demand has been repeated three times in this interval.—It is of the highest importance, in our present situation, to be certain of a communication perfectly free and uninterrupted, and as constant as we can desire, with our government. We therefore entreat your excellency to satisfy us on this point, in order that we may know whether, in all the possible cases in which we may think proper to demand passports either for ourselves or for messengers, we shall be sure to obtain them without delay.—We

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are also under the necessity of remarking that we have received no answer to the request we made to your excellency on the subject of Mr. Goddard.—We take this opportunity of renewing, &c. &c. (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806.

The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has the honour to transmit to their excellencies lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth, ministers plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of England, the passport for a messenger which they demanded. He regrets that the relaxation from business granted in the offices on Sundays, should have prevented him from sending it sooner. With regard to the passports their excellencies have demanded for themselves, the undersigned flatters himself that they will give to the delay in sending them, the interpretation the most natural and the most proper to prevent all complaint on their part. The undersigned can never fear the responsibility of delays, which have for object to prolong, for some days, the hope of restoring peace between two great powers, and of putting an end to the scourge of war in the four quarters of the world.—The undersigned begs, &c. &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, Aug. 11, 1806; 11 o'clock P. M.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty would not have delayed their answer to the note of this day's date, addressed to them by their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the French government; but as their reiterated demands to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs for passports, even for their messenger, remained unanswered, they thought it right first to ascertain, whether they were still to enjoy an open and uninterrupted communication with their government, such as, in similar cases, has always been permitted by every government in Europe.—The explanations which the undersigned have received from his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, induce them to hope that a like delay will, on no occasion whatever, again take place.—After having maturely considered the note of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the French government, the undersigned have to remark, that the British government, far from pretending to "exact from the French "government every restitution which may "suit their convenience, without being "bound to make any restitution to France," never expressed any other wish than that of treating with the French government on the basis which was proposed to them by France herself; as it is expressed in the note of lord Lauderdale, viz. "to treat "generally upon the basis of *uti possidetis*, "which was to be scrupulously observed, "except in the case of Hanover, which "was proposed to be ceded to his Britannic majesty with all its dependencies."—They must also observe, that if it were possible to mistake the result which would necessarily follow from this principle, the verbal discussions which took place on the 9th inst. between the French plenipotentiaries and the undersigned, leave no room for doubt, whether the proposition thus laid down was perfectly understood by those plenipotentiaries.—The undersigned have therefore only to repeat, that they cannot, consistently with the instructions of their government, do otherwise than insist upon the previous recognition of this principle. It is on this condition alone that they are authorized to continue the negociation.—As soon as this principle shall be agreed to, the undersigned will be ready to proceed to the discussion of the other points mentioned in the note of lord Lauderdale.—It only remains for the undersigned to add, that if the French government expresses a disposition to adhere to the proposal, such as his Britannic maj. understands it to have been made by them, they shall congratulate themselves as on a most fortunate event; an event which promises (according to the expression of Mr. Fox, quoted by their excellencies) "a peace honourable for the two nations, and at the same time of a nature to insure the future tranquillity of Europe." (Signed) LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

No. 37.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 14, 1806.

My lords; The messenger, Basilico, arrived here early this morning, with the dispatches with which your lordships had charged him; and, although it appears most probable, that, before he can again reach Paris, your lordships will be no longer there, yet, as there is still a possibility, from the last note from the French plenipotentiaries, that the negociation may proceed on the basis pointed out for it by your instructions, it has been judged proper that no time should be lost in redispatching him, in order that you may be apprized of his majesty's full approbation of the tenour of the different notes which have been delivered on your part since the earl of Lauderdale's arrival at Paris. As no other point but that of the general basis of negociation has yet been brought into discussion, nothing need be added to the former instructions, by which the course of any further discussions that may take place is still to be entirely guided.

No. 38.—Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Downing-street, Aug. 14, 1806.

My lords; His majesty's servants have observed, from the dispatches received this day, that some insinuation has been thrown out by the French government, of a disposition on the part of this country to gain some unfair advantage by the employment of two plenipotentiaries in the present discussions. That government has since taken the obvious mode of counteracting this advantage (if any such there was) by naming, on their part also, a second plenipotentiary. But, the king's government is desirous, while it adheres steadily to the substance of those points which are thought fit to be insisted on for the honour and interest of his majesty's crown, to leave no pretence for cavils as to the form in which these discussions are carried on. The advantage which was to be looked to from the personal share which the earl of Yarmouth originally had in these transactions, as the bearer of the overtures made by France, has now ceased; and, while his lordship has, on the one hand, properly recorded his decisive testimony as to the reality of these overtures, and as to the exact terms of peace so offered, the French government has, on the other hand, not only refused to adhere to those offers, but has expressly declared, that they never can even have entered into their thoughts. "Jamais il n'a puvenir dans la pensée de sa "majesté l'empereur des François, roi d'Ita- "lie, de prendre pour base de la négocia- "tion l'*uti possidetis;*" [it never could have entered into the thoughts of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to take for the basis of the negociation, the *uti possidetis.*] In this state of things, the king's servants are not aware of any benefits that would be likely to result to his majesty's service from imposing on lord Yarmouth any farther duty in this respect; nor do they wish that any such ground for cavil as I have before alluded to, however unfounded it would be, should be left to the enemy.—They have, therefore, submitted it as their humble advice to his majesty, that, in case of the continuance of the negociations, the French minister should be informed, that they will henceforth be conducted by the earl of Lauderdale alone, the earl of Yarmouth having obtained his majesty's gracious permission to return to England; but that, his majesty does not, on his part, make any objection to lord Lauderdale's treating with both the persons who have been named by the French government for that trust:—A proof perfectly decisive, in all its parts, that no unfair advantage, such as the French government appears to apprehend, can have been in the king's contemplation. I am, &c. C. J. Fox.

No. 39.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Aug. 16, 1806.—Received Aug. 19th.

Sir; The note to the plenipotentiaries of the French government, dated the 11th inst., of which a copy (marked F.) was sent in my dispatch of the 11th inst., was delivered early in the morning of the 12th, as you will see from the inclosed receipt (marked A.)—No answer having been received, it was thought proper on the 14th to send to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, a letter, of which a copy is also inclosed (marked B.)—No answer to the official note transmitted to the plenipotentiaries of the French government on the morning of the 12th, has yet been given; and gen. Clarke, upon whom lord Yarmouth and I waited this morning merely for the purpose of shewing him a mark of attention, informed us, that it was in the possession of the emperor, who had not as yet signified his pleasure on the subject.—At one o'clock we received a note from M. Talleyrand (marked C.), and nearly at the same time another (marked D.), from gen. Clarke.—Copies of both of these are herewith transmitted.—I think it evident from what gen. Clarke says, that no communication will be made for two days.—There is perhaps nothing sufficiently important to authorize my sending a courier. Indeed my principal motive for doing so is to quiet the anxiety which you naturally feel from receiving no information for so many days, concerning the state of a transaction so important in its consequences.—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a receipt, dated Paris, Aug. 12, 1806.

I have received a sealed packet, addressed to me, and to M. de Champagny minister of the interior, at half past seven, Aug. 12, 1806. CLARKE.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 14, 1806.

Sir; We think it our duty to acquaint your excellency, that early in the morning of the 12th inst. we transmitted to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, a note in answer to that of their excellencies received on the 11th inst. In this answer, we endeavoured again to set forth the points which appeared to us to require, in some form or other, a previous explanation, to authorize us, in conformity to our instructions, to pursue the present negociation.—The silence of their excellencies the plenipotentiaries in this respect, gives us reason to presume that we must not, at the present moment, expect such an explanation on their part.—Impressed with this idea, we desire to put an end to the general expectation of both nations, considering the slight appearance there is of seeing it realized. We feel that the demand which we make, under such circumstances, of passports for our return, may be susceptible of interpretations of a nature to retard the happy moment when the views of the French government shall approach nearer to those which it had been supposed to entertain. It is in order to prevent the possibility of such a misinterpretation, that we think it incumbent on us to assure your excellency, that a step which would have the effect of causing any obstacle to the renewal of the negociation, would be very far from our intention, though, from the reasons which we have detailed, we find ourselves obliged to put an end to our mission.—It only remains for us to assure your excellency, that if, fortunately for both nations, it should happen that we have been mistaken in the inference which we have drawn from the silence of the French plenipotentiaries, we will wait during a reasonable time for the explanations which their excellencies have to communicate to us. In order, however, to prevent the repetition of a demand, as painful for us to make, as it would be for your excellency to receive, in case the negociations should not have a favourable issue, we request you to furnish us with the necessary passports for us and our suite, to be made use of according to circumstances. We have the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE. YARMOUTH.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, Aug. 16th, 1806.

The undersigned minister for foreign affairs, hastened to lay before his majesty, the note which their excellencies the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth did him the honour to address to him on the 14th instant. As soon as he shall have received orders relative to the objects of this note, he will not fail to inform the plenipotentiaries of his Britannic majesty. The undersigned requests, &c. (Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from General Clarke to the Earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth; dated Paris, August 16th, 1806.

On going to the prince of Benevento's, I learnt that Basilico arrived yesterday at Boulogne. I lose no time in communicating this circumstance to lord Lauderdale. I learnt also, that his majesty the emperor is gone to hunt at Rambouillet, where his majesty intends remaining to-morrow. —I request lord Lauderdale to inform lord Yarmouth of this, and to accept, &c. (Signed) CLARKE.

No. 40.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August 17th, 1806. —Received August 22d.

Sir; I take the opportunity of lord Yarmouth's return to England, to inform you that in consequence of his majesty's pleasure signified in your dispatch of the 14th instant, I this morning wrote to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, stating to him, that lord Yarmouth had his majesty's permission to return to England; and that his majesty had been graciously pleased, in the event of the negociation proceeding, to confine the future management of it solely to me. About 11 o'clock, M. de Champagny and gen. Clarke paid me a visit of ceremony; lord Yarmouth happened to be with me at the time; and we mentioned to them the change that had taken place, and shewed them the note which I was just about to dispatch, and a copy of which is inclosed. The object of the visit was merely to ask the plenipotentiaries, and the gentlemen attached to the mission, to dine with M. de Champagny to-morrow.—Nothing whatever was said that related to the negociation, and I believe no answer will be given either to the note of the 11th, or to the note sent to the minister for foreign affairs on the 14th, till the emperor's return from Rambouillet, which, they informed me to-day, was uncertain. The mode in which I have mentioned to the minister for foreign affairs his majesty's permission to lord Yarmouth to return to England, seemed to me calculated to afford as little opportunity as possible to the French government to cavil about a change of form in the mission.—I think it proper to add, that in doing this, every facility was afforded by lord Yarmouth, who in the handsomest manner desired me on this, as on other occasions, to consider only what I thought most advantageous for the public service. I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Inclosure in No. 40.—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, 17th August, 1806.

The undersigned has the honour to inform his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that his Britannic majesty has been pleased to grant the request of the earl of Yarmouth, and to allow him to return to England. According to the tenour of his full powers, which have been already communicated to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, the undersigned is authorized to treat jointly or separately with the French government; and he has just received from his court precise instructions to that effect, in case the answer to the note of the 11th instant should be of a nature to permit the undersigned to pursue the negociation. The undersigned has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.

No. 41.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Fox to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, Aug. 23, 1806.

My lord; The contents of your last dispatches do not appear to require any particular answer, and this messenger is sent back only that you may be enabled to keep us regularly informed (so long as you shall still continue at Paris) of the state of the negociation there. If, on the arrival of any intelligence of the decision of Russia not to ratify without the consent of this court, the French government should increase their offers in order to separate his majesty from the emperor of Russia, your lordship is on all such occasions to observe, that it is M. d'Oubril's treaty alone that has released his majesty from the obligation not to separate in substance his treaty from that of Russia; an obligation to which his majesty had determined scrupulously to adhere, and from which, even in point of form, he had departed no farther than he had learnt to be the wish of Russia herself. Should, therefore, M. d'Oubril's treaty not be ratified, the two courts would revert to their former situation, with the additional bond of union which would result from the mutual proofs they would thus have afforded to each other of their resolution to adhere invariably to the spirit and principles of their alliance.

No. 42.—Copy of a dispatch from Lord Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August the 25th, 1806.—Received September the 3d.

Sir; In my dispatch of the 16th inst. I had the honour of transmitting to you a copy of a letter sent by lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 14th inst. to the minister of foreign affairs. I have now to inform you that my desire to combine with firmness the utmost degree of forbearance that appeared to me consistent with the character with which his maj. has been pleased to invest me, induced me patiently to suffer the silence of the French government, without remark, from the 14th till the 22d, when I transmitted to the minister for foreign affairs a note, of which I have the honour to inclose you a copy, marked (A.)—No notice having been taken of this note by his excellency, I have this morning sent a second note, of which I have also the honour to inclose a copy, marked (B.)—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First Inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 22, 1806.

Sir; The undersigned, minister plenip. of his Britannic maj. finds himself under the necessity of recalling to the attention of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs; 1st, That in the morning of the 12th inst. a note, signed by the undersigned and the earl of Yarmouth, and dated the 11th, was transmitted to his excellency gen, Clarke, in which the undersigned observed, "The British government, far from " pretending to exact from the French go-

"vernment every restitution which may "suit their convenience, without being "bound to make any restitution to France, "never expressed any other wish than "that of treating with the French govern-"ment on the basis which was proposed "to her by France herself; as it is ex-"pressed in the note of lord Lauderdale, "viz. to treat generally upon the basis of "*uti possidetis*, which was to be scrupu-"lously observed, except in the case of "Hanover, which was proposed to be ce-"ded to his Britannic maj. with all its de-"pendencies. They must also observe, "that if it were possible to mistake the "result which would necessarily follow "from this principle, the verbal discus-"sions which took place on the 9th inst. "between the French plenipotentiaries "and the undersigned, leave no room for "doubt, whether the proposition thus laid "down was perfectly understood by those "plenipotentiaries. The undersigned have "therefore only to repeat, that they can-"not, consistently with the instructions of "their government, do otherwise than in-"sist upon the previous recognition of this "principle. It is on this condition alone "that they are authorized to continue the "negociation." 2dly, that on the 14th inst. the undersigned, together with the earl of Yarmouth, had again the honour to state in writing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs; "The silence of their "excellencies the plenipotentiaries in this "respect, gives us reason to presume that "we must not, at the present moment, "expect such an explanation on their part. "Impressed with this idea, we desire to "put an end to the general expectation "of both nations, considering the slight "appearance there is of seeing it realized. "We feel that the demand we make, under "such circumstances, of passports for our "return, may be susceptible of interpre-"tations of a nature to retard the happy "moment when the views of the French "government shall approach nearer to "those which it had been supposed to en-"tertain. It is in order to prevent the "possibility of such a misinterpretation, "that we think it incumbent on us to as-"sure your excellency, that a step which "would have the effect of causing any ob-"stacle to the renewal of the negociation, "would be very far from our intention, "though, from the reasons which we have "detailed, we find ourselves obliged to "put an end to our mission."—The undersigned, on finding that no answer was made to these communications, persuaded himself that this delay might proceed from dispositions favourable to the progress of the negociation, and that he should be at length rewarded by an answer conformable to this expectation; even when he found that no answer arrived, he still persevered in a conduct which must have incontestably proved the sincerity of the desire he had evinced, to receive explanations which might enable him to follow up the objects of his mission. But if, so early as the 14th inst. the undersigned, together with the earl of Yarmouth, found himself obliged to observe to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that he feared (from the silence of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries) that no answer would be given on the subject; and if, at that period, they thought it incumbent on them to declare the necessity they were under, in pursuance of their sovereign's orders, of demanding passports for their departure, the undersigned has no occasion to remark to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, how imperiously the fresh delays that have taken place since that date, prescribe to the undersigned the pressing renewal of this demand.—The undersigned must at the same time add, that, not being able to persuade himself, that in case an unfavourable answer had been intended, his excellency the minister for foreign affairs would have so long deferred the adoption of the only alternative, namely, the sending passports, he does not even now give up the hope of a renewal of the proposal, such as the ministers of his Britannick maj. understood it to have been made on the part of the French government, since it is thus alone that the expectation of both nations can at last be realized. Even if these hopes should not be well founded, the undersigned will never regret a delay which has afforded him the opportunity of manifesting in an unequivocal manner, the sincere desire of a solid and honourable peace which his maj. has never ceased to entertain, and of which his maj. has given the most convincing proof, in authorizing the undersigned to negociate on the basis proposed in the first instance by France, It is with this view that the undersigned has borne so long a state of uncertainty, without making the least observation on the unaccountable delay.—The undersigned, in now requesting his excellency the minister for foreign affairs to transmit to him provisionally, and for the purpose of being made use of in the cases already pointed out, passports for himself and his suite, conceives that he has adopted the only means for preventing the necessity he might otherwise find himself under (if he was forced to repeat this demand) of accompanying it by representations, such as would be authorized by the law of nations, and by the dignity of his sovereign. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Second Inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Aug. 25th, 1806.

The silence still maintained by their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, as well as by his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, after the official note delivered by the undersigned and the earl of Yarmouth on the 11th inst. after the letter addressed to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs on the 14th inst.; and after the official note of the undersigned dated the 22d inst., appears clearly to announce, that the French government has abandoned every wish for peace, on the conditions which they themselves had in the first instance proposed, and which the undersigned has uniformly declared to be the sole basis on which he was authorized to negociate with that government.—In this state of affairs, the undersigned cannot flatter himself with the possibility of any advantage resulting from the prolongation of his stay at Paris; he feels too that farther delay would necessarily give to both nations and to all Europe reason to believe, that peace, the object of their desires, is on the point of being concluded, at the very moment when all reasonable hope of attaining it appears to be completely at an end.—The undersigned, strongly impressed with this idea, finds himself obliged to terminate his mission, by making to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs the formal demand of passports for his return into the presence of his sovereign.—At the same time, and in conformity with the spirit of conciliation which has constantly characterized his whole conduct since his arrival at Paris, the undersigned, at the moment when he feels himself obliged by his instructions to demand his passports, cannot resolve to prevent the possibility of a communication on the part of the French government, of a nature to enable him to carry on the negociation, although, from the continued silence of that government, he can scarcely retain hopes of so favourable an issue.—It will not therefore be until the morning of Wednesday the 27th inst. that the undersigned will have the honour of calling on his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, for the purpose of making a formal and definitive demand of the necessary passports for himself and suite. He has only to add, that the passports which he proposes to demand will be for his immediate return, and not to be made use of according to circumstances, as he lately demanded them. LAUDERDALE.

No. 43.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated August 29th, 1806.—Received September 3d.

Sir; In my last dispatch, dated August the 25th, I had the honour of stating to you the detail of the negociation till the afternoon of that day. At 11 o'clock at night, I received from the plenipotentiaries of France a note, intimating their desire of having a conference on the subject of the note written by lord Yarmouth and myself, on the 11th of the month. Of this, as well as of the answer agreeing to the proposal, I have the honour to inclose copies (marked A. and B.)—On the 26th, at the hour appointed, I went to the office of the minister of the interior, where I found M. de Champagny and gen. Clarke, the two plenipotentiaries of the French government. The general result of what passed, impressed me with a conviction that the French plenipotentiaries no longer thought of making peace, upon the grounds on which France was understood to desire it at the time of lord Yarmouth's communication; and I am confident that the part I bore in the discussion thoroughly satisfied them, that I was resolved firmly to adhere to the ground which I had taken in the note of the 11th, on which I was invited to hear their remarks.—The hour of dinner terminated our conference, a renewal of which, on any day I should name, was after dinner anxiously solicited by M. de Champagny. I objected to it, as apparently unnecessary, and only calculated to protract my stay in this country to no purpose; but before I left him, expressed my willingness to comply once more with the wishes of the French plenipotentiaries, as a farther mark of my anxiety to do any thing which even they could think had a tendency to produce that peace, which his majesty was so anxious to accomplish on equitable terms; and another meeting was fixed, to take place on Friday the 29th, at 3 o'clock.—Late on the evening of the 26th, I waited on the minister for foreign affairs, for the purpose of informing him, that, at the request of the plenipotentiaries of France, I had agreed to a renewal of the conference. He had gone to St. Cloud, and, as by the minister's absence, I had no opportunity of explaining my reasons for not waiting on him, for the purpose of asking passports as announced in my note of the 25th, I thought it right, early next morning, to send a letter, of which a copy is inclosed (marked C.).—On the 27th, after dinner, I had a very long conference with the minister for foreign affairs, the substance of which confirmed me in the opinion I had antecedently formed, in consequence of what passed at the meeting with the plenipotentiaries of France, that there is at present no disposition to make peace on the terms tendered for his majesty's acceptance; and I am convinced you will have the same impression, when I state to you that M. Talleyrand, in the course of our conversation, repeatedly made use of the following marked expression: "Jamais l'empereur ne cedera un grain de poussière du territoire François."—In the course of this conference, the minister frequently alluded to the situation of Hanover, and stated, that, within eight-and-forty hours, its fate must be determined for ever. He seemed much surprised that nothing appeared to make any impression upon me, frequently repeating, that, in getting the Cape, Malta, and his majesty's Hanoverian dominions, I should make a glorious peace; and assuring me, that if this opportunity should be lost, he did not foresee any means by which peace could be ever attained, as the emperor was determined to make war all his life, rather than yield any part of the territory of France, the integrity of which he had sworn to maintain.—Our conversation ended, by my assuring him, at the time I was about to retire, that while these sentiments continued to prevail in this country, it was impossible peace should be made, and that with the knowledge I now possessed of the opinions entertained by the French government, I could not acquit myself of trifling, if I should remain any longer to carry on what I must consider as a farce.—After a full consideration of all that has taken place, I have, therefore, this morning, resolved to bring things to a point, by delivering to the plenipotentiaries of France, the detailed note of which I inclose a copy, (marked D.) I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from Messrs. Champagny and Clarke to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, August 25th, 1806.

The plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, wishing to confer with his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, upon the subject of the last note [of the 11th inst.] his excellency addressed to them, request his lordship will call at the office of the minister of the interior to-morrow about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, where they will meet, provided the hour is convenient to his excellency.—M. de Champagny has the honour of inviting the earl of Lauderdale to dine with him after the conference, and hopes that his excellency will bring with him to dinner Messrs. Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY. CLARKE.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, August 25th, 1806.

The earl of Lauderdale, plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty, has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries have just transmitted to him. He will do himself the honour of calling at the office of the minister of the interior, about 3 o'clock to-morrow, and of dining afterwards with his excellency M. de Champagny. Messrs. Goddard, Stewart, and Maddison will also have the honour of dining with his excellency.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, August 27th.

Sir; I called yesterday evening at your excellency's house, that I might have the honour of seeing you, and of informing you that, in consequence of the request which was yesterday made to me by their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, of another conference on Friday next, the 29th instant, I have postponed my demand for passports, which I intended to make this day to your excellency. Their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries appeared to attach so much importance to my consenting to another interview, that I gave with pleasure this new pledge of the pacific and conciliatory spirit by which I have ever been guided; and if I cannot flatter myself that there will result from this demand the prospect of a happy issue to the negociation, I shall at least have the satisfaction of having again manifested in the most unequivocal manner, how much my personal sentiments agree in this respect with those of my government, and with what eagerness I avail myself of every opportunity of giving to the persons, with whom this negociation has procured me the advantage of being acquainted, fresh marks of the distinguished sentiments which I shall never cease, under any circumstances, to entertain towards them. I am, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to Messrs. Champagny and Clarke; dated Paris, 29th August, 1806.

The undersigned plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, being on the point of renewing with their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries the conference of the 26th instant, thinks himself obliged to lay before their excellencies the state of the negociation, such as it stood after the note transmitted on the part of the undersigned and of the earl of Yarmouth on the 12th instant. Their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries will perceive from this statement, that the discussion is come to a point which will no longer permit the undersigned to continue it, unless, by the admission of the only basis on which he is authorised to negociate, their excellencies should afford him fresh motives to justify such a determination.—In the official note transmitted to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries on the 12th of August, it was observed to them, "That the British "government, far from pretending to 'exact from the French government every "restitution which may suit their convenience, without being bound to make "any restitution to France,' never expressed any other wish than that of treating "with the French government on the basis which was proposed to her by France "herself; as it is expressed in the note of "lord Lauderdale, viz. 'to treat generally upon the basis of *uti possidetis*, "which was to be scrupulously observed, "except in the case of Hanover, which "was proposed to be ceded to his Britannic majesty, with all its dependencies.' "That even if it were possible to mistake "the result which would necessarily follow from this principle, the verbal discussions which took place on the 9th instant, between the French plenipotentiaries and the undersigned, leave no "room for doubt, whether the proposition "thus laid down was perfectly understood "by those plenipotentiaries. The undersigned have therefore only to repeat, "that they cannot, consistently with the "instructions of their government, do "otherwise than insist upon the previous "recognition of this principle. It is on "this condition alone that they are authorized to continue the negociation."—This note remained without answer till the 25th of that month, when their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries informed the undersigned by a letter, that, "the "plenipotentiaries of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, wishing to confer with his excellency the "earl of Lauderdale, his Britannic majesty's plenipotentiary, upon the subject "of the last note his excellency addressed "to them, request his lordship will call at "the office of the minister of the interior "to-morrow about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, where they will meet, provided "the hour is convenient to his excellency."—The undersigned forbears making any observations on the length of the interval which elapsed between the sending the note of the 11th and the period when it was answered; as well as on the manner in which their excellencies avoided entering into discussion in writing on the contents of that note, according to the usage of all times, and of all countries, whenever affairs of such importance are in question. He confines himself to remark that, when, after so long a delay, and the undersigned accepted an invitation from their excellencies to renew the discussions, in the hope of receiving at length the decision of the French government on the contents of the official note of the 11th, the conference appeared to tend, on the part of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries solely to engage the undersigned to present the detailed project of a treaty.—The undersigned, jointly with the earl of Yarmouth, had already, in the note of the 11th inst., formally declared, that, until France had adopted the basis, such as the British government understood it to have been originally proposed by her, he could not enter into a detailed negociation. If indeed the undersigned could have forgot himself so far as to accede to the proposition made at the last conference by their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, it would not only have been necessary for that purpose, that he should have abandoned the only conditions which his instructions authorized him to admit, as the basis of the negociation, but moreover that he should expose himself to a manifest contradiction, in presenting at first an entire project of a treaty, the details of which were to result from the negociation itself; a negociation which the undersigned had declared that he could not enter upon till after a previous acknowledgement of the basis in question.—In this state of things, the undersigned, after having attended, conformably to the desire of their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, at the conferences which they proposed to him; after having maturely reflected on all the communications which he had received from their excellencies, and thus fully convinced himself, that the present views of the French government are far different from those which his Britannic majesty had a right to expect from them; in a word, that the continuance of the present negociation can henceforth have no other effect than that of keeping up in both nations, a hope which cannot be realized, the undersigned thinks it his duty formally to declare to their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, the resolution which he has taken, in conformity to the instructions of his sovereign, to put an end to his mission. The admission, in writing, of the basis so often brought forward by the undersigned, can alone occasion a change in this determination. (Signed)

LAUDERDALE.

No. 44.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, August 30th, 1806.—Received September 3d.

Sir; When I reflect on the contents of the dispatch I had the honour of making up for you yesterday, I cannot help anticipating the surprise with which you must receive the intelligence, that I am now under an engagement to renew the conference with the plenipotentiaries of France, on Thursday the 4th of September. On going yesterday, at 3 o'clock, to the office of the minister of the interior, I confess I did not foresee the possibility of any thing occurring that could prevent my executing the resolution I had formed, of demanding passports this morning, and of returning immediately to England. I trust I need scarcely assure you, that I have as strong an impression as any man can have, of the bad consequences that may attend exhibiting any thing which looks like versatility of conduct; and yet, under the circumstances in which I found myself placed, I am satisfied I had no choice, and that I could not refuse, with propriety, the solicitations of the French plenipotentiaries to renew the conference.—At the commencement of our interview, I perceived a disposition to greater cordiality than I had hitherto experienced. To M. de Champagny's enquiry, whether they had been fortunate enough, by what they had said, to induce me to deliver the project of a treaty, I answered, by recalling to his recollection, the reasons I had formerly stated for declining such a proceeding till the basis that had originally been proposed was again formally recognized; and I informed him, that, in order to give them an accurate view of my conception of the subject, I had prepared a note which I wished to submit to them, delivering to them the note, a copy of which I had the honour of inclosing in my dispatch of August 29th.—After reading this note, and observing in general that they did not know whether, if we should come to a particular explanation, we might not arrive at a conclusion coincident in its effect with the object I had in view, when I insisted on the general principle, they entered into a detail with respect to the necessity of some immediate determination on the subject of Hanover, and afterwards stated their views as to the French possessions in the East Indies, the Dutch colonies, St. Lucie, and Tobago; on all of which, they talked in a style so perfectly different from any thing I had before heard, that I should not be more surprised if, at our next conference, they were to give them up, than I was at the change of tone manifested on this occasion.—A great deal more passed in the way of general conversation; all of which tended to shew me, that, although they were still at a wide distance from such terms as I could accede to, they had wonderfully relaxed from the tone they had antecedently assumed.—M. de Champagny then invited me to name a day for resuming our conference. To this, I decidedly objected, admitting, at the same time, that they had made concessions in the course of our discussion; but, adding, that they were still so far from agreeing to admit what the English government uniformly conceived the original proposition to have conveyed, that I could not yet indulge any hopes of our coming to an agreement, and should therefore feel it necessary to terminate my mission.—M. de Champagny asked me with some warmth, whether I wished for peace on the terms which I myself had stated? whether I thought myself authorized, after the concessions they had just made, to refuse them time to consider how much further they might go? and whether I might not reasonably entertain hopes that, with a little time, the differences which appeared now to separate us, might vanish? On receiving such a remonstrance, I thought it impossible not to agree to a renewal of the conference; and after some conversation, Thursday was fixed for the day of our meeting.

No. 45.—Extract from a dispatch from Earl Spencer to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, September 4th, 1806.

My lord; I am commanded by his majesty to inform your lordship, that he is pleased to approve entirely the conduct you have held in the circumstances detailed in your last dispatches, and to express his majesty's satisfaction in the good effect which appears to have resulted from it.—It is proper, however, to remark, that as the French plenipotentiaries have not bound themselves as yet by any written note, nor have even in conversation agreed to replace the negociation on its true basis; the present appearances of greater facility on their part, may probably arise only from their desire of keeping your lordship at Paris till the answer from Petersburgh shall be received; an object which your lordship's last note had shewn them they could no longer accomplish without some departure from the ground on which they have hitherto stood.—If the Russian treaty shall not be ratified, his majesty is then (as I have already observed to your lordship) replaced, with respect to the emperor of Russia, in the same situation as before the signature of M. d'Oubril's treaty; but with the additional tye, which the two courts would in that case feel from the fresh proofs each will have given to the other of a steady adherence to the system of alliance: and it will then be necessary that our peace shall be so far made dependent on that of Russia as is pointed out in the instructions originally given to lord Yarmouth.—Since the above was written, we have received the important intelligence contained in the indorsed papers [intelligence of the refusal of the emperor of Russia to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty] copies of which I have thought it necessary to forward to you without a moment's delay, for your information; the case is already provided for in this dispatch, and in the present state of our information on the subject, I have nothing to add to what is above stated. A few days will now probably put us in possession of the further views and intentions of Russia, to which reference must of course be had in every succeeding stage of the negociation; and as I shall lose no time in transmitting to your lordship such fresh instructions as these may give rise to, so we shall be anxious to hear as soon as possible from you what effect this event may produce on the disposition of the French government.

No. 46.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Sept. 4, 1806.—Received Sept. 7th.

Sir; In my last dispatch I informed you that in consequence of the solicitations of the plenipotentiaries of France, urged in the manner I there stated to you, I had consented to a renewal of the conference this day at three o'clock.—About half past two I received from M. Talleyrand a note, a copy of which (marked A.), as well as of my answer (marked B.), I now inclose.—On going to M. Talleyrand's office, I found him just returned from St. Cloud. He began by informing me that till yesterday they had received no certain information from Petersburgh; but that the courier who arrived last night, had brought intelligence that the emperor had positively refused to ratify the treaty. He stated that he had the emperor's orders to say that this change of circumstances would certainly induce him to make peace with England on more favourable terms than he would otherwise have at present consented to; and further to declare, that as he would find it necessary to give to his plenipotentiaries new instructions; so he thought it proper to communicate this to me, that I might write to my court to receive also such further instructions as they might think proper to give.—In answer to a question which I asked, whether there was any reason to expect the arrival of any minister to renew the negociation on the part of Russia, he said that no information on that subject had been received. On taking leave, I assured M. Talleyrand that I should report to you the apparent openness with which the communication had been made, and that I should dispatch a courier this evening with the information.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 7, 1806.

The minister for foreign affairs has received the orders of his majesty the emperor and king, to hold a conference this day with his excellency lord Lauderdale. He has therefore the honour to propose to his excellency to call at the office for foreign affairs at half past two. He begs him to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 4, 1806; half past two P. M.

Lord Lauderdale has this instant received the note dated the 4th Sept. by which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs proposes to lord Lauderdale a conference at his excellency's office this day at half past two o'clock.—This invitation was not delivered at lord Lauderdale's hotel till half past two, the time specified for the conference: but lord Lauderdale will have great pleasure in waiting upon his excellency in a quarter of an hour at farthest.

No. 47.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Paris, Sept. 7, 1806.—Received Sept. 11th.

Sir; I received last night, by the courier Parsons, the dispatch dated the 4th Sept. signed by the earl Spencer.—Though the latter part of it is written in the knowledge that the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty made by M. d'Oubril, and refers to the instructions antecedently given me, on the supposition that this event should take place, I shall delay pressing for any renewal of the conferences, till I shall receive further advice from England.—I am led to this resolution, because I wish to hear from you after you have received my dispatch of Sept. 4th, and, because I further think that it would be highly advantageous previously to be informed concerning the nature of the communication, which the court of Petersburgh intends to make to the French government, with respect to the basis on which his imperial majesty will renew the negociation. And it appears to me from the note, a copy of which you transmitted to me, that a communication of this sort may be daily expected.

No, 48.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Secretary Windham to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, Sept. 10, 1806.

My lord; Your lordship's dispatch of Sept. 4, has not failed to engage his majesty's most serious attention. The language held by M. Talleyrand appears directed to the object of engaging his majesty in a separate negociation, to the exclusion of Russia; but the interests both of this country and of Europe have always been considered here as essentially connected with the maintenance of the strictest union of councils and measures between his majesty and the emperor of Russia. It was with deep regret that his majesty saw the apparent violation of this principle in the separate treaty signed by M. d'Oubril; and he cannot but consider the steady and upright conduct of the emperor of Russia on that trying occasion, as imposing on his majesty a fresh obligation not to separate his interests from those of so honourable and faithful an ally.—Your lordship must therefore in the first place represent to the French government, that the refusal to ratify M. d'Oubril's treaty, has replaced the two courts in their former state of close and intimate alliance; and that any attempt on the part of France to separate them, must henceforth be considered as hopeless. She can now form no expectation that she can conclude peace with either of them, until the negociation with the other shall be brought to the same conclusion.—In reverting to this resolution, his maj. does not however desire to carry the operation of this principle at all farther than before. He has no objection to its being understood as was expressed to lord Yarmouth in Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of June, that the two courts shall treat separately in form, but in substance in concert with each other. In this mode of treating, the separate interests of Great Britain and France may as before be separately discussed between them. But his majesty is determined, as is expressed in the same dispatch, that he will not come to any final agreement without the consent of Russia; and that any arrangement of the points depending between him and France, is to be considered as provisional, and subject to the case of a like arrangement to be made by his ally.—With respect to the separate interests of Great Britain, his majesty adheres to the basis originally proposed to him by France, and on which your ldp. has so often had occasion to insist, that of the *uti possidetis* for the two powers and their allies in all parts of the world, with the single exception of the restitution of Hanover, as having been originally attacked on grounds which cannot be defended.—This is the offer of France as originally made to his majesty; it is the demand on which his majesty still thought fit to insist, when apparently abandoned by Russia; and his majesty has no desire of increasing it under circumstances, which, according to the avowal of France herself, entitle his majesty to expect more favourable conditions than France has lately been inclined to accede to. The *uti possidetis* thus described, must however now of necessity include the kingdom of Sicily.—Every endeavour was made, in the outset of the negociation to obtain the restitution of Naples to his Sicilian majesty; and the grounds on which it was thought fit finally to desist from that claim on the part of his majesty are detailed in the correspondence of this office with lord Yarmouth and your lordship.—But the case of Sicily was always deemed to be widely different from that of Naples. Our actual occupation of that island brings it fully within the benefit of the *uti possidetis*. And recent events have shewn how very distant are the hopes of conquest in that quarter, which were so much relied upon in one of the notes presented to your lordship by the French plenipotentiaries.—Lord Yarmouth had been uniformly instructed to insist on this demand as a *sine quâ non* condition of all arrangements for peace. On the refusal of France to accede to this claim, his lordship had actually, in pursuance of those instructions, demanded his passports, and it was not in the smallest degree departed from or relaxed until a desire was expressed to him by M. d'Oubril, that this government would listen to proposals for an equivalent to be given for Sicily. In compliance with the supposed wishes of his ally, and on that ground alone, his majesty consented to entertain the consideration of such an equivalent, but none has ever been suggested that appeared at all likely to meet the just expectations which his Sicilian majesty would have been entitled to form on that head. And his maj. has now the satisfaction of learning, that the sentiments of his ally have in fact never been different from his own on this point; and that the preservation of Sicily is considered in Russia, as well as in England, as a just condition of any peace with France. On both these grounds, therefore, both on the principle adopted for his own negociation, and on the ground of his determination not to separate himself from Russia, his majesty thinks it absolutely necessary to maintain this point with the same firmness which he had originally manifested respecting it.—This includes all that is necessary to say on any point respecting the immediate interests of this country, or of any possession hitherto known to be occupied by his majesty's arms.

No. 49. — Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 18, 1806.—Received Sept. 22.

My lord; I had the honour of receiving the dispatch, signed by Mr. Secretary Windham, dated Sept. 10, late in the evening of Friday last.—Unfortunately I had a slight degree of fever for four days preceding, and I never was more unfit than on Saturday morning to attend to business of such a magnitude.—On considering the instructions contained in the dispatch with all the attention I could, they appeared to me to relate to two distinct subjects: first, to the form and manner in which his majesty thought proper that I should conduct the negociation: secondly, to the terms which, under the present circumstances of the two countries, it is proper to ask.—To this distinction I conceived it to be the more necessary for me to attend, because I thought it regular and proper to address what I had to say on the first point to the minister of foreign affairs, whereas the plenipotentiaries of France, should the government authorize them to proceed, seemed the proper channel of communication on the second.—In pursuance of this idea, I immediately wrote a note, a copy of which (marked A.) I inclose, addressed to M. Talleyrand, which I sent by Mr. Goddard in the evening, as I was myself confined to my bed.—On Monday, about five o'clock, M. Talleyrand called, and though I was very ill at the time, I resolved to admit him. He sat upwards of half an hour. The outline of his conversation consisted in his expressing a desire to have a full communication with me, in his assuring me, that if the difficulties, in respect of form, could be got over, he did not think the objections to the terms would be material, and that, where peace was seriously in view, as it was with them, it figured as an object of such importance as to give a disposition to accommodate about conditions; in a word, that he had little doubt that he and I would arrange the business.—On my part, I stated, that I was afraid he proceeded on the supposition that I might give way in some of the points in question, which I thought it fair to assure him at once was impossible. I stated to him generally the demands I was to make on the part of England, which would no way vary from the terms we had originally understood to have been proposed; and that he must expect I would be as positive in relation to the conditions for Russia, with which he was acquainted, as I should be with respect to any point more peculiarly of British interest. I then thought it right to introduce the subject of my having no powers from Russia, observing that, although there might be some irregularity in this mode of proceeding, yet that, under all the circumstances of the present case, it seemed unavoidable, because the principle and feelings of his majesty would never permit him to think of treating, but in such a manner as might insure to the court of Petersburgh an honourable peace, at the moment that peace should be concluded between England and France; and that unless I could be allowed to state the objects of Russia, this could be hardly effected.—He assured me that they would wave all objections with regard to form, and that they would be perfectly ready to hear me on the subject of a treaty of peace with Russia; his objection to my proposal being founded, not on the circumstance of my wanting powers from Russia, but on the very unusual proposal of concluding a treaty, which, when signed, was only to take place in a certain event. I mentioned to him that the same thing had been done in Paris in 1782, when Mr. Oswald concluded a treaty of peace with Dr. Franklin and Mr. Adam.—During the whole of this conversation, I had gone even out of my way to repeat to him the necessity of his laying his account with my adhering rigidly to the terms I had detailed; and yet he left me with such expressions as could not fail to create a belief, that he intended to accede to my propositions.—At the moment he quitted me I was much better than I had been for some days, and was in such hopes that I was about to get well, that I undertook to write to him next morning, Tuesday the 16th, to say whether I could appoint a meeting in the course of that day. Unfortunately I had a miserably bad night, and finding myself in the morning totally disqualified for exertion, I wrote to him a note of which I now inclose a copy (marked B.)—Your lordship will perceive, that in this note I pressed for an answer in writing, in a manner as strong and as inoffensive as I could devise.—On the morning of the 17th, I wrote to M. Talleyrand a short note (marked C.) expressing my desire that he would come to me any time after three o'clock, which was hardly dispatched before I received a letter from his excellency, announcing the arrival of a courier at Boulogne, and the melancholy account of Mr. Fox's death. A copy of this, together with my answer, a copy of which (marked D. and E.) I have the honour of inclosing.—In the evening I received the inclosure (marked F.) from which your lordship will perceive that I shall at last have a meeting with M. Talleyrand tomorrow at one o'clock.—I have the honour to be, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 13, 1806.

The undersigned, plenipotentiary of his Britannic majesty, lost no time in transmitting to his court the communication which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs made to him on Thursday the 4th inst.; and he now hastens to reply to that communication, by informing his excellency of the line of conduct his majesty has thought proper to direct him to pursue under the present circumstances.—His Britannic majesty, ever anxious to maintain the intimate connection and alliance which subsist between his majesty and the emperor of all the Russias, naturally finds in the recent conduct of his illustrious ally, and in the proofs which he has lately afforded of the interest which he takes in the welfare of Great Britain and in the general happiness of Europe, additional motives not to separate, in any case, his interests from those of the court of St. Petersburgh.—It is not, however, the intention of his majesty to carry this principle farther than the earl of Yarmouth was instructed to carry it by Mr. Fox, in his lordship's communications with the French government. There is nothing to prevent the interests of Great Britain and of France from being treated separately; only his majesty does not authorize the undersigned to sign any treaty except provisionally; such treaty not to have its full effect until peace shall have been concluded between that faithful ally of Great Britain and France. It is upon these conditions alone that the undersigned is at present authorized to negociate.—The undersigned has orders to add, that his Britannic majesty, fully acquainted with the desire entertained by the court of St. Petersburgh for peace upon conditions reciprocally honourable and advantageous, and at the same time compatible with the interests of Europe, has authorized him to impart to the French plenipotentiaries the conditions upon which Russia (according to the full and perfect knowledge his Britannic majesty has of the intentions of that court) would be willing to negociate with the French government; to reduce them into the form of a treaty in the event of their being agreed to on both sides; and to insert an article in the provisional treaty between G. Britain and France, by which his Britannic majesty should engage to employ his mediation, for the purpose of obtaining the accession of his majesty the emperor of all the Russias to the said treaty.—The undersigned is aware that he ought to make the official communication of the conditions to the French plenipotentiaries: in the mean time, and for the satisfaction of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, he has no difficulty in telling him that they will be in substance the same as those which have already been communicated to his excellency by his excellency baron de Budberg.—The undersigned expects with great impatience the answer to this communication, which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs will have the goodness to send in writing. It is the more necessary for him to receive it in that form, as his court has remarked that the communications the undersigned has already made, have frequently remained without a written answer.—The undersigned has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 16, 1806.

Lord Lauderdale has the honour of informing his excellency M. Talleyrand, that he has passed a very bad night, and finds himself utterly incapable of entering upon business to-day.—Lord Lauderdale will have the honour of writing to his excellency to-morrow morning, when he hopes the indisposition under which he now labours, will have taken such a turn as may enable him to hold the conversation with his excellency, which he so much desires.—Lord Lauderdale hopes, nevertheless, that his excellency will be pleased, at this interview, to put into his hands a written answer to his last note.—He entreats his excellency to believe, that it is by no means from a desire of insisting upon a demand merely because it has been once made, that he now renews it, but the orders of his court are positive in this respect, and lord Lauderdale feels it the more indispensable for him to remind his excellency of this circumstance at the present moment, since he finds himself called upon to treat for a court from which he has received no direct powers.—Lord Lauderdale has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 17, 1806.

Lord Lauderdale, although still too unwell to leave the house, thinks himself able to hold a conference with his excellency M. Talleyrand to-day, if his excellency will do him the honour of coming to the hotel de l'Empire, any time after three o'clock that may best suit his excellency.—Should this proposal interfere with his excellency's engagements, or be in any other respect inconvenient to him, lord Lauderdale hopes to be able to go out to-morrow, and will wait upon his excellency M. Talleyrand at whatever hour may best suit him.—He has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 17, 1806.

The prince of Benevento has this moment learnt that the messenger, Johnson, is arrived, and will be in Paris to-day. It is with sincere regret that the prince of Benevento, at the same time, heard of the death of Mr. Fox, of which event, he has the honour of informing his excellency lord Lauderdale. Mr. Spencer succeeds Mr. Fox provisionally.—The prince of Benevento hopes that lord Lauderdale finds himself better to-day. He has the honour, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 17, 1806.

Lord Lauderdale received the note that his excellency the prince of Benevento sent him this morning, at the moment when he had just dispatched the note in which he proposed to hold a conference with his excellency this day. Lord Lauderdale presumes that, considering the state of his health, and the approaching arrival of the messenger, his excellency will agree with him in opinion, that the conference may be postponed till to-morrow.—Lord Lauderdale thanks his excellency the prince of Benevento for his attention in acquainting him with the arrival of the courier. The death of Mr. Fox occasioned him no surprise; and it appears from what his excellency mentions in his note, that the seals of the foreign department (as is usually the case) have been provisionally entrusted to lord Spencer, secretary of state for the home department, until a successor is appointed.—Lord Lauderdale has the honour, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Sixth inclosure (F.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 17, 1806.

The minister for foreign affairs, on his return from St. Cloud, found the note which his excellency lord Lauderdale had done him the honour of writing to him. He regrets extremely the continued indisposition of his excellency. To-morrow being the day of his official attendance at St. Cloud, he cannot have the honour of seeing his excelleney, but he will not fail to wait upon him the next day about 1 o'clock. —He has the honour, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

No. 50.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 19, 1806.—Received Sept. 22.

My lord; At one o'clock this day, M. Talleyrand called upon me according to the appointment which I announced to your lordship in my last dispatch. I immediately perceived, that his plan was to exhibit extreme civility, which no one knows better how to execute. After some time spent in compliments, and in condolence on the great loss the world had sustained, he told me, that as I insisted on an answer in writing, one was prepared, which contained a declaration consonant to what he supposed me to wish on the two most material points. 1st, That the emperor was willing to admit of an article being introduced to answer the objects I had in view in relation to Russia, and to instruct his plenipotentiaries to hear me with respect to the interests of that power. 2dly, That France would be ready to make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace.—After some conversation, all tending to impress me with the idea that peace was their main object, and that they were even ready to make any sacrifice to secure it; he produced the paper to which he had alluded (marked A.); and which I had at first understood he meant to transmit to me when he should go home.—Before he opened it, he looked at me, and said, that there was a mixture in it of what perhaps I should not like, but that I must take the evil with the good. He begged that I would allow him to read it through without interrupting him. When he had finished, I said that I should of course send such an answer as I thought becoming and proper. I told him, and, I trust, with perfect temper and seeming indifference, that the most important thing for me to know was, whether these concessions would be to the extent of allowing us to retain what they had originally proposed? He answered, that the emperor would leave every thing open to the plenipotentiaries.—On his going away I felt myself so extremely fatigued, in consequence of the weak state in which my late illness has left me, that I was obliged to lie down and recruit my strength before I could turn my mind to the formation of what I conceived to be a proper answer to his note. I trust your lordship will approve of the answer I have sent, a copy of which I have the honour of inclosing, (marked B.) My object in framing it, was to facilitate as much as possible the immediate progress of the negociation, and, at the same time, to let the government of France feel that I was alive to what, in point of dignity, belonged to the plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty. I have, &c. LAUDERDALE.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note delivered by M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 18th, 1806.

The undersigned, the minister for foreign affairs, has laid before his majesty the emperor, king of Italy, the note which his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary from his Britannick majesty, did him the honour to address to him on the 13th of this month.—His majesty the emperor and king sees with regret that the negociation seems to take every day a retrograde course, and he is at a loss to discover what point the English government wish to attain.—In the first instance, obsolete forms were brought forward and urged for our acceptance, the text and the substance of which had never been admitted, nor even discussed, by the French government, and when this difficulty appeared to be removed, and the French plenipoten-

tiaries held out a prospect of sacrifices which proved more and more the desire of their government for peace, points antecedent to the negociation were recurred to, and a question was started again which had been three times decided; 1st, by the powers given to M. d'Oubril, with which his Britannick majesty's plenipotentiaries were acquainted, afterwards by the powers given to the earl of Yarmouth, and lastly, for the third time, by those of the earl of Lauderdale. One might have supposed that a discussion, terminated before the first conference of the respective negociators, and decided even by the very fact of their negociation, would not again be brought forward.—His majesty the emperor wishing however to give a fresh proof of his uniform desire for the re-establishment of peace, adheres to the following proposal; That the negociations between France and England shall continue; that the minister plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of G. Britain shall be at liberty to introduce into the treaty, either as a public or a secret article, or in any other form which would answer the same end, whatever he may conceive would tend to reconcile the existing differences between France and Rrussia, and would procure for the latter a participation in the benefits of peace, it being well understood, that no proposals shall be admitted except such as are respectively honourable, and are not injurious to the real power and the dignity of the two empires; and that we shall not see again brought forward the extraordinary proposals which M. de Novosiltzoff was charged to make on the part of Russia, and which having marked the origin of a coalition conquered and destroyed in its birth, ought equally to be forgotten with the coalition itself. There are proposals which, being only the result of blind confidence, and of a species of infatuation, and, being founded neither on the real force of the parties, nor on their geographical situation, are deprived of a pacific character, and carry with them their own condemnation.—France ought neither to abandon the interests of the Ottoman empire, nor a position which enables her to sustain that empire against the aggressions with which she is openly menaced by Russia; but as all the objects destined to enter into the arrangements of the treaty, must be reserved for discussion, the undersigned will not seek to anticipate the result which it may produce.—If, after the changes which have taken place in the cabinet of his Britannick majesty, peace is still wished for in England, peace may be made, and that without delay. The emperor will not hesitate to make some sacrifices in order to accelerate it, and to render it durable; but if the dispositions for peace should have changed in London, if the wise and liberal views manifested in the first communications which took place with the illustrious minister, whom both nations lament, should no longer prevail, a vague discussion, immoderate pretensions, and ambiguous proposals, wide of that tone of frankness and dignity necessary to conduce to a real reconciliation, would only have the effect of producing more irritation, and would be unworthy of both nations. France does not pretend to dictate either to Russia or to England, but she will be dictated to by neither of these powers. Let the conditions be equal, just, and moderate, and the peace is concluded; but if an imperious and exaggerating disposition is evinced, if pre-eminence is affected, if, in a word, it is meant to *dictate* peace, the emperor and the French people will not even notice these proposals. Confiding in themselves, they will say as a nation of antiquity answered its enemies, "*you demand our arms, come and take them.*"—The undersigned, &c.
Ch. Mau. Talleyrand, prince of Benevento.

Second Inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from Lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Sept. 19th, 1806.

The undersigned plenipotentiary of his majesty the king of G. Britain, in answering the official note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, dated the 18th inst., which has been received to-day, begins by remarking, that he purposely abstains as much as possible from all observation upon those points contained in it, which are foreign to the immediate object in question. By this means, he will avoid discussions of a nature to lead him to forget that tone of moderation which it is his duty to observe in the whole course of his mission. He will thus maintain the line of conduct which is conformable to that love of peace, which characterizes all the proceedings of the king his master.—When the undersigned reflects, that he came to Paris, authorized to conclude peace upon terms understood to have been proposed by France; that notwithstanding the refusal of his imperial majesty of all the Russias to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril, and the splendid successes obtained by his majesty's arms in Spanish America, he was authorized to give assurances (as he had the honour of doing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs) that the demands of his court, in its own favour, would not in consequence of these successes be materially increased; the undersigned had reason to be surprized at finding his government charged with manifesting an "imperious and exaggerating disposition." He is not less astonished, that his excellency, in replying to a note in which lord Lauderdale had the honour of explaining distinctly to him, that the conditions pointed out by his excellency baron de Budberg were in substance what would be insisted upon by G. Britain in favour of Russia, should have thought it necessary to reprobate so strongly conditions proposed by M. de Novosiltzoff under totally different circumstances, and of the nature of which, the undersigned is entirely ignorant.—Nevertheless, after the explanations given by the undersigned to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, and the declaration made by him to his excellency, that the undersigned is not authorized to negociate otherwise than so as to ensure the conclusion of a peace with G. Britain and with Russia at the same moment; and, after having received, in the official note of yesterday's date, assurances that the French government does not refuse the admission of an article, the design of which shall be to provide for this indispensable object, the undersigned will make no difficulty in resuming the conferences with their excellencies the French plenipotentiaries, as soon as their excellencies shall be duly authorized for this purpose.—The undersigned, &c. Lauderdale.

No. 51.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.—Received Sept. 28th.

Nothing material happened after the conference with M. Talleyrand, which I detailed in my dispatch of the 19th inst. till the 22d, when I received from him a communication, informing me that the emperor having thought gen. Clarke's services near his person necessary in a journey he was about to undertake immediately, M. de Champagny would be instructed to conduct singly on the part of France the business of the negociation in future.—This communication was made in a letter which I enclose (marked A.) together with a copy of my answer (marked B.)—On the 23d, being anxious that the negociation should proceed as soon as possible, I took the opportunity of M. de Champagny's sending to enquire after my health, to urge him, in writing, to renew the conferences without farther loss of time. Your lordship will find a copy of my letter (marked C.), together with his answer (marked D.) enclosed.—On the 24th I received from M. Talleyrand an answer to the demand I had made for an explanationon the subject of passports, in my letter of the 22d. This communication (marked E.) I think it proper also to transmit to your lordship.—On the 25th at 1 o'clock, M. de Champagny called on me, as had been previously agreed, for the purpose of renewing the conferences. —After the usual interchange of civilities, he proceeded to say, that, to secure peace, the emperor had determined to make great sacrifices.—1st, That Hanover with its dependencies should be restored to his maj. —2d, That the possession of Malta should be confirmed to Great Britain.—3d, That France would interfere with Holland to confirm to his majesty the absolute possession of the Cape.—4th, That the emperor would confirm to his majesty the possession of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahee, and the other dependent comptoirs.—5th, That as Tobago was originally settled by the English, it was meant also to give that island to the crown of Great Britain.—To all this he added, that what he had now said, proceeded on the supposition, that Sicily was to be ceded, and that the French government proposed that his Sicilian majesty should have as indemnity, not only the Balearic islands, but should also receive an annuity from the court of Spain to enable him to support his dignity.—I here interrupted him, expressing my surprise after the full explanation I had with M. Talleyrand on that very point, that the possibility of our giving up Sicily should be mentioned again; that the guarantee of it to the king of the two Sicilies was as much an object with England as M. Talleyrand knew it to be with Russia; and that I was happy to take that opportunity of stating to him fairly, that I felt myself bound to consider the obtaining for Russia the arrangement which she desired, as an object more interesting if possible to England, than those points which might be considered as peculiarly connected with her own interests.—He informed me, that there was no clause in his instructions empowering him to hear me on the part of Russia; but that he had even seen M. Talleyrand's note to me, and, being satisfied that this was an accidental omission, which would be forthwith remedied, he had no objection to proceed as if such a clause had been inserted.—It was agreed that I should go to him to day at 2 o'clock to renew the conference.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 22, 1806.

My lord; I have the honour to inform you, that his majesty having thought it for the good of his service to retain gen. Clarke near his person, during the course of a journey he is about to undertake; M. de Champagny will henceforth be charged with conducting singly the negociation entered into with your excellency.—I have communicated his majesty's intentions to that minister, who has received orders to concert with you such measures as may prevent any interruption to the continuance of the conferences, and of the correspondence between the two missions. I should at the same time acquaint you, that being myself directed to follow his majesty, I shall nethertheless continue to correspond with your excellency as before; the general order of the service being such, as to secure the daily and regular delivery of all dispatches addressed to me on the affairs of my department. I beg, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 22, 1806.

Sir; I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of this date, in which you inform me that M. de Champagny will in future be directed to carry on singly the negociation with me, and that this minister has received orders to make such arrangements with me as may prevent any interruption to the continuance of the conferences and of the correspondence.—In returning my thanks to your excellency for this communication, I have the honour to remark to you, that it is no less essential to take measures, as your excellency will doubtless do before your departure, for ensuring a communication by messengers with my government during your absence, without any delay or obstacle whatever, in the same manner as has been practised since my arrival here. It cannot escape your excellency's observation how impossible it would be for me to transmit to you in sufficient time the demands which I may be obliged to make on this subject, as occasion may require; and I have in consequence to request you would have the goodness to inform me to what person I am to address myself for this purpose during your absence. I request, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Sept. 23, 1806.

Sir; It is impossible to be more sensible than I am of the interest which your excellency takes in the state of my health. For some days past I have been much better, and I now consider myself quite or nearly well. His excellency the minister for foreign affairs has informed me, in a note of yesterday's date, that your excellency is henceforward to carry on, singly, the negociation with me. The state of my health being no longer an obstacle, I request your excellency will be pleased to consider me at your disposal, either to receive you here, or to call upon you, as it may be most convenient, in order to resume the conferences, which, from various circumstances, have been so long interrupted. I request, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 23, 1806.

M. de Champagny has learnt, with the utmost satisfaction, the re-establishment of the health of his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, and he congratulates himself on the prospect of continuing with his excellency the relations on which he sets the highest value. He is extremely anxious to renew the conferences which had been interrupted; but the extraordinary business occasioned by the approaching departure of the emperor, does not allow him to do so, either to-day or to-morrow, as he could have wished. He has, therefore, the honour to propose to his lordship Thursday next, being the first day in which he shall have a moment's leisure. The conference shall be held at whatever place and hour his lordship may name; and M. de Champagny requests him in making this appointment only to consult the state of his health. He requests, &c. CHAMPAGNY.

Fifth inclosure (E.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 24, 1806.

My lord; I have the honour to inform you, that I have taken his majesty's pleasure on the subject of the letter which your excellency did me the honour to write to me on the 22d Sept. and that his majesty immediately authorized M. de Champagny, his minister plenipotentiary, to deliver to you all the passports which may be necessary to insure the regularity and expedition of your excellency's communications with the ministers of his Britannick majesty. I have the honour, &c. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

No. 52.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Spencer; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.—Received Sept. 28th.

My lord; In conformity with my engagement made yesterday, which I had the honour of mentioning to your lordship in my former dispatch of this date, I waited on M. Champagny this afternoon at 2 o'clock. He informed me, that the accidental omission in his instructions had been remedied, and that he had now powers to talk with me on the interests of Russia, with a view to arrange the conditions on which France would make peace with that country: but he, at the same time, proposed, that we should, in the first instance, talk over the terms of peace between France and England. I observed, that as the greatest difficulties in our last conference seemed to arise from the conditions that I had proposed as necessary to be granted to Russia; and, as England was resolved not to make peace without obtaining for Russia all the objects on which she insisted, I thought the more natural order would be, to resume our conversation on these last topics.—A long discussion accordingly ensued, which ended in his informing me that, on the subject of concession to Russia, he was authorized to communicate to me, that the government of France was willing, in addition to the treaty made by M. d'Oubril, to cede to that power the full sovereignty of the island of Corfu; but that he had no authority to go any farther.—I then informed him, that I was sorry to learn that the negociation was at an end, for that my instructions were precise, and that I should feel it my duty, the moment I left him, to state to M. Talleyrand, that all hopes having vanished of bringing the negociation to a favourable issue, I had only now to request passports for my return to England.—After strong expressions of mutual regard, he attended me to the outer room, where he again proposed a renewal of our conferences, in case his government should give him new instructions.—My answer was, that I had no choice in immediately applying for passports; but that, as long as I remained in this country, I never would refuse to see him; and that if, before my departure, he should come with powers to grant all the objects on which I had explained myself, I should feel the greatest satisfaction, though at that moment, I thought any appointment perfectly unnecessary.—On my return home I sent to M. Talleyrand a letter demanding my passports, a copy of which, (marked A.) I inclose; and, I understand from the courier Basilico, that he received it ten minutes before he got into his carriage to go to Mentz.—About 6 o'clock, I received from M. de Champagny a note, of which, as well as of my answer, I inclose copies to your lordship, (marked B. and C.)—Whilst I am writing, I have received the note, which I inclose, (marked D.)—I have, &c. LAUDERDALE.

I open this dispatch to inclose a note (marked E.) I have this moment received from M. de Champagny.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.

Sir; I lose not a moment in acquainting your excellency that the result of the conference which I have had to-day with his excellency M. de Champagny, unfortunately leaves me no hope of being able to bring the negociations, on the part of G. Britain and of Russia, to a favourable issue. In this state of things, and according to my instructions, no part remains for me to take but to address myself to your excellency for passports, for my return into the presence of my sovereign. In thus making this demand to your excellency, I cannot deny myself the pleasure which I feel in expressing my thanks for all the personal attentions which your excellency has shewn to me during my residence at Paris; and in assuring your excellency at the same time, of the sentiments of esteem which I have always felt, and which I shall ever feel, for your excellency, I request, &c. LAUDERDALE.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Sept. 26, 1806.

M. de Champagny has made a report to his government, of the conference which he this day held with lord Lauderdale; as several days must necessary elapse before he can receive fresh orders from his government, he thinks it may tend to advance that very desirable object, peace, to converse again on the subject with his excellency; and he has the honour to propose to his excellency to receive him at his house on Monday next, at the hour which may best suit his health. M. de Champagny requests his excellency the earl of Lauderdale to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Third inclsoure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.

Lord Lauderdale has this instant received the note of his excellency M. de Champagny, in which, after informing him of his having made a report to his government of this day's conference, he expresses a desire again to converse with lord Lauderdale. Although the result of the conference which lord Lauderdale has this day had with his excellency (at the conclusion of which his lordship thought it his duty to ask for passports, for which he has just made application to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs) leaves no hope of bringing the negociation to a favourable issue, the wish expressed by his excellency M. de Champagny to have another conversation with lord Lauderdale is decisive; and lord Lauderdale hastens to reply to this invitation, by informing his excellency that he will either meet him at his office, or will have the honour of receiving him at home, on Monday next, at whatever hour may best suit his excellency. Lord Lauderdale has the honour to repeat to his excellency M. de Champagny the assurance of his high consideration.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from M. d'Hauterive to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.

My lord; I have this moment received a letter from you for the prince of Benevento. He is this instant set out, and I embrace the opportunity offered by the departure of one of his suite, whose carriage will follow him immediately, to forward it to the prince of Benevento; it will probably reach him on the road, but at all events on his arrival at Mentz. I beg, &c. HAUTERIVE.

Fifth inclosure (E.) Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Sept. 26, 1806.

M. de Champagny will have the honour of calling upon lord Lauderdale on Monday next, at 2 o'clock, which he supposes will be the most convenient time.—He sends the passports lord Lauderdale desired for the messenger Basilico. He requests his excellency to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

No. 53.—Extract from a dispatch from Viscount Howick to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Downing-street, Oct. 1, 1806.

My lord; your dispatches of the 26th ult. brought by the messenger Johnson, have been laid before the king.—His majesty has seen with great regret that, after more than 6 months spent in negociation, the French government still hesitates upon the admission of points constantly urged by his majesty as the only grounds on which he could consent to peace, and that in so unsatisfactory a state of things, the chief of that government, together with his principal minister, has suddenly left Paris*, creating thereby new obstacles to the progress of the negociation. Whatever views the French government may have in keeping up this state of suspence and uncertainty, his majesty feels that it is equally prejudicial to the interests of his subjects and to those of Europe. If the professions of France are sincere, there can be no reason why she should not give a plain and decisive answer to demands which have been so long under consideration; and the time is now come when such an answer must be required as indispensable to your continuance at Paris.

No. 54.—Extract from a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick; dated Paris, Oct. 4th, 1806.—Received Oct. 6th.

My lord; Yesterday at 4 o'clock, M. de Champagny sent me a note to announce the arrival of a courier at Boulogne, who reached Paris this morning at 3 o'clock.—On reading your lordship's dispatch, dated Oct. 1st, it appeared to me, that his majesty had been pleased to approve of the demand of passports which I had made.—Your lordship may depend on my pressing for them with the utmost possible earnestness and assiduity; but how soon I may be able to succeed, it is impossible for me, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to prophesy.

No. 55.—Copy of a dispatch from the Earl of Lauderdale to Viscount Howick; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.—Received Oct. 8.

My lord; Late last night, M. de Champagny's principal secretary called upon me with a letter from him, inclosing a letter from M. Talleyrand; both of which I have the honour of transmitting to your lordship (marked A. and B.).—From these your lordship will perceive, that the negociation is now at an end, and that M. de Champagny has been authorized to give me the passports I required. I have this day accordingly renewed my demand to him in a letter, a copy of which I inclose (marked C.)—On considering M. Talleyrand's note, it seemed to me necessary, that I should not take the step of asking my passports from M. de Champagny, without accompanying my demand with a reply to some of the observations made by the minister for foreign affairs. Your lordship will accordingly find inclosed, a copy (marked D.) of an official note addressed by me to that minister. I have sent the courier, Lyell, for the purpose of conveying this information, and I have given him a letter to admiral Holloway, desiring him instantly to announce by the telegraph, that I shall leave Paris on Thursday morning.—I have taken this step because it occurred to me that government being thus in possession of the intelligence, that the negociation is at an end, ten hours before it can reach London, they may have it in their power to take the most prudent means to make the fact public. I have, &c. LAUDERDALE.

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* The chief of the French government left Paris on the night of September the 27th, and was followed by M. Talleyrand on the 96th.

First inclosure (A.)—Copy of a note from M. de Champagny to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Paris, Oct. 5, 1806.

M. de Champagny has the honour to transmit to his excellency the earl of Lauderdale the accompanying dispatch, addressed to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. He is also charged to inform him, that he is now authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded. This, of all the duties which he has had to discharge towards his excellency, is the only one which will have appeared painful to him; and it will be greatly so. He waits to be informed of the further dispositions of his excellency. M. de Champagny begs, &c. CHAMPAGNY.

Second inclosure (B.)—Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to the Earl of Lauderdale; dated Mentz, Oct. 1, 1806.

The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has laid before his majesty the emperor, king of Italy, the note which his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, minister plenipotentiary from his Britannic majesty, did him the honour to address to him on the 26th of this month. His majesty, after having, from a desire of peace, listened to every proposition which could have rendered it durable and of reciprocal advantage to the two contracting powers, and to their allies, will see with pain the rupture of a negociation, to which his own disposition had led him to hope a more favourable conclusion. If the English cabinet is resolved to forego the prospect of a peace, and, if his Britannic majesty's minister plenipotentiary must depart from France, his majesty still flatters himself that the English cabinet and lord Lauderdale will, when they shall measure the extent of the sacrifices which he was disposed to make, in order to facilitate the return of a sincere reconciliation, be convinced, that his majesty, in order to promote the happiness of the world, would not hesitate between any advantages in comparison with those to be expected from peace, and that the desire to insure its benefits to his people, could alone have determined his paternal heart to make sacrifices not only of self-love but of power, more considerable than even the opinion of the English nation could have pointed out in the midst of a war, in which he had obtained constant advantages without any mixture of reverse. If, however, it is the destiny of the emperor and of the French nation still to live in the midst of the wars and tumults, which the policy and influence of England have raised, his majesty having done every thing to put a stop to the calamities of war, finding himself deceived in his dearest hopes, relies on the justice of his cause, on the courage, the affection, and the power of his people. At the same time calling to mind the dispositions which he has ever expressed throughout the negociation, his majesty cannot see but with regret, that England, who might have strengthened and confirmed her vast power by the blessings of peace, the want of which is felt by the present generation, and by the English people as well as all others, willingly suffers the most favourable opportunity of concluding it, to pass by: the event will disclose whether a new coalition will be more disadvantageous to France than those which have preceded it. The event will also disclose, whether those who complain of the grandeur and ambition of France, should not impute to their own hatred and injustice this very grandeur and ambition of which they accuse her. The power of France has only been increased by the reiterated efforts to oppress her. Nevertheless whatever inferences for the future may be drawn from the examples of the past, his majesty will be ready, should the negociations with England be broken off, to renew them in the midst of any events. He will be ready to replace them on the basis laid in concert with the illustrious minister whom England has lost, who, having nothing to add to his glory except the reconciliation of the two nations, had conceived the hope of accomplishing it, but was snatched from the world in the midst of his work. The undersigned has the honour to inform his excellency the earl of Lauderdale, that M. de Champagny has been authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND, prince of Benevento.

Third inclosure (C.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. de Champagny; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.

Lord Lauderdale has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of his excellency M. de Champagny, dated the 5th of this month, and of the dispatch which accompanied it, from his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. Lord Lauderdale, learning that his excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to deliver to him the passports which he has demanded, requests his excellency to have the goodness to forward them to him, as well for himself as for his suite, and at the same time a separate passport for the messenger Scott, who, perhaps, may not accompany him. (Signed) LAUDERDALE.

Fourth inclosure (D.)—Copy of a note from the Earl of Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand; dated Paris, Oct. 6, 1806.

The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of his Britannick majesty, received late last night the note which his excellency the minister for foreign affairs did him the honour to address to him on the 1st of this month. The undersigned, learning that his excellency M. de Champagny is authorized to grant him the passports which he has demanded, and which he is on the point of receiving, cannot refrain from observing to his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, in answer to his note, that he has some difficulty in imagining from what circumstances his excellency has been able to infer, "that the British government have resolved to forego the prospect of peace." The undersigned was sent to France to negociate a peace, at a time when the illustrious minister, to whom his excellency has paid so just a tribute of praise, presided over the department for foreign affairs. This great man then acted under the full conviction, that he had received from France an offer of peace on the basis of *uti possidetis*, with the sole exception of Hanover and of its dependencies in favour of his Britannick maj. And, notwithstanding the success of the arms of his Britannick majesty, as well in Italy as on the continent of South America; and the refusal of his maj. the emperor of all the Russias to ratify that treaty, which in the eyes of the French government was equivalent to the most splendid victory; not one new proposition has been advanced on the part of his majesty, incompatible with the principle which was at first proposed by the French government, through the channel of the earl of Yarmouth, as the basis of the negociation. It is not surely from such conduct that the inference can be drawn, "that the British government have resolved to forego the prospect of a peace." Are the conditions which the undersigned was ordered to propose as the basis of a peace between his majesty the emperor of all the Russias and the French government, more of a nature to have given rise to this suspicion? Quite the reverse. If a solid and durable peace was the object of the two powers, these were such conditions as justice and expediency demanded. *Justice;* because certainly nothing could be more equitable than to grant to his Sicilian majesty and to the king of Sardinia a compensation for their immense losses on the Continent. *Expediency;* because, in order to ensure the duration of peace, such an arrangement of boundaries as may prevent disputes, must always be preferable to that which furnishes to one of the parties the means and the advantages of attack. It was on this principle that the proposed evacuation of Dalmatia and Albania by the French troops naturally suggested itself.—If, therefore, the undersigned has received orders to demand his passports, and to depart from France, it is certainly not because his sovereign wishes to renounce peace, but because his maj. finds himself obliged to do so; the French government not having consented to all the conditions which were comprised in the proposals originally made by them to his Britannick majesty, and having moreover rejected as the basis for the treaty with Russia the just and reasonable conditions which the undersigned was authorized to propose.—The undersigned has received with real satisfaction the general assurances of the disposition of the French government to renew the negociation at a future period, as expressed in the official note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. He has seen with no less pleasure, that the tone and the moderation observed in this communication correspond with the sentiments which accompany them. On this subject his excellency may rest assured, that the French government could not in any way express a stronger desire to see an end put to the calamities of war, than that which his Britannick majesty will invariably feel, whenever peace can be concluded on conditions compatible with the honour of his crown and the interests of his subjects.—The undersigned ought here to conclude the official answer which he has thought necessary to make to the note of his excellency the minister for foreign affairs. But he cannot pass over in silence one part of this note, where his excellency wishes to convey the idea, that the British government seems no longer disposed to act on the same principles which directed the conduct of the great man whom England has lately lost. The undersigned, without being authorized to mention this subject, nor even to introduce it in an official paper, trusts in the known goodness and indulgence of his sovereign, when he allows himself to make the following observations on this subject.—During 26 years of intimate and uninterrupted connection with Mr. Fox, the undersigned, as much as any one, has had an opportunity of confidentially learning the sentiments of that celebrated man. From his knowledge of them, he is impressed with the strongest conviction, that no minister could give to the instructions of which he was to be the organ, a more perfect assent, or concur more effectually in their execution, than Mr. Fox would have done, in giving to the undersigned, on the part of his Britannick majesty, such orders as the undersigned has in fact received, under circumstances in which peace (on the just and equitable conditions which had been proposed to that minister) would have appeared to him impracticable.—How much would this opinion have been strengthened in the mind of that minister, on perceiving the French government refuse the just demands of that illustrious ally, who, by his fidelity to his Britannick majesty, has deserved on the part of the king, that his interests should be as dear to him as his own! The undersigned has the honour to acquaint his excellency the minister for foreign affairs, that he this morning applied to his excellency M. de Champagny for his passports. At the same time he requests, &c. LAUDERDALE.

No. 56.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Buyukdéré, Aug. 25. 1806.—Received Sept. 29.

It was yesterday settled at the Porte, that the present Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia should be recalled, and that prince Charles Callimaki, the first dragoman of the Porte, should be named to the government of Moldavia, and prince Alexander Suzzo to that of Wallachia; at the same time Mr. Bano Hanchyry was appointed dragoman in the room of prince Callimaki.—To give you a perfect idea of the disrespect with which Russia has been treated in this instance, it is necessary that I should transmit to you an extract from the regulations respecting Moldavia and Wallachia, which were published in the year 1802. As no accusation whatever has been brought against either of the Hospodars who are now removed, there can be no excuse for breaking the convention; by which it was stipulated with Russia that 7 years should be the period of each prince's government. You will probably expect to hear that this measure has originated with the French ambassador; in effect, there are proofs sufficient that it is his work.

(Inclosure.)—Extract of a regulation respecting the principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia; dated Sept. 24, 1802.

The term of the continuance of the Hospodars in their governments shall from henceforth be fixed at 7 complete and entire years, to date from the day of their nomination, and if they are not guilty of any open offence, they shall not be displaced before that term is expired; if they do commit an offence during that time, the Sublime Porte will inform the minister of Russia of the circumstance; and if, after due examination is made into the affair on both sides, it shall appear that the Hospodar has really committed an offence, in that case only his deposition shall be allowed.

No. 57.—Extract from a dispatch from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Secretary Fox; dated Buyukdéré, Sept. 29, 1806.—Received Nov. 9.

Sir; On the 18th of this month, the dragoman of the Porte communicated to Mr. Pisani [first dragoman or interpreter attached to the British mission] for my information, a note which had been presented by the French ambassador; a copy of which I have herewith the honour to inclose.

(Inclosure.—) Note presented by the French

Ambassador at the Porte, to the Reis Effendi; Pera, Sept. 16, 1806.

The undersigned general of division, ambassador of his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, has the honour to lay before his excellency the Reis Effendi the following considerations. He has been positively informed, although in an indirect manner, that the Russian legation has delivered a note to the Sublime Porte, in which it is said that the emperor of Russia has refused to ratify the treaty of peace signed at Paris by his plenipotentiary. This refusal places Europe in the same situation in which she was 6 weeks ago, but it unmasks the projects of Russia. This treaty of peace stipulated for the independence of the 7 islands; a stipulation which removing the Russians from the Mediterranean, where they had established themselves in order to attack the Ottoman empire at various points, could not be acceptable to them.—Ragusa was restored to its independence under the protection of the Sublime Porte: this arrangement rendering it impossible for the Russians to keep up their intelligence with the Montenegrians and with the revolted Servians, was contrary to their views. Doubtless it is the article which stipulates for the independence of the Ottoman empire and the integrity of its territory which has occasioned the rejection of the peace at Petersburgh; Russia then perceived that she could no longer seize provinces of that empire by force of arms as she seized the Crimea, or extort them from her in time of peace, as she did with regard to Georgia and the passage of the Dardanelles. This treaty of peace, in fine, leaving the French in Albania and Dalmatia, placed upon the frontiers of Turkey her most ancient ally and her most faithful friend, who would have remained and will ever remain ready to defend her. Such are the motives which have led the cabinet of Petersburgh to this refusal. I do not give way to vain declamation; I lay facts before you; I beseech you to weigh them with all the attention to which they are entitled.—If in these difficult circumstances the Porte does not form a true estimate of her dangers and of her force, if she does not form the decision her interests require of her, I shall perhaps ere long have to lament her fate.—The undersigned has received the most positive orders from his majesty the emperor of the French, king of Italy, to declare to the Sublime Porte, that not only the principles of friendship, but those of the strictest neutrality, require that the Bosphorus should be shut against all Russian ships of war, as well as against every other vessel of that nation, bringing troops, ammunition, or provisions; and that the said passage cannot be opened to them without committing an act of hostility against France, and without giving his majesty Napoleon the Great a right of passage over the territories of the Ottoman empire, in order to combat with the Russian army on the banks of the Dniester.—Any renewal or continuation of alliance with the enemies of France, such as England and Russia, would be not only a manifest violation of the neutrality, but an accession, on the part of the Sublime Porte, to the war which those powers wage against France, and his majesty would see himself compelled to take measures conformable to his interests and his dignity.—The Sublime Porte cannot maintain her relations with two missions from Naples, and his majesty the emperor of the French cannot suffer his august brother, Napoleon Joseph, king of Naples and the two Sicilies, to meet with difficulties here which he does not experience from any power in amity with France.—His majesty the emperor has a large army in Dalmatia: this army is collected for the defence of the Ottoman empire, unless an equivocal conduct on the part of the Porte, and a condescension towards Russia and England, which might again throw her into their power, should compel his majesty the emperor of the French, to bring forward his formidable forces for a purpose totally opposite to that which he had in view.—His majesty has ordered the undersigned to state to the Sublime Porte in the most friendly though energetic manner these demands, for the purpose of obtaining an answer in writing, and it is expected that this answer shall be positive and categorical.—No further delay can be allowed; and his majesty has no doubt that the Sublime Porte will give him the assurances he desires, and which are so much in unison with the interests of the Ottoman empire.—The undersigned has no wish to make a vain display of the formidable forces of the great Napoleon; his friends know how to estimate their importance; his enemies have felt their power. The genius of his august master is well known; his determinations are wise and prompt, his personal attachment to his highness is sincere. He only seeks the independence, the integrity, and the glory of Turkey. He desires nothing. He asks nothing. What inducements to an union with him! at the same time what reason to apprehend the loss of his good-will by adopting a timid, uncertain, or inimical line of conduct! Under these circumstances the answer of the Sublime Porte will regulate the conduct of my august master. Let not the threats of the enemies of France impose upon the Sublime Porte; they have been vanquished, and they will ever be so. The great Napoleon will employ all his resources for the glory of his highness Selim III. his friend; and his resources are immense, his genius is still greater.—This note is of sufficient importance to be submitted to the profound wisdom of his majesty the emperor Selim III. and your excellency is requested to take the earliest opportunity of laying it before him.—The undersigned requests, &c. HORACE SEBASTIANI.

DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN; DATED OCTOBER 21, 1806.

The negociations in which his majesty has been engaged with France having terminated unsuccessfully, his majesty thinks proper to make this public declaration to his subjects and to Europe, of the circumstances which have led to an issue which his majesty deeply regrets. He has no object nearer to his heart than the conclusion of a secure and permanent peace. He laments the continuance of a war affecting the happiness of so many nations, and which, even amidst all the successes that attend his arms, is so burthensome to his faithful and affectionate people. But he is confident that there can arise on this occasion no other sentiment, either in his own dominions, or in any part of Europe, than that of an increased conviction, that the restoration of general tranquillity is retarded only by the injustice and ambition of the enemy.—The French government, unsatisfied with its immense acquisitions on the continent, still openly perseveres in a system destructive of the independence of every other power. War is pursued, not for security but for conquest; and negociations for peace appear to be entered into for no other object than that of deluding the neighbouring powers into a state of false security, while France is herself preparing, arranging, and executing her unremitted projects of encroachment and aggression.—Her conduct in the recent discussions has afforded but too many proofs of this disposition.—The negociation originated in an offer made by the French government of treating for peace on the basis of actual possession, which was stated to admit of mutual compensation, and a distinct assurance was added, that his majesty's German dominions, which had been attacked without even the pretence of any cause of hostility, should be restored.—Such a proposal appeared to his majesty to afford a just foundation for negociating: it was therefore accepted with this reserve, that the negociation should be conducted by his majesty in concert with his allies.—No sooner had this basis been mutually admitted, than it was departed from by the enemy, and that too, in points of so great importance, as to call for an immediate declaration on the part of his majesty, that unless the principle proposed by France herself was adhered to, the communications which had been opened between the two governments must at once be closed.—This produced new professions of the dispositions of France to make considerable sacrifices for the attainment of peace, if the discussions were suffered to proceed; at the same time that a difficulty was started on account of the want of full powers in the person intrusted by his majesty with this communication. Steps were thereupon taken by his majesty for opening a regular negociation by ministers duly authorized, in order to ascertain, in a manner the most satisfactory and authentic, whether peace could be obtained on terms honourable to the king and his allies, and consistent with the general security of Europe.—During these proceedings, a minister sent by the emperor of Russia to treat for the same important object, in concert with his majesty's government, was induced by the artifices of the enemy, to sign a separate treaty, on terms equally repugnant to the honour and interests of his imperial majesty.—Unmoved by this unexpected event, the king continued to negociate precisely on the same principles as before. He relied, with a confidence which experience has amply justified, on the good faith and steadiness of an ally, in concert with whom he had begun to treat, and whose interests he had maintained throughout with the same firmness as his own.—The French government, on the contrary, elated by this advantage, of which it boasted as equal in importance to the most decisive victory, departed in every conference more and more widely from its own offers and engagements. Not only did it take upon itself to change at its own will the basis of the negociation with Great Britain, but violated, in points still more important, every principle of good faith with Russia. The chief inducement offered to that power as the price of all the sacrifices extorted from her minister, had been the preservation of Germany. Yet, before the decision of Russia on this treaty could be known, France had already annihilated the whole frame and constitution of the German empire; had reduced under her own yoke a large proportion of the states and provinces of Germany; and, not content with this open contempt of obligations so recently contracted, had, at the same time, instigated the Porte to measures directly subversive of her subsisting enagements with Russia.—While such a conduct was pursued towards his majesty, towards his allies, and towards all independent powers, there appeared so little hope of any favourable issue to the negociation, that his majesty's plenipotentiaries demanded their passports to return to England.—This demand was at first eluded by an unusual and unexplained delay, and the French government afterwards, by some material concessions, accompanied with intimations that others of still greater consequence might be the result of further discussion, procured a renewal of the conferences, which were protracted from day to day, till at length it was announced at Paris that the emperor of Russia had indignantly rejected the unauthorized and separate treaty signed by his minister.—In consequence of this important event, the strongest assurances were given to his majesty's minister that France was now prepared to make sacrifices to a great extent, in order, by securing peace with Great Britain, to re-establish the tranquillity of the world.—The object of these assurances appeared however to be, that of engaging his majesty in a separate negociation, to the exclusion of his allies; a proposal which his majesty had rejected in the outset, and which he could still less admit of at a time when the conduct of Russia had imposed on him an increased obligation not to separate his interests from those of so faithful an ally. To these insidious overtures, his majesty steadily refused to listen; but he took the most effectual method to avoid all appearance of delay, and to accelerate, if possible, the favourable issue of the negociation. The confidential intercourse which he had constantly maintained with Russia, enabled his majesty to specify the terms on which peace with that power might be obtained; and his minister was accordingly instructed to state to France, in addition to the king's demands, those of his ally, to reduce them into distinct articles, and even to conclude on those grounds a provisional treaty, to take effect whenever Russia should signify her accession.—This form of negociating was, after some objection, acceded to by France; terms were now offered to his majesty more nearly approaching than before to the original basis of negociation; but these were still far short of what his majesty had uniformly insisted on, and was now more than ever entitled to expect; and the decisive rejection of the just demands of Russia, as well as of the conditions proposed by his majesty in behalf of his other allies, left to his majesty no other course than that of ordering his minister to terminate the discussion, and return to England.—The foregoing short and simple exposition of facts stands in need of no comment. The first overtures which led to negociation were made by the enemy, and they were accepted by his majesty in the sincerest spirit of peace. Every opening which seemed to afford the most distant prospect of accommodation has been anxiously embraced, nor was the negociation finally broken off, while any hope of a favourable issue could be entertained. His majesty's demands were uniformly just and reasonable; directed to no objects of personal aggrandizement, but to such only as were indispensably required by the honour of his crown, his engagements to his allies, and a due consideration of the general interests of Europe.—It is with heartfelt concern that his majesty contemplates the continuance of those evils always inseparable from a state of war; but it is with his enemies that this awful responsibility rests; and for the issue of the contest his majesty trusts, with confidence, to the justice of his cause; to the resources and bravery of his people; to the fidelity of his allies; and, above all, to the protection and support of the Divine Providence.—In contributing to the great efforts which such a contest must unavoidably require, his faithful and affectionate subjects will not forget that all their dearest interests are at stake; that no sacrifices they can be called on to, make, are to be compared with the certain disgrace and ruin of yielding to the injurious pretensions of the enemy; that with the inviolable maintenance of the good faith and public honour of their country, its prosperity, its strength, and its independence, are essentially connected; and that in asserting the rights, and upholding the dignity of the British empire, they defend the most powerful bulwark of the liberties of mankind.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, December 22.

[MINUTES.] The earl of Aylesford stated, that his majesty had been waited on with the Address of that house, to which his majesty had been pleased to return a most gracious answer, thanking the house for their determination to concur in every measure which the exigency of affairs might require.—Lord Grenville presented, by his majesty's command, the Papers respecting the late Negociation. In moving, his lordship said, to fix a day for the discussion, it was his wish, with every regard for their lordships' convenience, that, on the one hand, sufficient time should be given for the consideration of this very important subject; whilst, on the other, that no longer delay should take place than was absolutely necessary, in the expression of the opinion of that house, with respect to the result of the negociation. His lordship concluded by moving, that the papers be taken into consideration on Friday the 2d of January. —Ordered.

[BATTLE OF MAIDA—VOTE OF THANKS TO SIR J. STUART, &c.] Lord *Grenville* rose for the purpose of moving the Thanks of the House to sir John Stuart, and the officers and soldiers by whose valour the victory of Maida was obtained. His lordship said he had ever been of opinion that the high honour conferred by a vote of thanks of that house, ought to be reserved for great occasions; for deeds of valour of a superior description, for actions which tended to throw a lustre around the British name, or materially to benefit the interests of the country. Of this general description and character he conceived the instance to be on which he should presently move their lordships to come to a vote of thanks; and on that principle he proceeded. —The case before them was most distinguishable for its display of heroic valour, and as tending to illustrate the position, that wherever the British troops had been equal in point of numbers to their adversaries, or even where they were not greatly inferior, that native and characteristic valour for which they were so eminently distinguished, failed not to display itself, and to secure the palm of victory. In this view, he knew not where, in all the military annals of this country, to look for a more signal or brilliant example than that which gave rise to his present observations. In viewing this operation, the first consideration that presented itself was the great disparity in the number of troops on the side of the British: these were considerably less than 5000 men. Of the enemy there were certainly many more. What was the result? that the number of killed, wounded, and taken prisoners, either in the action at Maida itself, or in its approximate consequences, considerably exceeded the number of the victorious army! He knew of no occasion which could more forcibly call upon them for the testimony of their thanks, by affording which the assurance would be held out to them, that while his majesty's troops were risking their lives and combating for their country, no part of that country was insensible to their merits, or would hesitate to express its grateful sense and approbation of them. Upon these grounds it was, that he then moved, 1st, "That the thanks of this house be given to major-general sir John Stuart, K. B. and also to the hon. brigadier-gen. G. Lowry Cole, and brigadier-gen. W. P. Ackland, for their gallant and meritorious conduct in the action with the French troops at Maida on the 4th of July last, and to the officers under their command. Secondly, That the Thanks of this house be given to the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers serving under the same, for their bravery and good conduct, and that this vote be signified to them by the officers of the respective corps."—On the question being put, these motions were voted, *nem. diss.* and the thanks were ordered to be communicated to the general officers in the usual way.—The house then adjourned for the Christmas recess till Wednesday the 31st instant.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, December 22.

[MINUTES.] Lord Ossulston stated, that his majesty had been waited upon with the Address of this house upon his majesty's most gracious speech, as delivered by the lords commissioners, when his majesty was pleased to return for answer, that he thanked his loyal Commons; that their zeal and attachment gave him the greatest satisfaction; and that they might be assured, nothing on his part should be wanting to the maintenance of the honour and prosperity of the country.—Mr. P. Moore presented a Petition from Mr. Bowyer of the Historic Gallery, Pall-mall, for leave to bring in a bill to enable Mr. Bowyer to draw by a separate lottery, in case the next State Lottery should not contain a sufficient number of tickets for his purpose. The hon. gent. observed that Mr. Bowyer had concluded to draw his lottery, and given it out to the public, that it should certainly take place by the state lottery which was drawn in October last; but unfortunately for Mr. Bowyer, that lottery containing only 20,000 tickets, he was of course prevented, and which delay, the hon. gent. observed, had been attended with a considerable loss to Mr. Bowyer.—Mr. Grant presented the Third Report of the commissioners of Military Enquiry.—Lord Howick presented the Papers relative to the late Negociation with France. They would be ready, he said, for circulation this evening. It was desirable that as little time as possible should elapse before they were taken into consideration. But as they were very voluminous, it was necessary the members should have full time to peruse them. He did intend that they should be discussed on Wednesday se'nnight. But he did not think it would be so likely to procure an attendance then as on a subsequent day, and as he wished the attendance might be as full as possible, he would propose that day fortnight, beyond which day the discussion would not be postponed. The papers were then ordered to lie on the table; (see p. 92.)

[BATTLE OF MAIDA—VOTE OF THANKS TO SIR J. STUART, &c.] Mr. Secretary *Windham* rose in pursuance of his notice on Friday, to move that the thanks of the house should be given to general sir John Stuart, and to the officers and men engaged under him, in the glorious battle of Maida. He did not conceive that any thing more would be necessary to be said, on his part, in order to obtain the unanimous concurrence of the house in his motion. There had been so very general, so very lively, and so very proper a feeling manifested throughout the country on the subject, that he was convinced, that as no motion of this description had ever been agreed to with more perfect unanimity than this would, so none had ever more completely carried the feelings and approbation of the country with it. The action to which his motion referred was one of the most distinguished exploits that ever appeared in the annals of this or any other country. Every man must be so thoroughly impressed with its character and importance, that it was altogether unnecessary to dwell upon its value. If he ventured to say any thing upon the subject, it was purely from an impulse to give indulgence to his feelings. The character of the exploit itself, and the advantages that flowed from it, must present themselves to the sober reflection of every man; and, indeed, that house and the country at large had already, by their admiration and gratitude, pronounced upon the value of the glorious achievement. There was not a single one, of the various views in which this exploit could be considered, that did not rank it with the proudest achievements of our ancestors; that did not raise it to a level even with the memorable days of Cressy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. In mentioning these scenes of British fame and valour, he could not omit to state one peculiar character which belonged to this distinguished service, namely, the accession it produced to our stock of national glory, the most valuable possession of a great nation. Other services might cut a greater figure, in relation to their effect in adding to national importance, by acquisitions of strength, resources, or territory, though not of a character to call for the sort of honours and distinctions merited by achievements of this kind. In this respect the value and importance of the exploit was highly augmented, even in the midst of those splendid and brilliant triumphs to which this country had been so much accustomed. The glory acquired in this action had not often been equalled, and never had been surpassed in the records of military renown. Of what value it was to keep up this high character for military spirit; how necessary it was to encourage it with every honourable distinction of public approbation and gratitude; how impossible it was for any great country to preserve its character and independence without the possession of such feelings; these were topics upon which it was unnecessary for him to dwell. But if ever there had been a period of the world, when a strong military feeling was wanted for the preservation of the greatness and glory of a country, it was the present. It was this period, when the whole world had become, as it were, one universal camp; when all nations were occupied with military views, military fame, and military services; when these military pursuits were substituted in place of the civil arts of life; when no country could be safe that did not cultivate them, and when any country, that did not cultivate them, could no longer hope to continue its independence. We were come to that state of society when, as had been well said, the soldier was abroad; when, in the language of the poet, "man and steel, the soldier and the sword," were the only productions of a country that could be looked to with confidence for its protection and security. It was not because we had lost any part of the military spirit or character of the country that he dwelt with such pride upon the value of this exploit; certainly not. This country had never forfeited its just character for military superiority. Yet, from the circumstances under which the war had hitherto been carried on, and the pre-eminence of our great and glorious naval exploits, we had not had the same opportunity of distinguishing our arms by land as by sea. The nations of the continent too, as if they derived consolation in their humiliation from the impression, seemed to have been brought over to the opinion, that our military power, in the largest sense of the word, was wholly confined to naval operations. They seemed to think, that this country, was, he should not say proportionably weak, but that it was not proportionably strong by land as by sea. Now, the immediate tendency and effect of the glorious battle of Maida was, that it would meet these opinions, and correct the error in which they originated. It was impossible to contemplate this glorious exploit in all its circumstances, and not give way to a feeling of triumph at the superiority of national valour displayed in it. Yet, it might be said that it was not by naked valour that the skill, the discipline, and experience of the veteran troops of the enemy were to be overcome. It resulted, however, from the experience of this action, that British disciplined troops possessed a decided superiority over those of the enemy. Many persons in this country appeared to entertain, and in their writings avowed the opinion, that the troops of the enemy were superior to British troops. The opinion was flattering to the enemy, but he trusted it had not gone far in the country, and was convinced, that it had not made any impression upon the people or the army. British soldiers were strangers to any feelings that would prevent them, whenever they came in contact with the enemy upon nearly equal terms, from making British valour as conspicuous by land as by sea. It was a general opinion, that all our naval exploits had been achieved by a superiority of experienced discipline and skill; but he could not subscribe to such a position. Many of those heroic achievements which raised the glory of our navy to the highest pitch, had been effected by the naked valour of Britons, without the aid of skill or discipline. Of this description were the exploits performed in boarding ships, in cutting out vessels from under the protection of batteries, and in various other operations performed by British seamen on shore, in every one of which the native valour of our countrymen was uniformly triumphant. There were no such instances to be found recorded in the military annals of the enemy. The enemy, however, had persuaded other nations, that they were as superior to us by land, as we are to them by sea; and the delusion seemed to have prevailed on the continent. But the battle of Maida had broken the charm. Every circumstance of its progress, the conduct of the officers, and the bravery of the men, had established the ascendancy of British valour, and maintained that superiority, which this country possessed in all ages. In proof of this he could appeal to the determination, as appeared by the gazette, of sir John Stuart, to advance with his inferior force to the attack of the enemy, even in the strong position he occupied, if the enemy had not advanced to meet him. The issue of the action that ensued would prove to the chief of the enemy, and to his troops, who arrogated to themselves a superiority over all other troops, that they are not invincible, as they would represent themselves, that they could not withstand the valour of British troops when fairly committed against them in action. And yet, from whatever causes, certainly not from want of courage in their adversaries, the events of the late wars had contributed to countenance this opinion of their being invincible. They conquered because they thought they could conquer: "*Possunt quia posse videntur.*" This victory, however, had dissolved the spell. It was obtained in the face of Europe, in the view of the nation for whose interest the expedition was undertaken, and had proved to the world, in a manner not to be disguised or concealed, that French troops are inferior to British troops. And here it was necessary for him to take some precaution to guard against any possible misconstruction of his meaning. Nothing could be farther from his intention, than to represent this exploit as exclusively glorious for the reputation of the British arms. The whole of the campaign in Egypt was equally conspicuous for the lustre it cast upon the military character of the British nation. This achievement condensed into a single action, all the same merits, that had been displayed in every operation during that glorious campaign. It was a lesson to this country, to the enemy, and to the world, of the comparative value of British and French troops, and thoroughly confirmed the decisive superiority of British valour. There never had been an action so completely calculated in all its circumstances, so perfectly framed, to establish that truth. He could not more forcibly illustrate this fact than by adopting the eloquent language of sir John Stuart on the subject: "It seems," said the gallant general in his dispatch, "as if the prowess of the two nations was to be brought to trial before the world." Certainly no action, under any circumstances, could be better calculated for such a trial. If two sets of philosophers were to have undertaken to make an experiment, by doing away every thing extraneous to their process, they could not have succeeded more accurately. In the first part of the action the two armies advanced against each other with the bayonet; an operation, though much talked of, that very seldom took place between great bodies of men. Every circumstance, even in the most minute detail that had happened previously to the shock, concurred to bring the courage and intrepidity of the two rival nations to the trial. The contest was decided, not by any superiority of corporal strength, but by the predominance of personal intrepidity. Both armies advanced firmly to the charge, until within half a yard of each other. In this moment of perilous trial, British resolution and valour held out, and the enemy shrunk back with panic from the terrible contest.—It was not improper to state here, that hardly any of our men were wounded by the bayonet.—He had to apologize to the house for having trespassed so long on their attention; but really the theme was so pleasing, that he could not refrain from dwelling upon it with peculiar satisfaction. The detail of the action exhibited merits of all sorts, equally honourable to the skill of the officers, and the firmness and valour of the soldiers. Having been led thus far by the natural pleasure one felt in speaking of so grateful a subject, he should not detain the house longer than whilst he could state some circumstances respecting the action, which were not generally known. By these circumstances it would appear, that the victory had been more decisive, and the defeat of the enemy more complete than was at first supposed. Sir John Stuart had correctly stated the amount of his own force as under 5000 men; but he had not the means of accurately ascertaining the force of the enemy, when he wrote his dispatch. In that it had been stated at nearly 7000, but it should have been stated at nearly 8000 men. This fact had been discovered from returns found upon the persons of some of the officers that had been killed. The next circumstance he had to mention respected the amount of the enemy's loss. Sir J. Stuart stated the numbers of the killed at 700; but it had been afterwards ascertained, by observations made upon the spot, that the number of killed in the action amounted to 1300. Fifteen hundred prisoners had been the immediate fruit of the action, and a considerable number more fell into our hands from the consequences of the action. So that thus a number, nearly equal to the whole of the British force, had been disposed of by this brilliant action. Another consequence of the exploit was, that it had set the Calabrians free from the presence of the enemy, and had totally broken up the force of general Regnier in these provinces, which amounted to 13,000 men.—It was not perhaps necessary to have dwelt so much on the advantages that resulted from this battle; but the glory that had been acquired in it, he considered of infinitely greater importance than any immediate benefits that had been derived from the action. This it was that would carry the effect of the brilliant exploit beyond the single instance, by restoring the military renown of this country, which had been called in question. He who gave glory to his country, gave that which was far more valuable to it than any acquisition whatever. Glory alone was not to be taken away by time or accidents. Ships, territories, or possessions, might be wrested from a country, but the mode of acquiring them could never be forgotten, and the glory of the conquest was independent of all accidents. The acquisitions that were the consequence of the glorious days of Cressy and Poitiers, had long since passed into other hands; but the glory of those illustrious achievements still adhered to the British name, and was immortal. It was that fine extract, that pure essence, that indured to all ages, whilst the grosser parts, the residuum passed away, and were lost in the course of time. On this ground it was, that he thought that the victory of Maida would stand as high as any exploit upon the records of our military achievements, and that the glory of general Stuart and his brave army, would survive to the latest posterity, unless the country should, at any time, sink into such a state of degradation, that the memory of former glory would be a reproach to existing degeneracy. Even in such a state of degradation, he was sure, that such an instance as this, would be calculated to rouse a nation to emulate the exploits of its ancestors. The name of general Stuart would justly be ranked among the foremost in our military annals. The right hon. secretary said, he had felt pleasure in dwelling upon the various merits of this brilliant exploit, because it revived and resuscitated, as it were, that half of our national character which had been called in question, and proved that Britons had the same superiority over the enemy by land as they had by sea. The right hon. gent. concluded by moving: 1st, "That the thanks of this house be given to major-general sir John Stuart, knight of the most honourable order of the bath, for the distinguished ability displayed by him on the 4th of July last, in the brilliant action on the plains of Maida, which terminated in the signal and total defeat of the superior forces of the enemy. 2. That the thanks of this house be given to brigadier-general the hon. George Lowry Cole, brigadier-general William Palmer Ackland, and the several other officers, for their distinguished exertions on the 4th of July last, in the brilliant action on the Plains of Maida, which terminated in the signal and total defeat of the superior forces of the enemy; and that major-general sir John Stuart do signify the same to them. 3. That this house doth highly approve of, and acknowledge, the distinguished valour and discipline displayed by the non-commissioned officers and private soldiers of the forces serving on the 4th of July last, under the command of major-general sir John Stuart, in the brilliant victory obtained on the Plains of Maida, and that the same be signified to them by the commanding officers of the several corps, who are desired to thank them for their gallant and exemplary conduct."

Sir *John Doyle*, in seconding the motion, expressed himself, in a maiden speech, in the following words:—Mr. Speaker; in rising to address you for the first time, I feel, sir, how much I shall stand in need of your countenance, and the kind indulgence of the house; but I trust that the motives which induce me to trouble you, while they plead my excuse, may obtain for me a patient hearing, and I shall endeavour to mark my sense of that indulgence, by trespassing upon it but for a moment. Sir, having witnessed upon many trying occasions the zeal, discipline, skill, and courage, in this instance so brilliantly displayed, by this gallant officer and his brave companions, I cannot reconcile it to my feelings to confine myself to a cold and passive assent. I should not, sir, trust the cause of these valiant men to so feeble an advocate as myself, did I not know that they will find a ready and warm advocate in the breast of every man I have the honour to address. The thanks of parliament were never better deserved, nor would they be any where more highly prized; and I feel that the motion is not more justly applied, than it is happily timed; for as the crisis is fast approaching, when the country will expect that every man shall do his duty, what a noble incitement will it be for men, not barely, but enthusiastically, to do their duty, when so well assured of being rewarded by the gratitude of their country. It is in upholding and encouraging the high sense of honour so conspicuous in the fleets and armies of Great Britain, that the country will find its best security, and it is because the measures of the right hon. mover are built upon this foundation, that they not only meet my approbation, but, as a soldier, demand my grateful acknowledgement. I know, sir, so well the feelings of these gallant men, that whatever privations they may have endured, whatever labours sustained, or whatever dangers encountered, they will find themselves amply repaid by the most glorious of all rewards, the approbation of a beloved sovereign, and the thanks and plaudits of a brave and free people. The exclamation of every man will be, "When I cease to be actuated by such motives, I trust I shall cease to exist." I rely upon the good feeling of the house to pardon this effusion so naturally drawn forth, and which, if I were willing, I am unable to suppress.

Mr. *Johnstone* observed, that it was not his intention to add any thing to the very glowing and eloquent panegyric which the right hon. gentleman had pronounced; but there were one or two observations which so naturally arose out of the speech of the right hon. gent., that he could not refrain from stating them to the house, being deeply convinced that they were of great importance. He had ever regarded the right hon. gent. as one of the persons most sensible to whatever concerned the honour of the army, and the speech he had just then delivered had confirmed him in the opinion. At the same time, he had been led to believe, that the right hon. gent. was convinced, like every other gent. who had reflected much on the subject, that the best means were not found in our present military system, to excite in the army a spirit of enthusiasm, which, whenever it prevailed, was the sure omen of victory. Neither was the military profession followed by public approbation; nor was a soldier honoured and esteemed in this commercial island, in the degree due to him who devoted his life to the protection of his country. This evil was the necessary consequence of the peculiar favour with which we cherished our navy, and of the constitutional jealousy with which our military establishments were regarded. If our armies had still proved superior to those of all other nations with whom they had to contend, it resulted from the natural courage and energy of the British character. Yet every reflecting man must feel, that at the present crisis, it was desirable to practise those means used by all other powers to foster and encourage military virtues and military talents. He had therefore witnessed with much satisfaction the appointment of the right hon. gent. to the head of the war department. And when the splendid victory of Maida had been obtained, it had afforded him no less satisfaction for all the reasons that had been stated, than because it seemed to present a fit occasion for introducing a fundamental amelioration into our army, by granting promotions and distinctions to such officers as had displayed extraordinary merit. But all the hopes and expectations he had cherished had been disappointed. General Stuart had been honoured with the order of the Bath; but neither the four distinguished officers who commanded brigades, nor any one of the field-officers, had been advanced in military rank for their services on so memorable a day. He did not state this by way of charge against his majesty's ministers; because he was very sensible, that the present military system afforded no precedent for what he suggested. But it would scarcely be credited by posterity, or by other nations, that a victory, which exalted in the highest degree the national glory, which in our annals would be recorded with the triumphs of Cressy and Poictiers, had not obtained military rank or military honours for any of those brave men by whom it had been achieved. It was not thus that our Edwards and our Henries rewarded their companions in arms. It was not thus that our enemy had raised a spirit of enthusiasm in his army, which rendered him more formidable than all the conquests he had obtained. It was a fact well known, that throughout every military establishment in Europe, officers who distinguished themselves in the face of the enemy, were immediately promoted and honoured at the same time with various badges of distinction. In our naval service, when a victory had lately been obtained by admiral Duckworth, each of the captains were honoured by medals, and the senior lieutenant in each ship had been promoted. It was now the unvaried practice to promote every officer who distinguished himself, and not a little of the glory which had been obtained by our navy was the result of the emulation thus excited. Even when a frigate had lately been captured, the captain had been introduced to the presence of his sovereign, and received the honour of knighthood. But who could compare the merit of such an event with the glory that belonged to generals Cole and Ackland, and to colonels Oswald and Kempt, who commanded brigades at the battle of Maida? He trusted that his majesty would be advised to confer on them the like distinction; that all the field-officers would be advanced one step in rank by a brevet commission, and be authorized to wear an honorary medal in consideration of their services. To some, these things might appear trifling, as involving no substantial or solid benefit, but he hoped the number was few who would avow such sentiments. Titles and distinctions were indeed of little importance, when they were the reward of parliamentary labours or private attachments; but every distinction, however inconsiderable in itself, was precious, when it served to remind mankind of the courage and capacity by which it had been acquired.

Mr. Secretary *Windham* replied, that something of the nature of that to which the hon. gent. alluded, had been already done. But the circumstances of the army and navy were so essentially different, that the two services could not, in respect of honours, be exactly assimilated.—The motions were then agreed to, *nem. con.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, December 23.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Hobhouse obtained leave to bring in a bill to revise, amend, and render perpetual, the act of the 42d of the king, relative to the trial of Contested Elections; which bill the hon. member stated it to be material to carry through the house with all convenient expedition, in order that the parties concerned in the petitions which were now before the house, and about to be presented, might experience the benefits which it had been found capable of producing. The bill was brought in, read a first and second time, committed, reported, and ordered to be read a third time to-morrow.—The house resolved into a Committee of Supply, lord H. Petty in the chair, and the order, usual at the commencement of a session, that a Supply be granted to his majesty, was moved by Mr. Vansittart, and agreed to.—Mr. C. Wynne gave notice, that he would to-morrow move for leave to bring in a bill to continue and amend the Thames Police act.—The hon. gent. also called the attention of the house to an order made in the year 1805, that a return should be made of the Lunatics and Insane Persons in custody throughout Great Britain, in consequence of which order many returns had been made. But these and other similar returns could not, he understood, be laid before the house, unless the order referred to should be renewed. He therefore moved, that this order should be renewed. Ordered accordingly.—Mr. Biddulph gave notice that as the chairman of the committee of Ways and Means had no functions out of that house, and as the present was a period in which it was necessary to make every possible retrenchment, he should to-morrow move a resolution, that no salary should in future attach to that office.—Petitions were presented, complaining of undue returns for Weymouth and Thetford. The former was ordered to be taken into consideration on the 22d, and the latter on the 27th of January.

[GALWAY ELECTION WRIT.] Lord *Howick* observed, that in consequence of a return for the county of Galway, or rather something described as a return for that county, he felt it his duty to bring the subject before the house. The sheriff of Galway had thought proper to return, in compliance with the exigency of the writ, merely that the election was not concluded, and that he should keep it open until all the electors in the county should be polled. This mode of proceeding, the noble lord conceived the house must feel to be as highly irregular as the return to be unsatisfactory, and of course it required investigation. He therefore moved, that the deputy clerk of the crown should appear at the bar to-morrow, with the last return for the county of Galway, and when this return should be laid on the table, the noble lord stated it to be his intention to move on an early day, that the subject should be taken into farther consideration, and that the sheriff of Galway should be called to the bar.

Mr. *Corry* took occasion to observe, that there was no law in Ireland, as in this country, to limit the continuance of elections in any other respect than that prescribed by the exigency of the writ, and that the case alluded to by the noble lord, was not without precedent in that country. He remembered an instance where a returning officer had made a special return of the same nature; and possibly the sheriff of Galway might have acted upon the same precedent. Upon this point however, he could not venture to speak with precision, as he was wholly unacquainted with the circumstances of the Galway election; but he thought it necessary, for the information of the noble lord and for the animadversion of the house, to state the precedent to which he had alluded.

Lord *Howick* said, he was aware of the fact stated by the right hon. gent., that the law for limiting the duration of Elections in this country did not exist in Ireland, and suggested for the consideration of the house, whether it would not be proper to extend the law upon this subject to that part of the united kingdom. With regard to the precedent alluded to by the right hon. gent., he should be sorry to preclude the sheriff of the county of Galway from pleading the sanction of any precedent or usage that prevailed in Ireland upon this subject. But yet he was rather disinclined to think that any such precedent or usage could vindicate the return complained of, because the difficulties which were stated to have led to the return, could have been easily guarded against by a proper exercise of the discretion vested in the sheriff by law. —The motion was agreed to, and lord Howick stated, that he would fix upon to-morrow fortnight for the farther consideration of this case, as, within that time, all the proceedings would most probably be at an end, and the sheriff of Galway would be conveniently enabled to attend the house.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, December 24.

[MINUTES.] On the motion of lord Howick, it was ordered that the house should, at its rising, adjourn to Monday the 29th instant.—On the motion of Mr. Hobhouse, the Election Trial bill was read a third time, and passed.—On the motion of Mr. Freemantle, the order for the consideration of the Saltash Election petition, was postponed from Tuesday 13th to Tuesday 27th Jan. on the ground that the evidence would not be in readiness till that day.—Admiral Markham moved, that the Navy Estimates for 1807, be laid before the house.—The secretary at war and Mr. Calcraft made similar motions with respect to the Army and Ordnance Estimates; and Mr. Vansittart moved, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, requesting him to direct the said Estimates to be laid before the house. Ordered.

[GALWAY ELECTION WRIT.] On the motion of lord Howick, the order for the attendance of the deputy clerk of the crown, with the return for the county of Galway, was read. The deputy clerk was in attendance, and the return was read. It stated that the sheriff, in obedience to his majesty's writ, had proceeded in due time to the poll, and proceeded with all due diligence, it being kept open seven hours in each day: but that on the 15th of December, the day before which the return should have been made, the suffrages of a great number of freeholders remained still uncollected. The clerk of the crown notified at the same time, that a second return had been received this day, dated 17th of December. The substance of this return was, that, the suffrages of all the freeholders of the county of Galway being collected, Mr. D. B. Daly, and Mr. Martin, were duly elected. It was ordered that these returns should be entered on the books.

Lord *Howick* said, it was his intention to have followed up the substantiation of the default of the sheriff in not having made the return by the day when it was required, with a motion that he should be ordered to attend at the bar to abide the judgement of the house. But in consideration of the precedent stated by a right hon. gent. (Mr. Corry) last night, and from there being no room to suppose that the sheriff had been wilfully negligent of his duty, he should wave that proceeding, and rest satisfied with the real return.

Mr. *Corry* was happy that his recollection had tended to save the house and the sheriff the pain of misplaced severity. But he hoped the Irish gentlemen would, in the course of the present session, consider the propriety of amending the Irish election laws in this and many other particulars.

[SALARY OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE WAYS AND MEANS.] Mr. *Biddulph* rose, pursuant to notice, to make his promised motion, relative to the Salary of the Chairman of the Ways and Means. This salary, in his opinion, might be saved to the public. As he considered it as of extreme moment that the motion which he was now to make in furtherance of that economy which had been so warmly recommended in his majesty's speech, should not suffer from any thing connected with the person by whom it was brought forward, he disclaimed all intention of hostility to his majesty's ministers; he was fully sensible of their great talents, the purity of their motives, and their resolution to redeem the pledges of economy which they had given. If this had not been their intention, he was persuaded that the passage to which he alluded would not have been inserted in his majesty's speech. He admired the ability of ministers, and particularly of the noble lord (Howick) who had lately made a speech so distinguished for its eloquence, and so well calculated to make the deepest impression. The measure which he had to recommend, if carried into execution, would be attended with the happiest effects. As to the individual who was said to be named to the situation of chairman of the committee of Ways and Means, (Mr. Hobhouse) he certainly meant nothing personal against him. He had known him from his earliest years, had the greatest respect for him, and he knew too well the liberality of his mind, to doubt that he would give him credit for having the public good only in view. He would now come more immediately to the subject. He was sensible that this would appear rather too early a period for such a motion, but then it was proper to bring it forward before the chairman had entered on his duties. His attention had been particularly called to the subject by the paternal expressions in his majesty's speech, which had made the deepest impression on every one who heard them, and which, if not acted upon, might subject them to the charge of criminality. He would read the passage to which he alluded. The hon. gent. then read that part of the speech which lamented the necessity of the public burthens, and recommended economy. He thought this was an instance in which the economy recommended in his majesty's speech might be well put in practice. No man should, in his opinion, be paid for his duty in the house of commons, with the exception only of the person who filled the chair, whose salary was meant to support the dignity of the house, as well as to reward his labours. But the situation of chairman of the Ways and Means was one of a different nature. There was no reason, he apprehended, why some of the other officers paid by government should not take the duty on themselves. He asked the candour of the house, whether some of the junior lords of the treasury might not discharge it? It might be said, that their minds would be too much harassed, and their bodies too much fatigued with other duties, to undertake this one. But he understood that this could not be the case, as their duties consisted only in signing a few papers: but at all events, there were some whose duties were not heavy. An objection might be made, that this was an unusual mode of proceeding. His answer was, that these were unusual times; that the necessities of the public were unusual, and that this would justify them in receding from common forms. Another objection might be taken from the trifling saving that would thus be made to the public. His answer was, that the principle was not trifling, as it would convince the country, that the house was seriously resolved to set about plans of economy. It was necessary that there should be public burthens at the present moment, but it was proper that those burthens should be rendered as light as possible. He was convinced from reflection, and the conversation of sensible people, that a radical change of measures was absolutely necessary to the salvation of the country. A rigid economy would be that radical change. It had not yet been tried, and he recommended it as the first and easiest expedient. The hon. gent. concluded by moving this resolution: "That the "assignment of a salary to any member of "the house as chairman of the committee "of Ways and Means, is unnecessary, and, "in the present circumstances of the "country, inexpedient."—It was some time before the motion was seconded. A member having however given it that formal claim to consideration,

Lord *Howick* rose. He thanked his hon. friend for the favourable sentiments he entertained of his majesty's ministers, who, he assured him, were determined to practise the economy recommended in his majesty's speech. He exceedingly regretted, however, that the motion of his hon. friend was of such a sort as placed him under the necessity of appearing to resist that disposition, which had been manifested by his majesty, with regard to public economy. He felt as strongly as his hon. friend, or as any one, the necessity of economy, and of confining within the narrowest possible limits the supplies for those efforts which were now more than ever requisite. But feeling the obligation imposed by the pledges which had been given, he was sure that it was not his majesty's intention to limit an expence which was necessary for the due execution of a laborious and indispensable duty. This was not one of the points to which that economy could be properly applied. His hon. friend had fallen into two mistakes. He had alluded to a person, as appointed to this duty, for which, indeed, none could be better qualified. But the fact was, that no such appointment had been made. It was only when the house was in a particular committee, and when a call was made for such a person, that the appointment of a chairman took place. There had as yet been no such committee, nor had there been any such call. His hon. friend had fallen into another mistake. No salary was at present fixed for the place. Since the revolution, till of late years, there had been a salary attached to it, which had been paid out of the civil list. But the house thinking it inconsistent with their privileges, that the person who discharged a duty in which they were particularly concerned, should be paid in this manner, abolished the practice, and at the end of every session voted such a remuneration as to them seemed proper. If then his hon. friend had any objection to this, it would come better at the end of the session, when the vote of remuneration should be proposed. But what were the duties of this office? It was necessary that the person who held it, should be prepared with a full knowledge of the business of the house, and all its public duties, and that he should be acquainted with, and explain its orders when in a committee. He was bound to attend from the sitting of the house to its rising; all which would require time, attention, ability, and a great deal of personal labour. In every respect his hon. friend (Mr. Hobhouse) was well qualified; and certainly, whoever performed the duty well, was entitled to some remuneration. But his hon. friend supposed that the duty might be performed by other officers of the crown, who had abundance of leisure for it. All he would say to that was, that if there were any offices, the duties of which were so trifling as he supposed, the proper mode would be to move for the abolition of those offices. If his hon. friend's resolution should be agreed to, the result would be, according to the proverb, that, " What was every body's business, would be nobody's business," and consequently, confusion and disorder would take place of that regular and orderly way in which the business of the house had hitherto been carried on. Though desirous of economy where it was practicable, he did not think this one of the cases where it would be well applied. At all events, the resolution ought not to be moved till the end of the session. He really did not see any necessity for saying any thing further on this subject. It was one on which the house might properly judge, without any long and tedious discussion. The noble lord concluded by moving, that the other orders of the day be now read,

Mr. *Biddulph* in reply, said he had not been aware that no salary was attached to this office. But even upon the ground that the remuneration was not voted till the end of the session, he did not think his resolution so ill-timed. If agreed to at the present moment, it would at least have the effect of removing every expectation of salary or remuneration. The noble lord said, that if there were any unnecessary offices, a motion might be made for abolishing them. But in that case, he should be told that duties were attached to those offices which must be performed. He considered this country as in the situation of a private person, whose circumstances rendered it necessary for him to reduce his establishment. This was a case that might happen to the public as well as to a private person. It was sufficient for him that he had called the attention of the house to this business. He had no hostility to ministers. He had been too much accustomed to see in them proofs of the most noble disinterestedness to conceive it possible that they could be changed. If honours and offices alone had been their ambition, many of them might have had them fifteen years ago. But as he had been returned by a set of enlightened constituents, who had public economy much at heart, he felt it his duty to submit this resolution to the house.—The motion was then put, and negatived without a division.

[Westminster Election Petition.] Lord *Folkestone*, pursuant to notice, rose to move that the order for taking the Westminster Election petition into consideration on the 13th of January, should be discharged, for the purpose of postponing it to a future day. The circumstances on which this motion was grounded were these: he had presented the petition on the earliest possible day. In balloting for the petitions, the Westminster had come out of the glass the fourth, and consequently was appointed for the second day for considering Election petitions. Since that time, he understood that it was not supposed he would have presented it so soon, and the agents informed him that there was such a mass of evidence to be collected, as might naturally be supposed in such a city as Westminster, that they could not be ready by the time appointed. The noble lord hoped that the house would not be disposed to make the petitioner suffer from any mistake of his in presenting the petition, and concluded by moving, " That the order for considering the Westminster Election petition on the 13th of January, be discharged, and that it be fixed for the 24th of February."

Mr. *Sheridan* said, that after the communication which he had had with the noble lord, he would not oppose his motion; but he did not yield from any weight in his lordship's arguments, for these made against his own proposition. He said, that a great mass of evidence was to be produced, and the inference was, that it ought to be produced early, on account of the length of time which the business would occupy. All the witnesses were here; it was not necessary to send for them to a distance, as in country cases. The parties ought to have considered before, what evidence they had to produce, and not now be coming to the house to gain time to hunt out more. But when his lordship placed the matter on the footing of a mistake of his own, he would not, out of compliment to him, or any other gentleman, move any opposition. He understood from him, that he had presented the petition earlier than the petitioners wished; but as to the observation about the balloting, if it had come out of the glass the fifth instead of the fourth, it would only have made a difference of three or four days; so that there was nothing in that argument. But though the question was now respecting delay, he believed that the next notice of the noble lord would be, that we were to hear no more of this petition. They seemed to have employed very judicious counsel, who had, in considering the circumstances, advised them to delay it, and fix it for the very time when these counsel would be on the circuit. This would afford an excuse for further delay, which, out of compliment to these judicious gentlemen, he could not of course oppose. He would take this occasion to advert to something that had fallen from a learned gentleman opposite (Mr. Perceval) on a former day, in his absence.—[Hear! hear! from Mr. Perceval.] He was happy to hear this challenge from the learned gentleman, particularly as it was a proof that he continued in the same mind on this subject, which was not his general practice. The learned gentleman had talked a great deal of his want of popularity, and had observed, with a degree of wit correspondent with its candour, that it was not till the government horses had been yoked to his car that he had been brought in. Now, though his majesty had thought him worthy to hold an office of trust and emolument, he was bold to think, whatever the learned gentleman and some few other clamorous persons might pretend to the contrary, that his claim to public support was not thereby lessened. There was a sort of report that he was about to take another office, namely, the Chiltern hundreds, for the purpose of vacating his seat [A laugh]. He had no objection to take that office, if the learned gent. also would take it, and bring his popularity to the test by facing him on the hustings in Covent-garden [A laugh].

Mr. *Perceval* said, that instead of forcing this matter forward on a former night, he had expressly abstained from agitating it, on the ground of the absence of the right hon. gent. The noble lord (H. Petty) had, however, ingeniously put into his mouth the expressions now brought forward by the right hon. gent., but he had disclaimed them. He had, however, no hesitation now, nor at any time, to answer for what he did say. The expression, the wit of which the right hon. gent. described as equal to its candour, arose from the accident of his having seen the right hon. gent. parading the streets in a sort of triumphal car, decorated with laurels—[a loud laugh]. The hon. gent. had said, that it was contrary to his practice to adhere to his opinions. That was an accusation that came rather oddly from the right hon. gent., and those who sat with him on the other side of the house. With respect to himself, he was not aware of any such deficiency in adhering to his opinions as the right hon. gent. imputed to him. Certainly his opinions on the subject now before the house had undergone no change, and he saw no reason to change them. With respect to the right hon. gent.'s challenge to meet him on the hustings in Covent Garden, he had to excuse himself, on the ground that he had constituents who had shewn him uniform favour since they had returned him to the first parliament he had sat in. These constituents he was attached to, and was unwilling to desert them for the ambition of representing any greater place. The right hon. gent. had at times spoken of a similar attachment, though he had afterwards found it so easy to get rid of it. At least, such was the amount of what was represented in the news-papers, in the right hon. gent.'s name. But, perhaps, what was thus stated on the subject, was not authentic. It was easy to credit an excuse of that kind from the extravagancies contained in the speeches imputed to the right hon. gentleman.

Mr. *Sheridan* said, that when he stood for Westminster, it was with the full permission of the electors of Stafford [a laugh]. It was not, however, the severity of the learned gent.'s remarks that he complained of, but the prejudice they were calculated to cast on a contested election, on which the learned gent. himself might be called to sit as a judge. The triumphal car and the procession which had excited the spleen of the learned gent., was, he would venture to say, one of the most popular triumphs that had ever been witnessed in this or in any other city. [A laugh.]

Lord *Folkestone* said, that he had not been aware of the circumstance with respect to the circuit, and that it certainly would be necessary to accommodate the counsel.—The motion was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, December 29.

[MINUTES.] Upon the motion of Mr. Swan, the consideration of the petition relative to the Penrhyn Election was discharged, and fixed for the 29th of January. The consideration of a petition from the hon. Wm. Ponsonby, relative to the county of Londonderry Election, was fixed for the same day.—Two petitions were presented complaining of the return for Horsham, and they were appointed for consideration upon the same day as that fixed for the petition already before the house respecting the said election.—A petition from Mr. T. Jones against the Return for Shrewsbury was laid upon the table; and upon the speaker's moving, that it should be considered on the first vacant day, namely, the 3d of February, Mr. Johnstone, understanding that further time was required for the accommodation of the parties to this petition, proposed the 14th of February. The speaker felt it his duty to observe, that the proposed postponement would be a departure from the general practice of the house in such cases; the earliest vacant day being uniformly fixed upon in the first instance: and if any farther postponement were afterwards required, it was generally the practice of the house to accede to it, upon special cause being assigned. Having stated the practice on such occasions, it was of course for the discretion of the house to determine upon the course to be pursued in this instance. Some conversation arose upon this point, in which lord Howick, lord H. Petty, and Mr. Bennet, one of the parties interested in the petition, took a part, and concurred in the propriety of the speaker's objections; Mr. Bennet observing, that the proposed delay would interfere with the assizes. Mr. Johnstone then proposed the 5th of February; but, after a few remarks from the speaker and lord H. Petty, the hon. gent. withdrew his motion, and the 3d of February was fixed for the consideration of this petition.—A petition from certain electors of Norfolk, in the interest of Mr. Wodehouse, was laid on the table. This petition was read. It charged the candidates who were returned, Messrs. Coke and Windham, with having been guilty of treating, &c. Ordered to be taken into consideration on the 5th of February.—Lord Howick, adverting to what he had stated on a former day relative to the means of facilitating the progress of private bills, observed, that he had since consulted with those who were competent to form a correct opinion upon that subject, and that he should the next day move, that the house do make an order that, after fixing the time within which private petitions should be presented, the house should occupy itself until half after four o'clock each day in receiving the reports of private committees, and in forwarding private business.

[NAVY ESTIMATES.] Mr. T. Grenville moved, that the house should resolve itself into a committee of supply. Upon the speaker's leaving the chair, there was a general cry of "Mr. Hobhouse to the chair!" That hon. gent. accordingly took his seat at the table, and is therefore considered as chairman of the committees of supply and ways and means.

Mr. *T. Grenville* (first lord of the admiralty) then rose. He said, that from the situation which he now held, it became his duty to submit to the consideration of the committee the necessary Naval Supplies proposed to be granted to his majesty. There being no particular circumstances in the Estimates which he deemed necessary to lay before the committee, that differed from those of the preceding year, he did not deem it necessary to detain the committee with any preliminary observations. He should confine himself entirely to stating, that what he had to propose to the house, as to the number of men to serve in his majesty's navy, and the expence attending them, was precisely the same as had been voted last year. But although he declined making any observations at present, he should of course avail himself of his right to reply to any remarks that might be offered upon this subject. The right hon. gent. concluded with moving the following resolutions, which were agreed to; viz. 1. "That it is the opinion of this committee, that 120,000 men be employed for the sea service for the year 1807, including 29,000 royal marines. 2. That a sum, not exceeding 2,886,000*l.*, be granted to his majesty, for wages of the said 120,000 men for 13 months, at the rate of 1*l.* 17*s.* per man per month. 3. That a sum, not exceeding 2,964,000*l.*, be granted to his majesty, for victuals for the said 120,000 men for 13 months, at the rate of 1*l.* 18*s.* per man per month. 4. That a sum, not exceeding 4,680,000*l.*, be granted to his majesty, for the wear and tear of the ships in which the said 120,000 men are to serve, for 13 months, at the rate of 3*l.* per man per month. 5. That a sum, not exceeding 390,000*l.*, be granted to his majesty, for ordnance for sea service on board the ships in which the said 120,000 men are to serve, for 13 months, at the rate of 5*s.* per man per month."—The house then resumed, and the report was ordered to be brought up the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, December 30.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Raine gave notice that he should, on Friday next, move for leave to bring in a bill to explain and amend two acts, the 2d of Richard II. and the 32d of Henry VIII. for the preventing of any man of law from acting as a justice of assize in his own county. These acts imposed a penalty of 100*l.* for every instance in which their provisions were departed from, and the object of the measure he meant to propose, would be to render their operation more effectual. Mr. Corry trusted that due care would be taken to prevent the measure from operating any change in the law as it at present stands in that part of the united kingdom called Ireland, until it should be ascertained that such change was desirable. There existed several acts of the Irish parliament upon this subject, to which he begged leave to direct the attention of the learned gent. before he brought forward his measure. At any rate, he thought it would be desirable for the learned gent. to defer his motion, until there should be an opportunity of consulting the Irish government and law officers, how far the measure could be applied to Ireland. — After a short conversation between Mr. Raine and Mr. Corry, the former withdrew his notice for the present, in order to allow time for obtaining every information on the subject.—Petitions were presented, complaining of the late elections for Plymouth, Maidstone, Dublin, and Chippenham, which were severally ordered to be taken into consideration on the following days: the Plymouth petition on the 5th of February; Maidstone and Dublin petitions on the 10th of February; and the Chippenham petition on the 12th of February, on which day a petition from several burgesses of Chippenham, was also ordered to be taken into consideration. —The house went into a committee on the act for regulating the Leather trade, and, on the motion of lord Temple, agreed to a resolution, that the chairman do ask leave to bring in a bill to repeal so much of the said act as prohibits the regrating of Oak Bark, and to indemnify certain persons who had incurred penalties for regrating oaken bark. Lord Temple stated, that the whole of the Tanning trade was carried on with bark purchased of persons who bought to sell again. This had been prohibited under a penalty by the act referred to the committee; but the act was never put in force; and it was not until last year that some informers had brought *qui tam* actions to recover the penalties incurred under the act, that it had been found necessary to repeal it. Last session, he had brought in an act to suspend the prosecutions, and as the business of the trade could not be carried on, without permitting the regrating of Oak Bark, he then proposed, that that part of the bill which prohibited this practice, should be repealed. The house then resumed, and Mr. Hobhouse, the chairman, obtained leave to bring in the bill.

[DISTILLATION OF SUGAR.] Lord *Temple* rose pursuant to notice, to move that a committee be appointed to consider of the possibility, and, if possible, of the propriety of permitting Sugar and Molasses to be used in Distilleries and Breweries. In making this motion, it was not his intention to pledge either himself or the house to the measure. He wished at present only that a committee should be appointed to enquire into the subject, leaving it open to the house to take such proceeding hereafter as the circumstances of the case should be found to require. In the present situation of affairs, the circumstances of the continental nations must necessarily bear hard on many branches of commerce, but on none more heavily than upon our West-India trade. It was ascertained that there were at present in the port of London alone, between 80 and

90,000 hogsheads of Sugar upon hand. The quantity in the same situation in the out-ports was proportionably great: so that the Sugars on hand in the whole of England amounted to 150 or 160,000 hogsheads. This statement alone would be sufficient to convince the house of the propriety of taking some measures for the relief of so important a branch of the national commerce. It might not be amiss here to state, that it was not in contemplation to submit any proposition for the introduction of sugar and molasses into breweries and distilleries, to the exclusion of grain. The object was to allow the use of them upon principles of fair competition, not of exclusion. All the parties too, whose interests might be concerned, whether brewers, distillers, or others, would have an opportunity of making out their cases before the committee. Having premised thus much, the noble lord concluded by moving, "That a committee be appointed to consider of the expediency of permitting the use of Sugar and Molasses in the Distillery and Brewery, for a time to be limited, under the circumstances now affecting the trade of the British colonies in the West Indies; and to report the same, with their observations and opinions thereon, to the house."

Mr. *Dent* expressed an earnest wish, that this important subject should not be hastily decided upon, but that sufficient time should be afforded for a mature consideration of all the great interests connected with it.

Lord *Temple* was disposed to afford all the parties whose interests might be concerned, a full opportunity of being heard, and it was with that view that he had adopted the mode he had just proposed, of appointing a committee before which all such parties might be heard. But from the circumstances he had stated, it would be obvious that some immediate relief was necessary, and that his object would be defeated by any considerable delay.

Mr. *Baker* hoped that those gentlemen who proposed to bring forward this measure, would consider well what effect it might have on the value of lands and the interests of agriculture in this country. He was aware that there might be many circumstances which would require of the legislature to attend particularly to particular branches of the property and trade of the country; but he did hope that, in the measure to be brought forward, no predilection would be shewn for any one class of landed proprietors. The committee which had sat last session, had thrown much light upon the subject, and he trusted, therefore, that the whole of the case would be attended to in the present instance. He had thought it necessary to say thus much, in order that the house should not be considered as pledged to the measure, from the circumstance of this early stage of the business passing without any observation upon it.—The committee was appointed accordingly.

[WOOLLEN TRADE.] Lord *Temple*, pursuant to notice, begged leave to call the attention of the house to the state of the Woollen Manufacture of the country, and of the laws relating to that important subject. A committee had been appointed last session to consider of the matter, and had taken a large mass of evidence upon every part of the case. It had been the intention of the gentlemen who promoted that enquiry, to follow up the investigation by some legislative measure, which might provide some remedy for all the inconveniences resulting from the operation of the statutes then in existence. The dissolution of parliament, however, by precluding the house from instituting any proceeding upon a report of the committee of another parliament, had made it necessary to take up the business anew. The course he proposed to follow, therefore, was to move that the laws relating to the Woollen Manufactures be referred to a committee, and also the report of the committee of last session. Upon the report of this committee, the house would found the ulterior measure that was necessary for the interest of this important branch of our manufactures. From communications which he had had with the parties most interested, he had the satisfaction to state that they did not propose to bring forward any fresh evidence, but were prepared to rest upon the case they had made out last session. He expected, therefore, that the question would be brought to issue in the present session. But whatever pleasure he should feel in bringing it to a satisfactory termination, he was not disposed to object to hearing any further evidence, which might be thought essential. It was his wish that all the parties interested should be fully heard, if they had not felt that the case as made out before the former committee was fully sufficient.—The several laws relating to the Woollen Manufactures, and the report of the committee of last session thereon, were then, on the motion of lord Temple, referred to a committee.

[NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE.] Mr. *Perceval* rose for the purpose of putting one or two questions to the noble lord opposite (lord Howick), on the subject of the papers then in the hands of the members of the house, with a view to obtain information upon certain points, which appeared to him to require to be further elucidated. He wished to put the questions to the noble lord, because the answers he might receive, might perhaps render it unnecessary for him to give any notice of a motion on the subject, and it might also happen, that the noble lord, when informed of the points to which his enquiries were directed, might not have any objection to accede to such motion as should be necessary, in order to come at the information he required, in the most satisfactory manner. He should, therefore, state the points on which he thought information necessary, and be guided by the answers he should receive, as to the course he should ultimately adopt. The first point upon which he wished to be informed, related to an extraordinary interpolation, which appeared in the letter from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Secretary Fox, dated April 1, as published by the French government, when compared with the letter of the same date in the official papers on the table (p. 95.) He wished to know whether there had been a passage similar to that extraordinary interpolation in any letter received by Mr. Fox from M. Talleyrand, and also whether any answer had been returned by Mr. Fox to that letter. The next object of the information he desired was the letter No. 3, from M. Talleyrand, dated March 5, as it appeared in the papers before the house. This was evidently an extract from the letter received by Mr. Fox, and it struck him that it would be extremely desirable, previous to the discussion of the papers, that the house should be in possession of the whole of this document. Of this he was so convinced, that if the noble lord should not be prepared to produce the document to the house, he should feel it his duty to make a specific motion upon the subject, reserving his reasons until he should come to make the motion. This letter, he was aware, was a private one; but as it had been made the channel of communication upon the relations of the two countries, it was very material that the whole of it should be produced. Another point on which he desired to be informed, was whether lord Yarmouth had received any communication from Mr. Fox, or from any of his majesty's ministers, previous to his first leaving France; also the date of that noble lord's communication with M. Talleyrand; together with the date of his leaving Paris, and of his arrival in London. The first communication from lord Yarmouth to Mr. Secretary Fox certainly appeared dated the 13th of July, but he wished to know whether that was the date when the dispatch was addressed to Mr. Fox, or when it was drawn up. The next point related to a statement in an official note presented by lord Lauderdale to gen. Clarke, dated Aug. 6, "that intervening circumstances, which it was unnecessary to detail, had enabled his majesty to enter into a separate treaty." Now, it did not appear upon the face of the Papers what these circumstances were, and he wished to be informed respecting them. Another question he wished to ask, grew out of a passage in the dispatch of the 10th of September, from the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Windham) to lord Lauderdale. The passage was, "every effort was made at the outset of the negociation to obtain the restitution of Naples to his Sicilian majesty." He wished to know what those efforts had been, and whether there were any documents to shew that they had been made, and whether there would be any objection to lay before the house the details of the reasons for departing from that claim, as said in that dispatch to be detailed in the correspondence of the foreign office, with lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale. The last question he had to put, related to the communication made by lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, stating that he was authorized to negociate also for Russia on the same terms as had been communicated to M. Talleyrand by his excellency count Budberg. It did not appear on the face of the papers what these terms were; and on an occasion in which the house was to be called on to decide upon the merits of the negociation and the rupture of it, he felt that it was absolutely necessary that they should be put in possession of the terms upon which it was proposed to treat.

Lord *Howick* said, he was most willing to give every explanation on the subject of any part of the papers that were to be discussed on Monday, which might be thought necessary for the perfect elucidation of that important subject. He rose therefore to answer the various topics of enquiry that had been touched upon by the hon. and learned gent. If he should not be able to answer them in the order in which they had occurred, or should omit to notice any particular question, he had only to beg of the learned gent. to remind him of the omission, and he should endeavour to satisfy the enquiry. The first question of the hon. and learned gent. was, whether there was any passage in any other letter from M. Talleyrand, similar to the very extraordinary interpolation, which appeared in the publication by the French government. His answer to this was, that there was not, in any letter received from M. Talleyrand, any passage bearing the most distant reference to the interpolation alluded to. To the next question, which related to the extract, No. 3, he had only to answer, that the whole of the contents of that letter, which could throw any light upon the negociation, had been published; and here he could not but observe, that the publication of the French government had rendered it unavoidable to publish several documents, that it would not otherwise be regular to insert in such a collection. As to the enquiry, whether there had been any private letter from Mr. Fox in answer to the letter of the 5th of March, he could not answer, he did not know, and should make enquiry; but he rather thought that some such answer might have been sent. The next question of the learned gent. was, whether any communication had been made by this government to lord Yarmouth, previous to his leaving France. To this he should answer, none, most certainly not, consistently with his knowledge. As to the date of lord Yarmouth's communication with M. Talleyrand, he could not precisely answer; but as that noble lord left Paris on the 23d of May, it must have been previous to that day. The noble lord, in consequence of having been obliged to come round by Morlaix, did not arrive till the 4th of June, and his communication must have been made to Mr. Fox in a very few days after his arrival. It had been made on the 7th or 8th, verbally, and it had afterwards been deemed necessary to have it reduced to writing, when it was thought advisable to send back lord Yarmouth to Paris, upon receiving an account of the intention of the Russian cabinet to send a minister to that city, in order to have an opportunity of communicating with M. d'Oubril. As to the intervening circumstances, stated by lord Lauderdale, that enabled his majesty to enter into a separate negociation, the learned gent. must be aware, that M. d'Oubril had concluded a separate treaty on the 20th of July, and that such a circumstance released us from the obligation of not treating separately. Until it could be known whether it would or would not be ratified, it was to be considered the act of the Russian government, and we could not have had any moral certainty that the cabinet of St. Petersburg would refuse to ratify that treaty. As he had not been prepared for this question, this was all that he could at present answer; he did not mean, however, to say, that there might not have been other sufficient reasons. The next question of the learned gent. respecting the detailed communications in the correspondence between the secretary of state's office and lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale, with regard to the efforts for the restitution of Naples to his Sicilian majesty, he should answer by saying, that they had laid all the documents before the house, which they looked upon as necessary, to enable them to form a complete judgment upon the case. There were not many more documents, but those that had not been produced were of such a confidential nature, and upon the subject of the views of his majesty's government, that it was not thought discreet or wise to publish them, especially as such publication might affect a future negociation. The last point upon which the learned gent. had desired information was with respect to the terms on which lord Lauderdale was authorized to treat for Russia. The terms had been confidentially communicated to his majesty's government, and consequently they had not considered themselves at liberty to publish them. But he could have no difficulty in stating, what must appear on the face of the papers, that the terms on which Russia proposed to treat, as stated in the projét of count Budberg, were that Sicily should be confirmed to his Sicilian majesty, and that Dalmatia should be evacuated by the French. These were all the points to which the learned gent. had adverted, and on these points he had endeavoured to satisfy his enquiries. The learned gent. had undoubtedly a right to call for explanation on any point that might seem to him to want illustration, relative to the rupture of the negociation; but the could assure the house, on his part, that it was his most anxious desire to put the house in possession of every document that could, consistently with a sense of public duty, be produced in order to enable them to form a correct judgment on this important case.

Mr. *Perceval* admitted the statement of the noble lord to be satisfactory upon this point, as well as upon most of the other points upon which he had called for information. But until this statement had been made, they had no means of knowing what were the terms upon which Russia proposed to treat. However, as the communication had been made to the French government, he did not think there could be much impropriety in producing it to the house. But he would not press this farther. The statement in lord Lauderdale's note, appeared to him to refer to something that had occurred previous to the signature of the separate treaty; it might be an allusion to something that had been previously communicated by the court of Russia. There was one point upon which the noble lord's statement was not satisfactory to his mind, and therefore he should feel himself bound to submit a motion to the house upon the subject. If the house would permit him, he would then state the grounds upon which he meant to bring the motion forward. This course would save the time of the house, and prevent the necessity of his returning again to the subject. The two governments appeared to him to be at present at issue upon a fact. If there was any assertion in his majesty's declaration that was not true, the ministers who had advised the insertion of it, were guilty of a heinous offence by such conduct. It was necessary for the house to have every document that could throw any light upon this point. In the extract from M. Talleyrand's letter to Mr. Fox, it is stated, "if you are pacifically disposed, you know where to find the basis upon which to negociate." If this expression referred to the extract from Buonaparte's speech, it could not mean the *uti possidetis*, but the peace of Amiens. He wished therefore to know whether there was any passage in the remainder of the letter which referred to the basis *uti possidetis*. There was another reason why he wished for the production of that letter, arising out of the nature of the transaction. It was with peculiar jealousy that house ought to view a correspondence carried on during a war between the minister of the enemy, and a secretary of state. Besides, in the answer to the letter from which the extract is taken, it appears that an apology is made for having submitted any part of it to his majesty. If any part of it ought to have been so submitted, the whole ought. And what opinion should the house entertain of a private communication, where such an apology was necessary for laying any part of it before his majesty? They were told, the letter was private; but he insisted, the house ought to be jealous of such communications, and contended, that the whole of the letter ought to be called for. On these grounds he moved, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he would be graciously pleased to give directions, that the whole of the said letter should be laid before the house.

Lord *Howick* observed, that if, after the manner in which he had assured the learned gent., that the whole of the letter that had any reference to the negociation had been produced, he should still persist in his motion, he should not object to it. He doubted, however, whether the mode adopted by the learned gent. was the proper one to attain his object. This letter was not preserved in any of the public offices. However, there could be no doubt that a document in the possession of his majesty's servants would be produced, if his majesty should lay his commands upon him for that purpose. To the whole of the doctrine laid down by the learned gent. as to the heinous nature of the offence, if his majesty's ministers were to introduce any false assertion into a declaration bearing his majesty's signature, he fully subscribed. But when his majesty's ministers laid papers before the house, they were bound upon their responsibility to lay the whole that bore any reference to the case. He took that occasion to repeat, what he as expressly declared before, that the whole of the remainder of that letter had no reference whatever to the overture for negociation. When he said this, he meant none that he knew of. He could not tell what reference to that overture might be discovered by the ingenuity of the gentlemen opposite in the expressions of civility, which it might be found to contain, but he could positively assert, that it contained no direct reference whatever to that subject. As to the other ground upon which the learned gent. had thought proper to rest his motion, he could not discover any weight in it. When the learned gent. had argued, that that house should regard with jealousy a correspondence conducted under such circumstances, did the learned gent. mean to say, that there was any thing criminal in the expressions of reciprocal civility that appeared in these communications? Did he mean to say, that, when such a correspondence had taken place, it was reprehensible in persons who had formerly been acquainted, to recall some of the feelings of past intimacy, and give way to friendly enquiries respecting mutual connections and acquaintances? Did he mean to assert, that it was criminal in persons under such circumstances, to cultivate a disposition of mutual conciliation, with the desirable view of finally accommodating the differences between the two nations? He had stated before, that this letter contained nothing relative to the case before the house, and it would be for the house to decide, whether it should be produced. Of one thing he was clearly satisfied, that there was not, in any letter or document written by the illustrious person now no more, (Mr. Fox) a single expression that in the slightest degree committed the honour or dignity of his sovereign. He had but one word more to add by way of explanation. He admitted that the passage, quoted by the learned gent. from the note of lord Lauderdale, would seem to refer to something antecedent to the signature of the treaty of M. d'Oubril. It might have arisen from some inaccuracy in the language of the note, but certainly no communication relative to a separate negociation had been sent by his majesty's ministers until after the signature of the treaty of July 20. It was, previously to that event, proposed that Russia and Great Britain should treat provisionally with France, that the two treaties should go on together, and that neither should be signed until both were brought to a conclusion. The circumstance might possibly have arisen from the communication from the court of Russia, that M. d'Oubril was to be sent to Paris.

Mr. *Canning* observed, that the fact at issue between the two governments was not with respect to the first overture, but to the basis of negociation. His majesty's declaration stated, that the overture on the basis of the *uti possidetis* came from France. The overture contained in the letter which his learned friend moved for, referred to the basis of the treaty of Amiens. It was also to be observed that the French government had uniformly throughout denied having acceded to the basis of the *uti possidetis*. The question, therefore, to be ascertained was, whether France had at any time, and if she had, when, consented to that basis. On the face of the papers there did not appear any basis but the treaty of Amiens, to have been proposed by the French government; whereas his majesty's declaration positively asserted, that the first overture had come from France to negociate on the basis of actual possession. The noble lord, therefore, could not but be sensible of the necessity of setting this variance right, because, though the French government had shuffled on almost every other subject, they had uniformly held out on this. Upon this fact, therefore, the two governments were committed, and he must say, that the declaration was not borne out by the papers. He could not conceive how this could be got over, if no other documents could be produced, unless perhaps it should be said that there was no negociation, till that second negociation commenced when lord Yarmouth was sent over. He thought it essential that every document should be produced, that could throw any light upon this subject, because he thought every other part of the negociation comparatively unimportant. Upon the decision of this fact, as to the basis of the negociation, it appeared to him that the faith of the two governments would stand or fall; and therefore he was of opinion, that every light should be afforded to the house upon the subject.

Lord *Howick* stated that there were certainly no papers that could be produced in which the *uti possidetis* was recognized formally by the French government. That fact however was established in the communications with the French government, and clearly supported by the authority of lord Yarmouth's word. He had no objection to rest the whole of the case on the papers then on the table, and he felt no apprehension, that when the subject should come to be discussed on Monday, he should prove by arguments founded on these papers, that every statement in his majesty's declaration was fully borne out by the documents on the table.

Mr. *Canning* did not mean to insinuate that lord Yarmouth's word was not a sufficient authority, but he would not admit that he had not a right to question whether the interpretation of the words in which the basis was supposed to be contained, was correct or not.

Mr. *Sheridan* rose just to make a single observation. When his noble friend had assured the learned gentleman that no part of the remainder of the letter for which he had moved had any reference to the case, it appeared to him that his word might have been taken. As to the point upon which the learned gent. seemed to be so anxious for information, that was precisely the case that was to be discussed on Monday next. He was only surprized that the learned gent. should have expected to discover in some other part of the letter a basis different from that contained in the part that has been extracted. If the learned gent. had looked a little farther into it, he might, perhaps, have found wherewith to satisfy his curiosity. All that part of the letter that related to the case, had been submitted to his majesty, and certainly there was no necessity for laying any more of it before parliament.

Mr. *Perceval* pleaded guilty to the absurdity charged upon him by the right hon. gent., if it was an absurdity to think to find out that his majesty's present ministers had done something wrong, for to that, and that only, the right hon. gentleman's argument would come. All he wanted to know was, whether there was any passage in the letter which referred to any other basis than the treaty of Amiens. As the noble lord had stated that there was no reference to any such basis contained in it, and the noble lord had also declared, that he was satisfied to take the argument upon the papers, as at present before the house, he had no objection, with the permission of the house, to withdraw his motion.

Lord *Yarmouth* begged leave to say a few words on something that had fallen from the learned gent. in a former part of the debate, before the motion should be disposed of. That learned gent. had desired to be informed whether he had received any communication from his majesty's government before he left France. To this he had to answer that he had not received any communication whatever. Here he begged to state to the house the reason why he had been selected to be the bearer of the communication to Mr. Fox. The letters that had passed between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand, had usually been accompanied with private letters. In some of these, Mr. Fox had strongly solicited his (lord Yarmouth's) release from France, where he had been detained as a prisoner of war three years. He had not himself had the honour of being intimately acquainted with Mr. Fox, and for his kind exertions to obtain his enlargement, he was indebted to good offices with that minister, from a quarter to which he must ever look with gratitude and respect. M. Talleyrand imagined, from the interest Mr. Fox had taken in this application, that the person for whom it was exerted would be most likely to possess his confidence, and therefore it had been that he was very properly selected from the other gentlemen, who were coming over at the same time, to be the bearer of the communication to Mr. Fox. M. Talleyrand always gave him to understand, that the actual state of possession, subject to subsequent exchanges upon equivalents, was the basis of the negociation. M. Talleyrand had also often stated to him, that the basis of the treaty of Amiens would be a source of endless quarrels; and that the *status quo ante bellum* would be liable to the same objection, and that therefore the state of actual possession, subject to exchanges upon just equivalents, was the only basis that could lead to any solid peace. He had also been the bearer of dispatches to France, and when he returned to Paris, the French government continued to consider the state of actual possession as the basis of the negociation, until some circumstances, which it was not necessary to detail to the house, led them to depart from it, and then they objected to it, as if we wanted to make the basis the treaty.—After a few words from Mr. Perceval, the motion was allowed to be withdrawn.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, December 31.

[MINUTES.] This day the house met, conformably to adjournment.—It was ordered, on the motion of lord Walsingham, that no petitions for private bills be received after the 27th of February next. Also, that no reports from the Judges, upon petitions for private bills be received after the first day after the Easter recess.—Mr. Hobhouse brought up from the commons a bill for amending and explaining the act for regulating the Trial of Contested Elections.—Mr. Johnson, from the office of the secretary of state for Ireland, presented the 32d Report of the Irish Commissioners of Accounts, which was ordered to be printed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, December 31.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Johnson, from the chief secretary's office, presented the 32d Report of the commissioners of Accounts in Ireland, which was ordered to be laid on the table, and printed.—On the motion of Mr. Parnell, it was ordered, That there be laid before this house, an Account of the sums levied by Grand Juries of the several counties in Ireland, respectively, for 4 years, from Jan. 1, 1803, distinguishing each year and each assize; and distinguishing the sums levied for the Militia, from those levied for other purposes, together with an account of the rate per acre on the county at large, of the sum levied in each county in each year.—Mr. Fellowes moved, That the order made on the 8th day of July in the last session of the last parliament, "That there be prepared a copy of the return or returns made to the Privy Council by every Archbishop and Bishop of the names of every Dignity, Prebend, Benefice, Donative, Perpetual Curacy, and Parochial Chapelry, within their respective dioceses, or subject to their respective jurisdictions, and the names of the several persons possessing the same, who shall not have resided thereon by reason of any exemption under or by virtue of the Act of 43 Geo. III. c. 84; and also of all the persons possessing the same not having any such exexemption or licence, who shall not have resided on such Dignity, Prebend, Benefice, Donative, Perpetual Curacy, or Parochial Chapelry, so far as the bishop is informed thereof, in order to the same being laid before the house early in the next session of parliament," might be read; and the same being read, it was ordered that the said returns be laid before the house.—The following Election Petitions were presented, and fixed for consideration, viz. Two from Downpatrick Borough, complaining, on the part of J. W. Croker, Esq. and the Electors in his interest, of the return of E. S. Ruthven, esq. to be considered on Thursday, Feb. 12.—Liskeard, on the part of Capt. Tomlinson, to be considered on Tuesday, Feb. 17.—On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, it was ordered that there be laid before the house an account of the Exchequer Bills outstanding, under the act of last session for raising 10,500,000*l.* on Exchequer bills.—Lord Temple brought in a bill to indemnify the regraters of Oak Bark from certain vexatious penalties imposed by an act of James I. and for repealing that part of the said act; which was read a first time, and ordered to be read a second time to-morrow.—Mr. Calcraft presented the estimates of the Ordnance Service for the year 1807, and gave notice that he would move them this day se'nnight in the committee of supply. The estimates were ordered to be printed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, January 1, 1807.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Parkhurst, secretary to the Carnatic commissioners, presented the first report of that board, which was ordered to lie on the table.—The Election Trial bill was read a second time and committed.—The lord Chancellor said, he was authorized by his noble friend (lord Grenville) to give notice that the noble lord intended to present to the house the next day, a bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, January 1, 1807.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Parkhurst, from the commissioners for liquidating the Carnatic debts, presented their first report to the house, which was ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.—Mr. Vansittart presented an account of Exchequer Bills outstanding and unprovided for. Ordered to lie on the table.—He then gave notice that he would the next day in the committee of supply, move for an issue of Exchequer Bills.—On Mr. Vansittart's moving that the Oak Bark regrating indemnity bill be read a second time, lord Folkestone, although he had himself no objection to the bill, yet, as it would affect the interests of many individuals in the country, he trusted the hon. gent. would not press it through the house before those individuals could learn the nature of the provisions in which they were interested. Mr. Vansittart acquiescing, though at the same time declaring that it was indispensable that no great delay should take place, the second reading was postponed to Monday.—Petitions were presented against the returns for the following places:—Sudbury. The ground of complaint in the petition was treating. Ordered to be taken into consideration on Tuesday, the 17th of February.—Rochester.

This was a petition, by certain electors, against Mr. Barnett, on the ground of treating. To be taken into consideration on the 19th of February. Newcastle under Line. This petition to be taken into consideration on the 19th of February. Glasgow, Renfrew, &c. &c. This was a petition by Mr. Boyd Alexander against Archibald Campbell, esq. Ordered to be taken into consideration on the 17th of March. County of Mayo. The grounds of this petition were, the improper interference of the marquis of Sligo and the sheriff, and the admission of illegal votes. To be taken into consideration on the 24th of February.—Malmsbury. There were two petitions, one from the unsuccessful candidates, and another from certain burgesses. Both ordered to be taken into consideration on the 26th of Feb. Wick, &c. in Caithness. Petition from Sir John Sinclair. Ordered to be taken into consideration on the 26th of Feb. Colchester. Petition from some electors. To be considered on the 3d of March. Great Yarmouth. Petition from certain electors. To be considered on the 3d of March. Linlithgow, &c. &c. Petition on the ground of bribery and corruption. At the suggestion of lord Howick, this, for the purpose of forwarding the business, was also ordered to be taken into consideration on the 3d of March. Hythe. This petition to be taken into consideration on Thursday, the 5th of March.—Mr. Whitbread gave notice that he would the next day move, that the order for taking into consideration the Thetford petition should be rescinded, for the purpose of appointing a more distant day.—Mr. Adam moved, that the order for taking into consideration the Linlithgow petition should be rescinded, for the purpose of appointing a more distant day. This had been done in another case of the same nature from Scotland. The Speaker said, that this would leave a vacancy on the 3d of March, and if there was any objection to the motion, a notice must be given. Lord Howick thought the reason perfectly sufficient, and therefore there could be no objection. Mr. Johnstone thought that he would be justified in acting with the same severity here, as had been used towards him on a former occasion. However he would not have objected, had it not been that it was unfair to make any alteration in this case while one of the parties was absent.—Mr. Adam then gave a notice of the motion for the next day.

[RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO PRIVATE BILLS.] Lord *Howick* rose pursuant to notice, to propose certain regulations with respect to Private Bills. The utility of the purpose which he had in view was so obvious, that he need not trouble the house at any length on the subject. The house was aware that it was the practice to fix a certain day, beyond which, private petitions could not be presented. This was done, he apprehended, on this principle, that all the bills might be passed within the session. This principle, however, had been defeated by the latitude allowed with respect to the time of bringing forward bills on these petitions. His object, therefore, was merely to complete the principle which the house had already adopted. In addition to what had been done, he proposed to fix the last day for presenting bills upon the petitions, and also the last day for receiving the reports of these bills. He held in his hand a paper which shewed that the number of private bills presented towards the close of the session, had been for some years past increasing; and last year particularly, it appeared that, out of 204 bills, no less than 31 had been presented after the king's birth-day, and 78 reported upon. This was far beyond what could be allowed in consistency with the convenience of the house and of particular members. The last Friday of February was the day beyond which private petitions were not at present allowed to be presented. He thought that the parties would have abundant time to prepare the bills before the 26th of March, and therefore he would propose that this should be fixed as the last day for receiving private bills. This would be no inconvenience, as, in cases of inclosures and agricultural bills, notices were fixed on the church doors in the months of August and September, and in others, notices were given during the same months at the quarter sessions and in the county papers. Every person concerned, therefore, would have full time to make up his mind, and to be prepared before Easter. But this would be as nugatory as the former order had been found to be, unless a day was fixed, beyond which the reports on these bills could not be received. At present, five days inclusive intervened between the first and second readings. The bills were generally committed on the eighth day from the time of their being brought forward. He thought that the reports might very well be made within six or eight weeks from the same time, so as to enable the lords to pass the bills before the birth-day. He would, therefore, propose that the 11th of May should be the last day for receiving reports upon private bills. Some greater delay might be allowed in cases of Irish bills. But though 21 days must intervene between the first and second readings of such bills, he still thought that they might very well be brought within this general rule. But the house, in adopting a general rule, did not give up its discretion. Even at present, the standing order of the house was dispensed with in cases of notices upon special cause being shewn. But at the same time it would be important to adhere to the general rule, except in very particular cases; for its utility would be destroyed, if it should be once understood that it could be dispensed with on slight grounds. It would be of great convenience to the parties and to the members, especially members of counties, that the private business should be completed with all possible dispatch. He concluded by moving, "That the order, fixing the last Friday of February as the last day on which private petitions should be received be read, that the 26th of March should be appointed as the last day for receiving private bills, that the 11th of May should be fixed as the last day for receiving reports upon these bills, and that an order should be made for promulgating these resolutions, that every one might have due notice of them." They were only resolutions for the present year, and matter of experiment. If they should be found useful and practical, they might hereafter be settled as orders. He had the concurrence of the country gentlemen, and of those who might be supposed to be best acquainted with the subject and most interested in it, and therefore, he presumed, there could be no serious objection to the resolutions which he proposed.

Mr. *Johnstone* observed, that as the noble lord had the concurrence of the county members, and of those who were best acquainted with the subject, he had no very great objection to these propositions. But he must say, at the same time, that they were what a right hon. friend of the noble lord's (Mr. Windham) had characterized as measures of unnecessary legislation. The grounds stated by the noble lord did not altogether bear him out. He had not proved that any great inconvenience resulted from those bills accumulating after the birth day, for, last year, parliament had sat long after that time, and decided upon matters of the highest importance. He apprehended too that the adoption of these resolutions might be very inconvenient both to the agents and the parties.

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* dissented completely from the opinion of the hon. gentleman who spoke last. This was not a measure of unnecessary legislation. It was only, as the noble lord had stated, following up the principle which had already been adopted by the house. It was not a matter of legislation at all, but of regulation only. The adoption of the resolutions, he contended, would be attended with great convenience both to the parties and to particular members, as well as to the house. Parties could not force their agents to come to the house within a particular time; and with regard to the expences of such delays, they were completely in the hands of these agents. The house, therefore, ought to assist them and enable them to obtain justice with as little expence, and with as much dispatch as possible.

Mr. *Fuller* highly approved of the resolutions, as they might be the means of shortening the session, and prove very convenient to the country gentlemen, and to those who did not come to the house to make their fortunes.

Mr. *Fellowes* agreed that they would be very convenient. He himself had often felt the great inconvenience attending the delays that took place in cases of private bills, and thought that the house was under great obligations to the noble lord for having turned his attention to the subject. He suggested the propriety of having the private bills enumerated in the votes, and the days in which they came on, that members might have the earliest and most authentic notice on that point. This he merely threw out as a suggestion for the consideration of his lordship.

Mr. *Johnstone*, observing upon the point of shortening the session, asked whether the noble lord was diffident as to the number and sentiments of his friends, since he betrayed so much anxiety to get rid of them?

Lord *Howick* replied, that he only felt anxious to promote the convenience of the house and of the parties. Suppose that from what happened last year, that members should expect that 78 reports of private bills might be received after the birth-day, the consequence would be, that, if the public business could be soon finished, parliament must either sit to pass these private bills or they must be lost, and all the expence attending them would be to no purpose. As to his anxiety about dismissing his friends, he wished that, on a former occasion, an opportunity had been given of shewing the sense of the house, and he hoped that the hon. gent. would take the earliest opportunity of doing so.—The resolutions were then agreed to, and ordered to be printed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, January 2.

[SLAVE TRADE.] Lord *Grenville* brought in a bill for abolishing the Slave Trade, which was read a first time. His lordship then rose to move, that the bill be printed, and took that opportunity of observing, that no person could be more sensible than he was of the great importance of the measure now submitted to the house, and of the propriety of giving full time for its due consideration. He therefore informed their lordships, that he intended to give about a fortnight's notice before he should move the second reading. When the printed copies of the bill were on the table, he should propose to fix a day for the next motion; in the mean time he moved, that the bill be printed.

Lord *Hawkesbury* said, that he thought it necessary to call the attention of the house to the proceedings of the last session of parliament, on the subject now under consideration. It would be recollected that a Resolution was then come to, for an address to his majesty, which was nearly in the same terms as the preamble of the bill the noble lord had introduced. The object of that address was to learn how far other powers were disposed to concur in the abolition of the Slave trade. He thought, therefore, that their lordships ought to be put in possession of any correspondence which might have taken place with other governments in consequence of that address. Whether there had been any communications between his majesty's government and the governments of other countries on this subject or not, parliament ought to be made acquainted with the fact. He should not press any motion on this topic at present, but it was one which ought to be explained when their lordships proceeded to the consideration of the bill.

Lord *Eldon* thought that some explanation was necessary respecting the title of the bill. It was called a bill for abolishing the Slave trade. But did the noble lord mean that it should go to the abolition of the Slave Trade in general, both in the West Indies and on the coast of Africa; or was it the African Slave trade only that was meant to be abolished? It was his firm opinion, that even the African Slave Trade could not be abolished, unless the measures taken by this government were concurred in by other powers. This appeared to have been the opinion of parliament in the last session, when the address alluded to by his noble friend was voted.

Lord *Grenville* repeated, that he was sensible of the high importance of the subject to be discussed, but he was also, in his own mind, convinced that the time was now arrived when no solid objection could be offered to the abolition of the traffic in slaves on the coast of Africa. On this question he believed there was, generally speaking, but very little difference of opinion in this country; but this was not the day on which it was to be discussed. Before the day for the second reading should be fixed, he intended not only to give such notice as the other orders of the house required, but such as the peculiar importance of the subject itself demanded. Whether we were to continue the African Slave trade, because there were difficulties in the way of abolishing it in the West Indies, or whether we were to practise a great enormity, because other persons in other countries might not choose to abandon it, the house was not then called upon to decide. The only question at present before their lordships was, whether this bill should be printed. He did not therefore think it necessary to enter into the consideration of topics, the discussion of which, at this moment, could serve no purpose but that of delay.

Lord *Eldon* remarked, in explanation, that he had intimated no wish for delay. No such sentiment had ever at any time fallen from his lips as a desire to procrastinate the determination of the house on this important subject. He had only called upon the noble lord to state, whether, by the bill for abolishing the Slave trade, he meant the African Slave trade, or the trade in general. The noble lord, he understood, had admitted that the bill was to extend to the African trade only. He thought, however, that their lordships would, upon consideration, find that this mode of proceeding was impracticable, and that, if they consented to put an end to the trade on the coast of Africa, the application of the same principle would necessarily compel them to extend the abolition to the West-India Islands.

Earl *Grosvenor* expressed his anxious wish to see the odious traffic in human beings every where abolished.

The Duke of *Clarence* observed, that he had not opposed the first reading of the bill, because he always considered that proceeding a matter of form, and wished to reserve what he had to say until the subsequent stages of the bill. For the same reason, he should not oppose the motion for printing the bill. As, however, other noble lords had thought fit to bring the subject of the Slave Trade in some degree into discussion, his royal highness would just take the liberty of observing, that he had frequently given his opinion on that important question since he had had a seat in parliament; and his opinion was well known to the house and to the public. His sentiments, he assured their lordships, still remained unaltered, and it would require very great and very unexpected arguments indeed to induce him to change his mind on a subject which he had so maturely considered.—The bill was then read a first time, and ordered to be printed.

[NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE.] The order of the day being read for summoning their lordships to take into consideration the Papers relative to the late Negociation with France,

Lord *Grenville* rose, and spoke as follows: My lords, having had the honour of presenting to your lordships the Papers relative to the late Negociation between this country and France, it now becomes my duty to move your lordships to address his majesty on the result of that negociation. I do not think it necessary to enter into any lengthened detail upon a subject which is already so fully and amply before your lordships by means of the papers on the table. The documents which are in your lordships' hands, are fuller and more ample than have been presented to parliament on any former occasion of a similar nature, certainly more so than in those cases respecting which it has formerly been my duty to present papers to parliament. It would not, perhaps, have been advisable that these papers should be so minute in their details, had it not been for the very full, though not equally correct statement published by the French government. It will nevertheless be perceived by your lordships, that there are several omissions in the papers, omissions which could not be supplied without injury to this country or to our allies. It must be evident, that the instructions given to our minister for the regulation of his conduct during the negociation with which he was intrusted, could not be given amongst these documents, without the risk of injury to our interests. To reveal the instructions given to a minister employed to negociate a peace, must necessarily reveal the value which we set upon possessions or upon cessions, and the motives which actuate the government in consenting to give up, or desiring to retain the one, or to insist upon the other: a species of information, which it is evident must be of inestimable advantage to the enemy. It is not merely, however, with respect to ourselves that it becomes important to omit certain documents, but also with a view to the interests of our allies. It is not enough that the publication of documents and papers will not be injurious to yourselves; but you have no right to set up that as an argument for a publication, which may tend to reveal something the knowledge of which by an enemy may be injurious to your ally. The forms of our constitution require in certain cases the publication of the documents which have passed between our government and that of a foreign state, and if an inconvenience to ourselves sometimes arises from this practice, it is overbalanced by the benefits resulting from that constitution; but you have no right to set up the forms of your constitution as a reason for publishing what may tend to injure your ally. Conceiving, therefore, that the omissions in these papers are fully justified, and that the papers themselves are sufficiently ample to give every information relative to the negociation, I shall not enter into a detail, which is already in your lordships' possession. My object is to move an address to his majesty, humbly and gratefully acknowledging his majesty's desire to restore to his subjects the blessings of peace, assuring his majesty of our conviction that the failure of the negociation entered into for that purpose did not arise from any failure in his majesty's paternal regard for the welfare of his people, but is wholly to be attributed to the exorbitant demands and ambitious views of France, and pledging ourselves to concur, in every effort, to support his majesty in the continuance of the contest. I will now, my lords, briefly notice a few of the leading principles which characterize the Negociation, which is the subject of our discussion. There can be no doubt that peace was desirable, if a peace could be obtained consistently with the honour and the interests of this country. It must always be desirable to put an end to the calamities of war, and every state actuated by enlightened views of policy, will necessarily consider the prosecution of war as the means of obtaining an honourable, a secure, and a permanent peace; a peace which shall ensure safety against the renewal of war, and safety in the conduct of it in the event of its renewal. There may be cases in which a nation, actuated by views of sound policy, may think it advisable to make great sacrifices for the purpose of obtaining a peace, which bears every promise of being permanent. If we look back to the treaties of peace formerly concluded by this country, we find that though, of course, they could not be considered as permanent, yet that they produced a considerable interval of tranquillity, an interval which might then be fairly calculated upon, and which, inasmuch as it served to recruit and increase the resources of the country, was worth making sacrifices to obtain. In this view of the subject, and with the moral certainty of obtaining a considerable interval of tranquillity, valuable sacrifices, I do not mean merely valuable in point of finance, of commerce, or of revenue, but valuable in point of strength, might consistently with sound policy and expediency be made for the purpose of obtaining a treaty of peace. But those who consider the state of Europe for 6 years, or I may say for 13 or 14 years past, must be convinced that there was no rational hope of any considerable interval of tranquillity following a treaty of peace with France. It became therefore an object in this negociation, to seek out for an equivalent to set up against that want of permanence, which must attend any peace made under such circumstances. Valuable sacrifices could not be made to obtain an unstable and insecure peace. I was therefore, my lords, of opinion, and still am of opinion, that the only basis upon which we ought to treat with France, was that of actual possession. We had made several valuable conquests by means of our maritime superiority, whilst France had made great and extensive conquests on the continent. Those conquests were, however, of a description totally distinct, and could not be exchanged with any prospect of advantage to either country. This country being a great maritime and colonial power, and France a great continental power, there could be no reciprocity of cession between the two powers, which could in any degree tend to their mutual advantage. The conquests made by this country could be of no use to France, unless she could become a great commercial and colonial power; the conquests made by France could be of no use to this country, unless she could become a great continental power. Thus, the state of actual possession appeared to me to be the only true basis of negociation between this country and France, the only basis upon which peace ought to be established, under the circumstances in which that negociation took place, the only basis on which it could rationally be founded, viewing the relative situation of the two countries, regarding also the situation of Europe, and the slender prospect of a peace concluded under such circumstances, producing any considerable interval of tranquillity, and for the attainment of which, therefore, no valuable sacrifices ought to be made by this country, because they could not ensure to us safety against the immediate renewal of the war. This was, therefore, the basis which I thought the only one which ought to be the foundation of a treaty of peace between this country and France, if such a treaty was to be attained, and this also was the opinion of those with whom I had the honour to act, amongst whom and myself the greatest and most perfect unanimity prevailed, previous to, and from the moment of, the commencement of the negociation to its close. During the whole procedure of that negociation, from the hour it began till the moment of its breaking off, we had but one opinion upon the subject, and unanimously concurred in all the steps taken during its progress. I have already observed that the state of actual possession was the only basis which appeared to his majesty's ministers to be the fit and proper basis for our negociation with France. It will not, however, be supposed, that a negociation upon the basis of actual possession, was to exclude a discussion of equivalents to be given for certain cessions to be agreed upon. This is necessarily included in a negociation, taking for its basis the state of actual possession, inasmuch as it naturally arises out of the relations of states, which come to be discussed in the progress of such a negociation. This too is the more necessary where a negociation involves the interests of allies, the procuring for whom of advantages, of course gives rise to a discussion as to the equivalents to be given, or the sacrifices to be made by the powers negociating, to procure advantageous cessions for their respective allies. My lords, when his majesty's present ministers came into office, they found a treaty concluded by their predecessors with Russia, in which each party bound itself not to conclude peace, without the consent of the other. I am not about to question the wisdom of such a treaty; on the contrary, I think it a wise measure. I am decidedly of opinion, that if what remains of Europe is to be maintained, if Europe is to be recovered, as I trust it will be recovered, it can only be by a firm bond of union, a strict alliance between this country and the powers of the continent. When I declare that a wise treaty, in which one party cannot make peace without the consent of the other, I am not to have extreme cases put for the purpose of shewing that inconveniencies may arise from such a stipulation. My answer to such an argument is short—that extreme cases ought not to be put. Extreme cases cannot be included in, nor ought they to be an objection to, a general rule; they must be met and provided for on their own specific grounds. An extreme case may be put, that Russia might demand, as a condition of peace, that half the old French monarchy should be ceded to her; in that case, it is not to be supposed that this country would continue the war upon such a ground. Such extreme cases, however, may be put out of the argument, having no connection, in fact, with the broad and general principle on which such treaties are concluded. It is not enough for this country merely to form an alliance with the powers of the continent, who themselves near the enemy, and subject to his immediate inroads, feel all the horrors of war in the heart of their territories, whilst we, free from all fear of participating in their calamities, conceive ourselves at liberty to withdraw from the contest and make peace whenever it suits our convenience. This is not a system which can lead to any practical good. The powers of the continent will not, under such a system, feel that community of interest which is absolutely necessary to effect any thing against the enemy. Let there be a stipulation that one party shall not make peace without the consent of the other, and then there will be that community of interest, and that unity of action which in the present circumstances of Europe are so absolutely necessary to make head against the enemy. Even, however, supposing that the treaty with Russia, to which I have just alluded, had not been wisely concluded; still the sacred engagement of the sovereign having been given to Russia, his majesty's ministers were bound to act in compliance with the injunctions of that treaty, and to fulfil its conditions. Thus, therefore, the negociation commenced in compliance with the injunctions of that treaty, and, at the same time, with those views with regard to our other allies, which were dictated by justice and good faith. Amongst those allies were to be classed those to whom we were bound by treaty, and those to whom we were bound by the circumstances which had occurred during the war, and the situations in which they were placed, in consequence of the events of that war. Of the former class of allies were Sweden and Portugal; and of the latter, Naples and the elector of Hanover; who, in this case, must be considered as a separate and distinct power. With respect to Sweden and Portugal, nothing more was required than to guarantee to those powers their state of actual possession; no conquests having been made by them which it was necessary to cede, nor any thing taken from them respecting which it was necessary to enter into discussion. The king of Naples stood in a different situation; he had unfortunately, like too many other continental states, been deprived, by the power of France, of all his dominions on the continent of Europe. My lords, I have no hesitation in saying, that I would have consented to make sacrifices not merely valuable in finance, in revenue, or in commerce, but even sacrifices of safety and of strength, to procure the restoration to the king of Naples of the kingdom of Naples; but no sacrifices that we could make, could have been an equivalent to France for the restoration of the kingdom of Naples. It therefore necessarily became a discussion of equivalents, with the view of indemnifying the king of Naples for the loss of his kingdom somewhere else. With respect to Sicily, the king of Naples was still in possession of that island, or rather, I would say, it was in the possession of a brave, and, as it has been proved, an invincible British army. That army had entered the island with the consent of the king of Naples, who had received them there in the full confidence that they would defend it bravely and gallantly against the enemy, and at the same time in the full persuasion that the island would not be given up to the enemy. Would it not, therefore, have been an indelible disgrace to this country to have given up Sicily to France upon their offer of an equivalent? Was it for us to traffic with Sicily, and to dispose of it, without the consent of its sovereign? if the king of Naples chose to surrender his dominions for what he might consider a sufficient equivalent, upon the continent of Europe, he was, of course, at liberty to make such an exchange; but it was not for us to traffic with Sicily, and barter it away for any equivalent, without the consent of its sovereign.—With respect to Hanover, my lords, I feel some difficulty in addressing your lordships upon that topic, not that there is any doubt as to the clearness of the principle upon which our negociation with respect to that electorate rests, or as to the injustice committed by the enemy upon the territories of that electorate, but from a doubt that from some perversion or distortion of what is clear and obvious, there should be an idea entertained that our beneficent sovereign had for a moment wished to sacrifice any British interest to the re-attainment of Hanover. My lords, his majesty, with that beneficence which has always characterized his reign, had not the remotest wish that the least British interest should be sacrificed for the purpose of obtaining the restoration of Hanover. But, my lords, the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign was a point in which the honour of this country was deeply involved. It was said by a great statesman, now no more, after some remarks relative to Hanover, that if Hanover was invaded on account of its connection with this country, he would as soon fight for Hanover as for Hampshire, the honour of the country being equally involved in both cases. Hanover, my lords, was at peace with France, it was not connected in any way which could be a legitimate cause for war between France and that electorate; yet Hanover was seized by France soon after the latter power had declared war against this country, and for no other reason than because it was thought by France a good means of injuring this country, to invade and take possession of Hanover. Hanover was therefore sacrificed to injustice on the part of France for the express purpose of injuring this country. Would it not, therefore, be disgraceful in us not to insist upon the restoration of Hanover to its sovereign, from whom it had been taken, solely on account of its connection with this country. The restoration of Hanover, thus unjustly seized, was therefore insisted upon as an indispensable preliminary to the negociation. The French government felt the injustice of the act, and consented to restore it. This was consented to, previous to the commencement of the negociation, and never afterwards became an object of dispute. And your lordships are perfectly aware, as is clearly evinced by the papers on the table, that the rupture of the negociation did not proceed from any discussion about Hanover, but arose from far different causes. My lords, the principle upon which his majesty's ministers acted during the whole of the negociation was, that of good faith towards our allies. Without that, no treaty can be concluded by this country, without disgracing ourselves. The principle acted upon by the French government invariably through the whole negociation was, that of endeavouring to effect a separation between us and our allies. This clearly appears in the four stages of the negociation. The first at the commencement of the negociation, when the French government offered us terms which, had we been negociating for ourselves alone, might perhaps have been considered as the fair price of peace, but which, under the circumstances in which we negociated, were offered us as the price of dishonour, as the price of the desertion of our faithful ally, as the price of a direct breach of good faith. Here then, it was evidently their object to tempt us by these offers to separate ourselves from Russia. The second stage of the negociation was, when the French government, partly by threats, partly by inspiring hopes and making promises, contrived to persuade the Russian minister at Paris, M. D'Oubril, to sign a separate treaty of peace. Nothing, my lords, shews more clearly the views and objects of the French government than the alteration in their tone, after they had succeeded in obtaining the signature of this separate treaty with Russia. Then the French government say to our ministers, no, we cannot now grant you the same terms we were willing to do before. The signature of a separate treaty with Russia is equivalent to a splendid victory; therefore we must insist upon better terms. This, my lords, is not our language, but your lordships will mark the expression used by the French ministers in the papers now in your hands, when speaking upon that subject, and which evinces, in the clearest manner, the great importance which they attached to the separation which they thought they had effected between Russia and this country. They considered it equivalent to a splendid victory, and this expression was not loosely used in conversation, but forms a part of the written sentiments of the French government upon that event. A suspicion afterwards arose, that this treaty would not be ratified, or probably intelligence of the refusal of the emperor of Russia to ratify it had then reached Paris, although of this we know nothing. Which brings me to the third stage of the negociation; when the French government, finding the treaty would not be ratified, immediately offered us better terms, in the hope of finding that though they could not separate Russia from this country, they might, by the offer of better terms than they had previously offered, separate this country from Russia. Failing, however, equally in their endeavours to induce Russia to enter into a separate treaty, or to induce this country to enter into a separate treaty, they at length agreed to a negociation; to be carried on conjointly for the interests of Russia and Great Britain. This brings me to the fourth and last stage of the negociation, when they departed from the principle they had agreed to, of negociating with Russia and England conjointly, when they refused to agree to the terms asked on behalf of Russia, and again offered terms to this country, on the principle of a separate negociation. The rupture of the negociation was, of course, the consequence. My lords, in all this procedure on the part of the French government, it is manifest, that, from the first moment of the negociation to the last, their only object was to endeavour to effect a separation between this country and Russia. Had Russia, my lords, insisted upon extravagant and immoderate terms, or had she insisted upon points trifling and uninteresting, it would have been a painful duty for me to stand up in this place and state the rupture of the negociation in consequence of any such conduct on the part of Russia. But, my lords, the very contrary of all this was the case; the terms insisted on by Russia were moderate, free from all views of ambition, and were only directed to the security of her allies. She demanded the guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples, and the evacuation of Dalmatia by the French troops. By holding Dalmatia, the French turn the flank of the defence of Austria, and threaten the Austrian capital. Dalmatia also, though not immediately connected with Turkey, is yet occupied by the French troops, with hostile designs against that power. Dalmatia is not necessary to the vast empire obtained by the arms of France, and can only be held by the latter power as a post of offence towards Austria and the Porte, and of hostility towards Russia. These were the only terms insisted on by Russia, not to gratify any objects of ambition, not for the increase of power, but to obtain security for her allies, to obtain that in which this country was equally interested. The guarantee of Sicily to the king of Naples was clearly a British object, and in which this country has a preferable interest. This evacuation of Dalmatia by the French troops, to which Russia confined herself, not making any demand of the territory, is also of importance to this country as well as to our ally. With this good faith and moderation on the part of Russia, would it not have been an indelible disgrace to this country if we had violated good faith on our part? If we had accepted separate terms, would it not, after the good faith displayed by the emperor of Russia, have been a foul stain upon the country never to be washed away—a disgrace and a degradation which never could have been disunited from our name? And what are these terms which were offered to us as the price of disgrace and dishonour? We were to be allowed to keep Malta, which France can never take from us except by acquiring a naval superiority. The Cape of Good Hope also, which is equally secure to us, and which if it should be by accident taken by any French fleet, which might escape our blockading squadrons, would not remain 6 months in the possession of France. India, where our power is not to be shaken by any efforts of France, and Tobago, merely to mention which, is sufficient; these were the terms offered to us to induce us to disgrace and dishonour ourselves by violating our good faith, and deserting our faithful ally. My lords, I should have rejoiced if I could have had the opportunity, instead of moving an address to his majesty upon the rupture of the negociation, of moving an address upon the conclusion of peace. That I have not that opportunity, is wholly to be attributed to the enemy, to his views of ambition, to the principles upon which he acted, and which were utterly irreconcileable with those principles upon which this country must ever act, for the preservation of her interests, and the maintenance of her honour. I am sure, I shall have every heart and mind in the country with me, when I say that this country never can negociate upon a principle of inferiority to France. An expression was used by the French ministers, which is stated in the papers, that if we had made peace at the period alluded to in the papers, the treaty of the confederation of the Rhine would never have been signed, or at least would not have been published. It happens, however, that supposing peace to have been concluded with the utmost rapidity after the arrival of our ministers at Paris, the treaty could not have been signed before the treaty of the German confederacy was published. Thus this very confederation must unavoidably have preceded the treaty, and, supposing it to have happened the day after, it would necessarily have been a cause for war. My lords, I will only make one more observation respecting the stay of our minister at Paris. It was perfectly evident that, when the chief of the French government set out to take the command of the army, it was impossible that the negociation and hostilities against an ally of one of the parties negociating could go on *pari passu*. The assembling of the French army was, indeed, a sufficient cause for breaking off the negociation, and when the chief of the French government set out to commence hostilities against the ally of Russia, it was clearly impossible that the negociation and the hostile attack could go on at the same time. My lords, at the opening of the session, every thing like a pledge to his majesty respecting the result of the negociation was carefully avoided, until the papers should be regularly before the house. Now that the subject comes regularly under your lordships' discussion, I intend to propose that your lordships should pledge yourselves to support his majesty in this contest, the continuance of which has been rendered absolutely necessary by the ambition of France. His lordship concluded by moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, to assure him that this house have taken into serious consideration the papers relative to the late negociation, which he has been pleased to lay before them, and that we see with gratitude, that he has employed every means to restore the blessing of peace, in a manner consistent with the interests and glory of his people, and at the same time, with an observance of that good faith with our allies, which this country is bound to retain inviolate. That while we lament that by the unbounded ambition of the enemy, these laudable endeavours to restore tranquillity to his kingdom, have been frustrated, we beg leave to assure his majesty, that no exertion shall be wanting on our part to support and assist him, in the adoption of such measures as may yet be found necessary, either for the restoration of peace, or to meet the various exigencies of the war in this most important crisis."

Lord *Hawkesbury* rose, and said:—Although, my lords, we may differ in some instances with respect to the particular mode and course pursued in this negociation, yet, on the present occasion, there can be no room for difference as to the great principles and the result. I am convinced, that, at this moment, while our enemy continues to pursue his aggressions, and to follow that system by which his conduct has been regulated since the commencement of his career, such a peace as we alone look to as affording security to ourselves and allies is utterly unattainable. I therefore most completely concur with the noble lord upon the great points which he has stated, and of course do not feel desirous of urging any material objection to the address. At the same time this address may, in some parts, be liable to ambiguity, and therefore, if I do agree to it, it must be with some qualification. But, my lords, I most particularly approve of the conduct of the government, in the good faith which it has maintained with respect to our allies. And if Russia had insisted upon the evacuation of Dalmatia by the French, and if that were the only point of difference between us and the French government, I have no hesitation in saying that, upon that point alone, ministers would have been fully justified in breaking off the negociation. I have always thought, and maintained, my lords, that if there was any point which ought to be attended to more than another, if there was any point which ought to be insisted on in preference to every thing except our own vital interests, that point was, that Dalmatia and Istria, formerly dependencies of the Venetian states, should be evacuated by the French troops. In these points then I most unequivocally agree with the noble lord who has proposed the address. But while I say this, I beg not to be understood as approving all that passed in the course of this negociation. Where we approve of the general result, we may still differ materially as to some particular parts. At the same time I am perfectly ready to allow, that where we do approve of the general principles that pervade the whole, and of the practical result, we ought not to be too fastidious respecting modes, or too particular in searching out minute and comparatively trifling errors. This I declared on a former occasion, and I still adhere to the opinion which I then expressed. But when a declaration is solemnly made to the public, which is not borne out by the papers now on your table, I must confess that this appears to me no trifling matter, and therefore it makes a most material difference. I allude, my lords, to the declaration of his majesty, where it is stated that the French, from the outset of the negociation, agreed to proceed upon the basis of actual possession, subject to the interchange of such equivalents as might be for the advantage and honour of the two countries. Now I confess that, after a most careful examination of these papers, I have found nothing in the whole of them that can be considered as a certain and unequivocal foundation for such a declaration. Before the arrival of lord Yarmouth in London, the basis of actual possession was so far from being agreed upon, that another very different was expressly stated to be the grounds upon which the French government would enter upon a negociation. Lord Yarmouth, indeed, gives a statement in writing as a conversation which he had with Talleyrand, and he, no doubt, firmly believed that Talleyrand had proposed the basis of actual possession. But in looking over the papers, and examining with all the attention in my power the written account which the noble lord has given of that conversation, I can find nothing that can afford a distinct, precise, and unequivocal proof that the basis of actual possession was clearly agreed to by the French minister. The words are: "*Vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas.*"—But in order to affix the proper and precise meaning to these words, we must look at the context, and this shews that the words are not general, but that they refer only to Sicily specifically. But I confess, that though the words had been general, yet I should not have considered the mere verbal declaration of any minister, without any written document on the subject from him, by which he could be bound, as a sufficient ground to warrant the assertion, that the basis of the *uti possidetis* was actually and distinctly agreed to by the French government. This, my lords, is a point of material importance, not only with respect to this, but with regard to all other negociations. I have always understood that the grounds of negociation were to be laid down in written documents, and to be taken from conferences reduced to writing at the time, so as to leave no room for cavil, and to bind the parties to something specific, which they could never recede from, without exposing their want of faith to all the world. There may undoubtedly be some previous communications between the parties, leading to a particular point, and these may undoubtedly be very properly produced, in order to throw light upon particular parts of the subject, and to enable others to judge of the precise meaning and bearing of certain expressions, in which there might otherwise be some ambiguity. Indeed there can be no doubt that lord Yarmouth fully believed, that the basis of *uti possidetis* had been proposed by Talleyrand. Still, however, this is an *ex parte* statement, which the other party may admit or deny as they may think proper. Such statements can never constitute the essence of a negociation, or afford a clear and undeniable ground of proceeding. If there is any object, which in cases of this sort ought to be attended to more than another, it is to have distinct and positive admission of the basis, to have something which may be put on record, which the party cannot deny, and to which you may refer, and from which, if the other party should recede, all the world would be satisfied that you were in the right and he in the wrong. In all negociations, therefore, the settling of a clear and distinct basis, is one of the most material objects. It was not sufficient then that lord Yarmouth understood that the basis of actual possession had been acceded to by Talleyrand. But you ought to have demanded a precise and categorical recognition of that basis as a preliminary step, before you gave full powers to treat to your negociator. This would have avoided all obscurity. There could have been no room, at least no fair grounds for cavilling after this. I do not by any means object to previous communications. These may be useful and even necessary. Neither do I object to their production, but as they form no part of the essence of the proceedings, they cannot be admitted as the only proof of the particular basis agreed upon. This ought to be clearly seen from the written and essential documents, and of all others this is the point upon which precision is necessary. But more particularly in the present instance, the utmost precision is to be expected, after the declaration which has been made by his majesty, that the French government, from the beginning, admitted the basis of actual possession. Yet, my lords, notwithstanding this, the declaration is not borne out by these papers, and the utmost that they prove is this, that lord Yarmouth *believed* that the basis of actual possession was admitted by M. Talleyrand in a conference. Having, my lords, said thus much on that particular point—a point which most certainly claimed considerable attention, on account of its importance in various views, I have no hesitation in saying, that I most heartily concur in the general result of the negociation, and, with the above exception, that I most cordially join in the address, and in the assurances of support to his majesty, in prosecuting the war, which it has been found impossible immediately to put an end to, upon grounds in any degree consistent with the security and honour of this country, or the maintenance of good faith with our allies. My lords, I feel it due to myself, and to the house, to state my views with respect to the war in which we are engaged, and with respect to the means which we have to support it. No man can possibly be more anxious for the restoration of peace to this country and to the world, if peace could be obtained upon terms consistent with security and honour. For peace, I agree with the noble lord, great sacrifices might be made, if it was likely to be permanent, and would afford in any way a proper compensation for these sacrifices. Though I think, my lords, that foreign conquests are not to be yielded lightly, though I think that the conquest of colonies may be very advantageous to the country to a certain extent, and that these are undoubtedly of great value, as the means of procuring a safe and permanent peace, yet I am not one of those who think that our colonial possessions ought to be extended indefinitely. Colonies are undoubtedly valuable to a commercial country, but they are not valuable to us beyond what we can protect and govern. We ought to consider what are our own means, what our military force is, and what it may be made. Every thing that is beyond what we can protect and govern is only a delusive power, or rather a source of weakness. But after all, my lords, the great question as to peace is, could it possibly be obtained? Could we, consistently with the honour and interests of our country, conclude a peace with the French government at the present moment? Now, there are two points to be considered here. First, what was the situation of the continent at the commencement of the treaty with France in 1801? It was certainly very different from what it is now. At that time Holland and Switzerland, though subject to the influence of France, were not completely united to it. Naples was entire, and Austria, though she had lost much of her military reputation, was still a great power. Whatever she had lost in point of military character, she was, in point of population and extent of territory, equal to what she had been at the commencement of the war with France. It was said then, that the best chance for the salvation of Europe was in peace. We were powerful at sea, the French were powerful on the continent. This great power they had acquired owing to the energies which were roused by the French revolution, to which a military direction had been given. The advantages which they possessed, arose out of the particular circumstances in which they were placed, and were not natural, but artificial. History proves, my lords, that when a military direction is given to the energies of a people called forth by the peculiar circumstances attending great and general revolutions, they are then commonly most formidable to their neighbours. Many therefore thought, and I confess I joined in the opinion, that if France was left to herself, her power would sink to its natural level. This was one powerful motive for concluding a peace, which appeared to be highly desirable, provided the state of things in Europe could be left as they were at the time. Now, however, all the states to which I have alluded, have been either completely subdued by France, or reduced within comparatively narrow limits. In 1801 there was another object in view. We wished to try the feelings of France, and to find out what would be the policy of its government upon the restoration of peace. There were two ways in which that government might act, and each had its supporters. It might choose to endeavour to acquire confidence at home and abroad, which could only be done by a system of moderation, or it might consider its security to lie in pursuing that system of aggression which had marked the progress of that revolution from which its power had arisen. The latter system was that which they adopted, so that scarcely three months had elapsed from the time of signing the treaty till its spirit was violated by repeated aggressions. Ever since that time, these aggressions have been continued, as an instance of which we have only to look at the German Confederation, to which the noble lord has adverted. These, my lords, are considerations which must have the greatest weight in our view of this question, and in reflecting whether it was possible that any peace could have been obtained that could afford permanent security to us and to our allies, or that could be consistent with the honour of this country. Without these objects, peace cannot be concluded, for peace without them would be little else than a surrender to the enemy. With regard to the commerce of the country, considered with a view to peace, that undoubtedly in itself is a matter of internal regulation. I can easily suppose that two nations may be at peace with each other, and yet refuse to have any commercial communication. But with regard to France and Great Britain, between which there are so many points of contact, both at home and abroad, I apprehend there cannot exist a determined commercial hostility for any great length of time, without producing a degree of irritation which must terminate in war. In contemplating all these considerations, my lords, I cannot conceive how, in the present disposition of France, any permanent peace could be obtained. Whatever terms might be granted at the moment, and no honourable terms have as yet been offered, peace must at all events be exceedingly precarious. But in considering this subject, my lords, you will observe, that while you continue at war, you have at least this advantage, that whatever exertions France may make, they must be confined to the continent of Europe. But peace would open to her the way to Asia, Africa, and America. To these at least I hope her power cannot extend. Another thing to be considered is, that while you are at war, you are upon perfect equality with your enemies. You are as powerful by sea, as they are by land. But if peace should take place, from the very nature of the two cases, their power would not be made less, while your superiority would be diminishing, for peace would furnish them with the means of advancing in that particular sort of power, in which your superiority is undisputed. I state these things, my lords, not as making against peace absolutely. They are not arguments for eternal war, but they are circumstances that ought to have great weight with us in considering whether what we gain by a peace is a proper compensation for what we lose. But there is another thing, my lords, to which we ought to attend, in considering the question of peace, and the terms to which we are entitled, and that is, the internal situation of this country. The people in general seem to rejoice at the rupture of the negociation; not, my lords, because they thought war preferable to an honourable peace, but because, from a view of the present state of things, they despair of obtaining an honourable peace. Though war is an evil, they justly consider it as preferable to a hollow and dishonourable peace. Thinking war therefore necessary, they are willing to submit to all the sacrifices which may be requisite to support it, rather than hazard every thing upon the event of a dishonourable peace.—Another consideration upon which I reflect with infinite pleasure and pride, is the present flourishing state of our Finances, which is to be ascribed to two great measures, which have done more towards the welfare and greatness of this country than any that were ever before devised: The one suggested, brought forward, and matured by that illustrious and exalted character, my late right hon. friend now no more (Mr. Pitt), I mean the sinking fund, which is unquestionably the greatest measure ever produced by the ingenuity or wisdom of man:—the other, that of raising a considerable part of the supplies within the year, also first brought forward by my deceased friend, and which was acted upon, and in some degree improved, by the noble viscount opposite (lord Sidmouth). Those two measures have been of almost incalculable benefit to the country: the permanent taxes are not, I believe, less than 18 millions: the Sinking Fund at this time produces 8 millions and a half; and if we have but perseverance to go on for a few years, with a strict regard to economy in our general system of expenditure, we shall arrive at that happy period when the Sinking Fund will equal all the loans that may be necessary for the expences of the country; and though the debt being permanent constitutes what may be called an evil, yet in the resource of the Sinking Fund we have the consolatory reflection of having the means to meet it. It has often heretofore been asked, how long will you go on borrowing and borrowing; when will the limits of our taxation end? An answer may now be given: in a few years the Sinking Fund will meet every part of our expenditure, and shew the extensive value of that system, which will crown with immortal honour the memory and name of the illustrious character whose great financial genius produced it. If we look at the commercial resources of the country, we shall find them not less prosperous. The year 1798 has been looked upon as the most prosperous year of commerce that was ever known to this country. But by a paper which I have in my hand, it appears that in 1805 it had reached a much greater height. The amount of the imports in 1798 was 46 millions; in 1805, 53 millions. The amount of the exports in 1798, was 33 millions; in 1805, 41 millions. I state these things, my lords, in order to shew the means which we have of continuing the war.—I am, my lords, perfectly satisfied that his majesty's ministers have acted right in breaking off the negociation rather than give up Sicily, and in not divulging what they would have thought a reasonable exchange or equivalent for Naples. I agree with the noble baron who moved the address, that it would have been wrong to put the enemy in possession of what places or territories you think of high value, or to let them know what is likely to be your *ultimatum* till the last moment of shewing it. I agree with him also in the fact, that every attempt has been made to detach us from our allies. I rejoice to think those attempts have proved abortive, for nothing redounds more to the honour and magnanimity of this country than the good faith which it has always kept with its allies, and the fidelity which it has uniformly observed towards them. I am happy in being able to say, that I think the country is in the right. We made every reasonable effort to obtain a peace on just and honourable terms to ourselves and our allies: those efforts have unfortunately failed, and we ought therefore to address his majesty to assure him of our support in continuing the arduous contest in which we are engaged, till a peace can be concluded that is likely to secure the honour and interest of the empire, and to be of permanent duration. I think the basis of the negociation ought to have been reduced to writing, as it would have placed the whole in a clear point of view, and have taken it out of the power of the enemy to deny what it really was when it suited their purpose to throw obstacles in the way of its conclusion; but as far as the substantial points of the negociation go, I certainly highly approve them, and the more I contemplate the subject, the more perfectly convinced I am, that we have no alternative but to continue the war with increased vigour and energy; and, painful as the reflection may be, I am as decidedly of opinion that the continuance of it, under the present disposition of France, is safer than peace. I am persuaded, if we go on with vigour and energy, we shall succeed at last; and I am convinced, that if the government do their duty towards the people, the people with alacrity will do their duty towards them, in the fullest confidence of bringing the contest to an honourable and just termination.

Lord *Sidmouth*. My lords, after having attended to the able speech which we have just heard from the noble baron, I feel myself called upon to request your lordships' indulgence, if I trespass for a short time in noticing some points in the noble lord's speech; and, my lords, I must say, that it was with a degree of pain and concern, I heard the noble lord declaring, that he could only give a qualified approbation of the address to his majesty, which is this night submitted for your lordship's adoption. The noble lord laments, that the declaration of his majesty, stating the causes of the rupture of the negociation with France, should contain an averment, which is not clearly made out by proof in the papers submitted to your lordships' consideration; I mean, that the negociation was commenced in consequence of the offer of the *uti possidetis* on the part of the government of France. But, my lords, I trust I may be allowed to say, that if there be any one point established on the principle of the common understanding of mankind, the one in question is, I apprehend, such a point. I am willing to admit, indeed, that in the documents which have been submitted to your lordships, there is not to be found any such specific declaration on the part of the French government; but still I contend, that the whole negociation was conducted upon this very basis. In the letter addressed by M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox, in the early stage of the correspondence between the two governments, M. Talleyrand states, that France desires nothing of Great Britain that she already possesses. Now, surely, nothing else could be meant by this avowal, than that nothing was intended to be asked, which was then actually possessed by Great Britain. I would farther ask of the noble lord, what it was that caused a temporary suspension of that negociation? Was it any demur which arose on the part of the French government upon this point? No; but it was a delay occasioned by a matter of form as to the manner in which the negociation was to be conducted, and not from any objection which was started to this understood basis. In five or six weeks afterwards, lord Yarmouth arrived from Paris, when, by desire of his majesty's ministers, he committed to writing the substance of the various communications he had held with M. Talleyrand, who, it appears, in the name of the government of France, made use of the following expression, "*nous ne vous demandons rien,*" words which he afterwards energetically repeated. And, my lords, I apprehend, that no one who has carefully perused these papers, will attempt to contradict the assertion, that previous to the 20th of July last, when M. d'Oubril signed the Provisional Treaty with France, in the name of the Russian government, my lord Yarmouth entertained no doubt on his mind, that the state of actual possession was the mutually acknowledged basis. The first attempt to question it, in fact, though even then not expressly in words, was after this period, when M. Talleyrand avowed, that circumstances had altered, and that, in consequence, the French government had determined not to agree to that which was consented to originally, and that they must insist upon having possession of Sicily. I admit also, that upon three subsequent occasions, attempts were made by the French negociators to deny the statements of lord Yarmouth, and that uniformly after the signature of M. d'Oubril's treaty. In the answer of the French negociator of the 8th of August, to the note presented by lord Lauderdale, general Clarke declares, that the idea of treating on the basis of the *uti possidetis*, had never entered into the mind of the French emperor, and that he would not give up Tobago, nor any other part of the territory of France, the integrity of which he had sworn to defend. But even during that interval, when it was not known whether D'Oubril's treaty would be ratified or not; or rather when, as it should seem, the French government had reason to apprehend the refusal of its ratification by the emperor of Russia, and when pressed in conversation between lord Yarmouth and gen. Clarke, and reminded by the former of the various conversations which had taken place between him and M. Talleyrand, on this point; general Clarke merely evaded, without denying them, calling them loose conversations, "*des romans politiques;*" and lord Lauderdale states, that they did not deny the fact, when they were met face to face; when strongly urged on this point, not one of the French negociators denied that such was the agreement with lord Yarmouth. And it is remarkable, that, although the chief of the government of France then declared that he would never alienate Tobago, nor any other part of the territory of France, which he had sworn to defend; yet, in the course of a few days afterwards, a proposal was made to cede not only Tobago, but Pondicherry also, and Chandernagore and Mahee, to Great Britain. Now, all this combines to shew, that the statement of lord Yarmouth was originally well founded, as well as how little confidence can be placed in the assertions of the French government and its plenipotentiaries. The papers which have been submitted to your lordships' consideration, prove the truth of the fact that lord Yarmouth was authorized to make the communications he did, from the French to the British government; and afterwards, when lord Lauderdale met the French ministers, face to face, one of them attempted to evade and shuffle, whilst he could not deny the fact. I apprehend, therefore, my lords, that we are fairly entitled to argue, from the silence and the admission of the French plenipotentiaries themselves, that the *uti possidetis* was the basis originally agreed upon between the two governments. But why, it may be demanded, was not the French government called upon to avow their agreement with this principle in writing? They unquestionably wished it to be so understood by us, although they cautiously avoided formally committing it to writing, in order, doubtless, that they might afterwards have room to cavil; but is this any sufficient reason, why this government should not have treated upon that ground? The tone of the French government evidently altered after the signature of D'Oubril's treaty; but there had been a clear admission, previous to this event, that such was the mutually understood agreement. I cannot, then, avoid being of opinion, that when these considerations are candidly weighed, this single objection, as stated by the noble lord (Hawkesbury) should not have induced the noble lord to give a mere qualified approbation to the address. It may not, indeed, be perfectly regular, if I remind the noble lord of what formerly passed in another place, when he defended the negociations in a former treaty of peace, when his lordship called upon the other house of parliament, to look to the result of the whole, rather than to the detail piecemeal, and if it appeared, from the ratification of the whole, that it had been conducted upon sound principles, the house ought to be satisfied. Now, I would ask, can there be any room to suppose that it was not the intention of the French government that it should be fully understood by us, that the *uti possidetis* was the basis on which they agreed to treat; and, although they artfully continued to decline committing it into a formal written declaration, I have no hesitation in saying, that the people of England are perfectly satisfied that this was the intention of the French government. I acknowledge, indeed, that it is a serious thing for ministers to put forth any declaration in the name of their sovereign, which cannot be substantiated by facts; but, after what I have stated, I think that there can be no just ground for imputation on the veracity of the government of this country. I am persuaded, my lords, that but few negociations can be quoted, which, throughout the whole of them, exhibit, on the part of government, more proofs of self-denial, and good faith and honour, than his majesty's ministers have manifested upon the present occasion. All the territories of Sweden, of Portugal, and of the Porte, were guaranteed in their integrity. On the part of the king of the Two Sicilies, no positive treaty bound us to his interests, so that all that was attempted on his behalf, was honourable on our part. Our scrupulous adherence to our treaty with the emperor of Russia, and that even at the trying period of M. d'Oubril's improvident provisional and separate treaty with France, does honour to the good faith of this country; and I trust that we shall continue to cherish our connection with that magnanimous emperor, from a conviction that the interests of both countries are deeply involved in the continuation of that connection. With respect, my lords, to Hanover, I confess that I have met with animadversions on that subject which have given me pain. It is true, that it was a part of the Act of Settlement, that this nation should not be obliged to enter into war, on account of any foreign settlements, appertaining to the family which should inherit the throne of these kingdoms, without the express consent of parliament; but, surely, it was no part of the Act of Settlement, nor was it ever intended to make Hanover an exception to those other parts of the continent of Europe, which might become an object of British attention. It must be perfectly within the recollection of every noble lord, that when the first attack was made by France upon Hanover, that that was not made the ground of the war; at the same time, when in the course of the late negociation, his majesty's government considered it a point of honour to stipulate, that this seizure should be restored to its legitimate owner, they acted upon principles of magnanimity and justice. When Hanover was threatened during the war of the Spanish succession, parliament voted an address to his then majesty, in 1725, in which they stated, that they would stand by his majesty, against any menace of any potentate, against any territories of his majesty, although not belonging to Great Britain, in case such an attack should be made, in consequence of his majesty's just regard to the interests of this kingdom. Upon this principle of honour, our ancestors acted; and, I trust, my lords, that their descendants of the present day, will never swerve from their spirit. When we look to the continent of Europe, its present aspect, I confess, penetrates me with sorrow; still, so long as our connection with Russia exists, hope exists; added to which, there are other circumstances which, in my mind, at least afford a probable ground of expectation. The extent of dominion and of power are by no means convertible terms; power, when founded upon injustice and the grasp of inordinate ambition, can never be so solid, as when built upon the basis of justice and legitimate authority. The present power of France is chiefly derived from the military genius of its chief; which, though calculated to dazzle and to gain temporary success, yet is not formed to gain respect or attachment. Every father of a family is obliged to part with his son, to feed the ranks. The power of France is sustained by terror, whilst its ambitious ruler is secretly regarded with detestation; and should it not fall to the lot of this man to enjoy unexampled successes, then who knows but that a single check or reverse of fortune, will, to him, be likely to be more fatal than was ever before known in the history of the world? Looking, therefore, to the uncertainties of human life and fortune; regarding, likewise, the power, the fortitude, and zeal which animate our ally, the emperor of Russia, I cannot see any ground for despondency; and above all, looking to the spirit of the people of this country, I trust we shall arrive to an honourable termination of the present contest; for, I confess, it is on the spirit and fortitude of the people of this country, that we are called to place our chief reliance. The noble lord has justly animadverted upon the two financial sources of our national prosperity, the Sinking Fund, and the practice of raising the supplies within the year. The Sinking Fund certainly is a measure of incalculable benefit to our finances, and one which will immortalize the great man by whom it was established. I shall only say, therefore, upon this point, that at the present moment, we have resources very different from what they were in 1801. Then, the attempt to raise war taxes was abandoned, and the income tax was mortgaged to a certain extent. In the intermediate time, 97 millions have been funded, and at this moment, taxation to the amount of 4,900,000*l.* has been imposed in addition to the war taxes, amounting to nearly 20 millions sterling. With such means, exceeding double the amount of the interest of the national debt in 1793, and looking forward to the increasing surplus of the Sinking Fund, the nation need not fear to proceed in the struggle with perseverance and fortitude. I trust we shall submit to no compromise, in which our national honour shall at all be tarnished; that we shall come forth from this trial of fortitude with honour; and that, if we apply vigilantly, usefully, and economically, what shall be raised for the public exigencies, there is no limit to the exertions which this country will be disposed to make, either in extent, or duration of time. With respect to the late negociation, I shall ever contemplate with satisfaction the share I have had in it; no better proof was ever afforded of good faith and of a firm regard to the permanent interests of the country. I shall only repeat, in a word, that his majesty's declaration is strictly true in substance and in fact, and that the silence of the French plenipotentiaries affords satisfactory proofs upon this point. Government, by their conduct in this negociation, have, I trust, given a satisfactory pledge, that they will, in no case, compromise either the honour or the interests of the country.

Earl *Grosvenor* declared that if he were to confine his observations to the papers on the table, he should have very little with which to trouble the house, for in the most dispassionate and impartial examination of them, it distinctly appeared to him, that throughout the whole of the late negociation, there was evinced on the part of the British government the utmost sincerity and good faith; on the part of the French government, the utmost artifice and duplicity. He thought it perfectly apparent that the *uti possidetis* was understood by France to be the basis on which the two countries intended to treat, and on which the negociation proceeded. It was obvious that this was a proper basis for this country to proceed on, and it was equally apparent that this basis had been acquiesced in by France, at least that that country had given our government to understand that she acquiesced in that basis of negociation. If there was any thing in the course of the discussion to which he objected, it was to this, that the negociation had been too long delayed. If this country should ever again enter into a negociation with the present government of France, he hoped the basis on which it was to proceed would at once be fairly and distinctly pointed out and ascertained. While he lamented the failure of an honourable attempt to restore peace to the country, he could not, however, forbear contragulating himself, the house, and the country, on the general state of their affairs, and on their ability to carry on the war with vigour and effect. Adverting to the state of the continent, and to the military operations of the French, he observed that it was evident the person at the head of the French nation had determined not to sheathe the sword of war until he had subjugated the whole of Europe, and this country in particular. How were his ambitious designs to be counteracted? By a manly exertion of our power and resources. The retrospect of our naval and military fame was most encouraging. Let us recollect Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar, on the one hand, and Acre, Alexandria, and Maida, on the other, and we should look forward with confidence to the result of the contest in which we were engaged. The papers on the table, in his lordship's opinion, afforded satisfactory evidence of the activity, spirit, and energy of our councils, and held out to us the well grounded expectation that our courage and resources would be properly directed for the interest of the country. Our inveterate enemy, finding he could not otherwise induce us to enter into dishonourable terms with him, had attempted to aim, what he conceived, a vital blow at our commerce and manufactures. This, however, would also be found unavailing. He might, to his own conception, shut up the ports of the continent against us, but still our manufactures would flourish, and would find their way, even into the territories over which he exercised dominion. But, to injure our manufactures, it would be incumbent on him to shut against them, not the ports of the continent of Europe only, but those of Asia, Africa, and America; over which it was obvious that he could not possibly have any controul. Amidst our present gloom, said the noble earl, I cannot but derive some sources of consolation. One amongst others is that produced by the measure, which, in the early part of this evening, was brought forward by a noble lord high in his majesty's administration. I mean the bill introduced for the abolition of the Slave Trade. I rejoice that the inhuman traffic in slaves is seriously proposed to be put an end to. This to me is a source of consolation; another is the preservation of the established church. But here I cannot help lamenting that so little has been done of late years. In the reign of queen Anne, no less than 50 churches were at once ordered to be built; but have we been sufficiently attentive to this object, notwithstanding the vast increase of inhabitants in our populous towns and cities? Is it not for want of this, in a great measure, that the sectaries have of late years spread and abounded, so as to even threaten the safety and security of our religious establishment? I lament, likewise, the violation of the Lord's day, and that trades are suffered to be exercised on that day, to the disgrace of the country. The increased publication of newspapers on that day, I consider as coming within this charge of the violation of that holy day; and, even at the present moment, a new paper is advertised to be published, professedly denominated 'the Sunday paper.' These, I consider, as so many dark specks over our political hemisphere; nor are they trifling in their consequences; for, assuredly, if we neglect moral and religious considerations of this nature, we may look forward with fearful anxiety. But, I trust, we shall still adhere to the principles, civil and sacred, by which this country has so long flourished: "O fortunatos nimiùm, sua si bona nôrint!"

Lord *Eldon*.—I rise, my lords, with feelings peculiarly alive to the strong necessity of carrying fully into effect that part of the address proposed by the noble baron, of supporting with the most unceasing vigour and undaunted resolution the great contest in which we are engaged. Whoever reflects on what may prove the final issue of that contest, of what may prove the fate of this empire; whoever feels for the honour and happiness of Great Britain, must perceive, that the only chance of safety, and the great hope of ultimate and decisive triumph, now depends upon a vigorous prosecution of the war. Whilst, then, the genuine British feeling continues to animate the people of this empire, I am convinced there is not a man in this house, or in this country, who would not rather perish in the calamitous conflict, than willingly compromise the dignified character of Britain, or tamely submit to any base acknowledgement of inferiority to any enemy, however extensive his territorial influence, or splendid his military success. But, my lords, in entering into the discussion of the merits of the late negociation, anxious as I feel to express my approbation of the conduct of his majesty's government in fully supporting the acknowledged character of this country for sincerity and good faith; satisfied as I am with the manner in which the interests and safety of our allies have been preserved, as well of those powers to whom we were bound by the solemn compact of the most sacred obligations, as of others, whose strong claim upon our assistance, arose equally from the benefit of the principle, and the congeniality of the interest; yet, my lords, I may be permitted to say, without the least imputation upon the conduct or reputation of ministers, that I lament the protraction of the negociation. The prolongation of the correspondence I regret, because the chicanery and the deception of the French government were so peculiarly marked, and so apparently observable throughout every stage of the negociation. And, my lords, give me leave to say, that when, under the direct authority and express avowal of his majesty, such a negociation is thought necessary to be originated, no one act should be overlooked, or any circumstance omitted, calculated to lessen, either in the eyes of the enemy, or of Europe, the glory and honour of the crown, connected, as they are, with the greatness and security of the empire. Therefore, I should have pondered longer and longer, previous to my acquiescence in any procedure in which the manifest intention of the enemy of these realms was to delude by delay, to defeat by deception. For if, by any unfortunate and destructive infatuation, we should ever be brought to imitate the conduct of those countries, which, from narrow views of policy, and a confined, selfish, and fatal contemplation of events, have ultimately been made the victims of their own delusion, and annihilated by that very power to which they had so repeatedly succumbed; if, I say, the people of Great Britain should ever be induced to forget the proud distinction of their own immediate situation, or neglect the sacred principle, by the exercise of which that proud distinction was obtained, then should we have to regret the complete forgetfulness of all that was hitherto held sacred; to witness the lamentable submission of British honour and good faith, to the most scandalous violation of every principle of equity, and every precept of common justice. To guard against such an humiliation, and to preserve unsullied the unrivalled honour of the British name, there is not, I am convinced, an individual in this country, through whose veins one drop of British blood circulates, but would voluntarily shed it in that noblest of all causes, and who does not look forward, with the most ardent feelings, to that great and important trial, upon the result of which his own and his country's happiness and security will depend. But, my lords, though I fully appreciate the danger of the crisis, and the energies which such a danger demands to have brought into immediate action; and though I strongly feel the necessity of supporting his majesty with firmness and vigour, yet, from my knowledge of the man who commands the resources of France, from my knowledge of his respect for no law, and my conviction of the unceasing ambition by which he is actuated, I can by no means bring myself to join in that part of the address, where the ineffectual endeavours of his majesty to terminate a pacific treaty with the chief of the French government, are considered as a cause of regret. God forbid, that for one moment I should be considered the advocate of an interminable war, or an unfeeling spectator of the numerous afflictions and distresses which war occasions! yet, however humane considerations may tend to repress the assertion, I cannot refrain from expressing my dissent to this part of the address; and upon this point I appeal to the testimony of the noble viscount (Sidmouth) opposite. I appeal to the opinion, which, previous to the ratification of the Treaty of Amiens, I thought it my duty, as an honest servant of the crown, to communicate to my sovereign. At that period I never did assert, that the conditions of that treaty were glorious and honourable; I did not contend that its stipulations were such as to provide for the permanence of peace, or the lasting security of Great Britain; but I was induced to hope, that after the conquests which the chief of the French empire had obtained, that after the actual enjoyments and the comforts derived from his own repose, he would be unwilling to forfeit the great blessing he was possessed of, or to disturb the reciprocal tranquillity of the respective countries. But, my lords, considerably changed are my opinions, and widely different are my views of the advantages of a peace with France, when I recall to my recollection, that scarcely was the Treaty of Amiens executed, when the most insidious and open violation of every principle of good faith was exhibited; when, in defiance of every provision of that treaty, the head of the French government recommenced his system of unbounded aggression, with a renovated lust of power, with a complete disregard of all those maxims and usages, which were wont to support the honour and happiness of the civilized world. But if a further proof was still wanting to exhibit the characteristic duplicity of the French cabinet, let us, my lords, look to the dates, when the Russian minister D'Oubril was either forced, or tricked, to sign a separate treaty with France. Here the strong inducement with that minister, was to save the Austrian empire; for this specific purpose, and this alone, the treaty was actually executed, by the plenipotentiary of Russia; yet, if I do not much misconstrue the dates, the changes in Germany, and the Rhenish Confederation, were not only meditated, but actually completed, if not at the signing of the treaty by D'Oubril, most certainly before the arrival of that ambassador with the treaty at the court of St. Petersburgh. In this most flagitious conduct of one nation to another; in this uniform perseverance in fraud, aggression, and injustice, I find the strong argument which justifies me not to lament the failure of a pacific adjustment with an enemy, whose aggressions, in times of peace, are equally hostile with his movements in times of war.—Having thus declared my opinion upon the result of the negociation, I shall now advert to the basis upon which the declaration of his majesty has asserted that it commenced and proceeded. This principle of actual possession, or the *uti possidetis*, is asserted to be the basis upon which the respective governments originated the discussion. Now, my lords, fairly and plainly arguing the question, and comparing the understood and admitted meaning of the *uti possidetis* with the two bases agreed upon between that great departed statesman (Mr. Fox) and M. Talleyrand, I do confess I cannot recognize the principle of actual possession as the basis of a treaty. *Uti possidetis* are two latin words, fully empowering the contracting parties to hold, in their respective possession, whatever territory or conquests over which, at or before the execution of the treaty, they may have obtained a sovereignty. Let us compare this definition of the *uti possidetis*, with the two bases agreed upon, either with the one which specifies the determination of contracting upon general grounds for ourselves and allies, or with the more enlarged principle of guaranteeing the security of the lesser states; and I am sure, that, from such a comparison, there is nothing in the annals of diplomacy, to justify, from such a construction of the bases of a negociation, by the most tortured perversion which the most ingenious reasoner may adopt, any thing approximating to the principle of actual possession. That his majesty's ministers were sincere in believing that the *uti possidetis* was the admitted basis, I most candidly believe, and that it was the design of the French government to encourage that impression, at the same time that it cautiously avoided committing itself to such a compact throughout the entire progress of the correspondence. Indeed, the conduct of his majesty's government has proved it to be a government seeking peace, in the spirit of peace; whilst the contrasted fluctuation of the enemy, shifting and evasive, at one moment giving up one concession, in the next reclaiming the proposition, which it before conceded, clearly exhibits that, from the beginning until the rupture of the negociation, the same perfidy and bad faith were the actuating principle of the French cabinet. But there is one fact, to which I must beg the attention of your lordships, as it is one upon which the declaration of his majesty, the character of his government, and the credit of the country, are at issue with the statement of that man who is at the head of the French empire, and has, in the face of the world, positively denied that the *uti possidetis* was the basis of the late negociation. This is a circumstance which it behoves his majesty's ministers fully to explain; and to convince this house, and all Europe, that what has gone abroad, sanctioned by the name of their sovereign, is the true and justified inference. But the noble baron opposite, has proved, with considerable perspicuity, that the principle of actual possession, is the only principle which could apply to the comparative situation of Great Britain and France, that, from the diversified nature of the various conquests of the respective empires and from the maritime superiority of the one compared with the territorial influence of the other, the only probable basis upon which a treaty honourable to both the contracting parties could be effected, was the basis of the *uti possidetis*. Having thus proved that the principle of actual possession was the only basis upon which a beneficial treaty could have been concluded, the noble baron has certainly added to the number of the reasons, and enforced the cogency of those arguments, which render it absolutely necessary for ministers to prove to a demonstration, that the principle of the *uti possidetis* was the actual basis, agreed and acted upon in the late negociation. Really, I know not in what part of the official papers presented to this house, his majesty's ministers will find this principle of actual possession, once recognized by the French government. Surely not in the letter dated the 5th of March, where an extract from the speech of the chief of that empire states the readiness of the enemy to make peace upon the basis of the Treaty of Amiens—a basis directly contrary to the principle of the *uti possidetis;* and a treaty, to which, from the former feelings of the noble baron opposite to me, I am surprized he could have for one moment listened. But, my lords, not only in the letter of M. Talleyrand, of the 5th of March, is there no mention of this basis, but in the whole of the respective communications from the 20th of March to the 13th of June, not a syllable, word, or sentence, of such an import or meaning, is to be found. Is it not rather remarkable, that in the progress of a correspondence, avowed, by the Declaration of his majesty, to have originated and continued upon the basis of the *uti possidetis,* now that the negociation has failed, his majesty's ministers are unable to bring forward, for the satisfaction of this house and the country at large, no better evidence of the recognition of that principle, by the government of France, than the few scanty undefined words of the French minister? and indeed, my lords, it has produced in my mind no small degree of astonishment, to find in the answer of Mr. Fox, to the communication of M. Talleyrand, where this disinclination of France to demand any of the possessions of England is stated, no one observation or reference to the principle of actual possession; although that answer was intended to amplify and elucidate the important nature of the basis proposed, together with the probable commercial advantage of France, and the consequent respect of her naval flag. With respect to the conferences of the earl of Yarmouth with the French minister, how does the history disclose itself? On the 2d of June, a letter was dispatched from the French minister to Mr. Fox, for the purpose of explaining the nature of the conferences with the earl of Yarmouth, and the object of that lord's departure for this country. This letter arrived in London the 4th of June, the same day on which that noble lord reached town; yet, in this communication, there is not an admission of the principle of the *uti possidetis;* and though the earl of Yarmouth had a conference with Mr. Fox, about the time of its arrival, yet, in the answer of Mr. Fox, of the 14th of June, there is preserved an equally unaccountable silence upon the actual principle of the *uti possidetis.* It has been reported as a reason that the direct basis of actual possession was not specifically stated, that it arose from the peculiar circumstances of the German dominions of his majesty. Why the situation of those dominions should operate against a clear, decided, and unambiguous expression of the basis upon which the contracting parties had respectively agreed to treat, I am at a loss to comprehend. But I must again repeat, that in the history of diplomacy I never either read or heard of such a basis of negociation as that which his majesty's ministers have, in the present case, selected for the ground of their justification. There are a few other points upon which I beg leave to trouble your lordships; one is the last letter said, in the French account of the negociation, to have been sent by M. Talleyrand to lord Lauderdale. I shall be glad to hear from the noble lord that no such letter was ever received, or that no minister of a hostile power would dare to send to the plenipotentiary of Great Britain, a communication replete with the most base and injurious calumnies; calumnies which tended to exhibit that noble lord in the most savage form, and which, I am fully persuaded, were to him unfoundedly and improperly addressed. Another instance of the same inveterate malice and unprincipled audacity was the contradiction of one of the French plenipotentiaries, to the report the earl of Yarmouth had made of his conferences with the French minister, on the basis of the negociation, and, which reports were denominated Political Romances. Upon the whole of the evidence which the papers presented to this house contain, I still contend, that the basis of actual possession is not only not proved to be true, but that the evidence makes out no such proposition, even in the remotest view of the case. To the other parts of the address, I repeat my most cordial and hearty assent; deeply impressed as I am with the necessity of meeting the dangers of the crisis, and the menaces of our inveterate enemy, with all that firmness, patriotism and spirit, which have ever evinced the marked intrepidity of this country, and preserved inviolate, the purity of the national character.

Lord *Grenville* had an anxiety far beyond any personal consideration, that the cause of the country on this great question should stand clear, and its rectitude and truth unquestioned. He was rejoiced to find, than in this enlightened assembly, there was no doubt as to the propriety with which the cause of the country had been conducted that affected any one great principle. He was happy to think that there was no Englishman, who, on reading the papers before their lordships, but would say, with that noble energy which was so well conveyed in the language of the learned lord opposite, that he was unworthy of the name of Englishman, who, after his majesty's efforts for the restoration of peace had been frustrated, as the papers evinced, by the unprincipled ambition and bad faith of the enemy, would not be content to shed the last drop of his blood in support of the just cause of his majesty and the country. When he had with so much satisfaction heard this grand principle so eloquently enforced, it was with infinite regret that he heard the noble and eloquent lord enter into the consideration of points of such minute importance that they were no better than mere matters of technical form. It was with infinite pain that he should follow the noble and eloquent lord through these petty details. But he said it might seem disrespectful towards the house, if his majesty's ministers should leave even this part of the objections made to their conduct unanswered and unexplained. Yet if the objection urged by the noble and learned lord were even universally felt, that would not prove that the cause of the country was wrong, or that any error had been committed in the management of the negociation. The most it could amount to would be, that some inaccuracy had been fallen into by those who drew up the Declaration, for he was sure no wilful mis-statement would be suspected, in laying the case before parliament and the public. The noble lord on the other side maintained that there was nothing in the papers on the table to sustain the assertion, that the French government ever proposed to treat upon the basis of the *uti possidetis.* But even if the noble lord were borne out in his inference, still it would not avail him for the purpose he had in view; because ministers had other and still stronger grounds upon which to rest. At least the noble lord would allow that nothing appeared in those papers to form even an apology for denying that the proposition of the *uti possidetis* was acceded to by the French government at the outset. Although he might affirm, as he had done, that the statement in his majesty's declaration as to this point, was not directly borne out by the documents on the table; still he would not venture to say that it was directly contradicted. Indeed, it was hardly possible that any candid man would hazard such a contradiction. But, as he had already stated, his majesty's ministers had other information to proceed upon in forming the declaration which formed the subject of the noble lord's animadversion; and the noble lord must have been aware of that, although it seemed so much this night to have escaped his recollection. And this was certainly rather strange, for, considering the practice of that learned profession, of which the noble lord formed such a distinguished member, it was really extraordinary that when the best evidence that the case required, was within his reach, he should have taken up the very worst. The noble lord took for his basis, and argued upon the words of gen. Clarke and M. Talleyrand, to which no man could expect that house or any candid assembly to attach confidence in a business of this nature, and particularly under the circumstances in which those words were written, instead of resorting to that evidence to which a desire of attaining the truth would naturally direct; namely, the evidence of the very person (lord Yarmouth) to whom the proposition of the *uti possidetis* was made by the French minister, and who was specially dispatched by that minister to bear that proposition to this country. To that noble lord the verbal message which distinctly contained this proposition was committed by the French government, and by him it was communicated to his majesty's ministers. It was not therefore to any words of gen. Clarke or M. Talleyrand, when they found it convenient to change the original ground of the negociation, nor even to the papers before the house, but to the testimony of lord Yarmouth that house was to look for a justification of that paper, the correctness of which the noble lord on the other side thought fit to question. If lord Yarmouth had been dead, if he were not at present forthcoming, if he had not actually spoken, why, in such case, the doubts of the noble lord might have been excusable and his arguments plausible. But lord Yarmouth had fully testified to the fact stated in his majesty's declaration. That noble lord's written evidence was before the house, and his *vivâ voce* evidence was before the country (see p. 249). Was not that sufficient to satisfy the noble lord? If any man asserted that the proofs furnished by the documents on the table were nugatory, as to the establishment of the point respecting the *uti possidetis*, if it were argued that lord Yarmouth's notes were inadequate, and that further proof was demanded, then he would refer to the words of lord Yarmouth so recently delivered, as the best possible proof that could be looked for by any reasonable man, as amply sufficient to supply any omission that might appear in the papers before the house, and as forming the most complete justification of those concerned in drawing up that passage in the Declaration, to which the noble lord opposite had thought proper to object.—From this point the noble lord proceeded to the consideration of another, upon which he was induced to rise: he meant as to the slur which had been cast by the noble lord opposite, upon the conduct of the negociation. Upon this, he had no hesitation in asserting that the negociation was commenced under the direction of a statesman of the most eminent ability; of one who was particularly conversant with this department of political knowledge; of one who was, beyond any comparison, the ablest diplomatist he had ever known; certainly by far the ablest he had ever seen. Yet the noble lord, opposite, had been pleased to find fault with his mode of proceeding. But that Mr. Fox completely understood the general practice of diplomacy; that his plan of negociation was precedented and wise, and that the noble lord opposite, mistated that practice, he was fully prepared to maintain. The doctrine laid down by the noble lord, that no negociation should be entered into, unless the first overtures were specifically committed to writing, was, he would affirm, entirely novel and unprecedented. Nothing was so general as to commence with verbal communications, and then to proceed to written documents. In this instance the first propositions were made verbally, but then in every subsequent dispatch to both lords Yarmouth and Lauderdale, it was prescribed to have their propositions committed to writing, and there was no dispatch transmitted by those noble lords to his majesty's ministers in which it did not appear that they uniformly dwelt upon that point. Indeed lord Yarmouth was sent back to Paris for the special purpose of having the communications verbally made to him committed to writing. There was, therefore, no degree of incorrectness, inaccuracy, or looseness, in the conduct of this negociation, on the part of this country, whatever might have been the misconduct of France. Unless, indeed, the noble lord opposite could allege it as an accusation against his majesty's ministers that the French government had receded from their first propositions; unless he could shew that our government manifested a disposition to treat upon a different basis, or had actually proposed such basis; or rather, unless he could cancel from the recollection of their lordships and the country the positive directions to lord Yarmouth to abandon the negociation altogether if the French government would not treat on the grounds proposed in the first instance, it was impossible the noble lord could make out the charges he had endeavoured to establish against the conduct of his majesty's ministers. So precise were ministers on this point, that lord Yarmouth was instructed not to produce his full powers to the French ministers until the propositions verbally made to him should be formally confirmed by being committed to writing; until he should have a written document from the French government. The circumstance of that noble lord's having produced those powers before his instructions were complied with, it was now unnecessary to discuss; whatever might have been the merits of that transaction, sure he was that no one would question the motives of that noble lord, or doubt for a moment that his conduct was actuated by the most sincere and ardent wishes for the interests of his country. It was, however, clear, from the instructions given to that nobleman, that his majesty's ministers used every means to obtain from the French government a written acknowledgement of its views, as stated in its first communications by the same nobleman. For that purpose lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris. At least that was the first object to which he was to attend. That nobleman's instructions were, to have committed to writing the first propositions of the French government, including of course the *uti possidetis*, or else to return to England.—The noble lord concluded with observing, that he was induced to rise, only with a view to elucidate the two points alluded to by the noble lord opposite, namely, with regard to the statement in his majesty's declaration respecting the *uti possidetis*, and also in regard to the conduct of the negociation, upon both which points he hoped that he had succeeded in satisfying the house that the noble lord's censures were unfounded, that the statement in the Declaration of his majesty was fully sustained by the facts of the case, and that the conduct of the great statesman who was now no more, was not in any instance more strongly entitled to the esteem, the gratitude, and the admiration of his country—that, instead of having deserved the charge of inaccuracy or incorrectness, his management of this negociation was marked by the most perfect regularity.

Lord *Eldon*, in explanation, disclaimed any intention of casting a reflection upon the conduct or character of the distinguished statesman alluded to, but repeated his assertion, that in the correspondence which took place from March to June, there was not one word about the *uti possidetis*; and took occasion to observe, that the instructions to lord Yarmouth were, not that he should insist upon the *uti possidetis*, but that he should not produce his powers unless it were agreed to leave Sicily in possession of the king of Naples.

Lord *Lauderdale* expressed his happiness to find, that the address before the house was likely to meet with their lordships' unanimous concurrence, but at the same time he could not help observing, that in the course of the discussion, a vast deal of extraneous matter had been introduced, and particularly by the learned lord who spoke last but one. It was not, however, his intention to follow that learned lord either in his irrelevant remarks, or in that part of his speech which had relevancy to the subject under consideration. He could not think of detaining the attention of the house as to the one, and the able and impressive manner in which the case had been opened by his noble friend on the bench near him (lord Grenville) rendered it quite unnecessary for him to offer many observations with regard to the other. He did not rise, therefore, so much with the intention of adding any thing in the shape of argument to what the house had heard from his noble friend, as in order to give his testimony to the learned lord opposite (lord Eldon). But, before he proceeded to answer that learned lord's call, he could not help expressing his surprise that it had been made at all. It certainly was rather singular that the learned lord should apply to him for evidence after having doubted the evidence of lord Yarmouth—that he should deem his testimony of any account, after treating that of lord Yarmouth as perfectly nugatory. Passing this by, however, it did happen that he (lord L.) could give ample evidence to the facts questioned by the noble lord opposite. For, independently of lord Yarmouth's having repeatedly stated these facts to him, he was enabled to confirm them from other sources, particularly from his own conferences with the minister of France. Without, however, any corroboration from his testimony, he would contend that the notes and verbal communications of lord Yarmouth were quite sufficient to sustain the assertions complained of in his majesty's Declaration, and also to vindicate the conduct of the negociation from the noble lord's charge of irregularity. The learned lord professed to have read the papers on the table, and no doubt he had done so with great attention, still he seemed to have overlooked, or but slightly considered the dispatch of the 13th of June from lord Yarmouth to Mr. Fox. There the noble lord repeated the words of M. Talleyrand, that that minister had been "looking out for some means by which a secret and confidential communication might be made, explanatory of the sentiments and views of France, as well as the outlines of the terms on which peace might be restored." After this followed an account of the verbal communication of M. Talleyrand. Comparing this letter with that from M. Talleyrand, of the 2d of June, the propositions asserted by his noble friend in opening the case, appeared to him to be completely made out, and the objections of the noble lord to be most extraordinary indeed. But as to the conduct of Mr. Fox, it was to be recollected, that he wrote two letters on the 14th of June, the one in reply to such part of M. Talleyrand's communication as was written; and the other, presenting lord Yarmouth as an authorised person to make to the French minister a verbal answer to such verbal communications as that noble lord was authorized by that minister to convey to this country. Could any fault be found by any candid man, with that mode of proceeding on the score of regularity? Certainly not. But the noble lord opposite inferred that the *uti possidetis* was not insisted upon by lord Yarmouth, because Sicily alone was mentioned. He called upon the noble lord, however, to examine the dispatch of the 1st of July. There lord Yarmouth states, that in a conversation with M. Talleyrand he mentioned the impossibility of going on any farther upon the outlines of peace "unless he should return to the former grounds, and consider Sicily in its true sense—unless he came strictly within the meaning of his own words." To what then could this refer but to some general proposition before made, and the return of that proposition was easily deducible from this dispatch. The existence indeed of such general proposition appeared clearly from the words of M. Talleyrand, that a change of circumstances was always to be considered as a reason for a change of terms. Further, it was to be observed, that the change then arose out of the opinion which Buonaparte had just adopted, that Sicily could be captured by him with ease. Thus the French government thought proper to recede from their first propositions. In this instance indeed they avowed and attempted to justify the change, and in terms too which pretty intelligibly implied the nature of it. For why insist upon Sicily? because they thought they could get it into their possession, and the connection of possession, with the avowed change of terms in this instance, led at least to a natural and obvious inference in favour of the argument respecting *uti possidetis*. But there was no occasion to rest upon inferences. Lord Yarmouth had, in his presence, stated to M. Talleyrand himself, the original propositions of that minute, respecting the *uti possidetis*, as referred to in his majesty's declaration, without meeting any thing like a denial. The learned lord opposite would admit, that there was a very material difference between a controversy as to the inferences deducible from a proposition, and the giving a distinct contradiction to the proposition itself. Now, whatever there might have been of the former, Talleyrand never uttered any thing at all approaching to the latter. On the contrary, indeed, lord Yarmouth's assertion appeared evidently from the language and conduct of M. Talleyrand to ascertain an admitted indisputable fact, as to the original basis of the negociation. But, in order to controvert the statement, that this basis referred to the *uti possidetis*, the learned lord opposite fixed upon the first communication from France, and finding in that Buonaparte's speech to his senate, in which he spoke of the basis of the treaty of Amiens, the noble lord insisted that such was the probable basis originally proposed by the French government. Now, it happened that the noble lord was rather somewhat confused in his examination. For the negociation was not at all on the tapis at the time this speech was made, and therefore the sentiment quoted from it, had no connection with the case before the house. Indeed, the whole was confounding an amicable correspondence between two individuals, one of whom was sincerely anxious for peace, with the official communications of public ministers.—With respect to the continuance of the negociation after his arrival in Paris, he referred, for the justification of his conduct, to the documents on the table, confident that it would appear from them that he had not unnecessarily or improperly prolonged his stay after he found the French government unwilling to act according to the principles upon which alone he was authorized to proceed; therefore no charge of procrastination was attributable to him, for his delay at Paris would have been very short indeed, were it possible for him to have obtained passports as soon as he applied for them. Any time that he remained at Paris, in consequence of apparently pacific changes in the conduct and tone of the French minister, and particularly in consequence of the change produced by the intelligence of the non-ratification of the Russian treaty, was dictated by an anxious desire to avail himself of any favourable opportunity that promised to secure the great object his mission had in view, and in that to secure the honour and interests of his country. With regard to the letter alluded to by the learned lord opposite, he could say, that during his stay in Paris he experienced no want of civility whatever; nor did he know of any thing different, until he saw, in this country, the posthumous letter addressed to him in the Moniteur.—The address was then read from the Woolsack, and agreed to, *nem. diss.*—Adjourned at 11 o'clock.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, January 2.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Vansittart brought up the Malt-Duty bill, and the Pensions Duty bill, which were read a first time; he then moved, that the house should resolve itself into a committee of supply, and that the account of Exchequer bills, presented yesterday to the house, should be referred to the said committee. The Speaker having left the chair, Mr. Vansittart moved, that 10,500,000*l.* be granted to his majesty, for paying off 10,500,000*l.* raised for the year 1805, by Loans on Exchequer bills outstanding and unprovided for.—The house resumed, and the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.—Mr. Adam moved to discharge the order for taking the Linlithgow Election into consideration, and appoint it for the 10th of March.—The following Election Petitions were presented and ordered to be taken into consideration: Nottingham, appointed for January 22; Shaftesbury, for March 3; Culross, for March 24; Guildford, for March 5; Lancaster, for March 10; Taunton, for March 10; Melbourne-Port, (2 petitions) for March 10; Honiton, (3 petitions) for March 12; Christchurch, (2 petitions) for March 12; East Loo, for March 17; Newry, for March 17; Edinburgh (City) for March 26; Dublin, Shrewsbury, Glasgow, Malmsbury, the same day as the former petitions.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Saturday, January 3.

[MINUTES.] The Speaker acquainted the house, that he having been returned to serve in parliament for the University of Oxford, and also for the borough of Heytesbury, it was necessary that he should make his election, for which of those places he would serve; and, therefore, he informed the house that he had made his election to serve for the university of Oxford.—He also acquainted the house, that he had received a letter from John Lowther, esq. who had been returned for the county of Cumberland, and also for the borough of Cockermouth; stating, that he had made his election to serve for the county of Cumberland.—He also informed the house, that he had received a letter from Sir C. Hawkins, bart. who had been returned for the boroughs of Grampound, Michael, and Penrhyn, against which latter return a petition had been presented, and then lay on the table; stating that he had made his election to serve for the borough of Grampound.—He also informed the house, that he had received a letter from the right hon. Maurice Fitzgerald, who had been returned for the county of Kerry, and also for the borough of Tralee, stating that he made his election to serve for the county of Kerry.—Mr. Vansittart informed the house, that having been returned for the borough of Helleston, and also for the borough of Old Sarum, he made his election to serve for the latter place.—The following new Writs were then moved for: borough of Cockermouth, in the room of J. Lowther, esq. who had made his election to serve for Cumberland; borough of Haslemere, in the room of viscount Garlies, now earl of Galloway; borough of Tralee, in the room of the right hon. M. Fitzgerald, who had made his election to serve for Kerry; borough of Helleston, in the room of Mr. Vansittart who had made his election to serve for Old Sarum; borough of St. Michael, in the room of F. W. Trench, esq. who had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds; borough of Minehead, in the room of Sir John Lethbridge, who had accepted the office of steward of East Hendred.—Mr. Freemantle presented a petition on behalf of the agent for the petitioner against the return for the borough of Saltash, praying of the house to enlarge the time for receiving the usual recognizance. He stated, that the recognizance had been transmitted to the country by the post, in due time to be returned to town, but owing to some unaccountable delay, its transmission back to town had been delayed. The Speaker observed, that it was his duty to call the attention of the house to this subject. By a resolution of the house, the recognizance upon a petition, complaining of an undue election, should be returned within 14 days after presenting such petition; this had not been done in the present case, but a reason had been stated for this delay; it was therefore his duty to lay the facts before the house, that the house might consider whether there were sufficient grounds for admitting the receipt of such petition. The question was then put upon bringing up the petition, and carried, *nem. con.* The petition being then read, the time for returning the recognizance was enlarged until Wednesday next.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, January 5.

[THETFORD ELECTION.] Mr. *Whitbread* moved for discharging the order for taking the petition into consideration on the 27th instant, for the purpose of moving its consideration on a future day. The grounds that he stated for this motion were, that there was a number of persons who voted that were supposed to have no legal right to vote, and that therefore it was adviseable to try the legality of their votes in the usual manner, by moving a quo warranto in the Court of King's Bench. There had not hitherto been sufficient time for trying the validity of those votes in that manner, as the election was on the 4th of November, and the last term ended on the 26th. The object of his motion was, therefore, such a delay as would allow time for the question to be determined by a court of law. He should therefore afterwards move, that the consideration of the petition be postponed until the 12th of February.

Mr. *Mingay* declared, that he rose under considerable trepidation and alarm. If he were to say that it was diffidence, at presenting himself to a public assembly, such a declaration from a man of his years, and of his former professional habits, would draw down ridicule; but he felt seriously distressed, when he considered that he was so personally and pointedly attacked. Until yesterday he had not the slightest idea that any member of that house would bring forward such a motion. Although it was true, that the election of Thetford was on the 4th of November, yet the fact was, that the point now at issue had been settled five years ago, and had been ever since acquiesced in. It was not one term alone that the petitioners had had to try the law of the question, but every term since the year 1801 they might have brought it forward, if they had thought proper. The question went to nothing less than tearing to pieces the corporate rights of that borough, and dissolving the corporation. This was a petition that the house would not shew peculiar favour to; and he hoped they would not let it hang for ever over his head, as he believed the real object of the petitioners was to keep him as long in hot water as possible. It was the death of an old alderman (his brother) that occasioned this petition. There were complaints now of what a man, who was alderman, and afterwards mayor of the town, had done in 1801, 2, 3. A great part of the voters that had been made during that time were now sought to be disfranchised. There was however, no objection made to the votes made by that alderman in 1801, and yet, after so many years, the petitioners wished to disfranchise, on a supposed irregularity, such a number of voters, as would in fact change the corporation itself. After distinguishing this case from the cases of Harwich and East Retford, he hoped the house would not now establish such a precedent for attacking corporate bodies.

Mr. *Whitbread* was not conscious of having said any thing which the hon. gent. was justified in considering as a personal attack on himself. The question was merely a legal question, whether a certain description of persons had or had not the right of voting. If they had, the hon. gent. was secure of his seat; if they had not, he would of course be removed from his seat. He could not suppose the object of the petition was by any means to harass him, or keep him, as he had expressed it, in hot water. Although it was possible that for the last 5 years, illegal votes might have been received, yet, if the flaw was not discovered until the last election, the petitioners were in sufficient time.

Mr. *Mingay* again stated, that it was not one term only that they had lain by, but it was five years and one term. He was, therefore, against the motion for discharging the order.

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* considered that the house had hardly sufficient materials to decide on, having only two contradictory statements. He thought, however, that as to this flaw, which had been only discovered the other day, the courts of law would be as slow to lend themselves to the overturning corporate rights as the committees of the house of commons.

The *Attorney-General* had no objection to the delay of a fortnight, which was all that was asked for in the first instance, but he could not see why the petitioners suffered all the last term to pass over without moving for a writ of quo warranto. This was all they could do in the course of the next term, and that would be very far from deciding the question.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that the delay of a fortnight was all he asked in the first instance, and if, at the end of that period, he could not lay sufficient grounds for postponing it further, the house of course would not consent to put it off longer.

Mr. *Rose* considered that it was likely, that postponing it upon the grounds that were stated, would make it necessary that it should be postponed so long, that it could not be determined in the course of the present session.

Lord *Howick* observed, that it would be extremely inconvenient that the house should that night divide upon the question: he therefore proposed the debate should be adjourned until to-morrow. This proposition was accordingly agreed to.

[NEGOCIATION WITH FRANCE.]—Lord *Howick*, having moved that the Papers presented to the house on the 22d of December last (see p. 91) relating to the Negociation with France, be now taken into consideration, rose, and addressed the house as follows:—Mr. Speaker, the Papers which have been laid before the house in consequence of his majesty's gracious command for that purpose, having now been for a considerable time under consideration, it becomes my duty to offer that proposition to the house which has been usual on similar occasions; namely, a motion for an humble address to his majesty, expressive of such sentiments as the house may think fit to convey to the throne, after a careful review of the whole of this most important question. In rising to perform this duty, it is impossible for me not to experience many painful feelings: in the first place, regret, deep and lasting regret, for the failure of an effort sincerely directed to the restoration of peace to this country and to Europe, aggravated as that failure has been by the increased difficulties which the rapid succession of the most fatal events has since opposed to the restoration of peace. But, sir, connected with these feelings, peculiarly affecting to myself, is another event which it is impossible for me to pass by unnoticed, for it is impossible for me not to recollect by whom this business would have been detailed to this house, but for the dispensation of Providence. It is impossible for me to speak a word upon this occasion, either as to the effort itself, or the failure of it, without recollecting the great and irreparable loss the country has sustained in the death of that loved friend and instructor, without whose guidance and support I have no confidence in my own strength. It is impossible for me to forget what he was, and what I am. In detailing his efforts, and defending his conduct, I feel more than ever my own insufficiency for the performance of the task which he alone could adequately fulfill. If any thing can support me under such apprehensions, and upon such an occasion, it is the knowledge I have of those principles, as connected with this subject, which he held invariably until he ceased for ever to think of any thing in this life, of his opinions, as to the means to be used for the purpose of restoring peace and prosperity to this country. It is that knowledge which alone can enable me, or rather encourage me adequately to perform the duty which I owe to his memory, to this house, and to the public. Sir, if I could be confident of a general concurrence in this house on this subject, such as I believe to prevail abroad; or if I could even trust that this house would follow the example of the other house of parliament in the unanimity of its vote, my task would indeed be grateful and easy; but I know too well, the severity of criticism which I have to expect from some quarters in this house, and I am too apprehensive of a radical difference of opinion, to entertain that confidence, or to think there will be any such unanimity of sentiment in this house, as to the result of the negociation. I shall therefore endeavour, by as clear and detailed an exposition as I can make of the facts, to shew, that as, on the one hand, the king's government has, in no instance, committed the honour of the crown, by any manifestation or disposition to make improper concessions and sacrifices so, on the other, it has neglected no means within its power to conclude such a peace as was consistent with the honour, prosperity, and interests of the country. I do not know whether, on the present occasion, it will be necessary to shew to the house that, at the time of opening the late negociation, peace was in itself desirable. This, as a general proposition, is always true; peace is always desirable. The only true and legitimate end of war is a safe and honourable peace. But the question will be, whether we stood in a situation, at the moment of opening the negociation, that we could open it with a hope of obtaining such terms as, under all circumstances, the country had a right to expect. I think it will hardly be denied, that after the failure of the third coalition, after the fatal day of Austerlitz, peace, if it could have been obtained without any important sacrifices, which should place us in a worse situation as to the renewal of a war to which we might be provoked by the injustice of the enemy—if such a peace could have been obtained, I think that, merely with a view to the temporary repose of the world, it would have been desirable. If it would have been desirable, then, upon what principle ought the negociation to have been entered into? And here I must refer to the principle stated in Mr. Fox's first letter to M. Talleyrand, in answer to the first overture, "that a peace, to be advantageous to the two countries, should be negociated on principles honourable to both, and, at the same time, of a nature, as far as possible, to secure the future tranquillity of Europe." This principle is what I wish the house to keep in mind, because it is that which was invariably pursued by his majesty's ministers. It was that which they made the basis of the negociation. They insisted, first, that we should treat in conjunction with our ally the emperor of Russia; and, in the next place, that the negociation should be conducted upon the basis of actual possession, because they thought that a negociation, to be honourable, should be equal, and, to be equal, it is necessary that at the outset each party should acknowledge that neither is in a situation to be under the necessity of purchasing peace of the other on terms of humiliation, or any other disadvantage; and this I say results as a necessary corollary from that principle laid down by Mr. Fox, in the outset, in his answer to the overture of M. Talleyrand for peace, that the peace should be honourable to both countries and their respective allies, and secure, as far as possible, the tranquillity of Europe. Then let us see how this matter stands at the outset of the negociation. A right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) upon a former occasion said, that there were three points to be made out by his majesty's ministers: First, that the first overture came from the enemy; next, that the negociation was instituted on the basis of actual possession; thirdly, that we should act only in concert with our allies. Sir, as to the first point, I think it has been proved. I do not know whether the right hon. gent. means to recur to the truly fanciful argument he threw out, that we should shew something that came from the French government, prior to the letter of Mr. Fox, on the subject of the assassin. I should suppose he does not think it necessary I should shew the existence of such a fact. In answer to that letter there came an overture for a friendly discussion; that is stated to have been the first overture, and it was made by the enemy upon a different basis than that which was afterwards adopted. It was proposed that the basis should be the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. What was the answer? It was, that it was a basis which could not conduct the negociation to any salutary end, because the basis of that treaty was so undefined and liable to cavil, that we should dispute about the basis itself. Accordingly, M. Talleyrand, in his answer, gives up the question almost in words; he says, that he does not think any of the articles of that treaty were the cause of the war. Throughout the whole of his letter he expressly admits, that actual possession was to be the basis of the negociation, for he tells you, that France desires nothing that England possesses; he wishes that the negociation may be conducted on principles of reciprocal equality. He states that France is a great power on the continent, England is a great power by sea, and that France would make such concessions as, from the naval superiority of England, she had a right to expect. In consequence of this admission the negociation was opened. Satisfactory as the letter of M. Talleyrand was in this respect, it however contained another point not to be passed over, for it was then proposed by the government of France that we should treat separate from our allies. This, Mr. Fox rejected at once. He rejected every idea of separating the interests of this country and Russia. This produced an answer from Talleyrand. The discussion now was, the propriety of our insisting upon a joint negociation. It was contended by M. Talleyrand, that we were the allies of the powers of the continent for some purposes, but not for others—that the war was not one war, but two wars—that there was not only a war on the continent, but a war at sea—that we were not the allies of Russia; forgetting what had been so often said by the French government, that we were the instigators of all the wars on the continent; and forgetting the glorious achievements of lord Nelson and sir Richard Strachan. Three or four lines of Mr. Fox overturned all the lengthened sophisms of M. Talleyrand. Thus we stand, on the 20th of April, with a refusal to treat, except in conjunction with our allies. Then, what has been done that should have had any ulterior effect upon the negociation? Every one must see that Mr. Fox thought the negociation at that time at an end. This was confirmed by the long interval of silence which afterwards ensued.—Here, then, I would ask, whether up to this period of the negociation there is any thing which any man can blame, any thing which were it to do, any man would choose to alter? A right hon. gent. indeed, did choose to taunt ministers on a former occasion with their simplicity and credulity, and affected to ridicule their diplomacy. But is this what the right hon. gent. thinks deserving of ridicule? If it be true that ministers had claimed from the country the praise of good faith, and dignity in conduct, and of openness and simplicity in diplomatic language, Mr. Fox's correspondence with Talleyrand might be held forth as their title to that merit. If the people of this country had expected to see a noble simplicity of thought and expression, combined with the most dignified manliness of proceeding, distinguish their diplomacy, they would find the model in Mr. Fox's letters. If the people of England expected to see a commanding superiority of genius displayed in its diplomatic transactions; if they wished to see the honour of their country strongly contrasted with that of France, could they wish for a better instance than the correspondence of Mr. Fox with M. Talleyrand? (hear! hear!) I am glad to perceive this opinion ratified by that of this house, as I am convinced it must be by the judgment, not only of this country, but of all Europe and of posterity.—After Mr. Fox's letter of the 20th April, the negociation seemed to be at an end, as no answer was received till the 4th of June, about which time also lord Yarmouth arrived from Paris. The letter of M. Talleyrand, then received, reverts generally to former discussions, and does not distinctly admit, either the basis of actual possession, or that we should negociate jointly with Russia; though, in point of fact, it was accompanied with a direct overture, satisfactory on both these grounds. Talleyrand, however, proposes to recur to the precedent of 1782, though, indeed, he evidently misapprehends the true nature of that proceeding. Yet it is nevertheless true, that lord Yarmouth came over distinctly authorized to make an offer of negociation on the basis of actual possession, and to be carried on jointly with Russia. This, indeed, accounts for the delay which had intervened. M. Talleyrand sent for lord Yarmouth, and told him that he had been looking for a person to carry a confidential communication to the British government. It is clear, from this, that Talleyrand was unwilling to commit himself in writing, particularly respecting Hanover, and for that reason delayed sending the letter of the 2d of June till it was accompanied with an explanation of points he considered too delicate to be in the first instance put into a dispatch. Upon this point the evidence of lord Yarmouth is full and decisive; and after his explanation in the house a few days ago, it is impossible for any man seriously to doubt that he was fully authorized by the French minister to offer the *uti possidetis*, and, in substance, joint negociation. I beg, therefore, that gentlemen will resort to this the best evidence, and not carp at any particular expressions in lord Yarmouth's communication of the 13th of June, a paper not drawn up with technical precision, nor intended for the public, but as a memorandum in the office of foreign affairs. Will it then be denied that lord Yarmouth brought for the consideration of ministers an offer of negociation on the basis of the *uti possidetis* and jointly with Russia? Is not the testimony of lord Yarmouth sufficient? But is not lord Yarmouth's understanding, that the proposal of France was such as he had described it, proved by the whole tenour of the papers on the table? In the first conversation lord Yarmouth had with Talleyrand, does the latter deny those points? No; he, indeed, by his silence admits them, and only says, that as circumstances had changed greatly, he did not consider himself bound to the extent of former proposals; that Russia was negociating separately, and Sicily had been found indispensable to Naples. Such are the topics advanced by M. Talleyrand, but never does he deny what lord Yarmouth asserts. Nay, in a subsequent conference, when the acknowledgement of the French titles and establishments is waved, it is proposed that Sicily should be given up for Hanover; thus in substance recognizing the basis of *uti possidetis*, by proposing that we should give up for an equivalent that which it was agreed should be ceded purely and simply. The fact was never denied, though the terms were often changed. There are, indeed, some expressions in one of the notes of the French plenipotentiaries, which indeed seem to contradict the fact of the basis of actual possession having been admitted. It is said that such a thing never could have entered Buonaparte's head, and that, if he had negociated on such a basis, he must have continued in possession of Moravia, Austria, &c. forgetting that at the time of this negociation the French were in possession of none of those objects, and their arguments are so absurd they betray the consciousness of a bad cause.—Can any one doubt then that the basis of actual possession was proposed by the French? Can it be denied at least, that we understood that to be the basis? Is there any trace of our having at any period admitted another? Look at Mr. Fox's letter of the 5th July, in which he instructs lord Yarmouth to put an end to the discussion if the French government will not "revert to its original proposals with which your lordship was charged." Here I ought to take notice of a slight omission in the papers, which escaped my notice till pointed out. I had thought that the words "*nous ne vous demandons rien*," which lord Yarmouth mentioned as used by Talleyrand, and which Mr. Fox says had been employed by M. Talleyrand in one of his letters to him, were actually in a letter among the papers on the table. It has been observed to me, however, that Mr. Fox was too accurate to quote words which had not been used, though the sentiment is found in substance in M. Talleyrand's second letter. In reality it has been discovered, that in the private letter of M. Talleyrand, the latter uses the very words in question, accompanied with other expressions explanatory of them, such as "that the emperor had now greatly changed his views of things, and was convinced that the greatness of England was compatible with the greatness of France," &c. Clear it is, however, that ministers acted upon the supposition that France offered the basis of actual possession.—I might now ask gentlemen upon the other side, what conduct we ought to have pursued? Having received a verbal offer, do they think that we ought drily and peremptorily to have rejected it, though it was desirable to negociate, and if possible, to conclude peace? Do they think such a course would have deserved or obtained the approbation of this house, of this country, or of Europe? A noble lord opposite remarked, that we ought to have obtained an acknowledgement in writing, of the basis; and something of the same sort has been said by an eminent statesman in another place. But is it in the nature of things, is it consistent with the ordinary course of such transactions, that such an acknowledgement in writing can in the first instance be demanded or obtained? Has it not been usual in all times and countries, that negociations have commenced with some such unofficial proceedings? And, indeed, in proportion to the difficulty of the occasion, and the novelty of circumstances, to which assuredly the present can form no exception, it must happen that these unofficial proceedings must take place. If such dry, peremptory rejection of overtures of this nature, as that recommended, were to be given, it would encumber with new difficulties, that which with every facility is already so difficult, and peace would be rendered almost impossible.—But, without referring to precedents of the best times, and the examples of the most skilful negociators, I will prove from instances, which some of the gentlemen opposite will not dispute, that matters, fully as important as the offer of a basis of negociation, have been considered perfectly proper and authentic, when presented in verbal communication. I will shew, that an *ultimatum* in a negociation, previous to a rupture, an occasion surely not less important than that under consideration, was deemed by lord Hawkesbury perfectly regular. I have now in my hand the documents respecting the rupture with France, at the beginning of the present war. It is needless now to state what my own opinions were respecting that transaction, but on this point at least I never saw any thing to disapprove. At the time alluded to, however, the noble lord (Castlereagh) was a member of the cabinet, and is responsible for any transaction to which his sanction was required. The learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) was likewise committed to the approbation of the measures, and of the negociations which preceded that rupture, and defended them in parliament. Another right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning), indeed, is not so much implicated in this proceeding, as he was not much in the habit of approving the conduct of that administration, and though disposed rather to arraign their conduct, yet he never expressed any disapprobation of this particular point. I find, however, that lord Whitworth insisted upon three articles, which he had been instructed to demand as the *ultimatum*. M. Talleyrand desired that the articles in question should be presented formally in writing, with which, however, lord W. declined to comply. Lord Hawkesbury, in writing to him on the subject, mentions that it had been left to his discretion to make the communication in the way he might consider most advantageous, and he was authorized to do so. When we then received a verbal communication from the French government, ought we at once to have called them rogues and traitors, and refused to have any farther intercourse, or ought we to have got that verbal communication turned into writing? Lord Hawkesbury saw no impropriety in giving M. Talleyrand the written communication he asked; and we did nothing more than what M. Talleyrand had done when lord Whitworth made a verbal communication; he used no invective, he only asked it to be put in writing. The steps subsequent to lord Yarmouth's communication had no other view, and unless we had resolved to give a rude, peremptory refusal, and to depart from uniform diplomatic precedent, we could take no other course than that which the documents on the table shew us to have pursued. To the written letter, a written answer was returned. To the verbal communication, a verbal answer was made, and lord Yarmouth returned to Paris with instructions to ascertain the sincerity of the offer, and, in the regular progress of the affair, to obtain its formal acknowledgement.—Here I must correct a mistake which appears to have arisen upon this point. When lord Yarmouth went over to Paris, he was not authorized to insist upon an acknowledgement in writing, of the offer he had first brought to this country; because, in fact, lord Y. having no powers, could not ask or expect such an official communication. But the acknowledgement of the basis being made, and his powers produced, the authentic written communication of the proposed basis must immediately have followed. Lord Yarmouth was sent to Paris to establish the negociation upon this basis; and the whole train of the transaction evidently shews that this was the case. Indeed, so thoroughly am I satisfied that the assertions of his majesty's government are in every point strictly consonant with the real facts, that were they yet to be submitted to the world, I should consider the shape they now bear, that which the history of the case naturally dictated, and most satisfactorily proved.* I cannot, indeed, conceive that any man of common candour and impartiality can doubt that the basis of actual possession was proposed by the French, and that his majesty's ministers uniformly acted upon that belief and understanding.—Upon lord Yarmouth's return to Paris, however, he found circumstances considerably changed. He found M. D'Oubril engaged in a negociation from which the French government conceived the highest hopes, and in consequence of representations from Naples, a new importance was attached to Sicily. Soon after M. D'Oubril concluded a separate peace. It certainly is true that lord Yarmouth had been instructed not to produce his powers till the French government reverted to the basis originally proposed. At the same time, the difficulty of his lordship's situation at that period was very great, and if he erred, every one must acknowledge the rectitude of his intentions, and the fidelity with which he discharged the trust reposed in him. Nevertheless the production of his powers was contrary to the intentions of this government, and to their views of the policy which the moment required. Lord Lauderdale was then pitched upon as a man, from his general ability, acquaintance with business, and his intimate knowledge of the sentiments of ministers, eminently fitted to the difficult state of the negociation at Paris. The first thing lord Lauderdale did on his arrival at Paris was, to present a note demanding that the negociation should be placed upon the basis which the French government had originally proposed, and on which alone we had consented to treat. But it will be said, that the answer to this note was a denial of the assertion. If, however, the papers be examined with care, it will be seen, that even the terms suggested by France amount rather to an admission in substance, of what we claimed, and of the basis, as it was understood by us, and explained by lord Lauderdale. In general Clarke's note, it is worthy of remark, that there is a word substituted apparently by the imperial pen. The word as it stands, is *adopter*. "The only bases," it says, "which the emperor *veuille adopter*." It appears, however, that the word as it first stood, was longer, and probably was *reconnaître*; and it seemed as if the French government had been resolved rather not to admit the *uti possidetis*, than bold enough to deny that it had been once admitted. Be this as it may, lord Lauderdale formally insisted on the acknowledgement of the original basis, and on its being withheld, demanded his passports. After some delays on the part of the French government, and after a new conference, and a partial return towards the former basis, lord Lauderdale found it impossible to place the negociation on the only admissible ground, and with great difficulty at last got his passports. Never was a different basis for an instant admitted by this country.—Such is the plain history of the negociation, and in going through it I have not dwelt on the particular terms offered at different periods, meaning to touch on that point in the sequel. What part of our conduct, then, do the gentlemen opposite censure? A right hon. gent. has already said, that whatever be our merits, the cause of the country is clear. If, then the cause of the country be clear, I have gained that about which I am most anxiously concerned. Though, undoubtedly, I never can be indifferent to the censure or approbation of this house, yet the bitterest part of that censure would be taken away, if while our conduct was disapproved, it were admitted that in our hands the honour and the cause of the country remained unsullied and unquestionable.—Then what is it we are accused of? It has been stated, indeed, that the negociation betrayed a scene of artifice and duplicity on the one side, playing upon incredulity on the other. But in what have we been duped? Where is the proof of our credulity? These are assertions much more easily made than proved. I defy the gentlemen opposite to point to a single instance in which we have been imposed upon; and till they do so, I am not much afraid that the house will pay much attention to charges so lightly made, and assertions so little supported. Were we dupes up to the 20th of April? Did Mr. Fox in the correspondence with M. Talleyrand shew credulity? Did he make concessions? Was he seduced into sacrifices? No, All is refusal, the most victorious refutation of all the sophistry, and an utter rejection of all the offers that were employed to draw us into negociation on terms inconsistent with the just pretensions of the country. Was it in this point then that we were dupes? Whatever dispute there may be, for I will not say cavil, on other parts, I am confident that thus far, at least, we are beyond reproach. Will it be contended then that we should have refused to listen to the communication of which lord Yarmouth was the bearer? I do not believe that any man will venture his reputation so far as to say we should. And then, what was the object of lord Yarmouth's mission? what of lord Lauderdale's, but to place the negociation on the original basis, or to put an end to it? But the offers were false and hollow. Be it so; but, even if they were false and hollow, they could not have led to peace; we could not have been imposed upon by them. But, even after all the evidence obtained, after the fact of the insincerity of the enemy, strong as our suspicions may have been, what other course than that we adopted ought we to have followed? If an enemy, whatever suspicions you may entertain, assumes that appearance of sincerity, and makes proposals, not on the face of them unworthy at least of discussion, would it be wise, would it be politic, peremptorily to reject such advances; and would it be nothing to undertake the responsibility of such a proceeding, so as either to give rise to charges on our conduct abroad, or, what is more, create discontent and dissatisfaction at home, because we did not employ all just and conciliatory measures to put an end to the calamities of war? Is it nothing to expose the character of the nation with others, or to give rise to a spirit of dissatisfaction among ourselves, incompatible with those exertions and with those sacrifices which the true interest of the state might require? After the offer made to lord Lauderdale in September, to the moment of his departure from Paris, not a moment's delay intervened, which did not arise from a few days' indisposition with which his lordship was attacked, and from the refusal of the French government to grant passports. Of this the papers on the table furnish the most decisive proofs. Ministers pursued the only course which could afford to England and to Europe, the most convincing proof that our conduct was fair, equitable, and conciliatory, and that of the enemy, false, deceitful, and ambitious.—I will not deny that the prolongation of a negociation is in itself attended with inconvenience. But can it be expected that great and important interests in a perplexed and extraordinary state of human affairs can be adjusted without long and deliberate discussion? When have the long and fierce contentions of nations been adjusted without much difficulty and delay? A conqueror can speedily give the law, but when nations treat on equal terms, delays cannot be avoided. But it is said that the negociation prevented an arrangement with Prussia. I deny the fact. I defy any man to give the least proof of such an assertion. I do not wish to say any thing to aggravate the distress of that unfortunate power, but such had been the infatuated conduct of the court of Berlin, that neither to Russia nor to this country had any opportunity been given either of staying her precipitate counsels or assisting her rash operations. This, however, belongs to another discussion, and if gentlemen on the other side can shew that in this or in any other respect the negociation suspended any measures of war, they will have proved a very heavy charge; but till they bring that proof, neither the house nor the country will be much influenced, far less will be led to prejudge us, by their bold assertions and their unsupported accusations.—With respect to fidelity towards our allies, I am confident that no reproach can justly be made to the conduct of the negociation. If the cause of the country be clear, our cause must likewise be unquestionable. We have seen how steadily Mr. Fox refused to listen to the proposal of separate negociation, and when the form was abandoned, the substance was strictly maintained. When M. d'Oubril was sent to Paris, it was no longer necessary to refuse that to which the emperor of Russia had consented. It is proper to remark here too, that it was expressly stipulated by lord Yarmouth, that the concert with Russia should be fully admitted, and that M. Talleyrand knew that he was to concert with M. d'Oubril. Even after the separate treaty concluded by that minister, this government saw the importance of still maintaining the most unlimited faith towards Russia, and when the refusal to ratify the treaty was known, lord Lauderdale was instructed to insist that the two powers should be considered as replaced in the situation in which they stood before that event, and to urge those articles for which Russia was most desirous. This conduct, indeed, was due to an ally whose good faith had been so strongly displayed on former occasions, and to the character of the emperor Alexander, in whose honour the government had never ceased to confide, even under the most unaccountable appearance of his minister's conduct at Paris.—If our good faith cannot be impeached, are we culpable for the terms for which we insisted? Are we blamed, because, in the situation of the country, we thought it proper to retain what we possessed, as a counterpoise to the acquisitions of France? Are we blamed because we refused to cede any of our possessions, unless on the footing of a fair equivalent? Are we deserving of blame because we insisted upon a basis which implied perfect equality with the enemy, and which presumed that our conquests were at least as much beyond their power to affect, as theirs were beyond the possibility of being shaken by our attacks? This, then, was the basis to which we uniformly adhered. The principle we applied to Sicily, though not exactly a conquest, since we held it in concurrence with its lawful sovereign, and it was included by name in our demands. This, our faith to the king of Naples required. Hanover having been unjustly attacked for the sake of England, the honour of this country compelled us to stipulate for its recovery. The integrity of Turkey, of Sweden, of Portugal, was stipulated for, and it was our object also to secure the little states from the insults and encroachments they had experienced from France. From these points we never receded. How far we might have receded as to particular terms, it would not be proper for me in this place to discuss; but if the value of cessions must be calculated by the probability of the advantages and the duration of that peace for which they are given up, there was nothing in the aspect of affairs to lead us to make valuable sacrifices to purchase peace.—But, it now remains for me to shew, that there never was any opportunity of procuring such terms as would have been adequate to the just pretensions, and consistent with the honour and interests of the country. There are two periods in the negociation to which we must now advert. There never was any question of particular terms before lord Yarmouth went to Paris, with the exception of Hanover and Sicily, which on account of the particular circumstances of each were specifically mentioned. After M. d'Oubril had arrived at Paris, and the French government had hopes of a separate treaty, lord Yarmouth still writes that Hanover, the Cape, Malta, and India remained pure and untouched. The fact, however, turned out that Malta was to be ceded under conditions; even a limitation of the garrison being proposed. From Hanover, the district of Hoya, containing 10,000 people, was to be taken off, and the Cape was to be made a free port. India, too, a very important object, was likewise reserved, and all the Dutch colonies were to be given up with Tobago, &c. in the West Indies. Independently of th want of faith exhibited by the French government, and the little security we could have for the observance of treaties, were these conditions such as we ought to have accepted, considering what France had acquired on the continent, and the little probability of her wresting from us our conquests? But were they such as we could accept when Russia must have been left alone, and the king of Naples abandoned? Besides too, it should be known that in M. d'Oubril's treaty it was not the king of Sardinia that was to be indemnified, but his son was to get the Balearic islands; while it was insultingly stipulated that the French government should not object to a provision being made for king Ferdinand by this country! Need I add a word to shew that we could not in such circumstances have acceded to these conditions without at once sacrificing the national honour and betraying the national interests? Such, however, were the conditions on which the French government insisted till the end of August, when the refusal to ratify M. D'Oubril's treaty produced a suspicious change. A different tone was now assumed; and not only Hanover, Malta, and the Cape, without limitation or condition, were offered; but also the settlements in India, and Tobago in the West Indies. These doubtless, though better terms than the preceding, were offered as the price of our abandoning every thing by which we could have held them with security in peace. Russia was to be given up, and Naples sacrificed. Besides, they were not offered till Bonaparte had left Paris, to command the army: but had they been much more advantageous, never could this country have consented to purchase them at the price of disgrace and infamy.—Then as to the connection between Great Britain and Russia; my opinion of that is this, that if there is any hope that the continent of Europe can yet be saved from the grasp of France, it rests upon Russia and upon that connexion. In the present circumstances, and under the present aspect of affairs, it is impossible for me to answer for events. But there is certainly every reason to believe, from what has already passed, that the emperor of Russia will continue faithful to his alliance as long as he can do so. What he may be induced to do through hard necessity, it is not for me to say, although I hope that such a necessity is not likely to occur. Certainly his situation is not such as to justify us, for any more immediate advantage to ourselves, in abandoning him. His means are still not inadequate to resist at least the last encroachments of France. Terms were offered us that were not compatible with our honour; and, if we were to accept of these, it would be at once establishing a system of non-resistance, and affording free scope to the ravages and ambition of France, and leaving her, without check or controul, to pursue her desolating career. We were bound in honour to Russia, and more than this, we were bound by express treaty. Was it stipulated by this treaty, that we should accede to any wild or extravagant demands on the part of Russia, and that we should support her in circumstances where we could not do it with honour? No. Were we bound to assist her in unreasonable and chimerical schemes? No. What were the objects for which Russia contended? She insisted that Sicily should be given to the king of Naples, and this was an object for which Great Britain ought to contend more strenuously even than Russia. When it is considered in what manner the king of Naples had been brought into the war, the obligation upon us to sign no peace till Sicily is confirmed to its lawful sovereign, or a just equivalent given which he would be willing to accept, I hope we can never abandon it except on these terms. It would have broken the hearts of those brave men who fought for it on the plains of Maida, if it could have been given up on any other conditions. Then in what view are we to consider Dalmatia, the other object of Russia? Had Russia no right to look for any thing upon the conclusion of peace? It is true, that scarcely any point of contact existed between Russia and France, until the barriers were lately broken down, and M. Talleyrand said that there was nothing to do between France and Russia, except to agree that there should be an end to the war. But, surely, something was due to Russia for acknowledging the title of the emperor, and those of the different branches of his family, and this was not too much. But Russia had before that time taken some pains with respect to the arrangement for Sicily, and even on the principle of the *uti possidetis*, she was entitled to look for something considerable, for she was in possession of the mouths of the Cattaro, and why should she abandon them without some equivalent? This then she certainly had a right to insist upon. But the matter does not rest here. Let us only consider for a few moments what is the nature of Dalmatia. It is not, when regarded with a view to France, a territory in any way calculated for objects of defence, but only for those of offence. It could be retained only for the purpose of having a connection with those disaffected bashaws, who were accustomed to make war on the Porte. It would open a passage to India, if ever the French could get there by land, which however, I trust, is not very likely; and above all, it is on the flanks of Hungary, and therefore is a position from which the chief of the French government could for ever threaten Austria, and prevent her from making those exertions to retrieve herself, which she might be enabled otherwise to apply. It is therefore a situation which would render France more formidable in time of peace, than the possession of it could make her in time of war. It was, therefore, not only a Russian object that it should be given up, but it was also an object that intimately concerned both this country, and all Europe. It was not only a Russian object, but strictly an English and European one. Add to this, sir, the infinite importance of preserving the most inviolable good faith with our allies. For this good faith, this support of our credit, this support of our commerce, this support of every thing that ought to be held dear among nations, I trust we shall ever be ready to make all reasonable sacrifices. This will be either the sure and firm foundation of our prosperity, or our solace and comfort under whatever misfortunes may befall us. In refusing then the terms of peace that were offered by France, we acted in a manner equally demanded by our honour and by sound policy. Considering the importance of Sicily and of Dalmatia, suppose that we had no choice but to accept of all the colonies of France, or of Sicily and Dalmatia alone, I would not hesitate to secure these, and would say, give us Sicily and Dalmatia, and take back all your colonies. If there would have been objections to this, what would have been said of a minister who would have surrendered Sicily and Dalmatia, and yet have accepted of worse terms than these? And here, sir, I cannot help adverting to that argument of which I have heard something, viz. that we are not likely at any future period to procure better terms. All I think it necessary to say on that point is, that it was not consistent with our honour or our interest to accept of these terms at present. And if the matter is considered with a vie to the future designs of France on Russia, no argument can be more unfounded; because, unless we can, by a peace, secure the peace of Europe, we do nothing. Now, if the terms offered by France were inadmissible before, how could they be admitted after the 25th of August, when the chief of the French government set out to join his army, which had before been sent against Prussia? Could any peace concluded with us have stopped him, or could we depend on his assurances? If any person thinks that we might, let him look at the Germanic Confederation, which was carried into execution after the treaty with M. d'Oubril. I am sensible that I am detaining the house long, but they will consider the importance of the subject. One of the inducements that was held out to him for signing the treaty was, that the arrangements intended for Germany might thereby be prevented; and yet the ink with which that treaty was signed, was hardly dry before the German arrangements were ordered to be carried into execution. Why then, sir, our only hope was, that Prussia would be successful, though upon that point there was great room for apprehension. Now, suppose that she had succeeded, what would have been said to a minister who should have before concluded a peace, and thereby tied his hands and prevented his country from taking advantage of the new state of things in order to obtain better terms? Suppose, on the other hand, she did not succeed, which has actually turned out to be the case, does any one believe that peace with Great Britain would have induced Bonaparte to stop his victorious army? If he does, I would refer him to the note of Sebastiani, who was sent to Constantinople to insist upon the deposition of the Hospodars, in direct violation of the treaty with Russia. Sebastiani, on his journey, passed through the dominions of these princes, and received from them the rites of hospitality, and several valuable presents, at the moment that he was about to solicit their deposition. Peace then would not have prevented any of the scenes that have lately been exhibited on the continent. If Bonaparte had then stated that Great Britain, who had been the means of exciting the flames of war all over the continent, had seized the first opportunity of concluding a peace upon the most mercenary and selfish grounds, and then endeavoured to persuade the nations of Europe, that there could be no peace on the continent till England should be humbled, then, instead of possessing the friendship of Sweden, instead of being linked in the closest alliance with Russia, now opposing France with not inferior numbers, and with great advantages of situation, we should have been left alone, an object of universal jealousy and suspicion, and without the power of contributing any thing towards the exertions for restraining the ambition and encroachments of France. Every advantage, therefore, of which the nature of the case would admit, results from the part which we have acted. But, sir, I am at the same time far from encouraging very sanguine expectations, after all that has happened on the continent within these few years. The event is in the hands of "Him who giveth the victory." But one thing is clear, that the progress of Bonaparte has never yet been stopped by submission, and our only hope, therefore, is in resistance, as far as we can resist his ambitious projects. We have done what our honour and our duty called upon us to do. When this instrument of vengeance may be deprived of his terrors, I know not; but we may at least look to the honour and independence of this country, as secure against all his attacks, and while this country exists as an independent and an honourable nation, there will still remain some hopes of restoring that political balance in Europe, which has for the present been overturned.—I should have now concluded, sir, but there are two points which, in justice to my noble friend (Lauderdale) and the public, I cannot entirely pass over. On the 30th of August, the negociation appeared to be at an end. On the 4th of September, however, my noble friend was invited to a conference. The note said to be delivered to him by the French, was, in fact, never delivered. If such a note had been received by him, and he had his passports with him, he ought not, and I trust he would not, have waited a moment longer in France, but would instantly have considered the negociation as at an end. But what is the object of a note, which could be so easily disproved? This it is not easy to guess, but at all events sure I am that nothing could be more unjust. Now the other point is, the charge that a sudden change had taken place in the negociation after the political death of Mr. Fox. After he was dead, it was said that the war party had got the ascendancy, and that we wished to break off the negociation. That any change took place in consequence of that event, I most positively deny. My noble friend (lord Grenville) has too independent a mind to have been directed by any leader, and I can take upon myself to declare, that there never was the smallest difference of opinion on the subject in the cabinet. The last letter written by my deceased friend on this subject, is that of the 26th of June. But then he all along cordially approved of all that was done, and in his last letter expresses his strong sense of the cavils of the French government, and directed that our negociator should proceed no farther, except the basis at first agreed upon should be recognized. In the last conversation which I myself had with him, which was on the 7th of September, the Sunday before his death, three great cardinal points were insisted upon by him: 1st, The security of our honour, in which Hanover was materially concerned; 2d, Russian connection; 3d, Sicily. And the grounds on which the negociation broke off, were in direct conformity with this opinion. On that occasion he told me, that the ardent wishes of his mind were to consummate, before he died, two great works on which he had set his heart, and these were, the restoration of a solid and honourable peace, and the abolition of the slave trade. [A loud cry of hear! hear!] I have now, sir, endeavoured to shew from these papers, that the first overture came from France; next, that the basis agreed upon for conducting the negociation was that of actual possession; and lastly, that no terms could be procured that could be accepted, with a view not only to our own honour and interests, but also with a view to the interests of Europe, and the maintenance of the most inviolable good faith, towards our allies. I shall therefore now move, sir, "That an humble address "be presented to his majesty, to assure "his majesty, that we have taken into "our most serious consideration the Pa"pers relative to the late Negociation, "communicated, by his majesty's most "gracious order, to this house;—That we "acknowledge, with heartfelt gratitude, "the benevolent effort made by his ma"jesty, to restore to this country the "blessings of peace on terms consistent "with the honour of his majesty's crown, "with the general interests of Europe, "and with the good faith which his maj. "has ever maintained towards his allies: "That, whilst we lament the unsuccessful "result of an attempt directed to so be"neficent an end, we feel the fullest con-

"viction that this failure can be ascribed "only to the injustice and ambition of "the French government; and we beg "leave humbly to express to his majesty "our firm and constant resolution, to "give to his majesty the most effectual "support in a contest manifestly continued, on the part of the enemy, with the "hope of destroying the power and inde. "pendence of the British Empire."

Lord *Yarmouth* apologized for offering himself to the notice of the house so early in the debate. He trusted he should be acquitted of presumption, in claiming the priority of persons much better able to direct the judgement of the house, by the candour of gentlemen on every side, who would be sensible of the propriety of his offering an elucidation of some circumstances respecting the negociation, and some respecting himself in this early stage of the debate. It was essential that he should rescue himself from some imputations cast upon him, in another place, by a noble lord high in authority, to whom he could not regularly allude. He had seen the expressions he alluded to in a very respectable newspaper early on Saturday. He could not doubt the authenticity of the report, and he wished to set himself right with the house, and to set the house right with respect to the question in the points to which he meant particularly to advert. He thought he could prove to the house, that the reflections cast upon him were unfounded. He hoped it would not be taking up too much of the time of the house if he should, in his view of the subject under debate, go back to the causes of the present war. Considering the assigned grounds for the renewal of the war, he was of opinion, that at the beginning of this year there was strong reason for entering into negociations for peace. One great cause of the war was the impossibility of obtaining a sufficient guarantee for the security of Malta. An official statement in the Moniteur declared, long after the commencement of the war, that so long as England retained Malta, Buonaparte would not relinquish the sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy. Malta, however, was not the only cause of the war: the desire to resist the aggrandisement of France was another cause. Russia was as averse as we to the overbearing power and character of France. But Russia was unwilling to engage in the enterprise of reducing France, till Great Britain, which had little danger to apprehend, individually, from the result of the contest, should be engaged. From this principle arose the coalition, in which, two powers joined, a third ought to have joined. That coalition was defeated by means of the policy Prussia had thought proper to pursue. In the Spring of 1806, the continent afforded a very gloomy prospect. Austria was prostrate at the feet of France; Prussia was bound to France in an alliance, offensive and defensive. There was no longer any hope of saving Europe by war. The only remaining chance of saving it was by peace. The existence of Austria could be preserved by peace alone: peace alone could break the union between Russia and France, so detrimental to every hope of the deliverance of the world as an union cemented by the transfer of a part of his majesty's dominions. It was of little moment, which power had made the first overture. The first that overcame the mad and foolish pride of robbing nations of peace rather than make an overture, was entitled to the praise of both nations, and of all mankind. The great statesman, whose loss Europe had to deplore, (Mr. Fox) had conducted the earlier part of the negociation by the channel of a private correspondence, the substance of which was before the house. When he (lord Yarmouth) was introduced into the negociation, one great difficulty in the way of peace was the connection with Russia. That, however, might be got over on paper. But there was a difficulty with respect to Hanover, which was much less capable of management. It was known that we should spurn any peace which would not be coupled with the restitution of Hanover to our sovereign. But at the same time Prussia had been the unalterable ally of France since the revolution, and Hanover had been conveyed to Prussia, as well in reward of that alliance as in consideration of valuable cessions in exchange. Hence it was material, that the intended cession should be made matter of confidential verbal communication till the peace, for which it was to be ceded, should be ascertained and agreed upon. The communication was made confidentially, and treated of in letters from one friend to another. So he might speak of the ministers of foreign relations of this country and of France, though the countries were at war. Though both parties, actuated by a desire of peace, had covenanted for the cession of Hanover as one of the terms, yet it was required on one side, and agreed to as reasonable on the other, that, with a view not to dissolve the bonds which united France with Prussia, this agreement should not be disclosed, unless peace should have taken place. In the beginning of June, the proposal was sent by him to Mr. Fox. He declined putting it on paper, in regard to the confidential restriction imposed by the French government; and it was not till the day of his departure for France, with the answer of his majesty's government, that he was induced, on the representation of Mr. Fox that we were all mortal, and that in cases of such importance, some fixed record, independent of human casualties, should be preserved, that he was induced, on the faith of an assurance that the document should not pass the cabinet, to commit the substance of the proposal made to him, to writing. He did not mean to decorate himself with plumes to which he was not entitled. It might be true that one motive for choosing him to be the instrument of the negociation was his having been the bearer of the proposition from the French government; but, if it were inferred, as it had gone abroad, that he had been chosen on that ground only, without any regard to qualification, the inference was false. He regretted as much as any one, that the choice of his majesty's government had not fallen on some person of greater ability; but it was at the same time material to be known, that any other person in such a capacity would not have been suffered to remain 12 hours in Paris without producing his full powers. M. d'Oubril was not suffered to remain so long without producing them; and he believed it was a case unparalleled in history, that he (lord Yarmouth) was not called upon to produce his. He had hoped that the private letter of Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, conveyed by him, contained some memorandum of the substance of what he had communicated, and he told Mr. Fox he did hope so. He communicated to M. Talleyrand the wishes of this government; he made the demands he was instructed to prefer, in a fair, direct, and manly manner, and not with any artifice for the purpose of taking in. He did state the basis of the intended negociation to be, that of actual possession, and no objection was made to that statement then, or at any other time, it being always understood that, though the *uti possidetis* was the basis, it was subject to explanation and variation, according to mutual interest and convenience. The negociation might have proceeded on this understanding, were it not for the jealousies conceived by the political death of Mr. Fox, which was understood to have taken place the 17th of July. He had presented a note to assert the basis of the *uti possidetis*, as soon as he had communicated his full powers; and, in his second note, that basis was insisted upon as much as it could be. It was not easy in private quarrels to make an individual eat his words; but it was much more difficult to bring to that submission a man who was at the head of 500,000 troops. Hence the management to avoid a retractation, the word *adopte* was substituted for the word *reconnoit*, in the acknowledgement of the long-contested basis. Little progress was made in the negociation, and scarcely had an exchange of visits taken place, when M. D'Oubril arrived at Paris. It was of little moment now to enquire, whether the treaty signed by M. D'Oubril was the act of his own impropriety, or whether the refusal to ratify it arose merely from a change in the Russian ministry, subsequent to his setting out on his mission. He had given his majesty's ministers intimation by which they might have anticipated the possibility of M. D'Oubril's concluding a separate treaty; and in fact he did, two days after, sign a separate treaty. Then arose the difficulty of his (lord Yarmouth's) situation; and on this point particularly he trusted to the candour of the house for a patient hearing, though the statement was, he was aware, tedious. On Saturday morning, on getting up, he had read these words in a respectable newspaper, imputed to somebody he could not say who, "the noble lord (Yarmouth) having instructions not to produce his full powers, without a written acknowledgement of the desired basis, did think it proper to produce those powers." It was impossible he could have had such instructions. It was a known thing, that no paper could pass, till the full powers had been exhibited. He was instructed to present a paper, containing the sentiments of his majesty's government, to the French minister. But the French minister refused to receive it as a diplomatic communication, without an exhibition of full powers. The French minister desired him, in these circumstances, to go home and copy the note, and give it to him as an extract from a newspaper; and then he would answer it, under an engagement not to make the contents public. If his majesty's ministers were desirous to get a written acknowledgement of the basis in question, there should have been a letter on the subject to the French minister, which he would have been well contented to have delivered as a mere post-boy, and which must have called forth an answer. This answer he might have had authority to open, and thus a written acknowledgement of the basis might have been obtained, which would not have been denied except in a moment of anger. In the events that had occurred, even the agreement to cede Hanover might have been denied. He expected it would have been, and it probably would, had it not been for the war between France and Prussia. When he had received the communication, reflecting on his disclosure of his full powers, he had sent a justification on the most material points, as between him and his majesty's ministers. He did not conceive that what he wrote would come before the public, or he would have written a great deal more. He had no instruction to withhold his full powers, except on the ground of Sicily: and he considered the consent of his majesty's ministers to negociate for that island, as an evasion of the claim to its absolute, unqualified cession, which he had been before instructed to insist upon as a necessary preliminary to the farther progress of the negociation. The only question between him and his majesty's ministers was, the question of expediency; and his answer to what they urged against him on this point was, that he could not possibly have advanced a step further in the negociation without exhibiting his full powers. It would have been a question in that case with the French government, whether it should sacrifice the chance of peace with England, and with that chance the king's German dominions, to the preservation of its alliance with Prussia? or whether it would encounter a Prussian war for the chance of a negociation with England. In order to create an alternative in this case, he thought it necessary to give a real existence to the negociation by the exhibition of his full powers. If he had not taken that resolution, he should have been under the necessity of getting into a post-chaise, and proceeding, not to Boulogne, for he was not an accredited negociator, but to some other part from whence his majesty's ministers might have had news of him, and of the issue of the negociation with which he was entrusted, in a fortnight after the close of the proceedings. He wished he had had provisional instructions how he should act in the event of the conclusion of a separate treaty by D'Oubril. Then he would have been "*in utrumque paratus.*" But it was not till the fact of the signature of the separate treaty was known to all the courts of Europe, that instructions were sent to him how to regulate his conduct upon that event. Shortly after, lord Lauderdale was joined with him in the management of the negociation. He had too long an acquaintance with that noble lord, too high a value upon that acquaintance, too high a sense of his talents and his character, to feel hurt upon that appointment. He owned that some men might have felt themselves hurt at the conduct of his majesty's ministers in the matter; but he had too high a respect for the noble lord, to allow him to see that he felt himself from that time to be a mere dead letter; besides, he dreaded, that if he should withdraw from the negociation, new difficulties and fresh coldness, and want of confidence would arise. No one could doubt that the opportunity was favourable for the conclusion of a more glorious peace than had at any other time been offered to this country. We had broken off in the consideration of Dalmatia and Sicily. Our engagements with the emperor of Russia were the ground of this tenacity, and our engagements with the king of Naples, and the intrinsic value of the island of Sicily itself. It was not very easy to justify the breaking off a negociation so essential to the repose of two great nations, without the proof of having made every reasonable attempt to bring it to a favourable issue. What we thought due to the honour of Russia, certainly could not wear an unfavourable appearance when proposed by us, but we should be informed whether Russia herself set an equal value upon what we insisted upon, from a sense of her regarding it with equal estimation. When the king of Naples entered into the war, with a view to the common interests of nations, he was naturally defended by a great part of the disposeable force of this empire at a vast expence. He wished we could be told that we were at war, because the emperor of Russia disapproved of the terms offered for himself or for the king of Naples. What would the country think when we were told, that more glorious terms than had ever before been offered, had been rejected at a time when we had failed in every continental attempt, merely on the ground of this one impediment? But was it to be supposed that the king of Naples would not have been extremely happy to exchange Sicily, from which he might easily be expelled by France at a favourable opportunity, for some possession which the maritime superiority of Great Britain would always be sufficient to preserve to him, or some one which, by its own territorial power, would be sufficient to maintain itself? Dalmatia and Albania had been offered to the king of Naples, and it was not clear, if the attempt had been made, but the Balearic Isles might have been annexed to these: Dalmatia would have excited more jealousy if given to Russia, than if given to Austria or Naples. If it was clear that the war was continued because justice would not be done to our allies, there would be no doubt as to the resolution the house ought to come to; no more ought there to be if the war were continued on account of India. But if it was continued on the former ground, the identity of the sentiments and the reciprocity of the obligations of our allies, ought to be established. He had risen merely to rescue his own conduct from the very extraordinary situation of a public man, charged with violating instructions which he had never received.

Lord *Howick* thought he had stated, as distinctly as possible, that the noble lord had had no instructions to insist on a written acknowledgement of the basis in the first instance. As the noble lord stated, he was sent to carry a verbal answer to a verbal proposition, He was instructed to obtain in this way an acknowledgement of the basis, and directed not to use his full powers till the French government should return to the basis on which it had set out. It was not a written but an actual acknowledgement that the noble lord had been instructed to claim, previous to the production of his full powers; and as soon as he should have produced his powers, he was directed to seek, in his first subsequent note, a written acknowledgement. Mr. Fox's letter went back to the original offer of the *uti possidetis*. The demand of Sicily was a violation of that offer; and it was on that ground that the noble lord was ordered not to proceed one step further, till that demand should be relinquished, and the basis established; unless that requisition were complied with, the noble lord was instructed to demand his passports in civil terms, and to come away. He was only surprised, that, after the explanation that had already been given to this effect, the noble lord should have thought the vindication he had entered into at all necessary.

Mr. *Montague* regretted, that in the whole of this business he saw the complete success of the machinations of France. The French policy put him in mind of the policy of the ancient Turks, which was, to make short truces to secure conquests, and short wars to enlarge them. Considering the case on this principle, we might find that the French had procured the benefit of a truce, and used it to blind our government. The origin of the negociation was owing to the death of that great statesman, Mr. Pitt, the pilot who had weathered so many storms. He thought he saw that illustrious statesman contending with the demon who endeavoured to entice him, as Somnus did the pilot Palinurus of old. He thought he heard the demon address him in the words used to Palinurus:—

> Iaside Palinure, ferunt ipsa æquora classem;
> Æquatæ spirant auræ; datur hora quieti.
> Pone caput, fessósque oculos furare labori.

And so forth. He did not clearly recollect the rest (a laugh). But however the pilot did not trust the demon, but said—

> Méne salis placidi vultum fluctúsque quietos
> Ignorare jubes? méne huic confidere monstro?

But he would ask whether this conduct of Mr. Pitt was at all similar to that of Mr. Fox? Did Mr. Fox distrust the demon? No, he was earnestly desirous of making peace, and of this desire the French had taken advantage. He lamented the death of Mr. Fox. He was acquainted with him, and valued him as a man; but during the last 20 years, he had always differed with him in politics, and in all that period, he had never altered his conduct, which, in these times of shifting and returning, was rather a singular instance. As to the first overture, he considered it as having come from Mr. Fox, for his letter had broken the ice. It was impossible that those glances and oglings at peace which it contained, could escape the notice of such a penetrating politician as M. Talleyrand. He did not like the expression of perfect attachment to the man who had been the disturber of Europe in the late wars. It was natural to expect that a fulsome letter should be sent in answer; but this was not to be shewn to John Bull. He was not to see that. In saying this, he did not mean to cast any reflection on Mr. Fox more than the nature of the case warranted. When the friendship of Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand began, he could not say. Perhaps it was when Talleyrand was here, in 1792, and had kindled the flames of war over Europe. He would pass over what had occurred previous to the arrival of lord Yarmouth. He acknowledged that Mr. Fox had exposed the sophistry of Talleyrand in a clear and manly manner. But, was it the policy of Talleyrand to obtain peace? No. Why then it was nothing better than a truce upon the principle before mentioned, to enable Bonaparte to make preparations for his attack on Russia and Prussia. Talleyrand saw that Mr. Fox was desirous of peace, and though he himself was not desirous of it, yet he knew how to make the most of the disposition manifested by Mr. Fox. He saw how he might distract, disappoint, and confound us in all our operations, and he had succeeded. Mr. Fox's letter might, for any thing he knew to the contrary, have been given to the French party at St. Petersburgh, with a view to create doubts in the mind of the emperor. He knew not whether Mr. Fox had the precaution to inform the emperor of Russia that he had sent such a letter. It was sufficient to say, that he would not conclude peace without Russia, but he ought to have given the emperor notice beforehand. Talleyrand might have even insisted, from that letter, that a negociation was going on, and thus alienated the mind of our ally. Did he stick at going beyond the truth on another occasion? This negociation or truce was merely a blind, to enable Buonaparte the more securely to prepare for war against Prussia, our natural ally. It was only by a co-operation with Prussia that we could attack France. Now, he said that this obvious policy was lost sight of in our late war with Prussia, in consequence of which we had no influence in his councils, so that the late calamities happened to the king, and such was his situation now, that we must run all over Germany before we could find him out. Buonaparte conjured up a phantom which set Prussia and us by the ears, and which, like the dispute of Achilles and Agamemnon, brought upon us a whole Iliad of calamities. We did not seem to be aware of this. Now it was well known that Talleyrand was a man of considerable experience, and he chose the noble lord opposite (Yarmouth) to carry on the negociation under circumstances where he was not a proper person for the business, because he was then a prisoner in France, and had hopes of freedom only through the medium of peace. This country ought not to have entrusted such a burthen to a man unaccustomed to diplomacy; he said this without any disrespect to the noble lord, but really it was not fitting that he should be sent to treat with such a man as Talleyrand. This was very imprudent, and it was not less ungenerous to censure the noble lord in this public manner, when he happened not to have pleased them. Now, as to the basis of the *uti possidetis*, the whole lay between the assertions of the noble lord and of Talleyrand. A written note would have made the matter clear, and it was very inconsiderate in the government not to have insisted upon this. But the fact was, that Mr. Fox did not like to put the question suddenly. He was afraid he might lose his favourite object; following the policy of a man with a woman, he did not ask her the question broadly at once, otherwise she might have slapped the door in his face. From the conduct of the other noble lord (Lauderdale) entrusted with the negociation, in 1792, and his intimacy with the Brissotines, who had since put their king to death, and from the patience with which he had listened to the projects for the destruction of England, within the walls of the national assembly, he could not think him a fit person to be charged with the interests of his country in this negociation. He blamed the dalliance in which these ministers were kept. Their situation was no better than prisoners, being refused the passports they demanded. It reminded him of a story he had read in the newspapers the other day, of a gentleman, whom two prostitutes seized in Bond-street, and embraced so closely, one behind and another before, that he was unable to move; while a third picked his pockets. They had granted him the fraternal embrace, and held him so tightly, that he could scarcely move, much less stir a hand or leg. He absolutely could not move, so loving was this said hug. They treated him as Mr. Burke said they had treated lord Malmsbury. They told him stories, such as nurses tell children, "Poor baby bunting, the king is gone a hunting." Yes! he had gone a hunting with a vengeance; but then it was to hunt the royal tiger of Prussia, and he carried with him a train no less numerous than that which preceded the tiger huntings in the east. And then what happened? Why did not lord Lauderdale demand a categorical answer at once? He had only to say, "this is the basis on which we shall treat;" and then he would have had a plain answer, aye or no. In short, our ministers had been bamboozled from the beginning to the end. Mr. Burke had described the case of a person in Turkey, who, while he received a certain unpleasant application, begged those who inflicted it to accept "the assurances of his high consideration." This was the case with lord Lauderdale at first, but at length he seemed disposed to retort not only on the prince of Benevento, the prince of Ponte Corvo, and the duke of Berg, but even on the emperor himself. Otherwise he would not have been described as betraying unsuitable, imperious, and savage manners. He had no doubt that the noble lord had done his duty, but having sat quietly in the Cyclops' cave, while the thunderbolts of war were forging against his country, he could not think him a proper person to be entrusted with the negociation. He could see no benefit likely to accrue from sending a second negociator, after the changes in Germany, which rendered any peace that could be made, as the noble lord observed, totally insecure. He charged ministers with obvious inferiority to the late government, which they represented as inefficient. He blamed them for the deficiency of their own performance, and for the recall of officers who had done well, merely because they were objects of private pique. He joined heartily in that part of the address, which pledged every heart and hand to the defence of the country; and if there had been a disposition on the part of government, to sacrifice part of what was necessary to the balance of power, the ill success of that disposition afforded double motives for vigorous exertions in war. Now was the time to put forth British fortitude. In peace, nothing was so becoming as meekness; but when the trump of war was sounded, the sinews ought to stiffen, and the senses become fierce as those of a tiger. Let ministers be vigilant and attentive, and they should have his support; not uniform, unqualified support, for he thought it right to keep them alert by admonition and castigation, but qualified and rational support, according as they should be found to deserve it. Many of them he esteemed personally, and he particularly requested the noble lord opposite (Howick) "to accept the fullest assurances of his high consideration."

Sir *Thomas Turton* rose and delivered his maiden speech. He said, he did not think he should satisfactorily discharge his duty to his constituents, to that house, or to himself, if he did not candidly avow his sentiments, upon the present most important question, and state as candidly the reasons upon which he grounded those sentiments, and which should alone influence his vote this night. He said, that in his view of the conduct of our ambassadors, the story of their proceedings might be summed up in a very concise way—that they were in this country when they should have been in France, and that they remained in France long after that period at which they should have dated their departure. He was anxious to assure the house, that the grounds upon which his sentiments of the general conduct of ministers during the late negociation were rested, were deduced solely from the papers now before the house; and the observations he had to offer to the house upon those papers he should divide under three distinct heads; first, from the commencement of the negociation to the time of lord Yarmouth's arrival. The second period to which he should call the attention of the house was from the arrival of lord Yarmouth in this country, to the refusal of the court of St. Petersburgh to ratify the treaty of M. d'Oubril; and 3dly, from that period to the rupture of the late negociation. As to the first, he would in general observe, that the first question that would naturally suggest itself in the opening of any treaty for peace between the belligerent powers would be, what further advantages were to be expected by either party in the continuation of hostilities—such treaties should be conducted by a policy conceded to by all nations, and indeed in itself justifiable, the contracting parties concluding upon terms mutually and respectively advantageous. In this point of view, he could not be brought to think that the conduct of our ministers in managing that treaty was marked with that jealousy and caution which were so necessary in any communication with a cabinet so proverbial for diplomatic intrigue as that of the enemy; at the same time he was willing to confess that if there was a man in the empire peculiarly fitted for negociation with any continental power, more especially for conducting a treaty with France the great and illustrious statesman whose loss was so generally and sincerely deplored, was that man. Though a long, and indeed an uniform opponent to the measures of that great man, this admission justice required from him, and he felt no reluctance in acceding to it; nor, as he never opposed him but when he thought him wrong, so he did not now panegyrize him without reason. He had said, that he (Mr. Fox) was best calculated to negociate with France: and why?—because the artifice, finesse, and machiavelian tricks of the court of Saint Cloud could be effectually opposed only by the candour and manly simplicity of Mr. Fox. He did not look upon a negociation on the basis of the treaty of Amiens, as so very alarming as it was described to be out of doors. Though Bonaparte might gain ships and colonies and commerce, he could never gain a growth of English sailors, and therefore we had nothing to fear. The superior skill and elegance of our fabrics would always secure the commerce and manufactures of our country. He was of opinion, that the assassin whom Mr. Fox denounced, was a spy of the French government, like Mehée de la Touche. Only three points were agreed upon in the long negociation that had taken place, the integrity of the Turkish Empire, the cession of Hanover, and the right of Great Britain to interfere with the arrangements of the Continent. We refused, however, to treat further without Russia, and on what ground? We had no treaty with Russia, except the treaty of concert. That was a treaty of subsidy and of military operations. In this sense it could not be in force, for since the battle of Austerlitz, no Russian army had acted, and therefore no subsidy could be claimed. The basis of the *uti possidetis*, subject to exchange and cession, had been acted upon. It was impossible to imagine any thing so vague as the principle of a peace honourable to both parties; for the honour of each, and what that honour required, was entirely in its own conception. He condemned the employing of a person, not used to diplomatic transactions, in the conduct of the negociation. If an experienced person had been employed, the basis would have been early acknowledged, or the negociation would have been broken off. The negociation was meant but to entrap; and hence the aversion to written documents. The proposition to indemnify the king of Naples by the seizure of the Hanse Towns, ought to have been rejected with indignation. He thought the reasons assigned by the noble lord for producing his full powers, ought to acquit ministers on that ground. The noble lord said, in his first note to general Clarke, that he was ready to discuss the basis of a general peace. Hence it was to be inferred, that the basis was not considered as settled. He should have thought that lord Lauderdale would have been instructed to bring this matter to a conclusion. Till the 20th of April absolutely nothing was done, and the whole six months passed in negociation were nugatory. Though it might be a question, whether M. d'Oubril had exceeded his powers in concluding the treaty he had signed, there could be no doubt that he had authority to treat separately; and there were even rumours that negociations were going on at Petersburgh at the present moment. He thought we should consider, therefore, whether Russia had a claim on us for all this attention, amounting to a refusal to make peace without her, even when there could be no assurance that she was as decidedly with us. As to the question respecting Hanover, there was no Briton that was not prepared to make any sacrifice for its recovery, if the loss of his majesty's electoral dominions would produce a wrinkle on the brow of his declining years. He could not agree with the noble lord, that, if we had secured Sicily and Dalmatia, we might have given up all our other conquests. He saw no reason why we should not have claimed Naples as well as Sicily. It appeared to him extraordinary, that the question of indemnity for the king of Sardinia, who had been abandoned at the treaty of Amiens, had been in this instance revived. He was sorry to differ from his hon. friend, with respect to the policy of our supporting Prussia. The whole history of that power for the last 60 years, shewed, that her invariable policy was directed to her own aggrandizement. She had been the eternal enemy of Austria, and the uniform friend of all the different successive governments of France since the French revolution. He was glad to have observed in the address on the speech at the opening of the session, that there was none of that desponding language of exhausted means and dilapidated resources, used on other occasions, contained in it. The resources of the empire were said to remain unimpaired, and if they were unimpaired, it was owing to the measures of that great statesman now no more (Mr.

Pitt), to whose politics he had himself been always attached. The sinking fund, which had been the work of that illustrious statesman, was that to which this country owed all its prosperity. It was the record of his services; and well he might have said, when bequeathing such a boon to his country;

"Non omnis moriar,
Multaque pars mei vitabit ruinam."

He hoped the honourable gentlemen opposite would not hereafter give way to such desponding language as was contained in the letter of the noble lord opposite (Howick) to the lord mayor, on the subject of the capture of Hamburgh. That noble lord appeared somewhat partial to these communications; he did not mean to say, however, that he was influenced in that respect by the *cacoethes scribendi.* The hon. bart. commented with some severity upon the contents of the letter alluded to. He recommended to the noble lord, not to make such communications in future; and concluded, by assuring the house of his gratitude for their indulgence, and that, though he had trespassed at some length upon their patience, he had not uttered a single sentiment that was not sincerely and conscientiously the result of his unbiassed judgment.

Mr. *Whitbread* rose, and spoke nearly as follows;—Mr. Speaker; it was my wish to have spoken immediately after the hon. gent. (Mr. Montague) who preceded the hon. bart. (Sir T. Turton), for the purpose of offering a few observations upon a speech abounding with classical quotations, and full of fanciful illustration; but which, I confess, appears to me not to have contained the sort of reasoning likely to produce conviction upon the members of this house; far less to convey sentiments agreeable to the friends of either of those illustrious men, whose loss we severally and deeply deplore. The hon. gent. has informed us, that having twenty years since taken his seat in the house of commons, he has been absent from it for the last ten: but, sir, one would have thought it impossible, that he should not have heard of the political transactions which have taken place within that period; that he should not have known that the animosities and contentions of which he was witness, had long since ceased; that the dissentions which he has endeavoured to revive are obsolete; and that at a most critical period of the affairs of this country, one of those great rivals represented to his sovereign, however unsuccessfully, that the other was the person most fit to be joined with him in the councils of his majesty. Had that advice been accepted, the destination of Mr. Fox would no doubt have been to that office from which he has so lately and unhappily been torn by the hand of death.—Neither, sir, was it necessary for the hon. gent. to recur to those invidious topics, which in his estimation disqualified the earl of Lauderdale from acting in the capacity of plenipotentiary from this country to France. The leaders of the different revolutionary factions in France have expiated their crimes by their blood. But if to the various qualifications for such a situation possessed by my noble friend; his extensive information, his indefatigable industry, his acknowledged talents, and his inflexible integrity, could be added an actual acquaintance with the characters and persons of some of those with whom he might have to transact business of such importance, surely in the eyes of any reasonable man, it would decide the preference in his favour.—It is not, however, sir, merely for the purpose of animadverting upon these objectionable parts of the speech of that hon. gent., or of refuting his argument that I have risen to-night, but also for the purpose of expressing opinions, the influence of which upon my mind I am not able to controul. So far from entering into the sentiments of the hon. gent., I entertain those of a nature entirely opposite, respecting the negociation the details of which are now under the consideration of the house. I cannot concur in the language of the Declaration which it has been recommended to his majesty to publish, that the failure of the negociation is attributable *solely* to the injustice and ambition of France; neither can I concur in voting an address which tends to annihilate all hopes of peace to this country and the world.—No one, sir, who may have thought it worth while to look at my situation personally, or to attend to the conduct I have adopted from the formation of the existing administration to the present day, can doubt of the pain I must experience in the execution of the task I feel myself called upon to perform.—My known love and enthusiastic veneration for the dead; my close connexion with, and affectionate friendship for the living; my active and zealous support of measures which I approved, but for which I was not responsible; my public declarations on the subject of this very negociation, upon the faith of those whom I trusted; must, I think, secure me against the slightest imputation of acting from any motives but those of unmixed and sacred duty.—Sir, I will confess that in conformity to the sentiments I have always expressed in this house, peace is the object nearest my heart: and I need hardly explain, that by peace, I mean peace achieved with honour. One, therefore, of the principal sources of gratification to my mind arising out of the change which took place some time since in the councils of his majesty, was the conviction that the first opportunity of effecting a pacification with France, would be seized and improved by the persons now in power. I looked with an eager eye for the first symptom that might indicate the possibility of so joyful an event. I listened with an anxious ear for the first favourable rumour: and when I caught the grateful news of a correspondence actually on foot, I drew happy omens of the event, from my firm persuasion that *all* the parties engaged were sincere; and from my belief that peace sought in the spirit of peace is seldom sought in vain.—When the scene had closed, when all hope had vanished, my disappointment was keen, but my confidence was unabated. Upon the faith I had in my noble and hon. friends, and most especially in my noble friend and relation below me (lord Howick), I believed that peace with France had not been concluded, because it had not been possible to conclude it with honour. Certainly, then, I came to the consideration of the papers before you with the strongest feelings of partiality. I expected and was disposed to find the cause of the English government triumphant; the conduct of the government of France without justification or apology.—If, with such previous impressions, I am not satisfied that England is undeniably in the right, and France as completely in the wrong; if I think that, under any imaginable circumstances, it is the height of impolicy to declare that all hope of peace must be abandoned; how can I vote for the Address which is now proposed to you, or how can I refrain from stating the arguments which induce me to differ from those I so much respect and admire, and whom it has hitherto been my pride to support?—Nothing which I can have to utter will be more painful than this, that I think I perceive in the beginning and the conclusion of the negociation recently terminated, a character perfectly distinct.—The house, sir, has already heard a great deal of the details contained in these papers, and I should be unwilling to detain you by any unnecessary recurrence to the particulars of what has passed; but I trust I shall be excused if in my present situation I should dwell somewhat minutely on those parts of the transaction which at least justify my own conduct to myself. I have spared no pains to inform myself, I have omitted no opportunity which has offered of being either persuaded or convinced, but in vain.—I may be allowed, Mr. Speaker, to indulge in the effusion of my heart, relative to the opening of the correspondence with the French government. Sir, it was not any disposition to *ogle* for peace, as it has been called by the hon. gent., which induced Mr. Fox either to invent (for to that length it has been carried by some) or to give information of the circumstance which gave rise to his first letter to M. Talleyrand. It was the spontaneous act of that noble and generous heart, impelled by no motive but that of the pure and exalted benevolence with which it at all times overflowed.—Had he then thought peace as impossible as I am sorry to say my noble friend has now represented it to be; nay, had it happened at a much earlier period, and he could have foreseen, and have been sure that the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Auerstadt could have been prevented by the perpetration of a deed so foul; he would have rejected it with the same indignation, and made the communication, which might counteract it, with a feeling of abhorrence as strong, and an alacrity as decided as in the instance before us. As an admirer of the qualities of Mr. Fox's head and heart, I am glad such an opportunity was afforded of exhibiting to mankind his genuine philanthropy in its brightest colours.—This letter, sir, however, produced the correspondence, which forms the first part of the papers submitted to our consideration: and in all these letters, written by Mr. Fox's hand, there is exhibited a model of frankness, simplicity, wisdom, and resolution. It is obvious, that the proposal to negociate, came from the French government, and that the basis suggested was the treaty of Amiens [No. 4. of the Papers laid before Parliament, p. 93.] By the address of Mr. Fox, this basis, which as he truly said, might have been the source of endless difference and dispute, was immediately superseded, and the true basis of all treaties proposed; namely, "that the treaty should be reciprocally "honourable to both countries and their "allies." [No. 4, p. 94.] At the same time, it was explicitly stated by Mr. Fox, that England could not negociate unless Russia was admitted as a party to the negociation. France, as she had an undoubted right to do, refused to consent to that proposition. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the vague but ingenious reasoning with which the French minister attempted to shake the purpose of Mr. Fox, whose jealousy became justly alarmed by the perseverance of M. Talleyrand; lest France should entertain the idea so derogatory to the dignity and the right of Great Britian, of excluding her from all interference in continental affairs. An explanation, however, was produced on that head, perfectly satisfactory, by a declaration that the French emperor wished to erect it into a principle, "that each "country should have an interest and in-"terference in all that concerns the con-"tinent of Europe." [No. 10, p. 105.] Still the point of joint or separate negociation was not adjusted, and the correspondence had ceased from the 26th of April to the 2d of June, when it was resumed by M. Talleyrand in his letter of that date. In answer to which, Mr. Fox stated that the difference between France and England as to the mode of negociating was a difference of form rather than substance. But, sir, it must be acknowledged, had joint negociation been conceded by France, that Mr. Fox would have advised its being commenced the next hour. [No. 7, p. 97.] Sir, I would refer to the Papers before the house, for the truth of the statement with which I have troubled you, and I would then ask of my noble friend, whether up to the moment to which I have brought the transaction, there was any other *sine quâ non* than that of joint negociation? The unhappy term of *uti possidetis* had neither been introduced nor thought of: and most unlucky in my estimation it has been that it was ever used, for it has proved the bane of the negociation.—Sir, I must here repeat, that if a letter had come from the French minister conceding the admission of Russia to the treaty, the negociation would have gone on, and might upon a free discussion of terms in the hands of Mr. Fox (had it pleased God to spare his invaluable life) have been brought to a happy issue.—A new æra commenced by the arrival of lord Yarmouth from Paris with a verbal communication from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Fox. The substance of that communication is given in the written note of the 13th of June, [No. 12, p. 109.] and unquestionably if we had received no information but from the contents of that note, I must have been compelled to say the basis of *uti possidetis* was not proposed by the French government at all. Fortunately however, sir, for himself, and for the satisfaction of the house, my lord Yarmouth is present at our deliberations, and has upon this and a former occasion thrown great light upon the subject, and much assisted us in forming a judgment upon the case. Sir, my lord Yarmouth has told us that M. Talleyrand proposed the basis of *uti possidetis* in those express terms, and at the same time gave full assurance of the disposition of France to make specific concessions to England of the highest national importance.—Hanover was to be restored unequivocally and without compensation. Mr. Fox instantly adopted the proposition to treat upon this basis. The difficulty with regard to Russia having been removed by the arrival of her plenipotentiary at Paris, and it being understood that the two countries, although treating separately would not sign treaties separate from each other or be parties to any arrangement in which the honour of each country, as well as her interests, was not guarded by the stipulations of the other.—My lord Yarmouth returned to Paris, and, from whatever causes, found the French minister receding from the propositions with which he had charged him. In these circumstances lord Yarmouth conducted himself with propriety and dignity. [No. 14, p. 111.] He recalled to the recollection of M. Talleyrand the conversation which had passed between them, the truth of which was acknowledged by the French minister; and held out no hope of a favourable issue, under the altered disposition of the court of France.—In this situation he addressed the letter to Mr. Fox, which produced the spirited and indignant dispatch of the 26th of June [No. 15, p. 112.] which my noble friend has informed us was the last written by the hand of Mr. Fox. Much stress, sir, has been laid by my noble friend on the arguments urged by him as tending to shew that Mr. Fox would not have consented to proceed in any negociation unless the *uti possidetis* was acknowledged by the French government as the basis of the proceeding. Sir, I cannot find any ground for that assertion in the whole of this dispatch. True it is that Mr. Fox desired lord Yarmouth to recall the French minister to his own original proposal: but he emphatically states that "*Sicily is the sine quâ non*," and although he argues with great warmth upon the conduct of the French government, and even says that it was upon the faith of the *uti possidetis* having been agreed to as the basis of the negociation that lord Yarmouth was then at Paris; he does not direct him to break off the negociation unless that basis was again recognized. He sums up the whole of his reasoning in one remarkable paragraph: "The result of "what I have stated to your lordship is "this, 1st, That Sicily is a *sine quâ non*; "on which subject, if the French minister "recedes from his former answer, it is in "vain that any further discussion should "take place. It is clearly within his first "opinion delivered to your lordship; it is "clearly within his last description of "places, which are reciprocally possessed "by the two countries, and cannot in all "probability be recovered by war."—But, sir, can my noble friend find in any part of this dispatch any other ground stated upon which the discussions are to be finally and peremptorily closed? On the contrary, is not lord Yarmouth told that the moment the single point of Sicily is conceded, he may open the full powers (with which he had been furnished, in consequence of a suggestion from the French government) and that upon the refusal of that single point those powers were to be with-held. Further, sir, I would put it to my noble friend, whether upon the contents of the letter from lord Yarmouth to Mr. Fox, of the 19th, and Mr. Fox's answer of the 26th, the inference is not undeniable, that it was not the intention of either government to insist upon the absolute recognition of the abstract basis of the *uti possidetis* as preliminary to negociation, or even to negociate strictly upon that basis.—Why, sir, the state of actual possession on both sides must have been intended, if on either: and yet we find that in the relation of the very first conversation held by the English plenipotentiary, on his return to Paris, with M. Talleyrand, (wherein he urges upon that minister the correctness of the terms of the message he took to England) he gives Mr. Fox to understand that he had asked for the cession of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, as well as an alienation of some parts of the French emperor's Italian states to form a provision for the king of Sardinia, and at the same time had solemnly protested on the part of England against cessions in the West Indies, or elsewhere. [No. 14, p. 111]. That lord Yarmouth did not act without authority, in making these demands of France, if it could be otherwise supposed, is to be collected from the answer of Mr. Fox; who expressly directs him to "mention the questions of Na-"ples and Istria again, but not to state "them as conclusive reasons against agree-"ing on preliminary articles." [No. 15, p. 112.] Where then is this abstract basis of the *uti possidetis* to be found, as *indispensably* necessary to further proceeding? Not, sir, in any part of the papers, which I have so carefully searched; not in the narrative of lord Yarmouth, which he has so candidly given to the house; not in the able reasoning, or eloquent speech of my noble friend. After all I have read, and all I have heard, I am bound to say I do not find that the *uti possidetis* was, up to this period, the *sine quâ non* of negociation.—In a short time, sir, it will appear from the papers, that Sicily itself ceased to be the *sine quâ non* of negociation. For after the rejection of the absurd proposition relative to the exchange of the Hanse Towns for Sicily, a second proposal having been made by the French government, and an intimation held out, that if Sicily was not ceded for some equivalent, the meditated changes in Germany would be published, the Russian negociator M. d'Oubril requested that the English cabinet would temporize rather than abruptly terminate the negociation, and it was admitted that an equivalent might be found for Sicily. This is acknowledged in a dispatch from the English cabinet to lord Yarmouth, dated July 18, [p. 118.] and at the same time a compensation is named, which I confess it appears to me almost as unreasonable for us to expect that France should consent to, as it was extravagant in France to suggest the exchange of the Hanse Towns for the island of Sicily.—On the 20th of July, notwithstanding the warm and repeated remonstrances of lord Yarmouth, the separate treaty was signed by M. D'Oubril with France, the terms of which appear to have been highly disgraceful to that court, and injurious to the cause of her allies.—But, sir, here it may not be improper to remark, in order that justice may be done to all parties; which it is essential should be done, in order that we may obtain a just view of our situation; in order that we may stand, both now and hereafter, clear before the world at large; and especially that we may deserve from Providence, under whose aweful eye we act, that protection which we implore, I say it is but proper to remark that in signing a separate treaty with Russia, France did not violate any principle of good faith with this country. She had expressed from the beginning a determination to treat separately with the powers to whom she stood opposed, if she could effect it; and in so doing she had neither deceived nor injured Great Britain; nor, indeed, is want of good faith upon this score attributed to France in any part of the correspondence. With Russia it is impossible not to observe the case was different; and certainly her plenipotentiary had acted in a manner most inconsistent with every principle of justice and honour. The situation of lord Yarmouth was thus rendered almost beyond precedent difficult and distressing, and I cannot help saying that he had hitherto conducted himself in a manner which did him great credit; nor do I think that his subsequent conduct deserved the sort of censure which was thrown upon him by the king's ministers at the time, and which has been in some degree insisted upon by my noble friend below me to-night. True it is, that lord Yarmouth did at this crisis, upon the demand of M. Talleyrand, produce the full powers which had been intrusted to him on the 26th of June, on the express condition that they were not to be opened unless the French government would relinquish its claim to Sicily: but it must be recollected that in the interval, compensation for Sicily had been suggested by France, and the possibility of it not only admitted by England, but a specific mode of compensation pointed out. So that the circumstances of the negociation were changed altogether: and if under such circumstances lord Yarmouth, contrary to the letter of his instruction, did in consequence of the remonstrances of M. Talleyrand, as detailed in his lordship's letter of the 30th of July, produce his full powers, though not strictly justified in point of diplomatic etiquette, surely there was such palliation, if not complete ground of vindication to be found, as might have saved him from reproach on the part of his employers; more especially now it turns out that nothing injurious to this country of any sort arose out of his conduct. For although it is suggested in the correspondence that the negociation was in some sort, of necessity continued in consequence of the step taken by lord Yarmouth; by the declaration it would appear that it was the determination of the king's government at this period to send a minister duly authorized, to Paris.—Sir, my noble friend and his colleagues have accused the French government as having manifested an unbecoming elation, in consequence of the advantage they had obtained, and of having greatly increased in their demands. Upon this point I beg to refer to the short abstract from lord Yarmouth's dispatch of the 21st of July, wherein he tells his court, that "he can "perceive, that the terms of France are in-"creased, but still not so much so as the "sudden defection of Russia had led him "to apprehend. Hanover, Malta, the "Cape, and India remained pure and un-"sullied." [No. 23. p. 123.] Was it reasonable to expect that France would not increase in her demands in consequence of the event which had taken place? did we not afterwards rise in our demands when it was found that Russia would not ratify the treaty signed by her minister? and is it wise or dignified in a great nation to represent as an act of gross injustice on the part of her enemy, a line of conduct, which under a change of circumstances she herself has actually adopted? If we could but weigh the conduct of the adversaries with whom we treat and our own in the same equal scale, how much would it conduce to establish the tranquillity, and render permanent the happiness of mankind!—To this observation, sir, I might have been led by the comments of my noble friend on the communication made by lord Yarmouth of the conference which took place between his lordship and general Clarke after the exhibition of his full powers, in which conference [No. 25, p. 125.] the English plenipotentiary conducted himself with exemplary discretion, sagacity, and moderation; in no instance committing the high character with which he was invested, giving no hope to the French plenipotentiary that England would depart from the basis on which the negociation was avowedly instituted, at the same time in a discussion of many hours, seeking to ascertain the extent of the demands of France, and in what manner they could be modified. Sir, I would ask of my noble friend, how the most experienced diplomatist could have conducted himself in a manner more satisfactory, or could have evinced greater skill in a situation of extreme delicacy?—Now, sir, it becomes necessary to observe upon that part of the speech of my noble friend wherein he states the increased and extravagant pretensions of France, as arising out of the successful issue of her schemes with the Russian minister; and surely it is not just to take the terms mentioned by general Clarke, in this conference with lord Yarmouth, as the ultimatum of the French government, far less to assert that the French insisted with great elation upon their success with Russia, and in consequence of it *demanded* terms to which England could not accede. That a considerable advantage had been gained by France, no man can deny, and that such advantage would not be improved was unreasonable to expect. But the words of general Clarke are extremely cautious. He says that it would *entitle* the emperor to more advantageous terms. That, "the emperor would be *authorized* to withhold some of the great points, but having repeatedly said the contrary, though not in an official manner, he would abide by it."—My noble friend has justly remarked, that in the subsequent explanation of these great points by general Clarke, the proposed cessions of Hanover, Malta, and the Cape, were burthened with conditions wholly inadmissible: and my feelings revolt at them as much as those of my noble friend. The difference between us is this, that my noble friend considers these propositions to have been seriously intended as the ultimatum of France, whilst I consider them only in the nature of preliminary discussions, and if those discussions had proceeded, terms of a different nature, and *perfectly* admissible terms *might* have been proposed.—Here, sir, I would beg to refer those who are disposed to contend that the *uti possidetis* had been hitherto, and was now considered as the *sine quâ non* of the negociation, to the note prepared by lord Yarmouth for his discussion with general Clarke, and which was read by his lordship to the general. [No. 25, Inclosure D. p. 129.] You will there find that the English plenipotentiary states himself to be authorized to "*discuss* the basis, and to give full effect to the reciprocal desire of the two countries." Now surely, sir, if there had been but one indispensable basis upon which England would condescend to proceed, no discussion could arise upon the subject. The simple question was, Yes, or No? as was put by Mr. Fox relative to the joint or separate negociation in his correspondence with M. Talleyrand, and by the same minister also in the case of Sicily.—However, sir, to revert to the account of the conference itself. I maintain, that my noble friend is no more entitled to say that the terms mentioned by general Clarke, were the only terms which could have been obtained from France, than that the French minister would have been justified in affirming that the cession on the part of the French government of Naples, Venice, Istria, and Dalmatia, together with a part of the emperor's Italian dominions to the king of Sardinia, (p. 113) were the only terms upon which England would consent to make peace with France. Sir, I confess that such laxity and indulgence towards ourselves, and such strict interpretation of all that comes from the opposite party, seems to me, with great submission, neither to be in the true spirit of conciliatory treating, nor to be founded in equity or wisdom.—We now come to a period when the news of M. D'Oubril's conduct had reached England, together with the account of the step lord Yarmouth had consequently taken, and there is submitted to us a dispatch [No. 26, p. 129] bearing Mr. Fox's signature which unfolds the sentiments and views of the English cabinet at this juncture.—I cannot refrain from remarking by the way, that it is extraordinary to find M. D'Oubril's conduct in signing the separate treaty always referred to the threat held out about the affair of Germany; whereas the French minister from the beginning of the first correspondence with Mr. Fox always insisted that Russia had shown a disposition to negociate separately, and lord Yarmouth himself says, (p. 122) "that from the first hour he met M. D'Oubril in France he thought he was come determined to make a peace good or bad, with or without Great Britain."—Sir, there is something to me unintelligible in the conduct of the Russian plenipotentiary in the whole of this affair, and it would be improper perhaps to ask, or to give any explanation upon the subject at this moment. But to this I think there must be an universal assent, that no effort was left unemployed by lord Yarmouth to prevent M. D'Oubril from taking the step so justly deprecated.

—In this situation of things it was judged adviseable to add another minister to the earl of Yarmouth; and the earl of Lauderdale was selected for the purpose; a person perfectly qualified for any station where talents, activity, and integrity are required, and whom from motives of personal regard and friendship I should have wished to see placed in situations of eminence and distinction. If I shall be compelled hereafter to disapprove of that part of the negociation in which he was principally concerned, lord Lauderdale may no doubt appeal to his instructions as furnishing at once the best vindication, and the highest authority for his conduct.—About the same period we have been given to understand by lord Yarmouth, an impression was created in France most unfavourable to the issue of the conferences, by an event which was deemed to have taken place, I mean the political death of Mr. Fox. Alas! sir, how fresh causes of grief and lamentation for the loss of that illustrious man daily arise! how much more than ever are we now bound to deplore his untimely death! but was it unnatural that the French should conceive it probable his death would make a considerable difference in the British councils as to the great object of peace? Sir, notwithstanding, my noble friend, who has been during the whole course of his parliamentary life for 20 years the zealous advocate, and the most able and eloquent supporter of those enlightened and glorious principles which actuated Mr. Fox; notwithstanding, I say, he and others of his warmest friends and admirers were to be found amongst the advisers of his majesty, was it surprising that the French government should be somewhat diffident of other servants of the crown, who, whatever their sentiments might now be, had certainly upon former occasions not evinced the readiest disposition for peace with the chief of the French government. Sir, from my soul, I believe that every member of the English cabinet was sincerely desirous of peace. I have publicly expressed that conviction, and I repeat it: but am I to be surprised that France had not the same confidence as myself? and ought not peculiar caution to have been taken at a juncture so critical, to avoid giving the slightest appearance of a change of sentiment on the part of this country? The path was plain and obvious; I do not think it was pursued. That there had been in the case of Sicily, and possibly in some other points, something of tergiversation and chicanery on the part of France, is undeniable; but if it was fit to pursue the negociation at all, it was fit to pursue it in the spirit of conciliation and peace, both as to form and substance: and to judge from his manner of treating, I must say, it appears to me that lord Lauderdale's instructions were not judiciously drawn.—Sir, from the papers before you we find that lord Lauderdale arrived at Paris on the 9th of August and in a dispatch, dated on the 9th, he informs this government of interviews which had taken place between the English plenipotentiaries and general Clarke, to whom had been added M. Champagny as coadjutor, which had been announced to the earls of Lauderdale and Yarmouth, with "something like an insinuation that an unfair advantage had been taken by the English government by the appointment of two ministers on their part." [No. 35, p. 144.] I confess, sir, that I wish lord Lauderdale had omitted so invidious a communication to his court. It does not appear in the true spirit of amity, that any thing so vague and uncertain, as "something like an insinuation" should be seriously noticed and recorded. I am the more confirmed in the wish I have expressed, by adverting to the dispatch from the English cabinet, dated the 14th of August, [No. 38, p. 163] wherein the expression I have quoted, is so strongly taken up as to make it the ground of lord Yarmouth's recall from Paris.—Sir, the conference which took place immediately after lord Lauderdale's arrival at Paris is rendered for ever memorable by the delivery of a Note, (p. 145) signed by the new English negociator, doubtless, in strict conformity to his instructions, which indeed, did raise the *uti possidetis* into a *sine quâ non*, and threw such an impediment in the way of pacification, as was not surmounted till the period for a temperate discussion of terms was passed; the whole of the intermediate time having been lost in a fruitless dispute upon a barren proposition, which France nevertheless, as I shall hereafter shew, made an effort to surmount, an effort which might unquestionably have been highly improved. This same proposition we ourselves at last abandoned, for the purpose of doing that, which we ought to have done in the outset, namely, of considering the terms upon which a peace honourable to both countries might be effected.—Sir, my noble friend has paid to lord Lauderdale the tribute due to him from ministers for the faithful discharge of his duty; for the spirit with which he upheld the honour of the nation confided to his care, and for the ability with which he performed his various functions. I wish not to detract from that praise. They have both now, and in their dispatches addressed to him, done him no more than justice: and I am sure but little impression can have been made on the house by that part of the speech of the hon. gent. to which I have before alluded, wherein he tried to expose the noble earl to ridicule for the easiness with which he suffered himself to be duped, and the tameness with which he suffered the character of the nation he represented, to be insulted. Sir, to uphold the character of a great country is the first duty of a negociator, but not the only one. There is a skill which will combine firmness with conciliation, and obtain the object sought for without the slightest departure from the true feelings and expressions of national honour.—Sir, the note in question, at the same time that it demands the previous recognition of the basis of actual possession, admits, "that an indemnification "may be found for Sicily, and that pro"positions may be accepted for the ex"change of territory between the two con"tracting parties upon just and equal "principles." (p. 148). Sir, may we be allowed to ask, why not, as in the ordinary transactions of life, go at once to the substance, and dispense with the formalities, the recognition of which cannot conduce to any good purpose? Why not proceed to discuss those exchanges which it is admitted may be made, instead of dwelling upon a preliminary admission, which, when obtained, would not, in the slightest degree have accelerated the work? The recognition of a technical basis, which, whatever was her original proposition, you knew that France was now indisposed to admit, which, at all events, she would not be compelled to acknowledge, and which it does not appear to me to have been necessary or adviseable to send a fresh plenipotentiary merely to urge. But whatever may have been the course which I, as a person ardently wishing that every facility, consistent with national faith and honour, should have been given to this great work, might deem most proper, certain it is, that the course which was actually pursued after the arrival of lord Lauderdale at Paris, created a difficulty which delayed its progress during the whole of that valuable and irreparable period, which elapsed between the 7th of Aug. and the 18th of Sept.—My noble friend has commented with just severity upon the Note which was delivered by general Clarke to the English mission, (p. 150.) in answer to that which I have just mentioned. Undoubtedly, in that paper is contained great intemperance of expression, much vague and false reasoning, much exaggerated statement, and a great deal of assertion as to the possessions which the French emperor would retain, provided the basis of *uti possidetis* should be adopted. However Moravia, part of Hungary, the whole of Austria, &c. might have been his by the right of conquest, they had been restored by treaty, and, at the time of opening the correspondence, were not in the possession of France.—But in this note, the basis of actual possession is positively and violently rejected, and it is said that France will treat upon that *basis* alone, which was proposed by Mr. Fox, namely, "that the treaty should be ho"nourable to each party, and its allies; "and at the same time of a nature to in"sure, as far as should be in their power, "the future tranquillity of Europe, accom"panied by an acknowledgement in favour "of both powers, of the right of inter"ference and guarantee in continental "and maritime affairs."—According to the instructions given, no alternative was left to the English plenipotentiaries, after the step which had been taken, and the reception it had met with, but to demand their passports, and immediately to quit Paris. Passports were accordingly demanded, but the demand was eluded, as is said in the Declaration, by *an unusual and unexplained delay*, from the 9th to the 11th of August. The conduct of the French government in acting so directly in opposition to all established forms, in violation of that perfect freedom which must be allowed at all times to accredited ministers sent to treat with a hostile power for the great object of peace, has been deservedly reprobated. But I think the hon. gent. who spoke early in this debate, bore much too hard upon the noble earls in attributing to them any blame for their conduct at this crisis. They insisted upon their passports, and reiterated their request in a laconic, and forcible manner, such as could give no reason to doubt of their being sufficiently alive to the insult which was offered to their mission, and of the necessity there was for full and immediate apology and redress. But, sir, the 11th of August produced another note, signed by MM. Clarke and Champagny, far different in its language and tenour from the intemperate paper which had been before delivered, and which seems to me to have been calculated to remove all the difficulties created by the unfortunate adoption of the two baneful words which destroyed the power of treating.—Sir, I beg the favour of my noble friend, and of the house, to peruse with attention the following paragraph, contained in this note, signed by MM. Champagny and Clarke. "In "laying down the principle of *uti possidetis*, have the English plenipotentiaries "had it in view to propose a means of exchange and of compensation? If this is "the meaning, the emperor adopts it, because it appears to him conformable to "the two principles already agreed upon "by both parties." And having considered the import of this declaration, I request them to compare it with the paragraph contained in the first note signed by lord Lauderdale, part of which I have before quoted, "He cannot consent to treat upon any "other principle but that of the *uti possidetis*, as originally proposed to his sovereign by the court of France; at the "same time he desires it should be well "understood, that the adoption of this "principle will not prevent him either "from listening to any just and adequate "indemnification to his Sicilian majesty "for the cession of Sicily, or from accepting any proposition for the exchange of "territory between the two contracting "parties, upon just and equal principles, "such as may tend to the reciprocal advantage of the two countries." (p. 148.) Having compared these declarations, I would put it to my noble friend, to the house, and to the world, whether there is any substantial, nay, whether there is any formal difference between them? Why then did not the negociation proceed? the obstacle was removed; why was it revived? the simple answer, *yes*, on the part of England; which was the true, the obvious, the politic, the only answer to be given to the question of France, would have broken this unhappy barrier to treating between the two countries, and would have allowed of an immediate investigation, whether such terms as are described in the note of lord Lauderdale could be actually accepted or offered. Here, in my opinion, a golden opportunity was lost, not indeed of making peace; I cannot tell whether peace would have been the issue, nor am I called upon for an opinion upon that point; but of ascertaining whether peace could be made. But, sir, as this opportunity, amongst others, was missed, it is impossible for me to say, that the continuation of hostilities is entirely owing to the injustice and ambition of France; and that "with her altogether rests the awful responsibility." [Vide Declaration, p. 212.] It was not possible, certainly, for the English plenipotentiaries to return an answer to this note without an explanation on the subject of the passports which had been so unwarrantably withheld. They consulted their dignity; a previous explanation was demanded; an apology was made; and an answer was returned. It was in adverting to this part of the papers, I believe, that my noble friend indulged in some sarcastic remarks on the French ministers, which I think, as well upon general principles, as upon their application to this particular case, might better have been avoided. He taunts these gentlemen with the possible difficulties of their situation, in having a double negociation to conduct; the one at Paris, and the other at St. Cloud.—To allow for mankind in situations of difficulty is one of the first principles of wisdom and of charity; and the more arduous the situation, the greater the allowances must be. Taking it for granted then, that the persons employed by the chief of the French government were desirous of peace, which from the evidence of the papers in my hands I sincerely believe; if they had to allay some irritation, to conquer some prejudice, and to controul some violence, surely it would be more fair to applaud endeavours than to make them matter of reproach to those who were engaged in the task. Supposing my noble friend to be connected in administration with persons who had not all the same hearty dispositions to peace as himself, his difficulties in negociation would certainly be increased; but the minister opposed to him would be a very unskilful negociator who did not discover and allow for such disadvantages; and, if he himself were truly desirous of peace, did not dissemble his knowledge of them, and by every means in his power lend his assistance to their being overcome. I am not afraid to say that such allowances ought to be made for the minister and the plenipotentiaries of France. After the explanation, however, with regard to the passports, had been given, a note was delivered by the English mission, which at the moment when one word would have settled the whole of this preliminary difference between the two countries, puts them at a greater than ever. It is said, "That the "undersigned have only to regret that "they cannot, consistently with the in"structions of their government, do other"wise than insist upon the previous re"cognition of this principle." (p. 162.)—Why, sir, had not the principle been recognized or adopted (for my noble friend has given us to understand that the latter word was substituted for the former by the hand of the French emperor himself,) in the very note to which this was an answer? Sir, I cannot, I confess, comprehend the refined punctilio which still adhered so tenaciously to the empty form, when the invaluable substance was allowed to perish. Soon after this, lord Yarmouth was recalled from Paris. A long interval took place from the delivery of the last note on the part of England, which, I cannot omit repeating, was conceived in error: and during that interval, it for the first time appears that a suspicion was entertained by the English ministers, that Russia would not ratify the treaty of M. D'Oubril. The instructions given in the letter signed by Mr. Fox, supposing that event should happen, are consistent with all the principles of policy and good faith; and it is here not an improper place to observe, that the strict adherence to the terms of our treaty with Russia, however I may disapprove of the treaty itself, is highly deserving warm and universal commendation.—At length, sir, a conference [No. 43, p. 172] was desired by the French plenipotentiaries on the subject of the English note of the 11th of August, which took place on the 27th of the same month, and was totally ineffectual. A second conference was pressed for by MM. Clarke and Champagny, and agreed to by lord Lauderdale, who in the interval between the two conferences held a long conversation with M. Talleyrand; in which some strong expressions were used by the French minister relative to the determination formed by the emperor, not to cede any part of the French dominions, and a surprise, not altogether unwarrantable, I think, was expressed by M. Talleyrand, (p. 173) that no impression was made upon lord Lauderdale, and that he did not feel that in obtaining Malta, the Cape, and Hanover, England would make a glorious peace. Still the unfortunate basis stopped every avenue to discussion; and is again insisted upon in a paper delivered by lord Lauderdale on the 29th (p. 175). On that day the conferences were renewed, and although, according to the account given by lord Lauderdale himself, the tone of France was wonderfully lowered, and she appeared willing to make large concessions; his lordship's mouth was shut, and all debate upon the substance of the thing was precluded, by the old and worthless demand of the previous recognition.—Sir, I deeply lament the fatality which attended the introduction of this indispensable condition. I lament the false sense of punctilious honour, which did not use the means of relieving the difficulty which occurred on the 11th of August. I lament its anxious influence at this moment, which prevented the two countries from ascertaining whether their long and bloody differences could be reconciled or not. I lament that lord Lauderdale, at the conclusion of a conference, which, according to his own account, was of a nature more pacific than any which had previously taken place, should have felt himself under the necessity of drily asserting, that he must terminate his mission (p. 177); and I should indeed have been astonished if he could have withstood the warm remonstrance of M. Champagny, and have absolutely refused all further intercourse.—On the day proposed for further conversation, M. Talleyrand announced to lord Lauderdale, in a manner acknowledged to have been frank and candid, that news had arrived of the refusal, on the part of Russia, to ratify M. D'Oubril's treaty [No. 46, page 180]; and the orders of the emperor to inform his lordship that this event would dispose France to make peace upon terms more advantageous to England than she would otherwise have offered. Whatever any hon. gent. may see of trick, contrivance, finesse, or chicane in the conduct of France in every other part of this history, I think no one will be so unfair as to deny, that in this particular point before us at least, the conduct was natural and ingenuous. At the same moment, sir, it appears that the intelligence of this event reached England; and a dispatch with instructions was forwarded to the English plenipotentiary at Paris, signed by earl Spencer.—Lord Lauderdale very properly deferred any renewal of the conferences till he should have received such instructions as the English cabinet might think proper to send in consequence of the event which had been then so recently made known. These instructions were communicated in a dispatch signed by Mr. Secretary Windham, dated Sept. 10, of which we have an extract. [No. 48, p. 181.]—Sir, I must beg to call the attention of the house most particularly to this paper, because it completely bears out many of the arguments with which I have troubled you in the earlier part of my speech. But I cannot help observing upon the remark made in the first part of this extract on the communication made by M. Talleyrand to lord Lauderdale. Sir, it was the avowed policy of France to detach you from Russia, if she could:—to adhere to Russia was not only *your* avowed policy, but your bounden duty; and whatever might be her wish, France could now less than ever entertain the hope that she should be able to effect the separation. The *uti possidetis* is mentioned in this dispatch as the basis on which his majesty had originally intended to treat; and as the basis to which he still adheres: but the tone in which it is mentioned, is very different from that in which it had ever been talked of since lord Lauderdale's first arrival at Paris. Its previous recognition is no longer made an indispensable preliminary to negociation; and indeed how should it, when in the same dispatch we are informed that in the outset of the negociation every effort had been made by England to obtain the restitution of Naples to the king of the two Sicilies? Further, it is recognized that in the original instructions to lord Yarmouth, Sicily was a *sine quâ non condition*; and, sir, I again repeat and maintain, that it was the *only* sine quâ non insisted upon, or even mentioned by Mr. Fox in his dispatch of the 26th of June; the last he ever wrote. This alteration indeed now appears to have taken place; that whereas at the solicitation of the Russian minister, compensation for Sicily had been admitted as possible; the views of Russia had been ascertained on that point, and Sicily itself was again become not only essential, but indispensable to any arrangements for peace, with both the allied powers.—Sir, I contend that a new turn was now given to the negociation, and that this dispatch was calculated to effect that which ought to have been effected in the very outset; and accordingly by lord Lauderdale's answer, which is dated on the 18th of Sept. (No. 49. p. 184) we find that he had at length come to the discussion of terms. A conference with M. Talleyrand is there detailed, in which it appears not only that "if the difficulties in respect of form could "be got over, that he did not think any "material objections to terms would oc"cur, but that the interests of Russia "might be treated for by lord Lauderdale "himself," waving all formalities on the subject; and thereby removing the only difficulty which had occurred to Mr. Fox in his early correspondence with M. Talleyrand against an immediate and avowed negociation.—Sir, the difficulty of the basis of actual possession was removed: but the French minister was given to understand that there would be a rigid adherence to the terms which had been communicated to him both for England and Russia. Sir, on that I shall, for the present, make no observations; but I must remark that the note presented by lord Lauderdale to M. Talleyrand, dated Sept. 13th, (p. 186) preparatory to this conference, fully bears out the argument I have founded on the dispatch of Mr. Windham, and lord Lauderdale's answer to that dispatch. Would to God, sir, that at the first arrival of the English plenipotentiary at Paris, he had been instructed to hold such a conference as the one just observed upon! Then there was time to have discussed, considered, referred, conciliated, and agreed. Events were now pressing forward which cut off the possibility of further communication, which extinguished all hope of softening acrimonious feelings, of reconciling opposite and jarring interests, and finally restoring tranquillity to the world. And why not then as well as now? if the previous recognition of an abstract principle was necessary then, why was it abandoned now? and if abandoned now, why had any stress been laid upon it at all? In a former part of my speech, I looked forward to the period at which I am now arrived; and was I not justified in saying that the unfortunate introduction of that technical term of diplomacy was the bane of the negociation?—Sir, we are afterwards informed that M. Talleyrand, in another conference to which he was admitted by lord Lauderdale, and in which he evinced much personal civility, and disposition to please, presented a note, which from the manner of his presenting it, [No. 50, p. 189] does not appear to have been altogether such as he could have wished to have had committed to him, and which certainly did contain, according to his own phrase, both evil and good. In that note there is much unnecessary and irrelevant matter; much that marks prejudice and irritation; much that is objectionable; but there are many points stated, of which it would have been well if the allies could have taken advantage. Sir, it is stated that "the emperor adheres to the follow-"ing proposal. That the negociations "between France and England shall con-"tinue, and the minister of his Britannic "majesty shall be at liberty to introduce "into the treaty either as a secret article, "or in any other form which would an-"swer the same end, whatever he may "conceive would tend to reconcile the dif-"ferences between the two countries." "That the emperor will not hesitate to "make some sacrifices, in order to acce-"lerate peace, and render it durable."—"That France does not pretend to dic-"tate either to England or Russia, any "more than she will be dictated to by ei-"ther of those powers." "Let the con-"ditions be equal, just, and moderate; "and peace is concluded."—Sir, it would be injustice not to allow that the answer returned by lord Lauderdale (p. 192) to this note was dignified and moderate; but, sir, matters with Prussia were unhappily drawing to a crisis. The time in which temperate and repeated discussion might have relieved all difficulties, was irrevocably gone: and lord Lauderdale was informed of general Clarke's departure from Paris, to accompany the emperor. A conference, however, soon took place with the remaining minister, M. Champagny, [No. 51, p. 193.] when at length the terms on which France would consent to make peace, were opened by that gentleman. These were, the cession of Hanover and its dependencies to Great Britain: To confirm the possession of Malta: The absolute possession of the Cape: The confirmation of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Mahee, &c. in the East Indies. Also Tobago: The Balearick islands, as an indemnity for Sicily; and an annuity to the king of the two Sicilies from the crown of Spain. The answer given by lord Lauderdale was, that no proposition respecting an exchange for Sicily could be attended to, and that he was bound to insist peremptorily upon *all* the demands of Russia. In the subsequent conference which took place on the 26th of Sept., [No. 52, p. 197.] the demand on the part of Russia was again insisted upon, and the French plenipotentiary said he had no authority to make any offer for Russia, further than the full sovereignty of Corfu. This was positively rejected, and the negociation declared to be at an end. Notwithstanding M. Champagny again pressed for another conference, and held out the prospect of receiving fresh instructions.—Another conference was actually agreed to by lord Lauderdale, but whether it took place is not, I think, quite clear: and if it did, we are not informed of the particulars. Neither indeed is it material, for the emperor had quitted Paris, to put himself at the head of his army, and I perfectly agree with my noble friend, that when that event had once taken place, every hope of success in negociation was at an end, although perhaps the mission need not have been declared terminated, till the ultimatum of the emperor had been received—This was the position taken by my noble friend: not that which has been ascribed to him by the hon. gent. that all hope of peace was over, when the Confederation of the Rhine had been framed and published; for it is sufficiently obvious, that however the allies may have disliked that act, whatever character may be ascribed to it, the correspondence and negociation was never for a moment stopped on that account.—Thus, sir, I have taken a review of most of the papers submitted to our consideration by order of his majesty, longer and more tedious than I could have wished, but which has appeared to me necessary in order to justify to myself, to my friends, and to the country, the conclusions to which I have come, and the part I feel compelled to take. Sir, it remains for me to take some notice of the terms which were offered at last by France to this country and to her ally; and the propriety of our rejecting or accepting those terms for ourselves, and insisting upon *all* that Russia thought proper to claim for herself. Hanover, that jewel of the crown, as it has been represented, without which its lustre would be incomplete, was ours. The honour of the country therein was secured. Malta was ours. This surely was an important point. What, sir, was the original object of the war in which we have been engaged since 1803? Malta. If Malta could have been obtained, war would have been avoided. At least we had the positive assurance of that fact, in the papers which were then laid upon the table of this house. True it is that the first step taken by the persons who then directed the counsels of his majesty towards the rupture of the treaty of Amiens was the king's message of March, 1803, relative to the movements in the ports of the enemy. But the communication contained in the message did not, at the time, nor has it ever since appeared to me to be justified by any thing which could be shewn to have taken place. Indeed, I should grieve for the character of England if the imputation cast upon her by the hon. gent. to whose speech I have frequently alluded, could have credit with the world. He has told you, that England, bound by the solemn obligation of a treaty which she had concluded but a few months before; pretending an earnest desire for the continuation of peace, saw a moment in which she thought the powers of the continent might be excited against France, and that she sought a pretext for war, in order that she might persuade, by her example, those powers to join again for that chimerical object, which had been twice attempted and twice defeated. Sir, it cannot be so. It is impossible to believe it. The Cape of Good Hope, the cession of which by England at the treaty of Amiens had been so much censured, was ours. Every point of consequence in the East was yielded; and Tobago, perhaps of little importance in itself, but which having been originally an English colony was, on that account, an acquisition honourable to this country, was also to be given up. What was there remaining for England, as England, to ask? for I shall presently come to the stipulations for Russia. Surely for wealth, power, or the occupation of our naval force for their defence, we wanted no further accession of colonial possession. Sicily, sir, has been represented as an object important to British as well as to Russian interests; and my noble friend has laboured the question not a little upon that ground. Sir, I do not profess, upon the present occasion, either to concede or to contest this point: but I may be allowed to say, that an indemnity for Sicily had been admitted by the king's servants as possible, and if that time had been given for the consideration of the question which was wasted in useless discussions, such an indemnity might, I think, *possibly* have been found. That the real inclinations of the king of Naples must have been consulted upon the subject, is beyond dispute. We are bound by no treaty to that unfortunate monarch, but having been the cause of his breaking the treaty he had made with France in the autumn of 1805, having taken him under our protection, having occupied his dominions for his defence, no consideration upon earth could, I am sure, have induced the king's present ministers to have coerced, far less to have abandoned that monarch in the manner in which other princes to whom we were bound by the most solemn treaties, have been abandoned in the course of the sanguinary wars which have been waged with little intermission for the last 13 years. I confess I cannot lay great stress upon that part of the argument of my noble friend which presses the necessity of retaining Sicily for the purpose of supplying Malta. The confined territory of Malta, sir, I should conceive, might without any difficulty be furnished with provisions of all kinds from the surrounding Mediterranean states; and with the present increased population of Sicily diminishing so materially, if not destroying her power of exportation, we might be induced to ask, How is Malta supplied now? —Dalmatia has also been a little touched upon by my noble friend, as an English object, in consequence of the facility it would give to France to foment disturbances in the Turkish dominions, the possession of which by France would facilitate her views upon our eastern territories. Sir, I confess that I cannot quite keep pace with my noble friend. For however right and proper it may be in all cases to guard against contingencies, I do think there are some so remote, as not quite to deserve the attention sometimes bestowed upon them. Besides, sir, however we may talk of the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire, an object frequently insisted upon as dear to France and England in the course of these papers, we all know that the councils of the Porte are, at all times, either Russian or French. We conceive it to be our interest to support the preponderance of Russia at the Porte; but we know that the policy of Russia long since conceived, is not abandoned; that her desire for the possession of the Turkish provinces is not abated; that she will acquire that possession whenever the opportunity shall offer; and that whenever the acquisition of those provinces shall be made by any state really powerful, if the way to

India be laid open, the way to India will be travelled. But, sir, it seems that Sicily and Dalmatia were objects so important to Russia, that she would not yield an iota upon either, and bound as we were by treaty, in that case we could not recede. Be it so. State it then, that we are at war because Russia would not allow us to make peace. That however is not said to be the case: and indeed, I think there can be no doubt, that if England deemed the pretensions of her ally unreasonable and extravagant, it would have been competent for her to have used such arguments, and to have had recourse to such means as might induce her to modify her demands. In the case before us, however, lord Lauderdale insists upon *all* the demands of Russia, with as much perseverance as he does on those of Great Britain. We are to suppose then, that the ministers of this country deemed those demands such as Russia was entitled to expect.—It may then be fair to canvass their justice, and to express our opinion on their propriety. I think, sir, they resolve themselves into two; Sicily and Dalmatia. I will not trouble the house by a repetition of what I have said on the subject of Sicily. It is for persons better and more accurately informed than I am to determine the point: but as an exchange for Sicily had once been talked of, I might perhaps have hoped that such an exchange could have been found as would have afforded a just equivalent, and with the perfect and unconstrained concurrence of the unfortunate monarch most interested in its fate. Sir, before I say a word upon the subject of Dalmatia, I beg to recall the recollection of the house to one of the speeches of Mr. Fox, charged with those maxims of moral and political wisdom, which fell in such copious abundance from his lips, and which speech will, I am sure, be long recollected by those who heard it; I mean that delivered on the 21st of June, 1805 *. Wherein he vainly endeavoured to incite the persons who had then the government of the country to avail themselves of the mediation of Russia to effect a peace; and almost in a spirit of prophecy dwelt upon the evils which might arise from the line of conduct which was unhappily adopted. Mr. Fox's recommendation was to *place yourself in the situation of France at the time you treated* with her, and moreover, to let the terms you asked, to use his phrase, be *moderate in the extreme.* Now, sir, placing ourselves in the situation of France, let us see whether we can deem the demand of Dalmatia moderate. How had Dalmatia been acquired by France? At the point of the sword. By the treaty of Luneville, Dalmatia was left to Austria. What had happened subsequent to that treaty? the peace of Amiens had been made and broken. The chief of the French government, on assuming the imperial dignity, had addressed to this country a proposition for peace. He was answered by a letter, signed by lord Mulgrave; that his majesty could not attend to any proposition of that nature without consulting Russia. For what purpose did it afterwards turn out that Russia was consulted? for the purpose of obtaining her mediation to pacify the world? No such thing. But for the purpose of forming a general coalition against France, and again to revive the chimerical project of her subjugation. Into this coalition, framed under evil auspices, ill concerted, without bonds of union, without a due preparation of those means acknowledged by the framers of it to be necessary to its success, Austria was reluctantly dragged. Its formation was kept as secret as a scheme of that magnitude could be. It burst unexpectedly upon France. Its explosion was not to depend upon the conduct of the French emperor. Terms of peace were talked of amongst the coalesced powers, to be proposed to France; such as they knew it was absolutely impossible for France to accept: and after having decided upon asking what they knew she could not give, they determined to attack her at the season most convenient to themselves, without waiting for the result of any negociation at all. Sir, I refer to the Papers laid before parliament last year, for the truth of every assertion I have made *. Sir, unhappily, we know the issue of that project. The emperor of France marched his army from the coasts of the channel, and in a few short weeks, a series of successes then unparalleled, and terminating in the battle of Austerlitz, had destroyed the coalition, and laid Austria again prostrate at his feet, her capital in his possession, and her condition ten times more abject than ever. The peace of Presburg was made, and the peace of Presburg gave Dalmatia to France. Was it probable then that France would cede Dalmatia within a few months after she had so acquired it? Was it reasonable to expect she would? or to require it peremptorily of her?—Had the success of Russia in the war been such as to entitle her to make large demands on France, or to make it reasonable to expect that France would listen to great pretensions on her part? Sir, placing ourselves in the situation of France, I think we should say decidedly, no. Sir, my noble friend has truly stated that Dalmatia is not necessary to France, either for the integrity of her dominions, or for her defence. Is Dalmatia necessary to Russia, for either of those purposes?—But France, it seems, has been desirous of possessing herself of that province, as a point of offence in war both to Austria and Turkey, and for the still more dangerous purpose of fomenting disturbances in the provinces of both those empires in time of peace. Granted. But, sir, after such repeated and signal defeat of the one power, such a career of victory of the other, can we well be surprised, talking soberly, and considering the matter impartially, that France should, when almost every thing was in her power, select such possessions as would most effectually disable Austria from the like attempts; and if Austria, Russia, and England, conjoined, could not prevent the peace of Presburg, which gave Dalmatia to France, could it be hoped that she, for the sake of Russia, would do that for Austria, which Austria, with the assistance of Russia, could not obtain for herself?—But then, it is a point from which the independence of the Ottoman empire may be attacked. Granted again. Sir, of the independence of Turkey I have said as much as may be necessary; but if Russia is jealous of French influence in Turkey, is not France equally jealous of the influence of Russia? and in the hands of either of those powers, would not Dalmatia be equally a point of offence in war and intrigue in peace against that empire? What rational ground of hope, then, that you could obtain this province for Russia? But it has been insinuated, if not stated, that the object was not to obtain Dalmatia for Russia, but only its evacuation by France. Why surely, sir, no one will be brought to believe that if France could have been persuaded to march out, Russia would not have marched in. And even the undefined state in which such an arrangement, if practicable, would have left it, must have laid the foundation of future strife. But it so happens, that the stipulations of the Treaty of Presburg have never been fulfilled, and that the Cattaro has never been evacuated. A still stronger ground for supposing that, if ceded by France, Russia would not relinquish her hold; and a still stronger ground for believing, that France would never agree to the cession.—The result is, that if Russia insisted peremptorily upon her terms, and we agreed with her as to the propriety of her demands, peace was not attainable, because we asked that which, placing ourselves in the situation of France, we would not, I think, have given.—Sir, without presuming positively to contend in opposition to the authority of my noble friend, and those who are connected with him in official situation, that the terms proposed by France were such as ought to have been accepted; but as far as Great Britain alone is concerned, surely it was no disgraceful or inglorious offer that was made; and to Great Britain and her ally, the offer was such as may not speedily be made again; and the probability, or improbability of obtaining better terms than those which you refuse, is always a consideration of the utmost importance to those who are engaged in negociation. But, sir, I maintain that the terms stated even in the last communication between lord Lauderdale and M. Champagny, far less those originally talked of by general Clarke to lord Yarmouth, and upon which my noble friend has more particularly dwelt, cannot fairly be stated to be the ultimate terms of France. To the last hour, M. Champagny, with an eagerness which to me evinces sincerity, presses for further communication, hopes for fresh instructions. In the conference detailed by lord Lauderdale in his dispatch of the 19th of September, (p. 189), M. Talleyrand, in answer to a question proposed to him, says, "The emperor will leave every thing to his plenipotentiaries." All tends to shew, that if the time which elapsed from the commencement of the negociation, had been duly improved, it might have been known what the ultimate terms of France were, and then only could you have said with truth to the world, that it was solely owing to the injustice and ambition of France, that peace between the two countries had not been concluded.—Sir, it has been thrown out in the course of debate, that at all events we have had a good escape; for that as no peace between England and France could be deemed worth our having, which did not hold out a prospect of security to the continent, seeing what has happened to Prussia, we may congratulate ourselves upon not having concluded a peace, which would have been immediately followed by a war between that power and France. Much has been said of the injustice and the violence of France in her present contest with Prussia; and even in the speech from the throne we were told that Prussia was forced into the contest by France (p. 15). Sir, I was unwilling to express any difference of opinion on that day, but undoubtedly I could not concur in the justice of that position. Of Prussia, in her present state of abasement and dejection, one cannot speak as one would have done in her more prosperous moments. But the truth is, that having, during 13 years, evinced any thing rather than magnanimity of conduct, she rushed into a war with France, with an inconsiderate folly, amounting almost to madness: and for what?—Why, sir, according to the confession of Prussia herself, because she had evidence that France was negociating with England, and that the restoration of Hanover was to be a condition of the treaty.—It was not any act of recent aggression on the part of France; not the Confederation of the Rhine, not the lengthened abode of the French troops in Germany; but because Hanover was to be taken from her, that she did that desperate deed which has been succeeded by events so terrifying and stupendous. We, ourselves, then, sir, were engaged in an act which provoked the open hostility of Prussia; and what would have been the situation of the continent, had a treaty been concluded between the allies and France, of which the restoration of Hanover to the crown of Great Britain had been a condition! If Prussia had refused to yield it, we must have united with France to have wrested it from her. Sir, my noble friend has asked, whether we could have continued to negociate after the war had begun; and what security we could have had, that the French emperor would have checked his career after one victory, and whether he would not have followed up his successes to the extermination of the Prussian monarchy. Sir, in the other alternative; if peace with us, had produced war with Prussia, what security could we then have taken or obtained, that the same events should not have taken place? and yet by the very preliminary of our negociation with regard to the king's German dominions we risked it. Sir, it may be said, that I am putting a most improbable, if not an impossible case, for that if a treaty had actually been concluded, Prussia would have acquiesced. In all reasonable probability, sir, she would. But seeing what we have seen, it may be fairly said she *might* not; and to have resisted France and England united, would have been scarcely less insane, than to have gone to war with France at the time, or in the condition she did.—Sir, lord Yarmouth tells you, that M. Talleyrand sought a mode of secret communication with England, lest Prussia should take umbrage at the proposition respecting Hanover. It was known that she would not part with it, except by compulsion; and certainly her acquisition of that province was as much contrary to every principle of honour and good faith, as any that was ever made by any power at any time.—Much, sir, has also been said of the insincerity of the French, and of the dupery of the government of this country. I believe, on the contrary, and upon grounds which appear to me rational and satisfactory, the ministers of France to have been sincere in their wishes for peace. I believe the chief of the French government to have been desirous of it: and if not so, I am labouring under a great, but I hope, a pardonable error.—Sir, I am upon principle, as well as from feeling, in all transactions of life, public as well as private, an enemy to perpetual and endless suspicion. It is not the character of true wisdom, and it impedes the progress of all human affairs. That a man should be upon his guard against the machinations of the bad, and the artifices of the designing, is most necessary. Certainly, one would not employ a person who would be likely to become the dupe of others, to conduct any affairs of importance; but there is such a thing, as for a man to become the dupe of his own distrust, and that is in my opinion the most disgraceful as well as most fatal of all kinds of dupery:—Now, sir, what motive could France have had to desire negociation with England, but that it should terminate in peace? My noble friend has been unjustly accused of having delayed expeditions, and withheld armaments, in consequence of my lord Lauderdale's procrastinated stay at Paris; the truth of which charge he has denied. I believe, what he says, that we lost nothing by it; but if that be so, France gained nothing by it. Why, sir, if no correspondence had ever been entered into, would not every accession of power to France have been made, as it now has been made? would not the Rhenish Confederation have taken place? could we by any means within our power have delayed, much less have prevented it?—Till good grounds, then, can be shewn to me, to believe that France was insincere, I must trust to her sincerity in this case: and I think the papers before you justify me in so doing. Some topics, sir, have been urged by my noble friend, which I confess, I had rather he had not used, because I am loath to hear, and more especially from him, any thing like the sentiments which have always called for my decided reprobation in this house. Sir, the mere character of any person in power distinct from his conduct, can never be made a motive of action, and the reproach of ambition, injustice and rapacity, is, alas! but too applicable to more than one country, to make it any thing like a substantial reason of itself for a continuation of hostility with any. Is it upon the theatre on which they are now contending,—is it in Poland, that Russia and Prussia can with any face reproach France with injustice, rapacity, violence, and cruelty? When England looks at her Eastern empire, does she feel herself sufficiently innocent to throw the first stone? These charges may serve mutually to exasperate and inflame; they may tend to revive that acrimonious feeling, which M. Talleyrand in his first interview with lord Yarmouth, told him had so happily subsided. This rooted and rancorous hatred and animosity, which may be created even in one country towards another, can never afford just ground for war; but it may prevent, and I fear, within the last few melancholy years, has materially contributed to prevent, the restoration of the blessings of peace.—Such, sir, are my sentiments; and I could not help delivering them to the house, and to the world, however painful the execution of the task has been: and with those sentiments, it is quite impossible for me to vote for the Address which has been proposed by my noble friend. Sir, we are told in the declaration of his majesty, that he looks with confidence to the issue of the contest, the continuance of which he laments. The address holds out no hope of peace, it includes not even the word; and the speech of my noble friend gives me no consolation on that head. Good God! if peace be not the issue of the contest, whither are we hurrying? Contemplate, sir, if you can with composure, these two mighty empires exerting their utmost efforts, each for the destruction of the other; and think upon it, if you can without horror, that before the contest be ended, one or the other must be destroyed. Sir, this is a catastrophe I cannot bring my mind to anticipate, without sensations of the deepest anguish: it is a prospect which I do not think, with the blessing of God, it is necessary, even in the present disastrous state of the world, to look forward to. If it be, how trifling are the woes and calamities already suffered by mankind to those which are yet to come!! Sir, I for one will cherish the hope that even in the days of some now living, peace may be achieved, and I will not contribute to increase the difficulties in its way, by saying or allowing that it is impossible.—In the last note of the French minister, dated from Mentz, (p. 201) wherein Great Britain is forcibly reminded of the elevation to which France has been raised by the combinations to destroy her power; and the successes of the new contest are predicted, we are told that amidst all "the chances of war, the emperor of "France will renew the negociations upon "the basis laid in concert with the illus-"trious minister, whom England has lost." Russia in her manifesto, published after she had refused to ratify the treaty, signed by D'Oubril, declares her readiness to enter into immediate negociation. Why should Great Britain alone refuse to open her ear to any overture? Why should she alone reject all hope?—I am a friend to peace, I opposed the commencement of the first war with France. There never was a moment during the whole of that contest in which I did not wish and think that efforts might have been made for its termination. I supported with the little strength I had, every attempt that was made towards a pacification. At the conclusion of each, I anticipated that the offer at the next overture would be far inferior to what had been rejected at the preceding. I expressed my deep regret at the rejection of that favourable opportunity which was spurned in the year 1800. I supported the treaty of Amiens, and expressed my strong disapprobation of its rupture. I am sorry indeed that the offer of 1805 was answered by the mouth of the cannon. I deeply regret the conduct of some parts of the negociation which has just been concluded; and although it has been unsuccessful, I will not yet despair of peace; I will not consent to shut the gates of mercy against mankind.—Sir, I am aware, that my opinions are peculiar, perhaps they may be singular. I hope, however, some gentleman may be found so far to concur with me, as that the Amendment I shall have to propose, may be seconded; and that it may be recorded upon the Journals of parliament, that there were some (however few) who thought it unwise in policy, and false in principle, to assert that peace with France was, under any circumstances, impossible: but, sir, if I stand alone, I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of putting into your hand, this paper, which contains the amendment moved by my noble friend, upon the rupture of the treaty of Amiens, and I have selected the words as the most expressive of my sentiments and feelings on the present occasion. Sir, I move to leave out all the words of the Address after the word *end*, in the third paragraph for the purpose of inserting the amendment: "To assure his majesty of our firm determination to co-operate with his majesty in calling forth the resources of the united kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war, in which we are involved, and to pray his majesty that he will, in his paternal goodness, afford as far as is consistent with his own honour and the interests of his people, every facility to any just arrangement, by which the blessings of peace may be restored to his loyal subjects."—The motion was seconded by Mr. Johnstone. The question upon the amendment having been put, it was negatived without a division. The main question upon the Address was then put, and none of the ministers shewing any disposition to speak,

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* See Vol. V. page 539.

* See Vol. VI. Appendix, page 1.

Mr. *Canning* rose, and said:—I cannot think, sir, that I need offer any apology to the house for having deferred till the very last moment obtruding myself upon your attention. It was not until the last question now in your hand, was about to be put and decided, that I could believe it to be the determination of his majesty's ministers to suffer such a speech as we have just heard from the hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Whitbread) to remain unanswered; to suffer their own conduct in a transaction so momentous as that which we are this night considering, to go forth to the world under the imputations of their enemies abroad, and the inculpation of their friends at home, without an attempt to set themselves right in public opinion.—A complete vindication I did not expect from them, because there are some particulars in their conduct of the negociation, with respect to which the hon. gent. has accused them but too justly: but as to the general result of the negociation itself, they have a case which I think they can maintain; and which they owed it to themselves, to this house, and to the country, not to abandon in dumb despair, without an attempt to defend it against an attack so powerful, and coming from a quarter from which I think they must feel that attack with more than common severity.—If, indeed, the speech which has just been delivered had come from this side of the house, I could imagine that the ministers might have passed it over in silence; that they might have considered the charge of not having done enough towards making peace, directed by us against them, as one which they could safely leave unnoticed; as one to which we could not be supposed to have thought them seriously liable. I freely acknowledge that my suspicions of their conduct in the negociation were pointed quite another way.—But coming from one of their own body, from a friend and champion of their former politics, himself still apparently maintaining opinions which they—which the noble lord (Howick) especially,—has (much to his own credit, and to the advantage of his country) relinquished; opinions which have dictated so many motions in this house for peace and for negociation in the course of the last 12 years; many of them made by the noble lord himself, and all of them supported by him, and by the hon. gent. under circumstances much more unfavourable than those under which the late negociation has terminated; coming, I say, from such a quarter, and urged not only with so much ability, but with such peculiar force, from long personal and political friendship, and from that former similarity of opinions, I do think the speech of the hon. gent. required an answer. And I should have thought also that the noble lord (Howick) himself would have sufficiently felt the pride and the comfort of the situation in which he now stands, the advocate for the justice of the cause of his country against France, not to have omitted an opportunity of vindicating that cause against the objections of his hon. friend.—Since, however, neither the noble lord himself, nor any of his colleagues, have thought it worth their while to endeavour to counteract the impression which the hon. gent.'s speech is calculated to produce, I feel myself obliged (though very reluctantly at this moment) to state my opinion upon the question now before the house. I feel myself the more especially bound to do so, because agreeing with the hon. gent. in many of the premises which he has laid down, I am proportionably the more anxious to disclaim agreeing with him in his conclusions. I am anxious to repeat what I have before said upon this subject, that however the negociation may have been mis-managed, it has not, it cannot have been, so mismanaged, as to put France in the right, and this country in the wrong, as to the general result of the negociation, much less as to the general question of the war. There may have been, and I agree with the hon. gent., in thinking there have been, some considerable errors in the conduct of our government. There may be, and I agree with the hon. gent., there are assertions in the king's Declaration, which are not borne out by the papers upon the table: but I cannot agree with the hon. gent., that the effect of these errors or misrepresentations is to prove that an opportunity has been lost of making an advantageous peace; that the negociation has been prematurely and unnecessarily broken off on the part of this country; or that with a little more patience and dexterity on our part, we should have found France ready to give such terms as it became his majesty's ministers to accept. I cannot believe that there was, from the beginning, any other intention on the part of the enemy, than to delude and amuse us; I think the false statements in the Declaration are only so many ill-contrived attempts to conceal or to excuse our having been so amused and deceived; and so far from conceiving the rupture of the negociation to have been premature, while I agree in thinking the opportunity ill-chosen, I blame only that choice which let so many better opportunities pass by; which suffered a negociation which it was evident, from the earliest stage, must terminate, as this has terminated, to be protracted, by the artifices of the enemy, to his advantage alone, and to the infinite detriment of this country.—In stating the grounds upon which I have formed these opinions, I cannot do better than follow the order which the noble lord (Howick) has pursued in his speech. The noble lord did me the honour to begin by a reference to a part of my speech, on the first night of the session; in respect to the 3 material points upon which, as I then took the liberty of saying, it appeared to me the averments of his majesty's declaration required explanation and proof. These 3 points were, as the noble lord has correctly stated: 1st, The assertion that the first overture came from the enemy; 2dly, That that overture was accompanied by a proposal to treat on the basis of the *uti possidetis*; 3dly, The question of our having kept faith and concert with our allies, particularly with Russia, during the whole course of the negociation. The noble lord trusts that I am satisfied upon all these points; I will tell him how far I am so.—With respect to the first point, that the first overture came from the enemy, I have no hesitation in avowing myself perfectly satisfied. My doubts upon this subject, the noble lord will do me the justice to recollect, were founded upon the two letters, Nos. 2, and 3, of the French publication; the first of which is now shewn to have been interpolated, a trick of which it was impossible to form a suspicion; and the second to have been written in answer—not to that which it is made to follow immediately in the French publication,—but to that other note of M. Talleyrand, inclosing an Extract from Buonaparte's Speech, which in the French publication is wholly omitted. When I said that the letter about the assassin would be of itself an overture, unless something anterior to it in date could be produced, I said so on the presumption (which I should never have dreamt of questioning) that all the correspondence subsequent to that letter was correctly given in the Moniteur. Undoubtedly the case is altered by that letter of M. Talleyrand, which is now brought to light. Undoubtedly that letter, and the communication of Buonaparte's speech, expressing his willingness to treat on the basis of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, constituted a distinct overture, to which Mr. Fox replied as it was fit he should do.—Two things, however, I must remark, which the noble lord does not appear to bear in his recollection; 1st, that I never attributed any blame to the making the first overture, supposing we had in fact made it; on the contrary, I distinctly said that at any time when negociation might be desirable, I could not conceive that any delicacy as to which party should make the proposal ought to stand in the way: the blame would have belonged wholly to the publishing in his majesty's declaration, an assertion not supported by facts. 2dly, That my objections to the letter about the assassin were not confined to the single point of its unfitness as an overture; but were many of them of a nature to be in no degree done away by the proof of its not having been intended as an overture for negociation. Those objections I still feel. I still think the letter in its whole style and tenour, in conception and in taste, altogether unworthy of the great man who was the writer of it; and so unlike him, so wholly unlike any thing else of his writing which appears in the papers upon the table, that, when I heard the noble lord speak of the interpolations which the enemy had audaciously inserted in the publication in the Moniteur, I profess I fully expected to find this letter one of them. I was disappointed at finding it among our own official papers unaltered, and still attributed to Mr. Fox.—I was no less disappointed at not finding something else, which I understood the noble lord to have promised; but I suppose I must have misunderstood him. I did, however, understand him to say, that when the official correspondence came to be published, we should find that Mr. Fox had rejected with disdain, those exclusive compliments to himself, the object of which is obviously not so much to exalt him, as to vilify all the ministers who had gone before him. I find nothing like it. I wish I did. I retain my opinion as to what ought to have been an English minister's conduct in this respect. But having said thus much, I am not desirous of pressing this subject farther.—I will come next to the point which the noble lord has treated as the third in succession; that of our good faith and concert with Russia: because upon this point also I have to express, in the main, great satisfaction; and I willingly defer as long as I can that upon which I continue to entertain an unfavourable opinion.—I am happy to declare, that so far as the papers enable us to judge, ministers appear to have maintained our good faith towards Russia wholly unimpaired. And so far from undervaluing this merit in the negociation, I am ready and anxious to hold it up as that which is at once most praise-worthy, and most politic; for which, ministers are entitled to the highest credit, and by which the country obtains the most solid advantages, those of character and confidence for the future.—The noble lord will not think this commendation unreasonably qualified by the reserve with which I am obliged to accompany it,—that it is due so far as the papers enable us to judge. I do not blame ministers for not furnishing us with more ample documents upon this subject; perhaps they could not be furnished without hazarding mischievous disclosures: but unquestionably the want of any knowledge of the communications between us and Russia, which preceded the mission of M. D'Oubril, leaves us under the necessity of taking upon the minister's word the assurance that, up to that period, Russia and England acted cordially and confidentially together. For, if one could suspect that the mission of M. D'Oubril to Paris was intended by the court of Petersburgh as a reprisal for our having advanced before them in the negociation faster than they had expected, or than we had given them notice of our doing or intending to do,—it would then be impossible to contend that we had kept faith and concert with Russia, as strictly as we boast of having done: but even then I will confess I should be inclined to doubt whether our subsequent conduct, after M. D'Oubril's separate treaty, had not redeemed, or even more than redeemed our original failure. If, on the contrary, M. D'Oubril was sent without sufficient previous notice to us, and without waiting for and obtaining our full consent, our conduct would then be not only unexceptionable, but such as would have entitled us to the lasting gratitude of Russia, and have left her deeply our debtor;—but even then I should think that what we had done, though more perhaps than Russia would have been in such a case entitled to claim, was not more than an enlarged and enlightened policy warranted us in doing for her.—I am willing, however, to believe that there was nothing to atone for or to forgive on either side. That Russia and England took every step in concert: And then, while I admit and rejoice in the admission, that the good faith of the two governments towards each other has been sacredly observed, I cannot forbear regretting that so laudable a system should not have been carried fully and beneficially into execution; that there has not been as much wisdom as generosity and sincerity displayed in the conduct of the alliance; that a concert, so perfect in principle, has been acted upon so negligently or ill-avisedly, as to lose in policy all the main advantages which such a concert between two great powers is calculated to procure, and which constitute its principal value.—What is, in truth, the main advantage of such a concert and union between two great powers such as England and Russia, in a negociation with a common enemy? Not surely, that it obliges their respective plenipotentiaries to communicate with each other upon every step which each may advance in their treaty—not because it binds each not to conclude without the other. These are, abstractedly taken, disadvantages rather than advantages; they tend to complicate and embarrass; to retard the work of pacification; and ultimately may lead to the rejection of a peace in the highest degree desirable for one party, from the want of some petty object, or the failure of some unreasonable pretension, of the other. But what is the advantage which compensates, and more than compensates, all these possible inconveniencies? and which, especially at such a moment as the present, and against such an enemy as the nations of Europe have now to contend against, makes the union of two such powers as England and Russia not only a mutual security to themselves, but a common blessing to mankind? What, but that assurance which it holds out to the world of co-operation for ends in which all the world is interested—of a determination either to obtain such a peace as shall secure the general tranquillity, or to carry on war together for the general protection? What, but the rallying point which it affords to the weaker powers;—the hope which it offers of assistance to those who are able to contend for their freedom, and of refuge and protection to those who fly to it from tyranny and oppression?—But, for the attainment of these objects, what can be more obvious than that it is not sufficient for such an union to exist, unless its existence be known?—that a concert may be perfectly cordial between the two contracting powers; but if its operation be kept secret, if it be not diligently and (I would almost say) ostentatiously blazoned to the world, it is utterly useless for any purpose of larger benefit? And what was the fact? Was it notorious that England and Russia negociated in concert? Was not the direct contrary more than suspected? Was not the mission of M. D'Oubril universally believed to be a surprise upon our government? Was not the omission of any mention of Russia in the king's speech, at the end of the last session of parliament, understood both here and abroad as a tacit abrogation of our alliance? If that alliance still subsisted at that time, and if the concert was going on as intimately as is now insinuated, was it not our obvious policy to give every degree of publicity in our power to a state of things so honourable to ourselves, and in its consequences likely to prove so beneficial to the rest of the world? But what was our conduct? and what were its effects?—When once we had agreed to treat, [See Mr. Fox's dispatch to lord Yarmouth, June 26, 1806. No. 15 of the papers, presented to both houses of parliament, page 140 of the present volume,] "separately in form, though in substance, in concert with each other," (a most dexterous contrivance some appear to think it—I conceive it to have been a most mischievous concession); from that moment however our good faith might still be saved, every other advantage of concert was irretrievably abandoned. Russia and England might still be true to each other: but Russia and England together were no longer true to the cause of Europe and of the world.—And were not the effects correspondent with the error of the policy? What lost Prussia? I know, the noble lord says, the madness, the precipitancy, the infatuation of Prussia herself. But are we wholly guiltless? Had Prussia nothing to mislead and to deceive her? I know, the noble lord will tell us, as he has already told us, that Prussia acted without concert or communication. He will quote that note of the king of Prussia, in which he states that his resolution to go to war would be known at Paris before it was known at London or at Petersburgh. He will lament that Prussia did not throw herself upon the courts of London and Petersburgh for counsel and assistance. But what temptation had Prussia to take this course? Had she nothing to deter her from it? Let us see what the court of Berlin would answer for itself. In the declaration which was published by that court at the beginning of October, speaking of the time when Prussia was goaded by France into the measures which led immediately to the war, it is said "two negociations were at that time carrying on at Paris; one with Russia, the other with the English ministry. In both these negociations the intentions of France against Prussia were evidently manifested."

And then it proceeds to specify the stipulations hostile to Prussia in each. Such then was the impression at Berlin. The court of Berlin was satisfied that England and Russia were carrying on not a joint negociation, but two distinct and separate negociations:—"separate in form" we know they unfortunately were; and how should the court of Berlin guess that they were "in substance" united? And under this impression it is that the noble lord expresses his astonishment and indignation at the conduct of that court—that he admires the rashness, the want of common sense, the absolute madness and infatuation of Prussia in not having thrown herself altogether upon the courts of Petersburgh and London:—Upon two courts, of whom she only knew that they were engaged in separate negociations,—of whose concert with each other therefore she could entertain no reasonable belief; and further, that as far as related to herself, they were each in their respective treaty, stipulating something disadvantageous to Prussia! Would not the infatuation, the folly, the childish credulity of Prussia have been much rather to be admired, if with no other data than these she had formed the rash opinion that to the courts of Petersburgh and London she could safely betake herself for succour?—And if at the same time at which this undoubted fact of the separate negociations with M. D'Oubril and lord Yarmouth was communicated by M. Talleyrand to the Prussian minister at Paris, M. Talleyrand had (as no doubt he had) the goodness further to communicate in confidence that sentence of the English secretary of state's letter of the 8th of April, in which Mr. Fox declares his persuasion that "the project of a new combination against France is utterly chimerical,"—then I would be glad to know what rational Prussian could have advised his king to look for aid against France from the joint counsels and exertions of two powers, who were notoriously pursuing courses separate from, and independent of, each other; but each separately and respectively hostile to Prussia: and of whom one, and that the one which had been hitherto the soul of all confederacies against France, had voluntarily confessed to France herself that the day of such confederacies was gone by, and that the attempt to revive them would be utterly chimerical:—I trust that in all alliances which this country may hereafter contract, whether for war or for negociation with France, it will be remembered, that though good faith between the contracting parties be much, it is not all; that such a connection loses half its value, as well as half its sanctity, when it is not avowed in the eyes of the world; that what we appear anxious to conceal, or afraid to acknowledge ourselves, will not readily be believed or trusted in others; that "separately in form, but substantially in concert," is a form of treaty which has all the disadvantages of combination, without any of the advantages for which combination is most to be prized. Had we treated "formally,"—as well as "substantially,—in concert," M. D'Oubril could never have signed his separate treaty; even had we been "substantially,"—as well as "formally,—separate," we at least should not have been subject to the awkward and difficult suspense which followed that signature. This difficulty, however, was undoubtedly well worth incurring for the benefit of effectual concert; but how could that concert be effectual, which was known to none but the parties who concealed it, and to the enemy who stipulated for its concealment in order that he might deny it, and which presented to all other nations no other appearance than that of disunion of councils and diversity of objects?—I come now to the last of the three points, upon which the noble lord expects to find me satisfied, the assertion in his majesty's declaration, that France proposed to treat on the basis of the *uti possidetis.* And upon this, with the utmost seriousness and sincerity I feel myself compelled to declare, that so far from having received any satisfaction, I am, after the most diligent and impartial examination of the papers, more than ever convinced, that the assertion is not borne out by the evidence adduced in support of it. It is a question of evidence; it is a plain issue of fact, upon which an ordinary jury might decide; and I am confident that any jury would find the allegation not proved. The noble lord, indeed, goes a very short way to work upon this point, and travelling altogether out of the record before the house, and putting by all the written documents by which he originally engaged to convince us, betakes himself at once to the aid of the noble person whose intervention was employed on this occasion, and asks us if we will not believe lord Yarmouth's word? 'Is the assertion of my lord Yarmouth good for nothing?'—For every thing:

and in a matter of private concern, I, for one, should desire no other evidence; though even there, if there were contradictory testimony offered in opposition to it, I am afraid I must have recourse to other collateral evidence to turn the scale. But can any thing be more unfair or unreasonable than this direct personal reference to lord Yarmouth? unfair to the noble person himself, upon whom, singly, is thus attempted to be thrown the whole weight of a question upon which the honour of this country is pledged, upon which we are at issue with the enemy in the face of the world? Was such a question ever so decided? Was a point in dispute between two governments ever before attempted to be rested on the single responsibility of any individual, however respectable? Would any individual whatever undertake to convey a communication from government to government, at the risk of having such a load of responsibility cast upon him? We have heard from the noble lord himself that he had no such apprehension; that he was not by any means prepared for the use which is now made of his name; that he took for granted all along, that he was not the single and sole testimony on which the question between the two governments rested; that he imagined there was other concurrent evidence in the correspondence which was carried on, concurrently with his mission, between the two ministers for foreign affairs; that M. Talleyrand distinctly told him, that he wrote to Mr. Fox to the same effect with the communication made to him (lord Yarmouth); that he fully believed the letter of which he was himself the bearer from Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand, to be upon the same subject; and that he is astonished to find himself at this time of day the only support with which ministers have provided themselves for a point upon which they lay so much stress. And well may the noble lord express his surprise, and his resentment at having such a burthen laid upon his shoulders. The noble lord himself feels—and cannot therefore think it any personal disrespect to him, if there are those who feel with him—that he is not alone presentable to the world as a sufficient evidence upon such a question. We, to be sure, have the advantage in this house of the noble lord's presence, as a member of it. But this house is not the only judge in this question. It is a question for Europe, for posterity to decide: and what is the noble lord's private parole testimony to them? How can they know it? how can they be expected to take cognizance of it? Even in the other house of parliament they have not the advantage which we have here; and even we should have been deprived of it, if the noble lord had happened not to be returned to the present parliament.—If it was intended from the beginning to lay the whole weight of this assertion on lord Yarmouth's single declaration, why was not lord Y. duly apprised of this intention, and directed to reduce that declaration into a written official shape? The memorandum of the 13th of June is wholly insufficient for this purpose. Why was he not instructed to obtain in writing from M. Talleyrand the proposal which he understood him to have made in conversation? It is said, "M. Talleyrand would not have given it in writing!" How do you know that? Lord Y. distinctly says that he was never instructed to attempt to obtain it. 'But it was in the very nature of such a communication,' says the noble secretary of state (lord Howick), that it should not be reduced into writing:—the attempt to embody such overtures into a distinct official shape, has a tendency to put an end to that sort of preliminary, unavowed insinuation which has usually preceded formal negociations for peace; and which if you discredit and bring into disuse, wars must go on interminably; for how is the disposition to put an end to them to be ascertained? I confess I see none of the dangers which the noble secretary of state apprehends here: but if they exist, they are of his own creating. It is not the reducing into writing such communications as were made unofficially; it is not that, but it is the relying upon them, when not so authenticated, in subsequent official papers; it is the making a whole negociation turn upon an imputed admission of the enemy, which admission, at the time when it was made, you thought it indelicate to reduce into writing; this it is that has a tendency to discredit and bring into disuse that sort of preliminary overture. Every foreign minister may well be cautious how he commits himself by any verbal communication; which, while out of pretended delicacy you will not press him to render it precise and formal, you at the same time carefully lay up to be produced against him afterwards, according to your own construction. And after th example of lord Y., any gentleman may well decline to be the channel of such a communication, at the risque of finding himself, some six months afterwards, committed in the face of the world against the minister from whom he had confidentially received it.—For these reasons, and as much out of delicacy and justice to lord Y. (for whom I wish to shew more tenderness than has been shewn by his employers, and who, I think, has acquitted himself throughout the whole of this arduous business in a manner to entitle him to the highest respect and consideration), I beg leave to put wholly out of my view any other information than that which ministers have thought fit to lay before us in an official shape; upon which I originally understood the noble lord (Howick) to state himself to be prepared to go to trial on this question; and upon which alone, I repeat, it must, whether he be so prepared or not, be tried, in the opinion of Europe and of posterity.—In this view of the question, I confess I entirely agree with the hon. gent. who spoke last, not only that the *uti possidetis* was never offered in the sense in which the declaration affirms it; but further, that we have Mr. Fox's authority with us, for the sense in which we (the hon. gent. and myself) understand it. It is clear that Mr. Fox never understood the suggestion of the basis of *uti possidetis* as that regular offer and proposal, which it has since been attempted to represent it; and that he never laid that stress upon the question of the basis alone, as distinct from specific terms, which has been laid upon it in the subsequent part of the negociation. I think also, and upon this second point I have also Mr. Fox's authority clearly with me, that, even if the proposal of treating upon this basis had been distinctly made by France, and afterwards departed from unwarrantably (which I say is not proved), that even in that case the proposal was not one so advantageous to us, it was not so important to us to obtain the recognition of that basis, as we seem to have imagined. I think I can easily shew, that it would have been the most inconvenient basis, the most inapplicable to the actual state of the world, that could have been adopted as the foundation of our treaty. And thirdly, even if the two former points were decided in the affirmative; if France had indeed proposed the *uti possidetis;* and if it was indeed important to us to obtain the recognition of it: I think nothing is more demonstrable than that we went the very worst way about obtaining it.—1st, then, the main foundation on which the allegation rests, is to be found in lord Yarmouth's memorandum of the 13th of June; a memorandum which (be it remembered), his lordship was officially compelled to commit to writing, in direct violation of the promise originally exacted from him by M. Talleyrand. Lord Y. however, tells us, as well became him, that he declined committing it to writing, until he had obtained a solemn promise that no public use should be made of it. Such is the character of this document; and now for its contents. It contains, as I contend, but one positive averment, namely, that M. Talleyrand said, "We do not ask Sicily of you,—*nous ne vous la demandons pas;*" the rest is inference and induction merely; and subject, like all matter of inference, to be questioned by fair reasoning, without any imputation, or supposed imputation, upon the veracity and perfect honour of the person whose inference it is. Having obtained this admission respecting Sicily, lord Y. "conceived it improper to enquire further, '*Nous ne vous demandons rien,*' amounting (in his lordship's opinion) to an admission of the *uti possidetis,* as applicable to his majesty's conquests." Now here are no less than three successive inferences, every one of which I confess myself inclined to dispute: 1st, That "*nous ne vous la demandons pas,*" the expression applied by M. Talleyrand specifically to Sicily, is equivalent to the sweeping admission, "*nous ne vous demandons rien;*" an inference of a general proposition from a special one, which is not, I believe, very usually admitted to be sound in reasoning,—however possible it might have been to maintain the direct converse, and to infer the special from the general proposition. 2dly, That even "*nous ne vous demandons rien,*" (supposing for a moment that we had arrived fairly at that proposition, which I deny,) amounted to an admission of the *uti possidetis;*—Was it to be supposed that France had nothing to ask of us for her allies, though not for herself? The direct reverse is certain and notorious. 3dly, That the admission (supposing it to be one) was an admission with respect to "his majesty's *conquests.*" The whole admission, whatever its force may be, had its root in Sicily, and is to be construed with reference to Sicily only—and was Sicily a "conquest" of his majesty? Was the auxiliary army which we sent to the aid of the king of Naples, a conquering army? Had we vanquished our ally? And if not, what inference could properly be drawn from Sicily to "his majesty's conquests?"—So much then for the original text, upon which so many commentaries have been built, to sustain the imputed offer of the *uti possidetis.* If that offer is not found in this memorandum, it is to be found no where. Every thing else is at best but collateral and constructive argument, upon which no stress can be laid, when the original foundation fails us.—Where, in fact, did lord Y. himself look for the confirmation of his own impressions; (for that the noble lord's impressions were sincere, that he reported here no more than he firmly believed and really understood to have been said to him, no man can doubt for a moment;) where did he expect to find a confirmation of what he understood M. Talleyrand to have intended to convey through him to the British government? Why, naturally, in that letter to Mr. Fox, which (as M. Talleyrand informed him) was dispatched, at the same time with his lordship, and which arrived the same day in London. And does that letter contain any thing to countenance the notion of the *uti possidetis?* Look at it; it is No. 10 of the papers laid before parliament. (p. 105.) So far from any allusion to any such basis as the *uti possidetis*, another basis is distinctly proposed in that letter, a basis to be formed out of two principles; one of which was suggested by Mr. Fox in his letter of the 26th of March, "that the peace should be honourable for "the two powers and their allies;" and the other is now brought forward for the first time by the French minister, "the continental and maritime guarantee." Lord Y. ingenuously describes himself as having been disappointed at not finding in this letter a single word in allusion to himself, or to the new basis intrusted to his charge. —Where should we next expect to find some allusion to the *uti possidetis?* Why, of course, where lord Y. next looked for it, in Mr. Fox's answer to this letter of M. Talleyrand, or in his letter of the same date, which lord Y. carried back with him to Paris. Is there any such allusion in either of these letters, (Nos. 11 and 13 of the papers, p. 107 and 109)? Nothing like it. Is there any thing contradictory to such a notion, and inconsistent with it? Much. Mr. Fox in his letter of the 14th, written after he had received lord Y.'s communication, long after he had received it verbally, but the day after it was reduced into the shape of the written memorandum, which is now considered as conclusive upon this point, not only does not appear to think that the *uti possidetis* has been proposed as a basis, but directly adverts to the other basis which has been proposed, and says, in plain terms, "The basis offered in your second proposition, is exactly conformable to the views of our government;" and then goes on to qualify this statement, in a way which proves that the proposition to which he refers is (and it manifestly can be no other than) the principle of continental and maritime guarantee.—'O! but,' says the noble secretary of state, 'there is a form in these things; it is a rule to answer written communications in writing, and verbal ones verbally.' It was impossible, therefore, for Mr. Fox to allude to the *uti possidetis,* in answer to a letter from M. Talleyrand, in which it was not mentioned? Possibly this may be so. But was it reasonable, or was it like that plainness and simplicity which are so much boasted of in Mr. Fox's system of diplomacy, to go on with a correspondence directly at variance with the private communication that had been made to him? Would he have done so—can any man believe he would—if he had attached to that private communication all the precision and importance which is now contended to have belonged to it;—if he had considered it, as it was afterwards considered, as absolutely superseding all that had passed, or was still passing in open correspondence between him and the French minister;—as making that correspondence mere waste paper, and being in fact itself the origin from which the negociation was to date, and the sole foundation on which it was to stand? But above all, is it credible, that if he had so understood what passed between M. Talleyrand and lord Y.—though in compliance with the strict diplomatic form, which the noble secretary of state holds so sacred, he could not have committed any thing to writing in the first instance, on his own part,—is it credible that he could not have directed lord Y. to press for a more precise and formal statement from M. Talleyrand;—well knowing (as he must have known), that though verbal communications are very good as an overture to lead to negociation, they are not a sufficiently regular method of carrying on a negociation once begun? Had lord Y. any such directions from Mr. Fox when he returned to Paris? None. But he returned, it is said, as he had come, a simple unauthorised individual;—he had no character or powers; he therefore could require nothing in writing. But on the 26th of June, (No 15, p. 112) ten days after his return, full powers were sent to him. Is he then directed to employ them for the purpose of obtaining a written authentic avowal of the basis of *uti possidetis?* No; he is indeed directed to press for the admission of the basis: but Sicily—and Sicily alone is to be a *sine quâ non.* And even here it is remarkable, that the coupling of this supposed basis with Sicily, appears to arise from what, with Mr. Fox's general accuracy, is an extraordinary mis-recollection of the words of lord Y.'s original communication which is here stated: "*Vous l'avez; nous ne vous demandons rien,*" instead of "*nous ne vous la demandons pas,*" the words really employed by M. Talleyrand.—But after all there is one short view of this question, which with me, I confess, is more decisive than almost all that can be collected from the papers; it is this, that to prove such a point as the proposal of the *uti possidetis,* there should have been any need of argument, of inference, and induction, at all. The moment that you tell me you have arrived at the *uti possidetis,* through a long train of reasoning, and by an operose process of comparison and analogy, I think that very statement disproves your case. If those short and comprehensive phrases, by which particular forms and bases of negociation are described, have any character or meaning at all, it is this, that they are not to be argued *to,* but *from;* they are not results at which you are to arrive through a series of laboured argumentation, but points from which you are to start in commencing your discussion. As in the severer sciences there are certain axioms and definitions, which nobody dreams of analysing when they set out to the proof of a proposition, so in diplomacy these forms have been uniformly adopted, not as matter of substantive disquisition in themselves, but as clearing the way to the examination and solution of other questions. Whether it be true or not, as M. Talleyrand affirms that no treaty between two great powers was ever negociated on the basis of *uti possidetis,* I will not venture to say; but I have little doubt that neither the *uti possidetis,* nor the *status ante bellum,* were ever admitted, or contended by either party to have been admitted, as the basis of any negociation, by any process of reasoning and inference, or in any other less unequivocal form than the direct plain terms *uti possidetis,* or *status ante bellum.* If the admission requires to be made out circumstantially, by confronting detached passages, and collecting together scattered phrases and inferences, the only thing that is plain is, that no such admission has been distinctly made.—There is, indeed, one mode of inference to which the noble lord (Howick) has this night resorted, which is much too curious to be passed over without notice. He infers the *uti possidetis* from the several exceptions which are made to it. Was not Hanover to be given up to his majesty unconditionally; and is not that a deviation from the *uti possidetis?* Was not Sicily itself claimed rather as something which should not be too strictly subjected to the rule laid down, than as coming within the direct operation of the *uti possidetis?* Did not we claim Naples, (he might have added) in the very first conference which took place after the alleged proposal, in direct contempt of the *uti possidetis?* Why, sir, we have heard it said that *exceptio probat regulam:* but when the proofs of the rule are nothing but exceptions, the rule itself may reasonably be thought to be in some danger.—But if the noble lord's argument is not of much avail in establishing the admission of the *uti possidetis;* it does go some way towards proving the second proposition on this subject for which I contend, that the *uti possidetis* was by no means so desirable for this country, as is all along taken for granted by those who are only busied in arguing for the fact of its having been proposed. It was not important for the sake of Hanover; for Hanover was to be recovered, if at all, not by being included within its operation, but by being excepted out of it. And as to Sicily, there is no imaginable basis of negociation to which it would not have been more easy to reconcile our claim of Sicily, than that of the *uti possidetis.*—There are three different bases suggested in the course of the correspondence between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand, before this of the *uti possidetis;* and there is besides, the *status ante bellum,* which no where comes in question: and I will venture to say that there is not one of all these bases upon which the determination—the just and wise and honourable determination—not to give up Sicily to France, might not be more satisfactorily supported, than upon that to which we appear to have attached so much importance. 1st, The basis of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens: *that* would keep Sicily out of the hands of France; for, by the treaty of Amiens, France, so far from claiming Sicily, consented to evacuate Naples. 2d, The basis of " what should be honourable to the contracting parties and their allies," would clearly keep Sicily in our power; for what more honourable for us than to secure the dominions of the king of Naples, or for the king of Naples, than to retain them? 3d, The basis of " maritime guarantee" is equally clear in our favour: for is not Sicily a maritime state, and do not we propose to guarantee it to its sovereign? 4th, The *status ante bellum* hardly requires to be argued. The French had not Sicily before the war, and they must not have it now. In short, the *uti possidetis*, that basis for which we contend so earnestly, as peculiarly contrived to secure Sicily, is the only one of which (as we propose to apply it) the application is equivocal; or, I should more truly say, wholly unmaintainable. Sicily ours by occupancy, and claimed from France upon this ground! Is it possible that we did not see the fallacy and the danger of such a claim? how untenable on our part? how prolific of claims of the most immeasurable extent on the part of the enemy? Sicily ours! What then becomes of its lawful and actual sovereign, the king of Sicily? Ours by military occupancy! Is then the existence of an auxiliary military force in the country of an ally sufficient to transfer the possession of that country from the ally to the auxiliary? These surely were questions worth weighing.—Indeed, it did strike me that at one time the danger of this sort of claim on our part (which, however, is not once, but twenty times, repeated; which is, in truth, interwoven throughout with the doctrine of the *uti possidetis)*, had begun to suggest itself to his majesty's ministers; for in the dispatch signed by Mr. Windham (No. 48 p. 181), I find a new and bold construction of M. Talleyrand's imputed basis; so bold and so new, that I imagined there must be some good reason for venturing it. Mr. Windham says that the " basis proposed by France was that of the *uti possidetis*, for the two powers and their allies in all parts of the world." Now as this construction has never been hazarded before, in the whole course of the discussions, from the 14th of June to the 10th of Sept. and as the admission of the words " and their allies" is manifestly disadvantageous to us in one respect, inasmuch as by admitting the claims of the allies of France it destroys the whole of the argument arising from our wide and general construction of " *nous ne vous demandons rien*," in lord Yarmouth's memorandum; and of the words " *l'empereur n'a rien à désirer de ce que possède l'Angleterre*," which are brought in aid of that construction from M. Talleyrand's letter to Mr. Fox of the 7th of April; I could not but suppose that we had some adequate point to gain by this same admission, and I conceived it to be this; that having seen reason to doubt the solidity of our claim to Sicily, under the *uti possidetis*, from our own military occupancy, we were desirous of erecting a new claim, and with a much better grace, on the undisturbed possession of Sicily by its lawful sovereign. But I found myself mistaken. For after having made this bold push for no purpose that I can discover, except it were for that which I ascribed to him, the secretary of state, about ten lines afterwards, reverts to the old ground, and claims Sicily for Great Britain; " our actual occupancy of that island (he says) brings it fully within the benefit of the *uti possidetis*."—On this principle then, I beg the house to consider what would have been the advantage to this country, to have established military occupancy as the rule and measure of territorial possession; to have set out with a basis which should ascribe to each party the actual dominion of every state, of which their arms might be at the moment in the actual keeping or controul; subject to no other recovery than what might be effected by exchange and compensation. I say, to each party;—because I cannot suppose that his majesty's ministers can have entertained the opinion that the *uti possidetis*, if admitted at all, was admitted by France as applicable to " his majesty's" conquests or possessions only, and not equally to those of France: it is of the essence of a basis of negociation to be equal and reciprocal. And is it possible that ministers should not have seen what the effect of equality in this case would be? or seeing that they should still have thought it a point to be contended for? Is it possible that they should have been so dazzled with our " military occupation" of Sicily, as not to have seen the danger of admitting, and the difficulty of denying, a reciprocal claim on the part of France, to every country in which France might have a soldier? Did they consider well to what extent such a claim would go? And if, as the noble lord (Howick) has informed us, Mr. Fox rejected the suggestion of taking the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens for the basis of negociation, because he thought that they were vague and indefinite, and that more time therefore would be lost in defining and adjusting the basis than might be sufficient (if well employed), for discussing and settling the main points of a negociation; is it possible that the noble lord should not perceive that the adoption of the *uti possidetis* would have been liable to similar embarrassment;—that he should not be aware of the perplexed and interminable discussions which must have arisen in the attempt to define the precise degree of possession, occupation, or controul, which should or should not entitle to the benefit of the *uti possidetis;* to determine, for instance, whether the kingdom of Holland, whether the principalities of the Rhine, whether southern Germany, whether the fortresses of Austria herself, should, at the outset of a negociation, be acknowledged by us to be the lawful and confirmed possessions of France, except so far as they might be redeemed by such equivalents as we might be able and disposed to give in exchange for them?—I am confident, (and the very argument which the noble lord himself has advanced, renders me still more confident in the opinion,) that such was Mr. Fox's view of the subject;—that his passing by the treaty of Amiens, when it was first suggested by M. Talleyrand, and proceeding to suggest instead of it, something which he called a basis, but which, in fact, amounted to nothing more than the statement of a principle which might be taken for granted to prevail in every negociation, "The honour and glory of the two countries," was dictated by precisely the same motive which afterwards induced him, in his answer to M. Talleyrand's letter of the 2d of June, to accept so eagerly M. Talleyrand's proposed additional principle of "continental and maritime guarantee," in preference to (and one must fairly say, in exclusion of) the other offer which is asserted to have been made at the same time through lord Yarmouth, of the *uti possidetis.* And the motive which in each case operated with Mr. Fox, appears to have been simply the desire to avoid any technical basis, as utterly inapplicable to the existing state of the world, and as likely to require (as the noble lord has himself contended would have been the case with the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, and as I think I have shewn would equally have arisen in any attempt to apply the *uti possidetis)* more time in the application and adjustment of the basis, than would have been sufficient to discuss and settle the terms of the most complicated negociation.—It remains to shew, in the 3d place, that, supposing the offer of the *uti possidetis* to have been unequivocally made, and afterwards departed from; and supposing the recognition of it to have been as important to us as it is now pretended, we took the very worst course for obtaining that recognition. And this I really think it impossible for any man to doubt, who will take a fair review of the correspondence upon the table, and who will only consult his own feelings and common sense, and reason from the analogies of private life to the case before him.—I am not the champion of French good faith in general, nor of M. Talleyrand's in particular; but I believe it is pretty clear with respect to M. Talleyrand, or any other man living, that when he has once committed himself by a direct disavowal of any thing which he may have said, or may have been supposed to have said, in a private conference, there can be no rational hope of inducing him to retract that disavowal merely by a sturdy repetition of the assertion that he did say that which he has thus disavowed. When two parties in a discussion are thus directly committed against each other, it is evident that to persist in re-affirming what your antagonist must as constantly re-deny, is only equivalent to a determination to make no progress whatever. There are obviously but two modes of proceeding in such a case which can be resorted to with any chance of advantage; and your choice between the two must depend upon the manner in which you estimate the point in dispute. If you consider it as a point of honour; if you feel that the faith of your own negociator is compromised against that of the enemy's, and that both cannot come with credit out of the discussion, every other object ought of course to give way to this consideration; and you can in that case do no otherwise than break off the negociation upon the very first peremptory denial by the enemy, of the first distinct assertion on your part. A contest for three months of "You did say so," on one side, and "I did not," on the other, is undignified and discreditable to both parties. If, on the other hand, the obtaining the admission itself was so great an object that you would be content to sacrifice a little punctilio to obtain it, then is it not plain to any man's understanding, that instead of pressing and pinning your adversary into a corner, and insisting upon his making the recognition which you demand of him in a precise form of words that should carry his own self-contradiction upon the face of them, you ought, as soon and as decently as you could, to have afforded him a retreat and outlet from the difficulty in which his first denial had involved him; you ought to have changed your first peremptory interrogation of "Will you confess that you did propose the *uti possidetis?*" into the milder form of "Will you now agree to it?" If the practical concession was to be obtained, this was the only way to go about it: but with a curious felicity, ministers appear to have mixed these two modes of proceeding together, and to have produced a result which (as might be expected) has the advantages of neither. They adopt the high tone belonging to a point of honour, so far as to put the question in its most irritating and offensive form, and to make it impossible for the French minister to give the answer which they wish, without confessing himself guilty of falsehood and prevarication: and yet, instead of acting on the same tone in which they speak, they consent to prolong this miserable altercation for three months, and instead of recalling their whole embassy, recall only that member of it who is best qualified to maintain the point in discussion. They hold high lord Yarmouth's word; but they do not suffer lord Y. himself to stay to maintain it. They choose to rest every thing upon testimony, and they withdraw their witness. This could by no possibility be right. If you meant to abandon your point of honour, good care ought to have been taken not, even in appearance, to abandon lord Y.: and if, as appears, you meant still to maintain it, what chance could remain of maintaining it with effect in any other hands than his?—But neither is this all. The manner and very language in which our plenipotentiaries are instructed to insist upon the *uti possidetis* is not calculated to produce the effect desired, that of a previous and unconditional recognition of it, as a basis already admitted by France. In order to have extorted that recognition, it was surely necessary that the demand should be made in the plainest and most intelligible shape, unincumbered by questions about terms of peace, which naturally led the discussion away into other subjects. Yet I am pretty sure there is no one instance; or at most but one, (which I shall have occasion to refer to presently,) throughout the whole correspondence in which this demand is made in distinct aud unqualified terms, and without the accompaniment of other matter. The very first instance of any distinct mention of *uti possidetis* by us to France (between our own ministers at home and our ministers abroad, there is certainly no want of mention of it before that period) is in lord Y.'s note, read, but not delivered, to gen. Clarke in the conference of the 24th July, [p. 129.] In that note, lord Y. describes himself as authorised "*à discuter les bases,*" to "discuss the basis," of the treaty (which certainly does not imply the previous settlement of it); and after describing the respective situations of England and France, he says, "that the king would treat generally on "the basis of *uti possidetis;*" an expression which certainly has rather the air of an original suggestion, than of a claim of some foregone agreement. This note was not delivered to general Clarke. There is therefore no answer to it. The next that we hear of *uti possidetis*, and the very first that the French negociators see of it in a precise and tangible shape, is in the note presented by lord Lauderdale on his arrival. In this note it is distinctly stated, that the king "received a proposition from France to treat generally on the basis of *uti possidetis.*" [p. 145.] And to this distinct statement is returned the next day the peremptory denial: "That it never could have entered into the mind of the French emperor to take the *uti possidetis* as the basis of negociation." [p. 150.] This is surely the period, at which, if it were resolved to treat this question as a point of honour, as implicating the faith of the French minister on the one hand, and of our negociator on the other, the discussion ought to have broken off. This was the period at which, if it was intended still to pursue the object of obtaining the *uti possidetis*, it evidently became hopeless to extort it by the assertion that it had been already agreed to; and it would have been necessary therefore to take new ground, to admit the possibility of misapprehension on both sides in the verbal communication which had passed upon the subject, and to make the demand anew, as peremptorily as you might think fit,—as a *sine quâ non* of negociation, if you pleased; but to make it in a way in which it could be conceded to you.—Neither of these courses, however, were adopted: but from this period you begin that series of tiresome and useless repetitions, of which the effect could not well be expected to be other than it was, to irritate and inflame the discussion without producing any satisfactory explanation or beneficial result. If our first demand did not produce the recognition required, why should it be conceived that the multiplied echo would have any better effect?—especially as the repetition grew gradually fainter, and the direct and unqualified assertion in lord Lauderdale's first note which I have just quoted, we find softened down in the subsequent notes, with such modifications and qualifications as these: "The proposition "of the French government such as his "Britannic majesty *understood* it to have "been made by them;" [p. 161.]—"when "the views of the French government shall "approach nearer to those which it had "been supposed to entertain;" [p. 165.]—"the proposition such as his majesty's ministers *understood* it *(l'ont comprise)* to "have been made by France;" [p. 168.]—"the basis which the British government "believed *(croyoit)* to have been proposed in the first place by France;" [p. 175.] — "the conditions understood "*(censées)* to have been proposed by "France." [p. 192.]—Was it likely that the French government would become more yielding to our demand, in proportion as we appeared to become less confident of the foundation on which it rested? Or could this mode of pressing it for three months lead to any imaginable advantage?—There is one other circumstance and only one, to be noticed, which, added to what I have already mentioned, renders the policy of our government on this point completely inexplicable. And that circumstance is this: if their object really was to obtain the admission of the *uti possidetis* as a practical basis of negociation, there does appear to have been a period, when for that purpose they had gained their point, and having done so they made no use of it. In the note of the French plenipotentiaries of the 11th of Aug. [p. 159.] it is said: "If, in laying down the "principle of *uti possidetis*, the English negociators have in view to propose a mean "of exchange and of compensation, the "emperor adopts it." And was not this what in fact they had in view? I profess I had all along so understood them, and I so understand them still. But the answer of our plenipotentiaries to this note, in conformity, no doubt, to their instructions, is that the basis or principle of the negociation must be "*préalablement reconnu.*" They cannot stir a step without it. And this is the single instance in which this demand is separately and peremptorily made. Well may the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread) who thinks such a peace as France was now disposed to have given us, a desirable thing, well indeed may he complain that here was an opportunity of entering upon the real business of the negociation thrown away. I, who do not quarrel with the result of the papers in this view, who do not believe that any negociation could have been conducted at this time to a favourable issue, that France had the slightest intention of granting us such a peace, as alone it would have been wise or desirable to accept; who believe that her sole object was to amuse, and delude us,—to occupy our attention, while she was preparing and maturing her plans for the subjugation of what remained of independent Europe; I cannot but complain of the waste of a single hour after this note of the French plenipotentiaries was received.—I say, that upon this particular crisis the policy pursued by his majesty's ministers is wholly unaccountable. Did they mean to make peace if they could? Let them then answer the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread.) Why did they not avail themselves of this opening for negociation on their own terms? Did they think such a peace, as alone they were prepared to accept, hopeless?—then why protract the discussion a single hour beyond that at which they became acquainted with the utmost that France would concede, and found it insufficient?—If they wanted nothing but their basis to proceed upon, here it was offered them, subject to the qualifications and conditions which they themselves had all along annexed to it, and which the declaration itself states to have been, from the first to the last, in their contemplation. If they wanted, further, the admission that this basis had been admitted, nay proposed, by France herself before—was it not plain, even from the concession which France had made, that this further concession was one which she never would make?—And this leads me, sir, to that which is in truth the heaviest charge against ministers, and which I am sure the noble lord (Howick) himself feels to be one that it is difficult for them to answer, by the pains that he has taken to anticipate it. 'Where, after all,' says the noble lord, is the great advantage gained to France, what detriment has been sustained by England in consequence of the protraction of the negociation? Can the noble lord be serious in this question? Can it be necessary to argue with the noble lord that the suspense, the anxiety, the uncertainty attendant upon a state of negociation is to any nation matter of inconvenience, but to a commercial country, above all others, of real mischief and distress, from causes too obvious to be particularized? And if this were all, would not even this require some justification on the part of ministers; especially when it appears from the perusal of their papers, that weeks and months elapsed of doubt and solicitude to the public, after they had themselves considered the negociation hopeless, after their plenipotentiary had described it as "a farce?" [p. 173.]—But was this all the advantage which France proposed to herself, and which we suffered her to obtain? Would it were! What was, what must have been, the policy of France from the moment of the overthrow of the last confederacy? What but to dissipate the members of that confederacy, and to put them out of the possibility of uniting and acting cordially together again? Austria, by the fate of war, was, for the time, no object of jealousy. Russia and England remained in their full strength, and remained united in the strictest bonds of amity and intimate concert with each other. But we have Mr. Fox's authority for the fact, that "Russia and England alone are the two powers least calculated to make an impression on France by land;" [p. 99.] that it requires the intervention of a third power as a link in the chain, to give strength and efficacy to such a combination. Austria being out of the question, Prussia was the single state that could furnish this point of union and co-operation.—What was obvious to Mr. Fox, was surely not less so to M. Talleyrand, even if he had not had the advantage of learning it from Mr. Fox himself. He saw, therefore, that if Russia and England could be prevented from acquiring any third auxiliary, France was safe from attack by land, and the continent consequently at her mercy. Was it not natural then for France to turn her anxious attention to that power in which alone such an auxiliary could be found?—But neither was this the only motive of France. Prussia, by her accession to the former confederacy, however late, and however little effective, had manifested a disposition which Buonaparte could not forget, and for which no man who has traced the springs of action by which Buonaparte is moved, can doubt that from the moment of the treaty of Potzdam coming to his knowledge, he secretly vowed to take a signal vengeance.—Here, then, were the united motives of passion and policy, which no human being ever found the means of combining with so much dexterity before, of acting upon them with so tremendous a perseverance—these motives were united to stimulate Buonaparte to the destruction of Prussia—and I can entertain no doubt in my own mind that Prussia was Buonaparte's first object throughout the whole of the last year; that all that passed with us (striking and prominent as we may flatter ourselves our part in the political history of the year has been) was but secondary and subservient to that principal design. Even the separation of Russia from this country, important as he felt it to be, he felt to be important chiefly as making his attack upon Prussia more sure. In other respects he might safely trust, (and no doubt he did so,) to the assurance of the English secretary of state, that from the alliance of Russia and England, alone, there was no danger of an active coalition against France.—If such was his object, let us see with what success it was pursued? Prussia herself is no ill judge of this success: and her sense of it is unequivocally expressed in that declaration which she published at the commencement of the late unfortunate campaign—and from which I have already had occasion to quote that part which exhibits her feelings of despair at the apparent disunion which was effected in the course of the negociations, between G. Britain and Russia. But in the earlier part of the year, what was, according to the testimony of Prussia, the course pursued by France with respect to her, and to the powers with whom she had been in alliance? Prussia, at the dissolution of the confederacy by the battle of Austerlitz, or rather by the peace of Presburgh, was compelled to consult her own safety, and to conclude a separate treaty with France. By this treaty France transferred Hanover to Prussia. From good-will to Prussia? O, no. Prussia accepted the transfer in the first instance, "under the condition that her possession of Hanover should not be considered as valid till a general peace, and till the consent of the king of Great Britain should be obtained." (See Prussian Declaration.) For a time Buonaparte appeared to acquiesce in this condition; but no sooner was he set at ease by the retirement of the Russian army, no sooner had he secured an opening for negociation with this country, (and perhaps also at Petersburgh—but of that we have no positive evidence) than he found himself at liberty to press Prussia with less reserve—he insisted upon "the recall of the patent by which the occupation of Hanover was declared provisional—and upon the ports being shut against the British flag in the same manner as if the French had returned into the electorate." Prussia had then no choice but war, or compliance, at the risque of war with England. She saw this risque, but could not avoid it. She saw that France "triumphed in secret at the thought of having disunited two courts, the union of which might have been dangerous to her"—(these, sir, are the words of the king of Prussia). We either did not see this, or seeing regarded it not; for we fell into the snare, and the message of the 21st of April placed us in a state of war with Prussia.—And here, sir, I must take the liberty to remind the noble lord of an error into which he fell on the first night of the session, in correcting what he stated, (and, I have no doubt, really thought at the time) to be an error of mine, respecting the co-incidence of our negociation with France, and our war with Prussia. I had said, and I think truly, that the message of the 21st of April did not give to parliament a fair view of the subject on which they were to express an opinion; that whether Prussia had afforded just cause of war, by the occupation of Hanover, and by the shutting of the ports, was one question—a question upon which there could be no difference of opinion, and was none;—but whether it was wise and politic to act upon this cause of war, was a question that could not be fairly decided without reference to the negociation with France, of which not one word was mentioned to parliament: for it might very well be a clear case that it was adviseable to vindicate Hanover by war with Prussia, if there were no other way of attaining the same object,—while, if we were at the same moment attempting to gain the same object by negociation with France, it might be matter of very doubtful policy whether we would resort to a war which, however just, might be altogether unnecessary.—The noble lord's answer to this argument was extremely short, and, had it been true, would have been conclusive. "What will be the surprise of the hon. gentleman," said the noble lord, "when I tell him that there was no negociation going on with France at the time of the Prussian message? Mr. Fox's letter of the 26th of March had, in our apprehension, brought the intercourse with France to a close; and the circumstance of a month having elapsed without any new communication from France had confirmed us in that opinion." [p. 65.] I, sir, stood rebuked. I had then taken my information from the French publication, in which that letter of Mr. Fox which alone could be in the noble lord's contemplation, the letter which decisively insists upon the points in dispute between him and M. Talleyrand, and which was followed by a pause of a month in the correspondence, was dated not on the 26th of March, but on the 20th or 21st of April, that is to say, within a day of the Prussian message. Look, sir, at the papers presented to parliament, and see what turns out to be the fact? Why, the letter was written on the 20th of April, and not on the 26th of March. There had, therefore, been no pause of a month to satisfy the noble lord and his colleagues that the negociation was at an end. The whole of the noble lord's argument, as built on this suppositious date, falls to the ground; and the whole of mine, which that false date appeared to overthrow, is replaced (as I presume to think) on the ground on which it was originally founded. I must, however, do the noble lord the justice to say, that as soon as he was aware of his mistake, he shewed his desire to correct it. He did come down to the house the following day, and state that he had been wrong in the date of Mr. Fox's letter; that it was not of the 26th of March, but of the 20th of April. [p. 82.] But the mere correction of the date, without applying that correction to the state of the argument between us, was of little importance, except so far as it evinced the noble lord's candour. It was not the mere mistake of dates, but of facts, and of consequences, that was matter of important consideration.—But, in truth, I cannot help thinking that the noble lord's recollection still deceives him. I cannot now believe that ministers really thought the negociation with

France at an end on the 20th of April; because if they did so, I cannot frame to my own imagination a plausible excuse for their not having communicated the negociation, so far as it had gone, to parliament. They certainly were proud enough of it—justly—be it so—And then what a help would it have been to any future negociation, to have had the sanction of parliament to so much as had already been done? To have had the determination not to treat except conjointly with Russia adopted and approved by parliament, would have been the securest way of disappointing any subsequent attempt to disunite us. That alone would have prevented M. D'Oubril's separate treaty. That alone would have spared us the unlucky refinement of "separately in form, but substantially in concert with each other." It would have given publicity, and with publicity, stability to our connection with Russia; it would have baffled the policy of France; and saved Prussia from ruin. But, sir, they could not believe the negociation to be at an end. This is the apology which I must make for the noble lord and his colleagues, in spite of his own disclaimer of it.—True it is, that there was a pause in the French correspondence after Mr. Fox's letter of the 20th of April. But why? Because that letter was so formidably decisive as the noble lord would fain represent it? No such thing. Because the negociation with England was itself but a secondary matter in Buonaparte's estimation, and kept pace exactly with the progress of the other more important transactions which he had in hand: because the same courier who carried to M. Talleyrand Mr. Fox's clear and explicit letter of the 20th of April, carried also the copy of that still more clear and explicit document, the king's message, which announced our hostilities with Prussia. And well might M. Talleyrand pause; well might he rest and lie upon his oars for some short interval, after an effort so masterly and so successful; well might he grow comparatively careless and languid in the prosecution of the negociation with England, when the object for which principally that negociation had been undertaken was accomplished! "look," he might say to his master, "look at the work of the last 3 months. You apprehended the union of Prussia with the two great surviving powers of the confederacy; you wished to punish Prussia, to insulate her, to have her at your mercy. It is done. Three months have changed every thing according to your wish. Instead of Prussia plotting with England and Russia jointly against France, behold Prussia at war with England; and England and Russia separately negociating for peace!"—But to continue and secure to Buonaparte this beneficial state of things, it was necessary that the negociation with England should be resumed. Else we might have begun to see that war with that Power, by whose aid alone we could ever hope to make head effectually against France, was not precisely the policy most consonant to our interests; and we might possibly have corrected it before it was yet too late. 'What?' says the noble lord, 'would your policy have abandoned Hanover?' I answer this question by another, 'Has your policy recovered Hanover?' 'What, would you have made common cause with Prussia while you had such ground of complaint against her unredressed?' I hope we are making, or ready to make, common cause with Prussia now; and I do not see what great benefit we have derived from waiting till now to do so.—To prevent our recurring to this policy, however, at a period when it might have been more advantageous to us, M. Talleyrand resumed the negociation; and then came the message through lord Yarmouth; and then came the separate treaty of M. D'Oubril; a treaty in which, most fortunately for us, Buonaparte and his minister were betrayed by the intoxication of the success, which had so far attended their plans, into the demand of such terms as it was impossible for the emperor of Russia to ratify; and then came those tedious bickerings, those perplexed and wearisome discussions about the *uti possidetis*, contrived, as it would seem, for the express purpose which France had at heart, of gaining time, of absorbing our whole attention, of making the continent vanish from our view; and thus was the negociation protracted till the fate of Prussia was ripe; and then Buonaparte left Paris for the field of battle (to conquer Hanover for England—no doubt!) and "the farce" (as lord Lauderdale properly calls it) was at length permitted to conclude—And after all this, the noble lord gravely asks "what advantage to France?" And after all this, he adds, "what detriment to Great Britain?"—Really and sincerely, sir, I am at a loss to account for the protraction of the negociation on our part, under circumstances so obviously hopeless as to peace; and so obviously disadvantageous to this country, if peace was not to be the issue. But I do not concur with those who lay the blame of this endless delay on lord Lauderdale, still less on lord Yarmouth, and his production of his full powers. The assertion that lord Yarmouth's production of his full powers pledged this country to the continuance of the negociation, (p. 136) I will not say is unfounded; but I confess it is to me perperfectly unintelligible. At all events, lord Y.'s recall put an end to that difficulty; and with him and his full powers the negociation might properly have ended. As to lord Lauderdale, I am loth to notice what I think an idle challenge, which has been thrown out to those who disapprove of the length of his stay at Paris, to point out any earlier period at which he could properly have come away. There are many such periods. The very first refusal of passports was one; the insolent excuse assigned for that refusal in M. Talleyrand's note of the 10th of August, (p. 161) an excuse in fact amounting to the declaration that M. Talleyrand will again withhold the passports required, if he again thinks it advisable to do so,—was another; the first official denial of the basis was another; the period of lord Lauderdale's discovery that the negociation was "all a farce," was another. At any one of these periods lord L. might have come away, and I should have thought him right in doing so. But I do not therefore blame him for not having taken a step of so much delicacy on any of these occasions. Lord L. stood in a situation of great difficulty. An error on the side of war might have been less forgiven than one on the side of peace. And I must say that it is the habit of this country, I think I may add of this house, rather to lean hard upon our foreign ministers, and not to make sufficient allowance for the heavy responsibility under which they often have to act, in circumstances, of which we do not see the difficulty, till we see at the same view how it has been got over. I should gladly have excused lord L. if his patience had been sooner exhausted: but I am not unwilling to own he may have judged more wisely in stretching it to the utmost: and to the ability with which he conducted the business of his mission, and executed his instructions, I bear my testimony as unequivocally as any of his friends who have been most forward in his commendation.—But the commendation of lord L. is not an apology for the government; what they can have had in view is utterly inscrutable. "Beaucoup se prépare," was the constant language of M. Talleyrand, "we are meditating great things;" and the event has proved that he spoke truth. Had we any mighty preparations on foot, which it required the cloak of a negociation to conceal? Had we any great stroke of policy to execute? any splendid enterprise to achieve, which was to burst forth upon the world at the termination of the negociation, as a counterpart to the battle of Jena? No; but our gain, it seems, is of another sort. We have gained a thorough knowledge of the ambition and artifice of the enemy! We have brought away the conviction that a peace was not attainable; such a peace at least as this country ought to be satisfied to conclude. A great gain, no doubt, to those to whom this knowledge was altogether new: but having been for about 14 years impressed with that opinion of the enemy which is now said to be put beyond all question, I am perhaps the less sensible of the advantage. A salutary conviction I am ready to allow, for those who went in search of such a peace in the sanguine expectation of finding it; but to me who did not suppose it possible even to expect such a peace at this time, the experiment, if not altogether superfluous, appears at least to have been unnecessarily long.—But this is not all; we have established to our own satisfaction the justice of our cause. Here again I am unfortunately insensible of the value of what has been gained: for from the beginning of the war in 1793 (for I reckon as nothing the interval of peace) I have never doubted the justice of the cause of this country against revolutionary France. I am a stranger therefore to those transports which recent proselytism may experience.—But let us not depreciate these advantages, since they are all we have to boast of. If among those upon whom the new light has dawned, there should be any in high trust and confidence with their sovereign; if there be any member of the cabinet who required at this time of day to be convinced, that G. Britain was upon the whole in the right against France; if there be any one who held it as his creed, that France—poor France—had hitherto been "more sinned against than sinning," and who is by the result of this negociation converted to a belief more favourable to his country; I am willing to rejoice in his conversion. But let me hope of such a man, that though his conviction is only of this date, he has the candour to carry back the effect and operation of it to those periods and transactions, in his judgment of which he must now more than suspect he was mistaken. Those who have arraigned former ministers for want of good faith and of pacific disposition in all preceding negociations, and have given the enemy credit for the qualities which they denied to their country, must now begin to suspect that they were not always well-founded in their suspicions, or scrupulously just in their praise. If they have the candour, if they have the modesty to arrogate to themselves the pretension that their accession to office has totally changed the character of British councils, they will still be puzzled to shew how it should also have operated a change, in a precisely opposite direction, upon those of the enemy; and if they cannot do this, and if their earnest and anxious desire of honourable peace has been baffled and disappointed by the unreasonable ambition, the extravagant pride and passion of the French government—what ground can they have now for doubting that the negociations of former ministers were conducted with the same sincerity, and failed only from the same causes?—In this view, the faith which has been imbibed by such illustrious converts, is matter of real joy; it must contribute to the satisfaction of the country, as well as to the unanimity of the cabinet. It is certainly no small satisfaction, that the sincerity of Mr. Pitt in his attempts for peace, questioned as it has so often been by those whom I now see sitting opposite to me, should be vindicated, even according to their own confession, by the result of Mr. Fox's negociations with France; and it may be of no small advantage to the state, in the present composition of the government, that the conduct of the negociations of Basle, of Paris, and of Lisle, should at length be fully justified in the eyes of the colleagues of lord Grenville.—And this suggests to me yet another advantage of the same sort, which has not been so much dwelt upon, but which I think scarcely inferior in importance. There is an end, I hope for ever, of the doctrine of being "agreeable to the enemy." France is no respecter of persons. The single rule for the conduct of a British statesman is, attachment to the interests of Great Britain.—I am not aware of any other advantages which we can be supposed to have derived from this negociation. But it is at an end. The course which is now before us, cannot be mistaken; and I trust we shall manfully pursue it. The country has the means, and I am confident it has the spirit and determination, to persevere with firmness in a struggle, from which there is no escape or retreat; and which cannot be concluded, with safety to Great Britain, but in proportion as with that object is united the liberty and tranquillity of Europe.—We have come out of this negociation, in one respect, with honour; as having maintained in substance our faith with our allies. I attach the full value to this circumstance, and give ministers full credit for it. In other respects, I have stated freely what I think of their conduct; and I should not patiently bear to be told, that in doing so I have transgressed the bounds of my duty, as an Englishman, or as a member of parliament.—I have indeed heard it said, that in making such observations as I have taken the liberty to make, in pointing out the errors of ministers, in dwelling upon what (if wrong at all) are represented as merely slips in the declaration, persons who have taken that part have been guilty of petty cavilling, and have exposed the weakness of their own cause. Cause? What cause? I have no cause in this business, but the cause of my country. I know not how I can better serve that than by enquiring into the way in which it has been managed by those who have had the conduct of it; and if it has in any part been misconducted, it is better that we should find out the fault ourselves, than leave it to the detection and comments of the enemy.—But it must indeed be a mismanagement beyond any thing that I have dreamt of imputing to ministers, that could so far change the respective positions of us and our enemy, as to put him wholly in the right and us in the wrong. Pity it is, if in any one particular, appearances have been suffered to be against us. It is for that reason that the *slips* in the declaration (if such they be), are to be deeply regretted and deplored.—It is deeply to be regretted, that an assertion should have gone forth to the world, in the sacred name of his majesty, which cannot be substantiated by facts. It is deeply to be regretted that the misconception (to give it no harsher name) from which this false assertion flowed, should have pervaded so large a portion of the negociation, should have exhausted so much fruitless reasoning, and wasted so much precious time, and led to the omission or misuse of opportunities which it may be impossible to retrieve. And it is subject, not of barren regret only, but of prospective anxiety and of exhortation to ministers, that they should revert as quickly as possible to the pursuit of those objects, and that policy, from which they have been so unfortunately and unaccountably led astray; and should seek to recover those advantages which in the hopeless pursuit of unattainable peace they were unavoidably tempted to abandon —the advantages of a cordial co-operation with all the remaining powers of the continent.—Sir, I understand the amendment of the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread) has been disposed of. It is hardly necessary to say, that my vote is given most cordially against it. I cannot agree with him, that such a peace appears to have been within our reach, as would alone justify his insinuation, that a favourable opportunity has been thrown away. I do not wonder indeed at his indignation, at finding himself left alone in opinions which he has held for so many years in common with many of those who sit around him. Consistently with those opinions, the hon. gent. had a right to press such an amendment, and to expect a very different reception of it. I certainly rejoice in that change of opinion which leaves him without support; though, perhaps, I, like him, may be surprised at it. But I am still more surprised that, having determined to make no peace but one of a very different character from that with which the hon. gent. would have been satisfied, his honourable friends should have been eight months in making the discovery, that a peace of a higher character was not to be obtained.—With respect to the address itself, I should be very loth indeed upon any slight ground to break in upon that unanimity which is so desirable in a vote which is to assure his majesty of the support of his people; and which may be considered as addressed, in a certain degree, to the enemy and to Europe. My only difficulty arises from those general expressions of lamentation at the issue of the negociation, in which I cannot concur, without at least explaining and qualifying my concurrence. Regret or satisfaction at any event depends, in a great degree, upon comparison. We compare what we have missed, with what remains to us instead of it; and it is thus, in certain cases, very possible to rejoice at having missed what was positively a good, or to regret what would have been a positive evil.—Thus, war is undoubtedly *per se* a great calamity, and peace an inestimable blessing; but war may yet be felt to be preferable to an inglorious and insecure peace. On the other hand, an inglorious and insecure peace is to be deprecated as an evil; yet it is possible that a war may be so conducted as to render even such a peace an object of desire.—Ministers have so contrived as to make this a question of no small doubt and perplexity. They make the choice between peace and war difficult, or, perhaps, almost indifferent. When I peruse their negociations, and see to what sort of a peace alone they could have led; with what chance of security, with what hope of permanence; I am inclined to congratulate myself on the escape from such a peace to a continuance of the war: but on the other hand, when I observe what sort of a war the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) carries on, I can scarce refrain from casting back a wishful look at the negociation.—If the war were conducted with that ability which we had a right to expect from the character which the present administration gave of themselves, or suffered to be given of them by those nearest in their confidence, and from the unsparing censure and contempt which they lavished on the exertions of their predecessors in office; if it were conducted with that vigour which the country has a right to demand at their hands, trusting them as it does, with all its means, and seconding them with all its zeal and exertion; if any blow had been struck against the enemy in the course of the year, during which these ministers have wielded the whole strength of the empire; if every effort had been made, or even every disposition manifested, to give heart and hope to the nations of the continent,—so that out of such a war might arise the promise of an honourable, a secure, and a permanent peace; unquestionably, in that situation of things the rupture of the late negociation would be matter of unqualified joy, and I could not bring myself to concur in lamenting it.—But if the war that is to come, is to be the counterpart of that which we have hitherto witnessed since the accession of the present administration; if the events and exertions of the last ten months are to be taken as the sample and the measure of our activity and achievements; if, while the enemy insultingly tell us at every step of the negociation, *beaucoup se prépare;*" and telling us so, uniformly keep their word,—on our part such opportunities are to be thrown away as have existed for the last three months, and as exist still, had we the spirit to take advantage of them; if Buonaparte may traverse the continent of Europe to its furthest extremities, and drain France of her last man, relying as fearlessly and as securely upon our supineness, our sloth, and our despondency, as he could have done upon our faithful observance of the stipulations of the most advantageous treaty of peace; and, lastly, if that disheartening maxim, to which I have already had occasion to refer with sorrow and shame; that maxim which was so deeply impressed upon the mind of the government, even so long ago as the beginning of the negociation, that it overflowed in confidential communication to France herself; the maxim that there is nothing so chimerical as any new project of continental confederacy against France; if that, I say, still prevails, and prevails with all the additional weight which it may have acquired from the unfortunate events which have taken place, since it was first promulgated; then indeed seeing little to expect from such a war, conducted on such principles, under such auspices, and with no better hopes in the minds of those who have the charge of it, I can in that sense join in expressing my regret at the failure of the negociation; and with that explanation I am willing to vote for the address as it stands.

Lord *Henry Petty* said, that after the excellent speech of his noble friend (lord Howick) which remained in almost every part unanswered, he did not think it necessary to detain the house by many observations. He certainly thought there had been no cause for the surprise expressed by the right hon. gent. who spoke last, at the silence of the side of the house on which he sat, after hearing the speech of his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread). By this silence they had the opportunity of availing themselves of the answer of the right hon. gent. to the opinion of one who thought the French had been sincere in every part of the negociation; they had the advantage of seeing opposed the opinion of another, who considered the French to have been insincere throughout the whole. One who maintained the *uti possidetis* was not laid down as a basis by his majesty's government in the first instance, was answered by another, who maintained that it was rejected by the French negociators at the very outset. It certainly could not be unsatisfactory to his majesty's ministers, to see the discussion carried on in such a manner that their opponents completely answered each other, and left their cause triumphant. There was another satisfaction they had obtained from the right hon. gent.'s speech, which was his unqualified admission that he was now convinced the overture came from the enemy. He had also expressed some degree of satisfaction at the good faith maintained towards our allies, though that satisfaction he now expressed with some qualification. He feared the effects of an opinion which he supposed to have prevailed on the Continent, that a separation of the interests of this country and Russia had taken place. There had, however, been no secrecy preserved on the situation of Great Britain and Russia, and during the last year it was evident to all the world that their relations never had been more intimate. The right hon. gent. was completely mistaken when he imagined that it was these negociations which had disheartened Prussia, and hurried her into the war with France. No communication made by France to Prussia of what was then passing, if any such communication ever was made, could have produced the effect he had supposed. Let him look at the date of Mr. Fox's letter to Talleyrand, in which it is admitted that there was no longer any chance of organizing a combination against France on the Continent, and he would find that the treaty of offensive and defensive alliance betwen Prussia and France was signed one month before the date of that letter. It was impossible, then, that any communication of the negociation made by France, could have instigated Prussia to her subsequent rash conduct. The right hon. gent. had said that he would look at no evidence of lord Yarmouth's, but the paper he communicated to his majesty's government; but the right hon. gent. must know that the paper to which he referred was a memorandum of a verbal communication. Why then so much objection to this verbal evidence? The hon. gent. considered Sicily as an exception to the basis of the *uti possidetis*. In this instance, however, the enemy had been more liberal, for, on the subject of that island, M. Talleyrand had said to lord Yarmouth, "*vous l'avez, nous ne vous la demandons pas.*" It was difficult to discover upon what ground the right hon. gent. supposed the French negociators denied that the basis of *uti possidetis* had been admitted. Let him look at the papers, and he would find it stated by lord Lauderdale, that when the admission of that basis was urged by lord Yarmouth, general Clarke did not deny it, but pretended that it had been talked of in loose conversations, which he described as "romans politiques." This was certainly a very different thing from a denial. If a bill was presented to the right hon. gent. for acceptance, and he was to say, that when he put his name to it, he meant nothing but a joke, that surely would not amount to a denial of his having accepted it. He would in that case at least acknowledge the fact of his having signed the bill. The noble lord then applauded the zeal displayed throughout the negociation by lord Yarmouth, but regretted that he had produced his full powers before he received a satisfactory answer respecting Sicily, though in that instance he did full credit to the good intentions of his noble friend, as well as in every other stage of the transactions. In reply to what had fallen from his hon. friend (Mr. Whitbread), he contended that no change of system had taken place in his majesty's government after what was called the political death of Mr. Fox. If his hon. friend would compare the instructions given to lord Yarmouth with the first demand made by lord Lauderdale on his arrival in Paris, he would find the basis of the *uti possidetis* distinctly mentioned in both. This was a proof that the principle of the negociation remained unaltered. To the assertion of the credulity of ministers, it was only necessary to oppose a contrary assertion, since it was incumbent on those who maintained that opinion, to point out the instances in which his majesty's ministers had been duped; no such thing had, however, been attempted. Every negociation was liable to some disadvantage, from the suspence it occasioned, and at a time when there was an active concert of allied powers against a common enemy, it might prove injurious; but at the same time, when the third coalition had been destroyed, what injury of this kind could arise? If France had any sinister object in protracting the negociation, it could only be the separation of this country and Russia. But did she succeed, or were his majesty's ministers in that instance duped by the enemy? The noble lord lamented that no very immediate prospect opened of a restoration of the tranquillity of Europe, but trusted that some check would yet be given to the ambition and domination of France; one step to which he believed, under Providence, had been accomplished in that close union of England and Russia, a country which the machinations of France had now bound to us more intimately than ever. He considered the good faith, candour, and moderation of this country, as conspicuously set forth in the papers before the house. He was one of those who lamented most deeply the death of that great and illustrious person who commenced the work of negociation, so short a time before the stroke of death cut the thread of his life—a life which nothing but death could prevent from being serviceable to his country and mankind. But it had pleased Providence to give him the opportunity of putting upon record those principles of moderation, good faith, and justice, by which he was guided, in those writings. Out of such transactions as these arose the permanent honour and glory of states: these were lasting, while others were transitory. Thus was national honour and true public glory preserved, and handed down to late posterity. These papers would form a volume in the history of the present times, highly honourable to the great person who commenced them, and to those who conducted them.

Mr. *Perceval* asked, whether it was intended to report this address to-morrow, as in that case he would not trouble the house at the late hour to which the debate had been protracted, but would state what he had to say, on bringing up the report.

Lord *Howick* thought it an unusual course of proceeding, to adjourn a debate upon the subject of an address where the house was unanimous as to the general object of that address. He had no wish to prevent the learned gent. from addressing the house, and however long his speech might be, he assured him he would listen to it with patience.

Mr. *Perceval* took a review of all the circumstances connected with the negociation, from which he drew these conclusions; that the enemy were never seriously desirous of peace, and that ministers were the dupes of the artifice of the French government. The object of the enemy for engaging in the negociation was to play off England against Russia, and to compel

M. d' Oubril to sign such a treaty as they wished, by persuading him that the British government was on the point of concluding a separate peace. He considered, as a subject of deep regret, that a man of Mr. Fox's great talents and incorruptible mind, had been betrayed into a private and confidential correspondence with such a man as his attached friend M. Talleyrand. He blamed ministers for not having sooner put an end to the negociation, and declared his firm conviction that no peace could take place with France, at least such a peace as would be worthy of the acceptance of this country, as long as the force and councils of that country were directed by two such men as Buonaparte and Talleyrand. He then adverted to the situation of this country in relation to America. He said he understood that a Treaty of Amity had been concluded between us within these few days. He disapproved of the manner in which our affairs had been conducted with the United States, for they had terrified us into a compliance with their object; and if there had been a spark of spirit in his majesty's councils, that disposition would have been resisted. They had passed a law by which our goods were prohibited to be imported into their territories, and this law he understood to have been actually enforced. The government of this country ought not to have acted in compliance with this dictatorial proceeding; we should have said that we disdained to treat with the United States of America, with a pistol at our breast; and that until they repealed that act by which the importation of our goods was prohibited, we would not treat with them at all. He observed also, that as France had adopted a course by which neutrals were prevented from trading with us, we could easily retaliate, by taking care that no neutrals should trade with them until the goods should first have paid a duty in our ports; and this was not difficult for us under the present condition of things, for we were now literally masters of the whole trade of the world, as far as related to carrying any thing by sea. These were matters which required serious consideration under the present condition of things, for if we were so disposed, we could levy a very heavy tax on our enemies, which they would be compelled to pay, or perish almost for want of many articles of commerce. Having made these observations, he must confess that the support of the government in the most vigorous prosecution of the war, was a thing so obviously just and necessary, and the good intentions of government were in this negociation so manifest, and the good faith observed to our allies so entirely honourable, that he felt no difficulty whatever in assenting to the address most cordially.

Lord *Howick* made a very animated reply, and we are sorry that the hour at which he rose precludes us from following him in detail. He noticed with much animation whad had fallen from the last speaker on the subject of Mr. Fox's correspondence. Language had been used, he observed, which would have been unbecoming in one member towards another sitting on the bench opposite to him, and yet all the scoffs, taunts, and insinuations which had been employed were directed against one who was now no more, and whose answer the learned gent. knew he had no reason to dread. He had commented with much asperity on an attachment which he supposed had been formed between Mr. Fox and M. Talleyrand. Where did he learn that any such attachment ever existed? He could assure the hon. and learned gent. that no intimate friendship subsisted between M. Talleyrand and Mr. Fox. All the relation in which they stood with respect to each other was that of common acquaintance, and they had no intimacy but that which had arisen in social intercourse. An extract only of one letter, which passed between them, had been given, because the remainder was of a private nature. But was the learned gent. warranted on that account in supposing the remainder of the letter contained something improper? He could assure him that there was no part of the correspondence of which his majesty's ministers were ignorant. Nay, he could further assure him, that every line written by Mr. Fox to M. Talleyrand was seen by the king. The noble lord then replied to some of the arguments used by Mr. Canning and Mr. Whitbread. The hon. gent. he observed, blamed his majesty's ministers for having done too much in the way of negociation, while his hon. friend and relation blamed them for doing too little; but he thought it was not a little in their favour, that they had steered a middle course between the two extremes. The pamphlet which had been alluded to, shewed from the total ignorance with which it was written, that it could come from no official authority, as insinuated. As to the prosecution hinted at, he could only say, that those within whose department such proceedings came, would, if they thought fit, prosecute it. With regard to his hon. friend's question, are we to be shut out from all prospect of peace? he could only answer by saying, that, unless a change took place in the temper and character of the French government, peace must, in his view of the subject, be considered as very distant. The chief of that government, it appeared, had lately stated that he would not conduct the present war as he had done those in which he was before engaged. He had declared that he would not leave the shores of the Baltic, nor evacuate any of the countries of which he might take possession, unless this country gave up her maritime conquests. This was what England never could submit to. She must resist a pretension to which it would be dishonourable to yield, or the enemy must abandon it. There was here no choice, the honour of the country must at all hazards be maintained and vindicated, or we must sink under the attack meditated against us. This was a melancholy prospect for humanity, but it was one which rose out of the unfortunate state of the continent, and it seriously called for the pledge of supporting his majesty in the vigorous prosecution of the war, which was contained in the address he had moved.

Mr. *Perceval* said, that with respect to the word "attached," he had taken it from the Correspondence: if the noble lord would refer to No. I. of the Papers, (see p. 93.) he would there find that Mr. Fox, in addressing M. Talleyrand, had subscribed himself "with the most perfect attachment."—The address was then put and carried, and the house adjourned at five o'clock on Tuesday morning.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, January 6.

[MINUTES.] The deputy usher of the black rod required the attendance of the house at the bar of the house of peers, where the royal assent was given by commission to the Controverted Elections Trial bill.—The speaker informed the house, that he had received a letter from Mr. Bouchier, deputy clerk of the crown in Ireland, stating, that he had received petitions complaining of undue elections in Dublin, Newry, and Mayo county.—It was ordered, that these petitions be taken into consideration the same days as the other election petitions from these respective places.

[THETFORD ELECTION.] The order of the day for resuming the adjourned debate on the question of granting a further day for the hearing of the Thetford Election Petition, being read,

Mr. *Whitbread* rose and said, that he was the more confident in soliciting, on behalf of the petitioner, a more distant day than had been already fixed upon, when he considered that it was an indulgence generally granted by that house, and which the sitting member was seldom unwilling to accede to. From what had fallen from an hon. member (Mr. Mingay) in the beginning of this discussion, he believed that that gentleman was under a mistake in supposing that there was but one unqualified voter only objected to among those of the corporation who composed that gentleman's majority; but he was instructed to state that there were three, four, or more persons admitted to vote for the sitting member who were not electors, whose pretence to the right of suffrage was founded upon an illegal claim; and though an undisputed possession of franchise for a limited time made that right of suffrage valid, yet that time not being yet expired, the objections had been made within the period prescribed by law, and of course, no argument in favour of those votes could be drawn from the fact of possession. The sitting member had said, that the court of king's bench, if applied to for a *quo warranto,* would not hear such application. The hon. gent. said he would contend for it, that that court could not refuse such application, because the time limited by law was 6 years. Now, those voters had exercised this elective capacity only 5 years, and consequently the time for confirming a doubtful franchise was not yet expired. But there was another circumstance: the petitioner did not know of the illegality of two of the voters objected to, till long after the beginning of the term, and yet it was objected to him by the sitting member, that the petitioner did not apply to the court of king's bench against those voters, of the validity of whose franchise the petitioner had not at that time any doubt. He then moved, that the order of the day for hearing the Thetford Election petition be discharged.

Mr. *Mingay* contended that the question then before the house was not whether the king's bench would receive or reject any application that might be made to it on behalf of the petitioner, but whether that house would, in this so comparatively unimportant a case, make a precedent that might in all future cases of this kind be productive of consequences the most serious: five years ago, the persons objected to voted for the petitioner; and was the house now to be told, that this was the first time the petitioner had discovered those alleged inadequacies? After a five years' dream, he, the petitioner awaked, and discovered for the first time, that certain persons who had voted for him upon a former occasion, now that they voted against him, were from the beginning incompetent to vote. There was one fact, that he could not pass by. It had been said, that four or more voters were objected to. He (Mr. M.) assured the house, that there were not more than two objected to at the time of voting, upon the ground of not being franchised, as the third was objected to not upon this ground, but as having some employment in the post-office. He said that, anxiously as he waited for the decision of that house upon what he would call a vexatious proceeding, he should, however, bow to that decision with unfeigned humility and respect.

Mr. *Tierney* said, that he ought not to be anxious to speak on a question apparently agitating the feelings of two gentlemen, for each of whom he felt so much respect. He should, however, remove all such personal considerations from his mind, and consider merely the simple fact of a petitioner asking for a more distant day than that already fixed upon for hearing his petition; though in the case of petitions the granting a further day was by no means an unusual indulgence, yet he was, upon the general principle, an enemy to delay in such cases. But he thought the present case sufficiently exempted from the general rule by its peculiar circumstances, the petitioner desires a further day as indispensable to the object of his petition—the sitting member, on the other hand, does not shew that any possible inconvenience can arise to him from this delay. It was objected, too, that the petitioner did not make an earlier application to the king's bench. The election took place on the 4th of November, and the day next but one was the first day of term, and yet it was asked why the petitioner did not prepare all the necessaries for an application to a court of law between the 4th and 6th of November, though he was not at that time apprised of the inadequacy to vote of two of the persons objected to. He should think it a monstrous injustice to refuse the application for a longer day.

The *Attorney-General* conceived that the house was now about to exercise a judicial function, and that it should pause before it would rashly go to establish a precedent. The hon. gent. who spoke last had said, that it was hard to expect that the process of an application for a quo warranto could have been made within the first day of term; but the hon. gent. should recollect, that though term did not commence till the 6th, it did not end till the 28th, and that it was rather suspicious that in all that time no step had been taken by the petitioner to make such application. As to the argument, that delay was not alleged to be an inconvenience to the sitting member, he did not think it conclusive, nor should he think it fair to be compelled to prove his title to his estate, merely because that proof was entirely practicable. He should therefore vote against the motion.

Mr. *C. Wynne* thought, that however it might be a question whether such delay was inconvenient to the sitting member, he was sure that it was inconvenient to that house and to the public.

The *Solicitor-General* did not think that the house could reject the motion, consistently with justice—it had come within his knowledge that of three of the persons objected to, one only was opposed at the time of tendering his vote, and that a month had elapsed since the election before the petitioner was apprized of the illegality of the other two votes. He hoped that this strong circumstance would have its due weight with the house.

Mr. *Roscoe* thought, under such circumstances, that the party must apply to the court of king's bench, and therefore it must be supposed, that the house would give them time to do this. The attorney-general had said, that this could not be done in so short a time as that sought for by the petitioner; it therefore necessarily followed, that the decision of the question must extend beyond the time limited; and as it was very possible, that persons presenting such petitions might not quite understand the law as well as other gentlemen, it appeared to him that time should be granted to the petitioner.

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* was of opinion,

that if parties were allowed to postpone questions of this nature, because they had only just discovered an objection to three voters, they might come in a month more, and apply for further time, upon a discovery of objections to three more electors, so that there would be no end to it. They might go in the first instance before the committee; and if an application to the court of king's bench was then found necessary, they would be in no worse situation than before. He entirely concurred with the attorney-general, and thought that the house would not be justified in postponing the hearing to a more distant day than that already fixed upon.

Mr. *Johnstone* thought, that the petitioner had deprived himself of the benefit of such an application by his own act. In his anxiety to present his petition, it was lodged three or four days earlier than was necessary, and consequently, an early day was appointed for taking it into consideration. Upon these and other grounds already stated, he therefore thought the petitioner was not entitled to the indulgence of the house.—The question being loudly called for, a division took place; when there appeared for the motion, 35; against it, 54; majority against the motion, 19.

[DUBLIN ELECTION PETITION.] The order of the day for postponing the consideration of the Dublin Election petition, being read,

Mr. *C. Wynne* was of opinion, that upon such a subject as this, very sufficient reasons should be given, before the house would consent to any delay, which might tend to interfere with other more important public business.

Mr. *Calcraft* answered, that since the day fixed for the consideration of the petition in question, another petition had been presented against Mr. Grattan, of which he had not the least notice. In a city like Dublin, where there were upwards of 5000 voters, it was necessary to scrutinize a great many, and therefore it was important that sufficient time should be granted for this purpose. He further observed, that having received the petition in question, he inadvertently presented it before he had received any particular instructions upon it. He had since received a letter from Mr. La Touche, in which he explained these circumstances. He, therefore, trusted the house would grant a longer time for the consideration of this matter.

The *Speaker* reminded the house of the rule being entered into, that no petition should be postponed after a certain day, except under the special circumstances of the case. It was, therefore, for the house to judge whether they would relax that rule upon the present application.

Mr. *C. Wynne* expressed himself perfectly satisfied with the explanation of the hon. gent. and Mr. Shaw declared his approbation and consent to the application.—The petition was accordingly postponed until the 12th of March.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, January 7.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Hobhouse from the commons brought up the Malt Duty, and the Pension Duty bills, which were read a first time.—The Duke of Norfolk rose to advert to a Petition which had been laid on their lordships' table, from the claimants to the Barony of Howard de Walden. That petition was upon motion referred to the Committee of Privilege: but it was his wish that the day for taking it into consideration be extended. He therefore now gave notice that he should to-morrow move, that the said petition be referred to the Committee of Privileges, on the 10th of February next.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, January 7.

[MINUTES.] The Malt and Pension Duty bills were read a third time, and passed.—The Speaker informed the House, that as the Horsham Election petition was to be taken into consideration to-morrow, he would come down to the house at half-past three, and proceed to count the house at a quarter-past four precisely.—Mr. Vansittart brought in a bill for granting to his majesty 10,500,000*l.* to be raised by Loans or Exchequer bills, which was read a first time.—Mr. Hobhouse brought up the Annual Qualification Indemnity bill, which was read a first time.—Lord Ossulston reported to the house, that his majesty had been waited upon with the Address voted unanimously the 5th instant, and that his majesty was graciously pleased to return the following answer:—"Gentlemen, "I "thank the House of Commons for their "loyal and dutiful Address; and receive "with satisfaction the assurances of their "full conviction, that the restoration of "Peace has been prevented only by the "ambition and injustice of the enemy. I "rely with entire confidence on the effectual support of my faithful people in the prosecution of a contest, manifestly continued, on the part of the enemy, with the hope of destroying the power and independence of the British empire."

[ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.] The house having resolved itself into a committee of supply, Mr. Calcraft moved, that the Estimate of the charge of the office of ordnance for Great Britain and Ireland, for the year 1807, be referred to the said committee.

Mr. *Calcraft* then rose. He said, that, on moving the Ordnance Estimates, he felt much satisfaction, that it would not be necessary for him to detain the committee by observations of any length; that if, however, there were any topics that required further explanation, or any questions that gentlemen might deem it necessary to propose to him, he should willingly answer such questions, and, if he could, adequately. He had an additional satisfaction in being enabled to inform the committee that there was a considerable reduction in the Estimates he had now to submit to them, compared with those of last year: he did not mean, in stating this, to claim any extraordinary acknowledgement of merit as due to the present Board of Ordnance; he rather thought that the present reduction might more justly be imputed to the adequate supplies of former years, which, in facilitating the progress of the public works, had lessened the grants of money necessary to support them. If the Board of Ordnance had any claim to merit, it was for the uniform zeal with which the Board resisted all the projects of expenditure that had been submitted to them, and consulted upon all occasions the most practical economy. The principal reductions were owing to the completion of those great works in Kent, and upon the coast of Sussex, which, while erecting, were productive of an expence of no inconsiderable magnitude. The sum now required would be found to be 600,000*l.* less than that voted last year, and this too, notwithstanding the increase of 1,400 men in one battalion of foot artillery; the increased expence of the establishments of engineers, and the augmentation of pay to the artillery, granted by his majesty. This threefold addition to our expenditures would amount to 150,000*l.* so that had there not been a reduction of 600,000*l.* the increase now required would be 750,000*l.* As to the Ordnance Estimates for Ireland, the diminution would be found to be in the same proportion, and to be ascribed to the same cause; and in general he could say, and it was great satisfaction to him that he felt warranted in saying, that whoever should have the honour of discharging, next year, the duty he was now called upon to perform, would yet have a more pleasing task, as the reduction would, by that time, be still greater, as the lines of Chatham, and the great works now carrying on at Dover and the Coast, would, by that time, be completed. He had but one observation more to make, that since the estimates had been laid upon the table, an advance upon the vote of credit had been made to the amount of 400,000*l.*; he would therefore, from the sum originally required, make a deduction to that amount. He did not think it necessary to detain the committee further than by stating, that he was very willing to give every information in his power to any gentleman, and should listen with respect to any suggestion the hon. gentlemen opposite should think it necessary to offer.—The hon. gent. concluded with moving, "1. That a sum, not exceeding 2,278,197*l.* 0*s.* 10*d.* be granted to his majesty, for the charge of the Office of Ordnance for Land Service for Great Britain, for the year 1807.—2. That 479,246*l.* 19*s.* 7*d.* be granted to his majesty, for the charge of the Office of Ordnance in Ireland, for the year 1807.—3. That 301,406*l.* 9*s.* 8*d.* be granted to his majesty, for defraying the expence of services performed by the Office of Ordnance for Land Service for Great Britain, and not provided for by parliament in the year 1805.—4. That 262,365*l.* 14*s.* 2*d.* be granted to his majesty, for defraying the expence of services performed by the Office of Ordnance for Land Service for Great Britain, and not provided for by parliament in the year 1806." The report was ordered to be received to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, January 8.

[MINUTES.] At four o'clock the Speaker counted the house, when above 100 members being present, the house proceeded to ballot for a committee to decide on the double return from Horsham. Forty members having been balloted, a minor committee was appointed, and retired into one of the committee chambers for the purpose of reducing the committee of forty to fifteen. Some time after, Mr.

White from the committee made his appearance at the bar, and presented a list of the members selected, which was read by the Speaker, and which was as follows: viz. Sir F. Fletcher Vane, W. Jacob, esq. hon. W. Howard, A. Atherley, esq. A. Tower, esq. T. R. Beaumont, esq. earl Percy, J. H. Tremayne, sir J. Lubbock, hon. A. Foley, lord Walpole, G. Jones, J. Barry, esq. J. Raine, esq. W. Dickenson, esq.: the two last names were appointed nominees.—The Exchequer Bills bill, and the Annual Indemnity bill, were read a second time.

[ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.] Mr. Hobhouse brought up the report of the committee of supply on the Ordnance Estimate.—The first resolution being put,

Mr. *Johnstone* observed, that there were two charges which appeared to him to require some explanation. Among the stores sent to Ceylon, amounting to 59,400*l.* he observed some gun-powder, estimated at 4,000*l.* Now it seemed very improvident to send out so much powder from this country, when it might have been sent to Ceylon at a much cheaper rate from some of our Settlements in the East Indies. This was the first charge which struck him with surprise. The second was this; he observed that for worms, turn-screws, &c. the charge for the service of Ireland was about 7,000*l.* while that for England was only 1,000*l.* This required explanation.

Mr. *Calcraft* replied to the first observation of the hon. gent. that all stores furnished for foreign service were done so under an order from the secretary of state's office; but that not having that order then about him, he was unable to produce it. As to the difference between the charge of worms and turn-screws, &c. for England and for Ireland, he rather supposed, that a part of the charge for the former country was included in the sums provided for in the other resolutions. But he would make enquiry into this subject, and would be happy to give the hon. gent. every information in his power.

Mr. *Johnstone* not only thought, that sending powder from this island to Ceylon was an oversight, but that the whole sum voted for the Ordnance Service of Ceylon, was too large to pass without animadversion. With regard to the other sums, he supposed that they were not correctly particularized in the resolution; for it was impossible they could form a part of the sums provided for in the other resolutions, as those sums were for the defraying of the expences of former years unprovided for, and what he alluded to was the charge for the current year.

Mr. *Calcraft* repeated, that he would make himself master of this subject, and endeavour to account to the hon. gent. for that which now appeared to him to be so extraordinary. The resolutions were then agreed to.

[MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS.] Lord *Castlereagh* gave notice, that on Monday he would move for returns of the present effective state of our Military Establishment.—As the noble lord sat down, Mr. Secretary Windham entered the house, upon which he again rose, and observed, that had the right hon. secretary been in his place when he gave his notice, he would have put the question to him, which he would now. He wished to know whether it was in the contemplation of his majesty's ministers to carry into execution the Training Act passed in the last session, or to substitute some other means of military defence?

Mr. Secretary *Windham* replied, that he did not know that any other measure was in contemplation; that it was probable the operation of the Training act might be extended to Scotland; and that he had no doubt in that case the people of that country would cheerfully support their share of the burthen.

Lord *Castlereagh* fancied that he had not made himself perfectly understood by the right hon. gent. His question did not relate to the suspension, or to the execution of the Training act in Scotland. What he asked was, whether or not it was intended to carry it into execution in this country?

Mr. *Windham* observed, that it was at this moment in a course of execution in this country: to what extent, must be subject to the discretion of the executive government, who would, in this case, be guided by circumstances. As far as taking the names, and balloting from the lists, the measure would be put into complete activity.

Lord *Castlereagh* again enquired, whether it was meant to carry the measure into execution in a military sense, or merely to confine it to the obtaining of names and a consequent ballot. Did his majesty's ministers intend that the Training should take place?

Mr. *Windham* repeated, that the extent

of the operation of the act must be regulated by circumstances. That as it was not likely that any material circumstances would occur, it was assuredly the intention of government to carry the measure into as complete execution as it was ever proposed to do. At no time was it likely that it would extend to the whole of the kingdom.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, January 9.

[MALT DUTY BILL.] The order for committing the Malt Duty bill, which also purported to be a bill for removing doubts respecting the issue of certain Exchequer bills, and for other purposes, having been read,

The *Lord Chancellor* left the woolsack, to call the attention of the house to this bill, which appeared to contain matter foreign to the object of a money bill. His lordship moved that the standing order respecting bills of this description should be read. The standing order was accordingly read by the clerk, declaring, that to insert in money bills, clauses foreign to the objects of those bills, was unparliamentary, and destructive of the constitution of parliament.—The noble and learned lord said it would be wasting the time of their lordships for him to attempt to prove, what must be obvious to the house, that clauses were inserted in this bill, which had no relation to its object as a money bill, and which therefore rendered it obnoxious to the standing order of the house which had just been read. He therefore moved that the bill be rejected, which was ordered accordingly.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, January 9.

[MINUTES.] Sir J. Newport, took the oaths and his seat. The hon. baronet, upon taking his seat, informed the house that having been returned for Waterford and also for St. Mawes, he made his election for the city of Waterford.—A new writ was ordered to be issued, to elect a member for the county of Sussex, in the room of general Lenox, who was called to the upper house, as succeeding to the title and honours of the dukedom of Richmond.—Mr. Dickenson informed the house, that being chosen to serve in Parliament for the borough of Lestwethiel and the county of Somerset, he made his election for the latter place.—Sir J. Newport gave notice that he would, on Monday, move to bring in a bill for correcting an error in an act of the 42d of the king, for regulating controverted elections, as relating to Ireland. The object of this bill would be to supply a defect in the said act, for though the commissioners were sworn to act, they were not empowered to administer an oath to the clerk who attended to take down the evidence; to empower them to administer this oath, was the object of the bill he hoped to have the honour of submitting to that house.—Mr. Adam moved that the order for the consideration of the petition, complaining of an undue election for Aberdeen, be deferred from the 23d instant to the 26th of March. In answer to a question from a member, to whom it appeared that the practice of the house, as laid down a few days since in the Thetford case, was against the enlargement, unless some special cause was assigned, Mr. Adam stated the distance of the place, and the necessity of having the attendance of Scotch lawyers, who could not attend till after the rising of the session. After a few observations from Mr. W. Dundas, the motion was agreed to.—Mr. Wingfield presented a petition, praying an enlargement of time for entering into recognizances to prosecute the petition, complaining of an undue election for the borough of Penrhyn. The petition stated, that the petitioners had completed their recognizance, and sent it up to their agent before their petition had been presented; but that this recognizance was considered as informal, and could not be received. The distance of the place, and the length of time taken in the conveyance by the post, had rendered the remainder of the time limited by act of parliament too short. Mr. W. moved for an enlargement of the time to the 19th instant. After a few observations from Mr. Swan, the sitting member, who thought the petitioners had not used all due diligence to correct their first oversight, and from Mr. Perceval, who recommended a cautious investigation of all grounds assigned for departing from the law, the motion was agreed to.—On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the resolution of the committee of supply, on the 1st of Jan. for continuing the usual duties on malt, was read. Mr. V. then stated, that, in consequence of circumstances, into which it was unnecessary for him to enter, the bill already brought in on this resolution had been lost in another place; he therefore moved for leave to bring in another bill, which was granted.

[BATTLE OF MAIDA.] Mr. *Wilder*, seeing the right hon. secretary for the war department in his place, wished to be informed by him, why the name of colonel, now general Oswald, had been omitted in the vote of thanks for the glorious victory of Maida, to the achievement of which his conduct and gallantry had materially contributed.

Mr. Secretary *Windham* said, it had been his wish, in framing the vote of thanks, to go as far as any former precedent would warrant him in mentioning the officers concerned, by name. No officer of a lower rank than major-general was mentioned by name in any former vote of thanks. But, as the rank of brigadier-general had been recently introduced into our service, he thought we might with propriety extend the compliment to that also. Colonel Oswald was not at the time actually a brigadier-general, though acting in that rank with great credit to himself, and great benefit to the service. The circumstances he mentioned were the only causes of the omission, and he hoped this explanation, which he was happy to have the opportunity of making, would prove perfectly satisfactory to the feelings of the hon. gent. behind him, and of every friend of that gallant and meritorious officer.

Mr. *Wilder* said, he was perfectly satisfied with the explanation given by the right hon. secretary.

[ORDNANCE ESTIMATES.] Mr. *Calcraft*, seeing an hon. gent. in his place (Mr. Johnstone), said he should take that opportunity of giving the hon. gent. every satisfactory explanation as to the questions which the hon. gent. had thought it necessary to put to him yesterday, with respect to the item for powder in the charges for the island of Ceylon. The hon. gent. asked, why the necessary supply of gunpowder had not been furnished by some of our settlements in the East Indies: to that question the best answer would be the simple statement of the fact, that the governor of that island had required a supply of English gunpowder, in preference to that of our Eastern settlements, owing to the superior quality of the former; and this too, not so much from the comparative excellence of our gunpowder, as the positive inferiority of that formerly supplied by the settlements. As to the apparent disproportion in the charges of 1000*l*. for England, and 7000*l*. for Ireland, for worms, turn-screws, &c. it was to be considered, that of the supplies hitherto furnished for the service of England, 9,100*l*. remained unexpended, so that towards the customary annual supply there was but a deficit of 900*l*., whereas, there was no remainder to supply the yearly demand for Ireland; this statement, however, as it stood, put in this case the Ordnance Estimates of England to those of Ireland in the ratio of 7 to 3, which he was free to acknowledge was by no means in the due proportion. As to the officers of Ordnance, in Ireland, they were entitled to every praise for the strictest economy, and the most laudable attention to the duties of the department. If blame, therefore, was justly to attach itself to any quarter, it would rather belong to this side. He confessed that, upon this head, he was not sufficiently prepared, to be as satisfactory as he could wish, not having had sufficient time to possess himself of the fullest information upon the subject; he should, however, take the earliest opportunity to enable him to account for this apparent disproportion.

Mr. *Johnstone* felt much obliged by the great anxiety the hon. gent. had evinced to give him and the house every satisfaction relative to the questions he took the liberty of putting to him yesterday. It was, however, very natural for him to suppose that in that country, where the material of which the gunpowder was made was to be had, it could be furnished at a cheaper rate than it could be contracted for in England. As to the requisition forwarded by the governor of Ceylon, he did not think that the responsibility to that house rested upon the governor, but upon the ministers, who were bound to judge of the propriety of acceding to it. This, too, he felt it necessary to add, that he had the fullest reliance in the capability of the governor of Ceylon, and thought that that gentleman had given proofs of a strict economy.

Mr. *Calcraft* said, that he had only to repeat that English gunpowder had been sent out to the Island of Ceylon, upon the positive orders of the governor, founded upon reasons already specified, that appeared to the government convincing.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Saturday, January 10.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Hobhouse presented a petition from the provost, &c. of the city of Edinburgh, praying for leave to bring in a bill for the improvement of Leith Harbour. Referred to a committee.—Mr. Hobhouse brought up the report of the 10,500,000*l.* Exchequer Bills bill. The amendments were agreed to, and a clause added, providing that the bill might be altered, amended, or repealed by any bill or bills to be passed in the present session of parliament. The bill was then ordered to be engrossed, and read a third time on Monday. Mr. Vansittart brought up the Malt Duty bill, without the exceptionable clauses, which had caused the former bill to be thrown out in the lords, on the motion of the lord chancellor. It was read a first time.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, January 12.

[ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.] On the motion of lord Grenville, the second reading of the bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was appointed for Friday se'nnight, for which day the lords were ordered to be summoned.

Lord *Hawkesbury* adverted to the two resolutions adopted by the house last session; the one declaring that the Slave Trade ought to be abolished; and the other, to address his majesty to make such communications to Foreign powers as his majesty should deem advisable, with the view of procuring the Abolition of the Slave Trade. With respect to the second of these resolutions, he thought the house ought to be informed of what had been done in pursuance of it, or whether any thing had been done. This information he conceived not only those noble lords who were hostile to the abolition, but also those who were friendly to that measure, would wish to have. There were five powers who were materially interested in the Slave Trade, namely, Portugal and the United States of America, France, Spain, and Holland; Denmark and Sweden had also some interest in the trade, but it was of a subordinate nature. With respect to Spain and Holland, he could readily conceive that there had been no means of making any communication on the subject to these powers. As to France, he did not know whether, during the late negociation with the government of that country, there was any communication upon this subject made, and this was a point upon which he thought the house ought to be informed. So also with respect to the United States of America, and Portugal, communications might have been made, of which the house ought to be in possession previous to the second reading of the bill. His lordship concluded by moving an address to his majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to order to be laid before the house, copies of all communications which had passed between his majesty and foreign powers respecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade, in consequence of the address of that house.

Lord *Grenville* said, he was not aware of any material objection to the noble lord's motion. With respect to France, the fact was, that during the late negociation with the government of that country, communications on this subject did take place, to the production of which he saw no objection. As to Spain and Holland, the noble lord had justly supposed that no communications had taken place. With respect to Portugal, it was not thought expedient to make any communication on the subject during the negociation with France; and the fact was that none had since been made. With respect to the United States of America, communications had certainly passed during the negociation between the plenipotentiaries of this country and the United States; and this subject actually formed one of the articles of the treaty which had been signed by those plenipotentiaries. The only difficulty he had in acceding to the noble lord's motion was, that this article could not be produced, as it was well known that a treaty signed by plenipotentiaries could not regularly be laid before parliament until ratified by the respective governments.—The motion was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, January 12.

[CHARGES AGAINST MR. CAWTHORNE.] General *Porter* rose to postpone until Wednesday se'nnight the motion of which he had given notice for Wednesday next, on the subject of colonel Cawthorne's Court Martial. This postponement the hon. officer stated to be necessary, as many members could not, in consequence of the quarter sessions, conveniently attend the discussion of this question sooner.

Mr. *Cawthorne* expressed his wish that the hon. general would make up his mind and determine finally on the time when he was to bring forward his motion. The house would be aware how disagreeable must be the state of suspence in which he was placed by having the motion put off from time to time. Nearly ten days had already elapsed since the hon. general had given his notice, and it was not without surprise, therefore, that he found him now proposing further delay.

General *Porter* said, that his only object in proposing the delay was, in order to insure a full attendance, which he deemed highly desirable upon this occasion, and which could not be looked for if the discussions were to occur while the quarter-sessions were pending.

Mr. *Cawthorne* declared that he was as anxious as any man, that the discussion of the case alluded to should have as full an attendance as possible; for without any reference to himself, he thought it involved a question of very great moment. Putting entirely out of view the consideration of holding any member of that house, or any persons whatever whose character was implicated, one moment more than was indispensably necessary in a state of suspence, he submitted to the candour and judgement of the house, whether there was not something in the course of this proceeding which justified complaint. The hon. gent. gave notice of this proceeding, in the first instance, in a way certainly very unusual, at a time when the members were very little likely to have any knowledge of it, namely, after the debate had closed on Tuesday morning, and after almost all the members had retired. Not a word of it appeared in the morning papers, in which accounts of the proceedings of that house generally appeared: and if it were not for some gentlemen who happened to perceive the insertion of this notice in the book upon the table, the thing would have been very little known indeed.

General *Porter* repeated the grounds which induced him to postpone his motion; adding, that he would certainly bring forward the motion upon Wednesday se'nnight.

[CONDUCT OF LORD WELLESLEY.] Lord *Folkestone* gave notice of his intention to move, on that day fortnight, for the re-printing of certain papers which had been printed last session, relative to the Oude charge exhibited against marquis Wellesley.

Lord *Howick* expressed a wish to know from the noble lord, with what view he proposed to bring forward the motion of which he had given notice, and what was the nature of the measure he meant to found upon the papers to which his notice referred?

Lord *Folkestone* replied, that his motion would refer to the re-printing of the several papers connected with the Oude charge; namely, numbers 3, 4, and 5. With respect to any subsequent proceeding, he believed that none was likely to be taken for some time. The house was aware that the hon. gent. (Mr. Paull) with whom this business originated was now a petitioner, and until that petition was decided, it was not intended to ground any measure upon the papers to which this notice related. But yet, to prevent any delay hereafter, it was thought expedient that those documents should be fully before the house, in order that, if the hon. gent. already alluded to should be in a situation to prosecute this important enquiry, he might be enabled to proceed at once, unimpeded by the procrastination which the printing of papers upon this subject had so often produced in the course of the last parliament; and in order also that if Mr. Paull should not be in a situation to follow up this business, he himself (lord Folkestone), or some more competent person, might be furnished with the means of proceeding upon it. The noble lord concluded with expressing a belief that he had fully replied to the enquiry of the noble secretary of state, and expressed a readiness to afford any further information in his power upon the subject.

Lord *Howick* apprehended that the reasons stated by the noble lord could not be considered a sufficient parliamentary ground for the proposition he professed to have in view. It did indeed appear to him quite without precedent to make a motion for the production and printing of certain papers upon which the mover did not state that any direct proceeding was to be instituted, but merely upon the chance that another gentleman not a member of that house, might ground some proceeding upon them. This, however, he felt was not the proper time to argue the question; but he could not help observing, that the course proposed must be attended with extreme hardship to the party concerned in the case to which the notice referred. For that house was to be called on to promote the circulation of the most severe attacks upon the character of the noble person alluded to. The effects of such publications were easily to be estimated, and he would submit whether they could he in fairness acceded to, without any precise statement that a parliamentary measure would be founded upon them, or without any definition of the statement of such measures. The noble mover did not say that any farther parliamentary proceeding would be taken upon those papers; but merely that it might; and really he could not think that a sufficient ground for the noble lord's intended motion.

Lord *Folkestone* was aware that this was not the proper time for any argument upon the subject; but he would, with the leave of the house, make a further reply to the noble secretary of state. The object of the motion of which he had given notice, could not be fairly supposed to involve any harshness towards lord Wellesley, as the noble secretary of state stated, any farther than as it professed to assist and facilitate the enquiry respecting that noble lord's conduct. But the noble secretary of state seemed to imagine, that there was some probability the enquiry might be relinquished, and that therefore the documents his motion would relate to, might not be necessary. Of this, however, he could assure the noble secretary, that the enquiry would certainly be persisted in; for if no other person should offer, he pledged himself, if a member of parliament, to follow it up. The papers he had described were, the noble lord observed, laid before the house last session, and therefore there could be no just objection to their being re printed, particularly as the enquiry would be proceeded in. Indeed, if the hon. gent. who originally brought it forward should not be enabled from his presence in that house to prosecute it, he would, rather than let it drop, take it up himself. Those papers would not, therefore, be suffered to lie dormant on the table. It was for no such purpose that he intended to move for them. They were, indeed, already in the hands of the greater part of the members, and in general circulation; but in order to satisfy the forms of the house, it was necessary to have them again laid on the table, and re-printed, before any parliamentary proceeding could be founded upon them. Whether his motion for this purpose should be agreed to or not, he could not guess. He did not indeed anticipate the opposition manifested by the noble secretary. But whether that opposition should be persisted in or not, whatever the fate of his motion might be, that motion would certainly be made, and the enquiry to which it related as certainly prosecuted.

[OAK BARK BILL.] Lord *Folkestone* presented a petition from the Tanners of London against the Oak Bark bill.—Upon the motion being made for its lying on the table,

Lord *Temple* stated, that he had, upon the subject of this petition, taken occasion to communicate, as his duty presented to him, with the tanners of London, among whom he found some considerable alarm prevailed, relative to the bill before the house. But the result of this communication served fully to convince his mind, that that alarm was not well founded. Such indeed was his opinion, even before the conference took place. But still he felt it not only his duty, but his inclination, to consult any class of men interested in a question of this nature; to consider their opinions, to examine their objections, and even to pay attention to their prejudices. He would therefore propose to allow full time for enquiring farther upon this subject, in order that the grounds upon which the petitioners rested their objections to the bill before the house might be amply investigated. For that purpose he would move, that the second reading of the bill should be postponed till this day fortnight. In the interim the case might be diligently examined; and as the Oak Bark trade was suspended, at least until May, no injury could result from the proposed delay, to those concerned for the carrying of the bill.—The petition was ordered to lie on the table, and lord Temple's motion for the second reading of the bill on this day fortnight was agreed to.

[IRISH ELECTION BILL.] Sir *John Newport* rose, pursuant to notice, to move for leave to bring in a bill for amending the act of the 42d of his present majesty, for regulating the trial of contested elections in Ireland. The right hon. baronet observed, that there were several provisions in this act which he proposed to alter, and which were of such a nature as the house must feel admitted of no delay that could be consistently avoided in passing the bill which he had felt it his duty to bring forward. There were some points in the act he proposed to amend, which he thought it right to mention to the house, as proofs of the necessity that existed for such amendment. In the act referred to, there was a provision for swearing the commissioners appointed in Ireland to examine evidence, &c. upon the subject of election petitions; but strange as it might seem, there was no provision for swearing the clerks who acted under such commission. This omission, which he meant to supply, was the more extraordinary, as the whole of the proceedings depended on the accuracy of these clerks, upon whose written statement of the evidence taken before them, the committees of that house were to ground their decisions; therefore such clerks might have it in their power, by the suppression, or substitution of a single word, to defeat the whole proceedings upon an election petition. Another point in the act he proposed to amend was this: according to that act, no man could be a member of a commission to enquire into the merits of any election at which he had voted. But this prohibition he proposed to extend to those also who were entitled to vote at such election: and that he thought necessary to answer the object of the former provision; for, as the law stood, a man entitled to vote had only to decline voting, in order to qualify himself to become a commissioner, as was often the case in consequence of compromise with some of the candidates. Thus the spirit of the law was evaded. But this evasion was not confined to the commissioners; it extended also to the clerks, and therefore to them also he should extend the proposed prohibition. There was another new provision which he thought it necessary to introduce into the bill he should have the honour of submitting to the house, the object of which would be to remove doubts existing as to the power of a committee of that house to call for the production of any books or other documents which might have been laid before the commission in Ireland. Another amendment he had to propose, would relate to the expence of clerks. At present they were allowed at the rate of sixpence for every 72 words, which gave them an interest in protracting the enquiry; and it had happened that such protraction had extended so far, that although the receipt of the commissioners, who were barristers, did not exceed 200*l.*, that of the clerks amounted to no less than 800*l.* But it was his intention to reduce the allowance to the clerks from 6*d.* to 3*d.* for every 72 words, which would of course reduce their interest in the protraction of the proceedings. The last point of the proposed change the right hon. baronet stated to be the natural result of a case which had occurred in Ireland, where between 3 and 400 voters, forming almost the whole of those who had polled at the election, had been objected to, and of course taken to attend the commission at a considerable expence to the party interested, although not more than 50 or 60 of those votes had ever been enquired into at all. The remedy he should propose for this evil would be, that when a party objected to any voters, the specific grounds of the objection shall be stated, and unless such objection be sustained by evidence, it shall be declared frivolous and vexatious by the commission, and the party advancing such frivolous and vexatious objection obliged to pay the expence incurred in consequence by his opponent. This provision, he believed, would serve to diminish, if not to remove, an evil too often practised, and which the spirit of litigation only could prompt men to inflict upon their adversaries.—Leave was given to bring in the bill.

[MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE COUNTRY.] Lord *Castlereagh*, in pursuance of the notice which he had given on a former day, rose to submit his motions to the house. It was a satisfaction to him to find that no objection was likely to be made to the production of any of the returns for which he proposed to move. It would unquestionably be more satisfactory to the house, that no argument should be produced upon the subject to which his motions referred, until the documents he was to call for should be before the house. It was, therefore, not his intention to submit any reasoning to the house upon the question in the present stage. He should confine himself to a short statement of the points upon which he desired information, and to which his several motions would go. The first point upon which he thought it necessary to call for information, was the actual state of the army, regulars, and militia. His first motion, therefore, would be for a return of the present actual effective strength of the regular army, the militia, and the artillery, up to the latest period when returns had been made, and at the end of every month from the first of March 1806, inclusive. By this return the house would be enabled to judge how far the army had undergone any increase or diminution of its effective strength within that period. The next point upon which he proposed to move for information, was with respect to the sources, from which the supply for keeping up the strength of the army, was derived. By this return the house would be able to form some opinion of the sources of supply which formerly existed, to see what part of them still continued, and what part of the existing sources of supply had produced the greatest increase, as well as the policy of continuing or altering any part of them. The two motions which he meant to bring forward on these heads would put the house in possession of full information respecting the general state of the army, and the means at present existing for keeping it to its proper establishment. His two next, and indeed his only, further motions related to branches of our military force, that were collateral to the regular army, and calculated to support and keep it up; he meant the volunteers, and that other branch, which had engaged so much of the attention of the house during last session, when the general Training bill was under discussion. He proposed to move for a Return of the effective strength of the Volunteers, on the 1st of January, 1806, and also at the latest period of any returns of that force, distinguishing the period at which the last returns had been made. He felt that much information was necessary on the subject of the Volunteers; but a more seasonable opportunity would occur for calling for it, and discussing the question, when the documents he was then to move for should be before the house. The fourth head of information to which his motions referred, was the sole one that remained for him to advert to, namely, the general Training bill; because, whatever the right hon. gentleman might think of his explanation upon that head on a former night, it had proved by no means satisfactory to him, nor did he think it could be satisfactory to the house, or to the public. It did not appear from the right hon. gent.'s statement, that any steps had been taken in execution of that measure, except so far as respected the procuring lists. His last motion, therefore, should be for an abstract of the proceedings that had taken place in execution of that bill. When the information for which he proposed to move should be before the house, he should be prepared to state his opinion; and if the papers should not prove, that the state of the army was not, according to the prospects that had been held out to that house last session, more satisfactory, than, upon the general information which a person circumstanced as he was could obtain, was disposed to believe it; he should never bring himself to consent to a renewal of that fundamental change in the Mutiny act, which the right hon. gent. had introduced into it last session. If it should not appear that a great increase had been effected by the alteration in the amount of the army, whilst it laid the foundation of so great a diminution of its numbers, he should feel it his duty to endeavour to bring back the Mutiny act to its former provisions, and to those principles upon which the British army had been carried to such an extent of reputation and strength. The noble lord concluded with submitting his motions, which were to the following effect, to the house:—"1. That there be laid before the house, monthly returns of the amount of the effective strength of his majesty's regular troops and militia, from the 1st of March, 1806, to the 1st of January, 1807, inclusive; distinguishing cavalry, foot guards, infantry of the line, garrison and veteran battalions, foreign and local corps, German legion, West-India corps, British and Irish militia, and distinguishing those serving abroad, from those serving at home.—2. A similar return of the effective strength of the artillery for the same period inclusive, distinguishing the corps serving abroad and at home.—3. A return of the number of men raised monthly for the regular army, from the 1st of Jan. 1805, to the 1st of Jan. 1807, exclusive of foreign or colonial levies, and distinguishing those raised by the additional force act, by the regular recruiting, and those that were inlisted from the militia.—4. Copies of all orders or regulations that have been issued since the last session of parliament, respecting the recruiting of the regular army.—5. An abstract of the effective strength of the volunteers on the 1st of January, 1806, distinguishing infantry and cavalry; also a like return at the latest period when any return has been made, specifying within what period such return had been made.—6. An abstract of such instructions as have been issued by his majesty's command to the lieutenants of counties, and of such proceedings as have been taken thereon in execution of the act of last session of parliament, for the general training of the population of the country."—On the question being put upon the first motion,

Mr. Secretary *Windham*, though he felt that no information was too much, that could be supplied to the house on this subject, was yet of opinion that there might be many points which it would not be desirable to have made known. Every gentleman was aware, that any documents which might be laid before that house, were not exclusively confined to the members, but made their way to the public, and of course to the enemy. In this view it would appear to the house that there might be points, which, however desirable it may be that the house should be informed upon, it would still be not prudent to let the knowledge of them reach the enemy. When the noble lord had read over this motion to him, it had not appeared to be liable to any serious objection. The noble lord had stated to him, that it did not differ from a motion that had been agreed to in a former year, except in this, that this motion called for the monthly returns, whilst that had been half-yearly returns. But it appeared to him at present that his motion was objectionable, inasmuch as it would expose the strength of some particular local corps to the enemy. It would be an ungracious duty for him to object to the production of the information desired, yet, however he might have himself contributed to the production of similar returns in any former period, he should not hesitate between his private wish and his sense of public duty. The noble lord might perhaps shape his motion so as not to be liable to this objection, in which case he should agree to it with cheerfulness. He could not consent to have the returns of the black colonial troops, which were employed only in the West Indies, produced in the form called for by the noble lord; but he would leave it to him to explain his own motion in such a manner, as might obviate the objection that applied to it.

Lord *Castlereagh* concurred in the wisdom of the observation of the right hon. gent. that it would not be proper to produce any documents which might give any dangerous information to the enemy. But from the manner in which this subject had been brought before parliament for the last three or four years, he thought the information he called for, necessary to the house. He had remembered, indeed, one instance, in which not only the number but the distribution of the British forces had been produced on motion. The enemy, however, could have the same information from publications countenanced in this country. He had moved only for the gross amount of the British army, abroad and at home, and not its distribution; and this information was necessary to the house, in order to enable them to discover what proportion of that force was applicable to the defence of the country. If parliament took the responsibility upon itself, by the part it had acted, in changing altogether the whole military system, by its measures respecting the volunteers and the training, it was essentially necessary for them to know what force they had for the defence of the country. He certainly thought that they might get information of the gross amount of the black corps, as he did not propose to interfere with their local distribution, without giving any dangerous information to the enemy, especially as the black troops were not the only troops in the West Indies.

Mr. Secretary *Windham* admitted that the observations of the noble lord had, in a great measure, obviated his objection. He had still, however, a difficulty in stating the amount of black troops, which were exclusively employed in the West Indies. But as they were not the only corps employed, the objection did not appear to him material, and he should, therefore, not press it.

Lord *Castlereagh* consented to have the black West-India regiments thrown into the gross amount of the foreign local corps.—The motion was then agreed to, as were the second, third, fourth, and fifth, without any particular or material observation.—On the question being put upon the last,

Mr. Secretary *Windham* begged leave to say a few words on that occasion, which appeared to be called for, by some observations that had fallen from the noble lord in allusion to the measure to which this motion referred. The noble lord, from his experience of the additional force act, and every other gentleman, who was acquainted with the execution of such, must be aware that they embraced a great deal of civil detail, which it was impossible to precipitate. The militia lists had been used in preference to those originally pointed out by the bill. That part of the process had not been gone through, and until it had, it would have been impossible to accelerate the operation of the measure by the authority of office. All that had been foreseen by the framers of the measure, as well as that it was incapable of being executed last summer. If even there had been a necessity to put it in execution, it could not have been ready for such execution before the Spring. In the present state of the world and of the season, it would not be very eligible to put it into operation, even if every thing was ready. The noble lord seemed anxious for copies of the proceedings under this measure, and returns of the enrolments. But he could inform the noble lord, that that part of the process had already been gone through, and that nothing remained to be done but the apportionment, which had even already been begun. The act had left the government a discretionary power, as to its execution according to circumstances, and consequently justified fully their conduct respecting this measure. This was all he had thought necessary to say, in consequence of the observations of the noble lord, nor should he have said so much, if the noble lord had not made some allusion to a motion for military enquiry in consequence of the measures with which the house had recently been engaged, and which had been recommended by him. The noble lord might certainly have felt the necessity of such enquiry, from the consequence of those measures in which he had so large a share.—The motion was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, January 13.

[Minutes.] On the motion of sir F. Vane, the order for taking into consideration on Tuesday, the 20th instant, the Petition complaining of an undue return for the Borough of Tregony was discharged, and a new order made for Tuesday, the 27th inst. —The order of the day having been read for the house going into a committee on the Malt Duty bill, it was ordered, on the motion of Mr. Vansittart, that it be an instruction to the said committee to receive a clause of credit, and a clause to make good certain deficiencies. The bill then passed through a committee, in which these clauses were introduced and agreed to.

[Conduct of Lord Wellesley.] Mr. *Wellesley Pole* adverting to a notice given by a noble lord yesterday (lord Folkestone), of a motion on Monday se'nnight, for reprinting the papers relating to the Oude Charge, declared that when the notice was given he understood that the noble lord meant to comprehend the whole of the papers in his motion. He had since been told, that in answer to a question put by one of his majesty's ministers, the noble lord had expressed his intention of calling for the re-printing of Nos. 3, 4, and 5 only. He therefore rose to give notice, that as soon as the noble lord's motion should be disposed of, he should move for the reprinting of the whole papers, including the printed evidence. He would not pretend to anticipate the judgment of the house on the noble lord's motion, but justice to his noble relation, who was the ultimate object of it, demanded, that if the proposal for printing a part of these papers should be acceded to, the rest ought to be circulated in the same manner.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, January 14.

[Minutes.] Sir J. Newport brought up a bill, to amend the Act of the 42d of his present majesty, for regulating the trials of Controverted Elections, or returns of members to serve in parliament for Ireland; which was read a first time.—The Secretary at War presented the Army Estimates for the present year, and a copy of the warrant for fixing certain allowances and pensions, in pursuance of the Act 46 Geo. III. These papers were ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed. He then gave notice, that, on Friday se'nnight, he would move those estimates in the committee of Supply. Mr. Perceval wished to know whether the papers moved for on a former night, by a noble lord, not now present (Castlereagh,) with a view to the elucidation of the state of our Military Establishments would be ready before that day. The Secretary at War conceived the papers now presented, might in a great measure afford the information the noble lord wished for.

[American Treaty.] General *Gascoyne* rose, and observed, that he thought it his duty to ask the noble lord opposite (Howick) a question, if the house would so far indulge him. It was of the last importance to the commerce and manufactures of the country in general, and in particular to that town which he represented, that some explanation should be given of the situation in which we stood with respect to America. It was necessary to give publicity to the question and the answer, otherwise he would have been satisfied with a private explanation. A letter had appeared in the public papers, with his lordship's name to it, from which it appeared that a Treaty of Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, had been signed between this country and America, by commissioners respectively authorized by both governments. The noble lord had left it very doubtful whether the late prohibitory decree had met with any alteration? whether the congress had assembled, or whether the president had any power to alter the provisions of the decree? The consequence was, that merchants were left entirely in the dark, whether or not they might with safety export those articles that had been prohibited. This was a state of suspence that ought if possible to be removed. He did not ask about the terms of the treaty; he knew any such question would be premature. But if his lordship meant to say, that these goods might be exported without danger, explanation was required, for he had not been explicit. If he meant to say that they could not be exported with safety, explanation was still requisite, for he had been explicit neither on the one point nor on the other. He hoped, therefore, that the noble lord would have no objection to remove all doubt on this subject, by giving a full explanation of his meaning. This was material, as the note in question had created much anxiety among the commercial and manufacturing interests of the country.

Lord *Howick* would be glad to be able to answer any question which was stated to be of importance to the commercial and manufacturing interests of the country. How far the hon. general might think explanation necessary, he did know, but the house would immediately see that his question, if he rightly understood it, was one which he could not possibly answer. The hon. general had said, that a considerable impression had been created among the commercial and manufacturing interests of the nation by the note which he had written. How any impression should have been conveyed by that beyond the simple fact, he was at a loss to conceive. He had merely stated the simple fact, that a Treaty of a certain description had been signed by the respective commissioners. What was to follow upon that, he could not take upon him to say. It would be improper at present to go any farther than the bare fact. He had stated, that there was such a treaty, leaving it to others to draw such a conclusion as they should see fit. In this, however, as in all treaties, the most obvious inference would be, that since it was signed by persons duly authorised, it would in due time be ratified. If there was such a treaty, and the inference was that it would be ratified, it might naturally be concluded that the prohibitions would be taken off. But all that he could take upon him to say at present was, that there was a treaty of amity, commerce, &c. as he had stated in his letter. He could only communicate the fact, leaving it to others to draw such inferences as the fact might appear to them to warrant. A learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) the other night had adverted to this treaty, and seemed desirous to know whether we had bound ourselves down to a particular system of action with regard to the American and Neutral Navigation and Commerce, or whether his majesty had reserved to himself a right to proceed as far as was necessary to counteract the designs of the enemy, by using means equally severe against his commerce as he used against ours. He had no objection to answer that question. His majesty had reserved to himself a right to proceed with as much rigour against the French commerce as the chief of the French government had employed against us. This was a right which he hoped his majesty would always reserve to himself. Nothing had been given up therefore on that point by the treaty with America.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, January 15.

[MINUTES.] On taking the chair, the speaker acquainted the house, that he had received a letter from the right hon. W. Wickham, which stated, that having been returned for the borough of Midhurst, and the borough of Callington, he had made his election to serve for the borough of Callington. It also stated, that illness was the cause of his not having made this intimation within the time specified in the orders of the house.—A new writ was ordered for the borough of Blechingley, in the room of J. Dupre Porcher, esq. who, since his election, had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds.—The Malt Duty bill was read a third time, and passed.—Mr. Vansittart presented the Barrack Estimates and gave notice, that on Wednesday next he would move them in the committee of supply.—A message from the lords announced their lordships' assent to the Exchequer Bills bill.—Mr. Perceval gave notice, that he would to-morrow move for an humble address to be presented to his majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to cause a copy of the order of council of the 7th of January relative to Neutrals,' to be laid on the table of the house.—Mr. Biddulph gave notice, that on Tuesday next, he would propose to the house to come to a resolution, that the extent of the supplies, during the war, having caused great burthens to be imposed upon the people, a committee should be appointed to enquire into the practicability of a reduction of those burthens, by the abolition of sinecure offices, places, pensions, &c. and also by the reduction of exorbitant fees.—On the motion of sir J. Newport, the report of the commissioners of enquiry in Ireland, was entered as read. He then observed, that it appeared by that report that many offices in the customs of Ireland had become useless, and that others had been converted to sinecures, in consequence of the subsequent establishment of other offices, by which their business was transacted. The commissioners recommended, that 38 offices should be entirely abolished, and that 26 should be either abolished by being consolidated with other offices, or so regulated as to become beneficial to the public service. In the 38th of his present majesty, a similar report had been made, in consequence of which a reform, such as that which he meant to propose, had taken place. Without further preface, therefore, he should move, that leave be given to bring in a bill to abolish certain offices, and to regulate certain other offices in the customs of Ireland. Leave granted.—The 46th of the king, commonly called the Corn Intercourse act, having been entered as read, sir J. Newport, intimating that considerable doubts had arisen in some quarters as to the operation of the act, and an interpretation having been given to it which was by no means intended, gave notice, that he would to-morrow move that the act should be taken into consideration by a committee of the whole house. His object was, that the sense of the act should be declared, and that it should be shewn that it applied to the gross produce and manufacture of Great Britain and Ireland alone, and not to those of foreign countries.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, January 17.

[Minutes.] The deputy usher of the black rod appeared, and required the immediate attendance of the house, in the house of peers, to hear a commission read. The speaker and several members, accordingly attended. On their return, the speaker informed the house, that the lords, authorised by his majesty's commission, had signified the royal assent to the Exchequer Bills bill.—The speaker also informed the house, that he had received from Mr. Bouchier, the deputy clerk of the crown in Ireland, a return of barristers, qualified to act as commissioners under the Election act.—The speaker likewise informed the house, that the following persons having presented petitions on the 1st of January, complaining of undue returns for the places annexed, and not having entered into the recognizances prescribed by the 28th of his present majesty, he had caused the orders for taking such petitions into consideration to be discharged: W. Baker, Newcastle-under-Line; sir J. E. Brown, county of Mayo; sir C. Saxton, and H. Bouverie, Malmsbury; several burgesses of Malmsbury; T. Stacy and others, freemen of Hythe.—He also observed, that although no recognizances had been entered into on the joint petition of sir C. Saxton and C. H. Bouverie, esq. yet that, with regard to a separate petition from one of those parties, the forms had been complied with, and consequently, that the order for taking that petition into consideration would remain on the journals.—On the motion of lord Castlereagh, it was ordered, that the abstract of the army estimates for 1807, presented by the secretary at war on the 14th inst., be printed.—On the motion of Mr. Grenville, it was ordered, that there be laid before the house an estimate of the debt of his majesty's navy, as it stood on the 30th of September, 1806. The right hon. gent. immediately presented the above-mentioned estimate, and gave notice, that he would make a motion on the subject in the committee of supply, on Friday next. He added, that it was also his intention, on that day, to move for an additional number of seamen to those already voted: 120,000 had been already voted: he meant to propose a vote of an additional 10,000.—On the motion of lord H. Petty, there was ordered to be laid before the house a return of the effective number of volunteers, on the 1st of January, 1805.—Mr. C. Wynne obtained leave to bring in a bill for continuing the act of the 44th of the king, empowering his majesty to accept the extended services of volunteers from the militia of Ireland. This act had hitherto only remained in force from year to year. His object was, to continue it during the war. He then brought up the bill, which was read a first time. Mr. Biddulph obtained leave to withdraw his motion relative to sinecures, &c. with a declaration that he would bring it forward on some future day.—Sir J. Newport brought in a bill for abolishing certain offices in the Customs of Ireland, and for abolishing and regulating certain other offices; which was read a first time. On moving that it be read a second time, sir J. Newport took occasion to observe, that the recommendations of the commissioners of enquiry (as far as it depended on the executive government of Ireland) had either been already carried into effect or would speedily be so. The principal of these recommendations was comprised in the bill before the house; and two or three others of a minor description, would be submitted to the house in the course of the session.—On the motion of sir J. Newport, the house went into a committee to consider the act of the 46th of his present majesty, commonly called the Grain Intercourse act. He observed, that he had yesterday stated the object he had in view. From the generality of the wording of the act, considerable doubts had been entertained whether it did not extend to a point which was not in the contemplation of those by whom it had been proposed. He meant to the introduction of foreign corn and flour through the circuitous medium of one country to another. He now, therefore, moved for leave to bring in a bill, declaring that certain provisions of the act of last session, which related to the intercourse of every species of grain between Great Britain and Ireland, should extend to grain, the produce of those conntries only. In answer to a question from Mr. Bagwell, as to the operation of the act on malt, sir J. Newport declared, that it did not apply at all to malt. By some error, the word malt had crept into the preamble of the bill, but had never been introduced into any of the enactments.—The house having been resumed, the report was received, and leave given to bring in a bill accordingly.—Lord Folkestone presented a petition, praying for an enlargement of the time for entering into a recognizance in the case of the Milbourne port election. The ground of this motion was that the agent for the petitioner, a country attorney, did not know of the order of the house requiring a notice to be given to the sitting member, of the time when the recognizance was to be entered into by the petitioner. He held in his hand another petition, stating, that the attorney had not received the speaker's order till the 14th of this month, owing to its not being sent by the messenger, though the attorney had left directions for that purpose. He moved that the time be enlarged to Wednesday next. The speaker stated, that it was no good ground for this motion, to state that an old and established order of the house was not known. The messengers were not in the practice of sending the speaker's orders to any agent not residing in London, and it would be attended with great inconvenience if this should be altered. Mr. Leycester, Mr. Wynne, and Mr. Perceval severally objected to the motion, and were of opinion, that the prayer of the petition could not be granted. The first of these gentlemen stated, that the speaker's order had nothing to do with the recognizance. It only referred to the time when the merits of the case were to be tried. The motion was then put and negatived.—Sir J. Newport presented a petition from the right hon. Isaac Corry, praying that the time for entering into the recognizance might be enlarged. The ground was, the distance from which the sureties had to come, and the possible delay from adverse winds. He moved that the time be enlarged for three weeks. The discussion upon this motion was postponed till Tuesday.—Mr. S. Bourne presented a petition from John Hawkins, praying for an enlargement of the time for entering into the recognizance with respect to the petition against the return of Mr. Grattan. The ground was, that the petitioner could not find Mr. Grattan in order to serve the notice within the limited time. He moved that the time be enlarged to the 5th of February. The discussion was postponed till Tuesday.

[CHARGES AGAINST MR. CAWTHORNE.] Lord *Howick*, adverting to the consideration of the Army Estimates, which stood for Wednesday next, and observing that a subject of such importance would probably occasion some discussion, suggested to an hon. general, the expediency of deferring the notice which he had given for a motion on an important subject to some other day.

General *Porter*, however anxious that the subject alluded to should be brought before the house, yet, under the circumstances mentioned by the noble lord, had no objection to postpone his motion from Wednesday to Friday.

Mr. *Cawthorne* appealed to the justice of the house against any further protraction on this subject. He certainly felt the importance of the discussion to which the noble lord alluded, but he also felt the importance of the discussion in which he was so immediately interested, and which had been so frequently postponed. However, he left it entirely to the house to determine whatever they should think fit.

Lord *Howick* allowed that the discussion referred to was of an important nature. He deemed it important from other motives than as it related to an individual, and he trusted that when it was brought forward, it would be treated on general principles. He was also desirous that as little delay as possible should take place on this subject; but the delay of two days would not be very material, and he hoped, therefore, that the hon. gent. would consent to the postponement.

Mr. *Cawthorne* asquiescing, the notice was entered for Friday next.

[ORDER OF COUNCIL RELATIVE TO NEUTRALS.] Mr. *Perceval* said, that when he gave notice of his intention to move for an humble address to be presented to his majesty, praying that he would be graciously pleased to cause to be laid before the house the Order of Council of the 7th of January, respecting the mode in which his majesty had instructed his officers to deal with the trade carrying on by Neutral Vessels between the ports of the enemy, he had no idea that any objection would be made to the production of this paper, except, perhaps, that that production had been rendered unnecessary by the publication of the order in the London gazette, and in his majesty's proclamation, and that therefore any proposition to the house would be as consonant to form without the production of that order on the table. To this objection, had it been urged, he should have answered that long parliamentary usage had led him to believe, that whenever a motion was intended to be instituted on a paper, the more regular mode of proceeding was to call for the production of that paper on the table of the house. However, the noble lord opposite (for which he returned him his unfeigned thanks) had intimated to him, that he meant to object to the production of this order on other grounds. He therefore wished accurately to understand those grounds, that he might determine what it would be suitable for him to do. He hoped that the noble lord would have no objection to state whether or not he understood him correctly, when he supposed him to say, that, as he could not anticipate any proposition grounded on the production of the order to which he could give his concurrence, he must object to such production, unless he (Mr. P.) would satisfy him as to the precise nature of the ulterior proceeding which he meant to propose. If such actually was the ground on which the noble lord intended to oppose the production of the order, he certainly would not make his motion on the present day, because it would then be incumbent upon him, in that case, to satisfy the noble lord and the house of the expediency of the ulterior proceeding to which he alluded, and because he thought the nature of that proceeding too important to be discussed at such a short notice. He therefore again requested the noble lord to explain himself on this subject.

Lord *Howick*, finding that it was supposed that the motion for the production of this Order was a mere matter of course, had deemed it right to intimate to the learned gent. that he should feel it his duty to resist it. He certainly should not object to its production, on the ground of its having already obtained publicity in the London gazette and in his majesty's proclamation; for although he was aware, that the proceeding of the house might be founded on such a publication, yet he was also aware with the learned gent. that it would be a more regular course of proceeding to produce the document on the table. But although the document in its present state might be sufficiently authentic, yet it did not follow that it must be produced to the house of commons. There might be two causes for requiring such a production; the first on the ground of some declared parliamentary measure; the next, for the purpose of instituting some undefined proceeding. The last was the cause alleged by the learned gent. It became the duty of the house to enquire into the nature of that proceeding. As far as he was able to collect the views of the learned gent. they were such as he, for one, could by no means consent to. His object was altogether unprecedented, and in his opinion liable to the most serious objections. He therefore felt it his duty, until the learned gentleman should explain unto the house the nature of his ulterior proceedings, to object to the production of the order; and as therefore the learned gent.'s motion would probably lead to much discussion, he advised him to defer it with a special notice.

Mr. *Perceval,* although he should feel perfectly justified in making his motion for the production of the order in question, yet, after the declaration of the noble lord, and for the reasons he had before stated, he would decline doing so at present. The noble lord had described the ulterior proceeding which he meant to institute on this paper as unprecedented. This he would say, that the ground on which the noble lord objected to the production of the order was at least as unprecedented.

Lord *Howick,* without wishing for any premature disclosure of the learned gent.'s intentions, thought it might be convenient to the house to be informed of the nature of those intentions.

Mr. *Perceval* wished it to be understood, that the postponement of his motion was for the express purpose of giving himself an opportunity of bringing forward his proposition in the best possible shape. It would embrace in it the consideration of the policy, expediency, and adequacy of this order of council, as applied to occasions of such retaliative injury to the enemy's commerce, for the injury sustained by the commerce of this country; and also of the more vigorous execution of that wise principle of right and discretion, which the order on the face of it intended to enforce. He would shew, that the principle on which the order proceeded was not that on which it professed to proceed. He meant to propose a parliamentary resolution on its inadequacy and insufficiency which might find its way to his majesty's council, and which might produce an act of more vigour, and measures better calculated to benefit the country. With regard to the precise form of his motion, which he would now fix for Thursday se'nnight, he had not yet made up his mind.

[Army Estimates.] Mr. *Johnstone* said, he should not consider himself as faithfully discharging his duty to the country, if he voted the very large sums contained in the Estimates of Army Services for 1807, without knowing the various items of which those sums were composed. He might be told, that there were very few instances in which the Army Estimates had been printed, for the purpose of allowing this particular investigation; but at the present time, when so large a part of the estimates was occupied by the extraordinaries of the army, this appeared to him to be peculiarly necessary. What had happened on the subject of the ordnance estimates, sufficiently proved the expediency of giving all possible publicity to these subjects before the house disbursed such large sums; it was incumbent on them carefully and closely to examine the detail. He should therefore move, that the estimates of the army, presented by the secretary at war, on the 14th inst. be printed.—Mr. Biddulph seconded the motion.

The *Secretary at War* hoped that the hon. gent. would content himself with the precedent of last year, which was to print the abstract of the estimates. It would be impossible that the whole of the estimates could be printed before the time fixed for their discussion. The abstract afforded a reference to the estimates, by which any gentleman might be enabled to satisfy himself on ambiguous points. Without any grounds, therefore, for such a proceeding, he trusted the house would not go to so much useless trouble and expence. But he had another and a more serious objection to the motion, which was, the danger of laying any thing on the table of the house by which the enemy might obtain information of the destination of our troops. If the estimates were printed, the certain consequence would be, that they would get into the newspapers, and the enemy would thus become acquainted with the distribution of our whole military force.

Mr. *Calcraft* could not possibly listen in silence to the attack again made by the hon. gent. on the Board of Ordnance, otherwise he should not have risen on the present occasion: for, two years ago, he had himself moved that the Army Estimates should be printed. Not being aware of any difference in the circumstances of that period and the present, he should feel it his duty to support the hon. gent.'s motion. With regard to what the hon. gent. had again said, in implication of the board of ordnance, the state of the case was precisely this, a large equipment of stores and ordnance was sent for from the island of Ceylon. It was particularly demanded by the commanding officer, that English gunpowder should be sent out, because, as he stated, the powder in the island was so bad, that not only an immediate supply was necessary, but also a future annual supply. He had on a former occasion told the hon.

gent. that it was not intended by the board to send an annual supply: but in an immediate supply could the hon. gent. see nothing but a question of money? When ordnance was sent to a distant possession, would it have been expedient, by withholding ammunition, to risk the lives and honour of his majesty's troops, and the security of that possession, for a small and temporary saving? The order for the powder must first have been sent to the continent of India, and the powder have been thence transmitted to Ceylon; and who could have insured its arrival at the time of the arrival of the ordnance? Therefore, although he allowed that powder was dearer in this country than in India, yet he defended the policy of sending it in this instance, and maintained that the board of ordnance stood completely exculpated, and were undeserving of the severe censure which the hon. gent. had thought proper to pass upon them. In future, assuredly, the powder for Ceylon would be procured from India. As to the question before the house, no inconvenience had arisen from the printing of the army estimates two years ago; none was likely to arise in the present instance, and he should therefore vote for their being printed.

Mr. *S. Bourne*, in answer to the first objection made to the motion by the right hon. secretary, namely, that the estimates were extremely voluminous, declared, that that was the very circumstance which induced the hon. gent. who had just sat down, two years ago to move for their being printed; it not being possible for each member to have recourse to the sole copy, which was on the table of the house. As to dangerous disclosures, the Abstract, which on that evening had been ordered to be printed, would convey to the enemy all the information that they could possibly obtain from the estimates, for that abstract stated the amount of our military force in different parts of the world. He could not help thinking, that the change in the side of the house on which some hon. gentlemen sat, had made a wonderful difference in their sentiments on the policy of producing and printing papers. As no mischievous effects had resulted from the printing of the estimates, he should certainly support the motion.

Lord *Temple* thought the motion was only an indirect attempt to put off the debate on the Army Estimates; for it must be evident to every member of the house, that it was impossible those estimates could be printed by Wednesday. He regretted that the hon. gent. did not come forward manfully, and declare that to be his object. For his part, he had no other objection to the motion, than that it would postpone the discussion of that subject.

Mr. *Rose* was sure that there could be no disposition in the hon. mover to put off the debate on the army estimates. He was persuaded that they might be printed, and delivered to the members by Monday.

Lord *Howick*, however anxious not to withhold from the house any means of obtaining information which were unattended by unnecessary expence and inconvenient delay, would never be deterred by any taunts that might be thrown out by gentlemen opposite, on what they conceived to be a change of sentiments produced by a change of situation, from doing that which he felt it to be his duty to do. It was true that the estimates had been printed two years ago, but new military plans were then in discussion. Had the estimates been printed last year? No; the fair inference then was, that experiencing the expence and inconvenience of printing such a voluminous mass of papers, the house had thought proper to confine its order to the printing of the abstract. He denied the possibility of printing papers containing so many figures by Monday; nor could he see the probability of their being produced in time to be useful in the discussion of Wednesday, a discussion which it would be extremely inconvenient to postpone.

Mr. *Perceval*, adverting to the determination expressed by the noble lord, not to be deterred from any line of conduct which he might think proper to adopt, was happy to observe the reforming virtue which induced the noble lord to abide by other principles than those by which till lately he had been actuated. This was information which the country must be glad to receive. When the noble lord was in opposition, he supported the motion made by the hon. gent. near him, (Mr. Calcraft) for printing the army estimates. Here then was a precedent established of their own. What was the precedent against the motion? Did it arise on the side of the house on which he (Mr. Perceval) sat? No. Last year an hon. general, no longer a member, (Gen. Tarleton) had pressed for the printing of the estimates. The noble lord seemed to think, that when new military measures were instituted, it was wise to print the estimates. What was the case last year? Were not new military measures adopted? Yet the noble lord resisted the proposition for printing. If it could be made out, that any communications to the enemy would follow, no man would be desirous of pressing such a proposition. But this did not seem to him to be possible. The only remaining objection was the probability that these papers, on account of the number of figures contained in them, could not be printed and delivered to the members by Monday or Tuesday. Admitting this, was it to be maintained that the postponement of the discussion of the army estimates, from Wednesday to Friday, would be of such extreme injury that every other object which tended to produce that postponement must be abandoned? A noble lord had insinuated that delay was the object of the hon. mover, and had said, that it would have been more manly in him at once to have declared that object. What! a delay for two days! Had it extended to a fortnight or three weeks, a desire might have been supposed to exist to obtain the influence on the discussion which the presence of additional members might possibly occasion. But as it was, he could not suppose that the noble lord was serious in his remark.

Lord *Howick*, alluding to the congratulation of the learned gent. on what he termed a change in his principles, explained his former statement on that subject. What he had said was, that because he had formerly supported motions under certain circumstances, he would not be deterred by any taunts that might be thrown out against him from opposing similar motions under different circumstances. He challenged the learned gent. to point out an instance in which he had abandoned a single principle of his political life. In the session before last, a military arrangement of great importance was in agitation, which rendered the printing of the estimates necessary, but in the last session this was not the case. In the year before the last, a sufficient time had been given for the printing of the estimates, before the discussion. Last year the printing was not moved for till the estimates had been voted.

Mr. *Perceval* explained, that he had not said the noble lord had abandoned his principles, but had abandoned his former line of conduct.

Mr. *Montague* supported the motion. If large expensive establishments were necessary, he observed, and if in such cases objections were made to motions which went to enable the house more easily to examine into the public expenditure, a precedent would be formed, which would render it impossible for the members of that house to do their duty by their constituents. The facility, therefore, which would be afforded to them in doing their duty, would more than counterbalance any expence that might be incurred by printing these papers. The expence of printing such papers might well be saved, by economy in many other respects. For instance, if the powder sent to Ceylon from this country had been purchased at Madras, we should have had a saving, which would have gone far beyond any expence that could be incurred by printing the estimates now before the house. He saw no good ground of objection to the motion.

Mr. *Biddulph* thought it incumbent on him to say a few words, as he had seconded this motion. He considered economy in the public expenditure, of so much importance, that he would have been the last man to have given his countenance to any thing that would be attended with expence, had he not been satisfied that this was one of those cases where the saving of a few pounds might lead to the loss of many thousands. It was absolutely necessary that every facility should be allowed to gentlemen in enquiring into the public expenditure. This, at the present moment, was the most important of duties. He himself also wished to say something on the subject of these estimates, but it was utterly impossible for him to make himself completely master of them, unless he was allowed to take the papers home with him. But this he could not do unless they were printed, for in their present state they must lie on the table till they came to be discussed. He could not do his duty with satisfaction to himself therefore, unless the papers were printed, by which means he could have a copy home with him. This was the reason why he had seconded the motion. As to the question of the powder sent to Ceylon, he thought the board of Ordnance could not possibly have refused under such a requisition. But he hoped that in future the supply would be sent from India. If the board chose to enquire into the matter, they would get information in London that the Indian powder was not only not worse than ours, but that it was even better.

Mr. *Calcraft* observed, that an hon. gent. (Mr. Montague) seemed to suppose that it was always to be the system to send out powder to Ceylon from this country, when he (Mr. C.) had expressly stated that it was intended in future to send it from India.

Mr. *Montague* stated that that very possibly might have been a system, had it not been for the discussions that had arisen upon the subject.

Mr. *Vansittart* observed, that when gentlemen proposed a delay of two or three days, they did not seem to understand the course of the treasury. A million of money would be due on Friday next, and it was necessary to have the vote passed before that time.

Mr. *Ruthven* said, that if any information injurious to the country could be conveyed to the enemy by printing these papers, he would have opposed the motion. But the printing of the Ordnance Estimates had led him to believe, that no danger of this sort could reasonably be apprehended from printing the Army Estimates. The printing of the Ordnance Estimates had been advantageous, in as much as it had led to an investigation, the result of which, in his opinion, had done great honour to the Ordnance Board. When he said so, he begged it to be understood, that he had no particular connection with any member of it. The ground on which he would vote for printing these Estimates was, that it was impossible for every member to read them at the table before Wednesday, even supposing that they had begun from the time of presenting them. No man could contend that the house could be fully informed as to the contents of the papers, unless they were printed. But it was presumed that all who came to this house to give their votes, were in full possession of the nature and merits of the case. Whether or not they could be printed, so as to afford sufficient time for the house to be prepared to discuss them on Wednesday he could not say, but he was satisfied that the attempt ought to be made.

Sir *R. Williams* thought, that when the secretary at war had declared, that to print these estimates would be to convey dangerous information to the enemy, it was the duty of every independent member to resist the motion.

Lord *Castlereagh* said, he had moved for the printing of the Abstract rather than for the whole of the papers, from the feeling and information with which his former official habits possessed him. The Abstract conveyed the complete substance of the Estimates, but treated less of the detail. The only information which the papers could convey to the enemy, was the quantity of our military force, as divided into three heads, Guards and Garrisons; Forces in the Plantations; and Forces in India. The abstract stated the gross force; the Estimates, the regiments of which that force was composed. The statement therefore, of the right hon. secretary, that the estimates would convey more dangerous information to the enemy than the abstract, was unfounded.

The *Secretary at War* denied having positively asserted that great danger would result from the information which the printing of the Estimates would convey to the enemy. He had spoken doubtfully. In every discussion in that house there was some danger, for every discussion made a disclosure to the enemy in a certain degree. The question always was, how could the house execute its duty consistently with the object of concealing from the enemy what it was desirable to conceal from them? The estimates, by being more minute in the detail than the abstract, must necessarily convey to the enemy more information.

Mr. *Johnstone* would not have trespassed further on the time of the house, had it not been with a view to do justice to himself in repelling the insinuations of a noble lord, who had hinted that he said one thing while he meant another. His object was not to occasion delay, but to examine minutely those papers. He would have no objection to grant some money on account, if it was wanted immediately, as had been said by the secretary of the treasury. But his object was, from a careful examination of the contents of the papers, to see whether there was not room for reform in the expenditure. The first argument of the secretary at war was futile, and his second was not better. What was his objection? Why, that these papers would convey information to the enemy. Of what could they convey information? Delay was not his object. He was anxious to see how far the numerous pledges of economy which the gentlemen on the other side had made such a bluster about while in opposition, had been redeemed. Their conduct might not perhaps come to be discussed on the present occasion. But other opportunities would occur, when it would appear that they had not attended to that economy about which they had formerly talked so much, but that they had granted new and extravagant salaries to themselves—(hear! hear!) On the principal points in these papers there could not in the present circumstances be much saving. But a great deal of saving might be made in many contingent particulars. It was to the extraordinaries of the army that he wished to turn his attention in a particular manner. On that point he wanted to be fully informed, and that was the reason why he desired the whole of these papers to be printed.

Lord *Howick* observed, that he now understood, from the hon. gent. that he wished not for delay, but that all he wanted was to be fully informed on this subject, in order to see whether ministers had acted up to those principles of economy which they had formerly professed, and whether they had shewn an inclination to redeem their pledges to the public. If that was the ground on which the hon. gent. rested his motion, he would be inclined to withdraw his opposition. He was anxious that all the measures of the administration should be carefully and minutely examined and canvassed. The hon. gent. had said that they had wasted the public money, and granted new and exorbitant salaries to themselves. He wished that their conduct should be sifted to the bottom, and hoped that since these charges had been preferred, they would be speedily brought forward, that the house and the country might have an opportunity of judging of their validity. Now, if it should be understood that the discussion of the Army Estimates should not be delayed, though the papers should not be printed in time, he had no objection to withdraw his opposition with this reservation. The noble lord on the other side had said that the abstract would answer his purpose. If more was wanted, it was unfortunate that the motion had not been made sooner. The hon. gent. had given no notice of it, and he was not prepared to say how far the danger of communicating information to the enemy might be increased by printing the whole of the papers. If, therefore, the hon. gent. would postpone his motion till to-morrow, an opportunity would be afforded of comparing the papers. [The secretary at war here mentioned to him, that the only difference was in the greater particularity of the details]. His hon. friend had informed him, that there was no material difference, and therefore he would agree to the motion, it being understood that there should be no delay of the discussion; for to that he could not consent.

Mr. *Johnstone* observed, that he would not oppose the vote of such a sum as might be immediately wanted, and this he conceived would remove all inconvenience.

Mr. *Perceval* said, that every one would allow that it was necessary to see these papers in the mean time, in order to be enabled to enter upon a discussion with respect to the contents. But if the vote should be passed on Wednesday, it must be done without any one having an opportunity of examining the papers in the mean time, supposing they should now be sent to the printer, and could not be finished before the proposed time of discussion. But what would do away all these difficulties would be to vote a considerable sum on Wednesday on account, if the papers should not be printed before that time.

Lord *Howick* asked why the motion had not been made sooner, and why they now took occasion to press it at this late period? Full time had been given for any such motion, much more than, to his knowledge, had been given in some former years. The only ground on which he could agree to the motion was, that it might afford an opportunity of sifting the conduct of ministers, and of bringing the charges against them to a discussion, if the hon. gentlemen should find any reason to prefer them. He could not consent to delay the vote.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that it was his intention at first to have supported the motion, for he was satisfied that these papers could convey no material information to the enemy. But he congratulated the house and the country on the great change which had taken place in the conduct of the learned gent. opposite (Mr. Perceval), who was so ready with his charges of changing against others. The house and the country must be peculiarly happy to find, that he who formerly objected to all information on these points, was now suddenly become so zealous an advocate for information. The learned gent. certainly wished for delay. Now, if the papers were to be printed with a view to the ulterior purpose of the hon. mover, he would certainly not object to the motion. But he would vote against printing them, unless it was fully understood that there was to be no delay of the vote.

Mr. *Perceval* said, that his only object had been to obviate difficulties.

Lord *Howick* thought that the best course would be for the hon. gent. to withdraw his motion for the present, and leave the papers on the table till the vote was passed; after which he might have the papers printed, with a view to the ulterior object for which he wanted them.

Mr. *Johnstone* wished to know from the Speaker, how far it was reasonable to suppose that the papers might be printed before Wednesday.

The *Speaker* observed, that where there were a great many figures, it was impossible even for those most conversant with the business to calculate exactly.

Lord *H. Petty* observed, that the same reason, the multitude of figures, which rendered it difficult to print these papers in a short time, also rendered it difficult to examine them minutely. It would be better to have the papers on the table in the mean time. He therefore suggested, whether the object of the hon. gent. (for he was anxious that the minutest enquiries should take place into all the branches of the public expenditure), would not be answered by leaving the papers in the mean time, and moving to have them printed afterwards?

Mr. *Fuller* hoped that the abstract would at all events be printed in the mean time.

Mr. *Johnstone* then stated, that he was ready to consent to what had been proposed, but he begged leave at the same time to state, that it was perfectly in order and consistent with the duty of any member, to propose such a motion as the present one, which he should now, for the reasons stated, withdraw for the present.—The motion was accordingly withdrawn.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, January 20.

[MINUTES.] The house at its meeting, proceeded, pursuant to the order of the day, to a ballot for a committee, to try and determine the merits of the petition complaining of the election and return for the borough of Malden. The members returned upon the reduced list, and who were sworn as the committee, are the following: R. M. Phillips, esq.; L. P. Jones, esq.; hon. W. E. Eden; W. Biddulph, esq.; B. Hall, esq.; W. L. Hughes, esq.; lord Clive; sir G. Heathcote; hon. H. Caulfield; lord Forbes; R. Benyon, esq.; J. M'Donald, esq.; sir W. Lemon; nominees; Hervey C. Combe, esq.; John Simeon, esq.—Mr. J. Smith, having been returned for the town of Nottingham, and the borough of Midhurst, informed the house, that he had made his election to sit for Nottingham; and a new writ was ordered for the borough of Midhurst, in the room of Mr. Smith. Another writ was also ordered for the borough of Midhurst, in the room of the right hon. W. Wickham, who having been returned for that borough, and Callington, had made his election to sit for Callington.—The adjourned debate, on the motion for enlarging the time for receiving recognizances, on the petition against the return of the right hon. H. Grattan, was resumed, on the motion of Mr. S. Bourne, and the time ordered to be enlarged to the 10th of February.—The Secretary at War presented, pursuant to orders of the house, an Account of the effective strength of his majesty's regular militia forces; also, an account of the number of men raised for the regular army in each month, since the 1st of Jan. 1805, exclusive of foreign levies or colonial corps. On the motion that they be laid on the table, lord Castlereagh submitted to the right hon. gent. whether it would not be for the convenience of the house to defer the printing of these papers, until after the discussion of the Army Estimates to-morrow. The papers were then ordered to be laid on the table.—Mr. G. Johnstone adverted to a practice that had been recommended in a former session, and had been acted upon, of having duplicates of papers presented, so that when one copy should be taken off to the printer's, another should lie on the table for the use of members. The hon. member submitted, whether it would not be desirable to adopt a similar regulation. The Speaker observed, that it might be for the convenience of the house to come to some understanding on this head. The practice adverted to had prevailed to a considerable extent, though not universally, in a former session. It was for the house to decide how its convenience would be promoted by such a practice, and if they were to come to any understanding on the subject, the clerks in the public offices would take care to regulate their conduct accordingly. There were some papers on the table which had been presented in that form, but the practice had not been observed in all. Lord H. Petty admitted that it would be desirable that the practice should be con-formed to in every instance in which it could be carried into effect, but was apprehensive that it might not be possible to act upon it in all.—Mr. H. Thornton presented a Petition from the directors of the Sierra Leone Company, praying for leave to bring in a bill for re-investing in his majesty the possessions that had been granted to that company, and to limit the duration of the company. The Speaker desired to be informed, whether the prayer of the petition involved any application for a grant of public money? Mr. Thornton replied, that it might be taken to have that effect, as the expences which the company had heretofore been enabled to defray by annual grants from parliament, would hereafter be to be defrayed by the government. The speaker then observed, that in any case of a direct application for public money, the house could not receive from any individual a petition, without the consent of the crown; though, where the interests of his majesty were only indirectly concerned, such consent might be signified in any stage of the measure, which was to be founded on the petition. The house was therefore not precluded from receiving this petition. The petition was then brought up, and referred to a select committee.—Mr. Jacob observed, that an account had been moved for, and ordered on a former day, of the number of ships engaged and registered, in the British trade, and stated his desire to move for another paper, that would be supplemental to that, and was necessary in order to put the house in possession of the whole subject. The paper he proposed to move for, was, an Account of the number of British ships that had been captured by the enemy, and without being re-captured, had been admitted again to British Register. The practice was, to have such vessels taken into the enemy's ports, where they were sold to neutrals, and afterwards were allowed to be replaced on the British Register. This practice he contended amounted to a premium to the enemy for the capture of British vessels, as the neutral would not give half the price for the ships if he had not the power of placing them again on the British Register. Lord H. Petty was not aware of any particular objection to the motion, as a paper of a similar description was already on the table. It was then ordered, that there be laid before the house an Account of the number of British ships captured by the enemy, and afterwards without re-capture, admitted to British Register, from the commencement of the present war to the 5th of January, 1807.

[NEUTRAL TRADE, BUENOS AYRES, &c.] Sir *T. Turton* seeing a noble lord (Howick) in his place, rose for the purpose of putting two or three questions to his lordship on certain points which appeared to him to require explanation. That noble lord, in his answer to a question from a learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) on a former night, stated, that his majesty's ministers had, in the treaty which they had concluded with America, reserved to themselves the right of protecting the trade of this country against the measures of the enemy. If he understood the noble lord's answer right, it amounted to this, that his majesty's ministers had reserved the right to act for the protection of British trade, by the adoption of such measures towards neutrals, as they should submit to at the hands of France. If he was correct in his interpretation of his lordship's answer, he wished to be informed whether, in the event of its being necessary to adopt more vigorous measures than were authorized by his majesty's proclamation, there was any thing in the late treaty with America, which would prevent his majesty's ministers from resorting to such measures? He was induced to ask this question because of the opposition that had been stated to the learned gent. for the production of a copy of his majesty's proclamation. Besides, it would be desirable for the house to be informed upon this head, previous to the debate that was to take place on the learned gent.'s motion, and it was peculiarly necessary to know whether his majesty's ministers could act with the vigour which circumstances might require on account of the artful and insidious understanding which seemed to exist between the French and American governments. He wished to know whether they could adopt measures for the blockade of the ports of the enemy in the West Indies? The second question was relative to a late issue of money to the continent. It was notorious to every person, that an issue of money, to the amount of 3 or 400,000*l.* had been transmitted to the continent; and he wished to ask the noble lord upon what vote of that house such money had been issued. The last subject upon which he wished for information was one which had greatly agitated the public mind for the last three or four days, he meant the situation of Buenos

Ayres. He wished to ask whether his majesty's ministers were in possession of any real information respecting the actual state of that colony? He did not see the right hon. gent. (Mr. T. Grenville) in his place, to whom this question ought particularly to be addressed, as relating principally to his department. He trusted, however, it would not be imputed to him as any want of fairness, if he put the question in that right hon. gent.'s absence. The hon. baronet here began to comment with some severity on the letter that had been sent to the mansion house, on Saturday, when he was interrupted by a general cry of "order! order!" and concluded by apologizing for any irregularity he might have fallen into, and requesting to know whether ministers had any real information on the subject?

Lord *Howick*, in answer to the explanation desired by the hon. baronet, of his answer to a question of a learned gent. on a former night, had only to restate what he had said on that occasion. The treaty with America would not prevent his majesty from resorting to such measures for distressing the trade of the enemy, as neutrals should submit to on the part of the French government. Whether this was provided for in the late treaty, or otherwise, it was not for him then to state. The house would be aware that this was not the time for the publication, or discussion of the terms of a treaty, which was still subject to eventual ratification. This was all he thought necessary in answer to that part of the hon. baronet's enquiry: but he could not pass by without an observation on the extraordinary ground upon which he had thought proper to found his question, namely, that the house should be put in possession of the express stipulations of the treaty with America on this head, preparatory to the discussion of the motion of the learned gent. opposite (Mr. Perceval). To a question put on such a ground he could not be bound to make any answer, because he would not be justified in any premature disclosure of terms of that treaty: with regard to the right of blockade, that was a general right resulting from a state of war, and which his majesty's ministers could not be supposed to have given up. The exercise of that right, however, must be in a great degree left to their discretion, and he trusted the house would not interfere, until they should see strong grounds of suspicion that such discretion had been abused. With respect to the issue of money to the continent, he could answer the question of the hon. baronet, that it was the balance due to the court of Russia, under the provisions of a treaty then upon the table of the house. As to the last question of the hon. baronet, which, the hon. baronet himself had admitted, would more properly have been addressed to a right hon. friend of his, not then in the house, all he had to say upon that subject was, that the letters, which had been received concerning it, had already been communicated to the public. He was not aware of any other information on the subject, which his majesty's ministers thought necessary to be produced to the public.

Sir *T. Turton* thanked the noble lord for the manliness and candour of his answers. He wished only to know, whether his majesty's ministers had actually reserved the right of adopting more vigorous measures; because the answer of the noble lord on the former occasion, had been variously stated to him. As to the issue of the money, he wished to be informed on what particular ground that measure had been founded? He now perceived that it was founded on the treaty of 1805, which was no longer in force; and as this did not seem satisfactory to him, he proposed, on some future day, to submit a motion to the house on the subject.

Lord *Howick* desired it might be distinctly understood that the money sent was only the balance due to Russia for services performed under the stipulations of that treaty.

Mr. *Perceval* did not mean to prolong this conversation, but as his notice had been adverted to in the course of it, he took that opportunity of intimating his intention, in consequence of the unavoidable absence of an hon. friend, to put off his motion, from the Thursday for which it was then fixed, to the Tuesday following. The learned gent. at the same time disclaimed any wish to force the terms of the treaty with America into premature discussion.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, January 21.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] Lord *Grenville* said, that finding it would better suit the convenience of many noble lords to have the discussion on the bill for abolishing the Slave Trade postponed, he rose for the purpose of moving to defer the second reading of the bill till Monday se'nnight. He confessed it was with great reluctance that he consented to postpone a measure of such great importance, and which demanded an early discussion. It was, however, of importance that the consideration of this measure should be so fixed as to enable as many of the noble lords as possible to attend the discussion, and therefore he moved to defer the second reading till Monday se'nnight.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* rose to thank the noble lord for the proposed delay. He was, however, of opinion, that the extended time now proposed, was no more than sufficient to allow the bill to be properly known and considered throughout the country. The noble lord then moved for an address to his majesty, praying that there might be laid before the house copies or extracts of any correspondence between his majesty's principal secretary of state, and the governors of the colonies, respecting the amelioration of the condition of the slaves, and the effect of the abolition of the trade in slaves in the colonies. Information on these points had not, he observed, been laid before that house for several years, and he thought it of importance that they should be put in possession of information upon these subjects, previous to the discussion upon the bill for abolishing the slave trade.

Lord *Grenville* said he had no objection to the motion, although he doubted whether the production of these papers would afford so many proofs of zeal in the colonies, with respect to the objects comprised in the motion, as the noble lord seemed to expect.—The motion was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, January 21.

[Minutes.] A new writ was issued for a burgess to serve for Coleraine, in the room of sir G. F. Hill, who had made his election for Londonderry.—The deputy clerk of the crown attended, pursuant to order, and erased the names of lord Fitzharris and lord Palmerston, who were returned with Mr. L. P. Jones and colonel Wilder to serve for the borough of Horsham.—Sir J. Newport brought in the bill to amend the Corn Intercourse act, passed last session, by not extending the provision of the former act to any grain not the growth of Great Britain and Ireland. The bill was read a first time.

[Londonderry Election Petition.] General *Walpole* moved that the order of the day for hearing this petition be discharged, and proposed that the 17th of March be the day fixed upon for that purpose, as much more convenient to the party petitioning.

Mr. *W. Dundas* thought, that such a motion not being a motion of course, some reason should be specified to induce the house to do that which, upon mere general grounds, it seemed averse to do. He, for his part, was such an enemy to any teazing procrastination in the case of election petitions, that he should feel it his duty to vote against the motion of the hon. general, unless it appeared to him to be grounded upon substantial reasons. The hon. general had stated merely, that if his motion was not agreed to, it would be productive of inconvenience to the petitioning party. This might be true, but it was, notwithstanding, too loose and general a statement to warrant the extraordinary indulgence now called for.

General *Walpole* said that when a similar indulgence was claimed for the Aberdeen petition, the hon. gent. did not seem to think this indulgence so extraordinary, nor did he in that instance at least appear such an enemy to delay as he now professed himself to be. And yet with respect to the two cases, they were entirely analogous, except in one or two points, which gave that of the Londonderry petition stronger claim upon the indulgence of that house. Both places were precisely the same distance, with this difference, and a material one it was, the great uncertainty of passage. His own repeated experience had enabled him to state, that the communication between the two countries as to the county in question, had often not been effected within less than a fortnight, and to his own personal knowledge, once did not take place within less than 3 weeks. He moved, therefore, for the delay, in order that sufficient time might be allowed for the necessary exchange of communications between this country and Ireland.

Mr. *W. Dundas* replied, that six weeks had already elapsed since the petition had been presented, and that in that time the necessary communication might have been made.

Sir *J. Newport* apologised for trespassing upon the house, but as he had been as yet the only member who had travelled through the fiery ordeal of an Irish election petition, the subject was too interesting for him to let pass without some observation.

He begged leave to assure the house of the indispensable necessity of an Irish agent being brought over here, and that even this step, simple as it might appear, was, he could state from experience, productive of great trouble and considerable delay; besides, it was not one simple communication that might be necessary, but perhaps more, as, if some errors accompanied the first here, this first should be sent back again, and thus the delay of transmission might be very reasonably expected. The house had granted a further day in the case of the Aberdeen petition, and for his part he thought that there were twenty times the grounds for granting a like indulgence in the present case.

Mr. *W. Dundas*, in explanation, begged leave to remind the house, that the Aberdeen case was in two material points distinct from that now before the house; the peculiar circumstance of the Scotch baronet, and the agreement of both the parties in their joint wish for a more distant day.

Mr. *Perceval* objected to the principle laid down by an hon. gent., that the sitting member allowed to enjoy the privilege of a seat in that house, had no reason to complain of delay upon the part of the petitioners, because that such a principle might be readily applied to all election petitions, and therefore could not be advanced as peculiar claim upon a peculiar indulgence; and because that even admitting it, suspense was not of all states the most enviable; nor did he at all think it unreasonable that the sitting member should wish that his suspense should be put as short a period to as possible, as it was very natural for any man in that house to feel himself more comfortable in the possession of his seat in parliament, when all doubts as to the permanency of that possession was removed. As to the argument of delay upon the grounds of necessary communications, and bringing over Irish agents, it had not been alleged that such delay was not foreseen, and if it was foreseen, there was certainly sufficient time to provide against it, as six weeks had elapsed since the petition had been presented.

General *Walpole* answered, that the delay that had hitherto occurred, was owing to the absence of the petitioner in Ireland.

Lord *Howick* begged leave to correct the statement of the learned gent. (Mr. Perceval). Six weeks could not possibly have elapsed since the presenting of the petition in question, as the election to which it related was one of the latest in Ireland; at the same time he would say, that however entitled the circumstance of the present case was to the indulgence of that house, still he was aware that gentlemen should be cautious in establishing a precedent that might in other cases be productive of inconvenient operations. From the connection subsisting between the party petitioning and himself, his lordship said he was unwilling to go into the merits of the question, satisfied that the house would wisely exercise its own discretion, and that if the circumstances were sufficiently strong to justify the present motion, that motion would be acceded to.

Mr. *Rose* said, that the return was given in in the first week of December, and contended that, at the time, the party petitioning must have been aware of all the consequent delay a petition would be productive of, and the term of time the preparatory business would necessarily require.

Mr. *C. Wynne* maintained, that it was impossible for a party petitioning to be apprised of all the circumstances at the close of the election, and that it was upon this principle that parliament granted 14 days from the first day of their sitting to all persons petitioning. He thought that in general, Irish petitions, with respect to the grant of a distant day, had peculiar claims upon the indulgence of the house.

Lord *G. Beresford* said, that he did not receive notice of this petition till the 3d of January, and yet that since that day he had been able to effect such communication with Ireland, that he professed himself ready at that moment to go before the committee.—The house then divided upon the motion of general Walpole, that the order of the day for hearing the said petition be discharged. Ayes, 67; noes, 49. The petion was then ordered to be taken into consideration on the 17th of March.

[ARMY ESTIMATES.] Lord *Castlereagh*, before the order of the day should be proceeded upon, wished for some explanation on a point very material to the discussion. The right hon. secretary opposite, on opening his military plan last year, had stated, that it was not intended to apply to the men then serving, the system of discharges at the end of 7 and 14 years; but that the men who were entitled by having served so long, were to have the increased proportion of pay and allowance. In a subsequent discussion the right hon. gentleman had stated, that it was intended to discharge the men who had served 21 years, with full pensions. He wished to know whether this intention had been carried into effect? Whether the men who had served 21 years were discharged, or still retained in service; if they were retained in service, whether it was voluntary; and if it was voluntary, whether they had the increased advantages of pay and allowances; and also, if they had been discharged, whether they had the full pensions?

Mr. Secretary *Windham* said, it had been in contemplation at the period alluded to by the noble lord, to discharge with full pensions the men who had served 21 years. His own opinion as to the propriety of that proceeding was still the same. But it was a point that rested with the discretion of his majesty's government generally; and which had not yet been decided upon. The men who had served that period of time had not demanded their discharges, they of course remained still in the service, having all the advantages of pay and allowances which the vote of last session granted.

On the motion of the secretary at war, the house went into a committee of supply, to which were referred the Army Estimates, presented by him, on the 14th instant, and the Estimates of the Barrack Department, and the commissariat, presented by Mr. Vansittart on the 14th inst.

The *Secretary at War* said, that as the estimates he had to move were, with very few exceptions, made conformable to those of the last year, it would not be necessary for him to trespass upon the house, at any considerable length. The estimates now before the committee were classed under 26 heads; namely,

	NUMBER.	CHARGE, £.	s.	d.
1. Guards, Garrisons, &c.	113795	4051623	0	6
2. Forces in the Plantations, &c	79158	2609143	13	9
3. India Forces	25115	582397	0	0
4. Troops and Companies for recruiting ditto	437	25214	10	0
5. Recruiting and Contingencies	———	227249	0	10
6. General and Staff Officers	———	190529	17	6
7. Embodied Militia and Fencible Infantry .	94202	2493644	7	5
8. Contingencies for ditto	———	62153	17	0
9. Clothing for ditto .	———	157227	16	4
10. Full Pay to Supernumerary Officers . .	———	34418	11	0
11. Public Departments	———	221200	18	5
12. Allowance to Innkeepers, &c	———	467273	3	11
13. Half Pay and Military Allowances .	———	192515	2	11
14. Ditto American Forces	———	44000	0	0
15. Ditto Scotch Brigade	———	750	0	0
16. In-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals	———	50597	19	9
17. Out-Pensioners of ditto	———	355785	7	8
18. Widows' Pensions	———	43258	7	6
19. Volunteer Corps . .	———	1490301	4	8
20. Foreign Corps . .	21473	832540	19	9
21. Royal Military College.	———	22175	5	10
22. Royal Military Asylum.	———	21227	8	4
23. Allowances to Retired and Officiating Chaplains	———	18208	15	11
24. Hospital Expences (Ireland)	———	18461	10	10
25. Barrack Department (ditto.) . . .	———	469450	12	6
26. Compassionate List.	———	12000	0	0
	334180	14743348	12	4
Deduct the India Forces	25115	582397	0	0
TOTAL	309065	14160951	12	4

In the multiplicity of services comprehended in the estimates, some variations in the charges must of course occasionally occur. But the variation upon the whole was small. The difference was, in point of number of men, 5284, and in point of charge 9,176*l.* There was thus an excess in this year, but still there was a nearer coincidence than in any other two years. It was only where the variation was considerable, that he should take any particular notice of it, leaving the less material points to be explained afterwards. If any gentlemen should wish for particular information about them. The scale of the establishment was nearly the same as in the last year, being at the rate of 800 men a regiment for cavalry; and of battalions of 1200 men, 1000, 800, 600, or 400, for the infantry, according to the actual strength of the corps, as nearly as it could be estimated. He should consider the two first estimates, that of Guards and Garrisons, and that of the plantations together, as comprising the whole of the regular army at home and abroad. On this item there was an increase of 241,537*l.* This was a considerable increase, but it was owing principally to the addition to the establishment of one new regiment of foot, the 101st, which was the only one of the Irish regiments, ordered to be raised some time since, that had been completed. There were also six garrison battalions, composed of the men raised under the Defence act, who had not volunteered for general service. Gentlemen were aware that no further proceedings were to be had under the defence act after the last year. These battalions were instituted to receive the men from the second battalions, who would engage for home service only. There were besides ten veteran battalions, the corps for garrison service in Canada, and the corps called the royal African, part of which was in Africa, and the other part in the West Indies; and to the latter part of which an addition of two companies was made. There were also 11 companies of Sicilian troops attached to the regiments at present in Sicily, and commanded by British officers. It was expected, naturally, that the raising of this force would attach the natives of Sicily to the British standard, and that it would render their aid and their services available, in the best possible manner. There was an increase of the staff officers for foreign service, which had naturally arisen from the expeditions that had been sent out. There was an increase in the commissariat from the same cause; and there was an additional charge of 110,000*l.* for the increased pay and allowances voted in the last year. The total amount of the increase in all the items was 439,732*l.* The amount of decrease which was to be deducted, was composed of the 25th dragoons in India, and the royal waggon train reduced to 4 companies, and 7 battalions of infantry; the reductions on which amounted altogether to 81,771*l.* There was, besides, a saving of 30,000*l.* in the transport of troops from the Irish establishment. When the amount of these articles of decrease was deducted, there would remain a balance of increase of 241,537*l.* The next branch of the estimates was the Public Departments, in which there was an increase of 44,222*l.* Of this 40,000*l.* had arisen on account of the auditor of the exchequer, for exchequer bills, to make good a deficiency of 20,000*l.* from the last year, and the remainder for the current service. The charge of a number of offices had been taken from the extraordinaries of the army, and included in these estimates, on the principle that it was desirable to reduce to the certainty of estimate, every thing of which an estimate could be formed. Of these offices, that of the commander-in-chief amounted to 7,560*l.* In addition to this, there was the charge of the quarter-master-general's department; that of the adjutant-general, the inspector-general of recruits, the army medical-board, the office of the judge-advocate-general, and the comptroller of the army accounts, making altogether 44,222*l.* The next increase arose from the arrangements adopted in the last session, with respect to the out-pensioners of Chelsea. The amount of this increase was considerable; it was 114,171*l.* The next estimate was one in which several debates had taken place, the Volunteer corps. The gentleman would, he was sure, hear with pleasure, that under this head, there was a saving of 248,000*l.* but for the circumstance of its having become necessary to keep the corps, in certain parts of Ireland, on permanent duty for four months, instead of one, as had been calculated. This prolongation of permanent duty had caused a diminution of the saving to the amount of 119,000*l.* There was another item which produced a decrease of charge in this department, though not to the public; he meant the transfer of the artillery of the German legion to the ordnance department. The decrease produced in the department of the secretary at war by this transfer, was 153,658*l.* There was one estimate of charge in the paper now before the house, which was entirely new. It was the Compassionate List, for which no actual provision had ever before been made by parliament. For several years it had rested upon an imaginary fund, savings upon the half-pay, which did not exist. It was now judged proper to state the exigency to parliament, and to require a distinct provision. It was impossible to confine the subject of this charge within a particular estimate. It was taken at 12,000*l.* If it should exceed that, the deficiency would be made good afterwards. The utmost that was given to any one person, was 20*l.* a year. He would not detain the house with going further into the detail of the items, but would content himself with stating that he was ready to give the fullest information that any gentleman could require upon any point. The present estimates had been formed with the utmost attention to public economy, as would appear to every gentleman on investigation. With a view to a better insight into this point, he thought it would be better to separate the consideration of the additional pay and allowances, and to compare the expences of the last and the present year, as if that addition had not in fact taken place. The total amount of the estimates of the last year, exclusive of the additional pay, was 13,936,321*l*. The total amount of the estimates of this year, exclusive of the additional pay, was 13,710,951*l*. affording a difference in favour of this year of 225,399*l*. But there was a drawback to be made from this saving, in consequence of certain charges which were withdrawn from the war office, and provided for elsewhere, to the amount of 120,000*l*. On the whole view of the estimate, there was ground for congratulating the country on an augmentation of the number of forces, and a decrease of the expense of the establishment, of 150,000*l*. The additional expenses upon the whole, inclusive of the additional pay, were but 451,000*l*. On the full consideration of the estimates, he was of opinion the hon. gent. (Mr. Johnstone) who had the other night given notice of a charge against ministers, for waste of the public money, would be very much at a loss for any foundation in the military departments. In 1806, when the present ministers had first come into office, if they had proceeded according to the system before acted upon, without any reformation, the total charge would have amounted to no less than 14,800,000*l* He did not mean to state that his majesty's late ministers would have come to parliament for that sum, but that they must have asked for that sum according to the former scale, unless certain reductions, of which he was not aware, should have taken place. Thus there would have been, according to the old scale, an additional charge of 640,000*l*. exclusive of the additional pay and allowances; but with the additional pay and allowances, of 800,000*l*. There were only two or three other points upon which he would have to claim the indulgence of that house. The general training he should leave to his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) who had formed the plan, and to whose department it belonged. He should, therefore, content himself with stating, that the returns had been made, and that every thing was ready for carrying it into execution, whenever his majesty's ministers should think fit. The next point was that of the volunteers, and it was matter of satisfaction to him to state, as he was sure it would be to every gentleman in the house to hear, that all the gloomy apprehensions that had been formed, and all the dire predictions that had been put forth of the whole dissolution of that respectable body, in consequence of the reductions made in its expenditure in the last session, had been completely falsified in the event. During the agitation of the public mind, and of the volunteers, which had been produced by misrepresentation and studious irritation, while the subject was under discussion, some symptoms of disinclination to further service might have appeared. But on better consideration, and better understanding, these ill-advised discontents subsided, and the same order, for the service of the country remained, without any material defalcation in point of numbers. By the papers on the table it appeared, that the diminution in the effective strength of the volunteers was very inconsiderable. But he would state the amount of the establishment rather than the effective, as that would afford the fairest means of judging of the extent of the operation of the late regulations. At the present moment, the apprehensions of invasion, that had called forth and stimulated the volunteers, had subsided, and some relaxation of activity may have arisen in consequence; but there was no doubt that this highly estimable description of the public force would again display its characteristic zeal and spirit, if a renewal of the enemy's menaces should call for a similar ardour and energy. (Hear! hear! from the opposition bench.) The hon. gentlemen opposite seemed to triumph in this testimony to the merit of the volunteers, as if it was a sort of inconsistency in his majesty's present servants. But the present ministers had found fault, not with the volunteers themselves, but with the manner in which the hon. gentlemen opposite had organized them. Certainly the present ministers had never been guilty of uttering any charge so disrespectful, as that so pertinaciously upheld by the hon. gentlemen opposite, that the volunteers would disband themselves, in the event of any reduction of their pay or allowances. He was confident that the volunteers were still actuated by the same steady attachment to the cause of their country, and equally ready to expose their lives for its defence, though their pay was diminished. He thought the proper way of judging this point was, to take the amount of the establishment, which would best shew the numbers that had disbanded themselves, from dissatisfaction with the new arrangement. The whole number that had retired from this cause, was 11,486. The number that remained on service was 363,400. The next point was the alteration in the system of recruiting; a point which had been discussed more than any other. The explanation of what had taken place on this head belonged, more properly, perhaps, to a person much more able than he: but in consideration of the anxiety the house naturally felt upon it, he thought it right to say something with respect to it here. It would be remembered by many gentlemen, that so long as 12 years ago, he had urged the propriety of adopting a measure of this kind for the amelioration of the army. It would be remembered also, that he never expected, from the adoption of it, any sudden effect, but rather a gradual amelioration in the recruiting of the army, leading finally to the most beneficial effects. He was of opinion that the measure, so far as it had now been tried, gave full appearance of the benefits he had anticipated, and he was satisfied that while it continued to be tried, it would be found more beneficial every year. It was no argument against the permanent benefit, that no rapid improvement had yet been felt. It was not till last October that the measure had been regularly carried into effect. Consequently there had not been a fair trial in the last year. It would, perhaps, be taking too much credit to this measure to impute to it the whole of the improvement in the recruiting department that had taken place since October; but it was certain that it had been eminently successful in the two great objects of obtaining a greater number of men at a lower bounty. It had also been eminently successful in another great and beneficial point of view, the diminution of desertion. These great advantages were conspicuous in the short period of the last year, in which the new system had been acted upon; and if it had been tried in the other 8 months of the year, he was certain the beneficial effects of it would have been more conspicuous. These were the only topics he felt it his duty to notice. If any gentleman required further explanations, he would most readily give them. He concluded with moving the first Resolution, "That 113,795 effective men, commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be employed in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, from the 25th of Dec. 1806, to the 24th of Dec. 1807." On the question being put,

Lord *Castlereagh* rose. He said he had listened with great attention to the statement of the right hon. gent., and though he did not mean to enter into the items, he confessed, he certainly felt considerable difficulty in entering into this discussion, from the circumstance of the estimates not being printed, and still more from the want of any distinct specification, as to a great part of the expence, that had arisen out of the new measures adopted in the last session. It was difficult to come prepared to state an opinion generally upon a large branch of the public expenditure, when a great part of the expenditure of that branch remained wholly unexplained. He thought parliament was unnecessarily subjected to this difficulty, and that a more full explanation might have been afforded before the estimates were called for. He had imagined that when parliament was called together at a period so unusual, and so inconsistent with the habits of the country, some measure connected with the paramount interests of the people must have been the motive. Nothing, however, had yet been submitted to parliament, but the ordinary routine business, except merely the negociation papers. And he was of opinion that the discussion of that subject, too, might better have been postponed till a period more congenial to the parliamentary practice of business, and more likely to be accompanied with a full attendance of members. Such a postponement would have suited a subject involving so materially the character and conduct of ministers, and the honour and interest of the country; and it would have been more becoming than the unnecessary precipitation with which the papers had been forced upon the consideration of parliament. The right hon. gent. who had opened this debate, was not in the immediate councils of his majesty; but he held a high and responsible situation, and ought, therefore, to be able to assign sufficient grounds for the manner in which he acted. In the last year, the right hon. gent. had brought forward the Army Estimates four times, instead of one, in order to allow time to mature the arrangements which were then under contemplation. He wished to know why the same space might not be now allowed for the completion and elucidation of arrangement, and what occasion there was for the present unexplained precipitancy? There was on the notice book, an intimation from the right hon. gent. at the head of the admiralty, that he meant on Friday to move for 10,000 additional seamen. He did not suppose that he should resist the motion; but he thought it would have been better to complete the arrangement for the year before any yearly estimates were submitted, rather than to come forward with an imperfect estimate in the first instance, and a supplementary estimate after. He was sorry to see the house called upon by the present proposition to sanction by implication the new military measures, the charges for which were included in the vote without any explanation as to their effect, or their distinct expence. He, for one, thought that system could not possibly be persevered in. It was particularly improper to call on a new parliament at the close of the Christmas holidays, when members were not in full attendance, to approve those measures, without a full explanation of their effect, and a distinct specification of the expence. This precipitancy was the less excusable, as there would have been no difficulty to vote any necessary sum on account, in order to allow time to place the whole subject, in all its branches, fully under the view of the house. The right hon. gent. had made his statement with great candour; but he had, in his opinion, taken too narrow a view of the subject; and much of the last part of what the right hon. gent. had said, made him sorry that the custom of building upon establishments had been resorted to. The effective force on foot should be looked to, and then it would be to be considered whether ministers had an army adequate to the expence to which they put the country; and whether there was any reason to hope for a force sufficient to consume what parliament was called upon to vote. This boasted national saving of 240,000*l.*, always excepting the new expenditure, was an economy upon establishment alone, and not upon the effective force serving against the enemy. He should be extremely glad to see in his majesty's ministers any indications of vigour which would justify him in looking forward to the efficient expenditure of a great part of their supplies, which could not possibly be expended in the present state of the army. He was sure the right hon. gent. opposite had too much fairness to arrogate credit for economy upon the comparative establishments, taken at different times, and under different circumstances. Though the right hon. gent. was not in the cabinet, he ought to be able to state fully the grounds of any vote he proposed. The right hon. gent. ought to ground the vote, not on the estimate, but on the effective. Upon reference to the estimates, the gross number of men was 334,180. From this was to be deducted the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates, who amounted, in the proportion of about one-eighth, to about 41,095, leaving 293,400. This was the estimate of establishment; but, looking to the effective, there was a further deduction to be made for a deficiency of 37,000, which would reduce the actual force to 260,555. He was always desirous to vote supplies to the full extent in which they could be made use of for the benefit of the country; but he thought it too much to ask funds for 37,000 men, who were not in existence, nor likely to be so. If his majesty's ministers could shew any probability that in any part of the year these 37,000 men would be in service, he would readily grant the vote; but, if there were no prospect of that, though he held it to be the duty of the house to grant the fullest supplies that could be made use of for the benefit of the country, he could not in any case think it warrantable to grant a supply of this amount, without any prospect that it would be used. The total absence of ground for the demand was enough to render it indispensable with him to refuse the grant, however unwilling he was to do so. It was the duty of ministers to adopt measures calculated to carry the effective strength of the army to the height at which it ought to be; for in all the discussions this subject had undergone, in all the diversity of opinions as to the means, this one principle, at least, was universally agreed upon, that the effective strength of the regular army ought to be carried considerably beyond its present amount. Nothing had occurred since the agitation of military subjects in that house, in March last, to induce any wish to diminish the force of the country. If our operations could not be directed towards the Continent, our troops might be employed in maritime attacks. It was true, that in March last the French armies were on the borders of Hungary, and that now they were on the banks of the Vistula; but this was not a circumstance which should lead us to be remiss in our exertions. If the internal security of the country were a matter of concern to the right hon. gent. opposite, (and that right hon. gent. had formerly expressed himself very gloomily on that subject,) he wished him to consider in what situation Great Britain might be placed, if the French emperor, having obtained his object in Poland, was enabled, either by peace or by war, to liberate his army from that country. Prussia had been moved from the military map of Europe.—The power of the enemy would envelope us from the Baltic to the extremity of Europe. If, therefore, at the period to which he had alluded, the right hon. gent. agreed that great exertions were necessary, every thing that had since happened, every thing that was now happening, should prompt him to increase those exertions. To what had the late ministers pledged themselves on this subject? Not merely to a general augmentation of our military strength; they had specifically stated the manner in which that strength should be effectually increased. When he had himself declared it necessary (at the time when he had the honour of a seat on the opposite bench) to add 20 or 25 thousand men to our army, the right hon. gent. ran before him on that subject. And when that right hon. gent. came into power, his determination appeared to keep pace with his former opinion, and he expressed his sanguine expectations of obtaining an army, great as the important crisis in which we were now placed, demanded. The late right hon. secretary for the war department, had also gone so far as to express indignation at the limits which he (lord Castlereagh) had proposed to set to the augmentation, and spurned the idea of any bounds to it. He had called on the country to rouse from the slumber in which it had so long been sunk, and endeavour to regain its ancient military character.—Under all these sanctions, he was justified in contending, that it was the general opinion that the national interests imperatively required a great augmentation of the army, and that no means should be left untried to accomplish this important object. The country had a right to expect the accomplishment of this object from his majesty's present ministers. Above all, they had a right to expect it from the right hon. secretary for the war department, who, both in the late administration, and in that of lord Sidmouth, had said that those administrations should be disgraced and degraded for the inefficiency of their military measures. He had contended that they should be successively displaced. For what?—To make room for a government having his countenance, and in whom the empire could repose with confidence their trust of forming an army adequate to the interests of this country, and the situation of Europe. What had been the increase of our military strength? He would compare it with the right hon. gent.'s idea of the increase necessary; he would compare the right hon. gent. with himself; he would compare his administration with the administrations that had incurred his pointed censures. Our effective military strength, rank and file, on the 1st of March, 1805, (when the change of government took place,) was 248,782; (by some error in the papers laid on the table, it was stated, at 249,627; but the former was the correct number;) on the 1st of January, 1806, our effective military strength, rank and file, was 254,665, being an increase of about 5000. Our regular army at the former period was 173,600; at the latter period, 178,500, being an increase of between 4 and 5 thousand. Now, if this increase were compared with the impressions which his majesty's ministers had declared that they felt of the necessity of a considerable augmentation, it would evince a most miserable failure; but, on looking at the recruiting account, the subject would appear in a still worse light. It would be seen that, between January and June 1806, 5,834 men had been raised by the operation of Mr. Pitt's bill, the Additional Defence act; 3,600 had been raised by it between the 1st of March and the 24th of June, during the time when it was languishing and dying away under the threats of destruction announced against it by his majesty's ministers. It was, nevertheless, evident that, but for the operation of that bill, the actual state of the army would not have been increased one man since parliament last deliberated on the subject, and since the present government came into power. Had it not been for this bill, and the recruiting from the Irish militia (which produced 3000 men), the right hon. gent. would have met parliament under the degraded and melancholy stigma not only of having neglected to increase our army, but of having suffered it to be wasted under circumstances which called upon the country for greater military exertions than it had ever heretofore made. On the casualties also which, he had last session stated, and he feared too justly stated, must amount on the average to 15,000 a year, it was to be observed that, owing probably to his majesty's ministers having so entirely engrossed themselves with the negociation with France, they seemed until lately to have divested their minds of every idea of carrying on offensive operations against the enemy, no military effort had been made, consequently the number of casualties had been less; but we must expect that in 86,000 troops now employed in Foreign service, the number of casualties would considerably ncrease. It was impossible to suppose, that they would be exempt from the natural consequences of battle. Nothing could be farther from his mind than to press an invidious comparison between the right hon. gent. and other individuals; but he trusted that the comparison which he had made, would have a tendency to rouse that right hon. gent.'s exertions, and thus prove advantageous both to the country and to his own character. Did the right hon. gent. recollect the declaration which he made at the opening of the last session of parliament, that such were the military necessities of the country, that not an hour should be lost to repair the evils with which we were threatened? Let him look at the growth of the regular army under former administrations, and compare it with the growth under the present administration; and the comparison might suggest to him a little distrust of his own ability for military arrangements, and a great deal of forbearance from the remark on the ability of others. Examine the increase of the regular army, from the 1st of July, 1803, to the 1st of July, 1804, during the administration of lord Sidmouth, an administration so much vilified by the right hon. gent.! On the 1st of July, 1803, the regular army amounted to 99,342 men; on the 1st of July, 1804, it amounted to 140,119 men, being an increase in one year, of 40,777 men. But the right hon. gent.'s magazine of military sarcasms was not exhausted during the administration of lord Sidmouth —He continued to vent his reproaches on the administration by which it was succeeded. That administration continued in office until the beginning of February 1806. He had before stated, that, on the 1st of July, 1804, the regular force amounted to 140,119 men; on the 1st of March, 1806, (the nearest period to which the accounts were made up,) it amounted to 173,600 men, making an increase, in twenty months, of 33,481 men. Let the country compare this with the increase under the right hon. gent.'s management, from the middle of February to the present moment, of between 4 and 5 thousand men! an increase too, for which he was totally indebted to the expiring efforts of the Additional Defence act.—But he owned, that when he heard the right hon. gent. talking, in a strain of romantic enthusiasm, of carrying the military glory of Britain to a higher pitch than it had hitherto attained, he anticipated the consequences that had ensued. The right hon. gent. had been perpetually telling the late administration, " take away your acts; take away your useless machinery; and I'll be bound to get you a better army than you ever had before." Had he done so?—He would proceed to examine the numbers raised by ordinary recruiting. It would be found, that the produce of 1804 and 1805 had not differed materially from the average of former years. Calculating the annual produce of the ordinary recruiting under the right hon. gent.'s management, at the rate of the month of December last, which was the highest in point of number, and, including a regiment of 658 men, which ought not to be taken into the account, as they were raised under the operation of the measures of a former administration, it would be found not to exceed 11,800 men. The numbers raised in 1805 by the ordinary recruiting (when the Additional Defence act was operating against it) was 11,677: so that, excluding the regiment which he had mentioned, the ordinary recruiting at present was less productive than in 1805, notwithstanding all the embarrassments to which it had then been subject. It did not appear therefore, that one man more had enlisted from the temptation of the right hon. gent.'s system, and he could not but be convinced that what the country had paid to make this unsuccessful attempt, was but the earnest of future more extravagant and more hopeless disbursements. In the year 1805, the actual number of men that was obtained for the army by the ordinary recruiting, was 11,677; by the Additional Defence bill, 8,388; by the enlistments from the British militia, 8963; by the enlistments from the Irish militia, 4617; making a gross increase of above

33,000 men, exclusive of above 9,000 obtained by foreign levies.—After deducting the casualties, the net increase might be estimated, in that single year, at above 21,000 men; while the whole amount under the right hon. gent.'s system, with all his wonderful vigour and exertion, and calculated in the most favourable manner, did not exceed between 13 and 14 thousand! After he had thus shewn that the experiment had fundamentally failed, he wished that the comparison of expence between the right hon. gent.'s system and those which preceded it, would afford consolation: but the reverse was the case. At the outset of the business, the right hon. gent. stated, that he conceived, out of the new experiment, an expence of 450,000*l.* would immediately arise. He (lord Castlereagh) had calculated it at 493,000*l.* When the estimates were printed, it would be found to be more. This was the first visible effect of an experiment which had not produced a single additional man to the army! But this was not the only new expence originating in this measure. Two-thirds of the increase of expence in the navy estimates might justly be attributed to it; for there could be no doubt that it was the right hon. gent.'s military plan which prompted the noble lord at the head of the admiralty, during the last session of parliament, to propose an augmentation in the pay of the petty officers in his majesty's navy; an augmentation which, he allowed, became necessary, in consequence of that plan, but which certainly increased the annual expenditure of the country, during the war, on this point alone, to between 7 and 800,000*l.* The right hon. gent. would perhaps say, that the house ought not to pronounce maturely on an experiment of this nature. He would be the last man to urge the hasty abandonment of a military measure, if any hope remained of its success; if any argument could be adduced in its favour, or if the situation of the country was such as to render it eligible to devote an additional period to its trial. He (lord Castlereagh) had twice pressed the house to continue a military measure which they were called upon by the gentleman opposite to repeal: but this he did on very different grounds from those on which the present system rested. In March 1805, when the repeal of the Additional Defence bill was proposed, at a time when the bill yielded at the rate of 9,000 men a year, without the slightest injury to the ordinary recruiting, and subsequently, when it produced 300 men a week, and when thus producing at the rate of 16,000 men a year, he had called on parliament not to abandon it. Had the right hon. gent. proposed some auxiliary measure which afforded to the country the probability of giving to it the amount of force which it wanted, while the experiment of his new system was trying, he might perhaps have been induced to accede to the continuation of that experiment. But the right hon. gent. in answer to a question which he had put to him, on a recent evening, had distinctly disclaimed the supposition, that any such auxiliary measure was in the contemplation of his majesty's ministers. Had such a measure been proposed, he should not have been so completely justified as he now felt himself to be, in opposing a system which was not only immediately injurious, but prospectively destructive to the British army. It was for the present parliament to consider whether they would, for the first time, make themselves parties to this new system of expence and ruin. For his own part, he felt he abandoned his public duty, if he did not candidly state to the house that, strong as his impression was of the mischief, disadvantages, and dangers arising out of the measure of last year, it was nothing, compared with that which he felt in considering the effect which the new code contained in his majesty's warrant of the 7th day of October, for the regulation of the army, and which had been laid on the table of the house of commons during the present session, was calculated to produce. It was with considerable regret that he had heard the right hon. gent. during the last session declare, that he had made his mind completely up on all the points of his plan; yet this warrant shewed that he had not ventured to execute what he had stated it was his intention to execute. Of this he certainly did not complain. But it shewed conclusively, a distrust on the part of the right hon. gent. on the very outset of his system; which he must have considered likely to fail, or he would not have disappointed the expectations of the soldiers of 21 years' service. When he had stated to the right hon. gent. that the annual number of these amounted to 5 or 6 thousand men, and that his measure in this respect was likely to counteract itself, he listened to those statements with unbending firmness: but when he came to carry the measure into execution, he dreaded the consequences, and altered his resolution.—But there were other points in this code of regulations which had caused the apprehensions of danger in his mind to swell into the utmost magnitude: he pledged himself to bring this subject before the house in a detailed discussion, although he had not determined whether to avail himself of the introduction of the Mutiny bill for that purpose, or to move a specific resolution on those points, which, in his opinion, seemed likely to involve the country in fundamental military ruin. In candour to the right hon. gent. he would state three or four of the leading points to which he objected. The first (which was towards the close of the warrant), went to the complete subversion of the situation of a soldier, as it had hitherto existed in the British army, and to the total destruction of all order and subordination. The right hon. gent. had placed the claim of the soldier to a pension on a legal right, and not on the recommendation of his superior officer, on which alone it could with safety rest. These pensions were from *6d.* to 1*s.* 6*d.* a day; and it was true, a discretionary power was vested in the Board of Kilmainham, as to the individual amount. But the warrant went on to declare, that no non-commissioned officer or soldier should be allowed to claim of right any such pension, whose disability arose from vice or misconduct. It followed, therefore, that every one who was not discharged from the consequences of vice or misconduct, had a claim which a court of justice must confirm; and this without any limitation of time, without any consideration whether he had served 2 days or 21 years. What the effect of pensions granted by right, and not on the recommendation of his superior officer, would have on the mind of the soldier, and what effect the disbursements of such large sums would have on the finances of the country, it was unnecessary for him to point out.—The next objectionable point in the Warrant arose out of the answer to the question proposed that night by him to the right hon. gent. The right hon. gent. stated that none of the soldiers who had served 21 years had been discharged, but that he considered them as entitled to all the advantages of his measure. By that measure, a soldier who had served 21 years, was entitled to retire on a pension of 1*s.* a day, or 18*l.* 5*s.* a year. If he remained in the service, he was to receive an addition to his pay, of a halfpenny a day, or 15*s.* a year; and another addition of a halfpenny a day, on every succeeding year in which he might choose to continue in the army. Now, it would be found that the men who had served 21 years, were generally under 50 years of age. If, therefore, they continued in the army, it was probable that on the average they might do so for 17 years. The first additional 15*s.* to their yearly pay would therefore be worth between 12*l.* and 13*l.* sterling. The next year's 15*s.* would be only fractionally less valuable, and so on. The effect of this system would be to crush the country with the enormous expence, unless it was arrested by the hand of parliament. Let the house also consider the effect of this system of pensions on the men sent early in life to the East and West Indies: it ordained, that the soldier who had served 14 years in India, should be entitled to his discharge, and the same pensions as the man who had served 21 years in other circumstances. The climate of the East-Indies was healthy. Suppose that a soldier went out at 18 years of age. At 32, according to the right hon. gent.'s view of the subject, he would become a veteran, and be entitled to retire on a pension of 18*l.* 5*s.* which, on the average, he would probably receive for 28 years. Now, he would put it to the house, how it was possible, under such a system, to contend with the evils by which we were threatened? He would trace the operation one step farther. A great number of these men would stay in the army, suppose for 8 additional years; he would then be entitled to an accumulated pension of 27*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*; and the probable duration of his life, being 22 years, a bounty to the amount of that sum of 27*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* would thus be given on every year that he had served. But he wished to know what would be the situation of the right hon. gent. when he came to disband the army, or to reduce it to the peace establishment? Did he consider the nature of the discretion which he would then be called upon to exercise? He would have three classes into which to distribute his discharges; but how, without saddling the country with an expense which it was not equal to pay, could he avoid making his discharges out of the first class, and yet, by doing that, he would discharge the flower of the army. Among the regulations of the Warrant, it was stated, that those who were discharged should receive their pensions; but that they should be bound to obey the directions of Chelsea hospital, and come to serve in the veteran battalions when they were called upon. In the course of a few years, however, these veteran battalions would be composed of men in the prime of life, and possessing a complete knowledge of their profession. How could government then avoid considering those battalions as most fit for active service, for foreign service, and more particularly for West-India service, for which they were peculiarly fitted? And thus, all the motives held out, and by which men were to be seduced into the army, would cease to operate. He repeated, that he was little disposed to consider the situation of this country in a gloomy point of view. He had great confidence in its strength; he had great confidence in its resources; and he was happy to find that the gentlemen opposite began to think with him on this latter subject. But if ever there was a moment in the history of any country in which pecuniary economy was more indispensably necessary than in any other, this was the moment, and Great Britain the country. The right hon. gent., he was sorry to observe, had shewn himself indifferent, not only to the economy of money, but also to the economy of time. Adverting to the capture of Buenos Ayres, he expressed his anxiety to know why so long a period had been suffered to elapse before the reinforcements had been sent to secure the possession of that valuable province? Early in June, government received advices from St. Helena, that the expedition had touched there, on its way from the Cape. He was convinced that within ten days of the time, when those advices were received, three regiments of infantry might have sailed; and, whether the place was tenable or not, it would not have embarrassed his majesty's service to have sent that reinforcement, as it was necessary that troops should go to India: unless they sent a letter of recall to the forces at Buenos Ayres, ministers had no option but to send a reinforcement. Instead of doing this in the middle of June, they did not send a man until October; that was, until lord Lauderdale's return to this country: thus plainly shewing that his motions were the governing principles of their actions, and evincing a culpable neglect of their duty, by abstaining from a vigorous exercise of the power and resources of the country entrusted to them, at the moment when energy would have been particularly serviceable. His lordship concluded by declaring, that he should not oppose the passing of the resolution, but that he had deemed himself bound to state to the house, what he thought of the present military establishment of the country, and the dreadful evils which, he was convinced, would result from a perseverance in the right hon. gent.'s military plans.

Mr. Secretary *Windham*, in rising to reply to the speech of the noble lord, felt that there were many of his charges which it was impossible for him to retaliate. Two hours ago he was ready to remove that part of the noble lord's accusation, which reproached him with taciturnity; and certainly the mass of extraneous matter which the noble lord had introduced into his speech, had increased the subject of reproach; because, it was impossible for him to follow the noble lord through the whole of his arguments. From all that had been said by him in former debates, he did not conceive that it would be necessary for him to express himself much at length, and should therefore in this instance adhere to taciturnity by being as brief as possible. It would generally seem, that one long speech imposed the necessity of another nearly as long to answer it: but here the noble lord had imposed upon him the taciturnity he complained of, because he was not at that late hour so much to consider the time that might be spent in a reply, as the time that remained to be spent. When he had opened his measure in detail to the house, he had been obliged to do so in a speech of considerable length, a thing to which he always felt a reluctance, but the noble lord's *incidental* speech of three hours kept that in countenance. The noble lord had only touched lightly upon the topics which he had intimated his intention of discussing more at length on some future day. In replying to what had been said *incidentally* by the noble lord, he should first recur to that which was still fresh in the recollection of the house, and which the noble lord had no right to advert to, because it did not belong to the question before the committee. He should refer to that point as a specimen of the noble lord's reasoning. It would make the house distrust similar assertions which the noble lord might again make the foundation of the most extraordinary conclusions. The noble lord had set out with a fact which was not founded. He had stated, that his majesty's ministers had received the accounts of the destination of the expedition to Buenos Ayres, from St. Helena, early in the month of June, and then he went on to argue what great things might have been done if ministers had acted in the manner he would have pointed out. In answer to this argument he should first say, that it was not early in the month, as the noble lord stated, but it was upon the 24th of June that government received this information, and it certainly was a piece of information that nobody could have expected them to anticipate. The noble lord might speak of preparing expeditions, and sending them to sea in 10 days, but it must be recollected that the 3 regiments he spoke of must go over in ships, and that those ships must have ample stores and provisions on board, and be vessels proper to send troops in to such a distance. If the expedition was only across the channel, there were plenty of vessels that might have been easily got ready for that purpose; but when it was recollected that they were to cross the Atlantic, to look for another expedition; and if they could not find it, or should discover that it had been unsuccessful, to recross it again, to look for a place of safety; it would not be supposed that such a description of ships could be got ready and fitted out in so short a time. The noble lord would perhaps have sent them over in air-balloons, or some such other expeditious mode of conveyance. The noble lord was equally incorrect in this statement about the passage of the Narcissus: he had placed the capture of Buenos Ayres at the end of the month of July, instead of the beginning of it, and had made the Narcissus arrive in England at the beginning of the month of September, instead of the end. He believed it would be found, upon examination, that the Narcissus was 8 weeks on her passage, instead of 5; and, as she was a single frigate, a good sailer, and coming with good news (which would induce the captain not to make any deviation in his course), it was not probable that any force could by possibility have been sent from England, which could have arrived there before the 12th of August, if it was to be believed that the place was then retaken. These were tolerable specimens of the sort of facts upon which the noble lord grounded his reasoning.—The noble lord had, however, dwelt at very great length on the details of the expence of the new system, and upon this expence he founded his principal objections to it; but the noble lord had certainly forgot, that most of the gentlemen in that house had heard him before speak at great length upon that subject, but with very little success; for after arguing at great length, that the expence of raising men by that means would be ruinous, he, in the very same breath, contended, that no men would be raised by it. This was a circumstance which was certainly fresh in the recollection of many gentlemen in that house. He had often heard it said, that there was nothing so fallacious as an account; he thought that he might also say, there was nothing more fallacious than a calculation. He therefore should not follow the noble lord in all his calculations; he should content himself with shewing the fallacy of the basis upon which the noble lord had formed his calculation. He began by reckoning the life of a soldier discharged from service, and who had encountered hardships, and the variety of climates, to be worth 21 years, according to the calculation of the insurance offices for the lives of those who had lived at home and in a different manner. If the house would but grant the noble lord his basis, his arguments and his calculations might be very well; but when the basis was removed as fallacious, they must fall with it. In arguing about the expences of the new system, the gentlemen on the other side always appeared to consider, that this increase of expence had been merely adopted for the purpose of obtaining recruits; he, however, had always stated that it was a bare act of justice due to the brave men who had spent their lives in the service of the country. Expence, however, was merely a relative term, and must be considered in relation to the object of it. A hundred pounds might be a great deal for one object, and a hundred thousand nothing for another object. The argument of expence, however, did not appear to have so much weight with the gentlemen on the other side when it was connected with the Volunteer establishment, which was a greater favourite with them, from supposing that it was one of their own measures. No reduction had been proposed in the number of the Volunteers, but merely in certain expences, which were exorbitantly extravagant. The great body of the volunteers must have themselves perceived the extravagance of the former expences, as a number of favourite corps had been given large extra allowances superior to what were given to the volunteers in general. The striking off these extra allowances to favourite corps of volunteers was a saving to the public of between 3 and 400,000*l.*; but the same gentlemen that so violently opposed this diminution of expence, now, when it came to be a question about granting some increase of allowance to men who had devoted their lives and impaired their constitutions in the service of their country, wished to dole out that pittance with a niggardly hand, and made it a matter of reproach against him that he had brought forward the measure. He should not, however, fear the reproaches which he might meet with on this score; but was willing to come with the scroll of the objects and of the expence, and appear before the tribunal of the world and of posterity to answer for their reproach. He would present it, with the utmost confidence that it would meet with their approbation; and it would be the pride of his life to suppose that he had been instrumental in increasing the comforts of those to whom the nation was so much indebted. He should not envy the noble lord and the gentlemen on the other side, if they could bring forward their schemes and calculations to prove how our brave soldiers could be *starved* at a much cheaper rate than they could be *maintained.* The provisions given to the soldiers upon their discharge, had not before been increased since the time of Charles II. and when it was considered that money had been so much depreciated in value since that period, he would ask, why were the defenders of the country by land or by sea to be the only class of those who serve her who are to have no increase of allowance upon that account, or no share in the bounty of the nation? The calculation of the amount of those sums was not of nearly so much consequence as the great question, Whether it was too much to give for the services that were done? If it were allowed that the sum was not in itself too great, it could not be fairly argued that the country was not in a state to be able to give its brave defenders a fair and just reward for their services. In considering the class of men that would probably be induced to enter into the army by those regulations, the noble lord began by a very odd and whimsical sort of argument. He had said that this system would only operate on the bargain-making part of society; that is, on thoughtful and considerate men, who looked somewhat to futurity. It therefore appeared that the noble lord thought that the most valuable class was the thoughtless, the imprudent, and those who were easy to be acted upon by the arts of crimps, or the immediate temptation of a high bounty. In this opinion he must, however, beg leave to differ totally from the noble lord: he considered the high bounties both injurious to the men, who received them for the purposes of debauchery, and still more injurious to the discipline of the army. He also considered, that nothing could be more desirable than to get into the army that thoughtful, considerate, and undebauched class of men, which the noble lord appeared to set so little value on. He therefore thought the expence of the system was not more than was necessary for the objects it had in view, which were; first, to give an adequate reward and relief to those soldiers that should be disabled or discharged, after having served their appointed time of service; and, secondly, as a means to bring a supply of the most valuable men on the best terms. As to what had been stated, that the measure had failed, he must absolutely deny it. Since it had been in force, it had raised nearly double the number of men that had been raised during a corresponding period of the last year, and with a reduction of five guineas in the bounty: so that when the expence of the system was talked of, it must be recollected, that it had already operated a reduction of five guineas in the bounty, and he hoped that it would proceed by a gradual reduction, to take away the bounties altogether, and leave the advantages of the service as the principal inducement to entering into it. There was no reason, however, why some condition might not be annexed to the grant, so that the men who received these advantages might be forthcoming when their services were wanted. In that case, it would not be necessary to look for a number of raw recruits when we wanted our armies to be increased. We might have soldiers constantly enrolled, who could instantly be brought into the ranks, when wanted, in the same manner as the sailors in France had been kept by the registry. As to the arguments of the noble lord, on the general inefficacy of the plan, he thought that he might spare himself the trouble of answering those observations at any length, by merely taking away the foundation upon which they rested: he would shew that the basis of them was no better than the basis of his argument respecting Buenos Ayres. He had, in perfect conformity with the opinion of that great man (Mr. Fox), of whom he could never think without sentiments of the utmost kindness and respect, thought it necessary, that, in the present situation of the world, when we might look to a state of warfare in which the country might have to contend for its safety and its existence, its military means should be increased. He did not mean a mere temporary addition to our army, or a forcing the military means of the country beyond their natural power, but a positive increase to those means and to that power. This was a difference, that the noble lord had not perceived, when he contrasted the strictures he had made on some of the military measures of his predecessors, with the arguments that he had urged in support of the present system. In those strictures he was only arguing on the propriety or impropriety of what he conceived to be mere temporary measures, whose object was to procure an immediate addition to the number of the army. The system, however, which he had introduced, was never stated by him to have for its object any temporary addition, but as likely to afford a permanent increase. He had even not appeared so sanguine about its immediate operation, as many of those who supported it; and he would now say, that the operation of it hitherto had been much greater than he had stated or calculated. In speaking of the Army of Reserve, he considered it as only a temporary measure, and the event shewed it was no more, for that measure died of itself, but not until it had produced a considerable temporary supply to the army. Of all temporary measures which had been proposed, he certainly considered the Army of Reserve to be the best, as it produced above 40,000 men; but when it had done that, it could go no farther. The next measure which was proposed, and which he considered as merely a temporary measure, was the Additional Force act; and this was brought forward with such great promise, that it was the principal ground of removing the former administration. If he had made many strictures on this measure, it was because it appeared to him impossible that it could ever be the means of obtaining what it professed—a permanent supply for the regular army. He now thought that it had completely failed in every object it proposed; for if, from the addition which took place in the army during the late administration of two years, there were to be deducted those men who entered from the Army of Reserve, and the 13,000 men who entered from the militia (which was only changing the existing force from one hand into the other), and if it were not also for allowing officers to raise corps for rank, which was generally allowed to be the very worst way of raising men, the actual increase would be found to be very small indeed. This last mode of raising men, he certainly should not approve of. Some of those measures might have been useful as mere temporary measures. They were like a *dram* given to the country, which for the moment might increase its power, but which would be followed by greater languor and debility. The measure which he proposed, had for its object not a mere temporary increase of numbers, but a permanent increase of the power and military means of the country. It was not a measure of that class which the noble lord seemed so much to approve of: his object was,

"Non fumum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem;"

at least as far as lay in his power. The means that he had proposed for effecting this object were, first, to make the service as desirable as possible to those who were embarked in it; and, secondly, to let it be as generally known to the people as possible, what superior advantages and comforts were in future to be given to those who should enter into the army. But if hereafter, it should be judged necessary to resort to any sort of compulsory measures, even then the advantages of the present system would be felt, and would make the compulsion much lighter; for it could not be doubted, but that it would be much easier to procure substitutes, if the service was made desirable, than if it was not. The measures already adopted were perfectly compatible with any measure that it might hereafter be necessary to adopt; and, if even another Army of Reserve were to be raised, the good effects of this system would operate upon that, as well as upon any other compulsory mode that could be adopted. Whatever else parliament might resolve to do, they would find the benefit of what was already done. It must be in the recollection of the house, that he never stated the measure as likely to produce any powerful immediate effect in increasing the army, but he had considered it as a system which, beginning with little, would constantly increase in its operation, and, in time, materially increase the military strength and means of the country. When he was charged with delay in the execution of the system, he would at least say, that if he was to be justly charged with such delay, that fault was his and not the fault of the system. He might say, as the man who used to sell game when he was at college did, when told that his game smelt badly, "It is not the birds," replied he, "that smell bad, it is I that have a bad smell." He should say in the same manner, if he had kept the measure too long unexecuted, the fault must be personal to him, and not in the measure. If the measure had not already made greater progress in its operation, he supposed it must be in a great measure owing to the unenlightened state of that part of the community on whom it was to act. Although the members of that house, and gentlemen of their class of life, might be perfectly well informed of all that was done in parliament, yet the great mass of the people knew very little about the matter. He would venture to say, that a great majority of the people did not know at this moment, who was First Lord of the Treasury, or who was the Secretary at War. This was proved to him by his daily receiving letters, upon the supposition that he still held a situation which he had relinquished many years ago. That the progress of the effects of this measure, therefore, were slow, he admitted, and all he thought it necessary to say on that point was, that it was not so slow as he supposed it would be. He considered, that part of the operation of the bill had been retarded by the circumstance of the measure taking effect at a time which was intermediate between the payments made at Chelsea. When, upon the next payment, the additional allowances shall be actually received, then it would be made much more generally known to the public than it was at present: they then would see that government was in earnest in what it had promised, and would think much more of what they saw had taken place than they would of a mere act of parliament. The pensioners were dispersed over the country; and though they might have heard of the intentions respecting them, they might have said, "What signifies your acts of parliament?" But now they now could say, "Here we have it," and this was what would afford inducement to others to enter the service. The right hon. secretary then proceeded to state, that he could now speak much more positively as to the good effects of the measure. It was rather whimsical, however, to hear the noble lord represent, that the experiment had failed, because it had not immediately produced a greater number of men than it professed to raise, when it was recollected that the noble lord had always contended, that the Additional Force act had not failed, although it produced nothing near the number of men that it was calculated as likely to produce. It was calculated, that from the 1st of July, 1804, to the 1st of October, 1805, it was to have produced 40 or 50,000 men, besides the 15,000 that was necessary to supply the casualties: for this additional force was to supply all the deficiencies in the army of reserve and militia, the casualties of the army, and yield besides, an increase of 15,000 men to the army; but instead of doing this, it did not produce more than 15,000 men during the two years of that administration, which was a number not even sufficient to supply the casualties. This, then indeed, was a complete failure, as it proved itself to be utterly inadequate to the object which was proposed. He never, however, contended that it was impossible to raise men under it, for he knew that if they were determined to raise men at any pecuniary expence, and at any expence of the morals of the people, the thing was to be done. If they chose to make the parishes liable to penalties to the amount of 4 or 500,000*l.* if they did not raise the men, by even giving 50 guineas a man for them, certainly they must raise some men. If the parish officers could be induced to spend so much money, and to practise all the corruption and arts of common crimps, in addition to the abuse of their own power as church-wardens and overseers of the poor, certainly there must be some men raised. The regular recruiting service was, however, most materially injured by the means taken to carry that bill into effect; and if it had been possible for the bill to have succeeded to the extent at first calculated, after it had filled up the deficiencies in the Army of Reserve and Militia, it would after that have only yielded 9,000 men yearly, which would not have supplied even the casualties. If, therefore, that bill had succeeded, it would have been but a temporary measure. Besides, it contained in itself the seeds of its own destruction. The great benefit of the present system was, that it would provide for the progressive supply of the army. This progression made him prefer it to any measure that would have a sudden or violent operation, because the state of the army was such, being 12,000 stronger than at the beginning of last year, as not to require such measures. For this state of the army, or the measures that had produced it, he did not take any great credit to himself. The statements of the noble lord appeared to him to be founded on fallacious grounds respecting the success of the recruiting during the last year. He had himself a statement to make on this head, which was founded on accounts that the house could rely upon. They were the accounts from the office of the Inspector-General of Recruits. All the accounts of this office were kept with the greatest regularity, and all the business of the recruiting of the kingdom was carried on through this office, and by the Inspectors of Recruits in the different districts. By a comparison of these accounts with the accounts of correspondent periods of former years, he found that there was a growing increase, small at first, but at length amounting to an excess in the proportion of two to one. If the noble lord should object to this comparison, because the Parish bill obstructed the recruiting in a former year, then that would be an admission that he had never before made, it having always been stated that the Parish bill did not interfere with the ordinary recruiting. If the noble lord should not so object, then the conclusion was inevitable that the present was the better mode of recruiting. But, then, the hon. gentlemen opposite might say, that this mode of recruiting did not produce as much as the other two, and he should not say that it had. But it produced in the proportion of two to one more than the ordinary recruiting, and the desertion was considerably diminished. Besides, under the Parish bill, men above the standard age, and three inches below the standard size, were received. At present, no men would be received under 5 feet 5 inches. The increase in the recruiting had been progressive, but in the last few weeks it had exceeded the produce of the Parish bill and ordinary recruiting in the correspondent period of last year. There was to that advantage to be added, the amount of the recruiting at head-quarters, which had been finally extinguished by the Parish bill, and of which no returns had been yet procured. He was not aware of any other observation of the noble lord, to which it was at that time necessary for him to advert. Many, he was sure, were worthy of remark, but other opportunities would occur for that purpose. As to the circumstance of the men being entitled of right to the allowance, it had been thought proper that men, who had spent their lives and constitutions in the service of their country, should not be left to the caprice of commanding officers, as to their title to their reward, after a service of 14 or 21 years. The noble lord had observed, that a man who might be disabled after two or three years service, would be entitled to his pension, but if disabled in the service, he would ask why he should not? He invited the hon. gentlemen opposite to go into the proofs of the statements he had made, because the more they should be enquired into, the more they would be found correct.

Mr. *Perceval* said, that there were some remarks made by the right hon. gent. to which he should slightly advert, others to which he should reply more fully, and some matters he should notice that had not been treated as fit for the attention of the committee. The observations of his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) seemed to have been wholly misunderstood; the anachronism complained of had nothing to do with the argument; the charge against ministers was distinctly this, that they had taken no means whatever to secure the acquisition of Buenos Ayres until they had intelligence of its re-capture. The right hon. gent. affirmed that there was hardly any thing more fallacious than calculation. This opinion he (Mr. Perceval) supposed was the reason why he never indulged the house with his estimates; and from the same motive it was that the noble lord's computations remained uncontradicted; or perhaps it might be, that the arithmetical view given of the subject was unanswerable, and the right hon. gent. prudently declined making an attempt in which he could not succeed. The misfortune was, that when the right hon. gent. did try his hand at calculation, he was always erroneous. Such was his representation with regard to the bounty, which he said had been reduced 5 guineas. The truth was, that on the former plan, for 21 guineas a man was procured for life, and on the present, for 17*l.* a service of only 7 years was obtained. Thus for the trifling difference of 5*l.* 1*s.* three times the duration of service was acquired. The right hon. gent. told the committee that the Defence act had failed in every particular; yet the fact was, that at the very time it was abrogated, it supplied annually 15,000 men. Now it was admitted that the measure would produce men, yet the objection of the right hon. gent., which was yet ringing in his (Mr. Perceval's) ears, before was, that it would supply money, and not men. Another concession was, much in the same style, directed to the Army of Reserve act: he (Mr. P.) could only understand this as an offer of friendship to his right hon. friend who proposed it, and he would not complain that any civility should be so properly applied. The right hon. gent. was accustomed to assert, that no defence was competent but the regular army, and not a moment should be lost in augmenting it. The committee had now heard from him, that these measures were abundantly conducive to this object; but they had not learnt from the same authority, why they were precipitately abandoned. So much for the consistency of the right hon. gent. The right hon. the secretary at war mentioned the Training bill, the situation of the Volunteers, and the progress in the new mode of recruiting. On the first he observed that nothing was to be said, and as the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) was unluckily of the same opinion, nothing had been said upon it. A measure surely upon which nothing can be said, might certainly be denominated a failing project. So little had also been said on the condition of the Volunteers, that the right hon. gent. might as well have been silent on that subject also. It was asserted that there had been only a trifling reduction in the number of the Volunteers, and yet the computation was professedly made, not from the effective returns, but from the nominal establishment. How was it possible that the Volunteers should not be diminished, when those entering after the 24th of June last were to receive no pay at all? Under this circumstance a deficiency was a necessary consequence; and the wisdom of ministers had proposed to supply this by the Training bill, which it now appeared was wholly inoperative. Then, as to the recruiting, the facts stated by the right hon. gent. were entirely different from those which were to be collected from the papers on the table. He might have an accurate account in his pocket, but it would have been more respectful if he had submitted it to the examination of the house. The right hon. the secretary at war had said, that the new mode of recruiting could not be deemed to have commenced until Oct. and Nov. last, and in the former month 1156, in the latter 1064 men were obtained, or in the total 2220. Such it appeared in the two favoured months, and in the same of last year no fewer men than 3103 had been acquired, being an excess of 883 men. Such were the advantages of this boasted system. Yet it was not the fair way to govern the estimate by the most favoured periods. In Feb. of last year, 1282 were added, being above 100 more than were produced by the ordinary recruiting; and by the other mode which was described as suspended, no fewer than 830 were supplied. In the next month the number was 1312, an excess of 200 upon the new way, and further from Mr. Pitt's bill 891; in April 1088, and in May 1100; and these were four months of last year, by the regular recruiting under Mr. Pitt's bill, when more men were obtained than in the favoured months of the new mode; yet this was the scheme by which double the supply was stated to be obtained, not indeed by the accounts on the table of the house, but by other estimates, in the pocket of the right hon. gent. Thus on the Training bill nothing was to be said; regarding the Volunteers, there was exposed what was worse than nothing; and the last object, the recruiting, had completely disappointed the expectations of its supporters. The right hon. gent. indulged himself in frequent appeals to the committee. It was true, that such addresses had a certain influence on candid minds; but he should recollect that these expedients might be carried too far, and even to an extent that neither the house nor the public would patiently bear. On the present plan, the Chelsea allowance, which had so long been the reward of long service and indigent merit, was to be given to those not entitled to such remuneration. He (Mr. Perceval) was very apprehensive that such prodigality would be injurious to military discipline. He could not help lamenting that his majesty had been advised to give directions, on the subject of the recruiting, contrary to the established law of the land. The cavalry were now raised for 7 years, and the artillery for five years, but this was not the law. For the former 12 years, for the latter 7, was the oath of service required, and it was not decent that ministers should anticipate the decisions of parliament, and undertake for such alterations in the term of the service. Then the wording of the conditions on which the service was to be obtained, was careless and inaccurate. If a man obtained the bounty, and it afterwards appeared he was subject to sudden paroxysms, or any disorder that rendered him unfit for duty, he was to be allowed to retire with all the benefits of long service; such were to be the fruits of his own fraud. The correction of this palpable error should not be long delayed. As he should have other opportunities of commenting on the general topics of this debate, he should not, at this time, trespass further on the indulgence of the committee.

Lord *Howick* said, that after the able statement of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham), he should not have occasion to enter much at length into the subject. He would first advert to an objection which had lately been often started, and as often, he trusted, satisfactorily answered. Ministers were accused of not having resorted to the necessary means for the protection of Buenos Ayres. The answer given to this charge was, that no supplies could have arrived in time to prevent the re-capture, if, indeed, that unfortunate event had happened; and this was the only proper reply to such an accusation. The noble lord (Castlereagh) asserted, that such supplies would have arrived sufficiently early, allowing 10 days for the sailing of the transports, after intelligence of the capture by his majesty's arms had been obtained. Was the noble lord serious in representing, that 10 days were a sufficient time for such an undertaking; to prepare an expedition to a distant part of the globe, with the uncertainty that after its arrival the troops could even land there, and might probably have to proceed to some other settlement yet more remote? Did the noble lord recollect, that for such a project there could have been no anterior preparation? And could he imagine that 10 days were enough to provide and dismiss this effectual aid? While the noble lord supposed it to be no easy matter to cross the Atlantic with all this host of war in ten days, did he remember, that with him it occupied as many months to fit out an expedition to cross the British Channel, with long notice of the plan, and with the most urgent necessity for its precipitate adoption? Both the noble lord and the learned gent. had declared that no steps had been taken whatever to secure this important acquisition of British courage. His (lord Howick's) answer to this was, a positive denial of the neglect so charged upon ministers. The moment the capture was made known here, supplies were provided to support it. A line-of-battle ship started with the first fair wind for that purpose, and troops were ready to depart at the time the report of the capture was received, and they actually set sail in October; yet he would not conceal that a pressing emergency arose to lead to the change in the destination of that force. He had explained thus much on this subject, because it was one on which gentlemen might reasonably expect some explanation, although it had been unnecessarily introduced into the present debate. The hon. and learned gent. enquired, what had been done by his majesty's servants, after all the expectations they had raised by their magnificent exhibitions of future successes? "Compare," said he, "what you have done with what we had promised; we engaged to supply 25 or 26,000 men under the former mode of recruiting." It was discreet, both in the hon. and learned gent. and in the noble lord to confine themselves to what they had promised, and not to diverge to what they had performed. But even with this prudent limitation to their promises, they might have proceeded much further, and have told the committee that they had promised 40,000 men. Why did not they advance a few steps onward? Here again they conducted themselves with prudence; they knew the fact would be contrasted with the promise, and that the disproportion between 15 or 16,000, and 40,000 men, would be too considerable. Attending, then, to this inequality between the assurances given and the event, he could entertain no very sanguine hopes of what these gentlemen would have done, had they the most favourable opportunity both of multiplying their promises and their exertions. The noble lord had dwelt much in complimentary observations on one of the administrations of which he was a member. Certainly, it did make considerable additions to the effective force; and its measures had a much more beneficial operation than he (lord H.) had expected. Thus much it was fair to state. What was the result? It would be seen by the accounts, that in January 1803, about 95 or 96,000 men was the amount of the public force. On the 1st of July, 1804, it consisted of 230,759 men, and 6,000 artillery; constituting an augmentation of 140,000 men. No doubt could be entertained that the army of reserve act, as well as the regulations of the militia, were calculated to raise a large additional force; the objections were that the means were oppressive, and that the effect was not permanent. When the army of reserve act was put in activity, he (lord Howick) was in the country, and he had that experience of its operation which led him to wish that the experiment would never be again tried unless in circumstances of the most pressing necessity; yet he would not say, that the occasion on which resort had been had to the measure, was of sufficient urgency to justify its application. Thus, then, were added 140,000 men to the national force for limited service. The noble lord, emboldened by this success, became a little incautious, and asked, what was done in the next administration? To which (fond always of having "Two Strings to his Bow") he also belonged. At that time 33,000 men were added to the army. In this confident appeal, it would have been satisfactory if the noble lord had been able to shew, that this accession was derived from the politic measures of his administration. The first step was to abandon the project of the supplementary militia; and the whole increase was to be attributed to five sources of supply: 1. The militia. 2. The army of reserve act. 3. Raising for rank. 4. The admission of boys into the army. 5. The foreign corps. The last was principally derived from the German legion; however the foreigners amounted to 8000, and 13 000 volunteered from the militia. In July 1804, the increase was 140,000, and the total force 245,090. On Jan. 18, it was 258,000, and the increase only 29,172. The militia was then reduced 16,000, leaving the augmentation of the regulars and artillery at 13,185 men. To these add 8000 for the accession between the 1st of January and the 6th of March, and the increase would be 21,000. But the fair comparison was not to be made in this way: it should be confined to the native regular army, exclusive of the artillery, and comprising troops both for limited and unlimited service. In July 1804, they were 122,691; in March following, 142,700; being an excess of 20,000, of which 6600 were cavalry and 13,400 infantry. Taking, then, the final result of the measures of the last administration, the whole number raised was 5222, of which 3422 were procured for rank, and 1073 were mere boys; leaving only 707 men as the produce of their boasted exertions, which could possibly be considered a beneficial acquisition to the army. Let these vain and illusive attempts be compared, not with the promises, but with the advantageous effects of the measures of his right hon. friend, and he could entertain no fear that the consequence would meet the wishes of every friend to the military strength of the country. The hon. and learned gent. loudly complained that his right hon. friend had changed his opinion: before, the Additional Force bill was to raise money, now it was to raise men. No doubt it was for this duplex object. If you had the men from the parochial districts, the force was augmented; if you had not the men, the money was obtained. Such a plan was, in the sequel, found to be destructive of the regular recruiting; and, if men were procured by it, they were either boys, or men deficient in stature, and of course not suited to the public service. With these objections to it, the scheme had been very properly abandoned. In this situation of things it was, that the prudent expedients of his right hon. friend were resorted to, which have attracted so violent an opposition from the noble lord (Castlereagh). Whatever assistance the noble lord should require from the papers, with ministers to assist him in detecting their errors, should be supplied; but he (lord H.) must protest against the charge, so frequently repeated, that his right hon. friend had at any time declared, that any sudden and extensive addition to the public force could by such means be acquired. He could confidently appeal to every gentleman who heard his right hon. friend, that no such pretensions were made; on the contrary, it was urged, that all that could be expected from the measure was a gradual and progressive improvement, derived principally from the amelioration of the condition of the army, and from the conviction in the public mind, of the increased respectability of our military establishments. After this explanation, he hoped he should hear no more of any precipitate effects, and that debates in that house would not be needlessly protracted by calling for elucidations of subjects which had been so often discussed. How, then, did the real question before the committee actually stand? An opportunity of comparison could only at present be afforded from the 20th of October; as the regulations were pursued, more means would be supplied. The hon. and learned gent. had talked of February, March, and April, and many other periods, but no comparison could be made, as the information before the committee was limited to October. Availing himself, then, of all the intelligence received on the subject, the relative effect appeared thus: the regular recruiting in 1805, from the 20th of October to the 15th of the present month, produced 1208 men; under the new measures, 2155 in the same interval were obtained, yielding an addition of 947 men. But the learned gent. said, that this was an unfair comparison, because the recruiting at the former period was obstructed by the Parish bill. It would be in the recollection of many gentlemen, that the hon. and learned gent. had before said, that there could exist no such obstruction. He (lord H.) could not avoid complimenting the hon. and learned gent. on this unexpected and happy exercise of his discernment; he would, for the sake of further illustration, next advert to a time when, from the great scarcity of the means of subsistence, the recruiting service was conducted with unusual success; he meant in the year 1800. Even then, only 1878 men were raised, leaving a surplus of 277 in favour of the present time. Was it not under such circumstances correct to say, that the plan was progressively improving in its effects, and that, at least as far as it had operated, it had fully answered what had been predicted of the result? But it was said, that now the purchase was a purchase of service for only seven years, then it was for life. No doubt the proper allowance should be made for any reduction in the term of duty; and on the contrary side were to be placed, the other facilities in and of the service, and the enrolling at reduced bounties. Again, his right hon. friend asserted, that a superior order of men was obtained, and, what was most material, that the number of desertions was greatly reduced. It was yet more satisfactory, that the diminution of these desertions was applicable to the time between the enlisting and joining the respective corps, which was a convincing proof of the amelioration both of the condition of the army, and of the members who compose it. At a former time, out of 1,878 recruits, it was found, one in ten, or about 188, had deserted; in 1805, out of 1,208, there were 174 deserters, or one in seven; now, out of 2,155, only 155, or one in 13. This was no trifling recommendation of the plan of his right hon. friend. The opponents to it however asserted, that if their two projects of recruiting were taken collectively, then the advantage was in favour of the former methods. But it should be recollected that, under the Additional Force act, age and height were disregarded. Yet, notwithstanding this, including only the last 2 weeks, there was an excess in favour of the new scheme; in one the number was 221, in the other 225 men. With all these facts pressing on the attention of the committee, he trusted they would concur with him that there was an evident improvement, and that the means were fully competent to the end proposed. Only 3 months had been allowed for this experiment, and the result was obvious; in the case of the Parish bill, nearly two years had been allowed to try its efficacy, and it remained still unproductive. It was not surprising then, that he should be sanguine as to the result, but he would not admit his good opinion of the measure to conceal from him any of its defects. If it were the fact, that the pensions and emoluments might be obtained by persons without the performance of the duties which should entitle them to such rewards, he should have no difficulty in admitting that such a pernicious circumstance should not be allowed, and some provision should be made to prevent it. But was it perfectly clear that this was the fact? The learned gent. said, that by fraud a man might obtain these advantages. Was he a lawyer, instructed in all the erudition of his profession? and was it necessary to inform him, that by the laws of England no man can sustain any demand founded upon a fraud. The hon. and learned gent. supposed a case where a man inlisted when he was subjected to fits or sudden derangement. Did not that learned gent. know the form of the oath administered, and that perjury must be perpetrated to procure admission under such circumstances? and, indeed, there were prosecutions grounded on this violation of moral and religious duty. The hon. and learned gentleman further complained, that the Training bill had not, on the present occasion, been made a subject of discussion. If it were intended to examine this act, it would be easy to bring the matter before the house, but when the Army Estimates were under deliberation, it seemed improper to blend with that enquiry, what was so foreign and irrelevant. He should in this respect certainly follow the example of his right hon. friend, except by making a single remark upon it, that fit measures were taken to carry it into effect, and he entertained no doubt of its salutary operation.

Sir *John Doyle* said, it was his intention to have delivered his sentiments on the present subject, but at that hour, after the very ample explanations which had been made by the noble lord and the right hon. gentleman, he should be ashamed to trespass on the time of the house; and, as he understood a further discussion would take place on the subject, he would reserve himself for that occasion.

Mr. *Johnstone* begged leave to correct an error, which the secretary at war had fallen into in the course of his speech. The right hon. gent. had said, that he had pledged himself to make a charge against his majesty's ministers. He certainly wished to see how far the pledges made by those ministers had been fulfilled, or had, or had not been released. He did not pledge himself to make such a charge, but he professed an anxiety to examine the papers, and see how far those who had been so willing to bring forward charges of want of economy against former ministers, had themselves acted upon that principle.

The *Secretary at War* replied, that it would appear, from the papers before the house, that since the present ministers came into office, they had uniformly observed the strictest economy.—After some conversation between Mr. Windham, sir J. Doyle, lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Rose, upon the subject of whether the returns from the inspector-general's or the adjutant-general's department, were the most correct to go by, upon the future discussion of this question, the original resolution was read and agreed to, without further opposition.

Lord *Henry Petty* then rose, and having apologised for troubling the house at that late hour, observed, that as some of the present estimates came more particularly within the department of the treasury, it was necessary for him to detain the house for a few moments. The estimates he alluded to were those of the commissariat and barrack departments, the first of which could not be included in the army extraordinaries, and therefore stood in a separate estimate. The sum to be voted under this head was the same as last year, amounting to 841,526*l.*; 50,000*l.* of which sum was to defray the expences of the royal military canals. This was the last issue to be made for that purpose, consequently, a very great reduction would take place in that expenditure. The only additional sum for the barrack department which he meant to move for, was 57,000*l.* for erecting and completing new works. At the same time, he observed, that it was not the intention of government to undertake any more new works, but such as were found to be absolutely necessary. The barracks at Portsmouth were the principal object of this grant; they were considered as essentially necessary, and, it was possible, might not cost more than 47,000*l.*, for although, technically speaking, they were denominated new works, yet they were in a considerable state of forwardness. He had the satisfaction to state, that, the year before last, the expences of that department amounted to 1,100,000*l.* which had been reduced to 550,000*l.* and there would this year be a further saving of 50,000*l.* The resolutions were then read and agreed to.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, January 22.

The ballot for a committee to take into consideration the Petition complaining of an undue return for the borough of Weymouth, standing for to-day, at 4 o'clock the Speaker counted the house, when, only 64 members being present, the house necessarily adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, January 23.

[MINUTES.] On the motion of the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord bishop of St. David's was requested to preach before their lordships on the Fast Day.—The duke of Clarence presented five Petitions against the bill for Abolishing the Slave Trade; three from Liverpool, one from the Agents for Jamaica, and one from the Merchants in general concerned with the West-India trade. Ordered to lie on the table.—The Annual Indemnity bill went through the committee, and was reported.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, January 23.

[Minutes.] At four o'clock a ballot took place for a committee to take into consideration the Petition complaining of an undue return for the borough of Weymouth. Soon after, Mr. White appeared at the bar, and presented the reduced list, which was as follows:—W. H. Freemantle, esq.; right hon. C. Yorke; W. Taylor, esq.; J. Osborne, esq.; sir W. W. Wynne; G. Porter, esq.; sir T. H. Liddell; sir G. Cornwall; sir E. Knatchbull; sir W. Milner; sir J. Frederick; A. Browne, esq.; R. Vyse, esq.; nominees, W. Baker, esq. sir J. Anstruther.—Mr. Whitbread gave notice, that on the 12th of Feb. he would move for leave to bring in a bill to amend the existing Poor Laws. It was his intention to give gentlemen all possible time to examine this subject with the attention which it merited. If therefore the house would, at the period which he had mentioned, permit him to bring in the bill, and would allow it to be read a first time, he would then move that the second reading should lie over till after the Easter holidays.—The lord advocate of Scotland, after a prefatory speech, in which he entered into an historical detail of the various regulations relative to the stipends of the Scottish Clergy, and in which he expressed the highest regard for that respectable body of men, moved for leave to bring in a bill to suspend for a certain time the powers granted to the lords of session and council in Scotland, by an act of the Scotch parliament, in the 4th session of the first parliament of queen Anne, so far as they went to the augmentation of the stipends of the clergy in Scotland. His view was, that during the suspension, those stipends should be rendered adequate to the purpose for which they were originally intended.—Lord A. Hamilton gave notice, that on Monday se'nnight, he would make a motion relative to the Third Report of the commissioners of the Military Inquiry.—Mr. W. Wynne brought in a bill for more effectually preventing depredations on the river Thames and its vicinity, which was read a first time.

[Militia Officers.] On Mr. W. Wynne's moving that the order of the day be read for receiving the report of the Irish Militia Service bill, Lord Castlereagh rose for the purpose of asking the right hon. secretary, if any provision had been made for extending the additional pay granted last year, to the officers of the regulars, to the officers of corresponding ranks in the Militia service, that was, from the lieut. colonel down to the subalterns. The Secretary at War replied, that no such provision had been made. Lord Castlereagh hoped that a noble lord (whom he did not see now in his place) would bring this subject under the consideration of the house, more especially as he had himself stated that in his opinion, the increase of pay ought to extend as far as the captains of the Militia. The report was then received.

[Criminal and Pauper Lunatics.] Mr. *W. Wynne* moved, that a select committee be appointed to enquire into the state of the Criminal and Pauper Lunatics in England and Wales, and of the laws relative thereto, and to report the same with their observations to the house. It was a year and a half since he had called the attention of the house to this subject, which demanded immediate interference. The consequence of the attempt made by Hatfield on the life of his majesty, was an act empowering the judges in cases of acquittal on the ground of insanity, to order the person so acquitted to be detained in custody, until his majesty's pleasure respecting them should be known. Under this act, several unfortunate persons were now lying in public jails; of all places, the most improper for their abode. He referred to an instance in the county which he had the honour to represent, of a person who, having been tried for murder and acquitted, on the ground of insanity, had been imprisoned in the public jail, in which all possible care was taken of him that could be expected from persons ignorant of the mode of treatment, peculiarly requisite for lunatics, committed another murder on a felon in the same prison. Pauper lunatics, as the law then stood, were maintained by the parish, so that it became the interest of overseers that these unhappy people should commit some outrage by which the parishes might be relieved from the burthen of them. There were not less than 1700 pauper lunatics now in confinement. How to proceed, whether asylums should be erected to comprehend more than one county, or in what other way relief should be afforded, would be a proper subject of consideration for the committee which he proposed to institute.

Mr. *S. Bourne* asked why the hon. gent.

did not include in his reference to the committee, the Criminal and Pauper Lunatics of Scotland and Ireland ?

Mr. *W. Wynne* replied, that in those countries there were provisions which rendered the necessity of any interposition of the legislature less pressing than in England and Wales.—A committee was then appointed.

[CHARGES AGAINST MR. CAWTHORNE.] General *Porter* said, he rose in pursuance of the notice he had given with reference to one of the members of that house. He felt himself unfortunate in his inability to perform the task he had undertaken, in the manner its importance demanded. He assured the house, that he had not the slightest enmity or rancour towards the person who was the object of his motion, and he had therefore neither claimed nor solicited the support of any individual. He had felt himself called upon by an imperious sense of his duty as a member of the house, but above all, by his sincere wish to maintain the honour and character of the profession to which he had been attached for upwards of 30 years. Actuated as he was by these sentiments, it could not be surprising that he should look up with respect to the decisions of those courts martial whose proceedings he was persuaded were uniformly dictated by justice and impartiality. Thinking as he did, he felt that a person who had been tried by 16 of the most respectable characters among the officers of the army, and found guilty of 11 charges out of 14, and who had been convicted of a crime only short of felony, was not a fit person to sit among the representatives of the country. He wished the house to be in full possession of the case, and then to put it to the dignity and honour of the house, whether a person who had been so stigmatized was worthy of a seat in parliament ? He should conclude with his motion ; at the same time he trusted, that if a debate arose, he might have the privilege of expressing himself more at large. He moved, "That the Charges made against John Fenton Cawthorne, esq. a member of this house, and the sentence pronounced against him in consequence by the Court Martial appointed to try him, together with the proceedings of the house thereon in session 1795-6, be now read." The motion was seconded by Mr. Spencer Stanhope.

Mr. *Cawthorne* wished the hon. general had stated more fully his sentiments, and had adduced precedents which might have induced the house to go immediately and without delay into the proceeding. There were certainly many precedents for expulsion, but not one of them rested on the grounds on which the present case stood. In the whole code of British jurisprudence there was no rule more strong than that any man who had been acquitted or condemned could not again be tried for the same offence. This was a principle of our established law, rooted as he hoped in every man's breast, and against which he trusted that no one would dare to set his face. There was another circumstance which ought to weigh heavily in the consideration of the house. He stood there legally qualified ; he had been returned, and returned without opposition, by a very large body of electors. If he had been thought ineligible, the moment of election had been the time for stating that ineligibility ; but no such attempt had been made, and he had been unanimously returned for one of the largest county towns in the kingdom. He would not enter into any discussion of the merits of the sentence by the court martial, although that was a subject from which he would never shrink when it came regularly before the house. With regard to precedents of expulsion, there were several in the cases of Mr. Wilkes, Mr. Walpole, and others ; but he contended, that none of these cases was applicable to his own. The hon. general had disclaimed any feeling of personal hostility towards him. It was certainly very kind of him to bring the subject forward. This he would declare, that when he stood in a similar situation before, he felt much more depressed, and much more oppressed than he then did. But had he at the time to which he alluded known what he then knew, he would not have troubled that house for a moment on the subject. He meant, had he known that the first law officer in the house, the Attorney General of that day, had declared that the sentence of a court martial was too flimsy a ground on which to found the proceedings which had terminated in his expulsion from the house.

Lord *Howick* would not have said any thing upon this motion, had it not been for some expressions which fell from the hon. member who had spoken last. He apprehended that that hon. member had mistaken the nature of the case entirely, when he talked about another trial for the same offence, about his election and his qualification. This was not a question of election or qualification. The objection did not stand on these grounds. The view which his hon. friend had taken of the case was this: whether it was consistent with the dignity, the purity, and the honour of that house, that a person labouring under the stigma attached to his character, by the sentence of a court martial, and the proceedings on which it was founded, should be considered as a fit member to sit among them? The question was, whether the house possessed the power of re-expulsion, and if it did, whether it was fit and proper to exercise it in this particular instance? It was a proceeding undoubtedly of the utmost importance; for whether it was considered as affecting the character of the individual, and the character and purity of that house, or as involving those great constitutional principles that ought to govern the right of election, there was no question more deserving of the serious attention and careful examination of every person who had to decide upon its merits. It had afforded him, and must have afforded to others, great satisfaction to observe, that in bringing forward this business no mixture of passion or personal rancour had appeared. His hon. friend, from the manner and temper with which he proposed his motion, had evinced, what indeed he was well aware of before, that he acted from principle and not from passion—that he had truly stated that he was not an oppressor, but that he was actuated only by a conscientious regard to the best interests of his profession, of the house, and of the public. In this temper he hoped the investigation would be pursued, and therefore he was very much disposed to accede to a suggestion that seemed to be thrown out by the person who spoke last, when he said, that he rested his case on precedents. In order to ascertain what precedents were analogous to the present case, or in any degree bore upon it, it was his intention, if the motion had passed, to have moved for the appointment of a committee to search into precedents. Cases precisely similar to the present, perhaps, they could find none, but they might find many cases analogous to it, and some of these might probably be in the recollection of several members of that house. At all events, it would be of advantage to proceed with our judgments instructed by a careful examination of the journals of the house. This was so clear, that he believed he need say nothing further in support of it. He was not aware that any objection whatever could be urged to this method. The interest of all parties concerned would be best consulted by proceeding upon sound and constitutional principles, by adhering to the general rules of justice, and keeping the individual case as much as possible out of view, except in so far as it depended on these rules and principles. The only objection to this which he could possibly anticipate was the delay which it would occasion, and the consequent painful suspense in which the individual might thus be involved. But the delay would not be very long, and the individual ought to recollect that he now stood in a situation in which he was sorry that, after what had passed, he had placed himself. After this motion had passed, he would move for a committee to search into the precedents, and, after the report of that committee should be on the table, then his hon. friend would have an opportunity to propose whatever he thought best becoming the dignity of the house, the honour of the profession, and the interests of the public.

Mr. *Spencer Stanhope*, having seconded the motion, would say merely that he had intended to submit to the house, after the disposal of the present motion, a motion similar to that which the noble lord had just declared it was his intention to propose. For the question ought assuredly to come to a solid and impartial decision, and were it even only *pro formâ*, it would be the duty of the house, on such a solemn occasion, to appoint a committee to search the Journals for precedents.

Mr. *W. Herbert* observed, that it was not his intention to oppose the motion; but he felt himself called upon to express his opinion. With regard to the question, it did not appear to him to be one which could rest on precedent. The only question was, whether the house had a primary right of expulsion, and whether it had a right of re-expulsion? Then the only remaining question would be with regard to the propriety of enforcing that right, and whether there were grounds for exercising that discretionary power? The proof of this right could not rest on precedent. No person could deny the existence of the primary right of expulsion. If that was allowed, the other right of re-expulsion must follow as of course. It was a question, consequently, not of precedent, but of principle. He conceived that it was a right which was vested in the house, for the maintenance of its own rights, principles, honour and dignity. He was aware that some persons would argue, that the exercise of such a right by the house trenched upon the right of the electors. That he denied: he conceived it was a right inherent in the house for its own protection. There could be no right in the electors in contradiction to the right of the house; without such a right in the house, accumulated disgrace might attach to its character. The same individual might be sent back to parliament, whom it had stigmatized in the face of Europe and the world. As it seemed to be the opinion of the house that this question should be referred to precedent, he had no objection that it should be put in possession of every possible information, and should therefore not resist the motion.

General *Gascoyne* asked, why the house was to be kept in suspence upon such a question? It appeared to him that the proposition of the noble lord was the suggestion of the member against whom the motion was directed; and yet the noble lord had said, that he should not have risen had it not been for what had fallen from that member. What were the precedents to which the noble lord thought fit to refer the house? If he was inclined to trespass upon the time of the house, he would take every one of the precedents, and would shew that they had no more to do with this question than they had to do with a question of bankruptcy. If the house anxiously wished to see precedents, he had no objection; but upon the principle of their conveying any information to the house, he was against the motion. There was one precedent before the house upon which the house could not be mistaken. There was the precedent, that John Fenton Cawthorne was, for infamous and ungentlemanlike conduct in the year 1796, expelled the house. Till that could be erased from the Journals of the house, there could not be a precedent more decisive. He was sorry that the decision might hurt the feelings of the member to whom it was referred, but he had himself rendered the discussion necessary. Supposing there was not to be found any precedent which aplied to the present case, was the house to make one merely to cover that which was disgraceful and infamous? If a precedent was to be made, let it be one for the punishment of a sinner, and not to conceal his iniquity. What the house should decide, would become a precedent, for it was to the glory of the nation, and the honour of the military character, that there was no case directly in point. If the object of the noble lord was delay, he could assure him it would answer no purpose, for the question should certainly be decided. He trusted it was not to be supposed that the noble lord meant to throw the broad shield of power over the member who had so conducted himself. If such a construction could be put upon the motion, he hoped the noble lord would withdraw it.

Lord *Folkestone* thought that the two last gentlemen who had addressed the house had mistaken the question, which was merely, whether the proceedings of 1796 should be read. He hoped it would not be assumed by the hon. gent. opposite, that his arguments had been assented to, because they had not been answered. The hon. gent. seemed averse to going into a committee, and had stated that there was no precedent that applied to the present case. He could assure him that he was so convinced there was not a precedent, that he intended to have made a similar motion to that which the noble lord had suggested; and the noble lord would allow him to state, that there being no precedent was a strong argument to bring forward in answer to a proposition for expelling a member, and therefore he should support the noble lord's proposition. There was an expression used by the same hon. gent., and also by the noble lord, with reference to the disagreeable feelings the discussion might excite. They had observed, that if such disagreeable feelings were experienced, the person must thank himself. He admitted, that upon a question of this kind, personal feelings must be left entirely out of the case; but he thought it extremely unfair to prejudice the house, by stating that a member had put himself in a situation in which disagreeable feelings were likely to be excited. Perhaps, it might turn out that the person alluded to had as much right to sit in this house as any other member. In such case, it would be peculiarly unjust to reproach him with having placed himself in a situation in which he was liable to have his feelings wounded. It was his wish, and he hoped it was the wish of every one, to have this question decided as speedily as possible.

The *Attorney-General* said, that his only motive for assenting to the motion which the hon. general had made, was that of which notice had been given by the noble lord. If the noble lord had not announced his intention of moving the house that search should be made in the Journals for that information which the Journals afforded, he was quite free to declare that he should have given the motion of the hon. general his immediate negative, undismayed by any of those menaces he had often heard uttered in that house. He should have thought it his duty to the public, his duty to the law of the land, his duty to the constitution of the country, his duty to the rights of the electors of the country, who formed the constituting body of the house of commons, to have given his immediate and decided negative to the motion. He should have done so, because he was at a loss to conceive that the minutes proposed to be read before the house, could be made the ground of any proceedings by a parliament recently elected, and because he thought that the house would have been justified in putting a negative on a proposition for the adoption of any proceedings upon such a ground. He should have done so, because he should have thought it his duty to have guarded against trusting himself with any power that was not subject to law, and to those rules, in the exercise of which he had some system to act upon. He should have rejected those rules of proceeding, by which he was called upon to consult the feelings he might more or less kindly entertain towards a particular individual. He should not have been less disposed to have done so when it was proposed that he was to act upon the sentence of such a court as had been described; not that he had any thing to say to the prejudice of such a court, or its utility for the purposes for which it was instituted for military offences;—for offences truly military, he believed a Court Martial was the most proper tribunal. But to ask him at once, without his knowing whether there were any precedents to make the sentence of a court martial, in which there was no trial by jury, no challenge of jurors, in fact, none of the privileges that constituted the trial by jury—to ask him to inflict a penalty that never attached to any sentence of a court of common law, was to ask him to do that to which it was impossible he could assent; and particularly when, at the same time, he was required to adopt such a principle, he was to be denied the means of informing himself, and no precedent whatever was offered. He trusted such a proposition would be discountenanced. He had thought it necessary to trouble the house with his opinion thus early, on account of the manner in which the question had been treated. The noble lord had been cautioned not to throw the shield of power over the member to whom the discussion referred. The noble lord had not thrown the shield of power over the member. He had thrown the shield of the constitution over the member, as he hoped he would over every member, if he should stand in need of it. There had been allusions made to certain fanciful notions of honour and dishonour, which could never be made the ground of any rational proceedings in any court of justice. It was impossible that the house could found proceedings on any maxims or principles of such a nature. He believed that the electors of this country, as long as they possessed those feelings which an attachment to their own rights and the constitution of the country was calculated excite, would be convinced, that those who opposed the motion of the hon. general were the true friends of their rights, and of the constitution.

Mr. *Bragge Bathurst* said, that it was necessary for him, who had been a member of the parliament in which the member referred to had been expelled, to vindicate it from something that had fallen from a learned gent. (the attorney-general) who was not a member of that parliament. He begged to be understood as not wishing to enter into the question, either of the propriety of searching for precedents, or of reading the proceedings of the house. As to the question of searching for precedents, no material objection had been made. He could have wished that in this early stage of the discussion, the consideration of personal feelings had not been introduced. It could have no other effect than that of preventing the cool and dispassionate decision of the question. However, it was only his intention to notice what had fallen from the learned gent. Did he mean to say that the proceedings of the court martial were not now, or were not then, a proper ground for the house to exercise a privilege not disputed, of expelling one of its members? No such opinion, he was persuaded, had been maintained in the house when the question was determined by the last parliament. It appeared to him that the question ought to be disentangled of all legal niceties. It was monstrous to say, that if the house was satisfied there was such a body of crime proved to have existed, whether the crime was of a military nature or in a moral view, that it had not power to act. But the learned gent. should have stated what he meant by a crime purely military; a crime might be military, and yet, in the course of the enquiry before a court martial, there might arise, as in this instance, a case of moral turpitude. The ground on which he apprehended parliament decided was, that there was such a *corpus delicti*, as fully justified them in the exercise of their power. It was impossible to carry the question before a court where it could have been better decided. When it came on again before the present parliament, he trusted that no objection would be made on the ground of the defect of evidence, or any statute of limitation which seemed to be hinted at, as if this parliament could not look at the same evidence that had been given during a previous parliament. If it was fit to re-exercise a right now, which had been exercised before, there could be no difficulty. If the exercise of the right was not bad then, it could not be bad now. The only question was, whether the house could re-expel a member who had been expelled by a former parliament?

The *Attorney-General*, in explanation, declared that he never meant to question the grounds of the proceeding in the last parliament; a subject on which he was not sufficiently informed. If the house thought that the evidence (independent of the sentence) was conclusive, they had been right in doing as they had done. All that he had said was, that any sentence, and more especially any military sentence, must be an insufficient ground for such a proceeding.

Captain *Herbert* asked, if the learned gent. thought the sentence of a court martial too flimsy a ground of proceeding, what ground would he expect? The learned gent. was in error when he said that no right existed in the person tried by a court martial to challenge his judges. It was both the right and the practice. He was surprised how the learned gent. could think as he had expressed himself, without deeming the act of the last parliament a flagrant injustice.

The *Attorney-General* denied having used the word flimsy, as applied to the sentence of a court martial.

General *Gascoyne* stated, in explanation, that he did not say the broad shield of government had been thrown over the delinquent. He only cautioned the noble lord to avoid doing any thing which might be so misconstrued; nor did he say that the house should take the proceedings of a court martial for their guide; although he differed from the learned gent. on his notions of honour, he was as willing to abide by the honour of a court martial, as the decision of a court of justice.

Lord *William Russell* observed, that although this question had been already discussed and decided, still there was no reason why the house should not, under the present circumstances, exercise its discretion, and come to an opinion.

Mr. *R. Ward* did not rise to detain the house by entering into the merits of this question, his object merely was, to receive further explanations from the learned gent. (the attorney-general) as to his application of fanciful notions of honour, &c. to courts martial.

The *Attorney-General* declared, that he did not apply the words honour or dishonour to a court martial; he had already stated, that the acceptation of proceeding on any such fanciful phrase would not be received in a court of justice.

Mr. *Adam* was exceedingly sorry to feel himself obliged to trouble the house on this subject, after the ample discussion it had undergone in this preliminary stage; but the warmth of some members having superseded the perfect good humour with which the noble lord had introduced his motion, made him rise, in the hope of establishing the question on its original ground; and certainly he must confess, that the mode proposed by the noble lord appeared to him the best which the nature and importance of the case demanded. It was a proceeding founded on the principles of the constitution, to which every member was willing to submit, at the same time that it maintained the dignity of the house, and the regularity of its proceedings. He was a little surprised to hear a distinction taken between principle and precedent; for his part, he did not think there was any, as applied to this case, for the one would be found to contain the other; or, to be more explicit, he thought that precedent contained principle. He was old enough to remember the proceedings in 1764, on the expulsion of Wilkes for his publication of the North Briton; he also well remembered the question agitated respecting the same individual in 1769, on which occasion he was in the minority. It must be in the recollection of many members of the house, that in 1782 the expulsion previously voted had been reversed, and all the resolutions respecting it expunged from the journals by a majority, of which he was one. Though this was not a case in point, yet he apprehended that it settled the law of parliament on the subject of expulsion. Having made these loose observations with a view of bringing the question only before the house, he should conclude therefore with trusting that the motion of the noble lord would be adopted, being the best in any point of view which could, in his opinion, be suggested.

Mr. *Hurst* was astonished that a person of the ability of the learned gent. who spoke last, should say that there was no distinction between principle and precedent. They were far as the poles asunder. Precedent might illustrate, but did not constitute a principle. He would support the motion for searching precedents, however, as they would shew what had been done in similar cases, if there were any. If there were no precedents, then we must resort to the principle, and make a precedent for the future.—The motion was then agreed to, and the sentence of the court martial, and the proceedings of parliament thereon in the session of 1795-6 read in brief; after which it was moved by

Lord *Howick*, that a committee be appointed to examine into the journals of that house, and the records of parliament, for precedents of cases, in which members had been expelled by that house, who had been returned to it, and to report thereon to the house.

Mr. *Spencer Stanhope*, in seconding the motion, thought it his duty to abstain from giving any opinion upon the case by anticipation, one way or the other.

Mr. *Bankes* perfectly agreed with the noble lord as to the course of proceeding which he recommended, but thought, that as the motion was worded, it would narrow the view of the case. Gentlemen conversant with the records of that house, would be aware, that of cases similar to the present there were none, and of analogous cases extremely few. There were many cases to be found, which, as the motion was worded, the committee would think themselves bound to report. He thought, therefore, that it would be desireable to make the words of the motion larger, in order to come at the main spring upon which the house acted in such cases, which would enable them to discharge their painful duty in this instance. The hon. gent. suggested to enlarge the words of the motion to all cases of expulsion, distinguishing those in which the expelled members had been again returned.

Lord *Howick* adopted the suggestion of the hon. gent., and moved, "that, a committee be appointed to examine the journals of this house, and records of parliament for precedents of cases of members who have been expelled by this house, and for what causes they have been so expelled, and also of cases in which members, having been expelled by this house, have been again returned; and to report the same to the house, together with the proceedings thereon:" which was agreed to.

[PETITION OF THE ELECTORS OF LANCASTER RESPECTING MR. CAWTHORNE.] Lord *George Cavendish* proposed to present a petition to the house from a very considerable number of the freemen of Lancaster. It had been put into his hands as he came into the house, and he thought it his duty to present it. But in doing this he would not pledge himself to any opinion upon the case. As he had been a member of the court martial whose sentence had been alluded to, he should abstain from taking any share in those discussions. Of the contents of the petition he was ignorant, but if the house would consent to receive it, they would be enabled to judge of its contents when it should be read at the table.—The petition was then ordered to be brought up and read. It stated, "that the petitioners have been informed, that some measure, not being a petition from any party interested, is depending before the house, having for its object to prevent them from being represented in parliament by John Fenton Cawthorne, esq., one of the members chosen at the last general election to represent the borough of Lancaster in parliament: That the petitioners submit, that, according to the uniform practice in such cases, the legality of any election of a member of the house cannot be questioned, unless the same is made the subject of a petition presented to the house within 14 days from the first meeting of parliament after such election; and that any attempt to invalidate such election, by any other means than such as are specified in the several statutes in such case made and provided, must be contrary to law, and ought to be discouraged by the house: but, if it is not intended to bring into question the legality of the election of the said J. F. Cawthorne, and the same is admitted to be a legal election, then the petitioners humbly submit, that the house has no jurisdiction to exclude from the privilege of sitting and voting as a member of parliament any person who has become a member of the house by a lawful election, except for some matter arising subsequent to such election to disqualify such member from sitting and voting: That the petitioners having elected the said J. F. Cawthorne, with a full knowledge of all the circumstances which they are informed are now to be made the grounds of his expulsion, submit, with the greatest confidence, that unless such circumstances amounted to a legal disability to sit in the house of commons (in which case the petitioners submit that the question ought to be tried upon a petition, and before a select committee,) the exercise of a power by the house of commons, to defeat such election would be subversive of the rights of electors in general, and highly injurious to the petitioners, who insist they have a right to return to the house any person as their representative not previously disqualified by any known rule of law: and therefore praying, that no such measures may be adopted by the house, and that they may be heard against any such measure, by themselves, or their counsel, at the bar of the house." On the motion that the petition do lie on the table,

Captain *Herbert* asked the noble lord who presented it, whether it was really the petition of the freemen of Lancaster? If it was, it appeared to him not to be in the light of a petition, but as a dictatorial and insolent attempt to controul parliament. The last paragraph appeared most reprehensible, where they acknowledged that they were acquainted with all the infamy that was the object of the motion. This admission would almost justify the house in disfranchising the borough. (A loud cry of no! no!) There certainly could be no doubt that a person declared incapable of serving his majesty in any capacity, was not fit for any trust.

Lord *G. Cavendish* replied, that it had been put into his hands by persons of respectability, and was signed also by persons of character. He could only say, like most members who presented petitions, that he believed it to have been subscribed by those whose names appeared to it.

Mr. *Cawthorne* observed, that the hon. gent. had taken up the question very warmly, but appeared to be totally unacquainted with the circumstances of the case. He could shew him an alphabetical list of the subscribers to the petition, which had been taken from the list of the freemen of Lancaster, and transmitted to him. Amongst them were the names of the chairman and magistrates of the quarter sessions, and many land-owners in the hundreds about the town. It was not by any personal considerations that he was influenced on this occasion, but by a regard to the rights of the gentlemen who had sent him to that house.

Mr. *Spencer Stanhope* observed, that this was a petition against a motion made, though no proceeding had taken place on the subject to which it alluded, till a few minutes ago. This was strange conduct, for which he did not think there was any precedent.

Lord *Stanley* was of opinion, that this petition was of a nature so dictatorial, that it ought not to be suffered to remain upon the table of the house; but he would not agree, that it would justify a disfranchisement of the borough, because that would confound the innocent with the guilty. The petition was in the hands of the noble lord before any motion was made on the subject, or the petitioners could know whether their rights would be affected thereby. The petition was dictatorial, and presumed to lay down the law, and therefore ought not to be laid on the table.

Mr. *S. Bourne* entered his protest against the doctrines that had been laid down by the noble lord, and by the hon. gent. who had contended, that the language of the petition was so improper, as to justify the disfranchisement of the borough. The petitioners had a right to petition, if they apprehended, no matter upon what ground, that their rights were in danger of being invaded. The language of the petition was the same with the language recorded upon the Journals of the house, that an attempt to invalidate a return, where the person was not legally disqualified, was subversive of the rights of electors. Had not the petitioners a right to use the same language as the house? He had risen only to protest against such novel and unconstitutional doctrines, in order that it might not be supposed, if they were suffered to pass unnoticed, that they were assented to in that house.

Mr. *S. Stanhope* appealed to the speaker, whether it was consistent with the forms and practice of the house to receive a petition against any proceeding not immediately under consideration of the house.

The *Speaker*, as he had been appealed to, felt himself bound to declare, that he had always understood, and had collected from the proceeding of that house, that they opened their doors wide for receiving the petitions of all his majesty's subjects, whether with respect to grievances, real or apprehended, and that the only indispensable requisite in a petition, to intitle it to the consideration of that house was, that it should be couched in language not offensive.

Lord *Howick* agreed in the sentiments of the hon. gent. opposite (Mr. S. Bourne), and entirely concurred in the doctrine, laid down by the chair, that a petition from the subject was entitled to the attention of that house, provided it was not couched in offensive language. The language of this petition seemed not to be of that description, for the petitioners humbly submitted that the apprehended proceeding would be subversive of the rights of electors. They should not construe too technically the letter of the petition.—The petition was ordered to lie on the table.

[NAVY ESTIMATES.] On the motion of Mr. T. Grenville, the house went into a committee of supply upon the Navy Estimates for the current year.

Mr. *T. Grenville* rose, in pursuance of his motion, to move for a vote of 10,000 seamen, in addition to the 120,000 already granted. In moving a resolution to that effect, he felt it necessary to make some observation in reference to a charge of supposed neglect that had come from the other side of the house, upon the ground of the necessity of this additional supply not having been foreseen, when the late grant was made, for that nothing possibly could have occurred since the late demand was complied with to justify a subsequent demand for an additional vote of seamen. It would be found, however, upon examination, that his conduct had been, in this instance, strictly regular, and was to be justified upon the usual grounds of proceeding; the accounts ending the 30th of Sept. took in the estimates but for three-fourths of the year, and it was not for him to decide competently until furnished with the remaining quarterly account, ending the 31st Dec. In time of war the levies for each succeeding month are regulated by the report of the past month's recruiting, which however in such a crisis is never to be checked beyond a certain limit. It was a great satisfaction to him to state to the committee, that it appeared by this last quarter's estimates, that the number of British seamen exceeded 126,000 men, and that this considerable increase had taken place within the last five months. It might appear a question, why, if the numbers had exceeded by more than 6000 the ordinary supply, there should now be a further demand for an additional 10,000. When gentlemen came to consider the variety of increased expenditure in the department relative to the marines, they might be led to think this difficulty sufficiently obviated. And here he would take occasion freely to state his sentiments upon a subject that had not been as yet, in his opinion, satisfactorily propounded. He alluded to the present mode of submitting to the house the naval supplies, and contended that, according to that mode, it was impossible that the members could be put in possession of all the information that was indispensably necessary to their forming a right judgment upon the estimates required; the mode of proceeding hitherto adopted seemed to be grounded upon a scale of arithmetical reasoning, which could not be brought to apply; at present the allowance for the 120,000 voted was at the rate of 7*l.* per man; before the session of 1797, it was but 4*l.* per man; and until the allowance was increased, the naval debt was progressively increasing to a most inconvenient disproportion. As he thought that gentlemen should be possessed of the most minute details, he took this opportunity of acquainting the committee that he had in contemplation so to arrange the statement of the naval estimate in future, (should he have the honour of again submitting the estimates to any future committee) as to render them clear and intelligible to every gentleman who might be anxious to examine them minutely; he was at the same time aware that there were estimates of a nature that made it impossible to give such in detail—as, for instance, all those arising from the unforeseen damages, losses, and accidents, to which the sea service was so peculiarly liable. Gentlemen must see that in cases of such uncertainty, there could be no room for calculation, even of a general kind, much less of an exact detail of the minute expences. He felt confident in saying, that where it was admissible, the plan in contemplation would be found to be eminently qualified for removing all the many difficulties that had hitherto precluded gentlemen the necessary information, and he spoke with more confidence in its praise, because the labour had not been his own. To give gentlemen a clearer idea of the advantages expected to result from the proposed plan of statement, he should trouble them with an enumeration of the distinct heads under which the different articles of detail should be arranged. The first should be a reference to wages to officers; 2d, seamen; 3d, marines; 4th, and 5th, pilotage and wages; 6th, wear and tear, which would be found to be a most important and comprehensive head of expence; 7th, pensions; 8th, salaries to the admiralties, &c.; 9th, workmen in yards, &c.; 10th, rebuilding ships in merchants' yards by contract; 11th, hired armed ships; 12th, the most difficult branch of all others to detail, purchase of stores to replenish his majesty's magazines, an article in itself requiring no less a sum than 3,600,000*l.*; the 13th head he should entitle bills of exchange; 14th, incidental expences; and 15th and last, the victualling board. Under the above 15 heads, it was proposed that every minutia of charge should be fully detailed, each classed under its respective article, so that any gentleman anxious for minute examination, would have only to turn to the index, that would refer him at the instant to the point upon which he wished for information. As a proof of the necessity of such an arrangement, he would beg leave to mention one instance, that of the navy estimates, including a charge of 600,000*l.* for the victualling bills for the army in garrisons abroad. This surely was going beyond the naval department, and consequently introducing much confusion in the public accounts. The last estimate he had to submit to the committee, was six months' salary due to the commissioners of naval revision. This commission would have expired in December last, but as the gentlemen composing it had applied to him for further time, specifying that it would be of importance, that an abrupt stop to their labours hitherto should not now defeat the result of them; to such an application the hon. member said, that he thought it his duty to concede, though at the same time he must say, much as he individually respected the talents and experience of the gentlemen composing this commission, still he thought the commission inconvenient in its operation, and not the most infallible in some of its suggestions. While the same person was at the head of the admiralty, and this commission, no such inconvenience was to be dreaded. He could not approve of the report, that considered general establishments of pay, as connected with the pay of all officers whatever, or that recommended increase of pay to the officers in the dock-yards. The right hon. gent. then concluded with moving his first resolution—"That it is the opinion of this committee that 10,000 additional seamen be raised for the service of the year 1807, including 2,400 royal marines."

Mr. *Johnstone* thought the right hon. gent. certainly satisfactory in the clear and comprehensive view he took of his proposed improvement in the way of presenting the navy estimates for the future to that house. He, however, did not think the gentleman equally satisfactory in explaining why this additional grant of seamen had not been moved for when the 120,000 men were voted. He could not reconcile it to his mind that it was satisfactory to hear that the first lord of the admiralty did not know upon the 30th of September the number of seamen in the service. He was, however, glad to hear this promise of detail, and hoped it would be extended to articles of expenditure, as well as of supply; he hoped that the estimates might be printed, and did not see why (if the measures suggested by the commission of revision were censurable) the right hon. gent. acceded to them the indulgence of six months' grace.

Mr. *Rose* maintained that there was nothing either new or difficult in the way of making up the estimates as proposed by the right hon. member. He had it within his knowledge that it might be effected within a few days labour.

Mr. *Perceval* thought it no ground for not continuing the commission of review, to say that its suggestions were not approved of by his majesty's ministers, because nothing was more possible than that that commission might suggest measures as wise as his majesty's ministers could do.

Lord *H. Petty* said, that the commission of revision had never been recommended by the commissioners of naval enquiry. He thought, however, his right hon. friend right in not putting an abrupt close to the proceedings of the commission, particularly as it had been stated that the said proceedings would be brought to their desired issue within six months. With respect to what had fallen from a right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Rose), as to the facility of stating the accounts in the form proposed, he begged leave to ask why the gentleman himself had not before adopted a method so easy and so desireable?

Admiral *Markham* said, that when he applied upon a former occasion for the accounts of repairs done in ship-merchants' yards, the answer he received from gentlemen then in power was, that it was a thing impossible to be effected.

Mr. *Perceval* denied that he had said that the commissioners of review had been recommended by the naval enquiry commissioners.

Mr. *Rose*, to prove the justice of his allegations, was willing to lay before the house a minute statement of all the charges for the last 8 or 10 years he was in office.

Mr. *T. Grenville* asked, if it was fair or consistent, in the same instant, to censure him for laying the accounts before the committee in the usual way, and when he proposed a fuller and more satisfactory way of doing the same, to charge him with neglect, because he had not sooner made the discovery. As to granting a longer existence to the commissioners, he did not feel that it involved him in dilemma: the commissioners required time to wind up their labour, and he should have thought it a waste of all the former time and expence, if they were not continued the six months longer.

Mr. *Rose* read at the table a detailed account of the items of charge for foreign and home stores, &c. from the 12th of March, 1798; and contended from it, that he had already done that which was now to be called a new discovery.

Mr. *T. Grenville* was astonished at the suspicion which seemed to be entertained by the gentlemen on the other side, that because he wished to have the accounts of the navy laid before parliament in a more detailed and intelligible shape than they had hitherto been, he therefore meant any reflection upon those who had preceded him in office. He could assure gentlemen that he had no intention whatever to act with any such hostility. The right hon. gentleman who had just sat down had stated, that such accounts as he desired for the information of parliament, were made out in the offices for several years back, and had gone out of the house to produce a paper to shew that; but all that he could say to that was, that he could never find such accounts in any of the offices. The old and ordinary mode of making out the accounts was all that he could discover, and that he wished to amend. And surely that wish which it appeared was in direct consonance with that which the right hon. gent. alleged to have been the practice, in a way that did not officially appear, could not be deemed any reproach either upon himself or his predecessors, by whom the right hon. gent. ascertained that wish was entertained and acted upon.

Mr. *Rose* disclaimed the suspicions imputed to him. The right hon. gent. was not among those whom he supposed capable of censuring the conduct of his right hon. friend. All he meant to say with respect to the accounts referred to, was this, that his late right hon. friend had been in the habit, for several years, of obtaining similar accounts from the office of the comptroller of the navy.

Mr. *Vansittart* declared that he had never seen such an account in the treasury, and maintained that such an account as that alluded to by his right hon. friend, was continually necessary, in order to enable ministers to make out correct estimates, and also to render to parliament a correct account of the public expenditure.

Sir *J. Newport* took occasion to complain of the conduct of public officers in not leaving in their offices any official documents which might be communicated to them. He was sorry to say that this conduct was particularly remarkable in the office which he had the honour to occupy, as upon his accession to it he did not find a single paper relative to previous official proceedings, at least on this side of the channel. Papers which contained any official information, and which were communicated for public purposes, ought, as appeared to him, to be in no case removed from the proper offices, as they belonged not to the persons who might occupy any particular office, but to the public.

Mr. *Rose* stated, that the paper he had was his own property, as it was a case for which he himself paid, and that the original ought to be in the treasury.

Mr. *Ruthven* asked where the original was, in what office, and what denomination?

Mr. *Rose* did not know what particular place, as he was not keeper of the papers. The motion for the grant of 10,000 men was agreed to, as were the following motions: 240,500*l.* for wages for ditto, for 13 months; 247,000*l.* for victualling, &c.; 390,000*l.* for wear and tear of ships; 32,500*l.* for ordnance; 1,135,434*l.* for the ordinaries of the navy; 2,134,903*l.* for building ships in merchants' yards, and other extra expences; 1,500,000*l.* for the hire of transports; 300,000*l.* for sick and wounded seamen; 500,000*l.* for prisoners of war.

Mr. *Vansittart* moved the following sums for miscellaneous service: 6,853*l.* for the superintendance of aliens; 12,000*l.* for defraying the expences of the public office in Bow Street; 51,350*l.* for convicts at home; 15,000*l.* for contingencies in the offices of the three secretaries of state; 12,000*l.* for messengers for the secretaries' offices, &c.; 175,000*l.* for foreign and secret service money; 20,000*l.* for law charges; 3,000*l.* for the expence of prosecuting those concerned in the forgery of coin, &c.; 11,600*l.* for sheriffs of counties to defray the extra expence incurred in the conviction of felons, &c.; 140,199*l.* for the relief of French, Dutch, and Corsican emigrants, and also of American loyalists; 1,432*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.* to pay the balance advanced for ditto in 1806; 1,336*l.* for the relief of poor dissenting ministers, and French refugees; 1,828*l.* for the use of a certain class of ministers; 1,934*l.* for stationery, &c. to the court of exchequer, &c.; 5,210*l.* for the salaries and other expences of certain offices connected with both houses of parliament; 39,760*l.* to defray the expence of certain improvements that have been made, and are still to be made in the buildings of both houses of parliament; 11,800*l.* to make good the vote of last session for defraying the expence of certain additions to the houses of parliament, and also to that of the speaker; 4,993*l.* for paying the expence of military roads in North Britain.—The several motions were agreed to, the house resumed, and the report was ordered to be brought up on Monday.

[ARMY ESTIMATES.] Mr. Hobhouse brought up the report of the Army Estimates. Upon the first resolution being read,

Sir *James Pulteney* rose. He said, that considering the lateness of the hour, he should confine himself to a very few observations. As to the new military system being productive of an immediate supply for the army, it was now proved that it had not had that effect; and although the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) might not have been very sanguine as to the number that it might raise, yet it must be supposed that the advocates of the system did expect that it would at least produce some increase; whereas, on the contrary, it appeared by the estimates that it had occasioned a diminution. In order to make room for this system, which had only produced 5000 men in a year, we had repealed a former system which had produced 15,000. However his majesty's ministers might hope that this measure would ultimately be beneficial, he must ask them, did not they consider that some supply was necessary for the army in the present year, and whether any of their measures had a tendency to procure that supply? The hon. secretary at war had contented himself with saying, no bad effects have been yet felt from this measure; he thought, however, that he should have gone a little farther, and shewed that some good effects had been produced by it. As to the training bill, it was a measure he extremely wished to be carried into effect. If ever there was a moment in which the measure was necessary, it was no less necessary at the present moment. The danger was not to be despised because it was somewhat distant; but, on the contrary, we should take that opportunity of being fully prepared to meet it when it should come. If the bill ever was a good one, it ought now to be carried into effect; but if, in the opinion of parliament, it was a bad bill, it ought to be repealed. As to the volunteers, although it had been said by a noble lord that they were as numerous now as at any former time, yet it was notorious that there was by no means the same attendance at drills and musters that there was formerly, and that consequently the force could not be so effective.

Sir *John Doyle* rose and addressed the house as follows.—Sir; I admit that it would be much more convenient to agree to the adjournment proposed by the hon. member (Mr. Rose), though it certainly does not come with the best grace from this side of the house [the general spoke from the opposition bench], for, in their long calculations, they forgot to calculate *time*. (A laugh.) Before I observe upon what has fallen in the course of this discussion, I wish, sir, to account for my addressing you from this side of the house, differing so materially as I do upon this subject from the gentlemen who usually sit here. I have not, in truth, come into their camp to spy the nakedness of the land; but speak from this side for reasons, perhaps, similar to those of some of my neighbours; because we cannot get good *places* at the other side. [This created a general burst of laughter throughout the house.] I perfectly concur with my hon. friend who spoke last (sir James Pulteney), that we ought to have an augmented, a well-organised, and well-disciplined army; that we should allow no relaxation of our efforts to obtain that desirable object; because I feel that the perils which call for that army are by no means abated; that although danger is at a distance, it is not at an end. But yet I differ most materially from my hon. friend as to the means of providing the army we require. I differ from him, particularly, as to his opinion respecting the Additional Force act. That act appears to me to have done almost every thing but what it professed to have in view. When it was active, it was mischievous; when it was inactive only, it was tolerable. After 18 months trial, it was found defective, but then ministers were just going to mend it. This puts me in mind of one of our poets, who was very deformed, and who was in the habit of exclaiming, "God mend me!" and having once uttered it before a country clown—"mend thee!" quoth Hodge, "it would be easier to make a dozen new ones, than mend such an ill-formed one as thou art." So it may be said of this act. (A laugh.) The time they proposed for the amendment, reminds me of the story of a certain priest's maid, who, when found fault with for having omitted to do any thing, her constant reply was, "I was just going to do it." The priest, to try how far she would carry her excuses, asked her, why she had not washed his books and papers? "Lord, sir," replied she, "I was just going to do it." (A loud laugh.) In this they (the late ministers) seemed to have resembled duke Wharton's puppies, who never opened their eyes till they were in the act of drowning. The Parish bill was to aid the ordinary recruiting; but in this it followed the French example, and began by cutting off the resources of its new ally; whereas the plan of the right hon. secretary is calculated to produce a good regular income, without racking the tenantry. It appears from the statement of the noble lord (Howick), that since it has begun to operate, it has produced more men, for a similar period, than the Parish bill and ordinary recruiting put together, even without including the enlistments at head quarters, and the desertions considerably diminished; and here I must say, that the right hon. secretary has not treated his measure so well as the measure has treated him, by having lost so much time in carrying it into effect. I will not follow the noble lord (Castlereagh) in his infinite series of diverging calculation, which, rapidly accumulating in its progress, was to overwhelm the country with the expence of providing for its brave and worn-out defenders. A calculation that would deprive the veteran of a chance of spending, in calm repose, the evening of that day he had dedicated to the service of his country, and bring "his grey hairs with sorrow to the grave." A calculation which stooped to visit the truckle-bed of infirmity, in Chelsea and Kilmainham hospitals. A calculation which wanted nothing but just data to stand upon; thereby following the mode of demonstration ascribed by Mr. Locke to a certain class of unhappy people, who always reason right from wrong principles. (A laugh.)—I am perfectly willing to pay every tribute to the eloquence of the noble lord, and his right hon. friend. I cannot, however, but deeply lament, that it should, at such a moment, be employed in obstructing that unanimity so essential to the interests of the country, and which gentlemen themselves profess to have so much at heart; for, surely, there never was a period in the annals of our history, when unanimity was so imperiously demanded: for a nation, no more than a house, divided against itself, can long stand. But I am not so romantic as to suppose that political hostility shall be for ever buried in oblivion. I had only hoped it would have been allowed to sleep, till the great object of national security was perfect and complete. I am aware, sir, that in a free country like this, an opposition is a wholesome check upon ministers: if so, the greater the talents in opposition, the more effectual the check. Now, as every man must admit the present opposition to possess great talents, it follows, as a natural corollary, that, the longer the present gentlemen remain in that state, the better for their country. (A laugh.) But, to give them greater weight, I would humbly recommend they should adopt the words, as they have done the arguments, of M. Talleyrand, and make them serve as a proemium to their speeches against the treasury bench—"nous ne vous demandons rien;" in plain English, "we seek for nothing that you possess." (A laugh.) The noble lord alluded to the negociation, which I am the more surprised at, after the unanimous vote of the house, approving of the measures that had been taken to uphold the character of the country in that transaction. The proposition originated with France—the negociation commenced under auspices the most propitious. At the head of the foreign department was that minister (Mr. Fox) whose loss the nation so justly deplores—a man who, amid the endowments of a mighty mind, was peculiarly gifted with those qualities which fitted him for negociation in difficult times. To a vast, comprehensive, and cultivated understanding, he joined the most intimate knowledge of the various interests of Europe, a suavity of manner, and a spirit of conciliation, engaged foreign ministers to treat, while his probity and known honour insured the confidence of their masters. Devoid of guile, he had nothing equivocal in his conduct—nothing ambiguous in his language. He moved straight onward to his object, without turning aside into the winding ways of crooked policy or left-handed wisdom. There was nothing counterfeit in him—his affability flowed from the heart—his natural greatness required not the aid of assumed arrogance to give him consequence; he was too great to be haughty, too wise to be cunning. He was one of the few statesmen who knew the value of that adage, which, though homely, is true in politics as in morals, that "honesty is the best policy." Far be it from me to attempt his praise; it would require powers gigantic as his own to do him justice. Were he living, I should be silent. I never received favours at his hand. I leave it to those who have, to treat his memory lightly. I speak of him, as a man who loves his country must do, whilst deploring its brightest ornament. (Hear! hear!) If Mr. Fox were qualified for negociation in general, circumstances rendered him peculiarly so for that with France. His character stood high on the continent, as at home; and a former acquaintance with the prime minister of France, gave a facility in his case, that would not have applied to other ministers, however capable. Thus commenced the negociation; in its whole progress, it was conducted, on the part of England, in the true spirit of peace, and with a sincerity which has always characterized this country. Its rupture was occasioned by the duplicity of a government, whose fidelity to its engagements is measured by no other standard than that of its own immediate interest. If gentlemen were serious in their professions of unanimity, here was a favourable opportunity to display it; for it was not a question of party, but one between France and England, to be tried at the tribunal of the nations of the world; and it was essential to the character of the country, that its good faith should stand contrasted to public view, with the chicane and subtilty of its wily opponent. Whatever differences of opinion may prevail in this house, upon the various topics generally brought before it, there are two points upon which I cannot anticipate much diversity of sentiment; the one, the increased danger to which this country is exposed by recent events upon the continent; the other, the necessity of meeting that danger with the spirit and energy befitting a brave people, determined to be free. With respect to the danger, I believe there are few sceptics; but least of all can they be found in the ranks of those who composed the late administration; for if the alarm they spread throughout the land, was then well founded, in what a multiplied ratio is the danger now increased? But if any man doubt of the danger, let him look at the extent of coast from the Adriatic to the Baltic; the immense population; the numerous well-disciplined and well-commanded armies; and let him consider, that all these resources are at the uncontrolled disposal of that man who has sworn upon his altars eternal hatred to Britain. But I learn, that an idea prevails, that this country is secure as long as she preserves her superiority at sea. No opinion more natural to be formed; no opinion more dangerous to be relied on. If this were true, then indeed might every man in the nation lay his head upon his pillow in perfect security. It is impossible to value more highly, or to feel more proudly than I do, the brilliant achievements of our gallant tars. I know, that when the fleets of France are met by those of England, victory is no longer doubtful; and that the only question now asked by a British commander is, not, what is the force, but, where is the enemy ?—But knowing all this, I also know that the sea is wide, and that the elements are fickle: and ministers must be endowed with supernatural powers; they must "ride in the whirlwind, and direct the storm;" they must be able to tell the sea, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther; here shall thy proud waves be stayed." All this they must do, before I can trust the safety of my country merely to its superiority at sea. It is true, the ports of the enemy are blockaded; and, as it is affectedly expressed, their fleets are hermetically sealed up. As long as this blockade continues, and the seals remain unbroken, the country may be safe; but the same gale that forces our fleets to seek shelter in their own ports, gives free egress to those of the enemy to escape from theirs. What has been, may be; none can forget that the expedition under Hoche was prevented from landing in Ireland, solely by the interposition of a providential hurricane. Now, as I have not learned that ministers have laid in a stock of spare hurricanes, or that they have entered into any commercial treaty with the old ladies at Lapland, who are said to traffick in this article; I cannot conclude the country safe, merely because it is superior at sea. But in stating the danger, I trust none will imagine that I mean to create dismay or despondency. I know that if the danger is great, the spirit and resources of the nation are equal to meet it; but I wish to alarm to vigilance, to excite to caution, and to rouse into action, the energies of the country, for the salvation of the country. But above all things, I am anxious that we should not slumber under the shade of false security, "lest in that sleep we meet death."—Having shewn that government has not been able to restore the blessings of peace, and that the continuation of the war is inevitable; having stated the danger as it appears to me, and having pointed out the fallacy of relying solely upon our naval strength, splendid as its renown is, I now come to the other arm of our national force, so essential in either of the supposed cases. The excellence of our present army is acknowledged by every man in the nation, and it lives in the recollection of the enemies of our country: we are inferior to the enemy in numerical force alone. But to return to the plan of the right hon. secretary. It has been remarked, that this measure of limiting the term of service, would have no effect upon the minds of soldiers, or those likely to become so. Now, I have in my hand, sir, two papers that will shew the futility of an observation so opposite to common reason. The one is the return of a battalion of reserved men, in which, for the six months previous to the new measure, 147 men engaged for general service, while 334 engaged in the six months subsequent to his measure. The other is a still stronger case; for seven months prior to this change, only one man, out of a battalion of 400 men, extended his services; but in the month when the right hon. secretary's plan was explained to the battalion, 264 immediately turned out; thus polling, as it were by acclamation, for his measure. (Hear! hear!) These were good men, fit to be soldiers, capable of a military life, and not such as were received into the army, under the Parish bill; for the recruits obtained under the right hon. secretary's measure are not only superior in quantity, but better in quality, than those furnished by that notable bill. There has been a great difference in the desertions also, as a right hon. gent. has observed. But perhaps it is not quite correct to set down as deserters all those who received bounty under the Parish bill, and were never heard of more—for such fellows never joined, or meant to join any corps, and therefore could not strictly be called deserters, but robbers; and I am not sure that it would be quite incorrect to consider those as accomplices who held out such temptations to them. A great part of those, whom this bill collected, were, in fact, unfit for service; even where they were honest enough to shew a disposition to serve. How many of them have I seen, each bring a wife and six children! The old adage says, that it requires 9 tailors to make a man: but 19 of the fellows I have alluded to, would not make a soldier. They were really for the most part such as Falstaff would be ashamed to march through Coventry. You would in fact imagine that they were raised by a general gaol delivery of the nation, and a discharge of all the parish workhouses. It was, in short, taking a heavy load off the parishes, and transferring it to the army. The force, which is entitled to our confidence, must have the habit, the shape, the character, the soul of an army. I lay it down as a proposition, incontrovertible as any theorem in Euclid, that whatever weapon the enemy assails you with, he must be met by one of equal efficiency. If the enemy were to invade you with the trained bands of Paris, I should be content to meet him with the trained bands of London. But as he will come, *if he can*, with a regular disciplined army, inflated on the one hand by recent victories on the continent, and impelled on the other by the prospective plunder of this country, he must be met by a regular disciplined army, prepared to conquer or to die. But by this allusion, although it naturally induces a reference to the volunteers, I would by no means be understood to speak lightly of that meritorious body. I admired, as much as any man, that brilliant effusion of national spirit and valour, which burst forth so nobly in the hour of danger; and, I have no doubt, that the manifestation of that spirit made a very powerful impression on the enemy. It is not, however, inconsistent with the respect and regard which I always entertained for those gallant men, to express my disapprobation of the system under which they were originally organized and trained. A great deal of unnecessary instruction and inappropriate discipline was, at the outset, attempted to be communicated to them. It did happen to me in America to meet with a circumstance from which I derived much useful information on this head. About 150 recruits were sent out to the regiment of which I was adjutant; I immediately proceeded to have them taught, *secundùm artem*, eyes to the right, toes out, &c. But I was interrupted in my course by the major, who was a very sensible, intelligent man, and who told me, that "I began at the wrong end." I accordingly changed my course, and taught my men to manage the firelock. This was the major's advice, who thought it most necessary, particularly when time pressed, that the men should learn to fire at the enemy, and this proved to be wise, for in three weeks after they arrived, these recruits had to meet the enemy. Now the volunteers ought to have been so instructed, for the invasion by the enemy was almost daily expected at the very time that a kind of discipline was commenced, which they could not learn for months, and which was unnecessary even if they could. They would be extremely useful as auxiliaries to our army, if the enemy landed, particularly from the nature of the country, and their local knowledge, were they merely trained as light troops; in which case, the physical powers of the individual, and his patriotic spirit, would have fair play. Besides, it is the species of force, in which we are the most deficient and which is peculiarly applicable to an inclosed country. But perhaps I ought to apologise for speaking so much upon a military subject, because those who are not military, speak most learnedly upon it. Although, in other cases, men seek to know the practice as well as theory of a subject, before they venture to advise upon it, at least it is but natural that others should enquire, whether they have that knowledge, before their advice is taken. We generally conclude men to have some knowledge of their own profession in the ordinary concerns of life. We don't send our watch to be mended by a shoemaker; unless, indeed, we inverted Horace's rule of "*Omnis sapiens est sutor*;" but even in that case, his further directions should be observed, "*Ne sutor ultra crepidam.*" (Hear! hear!) But I will not proceed farther upon this topic at present, as other opportunities will occur for discussing it. And now let me implore gentlemen to recollect, that the eyes, not only of this country, but of Europe, and of the whole civilized world, are anxiously fixed upon the proceedings of the British senate, as the last remaining prop of expiring liberty. The hopes and destinies of Europe hang upon your decisions: then let it not be said, that the imperial parliament, forgetting the great objects of its dignified character, shall occupy itself with the little disputes of party politics, contending how to get this man in, or to get that man out of the government, instead of employing all its energies to keep out the arch-enemy of all legitimate governments. We are engaged in no ordinary warfare: we contend with no common enemy, unless, indeed, the common enemy of mankind. He has sworn vengeance. Your sins are of a nature he cannot forgive. You are loyal, content, and free; you aggravate these crimes, you resolve to continue free. Your punishment would be extirpation. He comes not for conquest only, neither would pillage satiate his wrath. Desolation and destruction are his objects;—the *Delenda Carthago* he applies to you. The existence of all you hold dear is at stake—property, liberty, life. Be but unanimous—banish party dissentions, let every hand and heart be joined in the common cause. Be but vigilant—let him advance—he will be met by free men, determined to lose their liberties but with their lives. (Loud cries of hear! hear!)

Mr. *Johnstone* contended, that the statements made on a former evening by the noble lord (Castlereagh) had hitherto remained unanswered. He congratulated, however, the gentlemen on the other side, on the new discovery they had made respecting the merits of the administration of a noble viscount (Sidmouth). After having, at a former period, heaped upon that noble viscount as a minister every term of reprobation which their imagination could conceive, they had at length found out that his administration was the most energetic of any for these three years past. As to the boasted measure of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) for recruiting the army, it must be evident that it had completely failed. This appeared from the right hon. gentleman's own statement. It could not be expected that it would produce any other result. Was it by frittering away the bounty of the country in pennies and twopences that an army was to be raised? Was it not rather by holding out splendid rewards, which, though only falling to the lot of a few, were inducements to the many, that an army was to be expected to be created? Ministers however, had not recurred to any thing of this nature, they had rather chosen to go on in the old way, and to grant promotions only to favour and to connections. What was to prevent them from recruiting from the militia? According to the right hon. gent.'s plan, the militia were to be reduced to 40,000 men; from the surplus number, therefore, the army might be strongly recruited. Yet, notwithstanding the ease with which this mode of recruiting might be resorted to, it had not been adopted. Why, the real reason he believed to be, because ministers were afraid of offending the militia colonels. This, of course, they could not state in that house, but this he believed to be the real reason. It had again been stated by a right hon. secretary of the treasury this evening, that he (Mr. J.) had pledged himself to make a motion respecting the conduct of ministers relative to their professions of economy. He thought it necessary therefore again to deny, that he had so pledged himself. At the same time, he conceived that ministers had acted wholly contrary to their professions of economy, and that all they had done was to give salaries to themselves, and with respect to salary granted to one of them he did intend to make it a subject of discussion in that house. The hon. gent. proceeded to enter into an examination of the estimates, contending that there was no proof whatever in them of economy, and particularly noticing the item of contingencies, which was stated at 52,000*l.* Upon another point also he wished for some satisfactory information, which was, what were the nature of the duties executed by the muster-master general of Ireland, and why it was thought necessary for that office to be executed by two persons?

Mr. *Rose* expressed his regret at being obliged to detain the house at so late an hour, but he felt it his duty to make a few observations, in consequence of its having been asserted by gentlemen on the other side, that if these estimates had been brought forward by the late administration, the amount would have been 5 or 600,000*l.* greater than their present amount. He could not avoid, however, digressing from this subject, to notice two or three other points. He had listened to the panegyric of the hon. baronet, sir John Doyle, upon present and former statesmen, and was extremely surprised to hear him praise ministers for their conduct during the late negociation, a measure which, above all others, in his opinion, was calculated to hold them up to the contempt of the country. The other point was the delay in sending reinforcements to Buenos Ayres. It was admitted that ministers received intelligence of sir Home Popham's expedition on the 24th of June, and yet no reinforcements were sent out till October. It had been alleged that there were no transports. Why were there not? During the greater part of the administration of his right hon. friend, now no more, transports were kept constantly lying at Spithead, sufficient for three thousand men, with victuallers ready to accompany them. It was not to be expected that transports were to be ready for a stay of four or five years, in any place to which they might be sent, but certainly transports were at the disposal of ministers, sufficient to enable them to send a strong reinforcement to that expedition. His right hon. friend also constantly took care that there should be a brigade of three or four thousand men kept ready for any emergency. Returning to the subject of the estimates, he found that the amount of them was actually 475,000*l.* more than those of 1805. This was a sufficient answer to the assertion, that the late ministers would have made the estimates higher. With respect to the increased allowances in the Chelsea establishment, he would be the last man to object to an increase of the rewards granted to those who had spent great part of their lives in the service of their country, but he dreaded the effect of these increased allowances in a peace establishment. In the event of a peace, probably 50,000 men would be discharged, and, adding the increased allowances, an additional expence would accrue of 6 or 700,000*l.*

Mr. *H. Thornton* thought the measure of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) for recruiting the army, deserved the highest praise as a general and permanent system, but he doubted its effect in providing for immediate defence. He approved highly of converting the service for life into a service for years. He approved also of the training bill, as tending to diffuse a military spirit throughout the country, but at the same time he thought it was calculated to do any thing rather than provide for immediate defence. The right hon. gent. had on former occasions given them the tone in calling for measures calculated to procure an immediate supply for the army, and he must allow them to give him the tone again, in calling for measures of a similar nature. Much time was necessarily lost in preparing great measures, and in carrying them into execution, and he felt anxious for some measure that should in the mean while meet the immediate exigencies of the country.

Mr. *Jacob* made a few observations relative to the capture of Buenos Ayres. Among other things, he stated that a most able and intelligent officer, a gentleman who had been particularly noticed in the dispatches from that place, had informed him that nothing but the great promptitude of general Beresford, prevented the army from laying down their arms; and that, if it were not that the most active and spirited exertions were made by that officer, if they were delayed for the space of two or three hours, the whole army must have met with inevitable destruction. An account of the recapture of that place had been put into his hands since he had come into the house; but from a comparison of the date of that communication, and the place it came from, with the date of the original capture, and the situation of the city itself, he found that it was impossible that the fact could then have taken place, and therefore could not suppose from that authority, that it had taken place at all. To have carried the intelligence from the one place to the other at that time, the bearer must, without the convenience of stage coaches, have travelled between 3 and 4000 miles in the course of 72 days, and that over roads considerably worse than those of the Alps, or the very worst parts of the continent of Europe.

Lord *H. Petty* corrected some apprehensions which appeared to have prevailed among gentlemen on the opposite side of the house. It was stated, that the number of men raised according to the papers on the table, did not equal the amount of what his right hon. friends had stated in their speeches. It was to be recollected, however, the papers began the account from the month of March last, and, of course, they did not contain a year's return. Now, if gentlemen would have the goodness to wait until the month of March next, he was confident, from the result of the most minute enquiries which he had made in the best informed quarters, that by that time the numbers would even exceed those stated in the estimate of his right hon. friends; the house had also the testimony of a gallant officer near him (general Doyle), that the measure of the right hon. secretary was already the means of adding to the consideration and character of our army; then, when he considered that it was thought by the noble lord (Castlereagh) and the other gentlemen on the opposite side of the house, to be a most grievous piece of expence, that some trifling addition should be given to the soldier who was disabled in the service of his country; when he reflected on this, he could not say that he envied the feelings of those noble and honourable members. Oh miserable thought to their minds, if some happy man should, after the faithful discharge of his duty to his king and country, enjoy perhaps some 20*l.* a year! For his own part, he was anxious to reform abuses and diminish expences where the practices were known to be corrupt or the establishments useless; and he would challenge the gentlemen on the opposite side to contradict him when he stated to the house, that in the staff at home, there had been, within the last year, a saving of 43,000*l.* and in the barrack department, notwithstanding there had been last year a retrenchment to the amount of 500,000*l.* there was in this year a further saving of 50,000*l.* and in the commissariat department there were nine places less than in the preceding year. But to give grudgingly to the worn-out veteran was a thought which he could not bear; and he was of opinion, that his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) was entitled to the thanks of the country for the act, not of generosity, but of humanity and justice, he must call it, which he had done in their name to a most deserving set of men. The volunteer corps had been mentioned on the other hand, with a view of reflecting on ministers for having made a saving in the expence of that establishment; but, to the volunteers, he would give the credit that belonged to them, and say he knew that they were not to be looked upon as a mercenary body; he was well convinced that they would not look with a magnifying glass at every little saving that was made in the public expence attendant on their establishment. When he looked at the total of the estimates, and heard gentlemen opposite say, "Oh, but if you had let us stay in another year, you should have seen what vast savings we should have made!" it reminded him of what was said of a man, who wished to become celebrated for a wit: That his wit was very good, but that it was all borrowed from yesterday; in speaking of those gentlemen, he must reverse this observation, and say that all their cleverness was borrowed from to-morrow.—After some further observations, the resolutions were read a second time and agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, January 26.

[Oak Bark Bill.] On the motion of lord Temple, that the Oak Bark bill be read a second time,

Mr. *W. Herbert* said, he was sorry to oppose any measure proposed by his noble friend, but could not agree to the bill in its present form. If the act of James I. was to be revised, he thought that all the penalties imposed by that statute should be repealed. It appeared to him to be an act of injustice to repeal the clause that was the object of this bill, and to leave the rest of the penalties imposed by that measure in force. The repeal of the whole act was necessary to the comfort of the different classes of tradesmen, whose interests were concerned, and it would not be prejudicial to the public. He begged to suggest to his noble friend the propriety of putting off the second reading of the bill, and of appointing in the mean time a committee to consider of the propriety of the revision, or repeal of the whole act.

Mr. *Wilberforce*, from the letters which he had received from different parts of the country, could state, that the measure before the house, was one which had excited a considerable and lively sensation in the country. He agreed in the suggestion that had been so ably urged by the hon. gent., for the appointment of a committee to consider of the act, before which all the parties interested might be fully heard.

Lord *Temple* wished to say a few words just to acquit himself of the charge of precipitation in bringing forward this measure. The clause of the act which it was designed to repeal, had lain dormant, and had never been acted upon, till, in the course of last sessions, prosecutions had been instituted for the receiving of penalties incurred under it. He had thought it necessary in that instance to bring forward a bill to suspend these prosecutions, and had then given notice of his intention to produce the present measure to the house early in this session. But, whatever his feeling of the necessity of the measure might be, he was alive to the paramount necessity of procuring every possible help to enable the house to judge upon the question, and was therefore ready, with the permission of the house, to put off the second reading of the bill to this day fortnight, under an understanding, that if the committee should not report in the intermediate time, the second reading should then be deferred to a more distant day.

Mr. *Rose* thought that the committee could not report in a fortnight, nor, possibly, in two months. He was of opinion, that the repeal ought to extend to a great part of the act of James, though not to the whole of its provisions.

Mr. *Sheridan* thought it would be a great hardship to tanners, if this clause were to be repealed, whilst the penalties under the other provisions of the act were to be continued. As the suspension act of last session was to be in force only till 40 days after the commencement of the present session, he submitted to his noble friend whether it would not be better that the bill should go into a committee in order to prevent the renewal of the prosecutions on the expiration of the suspension bill.

Mr. *Corry* highly approved of the proposal of the noble lord to put off the second reading of the bill, only from time to time, and not for any long period at once. He was of opinion, that the committee might report in a short space of time.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that the measure had excited great interest in the country, and the manner in which his noble friend had conducted himself with respect to it, would prove satisfactory to the country. He thought that the committee would be able to report in a short time, because the whole of the clauses of the old act were inapplicable to the present time; and trusted that the second reading would not be deferred for any considerable time.

Mr. *Grattan* was happy to find that the particular clause in the act of James was to be repealed. When the present bill had been brought forward, it had excited great alarm amongst the tanners of Dublin, who had done him the honour to send a deputation to him on the subject. If this particular clause were not to be repealed, it would be necessary to have some Irish tanners examined before the committee, which would require time.—The second reading of the bill was put off to Monday se'nnight.

[CONDUCT OF LORD WELLESLEY.] Lord *Folkestone*, in submitting the motion of which he had given notice to the house, begged to state the reasons upon which he founded that motion. Certain proceedings had been instituted in the last parliament, founded on papers that had been laid before the house, preparatory to the impeachment of marquis Wellesley; which proceedings had fallen to the ground by the dissolution of parliament. The gentleman who had instituted these proceedings, was not at present a member, though he was a petitioner to that house, with confident hopes of being seated in it. The object of his motion was, that the papers relating to the Oude Charge should be reprinted, and be laid on the table of the house as early as possible, as considerable delay had taken place last session on this head. This would be a convenience to all parties. When sufficient time should be allowed for the consideration of the papers, after they should be on the table, if the gentleman who had originally brought the subject before the house, should not be a member, he should certainly bring forward the business himself. He thought it right, however, to state, that he did not mean to push the question to an impeachment. Reserving himself to reply to any objections that should be made to his motion, he moved, "That the papers laid before the house in the last session of the last parliament numbered 3, with its six supplements, and also the papers numbered 4 and 5, be re-printed for the use of the house."

Lord *Howick* said, that as he now clearly understood that the noble lord moved for the papers, for the purpose of grounding some motion which he intended to bring before the house with all convenient expedition, he could have no objection to the motion. It must be the desire of the house that the noble lord should persevere in the business he had undertaken. He should, however, be glad that the noble lord would give the house some general idea of the line he meant to pursue upon the documents for which he moved, and inform the house whether he meant to bring forward any motion on the Mahratta and Carnatic papers?

Lord *Folkestone* thought it hardly fair to expect that he should, in this early stage of his proceeding, be called upon to state precisely the course which he might deem it adviseable to pursue. But yet he was willing to give all the information in his power, wishing it however to be understood, that he would not hold himself bound by what he might now say. His purpose was, as far as his mind was made up, to move a resolution or resolutions, expressive of the opinion of the house as to the conduct of lord Wellesley relative to the nabob of Oude; but without moving for any impeachment or criminal proceeding. With respect to the other charges against that noble lord, he felt a difficulty in answering the question of the noble secretary of state, because he had devoted much less of his attention to them than to that to which his motion referred. As to the charge which related to the Carnatic, a right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan) stood pledged to support it, if taken up by any other person; and the opportunity of redeeming his pledge would, he rather thought, be afforded him. Upon the subject of the Mahratta papers, he was disposed to think that they unfolded some transactions which would form good ground for a charge. But upon this point he had formed no resolution, nor would he at present pledge himself to any other than the Oude charge.

Sir *John Anstruther* thought it would be extremely satisfactory to the house, if the noble lord could answer more decidedly as to the course he meant to pursue, should the papers be granted; he also wished to know, how soon he proposed to make the motion that was to be grounded on the production of these papers.

Lord *Folkestone* found his difficulty increased instead of diminished, by his readiness to give the noble lord every explanation that was in his power upon the subject. All that he would pledge himself to was the Oude charge, and, he supposed, that, about a month or 5 weeks after the printing of the papers he should be ready to make his motion. The Mahratta and Carnatic questions floated at present but loosely in his mind, and he was not prepared to say how he should act upon them.

Sir *John Anstruther* declared himself to be perfectly satisfied with this explanation, and allowed that the noble lord had answered with great fairness and candour every thing which could be expected for him to answer.

Mr. *Whitshed Keene* considered, that it was for the honour and dignity of the house that the proceedings of the last session should not now be dropped.

Mr. *Bankes* wished for some further explanation. He considered the noble lord as acting as a substitute for Mr. Paull. If that gentleman should succeed in his petition, (how probable or desireable such an event would be he should not say), then the impeachment was not to go on; should he fail, then there were only to be resolutions of the house. He should always disapprove of impeachments for Indian offences, seeing that there was a competent jurisdiction appointed to try them by the act of 1784.

Mr. *Sheridan* said, that the motion had his approbation, and he hoped that the noble lord would not consider his having declined to notice the allusion which he had thought proper to make to him as the effect of any disrespectful inattention. The noble lord, in announcing his conditional notice, had expressed his hopes, that the original mover of these papers would succeed in his petition. [" No," said lord Folkestone, " I stated that such was the hope of Mr. Paull."] Oh! that Mr. Paull had such hopes, (continued Mr. Sheridan,) was extremely probable. He was, no doubt, a very active canvasser and a sanguine politician; but he must excuse him (Mr. S.), if he declined to sympathize in his hopes. But, as to the noble lord, he announced his resolution to pursue a different course from that followed by his hon. friend Mr. Paull. Then, of course, he disapproved of his hon. friend's mode of proceeding. It was rather surprising that the noble lord did not, in the course of the last, or preceding sessions, advise his hon. friend to abandon that mode. It was not quite so friendly not to have given him a hint. But, a word or two as to the pledge to which the noble lord had alluded. If that noble lord had been present, he might have heard him two or three times, state distinctly to the house, the reasons which had produced the delay he complained of, and also the grounds upon which he had brought forward this question. He, however, utterly denied that he had ever forfeited the slightest pledge on this business. He defied any man even to catch him tripping. All that he ever said, and the grounds upon which he had acted, he was ready to repeat again and again, and upon that repetition he would confidently rest for the justification of his conduct. Whenever that conduct was fairly represented and clearly understood, he would have no fear of censure. He was now prepared to declare, that if any other person, whoever that person might be, should bring forward the Carnatic question, he would most distinctly pledge himself to give that person his most zealous, active and cordial assistance; and to exert as much of his humble ability in support of the motion, as if it had been actually brought forward by himself.

Lord *Folkestone* replied, that he would not enter into a controversy with the right hon. gent. upon the subject of his former pledges. But he recollected very accurately that the right hon. gent. did promise to bring this question of the Carnatic before the house. As to the grounds upon which he had been induced to abandon that question, he really was not apprized of them. He had heard something of the right hon. gent.'s unwillingness to excite unpleasant sensations among his colleagues in office—that is, in plain English, that he was not willing to lose his place. The noble lord was, however, glad to hear the right hon. gent.'s fresh pledge this evening: for his strenuous and sincere assistance, wherever he would be strenuous and sincere, would, no doubt, be a most important acquisition indeed. The noble lord repelled the idea, that he was the substitute of Mr. Paull or of any man. He was actuated solely by a sense of duty, and even the friends of lord Wellesley ought to be obliged to him for the course he was about to take, as it would afford them an opportunity of vindicating his character, as well as the character of the country, which was stained by the acts imputed to him. If these imputations should prove to be unjust, he declared that he should feel the highest satisfaction, for he had no personal prejudice whatever against lord Wellesley. As to the course he meant to pursue, it would be open to any other member to propose a different one, if he thought proper, and this course would not at all interfere with those who wished to go the length of impeachment.

Mr. *Sheridan* rose again, and observed with some warmth, that no doubt the noble lord wished to have his public conduct ascribed to proper motives, and if he expected to have credit given him for such motives, he should not be so forward to impute improper motives to others. With regard to the motive which the noble lord had thought proper to attribute to him, he would ask that noble lord to state in what part of his public conduct he had ever seen any thing to justify the imputation he had attempted to fix upon him, to shew that he would be induced to abandon his principles to a love of place; or to sustain against him any charge of inconsistency. If the noble lord had had a correct recollection of the proceedings of that house, the noble lord would have known that he did, two years before the present ministry came into place, state the grounds upon which he was induced to decline bringing forward the Carnatic question, at the same time, pledging himself to support any person who should bring it forward.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, he thought the noble lord entitled to his thanks, and also to the thanks of the friends of marquis Wellesley, and that they must be satisfied with the very candid manner in which he had brought forward the present motion. He could not, however, agree in opinion with the hon. gent. (Mr. Bankes), that any question of this kind should be referred to the board of Indian Judicature, for he thought it beyond the power of any individual to bring any delinquent to punishment before it. He was, therefore, glad the noble lord had brought forward the present motion.

Mr. *Wellesley Pole* thanked the noble lord for the manner in which he had brought forward the business, and for the civility with which he had treated his noble relative. The dignity of parliament required, that this business should not lie dormant. Parliament, however, had taken no proceedings on this charge, although it had been circulated with much industry throughout the country. It was equally desirable for the house and his noble relation, that the business should be proceeded with. He had given notice of his intention, as soon as the noble lord's motion should be disposed of, to move for the remaining documents, in order that the whole case might be before the house. Every enquiry into the conduct of marquis Wellesley, had always had his hearty concurrence, and he was anxious that every paper which his majesty's ministers could produce, consistently with the public interest, should be laid before the house; but in saying this, he did not presume to judge what might be the decision of the house. As to the Carnatic question, he wished to ask the right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), what preference he meant to give his noble relation, because, on a former occasion, alluding to this question, that right hon. gent. had stated, that the Madras government was criminal, the board of controul criminal, and above all, the court of directors were highly criminal.

Mr. *Sheridan*, in explanation, said, the hon. gent. had stated his expressions very correctly. When he had first given notice of a motion tending to criminate the Madras government, and lord Wellesley by implication, an hon. gent. had moved for an immense volume of papers, by way of vindication; the effect of which was, to prove lord Wellesley infinitely more culpable than he had thought, the board of controul more culpable than lord Wellesley, and the court of directors more culpable than all. He had said, that the transaction involved great criminality in the Madras government, and particularly lord Clive; in the Bengal government, and lord Wellesley as the head of that government, in the board of controul, and above all, in the court of directors. It was, therefore, very true, that if the Madras government was not guilty in good company, at least it was guilty in very powerful company.

Mr. *R. Thornton* said, he had never been of opinion that the criminality that might be found to attach to lord Wellesley's conduct would amount to sufficient ground for impeachment. But he thought it necessary, for the honour of the country, that the noble lord's conduct should be enquired into;

and the enquiry having been once instituted, he thought it for the dignity of the house that it should not be suffered to fall to the ground. He thought the noble lord intitled to thanks for coming forward with this motion. With regard to the Carnatic question, he was glad it was to be brought forward, in order to shew that the directors were not the most criminal of all; to shew that they had borne up manfully against the difficulties they had to encounter, and had done their duty in spite of all opposition.—The papers were then ordered to be re-printed. On the motion of Mr. W. Pole, a similar order was made with respect to the other papers connected with the Oude charge.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, January 27.

[Minutes.] Lord H. Petty gave notice, that he meant on Thursday next, to submit certain Resolutions relating to the Finances of the country; and as he meant to move these resolutions in a committee of the whole house in the most formal manner, he should take the liberty of moving now, that the house should resolve itself into a committee of the whole house on that day, to consider of the Finances of the country. Ordered that the house should, on Thursday, resolve itself into the said committee.—On the motion of Mr. Johnstone, it was ordered, that there be laid before the house accounts of all pensions, granted by the crown in Great Britain from the 1st of April, 1805, to the 17th of Jan. 1807; also accounts of all new offices created, and all salaries increased by fees or otherwise, in Great Britain, in the same period. Similar accounts were ordered for Ireland.—Mr. White presented at the bar the following list of members appointed to try the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election for the borough of Thetford: P. Grenfell, C. O'Hara, R. Ferguson, hon. W. H. Lyttleton, sir R. Williams, G. Anson, J. Hewitt, G. Hibbert, lord Primrose, John Fane, A. Shakespeare, hon. C. L. Dundas, lord Headley; nominees, S. Whitbread, R. Fellowes.—On the motion of Mr. Herbert, a committee was appointed to enquire into the provisions of the act of James I. relating to the tanning trade, and to report their opinions upon them to the house. The petitions on this subject were referred to the said committee.

[Scotch Clergy Bill.] The *Lord Advocate* of Scotland moved the second reading of the bill, for suspending, for a time to be limited, the powers granted to the lords of council and session in Scotland by an act of the parliament of Scotland, made in the 4th session of the first parliament of queen Anne, intituled, "Act anent Plantation of Kirks and Valuation of Teinds," so far as relates to the granting augmentations of the stipends of the clergy in Scotland in certain cases.

Mr. *W. Dundas* expressed his approbation of the present bill. The frequency of the augmentations of stipends for these many years past rendered such a measure highly necessary; but more particularly so at present, because since the intimation was lately given in the other house of parliament of a change being in contemplation in the courts of Justice in Scotland, a race had been run by the clergy of that country for augmentations of their stipends. In the parish in which he had some connection, the clergyman had applied for a new augmentation within a few months after having received a very large addition to his former stipend.

Mr. *Perceval* observed, that if this was the true state of the case, it formed an argument not only for this bill to suspend the powers of the court of session, but also for the proposed regulations; for if that court exercised its power of granting augmentations blindly and without consideration, it was a good reason why it should be deprived of it. And if the clergy shewed such improper greediness, certainly they ought to be restrained. He was sorry, however, to hear this character of them, for he had before understood that the clergy of Scotland were a most respectable body of men, against whom there was less ground of reproach than almost any other class whatever. The house was not in a situation, however, to decide upon these points, and therefore this could not be any argument in favour of the bill at present. But, in addition to this, it would be hard to stop suits already commenced, and therefore if there were a great many suits of this sort pending, this was rather an argument for not suspending the powers of the court of session.

Mr. *W. Dundas* denied his having expressed any distrust of the court of session, or having said any thing disrespectful to the clergy of Scotland. What he said was, that some repose was desirable for the clergy, and he was not singular in this opinion, for the present president of the court of session had, when lord advocate, introduced a bill for discontinuing these suits for augmentation for 40 years.

Mr. *Horner* said, that he understood this bill to be brought in, not in the spirit of hostility to the court of session, but the contrary, for it was intended as a relief to them. The power to grant augmentations belonged to the members of the court of session only as commissioners. It was not a business that came under their jurisdiction as a court of justice, but properly of a legislative nature. This business had lately much increased, and it was proper that the court should be relieved. He highly complimented the clergy of Scotland, who were distinguished for their piety and good morals. Their emoluments, he said, were very inadequate to their station, and the duties they had to perform.

The *Lord Advocate* disclaimed any distrust of the court of session, or any disrespect to the clergy of Scotland. It was his pride to be descended from a family, which the clergy of Scotland, who were eminent for their learning, piety, and morals, had always looked up to as their firmest friends. The object of the bill was to relieve the court of session from a press of business of this nature. No less than 149 suits for augmentations had commenced since July last.—After some further conversation, the bill was read a second time, and ordered to be committed on this day se'nnight.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, January 28.

[MINUTES.] The house proceeded to ballot for committees, to take into consideration the petitions complaining of undue returns for the boroughs of Saltash and Tregony. Soon after Mr. White appeared at the bar with the reduced lists, which were as follow: Saltash; G. V. Vernon, W. Kenrick, W. Manning, sir O. Moseley, lord John Thynne, N. Saxon, J. Rutherford, earl of Euston, sir R. Milbank, lord H. Moore, W. Bonham, A. Robarts, hon. T. Knox. Nominees; J. Leach, J. P. Hill.—Tregony; H. Howard, T. Steele, hon. B. Bouverie, R. Wilson, hon. E. Phipps, M. W. Ridley, earl of Yarmouth, sir J. Pulteney, J. De Ponthieu, G. Mills, J. Lemon, T. Shelley, R. A. Daniells. Nominees; **J. Mitchell,** J. Topping.

[BARRACK SUPPLIES.] Lord *A. Hamilton*, after a few prefatory remarks on the public interest excited towards the conduct of the Barrack Department, by the Third Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, (an interest in which he strongly participated,) moved, for the purpose of comparison, that there be laid before the house a return of the Barrack Supplies furnished by Alexander Davison, esq. during the last whole year that he was so employed; specifying the articles furnished, their quality and price, the barracks to which they were delivered, and their total amount. Also, a similar return of the barrack supplies furnished by the commissary-general of the barrack department during the whole first year of his being so employed.

Mr. *S. Bourne* seconded the motion, conceiving it to be highly desireable that the house should be put into complete possession of all possible information on this important subject. He wished to call the attention of the house to a paper relative to the barrack department, laid on the table of the last parliament, which must render it obvious to all those by whom it had been read, that the last administration had taken every possible measure to prevent premature issue of public money in the barrack department. This paper proved that the subject had engrossed the attention of government towards the end of the year 1804, when an arrangement was made, that could not well have been entered into at an earlier period. That arrangement went to remedy the evils complained of, to bring the whole of the transactions in question, under the immediate superintendance of the commissary-general, to abolish the treasurer, to prevent any expences for building or repairs from being incurred without the knowledge of the treasury, and to produce a variety of other beneficial effects. If the noble lord (H. Petty) had no objection, as soon as the present motion should be disposed of, he would move for the re-printing of that paper.

Lord *H. Petty* declared that he should have no objection whatever to the motion of the hon. gent. He allowed that the regulation to which he alluded was extremely proper. It was now under the consideration of his majesty's government, and in all probability the subject would soon be submitted to the consideration of parliament.—Lord A. Hamilton's motion was then agreed to: and Mr. S. Bourne immediately moved, that the copy laid before the house of commons on the 20th of

March, 1806, of so much of his majesty's regulations respecting the barrack department, as related to the safe custody of money intrusted to the barrack-master-general, be re-printed. Ordered.

[Freehold Estates Bill.] The *Solicitor-General* rose to make his promised motion, on the subject of Simple Contract Debts. The injustice of the law in this case was so glaring, and the remedy for that injustice was so obvious, that he should feel it unnecessary to do more than barely to state the object of his motion, were he not aware that a similar measure had formerly been unsuccessfully proposed. By the law as it now stood, a man might contract debts to any amount, not evidenced by bond or other legal instrument; and, dying with sufficient property amply to satisfy those demands, his estate would pass to his heir at law, and his creditor would remain unpaid; or were the owner of such property, not before his death, to make a testamentary assignment, however capricious, to a stranger in blood, that stranger might, if he chose, look with indifference and security on the ruin of the creditors. It was very surprising that this evil should have been so long allowed to exist; more especially when the extent of commerce in this country was considered, and when it was recollected, that all debts on negociable security were merely simple contract debts. Cases had occurred in which persons engaged in expensive commercial speculations, and foreseeing the near and unavoidable approach of great embarrassments, have thought it policy to increase to a larger amount these simple contract debts, and having thus secured property to their heirs, have put a period to their existence, and occasioned an immense loss to their creditors. That an heir should be permitted to enjoy property, in despight of just creditors of that property, although on the faith of that very property credit had been given, was a law peculiar to this country. How did it originate? To resolve this question, it would be necessary to refer to our history; to those feudal times, when every proprietor held his land by military tenure, which rendered alienation of property inadmissible; because, to alienate property would have been tantamount to the desertion of the military standard. Subsequently the usage was less rigorous, and the tenant was allowed, in some degree, to alienate his property. In the 13th year of the reign of Edward I. he was allowed to alienate half his landed property; and a few years afterwards a law was passed, by which he was permitted to alienate the whole of it. Still, however, the law which secured landed property from being subject to the payment of simple contract debts remained. It had survived the season of its original existence five hundred years! It was astonishing that the law should be so lax in one respect, and so rigid in another, closely analogous. If a man in trade gave credit to a man of landed property, and that man of landed property died without making provision for the payment of his debt, the tradesman had no remedy: but the law strictly enforced the payment of the tradesman's debts; his little stock was swept away; his person exposed to the contagion of a jail, in which he was doomed to remain all his days, unless liberated by one of those accidental interpositions of the legislature, annihilating all engagements, and cancelling every contract, to which they had occasionally been driven for the purpose of relieving the capacious prisons of the country from their too numerous inhabitants. He should be sorry if what he had said, should be misconstrued into any reproach of those heirs who might have allowed debts, thus contracted, to remain unsatisfied; for he knew how easy those sacrifices were considered, which those who considered them as easy were not called upon themselves to make. These heirs had a right to urge the law as their guide, and if reproach rested any where, it was on the legislature, which had so long suffered the evil. With regard to the remedy, it had at first occurred to him, that it would be expedient to place contract creditors precisely in the same situation as special creditors, and to give them precisely the same means of recovery. Some difficulties however appearing, it now seemed to him preferable, simply to declare, that freehold estates should be assets for the payment of simple contract debts. Courts of equity had endeavoured to apply a remedy to the evil of which he complained, and had frequently had the boldness to order what was termed marshalling of assets: but this remedy was inadequate. He was fully aware, that when any person proposed to alter a long-established usage, it was incumbent on him to declare the advantages of that usage, as well as the disadvantages, otherwise the legislature would not be enabled fairly to estimate the necessity of the change. It might be thought that he had not done this. The reason was, that on the closest examination he could not find a single advantage to compensate, or even to alleviate the injustice of the custom which he had described. The law, as it there stood, appeared to him to be pure, unmixed evil. He therefore moved for leave to bring in a bill to make the freehold estates of persons dying indebted, assets for the payment of simple contract debts.

The *Attorney General* seconded the motion.

Mr. *C. Wynne* expressed his perfect approbation of the object which the learned gent. had in view. He hoped, however, that he would not stop here, but that he would employ the great powers of his mind and his extensive knowledge of the law, in applying a remedy for the creditors of the living possessors of estates, as well as of the dead; he meant by giving additional effect to the writ of *elegit.*—Leave to bring in the bill was then granted.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, January 29.

[Minutes.] A ballot took place for a committee to try and determine the merits of the Penrhyn Election petition. The following gentlemen were appointed on the committee:—T. B. Lethbridge, lord Maitland, C. Chaplain, D. Williams, D. Davenport, hon. W. Herbert, sir H. Neale, R. Benyon, W. Orde, G. A. Lee Reck, lord Ebrington, J. A. Wright, J. Lowther; Nominees, H. Leycester, R. Hurst.—Mr. Howard reported from the Tregony election committee, that the sitting members had been duly elected and returned; and also that the petitions of Messrs. Nicholls and Miles were not frivolous nor vexatious.—A new writ was ordered for the borough of Plympton, in the room of sir Stephen Lushington, deceased.—On the motion of Mr. Bathurst, the order appointing a committee to search for precedents of cases of members who had been expelled and re-elected, was rescinded, and a new order made, re-appointing the same committee to search for precedents of cases, touching the expulsion of members, and also of members who, having been expelled, had been re-elected; and to report thereon to the house.

[Abolition of the Slave Trade.] Mr. *Wilberforce,* in adverting to this subject, stated, that the house would remember the Resolution that had been voted by that house in the last session of the last parliament, pledging the house to take measures for the speedy Abolition of the Slave Trade. This resolution, it would be recollected, bound that house to take such steps for the early abolition of a traffic which it declared to be contrary to justice and humanity, as the house in its wisdom should deem proper. It might be thought that those interested in this question ought to have brought forward the measure in the early part of this session; but as a proceeding had been instituted in the other house of parliament for that purpose, he had been induced to abstain hitherto from bringing the subject under the consideration of the house. If that proceeding, however, should be extended to too great a length, so as to preclude the probability of its passing this session, he should, if no more competent person undertook the task, bring the matter forward in that house.

Lord *Howick* was happy that the hon. member had mentioned the subject, thinking that the attention of the new parliament could not be too soon directed to it. He thought the hon. gent. acted right in not having brought forward any proposition on the subject, as the proceeding in the other house would tend to the same end. Their own honour, and the honour of the house, was concerned in instituting some proceeding that would lead to an abolition of a trade, which parliament had declared to be contrary to justice, humanity, and sound policy.

[New Plan of Finance.] Lord *Henry Petty* moved the order of the day, for the house to resolve into a committee of the whole house, to take into consideration the Finances of the Country: also that the several acts relating to the redemption of the Public Debt, and also the several acts for granting to his majesty certain duties, for a limited time after the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace, be referred to the said committee. The house having resolved itself into the said committee, Mr. Hobhouse in the chair,

Lord *Henry Petty* rose, and addressed the committee as follows:—I feel, Mr. Hobhouse, as I naturally and inevitably must, some weight upon my mind, in rising to address you on the present occasion. I feel that anxiety which the vast magnitude of the subject is calculated to inspire, but yet from its magnitude and its importance, I derive some consolation, as they afford me a stronger claim upon the indulgence of this committee. I can indeed have no fear that such indulgence will be denied me, when you consider the arduous nature of the task, which my duty calls upon me to perform: and above all when you reflect, that the statements of our resources, which are the result of the accounts, for which my right hon. friend has moved, and which are to be laid upon your table, cannot now be regarded, only, as the subject of idle boast and self-congratulation, but contain all the elementary principles, and compose the solid foundation of our greatness—that they afford the means to which we are to look, the instrument we are to employ, in maintaining and securing all that we possess of national independence and individual freedom. I confidently indulge the expectation that notwithstanding the dryness and prolixity of the various minute and complicated details into which I may be obliged to enter, the subject must excite such a degree of interest in your minds, as will procure me that of which I certainly shall stand in need, a patient and unwearied attention on the part of the committee.—Although not quite unprecedented, I am aware that it is an unusual course for the person filling the situation I have the honour to hold, to open to the house, a detailed statement of the supply and ways and means for the year before the loan has been contracted for; but I trust that from what I have to offer this night, I shall be able to satisfy the committee of the propriety, and indeed of the absolute necessity of adopting such a course upon the present occasion. Without therefore detaining the committee by any further preface, I shall proceed to state as the foundation of what I shall have afterwards to submit to you, the supplies and ways and means for the present year, as far as they can now be estimated. Nearly the whole of the former have already been voted by the house.—Here the noble lord made the following statement of the

SUPPLIES.

Navy (exclusive of the Ordnance Sea Service)				£.16,977,837 9 3
Army	Great Britain	10,202,967 8 5		
	Ireland	3,445,130 17 3		
			13,648,098 5 0	
Barracks	Great Britain	506,237 0 0		
	Ireland	469,450 12 6		
			975,687 12 6	
Commissary General's Department			841,526 6 5	
Extraordinaries, as in 1806, after deducting Vote of Commissary General's Department	Great Britain and Ireland		2,758,474 13 7	
Total Army				18,223,786 18 2
Ordnance	Great Britain, including 422,500*l.* Ordnance Sea Service		3,264,469 4 8	
	Ireland		479,246 19 7	
				3,743,716 4 3
Miscellaneous	Great Britain		1,200,000 0 0	
	Ireland		666,000 0 0	
				1,866,000 0 0
Vote of Credit	Great Britain		2,400,000 0 0	
	Ireland		600,000 0 0	
				3,000,000 0 0
Total Joint Charge				43,811,340 11 8

SEPARATE CHARGES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Deficiency of Malt, 1805	200,000 0 0	
Services not voted paid in 1806	280,000 0 0	
Interest on Exchequer bills, 1807	1,200,000 0 0	
Five per Cents. 1797, to be paid off	350,000 0 0	
		2,030,000 0 0
Total Supplies		45,841,340 11 8
Deduct Irish proportion of Supply and Civil List, &c.		5,314,275 0 0
Total to be defrayed by Great Britain		40,527,065 11 8
Deduct on account of Ireland 2-17ths of the above sum of 43,811,340*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.*	5,154,275	
Deduct also 2-17ths for civil lists and other charges, the same as last year	160,000	
	5,314,275	

—It will be seen, said the noble lord, that a separate estimate is made out for the commissary-general's department upon the principle which I have on a former occasion explained to the house, of taking out of the account of the extraordinaries of the army, which are only voted after the services have been performed, all expenditure, the amount of which can be previously calculated and ascertained. Of the amount of the sum specified as a vote of credit, 1,000,000*l.* may be considered as applicable to the discharge of an arrear of subsidies to foreign powers, due in consequence of existing treaties, and a further sum of 500,000*l.* is left to be applied to further subsidies, should the state of Europe continue to require it. Whether this interposition upon our part, may be found necessary; whether the aspect of affairs upon the continent may, or may not become such as to require and to encourage more considerable advances, it is impossible for me now to state. What I have mentioned is all that his majesty's ministers deem it expedient to provide. It is thought that such a sum may be wanted, but there is no ground to form any certain conclusion upon that point.—With regard to the sum allotted to the interest of exchequer bills for the present year, those gentlemen who were in the last parliament will recollect that it was in the last sessions thought to be the more wise and manly course to state all the expences of the year at once, and fairly to vote the interest that was to accrue upon the unfunded debt, in the year in which that debt was to be created, without leaving it to be provided for in a subsequent sessions; a course in which I am sure, the committee will think it proper to persevere.—And now, sir, having gone through the several articles of the supply, I shall find great satisfaction in stating the Ways and Means by which that supply is to be met. The produce of the duties on Malt Pensions, Tobacco, &c. I estimate at 2,750,000*l.*; the Surplus of the Consolidated Fund I take at the same sum as the last year 3,502,000*l.*; and I am happy to state to the committee, that notwithstanding the inauspicious changes and events which have occurred in Europe since the last sessions, I feel myself perfectly warranted in this calculation. The next article of the ways and means will be the War Taxes, which although their produce will, I trust, be greater, I shall at present, for reasons I shall afterwards explain, take only at the sum of 19,800*l.*; and here, sir, I am glad to take the opportunity of informing the committee, that the measures adopted last sessions with regard to the Property tax, have led to a result far exceeding the most sanguine expectation of the persons who were concerned in framing those measures, certainly far exceeding any expectation that I had formed. Indeed the result of the assessments of the present year has been such, that although I took the Property tax at but 10,500,000*l.* in the last sessions, I now feel myself justified in taking it at 11,500,000*l.*—The other war taxes upon customs and excise, I shall set down, including the increased produce of the additional duties imposed last year, at 9,500,000*l.*; there is a further sum under this head to be added, of no very considerable magnitude—it is the result of an arrangement which has been some time in contemplation, but to the object of which it might be injurious at this moment to allude in explicit terms. I shall for the present observe only that it will be adopted more with a view to regulation than to revenue, and I have no doubt that when communicated to this house, it will meet with general approbation. Combining the produce of this arrangement with the duties I have stated, I conceive myself warranted in taking the war taxes *prospectively* at 21,000,000*l.*; although it will be remembered that as a part of the ways and means for the year, they are taken at 19,800,000*l.* The next article of the ways and means is the Lottery, which I estimate at 450,000*l.* the same sum as last year.—In addition to these several sums there remains to be raised by Loan, 12,200,000*l.* Gentlemen will recollect that the Loan of last year was 18,000,000*l.* And it will readily be admitted that the consequences likely to result from such a reduction of its amount, will be most beneficial. Taking then the whole of the Ways and Means, viz.

Duty on Malt, Pensions, &c. - -	£2,750,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund - -	3,500,000
War Taxes - -	19,800,000
Lottery - -	450,000
Exchequer Bills on Vote of Credit - -	2,400,000
Loan - - -	2,1200,000
	41,100,000

It will be observed, that the total of the

Supplies being 40,527,065*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.* while that of the Ways and Means is 41,000,000*l.* there will remain an excess of 572,934*l.* 8*s.* 4*d.* an excess which it may be thought desirable to provide, with a view to those circumstances in the state of the world, which may occasion an unavoidable fluctuation in that part of our revenue which arises from the trade and commerce of the country.—Having thus, sir, fully stated the supply and ways and means for the year, I should feel, were I now addressing you in any ordinary times, justified in confining my view to the exigencies of the moment.—I might here close my statement, dismissing the subject for the present year, and relieving myself from the necessity of intruding further upon your patience. But I think the committee will feel with me, that with the prospects that are before us in the present crisis of the history of the world, when the elements of discord are abroad, in the conspicuous station which we fill in Europe, with the eyes of all its nations fixed on us, that still preserve and value their independence, or that look to us as the means of regaining the independence they have lost, his majesty's ministers would not be justified were they to content themselves with presenting to parliament a limited and narrow statement of our circumstances and our views. I have no doubt that parliament and the country will agree with me in thinking that it is our duty and our interest to take an enlarged view of our situation and our prospects, and that from the emotions of gratitude we justly feel for our deliverance from the dangers that are past, we should direct our attention to those with which the future seems pregnant. Upon that future, there yet hangs a dark cloud, which we ought to contemplate, though not with alarm, yet with the awe and circumspection which our situation calls for. Much has passed over our heads, but there remains an impenetrable gloom, which although no human eye can search and scrutinize, it is yet our duty, if we can, to anticipate the dangers it contains, and to provide against the evils which it menaces, all those means of security which our national resources must happily afford, and which our reflection and experience may enable us to apply.—First of all then, as the greatest evil that can befall a civilized nation, it becomes our duty to make such arrangements as shall enable us to provide against the dangers of protracted warfare, to maintain the dreadful conflict in which we are engaged, and the termination of which no man can foresee, with the firmness we have hitherto shewn in its support, and if possible with increased energy and exertion.—With this impression upon my mind as to the situation in which the country is placed, I feel myself bound, not merely to consider the amount and nature of our resourses, but the adaptation of those resources to any contingency which may arise. In my view of this subject, I should not think myself justified in concealing my opinion, that there are unfavourable as well as favourable points belonging to our financial situation; and I feel, and the country must feel, that we labour under a considerable difficulty in discovering new sources of taxation; but yet so far from regarding this as a matter of surprise, I must confess the surprise I feel is, that the system of taxation should have so far supported us as it has done: such must be the feeling of any man who reflects upon the history of our revenue. It will be recollected that after the conclusion of the American war in the year 1784, our permanent revenue amounted to but 10 millions, and yet that great financial statesman (Mr. Pitt), who then presided over the affairs of the country, found it difficult to devise additional taxes. Indeed, some which he had imposed, he felt himself obliged to withdraw in the following year, and the difficulties under which he laboured were readily acknowledged. Yet such has been the augmentation of our resources, that the permanent revenue reached the sum of 28 millions at the conclusion of the last war, and at present it amounts to no less a sum than 32 millions.—It must indeed be matter of heartfelt satisfaction to any man interested in our fate, to reflect upon such evidence of the growing prosperity of the country, to find that our means have kept pace with our expenditure, and enabled us to bear for so many years a constant and progressive addition to our burthens.—At the same time that I state the difficulty of finding out new objects of taxation, I beg not to be understood as considering the means or disposition of the country exhausted in this respect; for, relying on the spirit and alacrity of the people to submit to further sacrifices from a just conception of the important ends for which those sacrifices would be made, I am prepared to state that ample means would be forthcoming if required to pay not only the interest of the loan of this year, but of the next, and perhaps several years to come. But looking, as I think it is our duty to look, to a long period of protracted war, we could hardly expect to continue from year to year, in addition to our actual burthens, augmenting our permanent taxes to a considerable extent without imposing restraints which might prove extremely vexatious and distressing in some instances, and in others incurring the risk of injuring the produce of old duties, and impeding national improvement, by taxing staple commodities, or such articles as would impede the growth of our trade and manufactures, by enhancing the price of the instruments with which they are conducted. In this view then it becomes of great importance to consider of what application our resources in future will admit, and, if possible, to combine with a provision for the vigorous support of the contest in which we are engaged, some relief from the prospect of increasing burthens. To relieve the public from any pressure is at all times desirable, but with the prospect before us, it is an object of the last importance. But the policy which prompted such a resolution, would indeed be most short-sighted and unjust, and defeat the very objects it purposes to attain, were it to lead to any anticipation of the resources of the future, much less did it involve the violation of any of those principles which have been recognized by public opinion, or sanctioned by public faith, and which it will, I trust, remain the invariable policy of this country to uphold. Much and ardently as I desire the relief of the people, I should never be reconciled to any proposition, however calculated to gratify this desire, if that relief were to be accomplished by the sacrifice of any of those major considerations, or any of those fundamental obligations, into which parliament has deliberately entered, and which the voice of the country has confirmed. I should be amongst the first to resist any measure calculated to injure, much less to destroy that great system which has so essentially contributed to maintain our national credit and to promote our national glory. But happily, there exists no necessity for any breach of faith, for any deviation from that course of rectitude which has ever constituted the pride and honour of Great Britain. (Hear! hear!)—I now come to the more satisfactory part of my duty, to touch upon the state of our great national resources, and in adverting to those topics it must be a peculiarly gratifying circumstance to reflect that the prosperity which they indicate, does not depend upon mere fortune; that it has not arisen from any of those casualties or chances which alternately raise or depress states; but that on the contrary it is the gradual result of the resolution, foresight, and energy of parliament, supported on the part of the people by a spirit, industry, and perseverance, alternately the cause and the effect of national improvement and prosperity. (A loud cry of hear! hear!)—In considering our resources, the Sinking Fund, and the system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of War taxes, are the two great subjects to which I shall have occasion to direct your attention. I hope for the indulgence of the committee while I take the liberty of dwelling upon their origin and progress, more especially as they form the ground-work of the system I shall have to propose for its consideration. They are, perhaps, the most remarkable features in the political and financial history not only of this, but of any country in the world.—First then as to the Sinking Fund, or the system of applying annually certain portions of the revenue to redeem, and after redeeming, to accumulate for the further redemption of debt. The first establishment of this fund took place, it will be recollected, in 1786, and it was introduced by Mr. Pitt, to the credit and honour of whose name it will long remain a monument. Wherever I contemplate this system, it is impossible that I should not feel a satisfaction in adverting to the author to whose measures I can never allude with greater satisfaction, than when I am enabled to bestow upon them that tribute of admiration which in the present instance I most warmly, and I may say, enthusiastically feel.—It will be matter of pleasing reflection to the house to recollect at the moment when we have felt within the space of the same year the loss of two illustrious characters; as distinguished competitors for fame and power as any country ever saw, and whom all men, whether friends or enemies, I mean of course political enemies, for none other could such men have had, will admit to have been the greatest and brightest ornaments of the time in which they lived; to recollect, I say, that both these distinguished persons concurred in the approbation and sanction they gave to this measure; that after some slight differences of opinion it was finally marked by a coincidence of sentiment on the part of both; that, amidst the dissention which prevailed on other topics, amidst the conflicts which so often and so long agitated this house, that upon the subject of the sinking fund, all those feelings and animosities disappeared; and the measure has uniformly continued to derive from that combination of opinion all the just weight and authority that belonged to it.—When the sinking fund was first established, as I have already observed, in 1786, one million was appropriated to the purposes of that fund. At that time, the public funded debt amounted to 238,231,248*l.*; and therefore the sinking fund was equal to the 238th part of the whole debt. The accumulation of the latter however raised its proportion to the former by the close of 1792, to the 160th part. A further addition to this fund was proposed by Mr. Pitt, and readily adopted in 1792, consisting of a grant of 400,000*l.* arising from the surplus of the revenue, and a further annual grant of 200,000*l.* So thenceforth 1,200,000*l.* were applied to the increased fund, and at the commencement of the war with the French republic, in 1793, looking to what had been held out and declared in the previous arrangements, a sinking fund of a different character was constituted. This consisted in setting apart one per cent. on the nominal capital created by each loan in order to form a fund for the liquidation of that loan. With respect to the first sinking fund, the sum voted in 1786, and that superadded to it, in 1792, were to be allowed to accumulate at compound interest until they reached the maximum of 4,000,000*l.*; and it was provided that any surplus which might afterwards arise should become applicable to the public service, and be at the disposal of parliament. But the fund arising out of the principal established in 1793, was to be subject to no such limitation; for the sum of one per cent. appropriated upon each loan, was to go on accumulating until it accomplished the redemption of that loan, which it was calculated would probably be effected in 45 years from the period at which the loan might have been contracted.—No alteration was made in the relative state of those funds until the year 1802. When lord Sidmouth, looking at the amount of the debt, but at the same time, impressed with the necessity of keeping open and unincumbered the system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, found it expedient from the amount of taxes he was compelled to raise to defray the interest of stock, for which the income tax had been pledged, to avoid loading the public with the additional of a sinking fund for that stock. To reconcile the stockholder to this arrangement, he consolidated the old and the new sinking funds. By the act which parliament then passed, the provision limiting the progress of the fund of 1786, when it should reach the amount of 4 millions, which it was calculated it would reach in 1808, was done away; and it was provided that the fund of 1786, should be consolidated with the fund arising from the appropriation of one per cent. on the nominal amount of each loan, and that both funds, thus combined, should be applied to the redemption of the whole debt.—This debt amounted in February 1803, to 480,572,470*l.* and the produce of the joint sinking funds to 6,311,626*l.*; so that although this fund was originally but in the proportion of the 266th part, it became in 1803 equal to a 77th part of the whole unredeemed debt.—It now remains for me to state the present portion of the sinking fund to the debt; and the committee will hear with satisfaction that this proportion opens a still more pleasing prospect; for since the consolidation proposed by lord Sidmouth, the sinkfund has materially advanced. The amount of the unredeemed debt at present is, or rather, will be on the 5th of February next, within a few days from the time at which I am speaking, 530,351,89*l.*, while that of the sinking fund is 8,331,709*l.* So that the sinking fund is now equal to the 63d part of the whole debt, or, if the committee are desirous of taking another, and perhaps a clearer, view of the subject, calculating the debt not at its nominal but at its real money value, (that is, taking the three per cents. at sixty) the proportion which the sinking fund bears to the unredeemed debt, is that of 1 to 42; a result at once satisfactory and striking, when it is considered that it arises out of a period of 20 years only, of which it will be recollected that 14 have been years of war.—I hope the committee will pardon me for having so long detained their attention upon this part of the subject—as it forms a material branch of the system which I shall have the honour of submitting to their consideration, the natural tendency and great recommendation of which will be that it will give an increasing power to the operation of the Sinking Fund.—The second branch of the proposed system refers to the War Taxes, to the origin, progress, character, and probable improvement of which I beg leave shortly to call the attention of the committee. In the year 1797, recourse was had to the principle of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year: but much as I admire that principle, and however beneficial the effects that have arisen from its operation, I must yet say that from the manner of its application, it was particularly in detail extremely unfair and unjust in its pressure. I do not make this observation with a view to censure any persons whatever, nor should I feel justified in pronouncing censure upon the original authors of such a plan from my own knowledge of the extreme difficulties that arise in the endeavour to carry into complete execution the principle of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year. But I have always been of opinion that the application of that principle to the assessed taxes in the case of the treble assessment was extremely unjust, as proceeding upon the very erroneous ground of taking expenditure as the criterion of income. The produce of the treble assessment for the year 1798 amounted only to 3,794,552*l.* In the following year, from the experience of its imperfections, the treble assessment was laid aside, but the principle of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, was retained, and the income tax substituted in its room. At the first imposition of the treble assessment, it had been subjected to a charge of 16 millions, the interest of which was to be defrayed out of its produce during the war, and on the return of peace the residue was also to be applied to the extinction of that debt. This charge therefore was transferred to the income tax, which thus became burthened with a double mortgage, to discharge which its continuance would have been necessary after the war had ceased, to defray the expenditure of which it was imposed. In consequence of this arrangement the principle of raising the supplies within the year was sacrificed, or at least partially suspended, by the application of that which was professedly a war tax, to provide for the interest of debt during the war, and for its redemption after a peace. This inconvenience did not escape Mr. Pitt's observation, and he found himself in consequence so far obliged to abandon this system, that in the year 1801, he returned to his former mode of raising loans, and no part of the loan for that year was charged upon the income tax. In 1802, after the peace of Amiens, when lord Sidmouth took the state of our finances into consideration, with a view to a peace establishment, the first circumstance of embarrassment that naturally occurred was the state in which the income tax was pledged. He found it mortgaged for a debt of no less than 56 millions of capital, to discharge which it would of course be necessary to continue it nine years after the war, in order to pay not only the capital debt, but the sum of 1,700,000*l.* annual charge for interest. With a view therefore not only to the relief of the country from the burthen of this tax, but also to leave this great resource open to be applied to the public exigencies in the event of renewed hostility, with all the additional effect and improved direction that could then be given to it, the noble lord who then filled the situation which I have now the honour to occupy, had recourse to the bold measure of repealing the tax and funding 56 millions of stock chargeable upon it, in addition to the sum of 40 millions required on account of the unfunded debt at the conclusion of the war; and for payment of the interest on this sum of 96 millions he contrived to find sufficient taxes. Thus was the country set free from this extraordinary burthen, and afforded the opportunity of saving its means for those future exertions which unhappily it was but too soon afterwards called upon to make, and the subsequent necessity of which form the best comment on the judicious policy which dictated, and the energy which effected a measure, without which, at the commencement of the present contest, our means would have been crippled, and our principal system weakened in the very point in which its strength could be most usefully displayed.—At the commencement of the present war, the tax upon property was substituted for that upon income. As this subject has already been amply discussed, I do not mean to observe further upon the property tax at present than to say, that it contained all the improvements which might have been expected from the experience of antecedent measures, for raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and that even in the first instance of its application, it exceeded in produce the hopes of those by whom it was framed. The largest amount of the income tax at 10 per cent. in the last war was 5,651,642*l.* the first year's produce of the property tax, in which its operation could be said fairly to have commenced was 3,919,108*l.* Still I do not mean to assert that this was at its outset or is even now, strictly speaking, an equal tax, or that it operates with perfect equality upon all classes of the community, much less upon all the individuals who compose those classes. That partial imperfection which is inseparable from all widely extended institutions must peculiarly attach to the provisions of a tax, calculated to include an immense mass of property, and persons placed in circumstances so infinitely diversified. It is indeed morally impossible to apply equally any large and general financial measure, without enfeebling its productive powers. As in the administration of criminal justice, which alike assumes equality in its operation, the same punishment affects men differently according to the health, temperament, strength of body or of mind, or the particular state and condition of the individual who suffers. So in taxation it ever has been, and ever will be unequally felt in its pressure, according to the peculiar situation and local circumstances of the persons to whom it attaches. This inequality is most sincerely to be regretted, and no man feels more strongly than I do how desirable it would be to provide for the most equitable distribution of the public burthens. But I apprehend that no ingenuity that can be exercised by any legislature will ever be sufficient completely to guard against the effect of that diversity of circumstances, which it would be difficult to ascertain and estimate, and much more difficult to counteract. The great practical object in the arrangement of this tax was to adopt some general principle, which should leave as little room as possible for evasion, because such evasion must, not only with regard to this but to all other taxes, be productive of injustice to those who do not evade while it serves to injure the state: and I have the satisfaction to inform the committee that this object has been in a great measure accomplished. Such means have been devised and put in force, to secure an accurate return of income, and such regulations adopted to ensure a strict collection in the customs and excise, that without resorting to any of the inquisitorial proceedings to produce a disclosure of property, which were formerly complained of, a very large proportion indeed of the expences of the war have been raised within the year.—To these objects the attention of ministers was called immediately after they entered into office last year, in consequence of the situation in which they found the finances of the country. Finding the annual expences of the country had increased no less than 7 millions, while the increase of the annual revenue did not exceed one million; in this state of things, with a growing expence and inadequate supply, it was determined to put the circumstances of the country upon a better footing. It was therefore resolved by government to propose an addition to the property tax, and also such further increase of the customs and excise as should raise the produce of the war taxes to 18 millions. As the humble organ of government, it became my duty to submit these propositions to parliament. The duty was painful, and I felt it most sensibly. I was fully aware, that the imposition of taxes is at all times an ungracious task, and that from the nature and amount of the taxes, the increase of which I was then called upon to propose, it was likely to be so in a peculiar degree. But with all these considerations on my mind, combined with the reluctance which I must naturally feel to impose any additional burthens upon my country, the exigency of the public service and the magnitude of the objects in view would not allow me to shrink from my duty even so far as to yield to some of the exemptions proposed.—I have now the satisfaction of thinking that the pain occasioned by the original proposition is in a great measure compensated by the efficiency of its produce. Such indeed has been the increase of the property tax, not so much in the character of burthen, as in the removal of that part of the system which admitted of evasion, that I feel myself justified in taking its produce for the present year at one million beyond what it yielded in the last, which, combined with the other war taxes, and the improved application of the sinking fund, will be amply adequate to defray our future expences to whatever height they can be fairly calculated to arise.—I trust that I have not deceived the committee in the picture I have drawn of the unfavourable points in our financial situation, and that I am justified in availing myself to the extent to which I have gone, of those points that are favourable, I think it will be found that I have neither concealed any part of the one nor exaggerated any circumstance of the other. In estimating the favourable points in our situation, I feel myself justified in taking the improved amount of the war taxes at 21,000,000*l.* which with the produce of the sinking fund of 8,300,000*l.*, I set down as forming a clear annual revenue of about 30,000,000*l.* Of this sum then the country is in possession, and at liberty to apply it to her use independently of the aids derived from her ordinary permanent revenues. (Hear! hear!) This is a fact upon which the committee and the country must reflect with pleasure, and from which gentlemen will proceed with greater satisfaction to consider how such a sum ought to be applied to meet the calls of a war, which from its nature demands our utmost exertion.—I now come to the consideration of the Expenditure which may be incurred for the present year, and which will form the criterion upon which I mean to found my calculations as to the expence upon the future years of war. In taking this criterion, I judge of course by the present state of expence independently both of subsidies to foreign powers and of such additional charges as may be occasioned by unforeseen emergencies, or by any increase in our establishments, or in the price of naval and military stores. Should such emergencies arise, as most probably they will, or should the operation of any of the causes I have just stated produce an addition to our expenditure, that addition must under the system I shall have the honour to propose, as it must under any other system of finance, be attended with an increase of burthen upon the public. —It may however be proper to observe, that should such further demands arise, they will occasion no departure from the principle of the arrangement which I have to propose to you, as they will serve only to cause a proportional addition to the amount of new taxes which under this plan would otherwise be required in that year. But to return to the question of war expenditure: the amount of the supplies I have already stated at 40,527,065*l.*, and that of the ways and means at 41,100,000*l.*; which leaves a surplus of more than 500,000*l.* But to this point I have already alluded. Excluding from this statement all demands which do not come into the regular account of our annual expenditure, or which may not recur, and deducting also the amount of the surplus of the consolidated fund and the annual taxes, upon the produce of which we may safely rely, we then come to ascertain the sum wanted to supply the exigencies of the war. In the first place, deducting the subsidies 1,5000,000*l.* and the sum required for the repayment of 5 per cents. 1797, 350,000*l.* the supply will be reduced to 38,677,000*l.* But the farther deductions of 2,750,000*l.* for the malt duty, of 3,500,000*l.* for the surplus of the consolidated fund, and of 450,000*l.* for the lottery, will reduce the provision to be made for the service of the war to 31,977,000*l.* or, taking it in round numbers, to 32,000,000*l.*—Now, sir, this is the point from which we are to depart in the arrangement, which I shall have the honour of submitting to you. I have shewn that the sum required to defray the extra expence of the war, amounts to 32,000,000*l.* To provide for this independently of the produce of the war taxes, I propose to borrow the sum of 12,000,000*l.* by way of loan.—These 12 millions it is proposed to raise as a war loan to be charged upon the war taxes, a certain portion of which is immediately to be set apart for its liquidation. But here two difficulties present themselves, which must have already occurred to the minds of the committee; the first is, that the tendency of such an operation must be gradually to exhaust the war taxes, so that at the end of a certain, although a remote period, this source of our supplies will be dried up.—The other objection is, that on the supposition of a prolongation of the war beyond the period, in which the war duties of excise and customs will be exhausted, a part, or, if the war should still continue, the whole of the property tax will be pledged for several years after the conclusion of peace. The means, however, by which I propose to obviate both these difficulties, will, I trust, when explained, receive the entire approbation of the committee.—It is proposed, sir, to borrow 12,000,000*l.* annually for the first 3 years, from the present time; for the fourth year (or 1810)

14,000,000*l.*; and for the ten succeeding years, if war shall so long continue, 16,000,000*l.* in each year.—In the first and each successive year for which these loans shall be raised, so much of the war taxes is to be appropriated, as will amount to 10 per cent. on the loan so raised. Out of this 10 per cent. the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking fund for the redemption of that loan.—When the interest of money is at 5 per cent. such a sinking fund would redeem each loan in 14 years from its creation; and in case of a rise in the funds, this redemption would be accelerated; because the loans would be borrowed at a lower rate of interest, and that proportion of the ten per cent. which would be applicable to the sinking fund, would consequently be greater.—But, without distracting the attention of the committee with the different results deducible on the supposition of variations of the funds, which, if they should arise in any material degree, are likely to favour the operation of this plan, I will proceed on the supposition that the funds remain at 60.—Thus, if 12,000,000*l.* be borrowed at 60, in 1807, the portion of war taxes appropriated to the interest and sinking fund on that loan will be 1,200,000*l.*; and that portion will continue payable for 14 years, (that is, till the end of the year 1820,) and at the expiration of those 14 years the loan of 1807 will have been wholly redeemed by the operation of its own sinking fund, and consequently the 1,200,000*l.* war taxes so pledged will then be liberated, and so in succession with respect to the loans of the following years, each of which will mortgage for 14 years its corresponding portion of the war taxes. It will be seen that this system may be carried on for 7 years from 1807, without pledging any part of the property tax; as the whole charge on the war taxes in those seven years, will amount to no more than 9,800,000*l.* The war duties of customs and excise, exclusive of the property tax, are estimated at 9,500,000*l.*, and it may be reasonably expected that the produce in the course of the next 7 years will be raised to 9,800,000*l.* I shall take an opportunity hereafter of stating the other measures to which it is proposed to have recourse, in order to prevent the necessity of pledging the property tax beyond the period for which it is now imposed, viz. the continuance of the present war.—This part of my calculation is framed on the supposition of the continuance of the war for the whole 14 years. If peace should be sooner re-established, other arrangements may easily be made, by which the portions of war taxes so pledged may be released at earlier periods; and the part not pledged will of course immediately be liberated on the return of peace. If on the contrary the war should be prolonged beyond these 14 years, war loans to the amounts above stated may be continued indefinitely, and the fresh charge so created in each year may be defrayed by the portions of war taxes thus successively falling in, without the necessity of laying on for that purpose any further taxes beyond those now in existence.—But as the interest and sinking fund to be thus provided in each successive year for the charge of these war loans are taken from the produce of the war taxes, which now constitute a part of the means by which the annual expenditure is defrayed, the deficiencies so created must be supplied as they may respectively arise by supplementary loans.—The loan so required this year will be only 200,000*l.* But it is obvious that the amount of the supplementary loans required for this purpose will, in each succeeding year, progressively increase by so much as the interest and sinking fund of the fresh war loans, annually charged upon the war taxes, shall lessen the unappropriated residue of those taxes.—But, although the supplementary loans will progressively increase, yet it will appear that the whole amount to be raised by loan in any one year for the period of 20 years, (supposing the war so long to continue) or, in other words, that the combined amount of the war and supplementary loans, will only in one year exceed by more than 5,000,000*l.* the sum which will, on the principles assumed in this plan, be applicable in the same year to the reduction of the national debt. Calculations of this nature are indeed liable to be varied by fluctuations in the price of the stocks. But on the whole, there seems no reason to doubt, that although the sums to be borrowed in the latter part of the abovementioned period of 20 years, should the present war so long continue, might unquestionably appear large; yet their effect upon the money market will always be sufficiently counteracted by the large amount to be paid off within the same year, by the operation of the sinking fund, in the manner, and with the limitations which I shall presently explain.—And this, I trust, will prove a most satisfactory article of information to the committee. For, if we look back to the loans of last war, we shall find that in one year (1797) the addition made to the public debt, that is to say, the excess of the sum borrowed above the sum redeemed by the sinking fund in that year, amounted to the enormous sum of 40,000,000*l.* money capital; and that on an average of the last 14 years the addition to the public debt amounted to 15,000,000*l.* annually; whereas under the system which I shall this night have the honour of proposing to the committee, should the war be protracted till the close of the year 1826, the addition to the public debt will in no one year, except the last (1823), exceed the sum of 5,000,000*l.*, and on an average of the 20 years from 1807 to 1826 inclusive, will fall below the sum of 4,000,000*l.* annually.—It is proposed to raise these supplementary loans according to the system pursued since the year 1792. A sinking fund of one per cent. upon the nominal capital will be added to the interest on these loans, and the charge so created will be provided for by imposing new taxes, or by the falling in of annuities.—The sum requisite to defray the interest and sinking fund of those supplementary loans will in the present year (1807) be 13,333*l.*; in 1808, 93,333*l.*; and so on progressively increasing in each year. But in considering the mode in which provision is to be made for those charges, it will be convenient, for reasons that will hereafter present themselves to the committee, to divide the whole period of 20 years into three successive periods of three, seven, and ten years.—With respect to the first period of three years from the present time, the amount of taxes required in 1807 will be 13,333*l*; in 1808, 93,333*l.*; and in 1809, 173,333*l.*; or the amount required in the whole three years will be 279,999*l.*; but in the present year annuities will fall in to the amount of 15,515*l.*; and in 1808 to the amount of 370,000*l.*, making together the sum of 385,515*l.*—The amount of these annuities being therefore more than sufficient to discharge the interest, &c. upon the supplementary loans to be contracted for within the period of three years, the committee will hear with satisfaction, that for those three years not a shilling of new taxes whatever will be imposed upon the country. [A loud cry of hear! hear!] This will be the first effect of the system I have the honour to propose; in the course of the next three years no new taxes will be imposed, but on the contrary, a surplus of the annuities already mentioned will remain applicable to the service of subsequent years. With respect to the second period of seven years commencing with 1810 and ending with 1816, the charge occasioned by the supplementary loan in 1810, will be 133,333*l.*; in 1811, 106,666*l.*; and will then increase progressively in each year, till in 1816, 640,000*l.* will be wanted. For these charges provision might be made by raising taxes to the amount required in each year; but as this mode might have the appearance of a desire to shift the burthen from the earlier so as to make it fall with disproportioned pressure on the latter years of the period, it has been thought more advisable to take an average in order that the pressure may be evenly diffused over the surface of the seven years. The result of this average is, that it will be necessary to raise the sum of 293,000*l.* annually by new taxes, for the period of seven years, from 1810 to 1817.—I am confident, sir, that the committee participates with me the satisfaction I feel at being enabled to make so satisfactory a statement. That at this time, sir, at the commencement of the fifth year of a war, the most expensive in its progress and the most important in its consequences that this country has ever carried on, we have in our hands the means of providing for an annual extraordinary expenditure of 32,000,000*l.* without imposing any additional burthen for the next three years, and with only the comparatively trifling addition of 293,000*l.* annually for the seven subsequent years, is surely a statement of which the house and the country may be justly proud. And I trust, sir, that I shall not incur the charge of being too sanguine in my expectations, when I state my belief that this annual addition of 293,000*l.* will in all probability be considerably diminished by the spring, which will be given to consumption by the relief afforded to the public from additional taxation, and which will operate to the increase of the existing revenue, and by the further increase in the produce of the existing revenue arising from improvements in the mode of collection, which the relief from additional taxation will tend greatly to facilitate.—It is, however, sufficient to have shewn, that provision may be made for ten years continuance of war, without imposing taxes in any one year to a greater amount than I have already stated. And it must again be remarked, that if peace should occur at an earlier period than the ten years here supposed, the burthens would of course be proportionally diminished; no further supplementary loans would then be required; the portions of war taxes then pledged would gradually fall in; those not pledged might at once be repealed, and other resources would present themselves for affording ease to all our financial operations. Having gone through the two first periods, I shall now proceed to the third. But before I enter upon it, I must beg leave again to call the attention of the committee, to the subject of the sinking fund, which during this period will become more immediately applicable to the public service. At the first establishment of the sinking fund, the amount appropriated to the reduction of the debt bore so small a proportion to the total capital of the debt, and to the general extent of our money transactions, that it might hardly have appeared necessary to take any precautions for preventing the inconveniences which might at a future period arise from the too rapid reduction of the debt, and too great accumulation of floating capital in the money market. Yet, with a view both to these inconveniences, and to the holding out a prospect of some relief to the public from taxes within a moderate distance of time, the accumulation of the sinking fund at compound interest was limited to the extent of 4,000,000*l.*, and after it should have reached that sum (which it was then computed would take place about 1808) it was thenceforward to be applied to that extent only, leaving the accruing surplus at the disposal of parliament.—The reasons which induced Mr. Pitt to fix this limitation are obvious. I need hardly press upon the consideration of the committee, all the evils likely to result from allowing the sinking fund to accumulate without any limit; for the nation would be exposed by that accumulation to the mischief of having a large portion of capital taken at once out of the market without any adequate means of applying it, which would of course be deprived of its value. This evil must appear so serious to any man who contemplates its character, that I have no doubt it will be felt, however paradoxical it may seem, that the redemption of the whole national debt at once would be productive of something like national bankruptcy, for the capital being returned suddenly into the hands of the holder, without any means of disposing of it, that capital would be equivalent almost to nothing, while the interest he had before derived from it would be altogether extinguished. The other evils which would arise from, and which must serve to demonstrate the mischievous consequence of, a prompt discharge of the national debt, I shall shew presently.—Different arrangements were adopted in the further provisions made on the subject of the sinking fund in 1792 and in 1802. By the first the sinking fund of one per cent. which was thenceforward to be provided for every new loan, was made to accumulate at compound interest until the whole of the debt created by such new loan should be extinguished. And by the second arrangement all the various sinking funds existing in 1802 were consolidated, and the whole were appropriated to accumulate at compound interest, until the discharge of the whole of the debt, also existing in 1802. But the debt created since 1802, amounting to about 100,000,000*l.* of nominal capital, is still left subject to the conditions of the act of 1792, which provides for each separate loan a sinking fund of only one per cent. on the nominal capital.—The plan of 1802, engrafted on the former acts of 1786 and 1792, provided for the still more speedy extinction of the debt to which it applied. But it would postpone all relief from the public burthens to a very distant period (computed in 1802 to be from 1834 to 1844); and it would throw such large and disproportioned sums into the money market in the latter years of its operation, as might produce a very dangerous depreciation of the value of money. Many inconveniences might also arise from the sudden stop which would be put to the application of those sums when the whole debt should have been redeemed, and from the no less sudden change in the price of all commodities which must follow from taking off at one and the same moment, taxes to an extent probably then much exceeding 30,000,000*l.* The fate of merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, and every description of dealers, in such an event, must be contemplated by every thinking man with alarm; and this applies to my observation respecting a national bankruptcy, for should the national debt be discharged, and such a weight of taxation taken off at once, all the goods remaining on hand would be, comparatively speaking, of no value to the holders, because having been purchased or manufactured while such taxation prevailed, they must be undersold by all those who might manufacture the same kind of goods after such taxation had ceased. These objections were foreseen, and to a certain degree acknowledged, at the time when the act of 1802 was passed: and it was then answered, that whenever the danger approached, it might be obviated by subsequent arrangements.—It appears, therefore, highly desirable that a plan should be adopted which may remedy these inconveniences, if it can be done without injury either to the present or future interests of the stock-holders, and without retarding the discharge of the existing public debt beyond the period already prescribed by parliament. This it is conceived may be effected by rendering the operation of the sinking fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present powers, and by diffusing over a greater number of years these extensive effects which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last period of its operation.—The arrangements proposed for this purpose are founded in part on calculations drawn from the increased benefit which will have been given to the stockholder, by applying a sinking fund of five per cent. on the money capital, instead of one per cent. on the nominal capital, to so large a proportion of the loans of the first ten years. It is proposed in return for this advantage, that when the present sinking fund shall have so accumulated as to exceed in its amount the interest of such part of the present debt as shall then remain unredeemed, the excesses of the sinking fund above the interest shall be at the disposal of parliament: but that these excesses shall never be made available to such an extent as would either prevent the redemption of a sum equal to the now existing debt, in as short a period as the same would be paid off by the operation of the present system, or postpone the final redemption of any future loan beyond the 45 years limited for that purpose by the act of 1792. And in this way a considerable increased advantage is given to the stockholder. By the operation of the proposed plan a larger sinking fund will be applied to the redemption of the present debt, until the period of its final extinction, than would have been applied during the same period by the effect of the present system. An amount also equal to the present debt will be redeemed at a much earlier period by the proposed plan, than by the existing system; and an amount equal to all future loans to be raised according to this plan during the continuance of the war, will, in any supposition of a rise in the funds, always be redeemed very considerably within 45 years from the date of the creation of every such loan. It will easily be seen that the result will in any case be that of a full compliance with the provisions of the act of 1792. Thus will parliament be enabled to afford ease to the public, and relief from taxation, in conformity to the principle of the act of 1786, without violating in the smallest degree, the principles of the subsequent acts of 1792 and 1802, or trenching upon any right or interest enjoyed by the public creditor.—It remains now to shew what will be the periods at which these arrangements will come in aid of the means of defraying the public expenditure during the third period of 10 years, supposing the war so long to continue. The provision made for the first and second periods, is independent of any measure respecting the excesses of the present sinking fund. Those excesses will not, according to this plan, become available in respect of the present debt till the beginning of 1817. In respect of the debt created by the new supplementary loans, the excesses will not be available until their sinking fund of one per cent. on the nominal capital, shall have accumulated to an amount equal to the interest of such part of those loans as shall then be unredeemed. The whole sinking fund created in respect of the debt charged upon the war taxes, must of course during the war be applied invariably to the redemption of that debt, in order to effect its extinction within the period of 14 years, as above explained, and to set free such portions of those taxes as must be applied to the charge of fresh loans to be raised in the same manner so long as the war shall continue. No excesses of the war sinking fund could therefore be available during the war, but on the return of peace there could be no objection to the consolidation of the war sinking fund with the sinking fund of the present debt, and to the leaving at the disposal of parliament the excesses of such sinking fund, so consolidated, above the interest of the war debt, and of the present debt, which would in like manner, be consolidated for this purpose.—These distinctions between present debt, war debt, and supplementary debt, are however, meant to be preserved, only, by keeping separate accounts of the payments made from each of the sinking funds; in order that the operation of the plan may distinctly appear. But it is intended that in practice the whole of the present debt shall be considered as forming one general mass of debt, with the future war debts and supplementary debts, as they are successively incurred; and that the different sinking funds shall be applied by the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt indiscriminately to the purchase of any part of these debts. From what has been said, it will easily be seen that this plan will effectually provide for the present expenditure, during the whole of the second series of ten years. I have already mentioned, that with respect to the present debt the excess of sinking fund above interest, calculated on the present price of stocks, will become available in the year 1817: But the whole of these excesses will not on that calculation be wanted for the purpose of carrying on this plan, even supposing the continuance of the war for the whole of the second series. A part only need on that supposition be taken in each year, and the remainder will be carried as at present in aid of the accumulation of the sinking fund. The result of this operation, with respect to these ten years will then be, (supposing the war to continue so long) that no new taxes whatever will be required in the whole of this period. It appears hardly necessary to carry these calculations beyond the supposition of 20 years continuance of the present war. But to any one who considers the effect which must be produced on our finances by the intermediate operations here described, and by the proportion which the sinking fund will then bear to the unredeemed debt, it must be obvious that after that period no considerable financial difficulty is likely to arise.—I shall now, sir, proceed to that point, which, if I may be allowed to judge from the feeling expressed when I before stated the circumstance, will prove an article of most satisfactory information to the committee, viz. to explain the mode by which we shall be enabled to release the Property tax, at the expiration of the term for which it is already pledged, that is, at the end of six months from the ratification of a definitive treaty of peace. I have already shewn that the amount of war taxes pledged in the next seven years will be 9,800,000*l.* a sum which it may be reasonably expected the war duties of excise and customs will be sufficient to supply. Should peace therefore take place in the course of seven years from the present time, no part of the property tax will have been pledged. Should peace take place between the end of the seventh and of the tenth year from the present time, that is, between January 1814, and January 1817, part of the property tax will have been applied to the purposes of this plan, but it may be released immediately on the conclusion of peace, by extending that principle to the excesses of the sinking fund of the war debt which I have already stated it is intended to apply to the excesses of the present sinking fund. In 1817, the excesses of the present sinking fund begin to arise, and when combined with the excesses of the sinking fund of the war debt will be amply sufficient to redeem, on the return of peace, any part of the property tax that may have been pledged.—From the length to which my observations have already extended, I feel very reluctant farther to take up the time of the committee; but I must beg leave to trespass upon their attention, while I briefly recapitulate the heads of the system, which I have had the honour of detailing to them.—We shall, in the first place, by this plan be enabled to provide for an extraordinary expenditure of 32,000,000*l.*; (and here I wish most particularly to impress upon the minds of the committee, that the plan I have submitted undertakes to provide only for an expenditure of 32,000,000*l.*: should any further charge arise, that charge must under this, as under any other system of finance, be productive of additional burthens;) but, sir, we shall by this plan be enabled to provide for an annual extraordinary expenditure of 32,900,000*l.* without imposing any additional burthen on the public for the next three years, and should the war so long continue, for the seven subsequent years to that period, with the compartively trifling addition to the taxes, of 293,000*l.* annually; but should the war be still further protracted, should it even continue for ten years beyond the two periods I have already mentioned, we shall have the means of providing for an expenditure of 32,000,000*l.* without imposing on the public any additional burthen at all. And this relief, sir, will be obtained without the least injury to the interest of the stock-holder; on the contrary, an addition will be made to the sinking fund even in the present year; an amount equal to the present unredeemed debt will be more speedily redeemed; the proportion which the sinking fund bears to the unredeemed debt, and on which the period of the redemption of that debt depends will be increased; and by a more equal distribution of the powers of the sinking fund, those inconveniencies will be avoided which would necessarily arise from the too great influx of money into the market in the latter years of its operation. It is true indeed, sir, that a part of the war taxes will be pledged beyond the war, but I have already shewn that the property tax may under any circumstances be released at the end of six months from the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, and by the application of the excesses of the sinking funds of the present and war debts as they arise, the release of the other war taxes will be considerably accelerated.—Such, sir, is the proposed plan of Finance which his majesty's ministers have thought deserving of the serious attention of the house; a plan resting on a foundation, the solidity and strength of which has been proved by experience on the great resources of the country; on the increased and increasing operation of the fund for the redemption of the national debt; on the approved principle of raising the greater part of the supplies within the year, carried to the extent to which it was last year, and above all, on the constancy of a people resolved to omit no exertion; to be dismayed by no difficulty, and to shrink from no privation, which can be called for by the honour and interests of their country.—The propositions which I have had the honour of submitting to the house, however impossible it may be to guard against the effects of chance, and the mutability of events, are recommended by the most positive experience, and depend upon causes which have been already ascertained to be constant and steady in their operation. If the plan itself then be unobjectionable; if the reasoning be just; if the calculations and results should be found unexceptionable, we are justified in looking, if not with certainty, at least with confidence, to the advantages which it offers.—Important as the advantages are which this plan presents, both in the present relief which it affords in a season of great and unprecedented difficulty, and in the prevention of those future evils which the unlimited operation of the sinking fund must ultimately occasion, yet its principal benefit consists in the impression which it must make both in this country and out of it, where it will be seen that without any further material pressure on the resources of the country, and by a perseverance only in its wonted exertions, parliament now finds itself enabled to meet with confidence all the exigencies of the present war, to whatever period its continuance may be necessary, for maintaining the honour and independence of the empire.—Our enemy indeed may still continue to consider our subjugation practicable, while he thinks our resources for war can be exhausted; what neither diplomatic artifice, nor military power have been able to accomplish, he may still look forward to as the result of the continued and aggravated pressure of taxation: but here too we possess the means of parrying the mortal blow, and defeating the favourite pursuit of insatiable ambition. If no interval of repose is to be allowed to the harassed world, unless accompanied by humiliation and by servitude; if new schemes of aggression, conquest, and tyranny, are still to desolate Europe, it will be found that Great Britain wants not the means to maintain the contest to the last; that her resistance will be proportioned to the efforts that are employed to subdue her, and her exertions unremitted till peace can be obtained in consistency with her honour, her security, and her independence. God forbid, sir, that any thing coming from me should be so far misconstrued or misunderstood as to convey an impression that I meant to contend that any situation however prosperous, any system of finance however plausible, any temptation to war, if such temptation could be supposed for a moment to exist, should lead us to protract its evils longer than we may be compelled to do by the injustice of our enemy. Far from me be any such assertion or any such idea. Let our enemy employ his power in destruction, if it shall continue to be so permitted; to us it belongs to use the means with which we are entrusted to protect and to save, to defend ourselves from this wide-spreading pestilence, and to support those to whom our assistance may yet be useful. Disclaiming therefore every idea of employing the resources we possess to protract the evils of war, disclaiming entirely any intention to assert that an improved system of finance ought to operate as a motive to impair the resolution to which I trust we shall invariably adhere, of earnestly and industriously embracing every occasion that may serve to restore to the world the blessings of peace, I may yet be allowed to say that it will be not a little satisfactory to reflect that if we should again fail in our future, as we have failed in our past attempts to accomplish that great work, we have amply the means of continuing the war, if war shall be unavoidable. If nothing can bring our enemy to moderation—if nothing will satisfy him short of the destruction of all that remains of independence in Europe, it is consoling to reflect that if we cannot at once subdue our present difficulties, we may at least survive them. *(Hear! hear!)*—By combining and applying the great resources which the state of the country now affords, we may at least hope from our efforts, that if the devouring flame which already has laid waste the fairest portions of the world, should be still permitted to spread its destructive influence, blasting all that it reaches, and threatening all that it approaches, we, through the excellence of the institutions under which we live, and the blessing and protection of an over-ruling Providence, may walk unhurt amidst the conflagration, and transmit to our posterity and the descendants of those continental nations which have been accustomed to look and may again look to us as the last bulwark and defence of liberty and law, when invaded by tyranny and violence, the most important and sacred trust that it was ever the lot of man to guard and preserve, the splendid inheritance we have derived from our ancestors, the undiminished glory and independence of our country, and last and best of all, the pure and unsullied faith and honour of the British character and name.—The noble lord concluded with laying the following Resolutions on the table, and proposed that the consideration of them should be adjourned till Wednesday se'nnight:

Resolutions.

I. "That the several duties of customs granted to his majesty by 43 Geo. III. c. 76, by 44 Geo. III. c. 53, and by the 45 Geo. III. c. 39, and also the several duties of excise granted to his majesty by the 43 Geo. III. c. 81, and by the 46 Geo. III. c. 42, shall be further granted and continued, and shall be payable in such proportions, and for such further terms as may be directed by any act or acts of parliament hereafter to be passed for defraying the charge of any loan or loans to be charged thereupon in manner hereinafter mentioned, that is to say:—That on every loan to be raised on the credit of the said several duties, or any of them, and charged thereupon, there shall be set apart, out of the produce of the said duties and appropriated to the consolidated fund of Great Britain, an annual sum equal to ten pounds per centum on the amount of the sum to be raised by every such loan, out of which annual sum the interest and charges of the management of such loan shall, in the first instance, be defrayed, and a sum equal to the residue thereof shall be paid in each year, by equal quarterly payments, into the Bank of England, and placed to the account of the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, and shall be by them applied in the purchase or redemption of such public annuities, charged on the consolidated fund of Great Britain, as they shall deem most expedient, until by the operation thereof an amount of capital stock of such annuities, equal to the capital stock created in consequence of every such loan respectively, shall have been purchased or redeemed; and that whenever and so soon as such amount of capital stock shall have been so purchased or redeemed, the aforesaid annual sum shall be at the disposal of parliament."

II. "That the several duties granted to his majesty on the profits arising from property, professions, trades, and offices, by the acts of 43 Geo. III. c. 122, 45 Geo. III. c. 15, and 45 Geo. III. 65, shall be applicable in like manner for defraying the charge of any such loan or loans, so long as the said duties shall continue payable by virtue of the said acts, and no longer."

III. "That the total amount of any loan or loans to be so raised and charged shall not exceed the sum of 16,000,000*l.* in any one year, or of 210,000,000*l.* within 14 years from this time."

IV. "That any further or supplementary loan or loans which may be necessary for the service of any year beyond the loan or loans so charged as aforesaid on any of the several duties above-mentioned shall be raised on such terms, and subject to such conditions of redemption as are hereinafter specified, videlicet, that an annual sum, equal to one per cent. on the capital stock created in respect of every such supplementary loan, shall be issued in equal quarterly payments to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt; or that other provisions shall be made by parliament for redeeming the same within 45 years from its creation; and every such loan may be charged upon any duties to be hereafter granted or appropriated by parliament for such purpose, or on any temporary annuities which may expire, and become applicable by parliament, conformably to the provisions of an act made in the 42d of Geo. III. c. 71."

V. "That in consideration of the large amount which by the effect of the foregoing Resolutions will be applicable to the redemption of the National Debt, beyond the sums which, in consequence of any law now in force, would be applicable thereto; it is reasonable and expedient that the provisions of an act 32 Geo. III. c. 55, so far as relates to the redemption of the several public funds created or to be created subsequent to the year 1802, and also that the provisions of an act 42 Geo. III. c. 71, so far as relates to the redemption of the several public funds therein mentioned, should be so altered and amended as may be necessary for giving effect to the principles of the said acts, in such manner as may, under the present circumstances, be most beneficial to the public interests."

VI. "That it is expedient, that whenever the whole of the sums applicable to the reduction of the National Debt, by virtue of any act or acts now in force, shall have accumulated to an annual amount exceeding the amount of the interest payable in respect of all such public redeemable annuities, created at any time previous to the 5th day of January, 1807; as shall then remain unredeemed, the excess of such annual sums above such interest shall be at the disposal of parliament, and may be made applicable to the charge of any loan or loans thereafter to be raised into such other public service as parliament may direct, but in such manner and to such extent only as shall always leave an annual sum applicable to the reduction of the National Debt, sufficient to redeem every part thereof, which existed previous to the 22d day of June, 1802, within 45 years at the utmost from the said 22d day of June, 1802; and also sufficient to redeem every part thereof created subsequent to the said 22d day of June, 1802, within 45 years at the utmost from the date of its creation."

VII. "That whenever the annual sums applicable to the reduction of the National Debt in respect of any loan or loans to be charged as aforesaid in the several war duties before mentioned, shall exceed the amount of the interest payable in respect of such part of the capital stock created in respect of any such loan or loans which shall then remain unredeemed, the excess of such annual sums above such interests shall be at the disposal of parliament in time of peace, but not in time of war, and in such manner and to such extent only, as that an amount equal to the capital stock created by every such loan respectively shall always be redeemed within 45 years from the date of the creation of such loan."

VIII. "That whenever the annual sums applicable to the reduction of the National Debt, in respect to any such supplementary loan or loans as aforesaid, shall exceed the amount of the interest payable in respect of such part of the capital stock created in respect of any such loan or loans as shall then remain unredeemed, the excess of such annual sums above such interest, shall be at the disposal of parliament, but in such manner and to such extent only as that an amount equal to the capital stock created by every such loan respectively shall always be redeemed within 45 years from the date of the creation of such loan."

IX. "That for the purpose of ascertaining the due execution of the regulations provided by the above Resolutions, separate accounts shall be kept by the commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt, of all public funds, or securities purchased, or redeemed by the sums vested in them by virtue of any act or acts now in force, or by such sums as shall be vested in them, in respect of any loan or loans charged on the aforesaid war duties, or any of them, or in respect of any Supplementary loan or loans to be raised as aforesaid; provided nevertheless, that the said several sums may be applied indiscriminately in the purchase of any such public funds or securities, as the said commissioners may think expedient."

X. "That an account shall be taken,

and laid before this house, of the net produce of all the permanent taxes for three years, ending the 5th day of January, 1807; adding thereto an estimate of the future annual produce of such of the said taxes as have not been in full receipt during that period, with an average thereof; and if the net produce of those taxes in the years ending the 5th day of January, 1803, 1809, and 1810, shall in the average of those three years exceed such former average, such excess, or any part thereof, shall be at the disposal of parliament, and applicable to the charge of any loan or loans thereafter to be raised, or to such other public service as parliament shall direct, and so on successively in any future years, if the excess of such taxes on an average of three years shall exceed the first average by more than the amount of any sums which may then have been charged thereon; but if on any such three years average there shall appear any deficiency below such average, together with such additional charge aforesaid, such deficiency shall be made good by parliament."

XI. "That an account shall be annually taken, and laid before this house, of the net produce of the several war duties aforesaid, and upon an average of three years, from the 5th day of January, 1807, the annual net produce thereof shall have fallen short of 21,000,000*l.* Such deficiency shall be made good by parliament, and so on successively in any subsequent year, in which any loan or loans shall be created and charged thereupon in manner aforesaid."

Mr. *Rose* said, he would not detain the committee at present, as any observations upon this plan would come better afterwards. He only wished to suggest, that the annuities which the noble lord mentioned as one of the means for carrying this measure into effect, had been already actually applied by law to the Sinking Fund.

Lord *Henry Petty* observed, that the right hon. gent.'s recollection failed him. It was true, that in 1786 they had been applied as he stated, but in 1802 they had been detached from this purpose. The debate would more properly take place after the Resolutions were printed; and besides the Resolutions, there was a set of Tables illustrative of the different forms and modes in which the plan he had just detailed would operate, and of which, although they could not be regularly laid on the table of the house, he would take care that every member should be provided with a copy. [See Appendix to the present volume.] Conscious as he was, that in the speech he had just had the honour of making to the house, many particulars had been omitted, and many things obscurely stated, he declared it would give him pleasure to afford every possible information to the house on the subject.

Mr. *Johnstone*, although he allowed that it would be preferable to postpone the debate until after the Resolutions should be printed, yet thought one short observation necessary; because, if the impression made by the speech of the noble lord were allowed to go abroad, the country might be induced to entertain an opinion which could never be realized. The noble lord had displayed great talents and great eloquence, and the display of those talents and that eloquence had been clearly evinced by his leading the house, at such a moment as the present, when the Income tax pressed so hard upon the necessities of the people, and when every alleviation of the burthens imposed by that tax had been so unprecedentedly and so steadily refused, to listen to a detail of the mischiefs which would arise from the payment of the national debt and from the relief from all their taxes. All the noble lord's conclusions proceeded on the supposition that the annual expenditure of the country would not exceed 38 millions. Grant him that, and the rest followed. What had been the consequence of a similar hope held out at the beginning of the war, namely, that the war could be carried on without any increase of debt, by the operation of the Sinking Fund? He was sure that he should not be suspected of derogating from the character and talents of the noble viscount (Sidmouth) then at the head of his majesty's government, for whom he entertained the highest respect; but undoubtedly the result of those expectations was, that in the fourth year of the war, our debt had increased 50 millions on account of England, and 17 millions on account of Ireland; being at an average rate of 17 millions annually. He feared that a similar result would follow the noble lord's calculations. The noble lord had omitted to consider the necessary enhancement that must take place in the price of every article required for the service of the country. He had made no allowance for that which was inevitable, the situation of the continent, which would call for essential aid from this country. There was another point which must immediately cause the total failure of the plan. This was the state of Ireland. The charges of a civil nature in Ireland amounted to 3,800,000*l.* while the whole receipt of the exchequer did not exceed 3,670,000*l.*; it would therefore be out of the power of Ireland to raise within herself the interest of the 5 millions. The noble lord had totally omitted to notice what must be the result when the two exchequers of England and Ireland should be united. Then the whole of the interest of the 5 millions must be raised in England, as Ireland was unable to do it within herself. Many other points might be mentioned, but these were enough to induce the house and the country not to be too sanguine in their expectations of being enabled to carry on the war for 20 years, without incurring any additional burthens. It was an expectation that could never be realized, and the disappointment of the people would render them more prone to complain of the privations to which they must necessarily be subject. He could not resist saying these few words, even under the disadvantage of the impression that had just been made by the noble lord's eloquence.

Lord *H. Petty*, alluding to that part of the hon. gent.'s observations which related to Ireland, said, that the hon. gent. must be aware that the finances of Ireland rested on a footing totally distinct from those of England; that the system, therefore, with regard to the war taxes could not possibly at present extend to that country.

Mr. *Hiley Addington* observed, that after the able speech of his noble friend, he would not have troubled the house had it not been for the allusion to his noble relation, made by the hon. gent. His noble relation had only said, that supposing the expenditure not to exceed 26 millions, the war might be carried on without additional taxes. This he had before stated in answer to the hon. gent. who had, on a former occasion, brought the same charge against his noble relation.

Mr. *Parnell*, in the absence of an hon. baronet (sir J. Newport), who had been compelled by indisposition to leave the house, declared, that owing to the exertions made in Ireland during the last year, the revenue of that country had been increased half a million. A few years ago the revenue of Ireland was little more than a million; it now amounted to nearly four millions. The increasing trade, and the abolition of injurious restrictions, would probably soon augment this revenue, and make the annual income of Ireland bear the same proportion to her annual expenditure, as the annual income of Great Britain did to her annual expenditure.

Mr. *Corry*, from the experience he had in Irish finance, was also of opinion that they were in a very promising state. He thought, therefore, that the hon. gent. ought to be more guarded in his expressions, lest he should convey a wrong impression on the public mind. The noble lord, whose statements were so clear, and who had opened a plan which would be satisfactory to all the world, except the common enemy of all, had justly observed, that his system was not applicable to Ireland at present, whatever it might be afterwards.

Mr. *Johnstone* meant no reflection on the management of the Irish finances. As to the prediction of lord Sidmouth, his argument still held good, for that noble lord had assumed that the expenditure would not go beyond 26 millions, and the noble lord opposite also assumed that it would not go beyond 38 millions. The grounds of the former prediction had failed, and so might those of the present.—The chairman then reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again on Monday se'nnight.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, February 2.

[Minutes.] On the motion of the archbishop of Canterbury, the thanks of the house were ordered to be given to the bishop of St. David's for his sermon preached before the house at Westminster Abbey, on Friday last; and his lordship was desired to print and publish the same.—Lord Eldon gave notice of his intention of submitting to their lordships a bill for the better and more effectually regulating the practice of the court of chancery, as far as the same related to suitors whose monies were paid into that court to abide the event of its decision; a measure which his lordship said, was of the utmost advantage to the safety of the suitor and the ease of the chancellor, and the want of which he deeply felt when he himself had the honour of filling that office. The lord chancellor quitted the woolsack, and declared that the noble lord should have his sincerest thanks for his attentive consideration of that object; and he assured him, that it was with infinite satisfaction he heard his determination that night, for, certainly, as the practice was at present, every chancellor must feel considerable difficulty in conducting his decisions, and in adjusting his judgements with suitors of the description adverted to by the noble lord.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] Lord *Grenville* having moved the order of the day for the second reading of the Slave Trade Abolition bill, observed, that those of their lordships who had witnessed his extreme anxiety to carry forward this important measure with the least possible interruption, would readily conceive that he now felt great regret in finding himself under the necessity of proposing a further delay. Unfortunately, however, two of his noble friends, whose sentiments respecting this measure it was important the house should be in possession of, and whose assistance he much wished to have upon the discussion of the subject, were too much indisposed to be enabled to attend the house. He therefore proposed that the second reading should be postponed till Wednesday.—Ordered, and that the lords be summoned for that day.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* presented a petition from the ship builders, ship-owners, manufacturers, and others of the port of London, against the Slave Trade Abolition bill; which was ordered to lie on the table. A short conversation took place respecting the propriety of hearing counsel in behalf of the petitioners against the bill.

Lord *Grenville* suggested the propriety of making some order upon this subject, if it was the pleasure of their lordships to hear counsel, in order that they might avoid the inconvenience which occurred, of having a preliminary discussion of this nature, on the very day on which the measure proposed was to be brought forward.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* moved, that such of the petitioners as thought fit, should be heard by their counsel on the second reading of the bill.

Lord *Grenville* thought it would be expedient to make some regulation with respect to the hearing of counsel in order to prevent unnecessary delay. As to the propriety of examining evidence, that of course would be decided on, after their lordships had heard counsel. He thought, however, that it would be sufficient to hear one counsel upon each petition, as the greater part of the arguments which the counsel must necessarily touch upon, had already been often repeated, and as it was of so much importance to avoid delay.

Lord *Eldon* also expressed himself decidedly hostile to unnecessary delay, but at the same time it was of the utmost importance that a subject of this magnitude should be deeply and closely examined, and that the parties whose interests would be affected by it, should be fairly and fully heard.

Lord *Hawkesbury* suggested, that the interests of the petitioners might be equally benefited, and the time of the house less taken up, if the petitioners were classed according to the interests of those petitioning, which would be found to be divided into three; namely, the old planters in Jamaica and other islands, the new planters in the island of Trinidad, and the shipping and commercial interests of the ports of this country, and counsel heard for each interest.—After some further conversation, the petitioners were ordered to be heard by their counsel on Wednesday.

[ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN SCOTLAND.] Lord *Grenville* gave notice that he should, on this day se'nnight, present to the house a bill founded on the Resolutions passed last session, for rendering more effectual the Administration of Justice in Scotland. (See vol. vii. p. 730.)

Lord *Hawkesbury* expressed a wish that full time might be allowed the learned gentlemen of the law in Scotland to make up their minds upon such a complicated and important measure before it passed into a law.

Lord *Grenville* said, it was his wish that sufficient time should be allowed for the consideration of the subject. He must however remark, that ample time had already been given for its consideration since last session, during which interval there had been an opportunity of obtaining the opinions of professional men of eminence with respect to the details of the measure. If it was meant that an interval of equal extent should again be allowed, it was evident the measure could not be carried through parliament in the course of the present session. That some measure of this nature should be adopted without delay was, he conceived, of the greatest importance, not only on account of the great defects which were acknowledged to exist in the Administration of Justice in Scotland, but also on account of the discredit thrown upon that house, in consequence of the great number of appeals from Scotland, and which, from their being so numerous, unavoidably met with much delay in their decision.

Lord *Eldon* confessed that he felt the difficulties as well as the advantages of the measure proposed by the noble baron. He had been employed in more Appeal causes than, he believed, any other man now living, and no man could be more convinced of the necessity of such a measure than he was. Not only Scotland but Ireland felt that necessity. He hoped, however, the intended bill would throw more light on the question than the resolutions afforded. At all events, he should most cheerfully contribute all that his experience and humble abilities enabled him to afford towards the advancement of the business.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, February 2.

[Minutes.] Lord Euston, chairman of the Saltash Election committee, reported, that that committee had been prevented from proceeding on the investigation of the matters given in charge to it, on Friday and Saturday last, in consequence of the absence of A. Robarts, esq. one of its members; that this day Mr. Robarts did attend, and the committee had proceeded to business as usual. Doctor Bailey stated at the bar, that Mr. Robarts's absence was occasioned by indisposition; and Mr. Robarts was excused for having absented himself on the above-mentioned days.—Mr. Yorke as chairman of the Weymouth Election committee, reported that the sitting members were duly elected, and that the petition against them was not frivolous or vexatious.—Sir G. Heathcote, chairman of the Maldon Election committee, reported that Mr. L. Hughes, a member of the said committee, had absented himself, on the ground that his presence was necessary in the country, in consequence of the alarming indisposition of his father. Sir R. Williams deposed to his belief of the fact, and Mr. Hughes was excused from further attendance; and the committee empowered to proceed without him.—On the motion of Lord Howick, the thanks of the house were voted to the Rev. Frederick Barnes, the Chaplain, for the excellent sermon preached before the house, at St. Margaret's Church, on Friday. Mr. Barnes was requested to print the same.—On the motion of Mr. Vansittart, the house went into a committee on the acts relating to the mutual Importation of Spirits between Great Britain and Ireland. Mr. V. adverted to the act of union which had wisely provided that all articles of the growth and produce of either country, should be received in the other, on paying the same charges as were paid on the home production of the same kind. The drawbacks on the spirit intercourse between England and Ireland had been regulated on this principle. But the duties being lower in Scotland than in England, advantages had been taken in consequence, which went to defraud the revenue in England, and to impede the distilleries in Ireland. With a view to correct these evils, he should move, that the chairman be instructed to move for leave to bring in a bill to suspend, for a time to be limited, the drawbacks on the mutual importation of spirits between Great Britain and Ireland; and also to suspend the countervailing duty on the importation of the Irish spirits into Scotland, so as to give the Irish distiller a fair competition with the Scotch and English. The chairman reported, and leave was given to bring in a bill accordingly.—Lord Folkestone gave notice, that to-morrow he would move for leave to bring in a bill to constitute into a law the regulation of the house for giving notice to parties in cases of Controverted Election.—Mr. Rose gave notice, that on Wednesday he should move for certain financial papers, calculated to afford information which was requisite to satisfy doubts which were entertained as to the first Financial Resolution submitted by the noble lord opposite, on Friday. In answer to lord Henry Petty, Mr. Rose stated that the accounts he wished for were intended to show the quantity of certain articles imported before the commutation.

[Treasurership of the Navy.] Mr. *Sheridan*, in rising, pursuant to notice, to move for leave to bring in a bill for the further regulation of the office of Treasurer of the Navy, did not think it necessary to go at length into the grounds of his motion, as the facts which rendered such a bill necessary were within the knowledge of the house. On a recent occasion, doubts had been entertained by the Judges as to the construction of the act of his present majesty, which was intended to prevent the Treasurer of the Navy from making any extraordinary emolument of the public money entrusted to his charge for official purposes. It was necessary to remove those doubts, and though some hesitation had existed as to the best means of removing them, no doubt whatever was entertained of the fact that they ought to be removed. A short act of parliament had, at length, been determined upon as the best mode of removing them, and of regulating the future management of the navy money, in the manner best adapted to the public service, and productive of the least possible inconvenience to the bank. Mr. S. moved accordingly, and leave was given to bring in the bill.

[Irish Treasury Bills Bill.] Sir *John Newport* moved the order of the day, for the house to resolve itself into a committee on the Irish Treasury Bills bill. He hoped that, before the Speaker quitted the chair, the house would indulge him with a few words, for the purpose of clearing up some doubts, with reference to a statement made by an hon. member (Mr. Johnstone) on a former night. In moving to bring in this bill for raising 1,000,000*l.* by Treasury Bills, for the service of Ireland, he trusted it would not be thought that he had claimed an unwarrantable confidence, when it was considered that a power had been given the Irish government to raise half a million for the service of the last year, which power had not been used, nor had any Treasury bills been issued.—He would ask, whether it could with justice be presumed, that the Irish Finances could be in the situation that hon. member had described them, when the Irish government had not found it necessary to avail itself of a power to raise half a million of money? In fact, there had been no occasion for making use of that power; on the contrary, he had been able to discharge a debt due from the Irish Treasury to the English Treasury, of a sum of 276,000*l.* advanced by the English Treasury, for payment of the lottery prizes in 1802. That was no proof of a failure of the Irish Finances. After payment of that sum, there remained, allowing for the subsistence of the army, a sum of upwards of 500,000*l.* belonging to Ireland. He was extremely sorry he had not been present on Thursday, when the noble lord near him (H. Petty) had made so very happy a statement of the finances of Great Britain. But he deprecated all comparison between the finances of G. Britain and the finances of Ireland. But though Ireland was not in that prosperous situation with respect to capital, industry, and commerce, which would enable her to raise a large portion of her expences within the year, she was far from being in a situation of financial failure or depression. Her revenue was more than adequate to the payment of the interest of her debt and the sinking fund, and, with that ability, and with the sums in hand, which he had mentioned, she could not be considered in a state of failure or depression, as she had been represented by an hon. gent. on the night he alluded to. The revenue of Ireland was 3,800,000*l.* which was far above the interest of its debt and Sinking Fund.

Mr. *Johnstone* regretted that he was not in the house when the hon. baronet began his speech, but he seemed to intimate that he (Mr. J.) had taken advantage of his absence. He wished the hon. baronet had been present to have heard him. He did not say that Ireland was in a bankrupt state, nor had attempted to convey any such impression. His argument was, that as the Irish revenue was only equal to the payment of the interest of the debt, and to the defraying of civil charges, it followed that she must raise 4,000,000*l.* by way of loan. He did not take the revenue too low, for he took it at 3,800,000*l.* as the hon. baronet had stated it, though, if he had taken it lower, speaking from the documents before him, he could not have been properly chargeable with error. If the hon. baronet therefore made a speech in order to combat a charge of bankruptcy, he spoke with regard to a charge that existed only in imagination. He had not said that Ireland was in a state of bankruptcy; he had only said, that as she could not raise the greater part of the supplies within the year, she must have recourse to loans here, and that this would interfere with the noble lord's plan.

Sir *J. Newport* knew of no civil charges on the revenue of Ireland, nor of any charges beyond the interest of its debt and sinking fund. These amounted to 3,132,000*l.* which, deducted from the revenue of 3,800,000*l.*, left a surplus of near 700,000*l.* applicable to the current expences.

Mr. *Johnstone* observed, that the hon. baronet's statement confirmed his allegation on the former night. The Irish part of the point charged being 5,300,000*l.* and the surplus of revenue applicable towards it being but 700,000*l.* there would remain to be borrowed 4,600,000*l.* instead of 4,000,000*l.* as he had stated.—The bill then went through the committee.

[Third Military Report—Conduct of Mr. Alexander Davison.] Lord *Archibald Hamilton* stated, that since he had given notice of his intention to bring forward a motion respecting the Third Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, he had understood that proceedings upon the subject were now pending in the Treasury. Under this circumstance, and having communicated with his noble friend (lord H. Petty), he was apprehensive that, if he made the motion, he should be trespassing upon what was the province of the treasury, and interfering with their arrangements; but he hoped the house would indulge him while he read the motion which he had intended to have submitted, and stated the peculiar situation in which he felt himself placed. He had intended to have moved, that the attorney-general should be instructed to take the necessary measures to ascertain, and secure, by due course of law, such sums as should appear to be due to the public from Mr. Alexander Davison, in consequence of the transactions disclosed in the Third Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry. If it should appear to the house, that he had been somewhat hasty in giving his notice of the motion, he trusted the importance of the subject, and the nature of the fraudulent and iniquitous transactions at which his notice was directed, would sufficiently excuse him. A charge of being too forward to institute enquiry against fraud and peculation, was a charge from which he should not shrink. As he imagined there were many members who would have been glad to have delivered their opinions upon such a subject, he feared lest they should feel some mortification at the opportunity being denied them, in consequence of his having relinquished his motion. He felt it his duty to state the view with which he had taken up the subject. He had considered that the report having been made, it was far from creditable that it should have been suffered to have remained so long on the table unnoticed. The opinion he had at first formed respecting the transactions developed by the report, he was by no means disposed to abandon. He had considered, that it would have been more desireable for the house to have instituted some process against Mr. Alexander Davison, than that it should have been done by the treasury. Indeed, he had not yet wholly relinquished that opinion, though certainly by his communications with his noble friend, it had been very much weakened. The enormity of the offence was so great, and so general and extensive in its operation, that it called for the most public and exemplary punishment. Nothing could be more destructive to a government than those agents, who while they were well paid for the duties they performed, yet made use of the confidence reposed in them to plunder the public.

The *Speaker* here interrupted the noble lord, and said, that if he did not mean to propose any motion, it would be inconvenient and improper to enter upon the particulars in a case of this nature.

Lord *A. Hamilton* again rose, and said, that he was sorry to trespass on the attention of the house, but all that he had said, or meant to have said, was intended merely to account for the line of conduct which he had pursued in this business.

Lord *H. Petty* was sensible of the irregularity of prolonging the discussion, but hoped he should be excused for taking this opportunity of explaining to the house the proceedings which the treasury had thought it right to adopt upon the third report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, which he was not surprised to find had attracted the notice of his noble friend, and of the house in general. No delay had taken place in the steps which the treasury had thought it its duty to pursue; and it would under these circumstances be an imputation that ministers had not used proper activity, if the house should take the prosecution out of their hands, and institute steps of its own. The commissioners of barrack accounts had very properly communicated to the lords of the treasury their opinion, that it was very necessary Mr. Davison should produce his cash account with the barrack-master-general. The lords had in consequence directed the commissioners to call for this account; they had written two letters to Mr. Davison, containing a demand to that effect; no answer had been returned to these letters, and the commissoners reported the fact to the lords of the treasury. The lords of the treasury then called peremptorily on Mr. Davison to produce the account, and Mr. Davison did reply to them, assigning a domestic calamity as the excuse for his delay, and declaring his readiness to give such information as to his cash account as he could give; but stating, that as his cash account was mixed with his other accounts, it was impossible he could give a clear view of it. This answer was referred to the commissioners, who stated upon it that it was not satisfactory; and that if the accounts kept by Mr. Davison were in such a form as to be useful at all, the information which the commissioners wished could be collected from them. The lords of the treasury upon this ordered the Third Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, and the correspondence between the barrack commissioners and the treasury and Mr. Davison, to be laid before the attorney and solicitor general, for their opinion, as to what steps ought to be taken to obtain the disclosure of the cash account, and to have justice done to the public in the recovery of what was due to it. The attorney and solicitor general reported their opinion, and recommended as the more speedy mode of proceeding, if parliament should concur in the opinion, that a bill should be passed, enabling the commissioners of barrack accounts to call upon Mr. Davison to produce his books, and to enforce his compliance, rather than to institute proceedings to that effect in the exchequer. He believed, his learned friend the attorney-general was prepared to submit a motion to that effect this night. It was not competent to him to say, in the present stage of the business, whether any evidence upon which to ground a criminal prosecution would be found; but if it should, the attorney and solicitor general would be instructed by the lords of the treasury to institute proceedings upon it. Mr. Davison had written to the lords of the treasury, stating that he would produce an account in his own defence, which would prove satisfactory. But unless he could produce his cash account, the noble lord did not see how it could be satisfactory. The commissioners, however, had called for the cash account by the direction of the treasury, and directions had been given for the recovery of the sums due; every step, therefore, that could possibly be taken, had been resorted to, and therefore he flattered himself that his noble friend would not repent the fair and candid manner in which he had consented to withdraw his motion.

The *Attorney-General* then moved, that there be laid before the house the commission appointing Charles Herries, esq. and W. Bragge, esq. commissioners for barrack accounts. He also gave notice, that he should to-morrow move for leave to bring in a bill, to invest the commissioners for enquiring into the barrack accounts with the same powers to examine persons on oath, as the commissioners of army expenditure.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, February 3.

[Minutes.] A ballot took place for a committee to try and determine the merits of the Shrewsbury Election Petition. The following gentlemen were appointed as the committee:—James Buller, esq., right hon. N. Vansittart, W. Gore, esq., H. Fawcett, esq., lord Folkestone, R. C. Ferguson, esq., H. C. Montgomery, esq., Oswald Markham, esq., R. Sheldon, esq., hon. John Ramsay, R. C. Carew, esq., hon. W. Quin, hon. J. Pierce. Nominees; George Johnstone, esq., Francis Horner, esq.—The Attorney-General, pursuant to notice, moved for, and obtained leave to bring in, a bill for investing certain commissioners for enquiring into the expenditure of the Barrack Department, with powers to examine parties on oath, and to call for papers and accounts. Mr. Rose entirely approved of the measure proposed by the learned gent., and gave notice, that on Thursday next he should move, for a copy of the opinion of his majesty's attorney and solicitor general upon the transactions in the Barrack Department.—Mr. Biddulph renewed his former notice of a motion, for a committee to enquire whether any alleviation of the public burthens might not be procured by the abolition of unnecessary and Sinecure Places for Tuesday next.

[Scotch Clergy Bill.] Mr. *Kenrick* presented a petition from the committee of the commission of the general assembly of the church of Scotland, setting forth, "that the petitioners are a committee appointed by the commission of the general assembly of the church of Scotland, held at Edinburgh upon the 19th of Nov. 1806, with instructions to attend to the progress of any bill that may be introduced into parliament founded on the Resolutions lately entered into by the house of lords, respecting the courts of law in Scotland, and to adopt every prudent and temperate measure for maintaining the established rights and privileges of the Clergy of the church of Scotland; and that the petitioners have been informed, that a bill has been brought into the house for suspending, for a limited time, the powers vested in the court of session as commissioners of Teinds by an act of the Scots parliament, passed in the year 1707, c. 9, and for certain other purposes; and as the petitioners are convinced, that the provisions of the said bill will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the Clergy of Scotland, therefore praying, that the same may not be passed into a law, or at least that, before any farther proceedings take place with regard to it, they may be heard, by their counsel, at the bar of the house, against the same being passed into a law." On the motion that the petition do lie on the table,

Mr. *Wilberforce* said, he had not yet had sufficient opportunity of acquiring the necessary information upon the subject, but from the little information he had obtained, he was induced to think that it would be more adviseable to hear counsel before the house should go into a committee on the bill, because then gentlemen would in that case be in possession of the leading objections urged by the petitioners against the bill, and perhaps it would appear that all such might be so modified in the committee, as entirely to satisfy all parties; an object which, whether he considered the character of the learned lord with whom the bill originated, or the great respectability of that class of men who had now petitioned against it, was with him one of no inconsiderable importance.

The *Speaker* felt it his duty to acquaint the house, that as the bill in question had been read a second time, it was not the regular usage to hear petitioners by their counsel at the bar, in any stage so intermediate as that in the present instance. When the bill was committed, it would be for the committee to exercise its own discretion; but it was more usual for the house to hear counsel upon the report being brought up.

Mr. *Adam* begged leave to observe, that no counsel could be heard in the present stage of the bill, and that were it even not irregular it would be inconvenient, for that he was satisfied the objections of the clergy of Scotland, for whom he entertained the most unfeigned respect, went rather to the apprehended modifications of the bill, than to the principle of the bill itself, for it was neither in the nature, nor was it any part of the object of the bill, to take away any privilege, or to infringe upon any right. He assured the hon. gent. and the house, that nothing was more foreign to the minds of those with whom the bill originated, than any sentiment hostile to the true interests of the Scotch Clergy. The object of the bill was merely to suspend for a limited time, and a very limited time, certain proceedings pending before the commissioners of Teinds, relative to the augmentation of stipends. The court of sessions, of which those commissioners were members, would terminate its sittings on the 12th of March, and not resume them before the 12th of May, but the time of suspension was not to exceed the first day of the subsequent sessions: where then, he asked, was the ground for any reasonable complaint of delay, when the recess was to commence so soon, and the time of suspension was to be limited by its termination?

The *Lord Advocate* of Scotland said, he should desire no better testimony to the sincerity of his good wishes to the Church of Scotland than that of the Scotch Clergy themselves. Taught, he might say, from his infancy, to hold that respectable class of the community in proper estimation, he did not think that he could be supposed capable of deliberately introducing into that house any measure that could, in the slightest degree, tend to detract from their privileges, or to alienate their rights: so far from it, that he had it in his intention to submit, upon a future day, to that house, some measure for rendering them more secure and permanent. He was, however, as willing as any gentlemen in that house could be, to hear the petitioners by their counsel: he was anxious that no possible channel of information upon that subject should be closed. The principle of the bill was not objected to, but the modifications which the bill should undergo when in the committee. He was persuaded that when the blanks were filled up in the committee, the petitioners would then see the bill in a clear point of view, and feel, as he did now, how groundless were their apprehensions. When he had the honour of submitting that bill to the house, he felt happy in the consciousness of introducing a regulation that he believed would be beneficial to the church of Scotland: but if it should appear otherwise; if there was the least ground to suspect that it might be productive of any consequences injurious to the Scots Clergy, he should feel still greater happiness in immediately withdrawing it.—The petition was then, together with another on the same subject, ordered to lie on the table, till the report of the bill; and the committee on the Scotch Clergy bill was put off to Thursday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, February 4.

[Slave Trade Abolition Bill.] Counsel having been called in, pursuant to order, Mr. Plumer and Mr. Dallas attended, on behalf of the West-India merchants; Mr. Alexander, for the merchants of Liverpool; Mr. Scarlet, for the merchants and planters of the islands of Jamaica and Trinidad; and Mr. Clarke, on the part of the corporation of Liverpool, and the trustees of the dock of that port. The arrangement with respect to the order in which the learned counsel for the several interests should be heard, having been referred to their own decision; Mr. Alexander, for the merchants of Liverpool, first addressed their lordships, and concluded with requesting that, according to the prayer of the petitioners for whom he appeared, witnesses might be called in.—The counsel having been ordered to withdraw,

Lord *Grenville* said, that for the purpose he then had in view, it would not be at all necessary to enter into the general question; the simple enquiry was, whether, in the present situation of things, it was or was not expedient to hear the depositions of the witnesses, according to the recommendation of the learned counsel. In his opinion, there could be no ground for this mode of proceeding, unless their lordships thought that this was a subject utterly unknown to them; and that in consequence of the deficiency of all former experience and information, it was necessary to go into a long and formal examination of the matter. This was not the first time, or the first year, that the enquiry was made before their lordships: it was the 20th year in which it had been brought under their consideration; and there was no one session during that long period in which it had not been, in some form or other, submitted to the investigation of parliament. Could any individual peer suppose, that, to enable him to decide on the principle of this bill, it was expedient to examine how far the local interests of the ship-owners of Liverpool were concerned, and what were their comparative profits in the subsisting intercourse between Africa and the West Indies? This bill was not offered to their lordships, because the capital of no British subjects was employed in the Slave Trade, or because no British mariners were engaged in it; but expressly because the property and persons of the subjects of this realm were engaged in it: and hence it called upon the justice and humanity of their lordships to prevent this misapplication both of the one and the other. Their lordships were not now to determine, if a few more or a few less ships were devoted to this commerce, but to wipe away the disgrace of this country, by the direction thus given to the industry and talents of British merchants. The learned counsel, by shewing that the capital of this description of persons was largely concerned, in part supplied the motive on which the proposal for the abolition was founded. Thus, without any confirmation from the witnesses proposed, all the facts that were material were admitted. It might be easy to shew, that particular items to which the learned counsel adverted, did not operate in aid of his argument: thus, the premiums paid to insurers were not to be deemed all profit; they were a consideration for certain risk, and were in proportion to the hazard to which the property would be exposed. The principal motive, then, of the bill was, that British capital was engaged in the trade; and an additional instigation to the adoption of it was, that in the present posture of affairs, it could be supported by no other capital; so that, by withdrawing the subjects of this country from the commerce, it would be effectually abolished.

Lord *Eldon* was willing to admit, that, in the instance now before their lordships, the examination of witnesses would not be necessary; but he was anxious to enter his protest against any determination not to hear evidence in a future stage of the proceeding. It was true that this grave and important subject had been long under discussion; but it was not merely expedient to shew that this trade was contrary to justice and humanity. Admitting it to be so, the circumstances, the mode, and the time of its abolition, were proper matters of consideration. What had been the course of proceeding? A noble lord, in the last session, had brought forward Resolutions, which embraced a vast deal more than was comprised in the present bill: those extended to the total abolition of the Slave Trade. He did not believe that the measure now proposed would diminish the transport of negroes, or that a single individual would be preserved by it; at the same time that it would be utterly destructive of the British interests involved in that commerce. This house was always disposed to proceed with deliberation and with justice; and in pursuance of that line of conduct, it had determined not to hear the evidence on this affair in a committee above stairs. He trusted that the same discretion would be now employed; and that, if any important facts were to be ascertained, the witness would be heard at their lordships' bar. Was it right, because there was a change of men, and of public measures in consequence, that the interests of these petitioners should be disregarded; and what was before determined to be fit matter of enquiry, should now be rejected, as immaterial and inapplicable? If these interests had any existence, redress ought to be given, compensations ought to be assigned; and the extent of these could only be ascertained by testimony. He would repeat, that he did not contend that evidence should now be heard; but he thought it extremely probable that, on further progress, it would be discovered that witnesses ought to be examined.

Earl *Grosvenor* was very anxious to do justice to all parties, but thought that to hear evidence in this stage of the enquiry would be useless, and would be a departure from the propriety of their lordships' proceedings. There were many occasions on which it was extremely desirable to hear evidence, especially where the subject was novel: but this was not a case of that sort; much testimony had already been supplied, which was still in the recollection of their lordships. Indeed, so completely had the question been examined, that resolutions had been entered into, coinciding with those passed in another place, that a termination should be put to this nefarious trade. If the learned counsel wished to prove that the great lord Somers was auxiliary in passing certain bills favourable to the trade, or that charters, at various times, had been granted to favour it, no depositions in the form now proposed were at all necessary. If he were desirous of shewing, that after the bill should have passed into a law, the merchants would be ruined, and they must throw themselves upon the liberality of parliament, neither did this require any immediate confirmation; the proper time to adduce such proof would be when the measure, productive of such effects, had become the law of the land. The same might be said as to any evidence applicable to mere speculative propositions. After the resolutions their lordships had come to last year, it would not be consistent with their dignity to enter into such a mode of examining the fitness of their own deliberate determinations.

Lord *Hawkesbury* said, that with regard to the immediate question now before the house, he very much concurred with his noble and learned friend (lord Eldon), that no witnesses need at present be called. Whether in a future stage it would be right to have recourse to such assistance, it was not now necessary to enquire; he should on this subject reserve his opinion for the proper occasion when it should be expedient to declare it. He was not disposed, however, to be equally silent on the concluding sentiment delivered by the noble earl who had just sat down, which, if adopted, would defeat the purposes of all parliamentary deliberation. He said, that because the house in the last session thought it expedient to give its opinion on the subject of the slave trade, it would be now inconsistent with its dignity to examine witnesses on the subject matter of this bill. This was to assert that their lordships were to be so bound by their former determination, that they were to be precluded from hearing testimony as to matters, however strongly urged by counsel, and however important to the decision on the merits of the present bill. Were the resolutions passed during the last session to be considered in a more serious light than a bill which had gone through the progressive steps, until it was finally transmitted to the commons? Such a bill might be rejected, and could, in such case, be cited as no authority by which the opinion of their lordships should be governed. It was obvious that such resolutions were not to prevent the exercise of their deliberative functions, and thus much he thought it necessary to say, that these functions might remain entire and unimpaired.

Lord *Holland* perfectly agreed with his noble friend (earl Grosvenor), and thought that the commentary of the noble lord who had just sat down, originated in a misapprehension of the terms employed. The noble earl did not say that the previous opinion declared, however solemnly, should preclude all examination of any future measure connected with the same subject; but he said that when such a determination was made, that the trade was contrary to the broad principles of justice and humanity, it would not become the dignity of the house to enter into minute enquiries into the precise profits, of which the adventurers would be deprived. This was the sentiment expressed by the noble earl, and supported by the general tenour of his speech; and, on his mind, they were neither subversive of the constitutional privileges of their lordships, nor destructive of their deliberative functions in any particular.

The Duke of *Clarence* was of opinion that the counsel ought not to be allowed to call evidence in the present case. His reason was, that all the evidence necessary to illustrate the interests of the petitioners was before the house. Their lordships had materials enough before them to form their judgment. His royal highness, however, reserved to himself the right of considering whether it would not be necessary to hear evidence on other points.

Mr. Clarke was then heard as counsel for the corporation of Liverpool. He asked leave to examine Mr. Foster, to shew the interest which the corporation of Liverpool had in the wet docks of that port. —Lord Grenville moved, that the next counsel be heard. Ordered.—Mr. Plumer was called in, and addressed their lordships as counsel for the planters, &c. of the island of Jamaica. He concluded by requesting the permission of the house to examine the earl of Balcarras.

The *Lord Chancellor* asked what facts the counsel expected lord Balcarras to prove?

Mr. Plumer observed, that from the long period his lordship had been governor of the island of Jamaica, he would be able to point out the consequence of the abolition of the West-India colonies.

Lord *Grenville* remarked, that it was irregular to examine witnesses at their lordships' bar, who had no facts to state, but were merely called to explain their views and opinions. Facts might be sworn to, but prophecies could not. That kind of evidence was not fit for their lordships to hear, nor for others to give. He moved, that the next counsel be called in.

The Duke of *Clarence* did not oppose the motion, but he observed, that since the evidence was last heard on this subject by their lordships, alterations had occurred in the state of the West Indies, which might render it necessary to hear further evidence. There were three principal points of which his royal highness thought it necessary to remind their lordships: 1st, The evacuation of the island of St. Domingo by the British troops, which left it to be considered what effect the state of that island might have on Jamaica. 2dly, the possession of the island of Trinidad, which was, as to cultivation, almost in a virgin state. 3dly, the catastrophe which had befallen the island of Dominico. How were the lives which had been lost there to be supplied?

Lord *Holland* observed, that, according to the speech of the learned counsel, theorists were those that had stated facts as they were, and then the learned counsel proposed to call men of experience to prophesy to the house the effect which this measure would produce in future.

The Bishop of *London* declared, that after the ample evidence which had been produced, particularly in the examinations before the privy council, and the discussions which had already taken place on this subject, he much doubted whether all the evidence which counsel could produce, would be sufficient to invalidate the proofs of the cruelty of this trade. The persons who then gave evidence, were men of high distinction, and unquestionable veracity. He deprecated any delay, which might prove fatal. Every moment was precious; numbers of poor Africans were now perishing in the holds of slave ships, and suffering incredible hardships in the seasoning, which would be increased if this measure were unnecessarily delayed.—The motion was then put and carried. After Mr. Scarlet had been heard,

Lord *Eldon* moved, "that an humble address be presented to his majesty, that there might be laid on the table of the house copies of the correspondence between the then secretary of state and the government of Trinidad, in 1799, respecting grants of lands to be made to any persons settled in that island."

Lord *Grenville* said, he should not object to this motion, but believed that no such permission would be found to have been granted to the government of Trinidad; as it was in the contemplation of government, at that period, that if the island should remain after peace to this country, no encouragement should be given to any new and large importation of negroes into that settlement, and that no steps should be taken with respect to that island, which should obstruct any ulterior measures respecting the abolition of the slave trade.—He then moved, that the order for the second reading of the bill be discharged, and that the bill be read a second time to-morrow, clearly wishing it to be understood, that the debate on the main question would then come on.—Agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, February 4.

[Minutes.] Mr. J. Fane, chairman of the committee appointed to try the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election for the borough of Thetford, reported that the committee had decided that Thomas Creevey, esq. was duly elected, and ought to have been returned; and that James Mingay, esq. was not duly elected, and ought not to have been returned, and that the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious.—Sir G. Heathcote, chairman of the Maldon election committee, reported, that it had determined that B. Gaskill, esq. was not duly elected, and that Charles Western, esq. was duly elected, and ought to have been returned, and that the opposition to the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious.—Mr. Atkyns Wright, from the select committee appointed to try and determine the merits of the Petition complaining of an undue election and return for the borough of Penryn, informed the house, that the said committee have determined, that sir Christopher Hawkins, bart. is not duly elected; that Henry Swann, esq. is duly elected; that John Trevanion, esq., the petitioner, ought to have been returned; that the said John Trevanion, esq. is duly elected; that the said petitions did not either of them appear to the said committee to be frivolous or vexatious; and also that the opposition of sir C. Hawkins to the said petitions did not appear to be frivolous or vexatious. The deputy clerk of the crown was ordered to attend the house to-morrow to amend the said returns.—Mr. Atkyns Wright also acquainted the house, that the said select committee had come to several Resolutions, which they had directed him to report to the house; and he read the report in his place, and afterwards delivered it in at the table, where the same was read, and is as followeth, viz. "Resolved, that it appears to this committee, that sir Christopher Hawkins, bart. has, by himself and agents, been guilty of bribery and corrupt practices, to influence the last election for the borough of Penryn. That John Stona the elder, James Edgcombe, the rev. Robert Dillon, and other persons, being electors for the said borough of Penryn, were engaged in, and parties to, the said bribery and corrupt practices." Ordered, that the said report be taken into further consideration on the 23d instant; that the said report be printed for the members of the house; and that the minutes of the proceedings of the said committee be laid before the house.—Mr. Parnell moved, that the order for taking the Mayo election petition into consideration on the 24th of February, be discharged, with a view to postpone it to some early day in April. The precedents of the conduct adopted by the house in the cases of the Aberdeen, Dublin, and Londonderry election petitions, he urged as the grounds upon which the party founded his motion. The absence of a material witness, the circumstance of an eminent barrister, who was engaged to support the petition, being absent on other professional avocations, and a matter of general consideration in such cases, the distance of the place, he conceived to be additional grounds for inducing the house to comply with the object of his motion. Mr. Corry opposed the motion, as he could not possibly see that there was any analogy between the cases, which the hon. member had cited as precedents, and that which was the subject of the present motion. In the county of Mayo there were nearly 8000 freeholders, and about three fourths of those who voted had polled in favour of the sitting member. It was also to be recollected, that the witnesses might be examined by commission in the county of Down, and adjoining county.—The gallery was then cleared, but the house did not divide, and the motion was negatived.

[Order in Council respecting Neutral Vessels.] Mr. *Perceval* rose pursuant to the notice he had given above a fortnight since, for the purpose of moving for the production of the Order of Council of the 7th of January last, relative to vessels sailing from port to port, such ports respectively being in the possession of France or of her allies;—a paper which, when produced, the house, he had no doubt, would think deserving of their most serious attention. But, however important the subject, and however serious the consideration which the paper deserved, yet he apprehended that he might appear to want an apology for himself, for having given to the motion which he was about to submit to the house, so much pomp and solemnity, by a notice so extended. Because, when it was understood that this motion was merely for the production of a paper which was already before the public, and known to all; which must have been in the possession of every one accustomed to enter a coffee-house, or read a newspaper for more than a month; which, in order to give it every possible publicity, authenticity, and authority, had been inserted in the London Gazette; and which, from its reference to the law of nations, and the regulation of neutral trade,) was in its nature calculated to excite attention; he was apprehensive that those who were not in the house on the other night when this matter was under consideration, might suppose that he was acting an idle and injudicious part, in giving a distant notice of a motion for the production of a document which every one would consider, at the first view, as a thing to be granted of course. In this situation he felt it due to himself to state the real circumstances of the case.—When he first intended to make this motion, he naturally concluded that there could be no objection to it, and that it would of course be complied with, and therefore he gave notice that he would move for the paper on the following day. On his coming to the house for that purpose, the noble lord opposite (Howick) very openly and candidly stated that it was his intention to oppose it. He conceived that the ground of objection must be that the paper was already before the public, and that therefore the production of it was useless and unnecessary. But it was admitted that when any subsequent motion was intended to be founded upon any great public document, the regular and ordinary mode of proceeding was to bring that document formally before the house. He therefore found that this was not the ground of objection. He was desirous, however, that the house should be in possession of the real ground, whatever it might be, and therefore requested the noble lord to state openly, whether that was his objection, or whether he had a different one. The noble lord accordingly stated that this was not the ground on which he meant to object to his motion. He admitted that the regular and proper mode of proceeding, with a view to a subsequent motion, was to move, in the first instance, for the production of the document on which it was to be founded. But the noble lord stated, that he would oppose it, because he could not anticipate any measure that could be founded on it, to which he should not feel it his duty to object; and therefore, he would not even go so far as to countenance that subsequent measure, by acceding to the production of the paper. Under these circumstances, he was unwilling to bring the house prematurely to a discussion involving so many extraordinary considerations, and charged with doctrines and principles so entirely new. The abilities of the noble lord opposite, the eloquence with which he always enforced his sentiments, and the influence which justly and naturally belonged to the station he held, rendered it unwise to oppose him without having first made that preparation which was essential to the discussion which was to result from agitating so important a question under such extraordinary circumstances. But, it would be obvious to every one who was acquainted with the principles of parliamentary proceedings, and more strikingly so to those who were acquainted with the principles maintained by the noble lord and his friends, while they sat on the side of the house from which he (Mr. P.) now addressed the chair, what a novel and extraordinary, what an unparliamentary and unconstitutional doctrine it was, that no motion for papers should be offered to the house unless it should, at the same time, be shewn, that no proceeding was to be founded on those papers but such as government would countenance. He hoped the house would not countenance a precedent as different from its former practice as the noble lord's doctrine was from the tenets he and his friends had formerly maintained. He had been disposed to think the noble lord would have anticipated this motion by some previous statement, either to defend his principle or to withdraw his opposition. The paper itself was a measure of government, published with great care and anxiety, and intended to be acted upon. Ministers admitted, that the ground of objection was not, that the paper would be made known by this motion, but that it would be rendered too public. The paper was already known over this country, it was open to the inspection of all men; it was known over all Europe; and yet after all, the only persons, who were not to be allowed to see the paper, were those who were called upon particularly to discuss it. The representatives of the people, who were to approve, or to disapprove what was done in the interests of their constituents, were refused the means by which to direct their judgement. He was persuaded the house would feel that this refusal was no less unprecedented than it was unprincipled; and if the house should abandon their right to call for papers of this nature, they would abandon the means of prosecuting any enquiry into measures of administration, and establish a principle which would be in the highest degree disadvantageous, and would be attended with the most deplorable and ruinous consequences. The ordinary grounds of objection were not stated in this case; there was no mention of any inconvenience that would attend the production of this paper; no mention of the length of time which would be required to prepare it; no mention of the trouble and labour to which the public offices would be exposed. It was not stated that it was from any idle curiosity that it was called for, and, what was the most serious objection, it was not stated that any mischief could arise from that publicity which would be the consequence of discussion; for the paper was already as publicly known as it could be. Under these circumstances, could the house refuse to accede to his motion? The subject was acknowledged to be of a magnitude to require the attention of parliament, and the production of the papers was resisted merely upon the ground that no motion was to be founded on it to which government was disposed to give its approbation. Then suppose, for the sake of argument, that it was admitted that the noble lord would be able to satisfy the house that there were no grounds for any subsequent motion; suppose it should be admitted that after discussion the house ought to be perfectly satisfied with what had been already done by ministers, and should be of opinion that they acted wisely and properly in doing no more: though this should be conceded, did it therefore follow that the necessity for discussion was superseded, or that the house ought to rest on the authority of any minister who should take it upon himself to dictate to the house, and say, that enough had been done, and that there was no need of discussion? He never heard reasoning more completely irregular than that upon which the noble lord seemed disposed to rest his case. It was admitted that the document ought to be on the table, in order to lay the foundation for discussion. The document therefore was necessary to lay the ground of dicussion; but we could not get the paper without first entering upon the discussion; therefore the discussion was necessary in order to procure the paper, and yet there could be no discussion till the paper was produced. This was a complete circle. The magnitude of the measure was a sufficient ground for the production of the paper: and, even if the noble lord could satisfy the house that it was not probable, that upon discussion, any fault could be found with the measures which had been adopted, still that would not be a proper ground for refusing to accede to this motion. But here ministers were so confident, that they would not even allow the house to deliberate upon the case, to point out any errors, or to shew where improvements and useful alterations might be introduced. They would not even allow them to consider whether any such alterations were required. He could not conceive how, for the credit of the measure itself, they could resist discussion. If the measure was a wise one, it would well bear discussion, and it would be advantageous to government, that it should be seen and shewn, for then the government itself would rise in credit and estimation, and the whole measure would be much more complete and satisfactory. But, if there was any other opinion respecting the measure; if there were doubts as to its wisdom or its policy, then indeed, he could conceive, that there might be objections to the production of this paper, and that the subsequent motion would not be such as would be agreeable to the noble lord. If there was a little consciousness that the measure could not be defended on principle, and that there was a defect in the execution; if, where there ought to be vigour, there was languor; if, where there ought to be strength, there was weakness; then the noble lord might be disposed to oppose the motion. This led him to say that the house might reasonably doubt whether the alleged ground of opposition constituted the real one. If the reason of his opposition was that which he alleged, namely, an unwillingness, so far to countenance any future motion that might be founded on this paper, as to agree to its production, he might say that he would not pledge himself to agree to any subsequent motion, and he might even disavow the implication which his assent might possibly occasion. This would put him exactly in the situation in which he said he desired to be placed. But really it was scarcely possible for him to conceive any rational ground of objection to this motion. There were two objections only which could possibly enter into his imagination. First, it might be desirable for the noble lord to know how far his influence over the members of this house might extend; how far they would submit their reason and their consciences to the controul and direction of the noble lord, and think, speak, and act precisely as he would have them. If that was the object of the noble lord, then indeed it must be admitted that this was a favourable opportunity. To those who before sat with him on the opposition side of the house, he might say, "To you who followed me when we were in opposition, in calling for papers, and were convinced by the arguments which I then used, I will now shew the fertility of my invention, the versatility of my genius, and the abundance which I possess of powerful, cogent, and irresistible arguments. By these means I shall satisfy you, that the course which we before pursued ought now to be abandoned, and that as we have got to another side of the house, we ought to adopt new principles of conduct; only rely on me, while you trace back your former steps, and believe that though our arguments were good against the former ministers, yet the same arguments are bad when urged against ourselves."—There might be another ground of objection more dangerous than the one he had mentioned. He said more dangerous, because in this country when authority was carried to too great a length, it could not be of long continuance. The abuse of authority here was not the way to maintain it, and the attempt to force the opinions of the members of this house, would in the end be fatal to those who acted on such a principle. But what he was particularly apprehensive of was the precedent, which would be one of the most mischievous that could be conceived. It might be said here, that no inconvenience would result from the refusal to produce this paper. It was publicly known, and there was no occasion for producing it in a formal way. But, if the principle was once established, what would follow with respect to papers relative to negociations for peace, or treaties of any sort? If there should be treaties where the rights of this country would be abandoned, we could only have surmises about the matter. If we asked for them, we should be told that ministers would oppose their production, because they could not conceive that motions could be founded on them to which they would be disposed to agree. Unless therefore, a case was made out in the first instance, no papers could be produced, though from the nature of the thing, the papers were absolutely necessary to lay the foundation of the case. The circular reasoning would be a constant resource, and the consequence would be, that the house of commons must blindly submit to the judgment of ministers. The noble lord opposite, had said on a former night, that no taunt should drive him from pursuing what he held to be his duty on the side of the house on which he sat, however inconsistent with his conduct on the other side. On the occasion to which he alluded, the motion for printing the Army Estimates, the noble lord had to contend against a special precedent. In the present instance, he had to contend against universal usage, for there was not a single instance before, of a paper of this kind being refused. But it was not with their former principles; but with their present professions that he wished to compare the conduct of the hon. gentlemen opposite.* How would their conduct upon the present occasion correspond with the desire they professed of giving all possible information, and facilitating every investigation with respect to their conduct. The noble lord opposite (lord H. Petty) had stated as the rule of his conduct, and that of his colleagues, the principle of the Roman Moralist, who wished to live in a house encompassed with glass windows, so that all his actions might be seen from every side. It might now be said to the noble philosopher, "there you are in your glass house, but you are so much afraid of the glass being broken, that we must not approach near enough to look at you." (A laugh.)—He believed he had now said enough to induce the house to vote for the production of this paper. But though he had done this, yet he thought it necessary to enter a little into the subject matter of the order of council, not at this time with a view to persuade the house to adopt any measure which he might think himself called upon to recommend in case his present motion was acceded to, but in order to shew that he had not resolved to move for the production of this paper without reason, and that there were serious grounds for a consideration of it. For this purpose he would call their attention to the order of council of the 7th of January; he would state that order, and what it recited. The recital was, "Where-

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* See vol. vi. p. 575.

"as, the French government has issued "certain orders which, in violation of the "usages of war, prohibit the commerce of "all neutral nations with his majesty's do-"minions, and also to prevent such na-"tions from trading with any other coun-"try in any articles, the growth, produce, "or manufacture of his majesty's domi-"nions; and whereas the said government "has also taken upon itself to declare all "his majesty's dominions to be in a state "of blockade; and whereas such attempts "on the part of the enemy would give to "his majesty an unquestionable right of "retaliation, and would warrant his ma-"jesty in enforcing the same prohibition "of all commerce with France: and "whereas his majesty, though unwil-"ling to follow the example of his enemies, "by proceeding to an extremity so distres-"sing to all the nations not engaged in the "war, yet he feels himself bound not to suffer "such measures to be taken by the enemy "without taking some steps on his part "to restrain the violence, and to retort "upon them the evils of their own injus-"tice." After this recital, the paper went on to order, "that no vessel shall be per-"mitted to trade from one port to ano-"ther, both which ports shall belong to, or "be in possession of France or her allies." Here it was stated that we had a full right to retaliate, an assertion which he would not dispute, for he entirely concurred in its justice. On the contrary, he thought that we ought to have retaliated, not on neutrals, but on the enemy, however hard that retaliation might prove upon neutrals. He would not go so far as to say, that if this violation of the law of nations had been merely accidental, or confined to some small territory, that we either had the full right or ought in reason to have applied the same principles universally; but where the principle was adopted and applied in its widest extent by our enemy, it was the maddest proposition that ever was laid down, that any belligerent power should be restrained by laws which its enemies had renounced. When we turned to the French decree, there was an avowal that they were not to be bound by the law of nations. Here it was necessary to attend to the considerations that induced states to accede to the law of nations. They did it with a view to the interest of nations in general, and of course expected that others would submit to it; for if others would not, then they suffered a manifest injury, and did not act so as to maintain their just and proper rights. Now the French decree recited, "that England had ceased to ob-"serve the law of nations; that she ex-"tended the right of conquest to the car-"goes and property of individuals, and "that she had monstrously abused the "right of blockade, with a view to ag-"grandize the commerce and industry of "England at the expence of other nations, "between whom the communication was "impeded. That as this was the object "of England, all those who carried on "traffic in English commodities on the "continent, seconded her views, and ren-"dered themselves her accomplices; and "that France had a right to employ the "same weapons against England, that "England employed against her." It then went on to order, that "the consequences "of the decree should be considered as "fixed and fundamental laws of the em-"pire, so long as England refused to ac-"knowledge one and the same law, as ap-"plicable both to sea and land, and till "she ceased to consider private property "as good prize, and that all commerce and "all correspondence with the British isles "should be prohibited." Here then it was decreed, that till Britain renounced the right to capture private property, which was a right recognized by the law of nations, it was to be made a fundamental and fixed law of the French empire, that all commerce with the British isles should be prohibited. It was unnecessary for him to go on to prove the right of retaliation, because that was announced by the government in the order of council. But, when it became matter of doubt whether this right had been acted upon, it was not sufficient for government to say that they had acted upon it; that was a matter to be considered and discussed by the house. But if this right was conceded, it then became a question, whether it was politic or expedient to exercise that right, and to what extent. Now, that it was expedient and politic to act upon this right, he had the authority of the order of council itself for maintaining, for it was there stated, "that his majesty felt himself bound to "take some steps to restrain this violence "and turn upon the enemy the evils of "which they themselves had been the "authors." It was therefore admitted that we had the right to retaliate, and that it was expedient to act to a certain degree on that right.—This being admitted, the only question that remained was, as to the extent to which it ought to be acted upon. He wished the house to attend to the data upon which he had proceeded so far. The right was admitted to retaliate to the full extent, but if we had a right to destroy the enemy's commerce entirely, then it followed as a corollary, that we had a right to do it with some conditions. These being conceded, to what extent ought we to proceed? In order to form a correct opinion on this point, it was necessary to consider the views which we ought to have in resorting to measures of retaliation at all. Now, there were two objects which we ought to have in view, the right and the expediency being clear. First, we ought to retaliate in the mode best suited to counteract the evil effects resulting to ourselves from the measures of our enemies; and secondly, we ought to retaliate so as to make our enemies feel as much as possible the evil of their own injustice, as the words of the order had it. Now, if these were the principles on which we ought to have proceeded, then he might venture to say, that the portion of the enemy's trade, which had been selected as the object of retaliation, was that portion which offered not one of the advantages in view, to any thing like the extent in which they would have been furnished by other trades. The first object was the greatest, and that was to counteract the effects of the enemy's measures, and make the evils be felt as little as possible by ourselves. Then it could hardly be said, that stopping the coasting-trade of the enemy was the best way to answer that purpose. But what was the mischief? He hoped that the effects of the enemy's measures would be in a great degree counteracted by the elastic principle of trade itself, and that our commodities would find their way to the continent, in spite of all prohibitions. But no one could doubt that some mischief would be done. None could doubt that the hazard and inconvenience would send our commodities to the foreign market at an increased price. Something at least would be added to the insurance, from the risk of capture and confiscation, and this would force the seller to enhance his price, and consequently enable others to come into competition with him, and even to undersell him. It must therefore be clear, that though our commodities should not be excluded from the continent, they must find their way there, with greater inconvenience, and at an advanced price. Why, then, if there were goods, which were almost excluded from the continent by the increased risk, inconvenience, and increased price consequent on a state of war, they must by this additional burthen be totally prevented. In that point of view, it was impossible to consider the order of council as affording us any relief. Then, if this was so, it remained to look at the other object, which was to distress our enemies as much as possible. Now, the order ought to be made to bear on the trade which we could most effectually destroy. The coasting trade! Was that the trade most easily interrupted, when the vessels could so easily run into creeks and get under the protection of their batteries? It must be evident, that it would be impossible to make any very serious impression on this trade. But supposing that it could be effectually prevented, he would ask, whether that was the way in which the greatest mischief could be done to the enemy? He allowed that the interruption of this trade would be mischievous to the enemy, and therefore he would by no means preclude the government from retaliating in that way. But every body must be sensible that this trade was in a great measure internal, and that it could be carried on by land as well as by sea, though not with the same ease and convenience. The Brest fleet, for instance, might be perfectly well supplied by land carriage, though the coasting trade should be annihilated. We might press heavily upon the internal trade of France by this means, but we could never prohibit it. Now, if there was any trade by interrupting or preventing which we could in a great measure, or completely, exclude certain necessary commodities from that part of the continent under the dominion of France, that was the trade which ought to have been preferred for the purposes of retaliation. The house might have anticipated him in what he was going to say. But he begged to be understood as not peremptorily insisting upon any particular measures, as those which ought certainly to have been adopted. All he wished to do was, to shew that there was much reason to doubt whether the measure that had been adopted by government was the most efficient that could have been adopted under the present circumstances. He thought that the best plan would have been to prevent the importation of the commodities of the colonies of France and Spain into France, and the countries under her dominion. Suppose that we could not succeed in doing this completely, yet we should increase the cost, and render the conveyance more perilous. We should enhance the price of these articles, and enable our own commodities to meet them with advantage. We should improve the market, therefore, for our own merchants and manufacturers, and promote the sale of their goods. We should then have that trade which could be most easily interrupted, and which our enemy could not extricate from our grasp, and he would literally be made to feel the evil effects of his own injustice. It might be said that this would interrupt the accustomed trade of neutrals. But to interrupt the trade of their colonies to France and Spain was, most of all others, that which would least interrupt the accustomed trade of neutrals. It had been said, that this subject ought not to be discussed until the time when the stipulations of the treaty with America would come regularly before the house. He disclaimed all sort of animadversion on that treaty, as the noble lord had distinctly declared, that his majesty had reserved to himself a right to retaliate to the same extent to which the enemy had carried their unjust aggressions. But at the same time he must say, that he could not conceive what was the value of that right unless it was acted upon.—If, then, the measure of government on this subject was not so adequate as it might have been, upon what ground was it, he would ask, that the means were refused of considering whether any measure more effective might not be adopted? It might be said, that this was from our fear of neutrals, for we might apprehend some danger if we proceeded to vigorous measures without consulting them. This, however, was not a defence for government, for they had done something already without consulting neutrals. But, if our right was clear and manifest, there was no necessity for consulting them. All that they could reasonably expect was, a notice. Those already on their voyages should not be interrupted, and this was all that they could reasonably hope. A reasonable time ought to be allowed them for receiving information, as had been provided for in the order. They could claim nothing farther. But, could you say that your apprehension of neutrals was the ground of this very lenient procedure? This would not be avowed by any government. But there was great reason to suppose that this was the true ground when it was considered that the negociation with America was going on at the time of the passing of the non-importation act, and concluded before that act was suspended; and those who said that this act had produced a wholesome effect, would, when they knew this circumstance, find that they had better authority for saying so than they at first imagined. But, if you should be right in point of justice, the pressure of your measures on neutrals was not to be ascribed to any fault of yours. The blame rested with the enemy who forced you to adopt them. He was therefore at a loss to conceive upon what principle it was, that something like these measures, which he had mentioned, had not been carried into execution by government. But there was another measure. You might turn the provisions of the French decree against themselves, and as they have said that no British goods should sail freely on the seas, you might say that no goods should be carried to France, except they first touched at a British port. They might be forced to be entered at the custom-house, and a certain entry imposed, which would contribute to enhance the price, and give a better sale in the foreign market to your own commodities.—Having stated this, he did not go the length of saying that we ought to retaliate to the full extent of our right. All that he said was, that the measure adopted by government was inadequate, and the motion which he meant to have made would not have gone farther than to state that ministers had not taken the most effectual means to avert the evils of our enemy's injustice from ourselves, or to retaliate to the proper extent upon him. If this motion had passed, he meant to have left it on the table, that ministers, influenced by the weight and authority of this house, might have adopted such further measures as might appear best calculated to answer the intended objects. Now, if he had not succeeded in proving that the plan which he had mentioned was the best that could be adopted, he hoped he had at least shewn that there was something in this order of council that deserved the serious attention and consideration of the house, and that there was no principle which could justify the exclusion of the paper itself. Here he would therefore leave the subject, and only further trespass on the attention of the house by moving, "That an humble address be presented to his majesty, praying that his majesty may be graciously pleased to direct, that there be laid before this house, a copy of the Order of his majesty in Council, dated the 7th of January last, relative to vessels sailing from port to port, such ports respectively being in the possession of France or of her allies."

The *Advocate-General* (sir John Nicholls) began with regretting that he did not feel himself better qualified to resist the arguments, in his mind rather specious than solid, which had been advanced by his hon. and learned friend, in favour of the present motion; but, however inadequate he might be to the task, he certainly should not shrink from the undertaking of briefly stating his reasons for thinking the present motion unnecessary, and that the reasons by which it was attempted to be supported were more indebted to the plausible ingenuity of his hon. and learned friend's mode of putting them, than to any intrinsic force in the arguments themselves. The motion, as to the shape in which it at first presented itself, was certainly liable to no serious objection; but he conceived the question for the house to consider, in the present instance, was, what was the real nature of the motion, and what the ulterior proceedings which were to be founded upon that motion, if acceded to; and in this view he had no hesitation in maintaining, that the present motion was altogether unprecedented. He called upon his hon. and learned friend to adduce an instance in which parliament consented to the production of a paper until the circumstances of the proceedings to be instituted upon the ground of that paper had been clearly and explicitly laid down, and as generally understood. Ignorance, at least, was not among the pretences, for it had been admitted by his learned friend, that the paper in question had appeared in the London Gazette, and had found its way to the table of every coffee-house in London. This not only proved that there was no necessity for any additional information upon this subject, but tended sufficiently to retort any idle jokes that the volatile humour of gentlemen might tempt them to cast upon the alledged mysteriousness of his majesty's government. If the publication of the paper now called for, in every daily vehicle of information, was a mark of mystery, and of the wishes of his majesty's ministers to conceal and to suppress the interesting intelligence therewith connected, he confessed himself totally mistaken in his understanding of the terms secrecy, mystery, and disguise. It was equally unfair to argue, that his majesty's ministers in that house were averse to the production of the paper from an apprehension of an active and searching discussion, which, as it was pretended, it might be prudent in them to decline; for, if that were the case, they would not have persisted in that refusal, which more immediately involved them in the supposed difficulty, and gave his learned friend, upon the opposite side, the most plausible pretence upon which he could urge his present motion—a pretence which had been dwelt upon with all his learned friend's characteristic address, but which, at the same time, was certainly rather to be admired for its declamatory display, than assented to for its reasoning force. But leaving all further argument upon this part of the subject, he should now proceed to argue the merits of the case, as if the document required were really before the house: confident, as he was, that whenever it should be expedient to produce that document, the measure would not be found likely to produce those effects which his hon. and learned friend had been pleased to attribute to it. The conduct of the French government, in issuing the edict alluded to by his hon. and learned friend, was allowed on all hands to be in direct violation of the law of nations, and of the rights of neutral powers, with a view solely to destroy, if possible, the commerce of this country: for what were its tenour and purport? Why, to declare, forsooth, all the ports of the British isles in a state of blockade (although France was not able to send a single ship to the mouth of any one of them, to support the manifesto), and to announce her determination to capture and confiscate every neutral ship, with its cargo, that shall have touched at any of those ports, on its way to a continental port, or shall be found approaching thereto, until Great Britain shall have renounced the right of capturing the private ships of any nation with which she may be at war, and to confine the exercise of the right of capture merely to the ships and vessels belonging to the government of the belligerent nation. But this was a principle as novel in the usages of war between belligerent powers, as the edict itself was contrary to the law of nations. The usage of capturing the commercial ships and cargoes of an enemy at war was, he contended, as old as war itself; it was an usage asserted by every nation, and a right still more important than that of capturing an enemy's ship of war; because the commercial vessels of an enemy contributed so greatly to increase his revenues and resources for carrying on and protracting war; and yet this was the sole ground of pretence upon which the French government proceeded to declare the ports of these islands in a state of blockade! His hon. and learned friend did not venture to sustain the conduct of France on this occasion; he was of opinion, that neutral nations had full right to retaliate; and that those nations would allow the like right to this country, and of having recourse to similar means for distressing an enemy, who had so flagrantly outraged the law of nations. The question, then, to be considered was merely, to what extent it would be politic and advisable to exercise that right, without first giving due notice to those nations? Were we to press and crush unoffending merchants by the actual execution of severities to the utmost extent of the enemy's menace? He believed the house would not go with his hon. and learned friend so far, but would rather prefer mild and moderate measures at first, if likely to be efficacious. It became a great and magnanimous nation to be always moderate in the application of its power; and he was sure the house would approve of the reluctance with which his majesty's ministers yielded to the necessity of adopting measures of retaliation upon the enemy which would occasion so much distress on neutrals. It was not denied that some steps in retaliation were necessary, and the question was, how far the ships that had been taken were adequate; his honourable friend said, we ought to have gone the length of interdicting all commerce with France, and suggested some measures which the house was to compare with those of ministers now carrying into execution. It was necessary to allow a fair trial to what ministers had adopted. A total prohibition of all commerce in the produce of the enemy would be attended with the most distressing consequences to the few provinces that remained neutral, and perhaps with some mischief to ourselves. Spain, Italy, Holland, the North of Germany, all the coast from the Elbe to the gulph of Venice, with the exception of Portugal, were under the dominion of France, and all powers that covered this extent of country were leagued with her in the war; and on the other side were Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, co-operating with us. The only powers that were neutral, were Austria, which had only the single port of Triest; Denmark, which had no means of supplying its colonies, or of disposing of its colonial produce, if we carried a general interdict into execution; Portugal, which would feel the same disabilities; and America, with respect to which such an interdict would be the means of infinite distress. He could discover that a jealousy of America was at the bottom of all these complaints. But was it to be conceived that we also should not suffer by adopting and enforcing a total interdict? For if we shut the door upon neutral commerce, we must also shut it in a great degree, upon our own. If the commerce of neutrals with the continent was stopped, we must be totally debarred from all access to the continental market. If neutrals are deprived of the continental market for their colonial produce, they will not have the means of purchasing from us. America exports to the continental nations, but imports chiefly from Great Britain. The commerce of neutrals with our enemies was also necessary to us in another view. We wanted some of the produce of the enemy's country for our manufactures; the silks of Italy for instance, and the wools of Spain. We wanted a little of the wines and brandies of France to cheer and comfort us. France had no maritime power to enforce her decree; but if her intimidation deterred neutrals from coming to us, it would be then time enough to recur to extreme severity. The restriction of the commerce between one port of the enemy and another, was the measure of present retaliation, which it was conceived would fall heaviest on the enemy, with the least possible annoyance to neutrals. Much trade was carried on from port to port of the enemy under neutral names. The whole trade of the enemy was, in fact, carried on under a system of neutralization. This trade from port to port of the enemy, was a trade in which neutrals were not concerned in time of peace, though they had a right to exercise it. Their interference in it increased in proportion as our maritime superiority grew on the destruction of the marine of the enemy. In times when maritime power was nearly balanced, every country carried on this trade in its own bottoms by means of convoys. It was thus carried on in time of peace. The restriction now imposed, while it would be very annoying to the enemy, would still allow to neutrals a gainful commerce, by making their ports the entrepôts between one enemy's port and another. It was honourable to us as a great nation, that in proportion as the enemy was violent, we were moderate. Our moderation would be, besides the means of procuring us the supplies of the articles we wanted from the enemy, and of introducing our commodities among them. He would ask, whether the intervention of neutrals would not afford a great facility to what Buonaparte was most hostile to, the introduction of British goods into the countries under his controul, and our obtaining from those countries the supplies we wanted from them. The commerce from port to port, in a line of coast extending from the Elbe to Venice, with the exception of Portugal, could not be carried on by small craft, creeping along shore under the protection of batteries. Small craft could not creep from Amsterdam to Bourdeaux, from Bourdeaux to Barcelona, from thence to Leghorn, and from Leghorn to Venice. The number of vessels employed under the system of neutralization in this extent was very great, and the trade itself was of vital importance to France; and was it to be contended, that the application of our maritime superiority to the prevention of this trade on so vast a line of coast, was a measure that would be attended with no effect, at a time when our cruizers were so numerous on every station, that no ship could move without the greatest risk of being captured? The learned gent. then adverted to the opinion of an hon. and learned friend (sir W. Scott) who presided over the admiralty court, relative to the importance and extent of the coasting trade. This was an authority which the house would look to with respect. The opinion had been stated by that learned gent. in giving judgement in a cause tried before him, and the coasting trade was represented by him as one of the greatest accommodations to any country. Some conception might be formed of the importance of it, if gentlemen would suppose France to be possessed of the same naval superiority, which this country at present had, and that the coals of Newcastle were to be brought to the port of London, and every other necessary for the consumption of this great metropolis, in neutral vessels. His hon. and learned friend, therefore, was not correct in stating that the interruption of the coasting trade would be no great injury to France, or that the order of council for that purpose signified nothing. That order was but one step, and an important step, of those that would, if necessary, be resorted to for retaliation. From the manner in which this subject had been treated, it might be supposed that no such measure as that of the enemy had ever been resorted to before. But in the administration of that illustrious statesman, now no more, (Mr. Pitt) and whose loss he regretted as much as any member of that house, much more rigorous measures had been resorted to by the enemy than the present. In the year 1797, after the French had made peace with Austria, and the army, which had been arrogantly called the Army of England, had been collected at Brest, with a view to turn their whole force against this country; in that year, on the 29th Nivose, year six, that is, in Christian language, on the 19th day of January, 1798, a decree was passed by the French government, making all vessels that should be freighted in the whole or in part with English commodities, good prizes. A vessel proceeding from Copenhagen to Tranquebar, or from Lisbon to the Brazils, which had but a single bale of English goods on board, was to be confiscated, if captured by French cruizers. The house would perceive that the former decree was much more atrocious than the late one. In order to shew what had been the feeling of the neutral nations on the subject of that decree, he need only refer to the speech of the president of the United States on opening the session of congress, on the 8th of December, 1798, in which he declared, that "as the decree of the 19th of the preceding January was still in force, in consequence of the failure of an attempt to procure its repeal, he considered it as an unequivocal act of war, and a breach of the independence and sovereignty of neutral nations, which was only to be met by a determined resistance." As the chief magistrate of America had expressed so strong a sense of the aggression in that instance, there was no ground to suppose that he would not act as decidedly on the present occasion. And this was another consideration why this country ought to abstain, for the present, from any act which might prove grievous to the trade of America, until it should be seen whether the American government would follow the same course now as in 1798. The decree of 1798 had continued in force during the last peace, and though it had been evaded by means of neutral ships, no vessel was allowed to enter a port of France, without a certificate of origin from the French consul, or commercial agent, at the port whence it had sailed. Yet that decree had passed unnoticed in that instance, and, on the authority of that precedent, it was his opinion that no measures should be taken in the present case, except such as would be attended with as little rigour as possible to the trade of neutrals. As to the measure proposed by his hon. and learned friend to be substituted for the order of council, namely, that no ships with colonial produce should be suffered to enter the ports of France; did he suppose that such a measure would be more distressing to the trade of France than to that of neutrals, or to our own trade? It would be injurious to our trade, because the neutrals, by carrying the colonial produce of the enemy, are enabled to export our manufactures in great quantities. The house of commons would not therefore, in the exercise of its inquisitorial powers, interfere with this act of the executive, until it should see what effect would be produced by the measure that had already been resorted to. It was his opinion that the cutting off of the coasting trade would be highly distressing to France. But if France should, in the madness of her policy, think of shutting up the remaining neutral ports upon the continent, she would soon find that they were now as necessary to her as to Great Britain. As soon as she should begin to feel the distress arising from shutting up those ports, she would open again those ports which were at present in her occupation. It was therefore his opinion, that they should in the first instance make trial of the measure that had been adopted, as they would at all times have it in their power to resort to measures of greater extremity, if such should be found necessary. The adoption of moderate measures in the first instance, would be creditable to the national character, and in the national character consisted, in a great degree, the national strength. If the enemy should persist in their decree, and attempt to enforce it, then he was convinced that the country had sufficient means, and his majesty, sufficient vigour, to resort to such measures as should be deemed necessary for a complete retaliation. On all these grounds, he thought that no good reason had been stated for the production of the paper.

Mr. *Jacob* was of opinion, that this country ought always to assert its claims to its full rights, but, at the same time, he did not think that, in the present circumstances of Europe, it should exercise them to their full extent. If the whole colonial trade was to be stopped, he would ask the learned gent. whether he thought it would be more injurious to France than Great Britain? Above one half of the colonial produce consumed in France was British colonial produce. What inconvenience, therefore, might not result, if the trade that supplied France with that produce was to be put a stop to? If the measure proposed by the learned gent. were to be adopted, the only effect of it would be, that it would be injurious to that already suffering class of the community, the West-India merchants and planters, and irritating to neutrals, and the whole of the remaining civilized states of the world. He was of opinion consequently, that no gound had been laid for the production of the paper.

Lord *Castlereagh* rose to make a few observations, just to shew the grounds of the vote he meant to give on the motion of his learned friend. It did not appear to him that any arguments of any weight had been brought forward to resist the able arguments of his learned friend, and certainly no parliamentary objection had been started to the production of a paper, which was already in the hands of every body in the country. The hon. and learned gent. opposite (sir J. Nicholls), who was justly entitled to the confidence of that house and of the country, had not produced any sufficient objection against the motion of his learned friend, and, as that hon. and learned gent. was so fully competent to decide upon this question, he did not suppose that any hon. member who should follow him, would be more successful in the arguments he might bring forward. The right of war he was ready to admit was a prerogative of the crown, but then it was subject to the controul of parliament. He contended that his learned friend opposite was bound to make out a case, to shew that the papers ought not to be produced, before he could call upon him, or his hon. and learned friend near him, to make out a case of the paramount necessity for its production. If, however, they were so called on, their difficulty would not be great, because they could shew that the measure that had been resorted to was inadequate to its professed object. Whatever objection there might be to the production of the paper, on the ground of the adequacy of the measure, or of the delicacy of his majesty's ministers on the subject, they would more properly apply to the proceeding that was to be grounded upon the production of the paper. This question was one of too much importance for any man to bring forward lightly; or unless he could state sufficient ground for the production of the paper. He derived some consolation from the argument of the learned gent. opposite, that this measure was not final. He was surprised that his learned friend had been so misunderstood, as to have it conceived that the order of council would have no practical effect. On the contrary, he had allowed that it would have a great practical effect; but as the present circumstances of the country, arising out of the order of the French government, were different from any in which it had ever been placed, he contended that more vigorous measures should have been adopted. As to the period of our history, which had been alluded to, he should presently shew that the time of the American government had been wasted in negociations and in intrigues to corrupt the French ministers. Whatever might be the feelings of government towards America, whatever might be the principles on which the late negociation had been conducted, these were no reasons for delaying the adoption of more vigorous measures of retaliation against the enemy. He thought it impossible that the house could form an adequate opinion whether the measure of government was wise or unwise, adequate or inadequate, unless they should look at the state of the country as to its maritime rights. It would be futile for him to dwell, in this instance, on the importance of its maritime rights to this country, but it was necessary for the house to look a little at the two systems of maritime rights which it had under different circumstances been called on to accede to. They would recollect the claims made by the armed neutrality of 1780, and of 1800, that neutral ships should make free goods, and that neutral vessels sailing under convoy of ships of war should not be molested, and that such claims had been resisted even unto war. But the claims advanced by France in the present instance, not only extended to neutrals, but to the free navigation of the mercantile shipping of the enemy. As the claims now urged by France were so much larger than any that had been before made, gentlemen should take care not to assist the views of the French government by opposing the motion of his learned friend, which might lead to the adoption of such measures as would visit the aggressions of the French government upon itself, the object of his hon. friend being only to shew that the order was inadequate to its object. There was as great a difference between the situation of this country at present and in the year 1798. Though France had then considerably added to her territory, she had not identified with the whole of Europe as she does at present. She had the central of Holland it was true, but she had not the ports of the North, Hamburgh, and the Hanse towns. She had not extended herself over the whole of Europe. She had the north of Italy, but not the south, or the kingdom of Naples. Her dominion had not been established over Spain, and Portugal was a substantively independent kingdom, and not tributary as at present, when she is allowed to import articles of British produce, only by paying a tribute to the French government. The relative situation of Europe had therefore undergone a great change since the year 1798. The influence and the power of the French government had been then great and formidable; but they could not employ with such effect, as at present, the pressure of their military force against the commerce of this country; and, therefore, a greater forbearance might have been practised towards them than at present. He contended, that considerations of forbearance respecting America, should not induce the house to abstain from adopting, not an act of practical injustice, but the measures which the circumstances of the times required, namely, to warn American vessels, in the first instance, against entering French ports; but not to capture them, unless they should be found contumaciously bent on entering the ports of France. What had been said, therefore, did not appear to them to be any ground why his hon. and learned friend should desist from prosecuting his motion, because it would be obvious, that what was lost to this country by its forbearance, would be gained by France.

It was also desirable, that the house should have a more definite statement of that unexplained period that was to elapse between the present measure, and the more vigorous measures that were to be adopted by government. Notwithstanding the vast superiority of our navy, uncontested and incontestable, France had a surprising facility of importing the produce of her own, and the Spanish colonies, to as great an extent as during peace. Unless some measures of more vigorous retaliation should be adopted, she would hereafter have a larger share of this trade than heretofore, because she would not only supply herself with colonial produce, but absolutely have a monopoly of all the continental markets, against the colonial produce of this country. It was impossible for him, with the documents he had, to state to what extent this would take place, but certainly France would be put in a better situation than this country; and the house would be able to judge of this question, when aware, that the object of the French government, as stated in her decree, was to annihilate the trade and commerce of this country. It might assist in forming his judgment, to look at the amount of colonial produce imported into, and exported from America in the last year. The gross amount of its imports was of the value of 75 millions of dollars, of which 28 millions of dollars value had been re-exported to Europe, the greater part of France, by fictitious changes of ownership. However, it was contrived; the amount of the export he took from an official American document, and the produce reached the ports of France, wherein a revenue was collected upon it, that enabled France to carry on the war against this country; and all this from our forbearance, relative to neutrals. If they were to look only to the question of insurance, they could find that a cargo from a French colony to a port of the mother-country, without some protection of convoy, can be insured on the same terms as a vessel from Jamaica to Great Britain, whose squadrons cover the ocean. By these means the revenue of France was fed as effectually as in time of peace, and the French government enabled to carry on the war with so much facility and effect. But the learned gent. opposite had said, that we had no right to interfere until we should have ascertained whether America would submit to the aggression of France. Did the hon. gent. mean to say, that, until the American merchant should be afraid to risk his cargo, which he might cover by insurance, lest before its arrival at its destination, it should be captured, we should defer taking the vigorous measures, which the measures of the enemy had rendered necessary? That this country was to wait till it should know what might be the representations of the American government, by the conduct which that government had adopted during the last war, when it was every way in a better condition to resist the injustice of the enemy? But if they were to wait till the American government should insist upon those principles, by which the law of nations is upheld, they might wait till doomsday, as, whatever might be their feelings, the commercial people would attend to their commercial interests. Since the publication of this decree, which had been at first general as to all nations, some communication had taken place between the American minister in this country and the French government, in consequence of which some practical relaxation of the decree had taken place. This was one ground why we should look upon America with jealousy; and it was an aggravation that she had, by a secret understanding with the French government, contrived to take her shipping out of the operation of the decree, that was at first general, and placed herself in a situation of connivance with the French government. An American agent might have represented to the French government, how little it could gain by the execution of the decree, so far as America was concerned; that France had not the power of intercepting American vessels, and therefore as she could not gain much, that she might the more readily take from the Americans the necessity of vindicating their own rights, by resisting the execution of the decree, and leave their neutral flag still to cover French colonial produce. It was not surprising that the deputies of Hamburgh, and the Hans Towns, had failed in their mission to the French ruler; but when the case of America had been stated to him, it was too obvious not to awaken him to a sense of the policy of attending to it. If it should not also awaken his majesty's government to a sense of what they ought to do, parliament ought to make them alive to the measures which should be adopted in consequence of the aggressions of the French government, and the supineness of his majesty's ministers. On all these grounds he should support the motion of his honourable and learned friend.

Lord *Temple* said, if he had had any doubts as to the propriety of granting the paper moved for by the hon. and learned gent. when he had given notice of his motion on a former day, he felt that those doubts would have been greatly removed by the speech of the learned gent. himself, and of the noble lord who had just sat down. Nothing could be more hostile to the constitutional principle than what had been stated by the learned gent. as the ground of his motion; nothing more hostile to the feelings of that house, or to the interests of the country. It had always been his opinion, that it was the duty of that house to watch the conduct of his majesty's ministers; that it was the duty of the house to give them its confidence, until it should see some sufficient ground for withdrawing it, and to carry up advice to his majesty with respect to the great concerns of the government. But this was the first time in which it had been proposed to recommend to his majesty from that house a great measure of warfare. This was the first instance of the house having been called upon to go to the foot of the throne to tell his majesty, that the house, not approving of a particular war measure, recommended another to be adopted in its place. If the house was of opinion that the war had been improvidently conducted by ministers, it was their duty to state to his majesty, and to the house, that circumstance: that they had forfeited their claim to confidence, and to address for their removal from office. But he looked upon the present proceeding as being most unconstitutional as it was most unprecedented, inasmuch as it had for its object to force government to alter the measures it had adopted with respect to the neutrals of our allies, before it could be known what effect they would produce. If the ground of the learned gent.'s motion were admitted, it would prove injurious to this country, and favourable to the enemy. The learned gent. had made an attack on his hon. friends for their opposing this motion. But he could have wished, that the learned gent. had called to remembrance his own conduct, when he (lord T.) and some friends of his who disapproved of the treaty of Amiens, had supported a motion for some papers relating to that treaty. It had then been objected to them, that the treaty was concluded, and no person had given a more decided opposition to that motion than the learned gentleman, with the whole force of his eloquence. The learned gent. had asked, whether there was any precedent of a similar paper, when moved for, having been refused? but he should ask that learned gent. for a precedent of a similar paper having been asked to be produced? Many orders of council had, on different occasions, been called for; but this was the first time in which an order of council had been called for immediately after it was made, and before it could be known what effect it would produce. It was agreed on all hands, that this country possessed the right of retaliating; but the question was, whether it would be politic in us to exercise that right to its full extent? The noble lord seemed to think it a great object to prevent her colonial produce from reaching France; and the learned gent. had stated, that if that were effected, it would raise the price of our colonial produce in France. He admitted that such an effect would be the consequence. But was the noble lord aware of the consequences that would result to the commerce and manufactures of this country, if the neutral colonial trade were done away? The exports from this country amounted within the last year to 24 millions, which, he admitted, had unfortunately not all been exported in British vessels: 11 millions of these had been exported to America, a small portion of which were for the American consumption, and the rest were disposed of in payment for colonial produce, which was afterwards brought to Europe. The utmost produce of the French colonies in one year, did not exceed 4 or 5 millions, so that the whole of the remainder must have been the produce of the British colonies. The effect of putting a stop to the colonial trade, therefore, would be to diminish the amount of the exports from Great Britain. The exports to America had sunk considerably during the last peace, because the trade which the Americans had enjoyed exclusively before, was then carried on by the mother countries. Another objection that appeared to him against measures of rigorous retaliation was, that if American trade to French ports were to be stopped, according to his apprehensions, the interruption could not be extended to their trade to friendly neutral ports. The result therefore would be, that French colonial produce would be spread by the Americans all over Europe, and by meeting our own colonial produce in every market diminish its value. The learned gent. had expressed some satisfaction that the right had not been conceded, though he could not conceive how the right could have been reserved if not acted upon; certainly it could no otherwise be a right reserved them by not being acted upon, viz. a right dormant until an occasion should occur for exercising it. The hon. and learned gent. had recommended as a substitute for the present measure, to compel Americans to touch at British ports, before they should be allowed to proceed to the ports of France. This appeared to him a most extraordinary proposition, that French colonial produce should be warehoused as British stores, and pay duties in this country. After the statement of his learned friend, it was not necessary to go more at length into this question.

Sir *Thomas Turton* expressed his surprise that any reluctance should be betrayed to grant papers, for the production of which the most constitutional parliamentary grounds could be urged: that at least was his opinion, and he did not despair of being able to maintain it. The paper that was moved for, bore upon the face of it every possible mark of imbecility and indecision. All the commercial towns in the kingdom, indeed the whole country, considered it in that light, and lamented the want of that vigour and energy which should characterise the measures of a British Administration. The house was told, indeed, that to push measures to a proper degree of retaliation would be to act in a manner not only injurious to neutral powers, but prejudicial to the interests of our own commerce. He was at a loss to see any satisfactory proof of such an assertion. In his mind, the real cause of this pusillanimous forbearance, was the fear of offending America, the dread of breaking off the treaty lately pending between this country and the American government. That was the pistol held to the breast of ministers; and this their great anxiety to ward it off. He was happy, however, to learn that ministers did not mean to stop here, and that the present measure was only an experiment. If any thing farther was done, the country would be indebted for it to the motion made that night by the hon. and learned gent. Mr. Perceval); for without such incitement he was sorry to observe, that ministers seemed of themselves little disposed to adopt any thing like vigorous and energetic measures.

Lord *Howick*, although he felt it almost unnecessary to add any thing to what had already been offered upon that side of the question which it was his wish to defend, yet he could not reconcile it to himself to give a silent vote, and therefore as no one among those with whom he had the honour to act, seemed disposed to address the house, he could not forbear to request its indulgence for a few moments. As to the grounds upon which he felt it his duty to resist the production of the document alluded to in the motion, and which grounds were not correctly stated by the mover, he would take occasion to state them shortly to the house. Those grounds were, that unless a parliamentary ground were laid for the production of any public document, it was not usual to grant it; therefore it was by no means a matter of course to accede to such motions. And in opposing the learned gentleman's motion, he felt that he was supporting a constitutional principle of that house, so far as it regarded the regularity of its proceedings. He could not assent to the production of this paper, precisely for the reason which the learned gent. was so often forward to assert when on his side of the house; namely, as he before said, until a parliamentary ground for its production was made out. Why, then, if such an objection were conformable to the usage of the house, and the suggestions of common sense, it was for the house to examine the nature of the ground alleged for such a motion, to enquire whether it would be consistent with its duty, with the interests of the country, and the confidence fairly due to his majesty's government to enter into the discussion.—With respect to the learned gent.'s charge, that he had manifested a disposition to desert the general principles which, while on another side of the house, he was very tenacious of asserting, he challenged the learned gent. to make out that charge. In what instance, he would ask, had he ever maintained that that house, to whom it belonged to enquire, deliberate, and decide, upon every proposition submitted to it, was bound, as matter of course, to agree to the production of any paper of this nature that might be called for? Unless the learned gent. could shew that he had upon some occasion supported this extraordinary doctrine, the charge he had hazarded must fall to the ground. Indeed, the learned gent. himself confessed, soon after he had made his charge, that it was not tenable; for he stated that he remembered no precedent in which a similar paper was refused, which formed a pretty strong evidence that none such was ever applied for by the party with whom he had the honour to act; although a tolerably numerous list of orders of council were issued during the period in which that party occupied the bench upon which the learned gent. now sat.—Having stated that there was no precedent whatever for such a proceeding as the learned gent. would persuade the house to adopt, he had no hesitation to add, that the reason was obvious. For such a proceeding would be nothing more nor less than to supersede the functions of the executive government, while it would call on the house to judge upon a subject, with regard to which it would be incompetent to decide without information which it would not be consistent with the public interest to grant. He apprehended that the case to which the motion referred would appear to be precisely of that sort which it would not be proper for parliament to discuss, for such discussion must amount to a direct and prejudicial interposition with government in the conduct of the war, upon a measure just in its progress, and upon the propriety of originating, or the means of executing which, it would be impossible to form a fair and adequate opinion without information, such as it would be highly imprudent to make public; such indeed as could not be called for, or at least such as he believed had never been called for before.—Now, then, what was the state of the case as to the learned gent.'s argument? Why, that because the French government had issued a decree, not less remarkable for impotency than for its injustice and extravagance; that because it proceeded upon the most fallacious and mischievous principles; that because it proclaimed a threat which it had not the power to execute, and which was only to be paralleled by another decree, issued some years back from the same nation, we should be called upon to discuss the question as to the propriey tof retaliation. The learned gent. must recollect that the recent decree of the enemy was two-fold; the first part related to the confiscation of such articles of British produce and manufacture as might be found in those countries on the continent, which might be subjected by their arms; the second part referred to the confiscation of such British goods as might be captured at sea on board neutral ships. Now, surely, the learned gent. would not, as to the first part, recommend that we should seek to retaliate upon those unfortunate states which were subjugated by the arms of France; that those who were entitled to all the forbearance and moderation which the strong should grant to the weak, should become objects of our resentment, for an act of submission to which nothing but their weakness could reduce them. What did the learned gent. mean by asserting that we had not taken a measure of complete retaliation? did he mean to say, that because the enemy was guilty of violence and injustice, we ought to imitate him? There was a maxim in politics which he was almost ashamed to be under the necessity of maintaining on this occasion, that every right is subject to considerations of political expediency. Indeed, if it were not so, there were many rights which would become burthensome. Taking this maxim, then, into consideration, would the learned gent. himself maintain, that we ought to go to the full extent of our right in this instance? We had a right to confiscate all the French property to be found in England, in the funds or elsewhere; we were entitled to call upon every man who had property in the funds in trust for any Frenchman, a subject of France, to declare upon oath, and to surrender the amount of that property. But would the learned gent. advise the exercise of that right? (Here Mr. Perceval expressed his dissent.) The learned gent., added the noble lord, seemed to revolt at such a proposition. Why, then, the question under consideration came to be regulated upon grounds of political expediency, and upon those grounds the learned gent. would call upon the house to decide as to a measure which his majesty's ministers felt it their duty, after the best deliberation in their power, to adopt. He submitted, whether, if these ministers were deserving of the confidence of the house, and he would ask no unreasonable confidence for them, it would be right to entertain a discussion as to the propriety of their conduct at present, particularly as the order referred to in the motion, being a question of political expediency, must depend upon the consideration of various points which it was quite impossible that that house could at present consistently touch. Into this part of the subject his learned friend (sir John Nicholls) had already entered, and had left little for any man to add. But there were two or three points connected with the subject of the order referred to in the motion, which he could not forbear to mention, because they would serve to shew what kind of information must be laid before the house, in order that it should become competent to decide upon the question which the learned gentleman would urge the house to investigate. Now, first of all, it would be necessary to shew the nature of our communications and relations with other powers, how far they concurred in the matter of the order alluded to; how it was likely to affect them; also, how it was to affect ourselves; how it might, notwithstanding the rigour of the French decree, operate to promote our commerce; how, in fact, it was likely to become a great means of sustaining and advancing that commerce. Would the house desire that such communications should be published? Certainly not. For these circumstances were such as could not be made known without exposing some vulnerable points on our part, and on that of the enemy, and defeating the ends which we had in view.—With these observations he thought he might very well close, fully satisfied that the justice of the cause he supported was fully established; but there were a few remarks from the noble lord (Castlereagh), which he felt it proper to notice. That noble lord had asserted that the French decree of 1798, relative to our commerce, did not go so far as that to which the order of council alluded. But the noble lord was mistaken; for the former decree condemned to confiscation both the ship and cargo, if any portion whatever of English commodities were found on board; while the latter only condemned the cargo, and not the ship, as the hon. and learned baronet (sir T. Turton) had ignorantly stated. And as to the noble lord's allusion to Portugal, there was no material difference with regard to us between the connection with France, in 1798, and that which she had at present. But to return to the decree of 1798: it surely could not be pretended that there was such a difference between the relative circumstances of that country and this, at that time and the present, as to justify the ministry of that day in thinking that this decree required no measure of counteraction whatever, if the present ministry were to be condemned for not going the full length of imitating the wildness and extravagance of the enemy. How was it to be made out that total abstinence from retaliation was proper in the one case, if some effort to retaliate was to be culpable in the other, because that effort did not go to the extreme of an indiscriminate retaliation? He did not put this from any wish to find fault with the conduct of ministers in 1798. On the contrary, he believed their forbearance wise, although the power of the enemy to execute his menaces was, it would be recollected, materially greater in 1798, than it was at present; for at the former period his maritime strength was considerable. The battle of the Nile had not then been fought.—On the whole, the noble lord declared that he could not see any reason to warrant total forbearance in 1798, if it were inconsistent at all to forbear in the instance under consideration. But as to the manner in which the French decree of 1798 had been executed towards neutral powers, the noble lord (Castlereagh), he observed, dwelt particularly on the circumstance of its having been repealed with regard to America, and the noble lord seemed very jealous lest the Americans should be exempted from the operation of the late decree also. Indeed, the noble lord had stated, that he understood the resolution to relax this decree with respect to America, had been already communicated to the American minister here. Where the noble lord had obtained that information, he could not pretend to say. Certainly the noble lord was better informed than he was; for he had heard of no such thing, but he was authorized to say, that the American minister had received no official communication of any such nature. But supposing that a relaxation of this decree in favour of America had actually taken place, and admitting all that the noble lord had stated to be really true; what course would the noble lord recommend to us in consequence? Would he advise, that because America was exempted by France, from the operation of a measure hostile to all neutral powers; that because our commerce and manufactures were allowed the opportunity of conveyance in American ships, to that part of the continent, our direct intercourse with which the enemy had it in his power to obstruct, we ought to declare war against America? In truth the whole amount of the noble lord's argument, seemed to be this, that as America was exposed to the injustice of France, she ought to be exposed to farther injustice from this country.—With regard to our treaty with America, he could not conceive the grounds upon which the learned mover of the proposition before the house could warrant his very frequent allusions to that treaty. It was a subject that he dared not enter into, because this house would not allow it; but yet, he was perpetually nibbling at it; aware that ministers could not consistently answer his insinuations. The learned gent. had stated that the existence of the non-importation act rendered it degrading in us to enter into a negociation with America. But to this he would only say, that whether it was right or not to enter into the negociation, or what the circumstances were under which it commenced, were questions which he should not much enquire about, if the treaty should be found such as consistently with the honour and interest of the country ought to have been concluded. If, however, the learned gent. thought the commencement of the negociation so very disgraceful to the country, why did he not last session of parliament, when he had not so much information upon the subject as he had at present, move an address to his majesty for the removal of those ministers, who could have involved the country in a proceeding so dishonourable as to treat with a nation which held a hostile tone?—But to return to the measure of forbearance and moderation in the order alluded to in the motion, and of which the learned gent. so loudly complained; he would again seriously ask him, whether he would prefer the country to retaliate any proceeding of the French government which might be dictated by hostility to us? If so, he must be betrayed into gross inconsistency, and something more, for he must recollect the decree of 1798, already referred to; but still more, he must recollect the sanguinary decree issued at the early part of the revolution, ordering that no quarter should be given to English soldiers, and that no retaliation was attempted to either. Where, indeed, could the man be found in this country, capable of proposing reprisal for the latter? Nothing of the kind was ever mentioned in this country, and it was found in France that the order could not be reduced to practice. Such also, he had no doubt, would be the fate of the decree under discussion, and that the commerce of this country would be the best consulted, and its prosperity most securely preserved, by a perseverance on our part in that system of forbearance and moderation which we had heretofore pursued, and to which those flourishing circumstances which the noble lord so often brought forward his numerous accounts to prove, were so materially attributable. That by continuing this system, we should continue to prosper, he had not the least doubt, notwithstanding the violent decree of the enemy, unless it were determined, by adopting the learned gentleman's advice, to assist the views of that enemy for the destruction of our commerce. Really, he knew nothing to which to compare the learned gent.'s advice on this subject, but to an old story he had once heard of a poor man who wished to get some cocoa-nuts. So he sat about throwing stones and rubbish at a monkey which he perceived in a cocoa-tree, and the little animal in revenge flung the cocoa-nuts at him. So the learned gent. in revenge for the provocations of Buonaparte would fling the commerce of England at him. Under all the circumstances of the case before the house, the noble lord trusted that the conduct of ministers would not be judged of upon imperfect evidence, and that they would not be called upon to assent to the production of a public document, upon such grounds as had never before been recognized or assented to. He demanded, on the part of ministers, no more confidence from parliament than was necessary to enable them to execute the duties of their offices. If they were undeserving of that confidence, they were unworthy of those offices, and ought to be removed. To make a motion at once to that effect, would, in his judgement, be a more fair and manly mode of attack than to submit such a motion as that before the house, and to such a discussion which the mover professed to have in view. The noble lord concluded with disclaming the construction applied by the hon. baronet (sir T. Turton) to the words of his learned friend (sir John Nicholls), namely, that he had stated ministers to have an ulterior measure in view, upon the subject of this order. He did not understand any such thing from his learned friend. All he had said was, that if the order referred to in the motion should be found not to answer the end in view, further measures would be resorted to; and no doubt they would. There could be no reason to apprehend that his majesty's ministers would hesitate to adopt any measures that should be thought necessary, from the fear of any government whatever.

Mr. *Perceval*, in reply, declared that he must think it impossible that he could have been so completely misconceived by any person who had heard him deliver his sentiments upon the present subject, as he appeared to be by the noble lord who had just sat down. The only way in which he could possibly account for the noble lord having delivered the speech he did, and apparently directed as an answer to him (Mr. Perceval), was, that he supposed his lordship had adopted a mode which was very frequently, nay, generally, adopted by the ablest orators, of considering what objections could possibly be urged against the statements which he had laid down. In making this calculation, he had evidently anticipated the arguments which were to be advanced on this side of the house; he had accordingly formed his answer to these imaginary objections, and the anecdote of Sinbad the sailor his lordship thought to be so extremely applicable to his purpose, that he could not possibly let slip the opportunity of relating it to the house. The hon. and learned gent. then entered into a minute reply to all the observations that had been advanced in support of the refusal to produce the order in council. Several of the assertions that had been laid to his charge, he felt it to be a duty which he owed to himself, most positively to deny. Then, as to the declaration which had been made by a noble earl on the other side (earl Temple), that, if this motion were to have been followed up by another for the removal of his majesty's ministers, that then and then only, he would have given it his support; this really appeared to him to be so extravagant, that it would lead to this conclusion, that parliament would be so circumscribed that, unless the member who called for a paper in some degree implicating the conduct of ministers were prepared immediately to move for an address, praying that such ministers should be dismissed from his majesty's councils; unless this were the case, parliament could never hope to be put in possession of any paper which had a tendency, in the slightest degree, to reflect on the conduct of his majesty's ministers. With respect to another argument, that a measure should not be enquired into, while it was in the progress of its execution; if this inference were correct, then every address which was ever moved for in that house, praying that a conclusion might be put to a war, on account of its circumstances, and its manner of being conducted, was erroneous; the house should never have said a word upon the subject of the war at that time; no, they should have waited till the war was ended, before they should have presumed to have seriously entertained a motion of that nature. What he had said was, that the measure would not be productive of any very serious injury to the enemy, and that it could not possibly produce any very material benefit to this country. If in the present circumstances of Europe, if in the present state of the enemy, and in the present state of our own marine, we adopted such an inefficient measure of retaliation as this was, he thought that it would be declaring to the enemy, it would be also publishing to all neutrals in the face of Europe, that we were not prepared to assert our right in any circumstances whatever. As to France herself, he conceived that she had put herself out of the pale and protection of the law of nations, and, as to the hardship upon the subjects of neutral powers, he must confess that he would be sorry for them, but then it would be evident to the world that this evil had been brought on by the enemy, that on our part it was only a measure of self-defence. The noble lord (Howick), however, at the end of the debate, had stated, that as a minister he could not feel himself authorised to declare to the house the full particulars upon which the measure was founded, lest it might tend to a disclosure of circumstances that would, or might eventually, be prejudicial to the interests of neutral powers. This, however, was not mentioned until now; he did not know how it could possibly affect the interests of other nations, but he must bow to the noble lord in the situation he was, and give him full credit for his assertion. With his understanding he should not press his motion any farther under such circumstances. [Here the hon. and learned member conceived that he saw a smile or some gesture indicative of triumph on the treasury bench.] There was no such great reason for triumph as gentlemen seemed to imagine: the question appeared to be entirely abandoned by ministers, and, had the noble lord been equally explicit on a former occasion, he would not, perhaps, have been troubled with the present debate.—The question was then put on Mr. Perceval's motion, and negatived without a division.—The other orders of the day were then disposed of, and the house adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, February 5.

[Slave Trade Abolition Bill.] The order of the day being read for the second reading of the Slave Trade Abolition bill,

Lord *Grenville* rose and spoke as follows:—In stating to your lordships, in detail, some of the arguments on which this important measure rests, I hope I shall be excused by your lordships if I should feel myself obliged, in some instances, to tread over the same ground which has become so familiar to you in the course of a discussion which has lasted for 20 years. After the investigation this subject has already undergone, it is scarcely possible to avoid repeating, in some instances, the same arguments to which we have so long been accustomed. I will, however, my lords, proceed to the discussion without further introduction, and, in the first place, to state that argument which is the principal foundation of this measure, namely, justice. This measure rests upon justice, and calls imperatively upon your lordships for your approbation and support. Had it been, my lords, merely a question of humanity, I am ready to admit that it might then have become a consideration with your lordships as to how far you would extend or circumscribe that humanity. Had it been simply a question involving the interests or welfare of the British empire in the West Indies, it would then certainly have been a question with your lordships how far and in what respect you should legislate. But in this instance I contend, that justice imperiously calls upon your lordships to abolish the Slave Trade. I have heard some opinions urged to the effect as if justice could contain opposite and contradictory tenets. Justice, my lords, is one, uniform and immutable. Is it to be endured that the profits obtained by robbery are to be urged as an argument for the continuance of robbery? Justice is still the same, and you are called upon by this measure not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but also to your own planters; to interpose between the planters of your own islands and their otherwise certain ruin and destruction. You are called upon to do justice to your own planters in spite of their prejudices and their fears, and to prevent them by this measure from meeting that destruction which is otherwise certain and inevitable.—Was it, therefore, a trade which was in itself lovely and amiable, instead of being, as it is, wicked, criminal, and detestable, that you were now called upon to abolish, this would be an unanswerable argument for its abolition, that its continuance must produce the ruin of our planters. But, my lords, when it is considered that this trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in; when it is considered how much guilt has been incurred in carrying it on, in tearing the unhappy Africans by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their connections, and their social ties, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery, and after incurring all this guilt, that the continuance of the criminal traffic must end in the ruin of the planters in your islands, who vainly expect profit from it, surely there can be no doubt that this detestable trade ought at once to be abolished. We have heard, however, statements adduced for the purpose of attempting to prove that the present state of the population of the islands cannot be kept up without fresh importations. We are then to be told that that law of nature, which has hitherto been considered as universal, meets with an exception in the West Indies, and that there alone the increase and multiplication of the human species does not take place. Let us therefore examine how far this statement agrees with facts. Some years since I was engaged in calculations respecting the population of the West-India islands, along with a person who to many great and brilliant qualifications, added a complete knowledge of political arithmetic: I mean the late Mr. Pitt. The result of those calculations was, with respect to the island of Jamaica, that from the year 1698 to 1730, the excess of deaths above the births amounted to 3½ per cent.; from 1730 to 1755, to 2½ per cent.; from 1755 to 1769, to 1¾ per cent.; from 1769 to 1780, to 3-5ths per cent.; and the average of three years ending, in 1798 or 1800, it is not material which, gives an excess of deaths of only 1-24th per cent. In this calculation is included the whole population of the island, and of course the fresh importations; and it is well known, that with respect to the latter, the negroes newly imported die in the harbours before they are landed, to the amount of 5 per cent., and that many more die soon after they are set to work. It is therefore clear that the population of the island is perfectly competent to support itself. It is remarkable also that in Dominica, although a newer island, and although fresh lands are known to be inimical to the increase of population, there is an excess of births above the deaths. The argument, therefore, that fresh importations are necessary to keep up the present population of the islands, completely fails. But then we are told that fresh importations are necessary in order to cultivate new lands. My lords, to encourage the continuance of the trade for this purpose is to ruin the planters of your islands: are they not now distressed by the accumulation of produce on their hands, for which they cannot find a market; and will it not therefore be adding to their distress, and leading the planters on to their ruin, if you suffer the continuance of fresh importations? Even, however, on the supposition that the cultivation of the waste lands in Jamaica, or of nearly the whole extent of the island of Trinidad, could produce profit to the planters, is it to be endured that this detestable traffic is to be continued, and such a mass of human misery produced, not to prevent loss but to create gain? My lords, according to a very moderate calculation, to bring into cultivation the waste lands in the islands of Jamaica, the slave trade must be continued for two or three centuries longer, and, to cultivate nearly the whole island of Trinidad, a much longer period, whilst it would take a million of those unfortunate beings from Africa to cultivate each island; to cultivate Trinidad even a greater number. Were it possible, my lords, that these two millions of human beings could be collected together at the same time, and that they could be contemplated with the reflection that they were to be torn from their families and their friends, that every social tie was to be broken asunder, that they were to be delivered over to barbarity and oppression, and were to endure the greatest misery that it is possible for human beings to suffer; would it be endured by any one of your lordships, that a traffic productive of so much misery should be continued for an instant? would it not soften the obdurate heart of the greatest barbarian that ever tyrannized in a slave ship? We were told, however, yesterday, by the learned counsel at the bar, that fresh importations were necessary, in order that the slaves might be more easily governed; we were told of the favourite maxim of *divide et impera*, and that by fresh importations the slaves were more readily divided into classes, and more easily kept in order than one body of natives. My opinion is directly the contrary. Fresh importations are surely more likely to put those negroes already on the island in mind of the injustice they had previously suffered, and there is little difficulty in communicating a sense of injustice and oppression from man to man. Prohibit fresh importations, and let the negroes already on the islands be well treated and properly protected, and they will become sensible of the protection and kindness extended to them, and gradually lose their feelings of the original injustice practised upon them. The horrors of St. Domingo have been, however, presented to our view; but to what are they to be attributed? to the violation of solemn promises, to the breach of faith towards the negroes, and the gross injustice practised towards them. My lords, so far from the abolition of the slave trade having a tendency to produce those horrors in our islands, I contend that it is the only measure that can prevent them. I have endeavoured to prove, my lords, that the continuance of this trade is unnecessary, with a view to the present state of the population of the islands, as that can support itself; that to suffer it to continue for the purpose of cultivating new lands, will be certain ruin to the planters, and that the abolition of the trade is the only way of avoiding, in your own islands, the horrors which have afflicted St. Domingo. Some years since, it was thought that a gradual abolition was the best mode of destroying this trade; the advocates at that period, of gradual abolition, must now be adopted for a total abolition, for the period has arrived to which they looked forward, namely, when the population of the islands would be able to support itself. Nothing but a total abolition will now satisfy justice. Let us not think that any regulations in the islands can be carried into effect with a view to abolition: on the contrary, abolition must take place with a view to regulations. In the year 1792, when the proposed abolition of the slave trade was negatived, it was agreed to address his majesty, praying him to send instructions to the governors of the colonies to procure the adoption of measures for the better protection, and the better treatment of the negroes. What was the consequence? My lords, I wish not to inflame, and therefore I will simply refer your lordships to the correspondence upon the table relative to that subject, and particularly to that of my lord Seaforth, the governor of Barbadoes; three most horrible and dreadful murders of slaves were committed in that island, attended with circumstances of barbarity, which I will not shock your lordships by detailing. Lord Seaforth of course instituted an enquiry, upon which it was found that the murder of a slave was only punishable by a fine of eleven pounds. That noble lord, in conformity to the instructions he had received, and with a proper regard for the British character, immediately proposed to the legislature of the island, to enact a law, which affixed the punishment of death to the murder of a slave. How was this proposition received? it was received, my lords, with insult, and the council and house of assembly returned answers in language fitting, as they conceived, to the insult which had been offered to them. What then is to be expected from regulations to be adopted by the colonial assemblies? It is but right, however, that I should state, that I have heard it reported that the legislature of Barbadoes has since adopted the course which justice pointed out, and have affixed the proper punishment to the murder of a slave. Still, however, if the evidence of a slave is not to be received against a white, is there not given to the master an opportunity of tyrannizing over his slaves, and inflicting on them dreadful cruelties without the possibility of bringing him to justice? Let us, my lords, abolish this criminal traffic, and we may look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection extended to them, and the good treatment they experience, and will evince a corresponding attachment to the country from which they receive those benefits. Throughout all history we find that the progress from slavery to liberty has been first by means of personal slaves becoming predial, or attached to the land, and from thence they have ascended to freedom. My lords, I look forward to the period when the negroes in the West-India islands, becoming labourers, rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country to whom they are indebted for protection, and of the islands where they experience real comforts, and when they may be called upon to share largely in the defence of those islands with a sure confidence in their loyalty and attachment. My lords, the measure now proposed for the abolition of the slave trade is one to which I cannot think that any one who dispassionately considers the subject, can give a negative. What right do we derive from any human institution, or any divine ordinance, to tear the natives of Africa, to deprive them by force of the means of labouring for their own advantage, and to compel them to labour for our profit? If then to do so is gross injustice and oppression, as I contend it evidently and undoubtedly is, can there be a question that the character of the country ought to be cleared from the stain impressed by the guilt of such a traffic, of a traffic by the effect of which we keep Africa in a state of barbarity and desolation? In support of the trade, it has been said, that if we did not take away the individuals who are the objects of it, they would be put to death either as prisoners taken in war, or for witchcraft, or other crimes; but is it not evident, from the testimony we have had upon this subject, that this is not the fact? On the contrary, we have not only every reason to believe that the men made prisoners in war would be, according to the custom of barbarous nations, made domestic slaves to their captors, but we have every reason to conclude, that it is the temptations held out to the chiefs on the coast of Africa, for the gratification of their passions, that induces them to enter into those frequent wars, and that produces those frequent accusations of crimes, by means of which negroes are procured for the purpose of selling them to our traders. Of the desolating influence of the slave trade, in Africa, and its effects in keeping the country in a state of barbarity, we have sufficient evidence in the Travels of Mr. Parke on that continent, although the work was edited by a person known to be one of the most active opponents of the abolition of the slave trade. Yet we find in that work, that it is towards the interior of the country, that population and civilization increase, and that on the coast barbarity continues to prevail, which can only be attributed to the influence of the trade, which your lordships are now called upon to abolish. My lords, an argument was used against this measure last session, which I cannot conceive entitled to the least weight. It was said that we ought not to abolish this trade, unless other powers would agree likewise to abolish it; that is to say, that we should not do an act of justice, unless other powers would consent or rather that we should continue to commit injustice, and persist in guilt, in criminality, because if we did not, other powers would. As well might it be said, that a man could be justified in robbing another, because if he did not, he knew there was a banditti ready to commit the robbery; or that an assassin would be justified in committing murder, because he knew that if he did not, others were ready to perpetrate it. This argument, however, bad as it is, fails in its own grounds. The united states of America, who had fixed the period of the abolition to take place in 1808, have anticipated that period (I wish we had had the glory of being the first in the race), and there is already, according to the last accounts, a bill in its unresisted progress through the legislature, for the immediate abolition of this trade, in which it is declared that death shall be the punishment of those who deal in the blood of their fellow creatures. With respect to the European powers, how are France and Spain to carry on the trade? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and how is that power to carry on the trade? Is it to our own islands, where we prohibit it; is it to the French islands, which we block up; is it to the Spanish islands, where we prevent it; and where is Portugal to find capital to carry it on? Another objection advanced by a noble and learned lord (Eldon) is, that this measure does not come up to the resolution passed last session, and that instead of the abolition of the African slave trade, we are only abolishing the British traffic in that trade; but is it to be contended, my lords, that because we cannot embrace all the good that may be done, that therefore we are not to effect a partial good? If that were the case, we could never effect any good whatever. My lords, in calling your attention to this great measure, let me entreat you to consider that the whole country looks to the parliament to wipe away the stigma attached to its character in continuing this detestable traffic; that it looks not merely to parliament, but to your lordships' house. Twice has this measure failed in this house, and if this iniquitous traffic is not now abolished, the guilt will rest with your lordships. We have to lament the loss, in the other house of parliament, of some of the ablest and most distinguished advocates for the abolition; we have also to lament in this house, the loss of some of its able and strenuous supporters. Still, however, if your lordships should agree to the abolition of this inhuman trade in blood, as I trust you will feel it due to your own character and to the character of the country to do, it will meet in the other house of parliament with the strenuous support of a person to whom the country is deeply indebted for having originally proposed the measure, and for having followed up that proposition by every exertion from which a chance could be derived of success. I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that person, on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life, carried into effect—a measure so truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous prosperity of his country, and the welfare of mankind—a measure which will diffuse happiness amongst millions, now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn. My lords, I have to apologize for having troubled your lordships so long; but upon a measure of such importance—a measure, for the completion of which I have been labouring for the last 20 years—the ardent zeal which I felt for the attainment of such an object, will, I trust, plead my excuse. The noble lord concluded by moving that the bill be now read a second time.

The Duke of *Clarence* assured their lordships that he had ocular proof of the manner in which the planters behaved to the negroes; he had been in almost every island in the West Indies; he had conversed with the people themselves, and the result of all his observations and all his enquiries was a most clear and positive conviction on his mind, that there was not the least foundation in fact for the charge which had been brought against the planters of ill-treatment to their slaves. The noble lord, among other things, had said, that we should look to the fate of St. Domingo; every man who wished well to the commercial interests of this country, must agree with his lordship, and also hope that their lordships would weigh deliberately in their minds the fate of St. Domingo, before they came to a decision upon this important question. It was not at present competent to England to prefer any claim to sovereignty over that island; and whenever the time of peace should arrive, the French most probably would turn their attention towards the recovery of an island which had been lost to them by insurrection and revolt. No other nation on earth could reasonably interpose their authority or their influence between two parties so circumstanced, and it was far from being improbable that that island would one day be in the hands of France. He most seriously called upon their lordships to consider what might probably be the consequence of such a re-assumption of power, by the natural enemy of this country, if at the same time we were to have abolished our only mode of supplying our islands with labourers. Would they not, with an island of so great extent at their command, would they not continue to import; and if they could not frustrate our views of abolition by smuggling, would they not at least on the first appearance of misunderstanding between them and Great Britain, foment disturbances in our islands, and endeavour to accomplish that most prevailing wish of their present ruler, by the destruction of British commerce?

The Duke of *Gloucester*.—My lords, I cannot find language sufficiently strong to express my abhorrence and detestation of this abominable traffic in human blood; and I think the present question is the most momentous that ever came before your lordships: for what question can be more momentous, or come more closely home to our bosoms and our feelings of humanity, than that which concerns the welfare, the happiness, nay even the lives of myriads of our fellow creatures? Adverting to the resolution of last parliament, now on your lordships' table, declaring that the Slave Trade is contrary to justice, humanity, and policy, can you still allow British subjects to carry on what has been thus solemnly declared to be unjust, inhuman, and impolitic? It has been told us from the opposite side of the house, that the mortality among the slaves has of late years decreased, and that the negroes were flourishing; but I can tell your lordships the real cause of that decrease in mortality: It arises not from the situation of the slaves having been actually ameliorated, but from the encouragement given by some planters to the breed of free negroes, instead of purchasing slaves. They find, from experience, that the former, though, perhaps, the slower method of procuring a supply of labourers, is yet by far the most beneficial in the end to the planters, as it is also more consonant to the feelings of humanity. As to the ruin that will fall upon the merchants engaged in this traffic, if it is put a stop to, I have to observe, that there are many new branches of trade that might be opened in lieu of it. I have been on board of and inspected several of the vessels employed in these inhuman voyages, and I do not think there are any ships in the world better qualified for transports for conveying troops than they are. It has been also urged against the present bill, that the passing of it would destroy one of the finest nurseries for our seamen; but this cannot be correct, for I know, from an actual examination into the subject, that only one half of the seamen employed on any one slave voyage, returned to this country, the rest generally dying on the voyage. In fact, there are two-thirds more seamen lost to this country in this manner than the boasted nursery of the African slave trade produces. It has been said against the abolition, that the natives of Africa would murder the prisoners they brought down to the coast with the view of exposing them to sale, but I do not think that one single life would be lost in this manner.—His highness concluded with repeating his abhorrence of the trade, and gave his warmest support to the bill.

The Earl of *Morton* opposed the bill, and recommended to their lordships to pause, and to consider whether the abolition of the trade would not be attended with worse consequences in the view of humanity, than its continuation.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* said, that in the British West-India islands the life of the slave was protected by the law as well as that of any other inhabitant. The house had been told that they should prevent the continuance of oppression and cruelty; but the question was not as to how far we ought to exert ourselves to put an end to practices of that nature, but how far any thing that was in our power was capable of effecting that purpose. Portugal, for instance, had no other means of working her mines than by the employment of slaves; could we suppose that she would give it up? indeed nothing had been said about her. Of France there had been something like a whisper that she would relinquish the trade, and it was then inferred that Spain would follow her example. America had promised, but had not yet given up the traffic; and who could answer for Carolina, that it would agree to the resolutions of the other states on that head? If we abandoned this trade, it was certain that some others would take it up, who might not act with so much humanity as the British traders; and with it we should abandon the employment of one million capital, about 6 or 700 ships, and from 16 to 20,000 seamen. This, he maintained, would occasion the loss of nearly one-third of the amount of British imports and exports. He had a stronger objection yet to make against the adoption of this measure, namely, that if such a system were acted upon, no property could be reckoned safe which could fall within the power of the legislature; upon such a principle as this the tithes of the clergy, and the very freehold estates of the landholders might be sacrificed to field-preaching and popular declamation. His conduct, however, should never receive the smallest degree of influence from such powers as those, and though he should see the presbyterian and the prelate, the methodist and field-preacher, the jacobin and the murderer unite in support of it, in that house he would raise his voice against it.

The Earl of *Selkirk* could not reconcile to his mind the distinctions made by the noble earl who had just sat down. If he was right in his conception of what had fallen from that noble lord relative to the dispensations of Providence, it went the length of asserting, that no cognizance should be taken of any moral offence, however aggravated or injurious to society. If human duties were thus estimated, and vicious deeds only considered by that criterion, rapine and outrage would be constantly at work, and jurisprudence be rendered incapable of repressing the commission of crimes, by merited punishments. There was also another observation made by that noble earl, with which it was impossible to coincide, unless evidence was produced at the bar, that the climate of the West Indies was unfavourable to the propagation of the human species. In countries where the means of human subsistence were proportionate to the number of inhabitants, the increase of population had always been found progressive. This principle had been acknowledged by all writers on the subject, and had been unanswerably explained in the able work of Mr. Malthus upon population. The noble lord proceeded to discuss the causes which were likely to increase or lessen the black population in the West Indies, and concluded with the inference, that after the proposed abolition, the West-India planters would naturally look to moderate profits, and a progressive increase of the negroes on their estates; whereas, the thirst of immediate gain, and the opportunity of speedily supplying a deficiency of labourers, was, under the present circumstances, a strong incentive to overwork the negroes, and, consequently, to curtail the population.

Lord *Sidmouth* felt it a painful duty to be obliged to differ from some of his noble friends, particularly on a subject which involved questions of justice and humanity. To the measure itself he had no objection, if it could be accomplished without detriment to the West-India islands; but this he did not think possible, under existing circumstances. Instead, therefore, of abolition at present, he begged leave to suggest, that the best plan would be to throw certain difficulties in the way of the trade, which may finally, and perhaps at no distant period, operate as a bar to it altogether. For this purpose, he would suggest that a tax be laid on every slave imported into any of the islands, gradually raising this impost, till the merchants should of themselves give up the traffic. With respect to the West Indies themselves, he would recommend the advice of that great man (Mr. Burke), viz. that churches should be built for the negroes in the islands, and that they should be instructed in the morality and doctrine of the Christian religion; he would also have them united by the ties of matrimony, as the first step towards civilization, and the future improvement of their condition. With these advantages, and the blessing of being protected by our laws, he thought that the time would arrive for emancipating them.

The Earl of *Rosslyn* said, he was convinced that the immediate abolition of this odious traffic would be attended with no injurious effects to the colonies, to the culture of which the negroes already imported were fully competent, if properly treated. Such treatment, it might be said, it was the obvious interest of the planter to give the negroes, and therefore it might be inferred that they experienced it already, and yet that importation became necessary to keep up the supply. This, however, he was prepared to contradict. It was only from the strongest impulse of self-interest, from the most cogent persuasion of necessity, that men of such habits were likely to adopt the practice of humanity. When unable to procure any more negroes, they would feel the urgency of taking care of those they already had. With regard to the statement of the noble earl (Westmorland), as to the various description of persons who concurred in a wish to produce the abolition of this trade, he thought that formed a forcible argument in favour of the measure before the house. For the concurrence of men of all religions, of all political parties, and even of those who professed no religion, in support of this measure, served to shew that to all who were susceptible of a sentiment of humanity, who were capable of discriminating between the beauty of virtue and the deformity of vice, this traffic was abhorrent. With such an unanimity of sentiment, with such a combination of powers, could that house, without fixing a stain upon its character, without incurring universal odium, hesitate to accede to the motion of his noble friend?

Earl *St. Vincent* deprecated the measure, which, if passed, would, he was satisfied, have the effect of transferring British capital to other countries, which would not be disposed to abandon such a productive branch of trade. As to the humanity so much contended for, it would be well if noble lords reflected upon this question, whether humanity was consulted by the abolition. If it were, their arguments would be well founded. But, from his own experience, he was enabled to state, that the West-India islands formed Paradise itself, to the negroes, in comparison with their native country. Knowing this, which, upon due enquiry, it was in the power of any noble lord to ascertain, he was surprised at the proposition before the house; and, considering the high character and intelligence of the noble proposer, he declared that he could account in no other way for his having brought it forward, but by supposing that some Obiman had cast his spell upon him. (A laugh).

Lord *King* argued forcibly in support of the motion, which, in his opinion, nothing but the sacrifice of every generous and manly sentiment to cold and low calculations of self-interest; nothing but a perversion of justice and humanity, could induce any man to defend. And with regard to the reliance which some persons professed to place upon the equity and feelings of the colonial legislatures, he begged to know if a perversion of justice and humanity were supported in that house, what was to be expected from less enlightened and liberal assemblies?

Lord *Northesk* detailed several instances of wanton cruelty practised upon the negroes in the colonies by their masters, who were scarcely under the controul of any law with regard to their conduct. If humane treatment were practised towards the negroes, he was certain, from his knowledge of the interior of the colonies, that a sufficient supply could be kept up for every purpose of cultivation, and such treatment the good effects of which he had witnessed in St. Christopher's and other of the colonies, was not, he was very much afraid, ever likely to become general, until the planters were precluded from farther supplies.

Lord *Eldon* considered that the abolition of the British traffic would by no means imply that of the Slave Trade in general, which could still be carried on by other states. The present had been called a measure founded on justice, humanity, and policy. If it were so in justice and humanity, he would agree that it was so in policy. But it was not clearly made out that it was so, in justice and humanity. It was, however, necessary that it should be shewn that this measure would promote the views of justice and humanity more than they were at present promoted. The learned lord then entered into a review of the measures adopted by parliament respecting this trade, which, he contended, had been sanctioned by parliaments in which sat the wisest lawyers, the most learned divines, and the most excellent statesmen; and he declared, that on this subject he had always differed from his illustrious friend Mr. Pitt. He adverted to Mr. Locke, lord Somers, and others, and they did not think it wise or politic to oppose it.

The Bishop of *Durham* supported the abolition, and considered the Slave Trade as wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the Christian religion. He reminded the house of the story of Themistocles, who proposed a measure by which the enemies of the Athenians might be destroyed, without hazard to themselves; which was referred to Aristides the Just: it was to destroy their fleet, while they thought they were in safety. Aristides said to the Athenians, it could be done; but that it was unjust: upon which the people, with one voice, said it should not be done, for that the Athenians would not owe their safety to injustice. The British people should not be surpassed by the Athenians in a love of justice; and therefore, if there were any profits to us, in the continuation of the African Slave trade, we should forego them. We were a people more favoured by Heaven than any other nation had been from the commencement of time to the present hour; but we should beware how we forfeited the protection of Providence, by continual injustice; for if we did, we should look in vain hereafter for the glories of the Nile or of Trafalgar.

The Earl of *Moira* took a general view of the subject; he thought that the evidence upon the table of the house must be sufficient to convince their lordships of the necessity of abolishing this sanguinary traffic. If noble lords were not satisfied with this evidence, he referred them to Holy Writ, he referred them to that great work of our forefathers the Old Testament, and that great Commentator upon that work, whose maxim was, "Do unto others as you would they should do unto you."

Lord *Hawkesbury* admitted that the slave trade was a great political evil, and that it was desirable to put an end to it; but considering that slavery had been permitted under the Jewish dispensation, that there was no express prohibition of it in the Christian; that it was a condition of mankind which many great and wise men in all ages had sanctioned, he was not prepared to say, that to allow slavery was a crime. Nevertheless, combining slavery and the slave trade, he thought that it was matter of regret the latter had ever existed, and that it was desirable to abolish it. The question was, however, whether it could be abolished by the proposed measure, and whether the consequences would be beneficial to the nations of Africa? He contended that the Slave Trade in Africa had subsisted before Europeans had entered upon the trade, and he doubted whether their withdrawing from it would put an end to the evil, or tend so much as was argued to the internal peace and improvement of Africa. He denied, however, that our withdrawing from it would abolish the trade; and if it only shifted hands, the change would be to the disadvantage of the negroes, and of the cause of humanity.

Lord *Holland* said, that the arguments of the learned lord (Eldon) respecting the opinions of former statesmen and legislators, lord Somers, Mr. Locke, &c. would, in their application, put a stop to all improvement. But could it be supposed that so great and wise a man as Mr. Locke, after reading the evidence which lay on the table respecting the slave trade, would give it his sanction? The evil was now exposed, and could not be defended. As well might we be told that the Reformation was unnecessary, as it might be said, could a reverend prelate be more wise than sir T. More, or more learned than Erasmus. It was in vain, therefore, to say that the slave trade was justified by the authority of those whose attention had never been called to its enormity. The Christian religion had tended to abolish slavery in Europe, and its principle equally led us to abolish the detestable traffick in human beings on the coast of Africa. The noble lord contended, on the authority of Mr. Park, that the demand for slaves tended to perpetuate wars in the interior of Africa, and maintained that if the market were taken away, the horrors which led to its supply would cease. He insisted that if the trade were abolished, the stock of negroes in the West Indies would be kept up by the ordinary means of increase, which could not be the case while the trade continued, and the interest of the planters found its account in a different system. He maintained that it was impossible to believe that the state of a negro in the West Indies was such as to lead him to prefer it even to slavery in Africa, and it was absurd to think so, considering the new kind of labour to which he was condemned, when he had never been accustomed to such habits, and when he must be torn from his country and connections. He was convinced, too, that, far from weakening, the measure would tend to the security of our islands, and he shewed from the instance of Barbadoes, and that in the cases where the importation of negroes was the least, the proportion of whites to blacks was greatest. The noble lord concluded with a pathetic allusion to the sentiments of Mr. Fox on this subject. Mr. Fox had often told him that the two objects nearest his heart were, the restoration of peace, and the abolition of the slave trade, and when, by the shuffling of the French government he anticipated disappointment in the former, he consoled himself with the hope that the latter might be obtained. The noble lord mentioned with approbation the exertions of others in this cause, and particularly of Mr. Wilberforce, whom, though he was hardly acquainted with him, he should always consider, notwithstanding any past or any future differences of opinion on other points, as an honour to his country and to human nature on account of the zealous, able, and persevering efforts he had made for the abolition of this odious traffic.

The Earl of *Suffolk* said a few words in support of the bill; after which their lordships divided,

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HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, February 5.

[MINUTES.] The house at its meeting proceeded to ballot for committees, to try and determine the merits of the Petitions complaining of the late returns for the county of Norfolk, and the borough of Plymouth. The following were the committees appointed: For Norfolk, Henry Baring, esq. Mark Wood, esq. lord Morpeth, T. W. Plummer, esq. A. Atherly, esq. C. Western, esq. R. T. Stuart, esq. Henry Parnell, esq. Robert Williams, esq. Charles Adams, esq. J. Kingston, esq. Wm. Praed, esq. Owen Williams, esq. Nominees, G. H. Rose, esq. Charles Dundas, esq.—For Plymouth, J. Barham, esq. H. Willoughby, esq. Wm. Roscoe, esq. R. B. Robson, esq. E. Desborough, esq. Wm. Cavendish, esq. John Calvert, esq. hon. W. Hill, Lord Rancliffe, hon. Wm. Maul, Joseph Crips, esq. James Brogden, esq. T. Godfrey, esq. Nominees, Wm. Cartwright, esq. Jonathan Raine, esq.—Ordered, on the motion of lord Howick, that the order for calling over the house be renewed for Tuesday next: also, that the names of such members as shall be absent on that day be reported to the house on such day as the house should direct, and that those for whose absence a sufficient excuse could not be assigned, should be taken into the custody of the serjeant at arms.—The Speaker acquainted the house, that the Worcester Petition having been appointed to be taken into consideration on Tuesday last, at half past three o'clock, and W. Gordon, esq. the petitioner, not having appeared pursuant to the act, within one hour after the petition was ordered to be taken into consideration, he had certified the recognizances in this case to his majesty's court of Exchequer.—Mr. Simeon gave notice that, in consequence of an extraordinary circumstance that had taken place in the Maldon Election Committee, he should, on a future day, move for leave to bring in a bill to explain and amend the Grenville Act respecting election committees. The hon. member was proceeding to detail the grounds of his motion, when the Speaker begged to remind the hon. gent. that the house confided all matters touching Election Petitions to its committees, and that, according to the practice of the house, the hon. gentleman ought to confine himself to stating the object of his motion. Mr. Simeon was aware, that the decision of select committees were final relative to the elections, but from the circumstance of the chairman of the Maldon Committee having given a double vote in the late case, whereby one member was seated, and another deprived of his seat, he thought this part ought to be regulated. It was on that ground, that he proposed to give notice of a motion to amend the Grenville Act. The hon. member fixed his motion for Monday next.—Mr. Atkyns Wright presented at the bar, the minutes of the evidence taken before the Penrhyn Committee. Ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.—The house having gone into a committee of the whole house, to consider of the several acts relative to the Trade of the Cape of Good Hope, Mr. Hobhouse in the chair; it was resolved, That the chairman be directed to move for leave to bring in a bill to authorise his Majesty for a time to be limited, to make regulations respecting the Trade and Commerce of the Cape of Good Hope. On the house being resumed, the chairman moved for and obtained leave to bring in a bill accordingly.—The Lord Advocate of Scotland moved, that the order for the committal of the Scotch Clergy bill should be discharged. The bill, of which he had given notice, to vest the powers of the Commissioners of Teinds in the court of Exchequer, would embrace the object of the bill which he now wished to withdraw. The order was accordingly discharged.

[THIRD MILITARY REPORT—CONDUCT OF MR. ALEXANDER DAVISON.] Mr. *Rose*, in rising to make his proposed motion for the production of the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, relative to the case of Mr. Alexander Davison, disclaimed all idea of imputing any neglect to the government in the performance of its duty. The principal difference between himself and the noble lord (H. Petty) was this. The noble lord was for leaving the matter to the management of the executive government. He thought that where a parliamentary commission was appointed to examine into the public expenditure, the prosecutions ought to be conducted at the instance, and under the direction of this house, rather than be left to the government. He had no intention whatever to convey the idea, that blame rested any where. He did not for a moment suppose, that the executive power had not done its duty in this affair, nor did he impute to it any wish to protect delinquency. He had no doubt that the learned gent. had given a sound and proper opinion. It only appeared to him, that the proceedings in this case ought to be conducted under the order of the house, and this was the object of his motion. This had been the practice of the house when frauds had been discovered in the management of the public money. He mentioned a case very similar to the present, which had occurred in the reign of queen Anne, where certain persons who had committed frauds in furnishing beer to the navy, had been prosecuted by the house. To be sure, these were discovered by a committee of the house, and here the commissioners had been appointed by the crown. But we were to look at the nature of the abuses, which was such as called for the interference of this house. The opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General with respect to an allowance of ingrain on coals had been given in the Report, but there was no opinion with respect to the fraud, as that was not then before them. It was difficult to find out where the frauds rested. A Mr. Hargrave, a coal-merchant, delivered 60 chaldron of coals for Mr. Davison, at 46s per chaldron, and yet this same Hargrave certified the price to be 60s per chaldron. Now, there was the case of Mr. Emerson, of Dover, who supplied coals at 45s per chaldron, and charged 9s 6d for carriage from Dover to Deal for each chaldron, making 54s 6d, whereas the certificate was, that the coals were 3l. per chaldron, and that the carriage was 17s 8d. It might be supposed that the quantities ordered by Mr. Davison being so large, the merchants might have supplied him at a cheaper rate than the ordinary price. But this was not the case; for in one case where only 4 chaldrons were furnished, a monstrous surcharge appeared. Some of the transactions were attempted to be explained, but with regard to others, neither Mr. Davison, nor his clerk, it was said, attempted any explanation. The right hon. gent. then adverted to the ledger of George Walker, (who was executed a few months since for forgery) and to the differences of the prices which it disclosed. On the closest attention he could give the subject, he was inclined to think that some part might be immediately recovered, and that there were grounds for a criminal prosecution against some person. For that reason, he wished to have the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor General, on the latter point. It manifestly appeared, that there had been great abuses in the Barrack Department. It appeared that Davison had on some occasions got a sight of the terms given in by others, and by that means, by offering a trifle more, had secured the contract. If the noble lord was of opinion that any inconvenience would arise from the production of the paper, he would not press his motion. The rt. hon. gent. concluded by moving, "That the Opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General relative to the Abuses in the Barrack Department, arising out of the Third Report of the Commissioners of Military Inquiry, be laid before the house."

Lord *Henry Petty* said, he should not follow the right hon. gent. through all the points he had touched upon, but he could not but notice the position which had been laid down by him, that this was of that class of prosecutions which ought to be conducted under the authority of that house rather than by the Treasury. He might state without fear of its being controverted, that it was the duty of the Treasury, when they discovered any frauds to have been committed, to take measures for their punishment, and to secure the public interests. If the Treasury did not act in this manner, they would merit the censure of that house; and if the Treasury should omit to take such measures, it would become the duty of that house to take such steps as might appear necessary on the occasion. But he should ask, what convenience would result from the house instituting a prosecution, after a proceeding had been adopted by the Treasury? The only effect of granting the paper moved for by the right hon. gent. would be to convey information to the defendant, of the strong and weak parts of the evidence against him, whereby he might be enabled to frustrate the objects of the prosecution, by secreting such parts of the evidence as might be necessary to supply any deficiencies at present existing. On the contrary, when the proceedings were carried on by the Treasury, no such information could be acquired before the proper time, and the ends of justice would thereby be secured. This was an illustration of the doctrine which he had stated, and when the right hon. gent. was aware of these circumstances, the noble lord had no doubt he would consent to withdraw his motion.

Mr. *Perceval* agreed that the motion ought to be withdrawn. He differed from his right hon. friend with respect to the practice of the house; for, if the precedents were closely examined, it would appear that in those cases where the house had taken up the matter, the discoveries had been made by committees of their own, and were connected with some affair before the house. But, even if the house should take the proceedings in this case into its own hands, he thought that the Attorney and Solicitor General ought to be ordered to proceed on the report, merely without giving in any previous detailed opinion. The reason why he thought so, was founded on the mischievous effects that would result from premature publicity, as had been stated by the noble lord. But while there was no pretence that the treasury did not do its duty, he apprehended that it was much better to leave the case in their hands.

Mr. *Rose* said, that after what had fallen from the noble lord, he would certainly, with the leave of the house, withdraw his motion.

Lord *A. Hamilton* explained, that the reason why he had the other night withdrawn his motion on this subject was, that he thought it would be attended with great inconvenience to interfere with the steps that had been already taken by the treasury.

Lord *H. Petty* begged it to be understood, that no prosecution had as yet commenced, for the reasons which he stated on a former night. It was thought more advisable to postpone any prosecution till it could be seen what further lights would be furnished by the production of Mr. Davison's cash account with general Delancey.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, February 6.

[Minutes.] On the motion of the archbishop of Canterbury, the bishop of Exeter was desired to preach before their lordships in Westminster Abbey, on Wednesday, the 25th instant, being the day appointed for a General Fast.

[Slave Trade Abolition Bill.] The house resolved itself into a committee on the bill for abolishing the Slave Trade. The preamble having been postponed,

Lord *Grenville* said, with respect to filling up the blanks in the bill, that the time which he intended to propose as the period for the abolition of this trade, might, perhaps, appear somewhat at variance with that eager desire which the house had expressed for the abolition, but the gratification arising from the near prospect of at length carrying into effect this great measure, would, perhaps, induce them to give way, in a small degree, to circumstances, and not to insist upon an abolition to take place immediately. He proposed that the time to be fixed for the abolition of the trade to the West Indies should be the 1st of January, 1808, but that the period after which no ships engaged in the trade should clear out from the ports of this country, should be the 1st of May in the present year. His object in proposing these periods was, that the vessels at present engaged in the trade might have a fair opportunity of clearing out from the ports of this country, previous to the 1st of May next, and afterwards of taking in their lading in the ports of Africa, and of carrying their cargoes to the West Indies, previous to the 1st of January, 1808. As it might happen, however, that from unavoidable circumstances some vessels might not be able to complete their cargoes on the coast of Africa, so as to carry them to the West Indies previous to that period, he intended to submit to the committee a proviso for the purpose of allowing vessels under such circumstances to trade to the West Indies with their cargoes.

Lord *Hardwicke* wished to know in what light the Black Corps in his majesty's service were to be considered, whether as freemen or slaves.

Lord *Grenville* replied, that he should have always considered them as freemen; but that at all events particular provision would be made for that case in the Mutiny bill for the year.

Lord *Redesdale* hinted, that the bill, as it was now worded, might extend to our settlements in Asia Minor, and in the East Indies.

Lord *Grenville* observed, that no slaves had been imported to either for some time. He was aware, however, that both in the East Indies and in Asia Minor, there were many Christians who kept a number of slaves, but he did not conceive that this bill could be construed to extend so as to injure them in their property. He would, however, again consider the subject, and, if necessary, a clause to prevent the effect of any such construction might be proposed.—The blanks having been filled up, the noble lord proposed a proviso, allowing such vessels as should have cleared out from the ports of this country for Africa, previous to the 1st of May next, and should not have been able to complete their lading in Africa, so as to carry their cargoes to the West Indies, previous to the 1st of January, 1808, to trade nevertheless to the West Indies with such cargoes. He also stated, that as some persons might take advantage of the interval allowed, to make two voyages with the same vessel, he intended, therefore, to propose a clause to prevent that advantage from being taken.—The provisions of the bill having been gone through, the preamble was again taken into consideration.

Lord *Hawkesbury* declared his disinclination to enter into any discussion of the merits of the measure, after the opinion which a great majority of their lordships had, on a former occasion, pronounced. But, with the conviction he entertained of the impropriety of introducing abstract principles into the preamble of the bill, he conceived it his duty to submit to the Committee an amendment, which should exclude the terms "justice and humanity," and confine the necessity of abolishing the slave trade, solely to the inexpediency of its continuance. He could not see what objections the warmest advocates for the abolition could have to the amendment. The preamble, as it then stood, unnecessarily mooted a point, on which a great difference of opinion existed, and which, if suffered to be made a part of the law of the land, and of the colonies, might be productive of mischievous and fatal consequences; of those consequences which the noble baron, who introduced the bill, so strongly deprecated; he meant any ill-grounded conclusions which the Negroes in the West Indies might infer, relative to their emancipation, as connected with the measure of abolition. Indeed, it was a conclusion natural for men in their circumstances to make, when they found the law of the land declaring that system unjust and inhuman, by the operation of which they were detained in a state of slavery. Some allowance should also be made for the feelings and characters of those who had embarked their property in the African trade; and as the end was obtained, it was exceeding even the practice of hostile parties, to continue and promulgate an imputation, which nothing but the inability of succeeding in the object could justify. It might be objected, that the resolutions of the two houses of parliament had already expressed the same opinion; but he begged leave to state a marked difference in the two cases. The resolutions of the two houses were not obligatory, they were limitted to the members; but the act became obligatory upon the whole empire, upon those very colonial assemblies, whose opinions and feelings were known to be widely different. He therefore trusted, as the noble lords had carried the measure, for the accomplishment of which they appeared so anxious, that they would join in an amendment, in no manner hostile to the principle, but which, in its operation, might have the effect of promoting its success, by the reconciliation of the different interested parties. The noble lord then moved, "That the words 'inconsistent with the principles of justice and humanity,' be left out of the preamble of the bill."

The Earl of *Carnarvon* assured their lordships, that, with the feelings which actuated him, and the views he entertained of that unjust and execrable traffic, he could by no means acquiesce in the amendment of the noble lord. To palliate guilt and compromise injustice he never would consent, nor should he think of shrinking from the exposure of a system, as illegal as it was iniquitous. The laws of the country equally extended to every part of the British empire, as well on the high seas as to the colonies; and if the necessity of cultivating the waste lands of the West India islands was a sufficient plea for the violation of justice, upon equal principles of propriety, the peasantry of this kingdom might be dragged from their homes, to till and labour in the inclosure of waste lands. (A cry of "Order.") Noble lords might accuse him of not being in order, but he felt he was acting perfectly orderly, and, therefore, should continue to exercise his own judgment, in exposing a system of oppression and rapine, which, if suffered to continue, would be ultimately extended even to this country.

——"Malum quo non aliud velocius ullum;
Mobilitate viget, viresque acquirit eundo;
Parva metu primo: mox sese attolit in auras,
Ingrediturque solo, et caput inter nubila condit."

The *Lord Chancellor* observed, that the expression in the preamble having been admitted by the noble lord (Hawkesbury) to be true, it followed that it ought to be retained. What was the objection of the noble lord last night? It was, that this trade ought not to be abolished, except in conjunction with foreign powers, and now the noble lord, by his motion, would take away the only ground upon which we could ask other powers to co-operate in the abolition of the trade. If we declared that we abolished the trade on the ground of expediency alone, then it might be fairly supposed that we did so for reasons applicable to ourselves alone, or to our own colonies; but by stating broadly and distinctly that the trade was contrary to justice and humanity, we took a ground upon which we might fairly call upon other powers to co-operate with us in abolishing the trade. He could not discover any reason for apprehending danger from thus expressing, in a legislative act, their opinion of the trade, whilst the retaining the words objected to, was the best mode they could at present adopt of leading to a general abolition.

Earl *Morton* thought the adoption of abstract principles in a legislative act, was inconsistent with the wise and wary language which their ancestors had used on such occasions, and seemed rather like an adoption of that mode of expression which had been so repeatedly used in modern France.

Earl *Stanhope* approved highly of the expressions in the preamble which had been objected to. He thought, however, that this bill would not do much towards the abolition of the slave trade without the adoption of adequate regulations in the colonies. It might, perhaps, be proper to enact, that every slave imported into the islands contrary to law, after the time limited for the abolition of the trade, should *ipso facto* be free. If the local legislatures would not adopt regulations sufficient to carry the abolition into complete effect, we had the means of compelling them, by imposing additional duties, and in other ways. If we could not speak to their hearts we might to their pockets, and by the latter mode produce a greater effect than could possibly be produced by Demosthenian or Ciceronian eloquence.

Lord *Redesdale* expressed apprehensions that dangers would arise from retaining these expressions in the preamble, and called the attention of the house to the dangerous consequences which resulted in France from the adoption of abstract principles in legislation, which, however true in themselves, were applied in a manner that produced confusion and anarchy in that country.

The Earl of *Lauderdale* maintained that the words which it was proposed to leave out, were the most essential words in the bill. How was the great object of general abolition to be attained, if it appeared upon the face of our own proceedings that we were only actuated by considerations of expediency, and that in calling upon other powers to abolish the trade, we made no sacrifice ourselves? This he could illustrate by communications, which he had whilst at Paris, with one of the French ministers on this subject. On his urging to the ministers the abolition of this trade, he was answered, that it could not be expected that the French government, irritated as it had been by the conduct of the negroes in St. Domingo, would readily agree to the abolition of the trade. He replied, that the abolition would have been the only effectual means of preventing the horrors which had occurred in that island. Then the truth came out: he was told by this minister, that England, with her colonies well stocked with negroes, and affording a large produce, might abolish the trade without inconvenience; but that France, with colonies ill stocked and deficient in produce, could not abolish it without conceding to us the greatest advantages and sustaining a proportionate loss. Thus, then, if we were to declare the ground of our abolishing the trade to be expediency alone, we should be declaring that we were actuated by the very policy imputed to us by the French minister; and how, in thus being supposed to make no sacrifice ourselves, could we call with any effect upon foreign powers to co-operate in the abolition?

The Duke of *Montrose* declared himself to be a friend to the abolition, but thought at the same time, that it would be better to leave out the words objected to.

Lord *Holland* said he could not clearly understand the distinctions which had been attempted to be drawn between justice and expediency. He was of opinion, that if the subject was fully considered, those distinctions would be found to center in the same point. It was not a distinction between justice and expediency with respect to abolition and emancipation; on the contrary, whilst on the one hand it was essentially just that the trade should be abolished, it would on the other be injustice to the slaves in the islands to give them emancipation, because it could only tend to their own injury. He was surprised to hear the noble and learned lord (Redesdale) condemning the introduction of abstract principles into legislation. What did our Bill of Rights contain but abstract principles? He was decidedly of opinion that the words ought to be retained. No danger whatever had resulted from similar conduct in several of the provinces in America, where the trade had been abolished, and slavery still continued.

The Duke of *Clarence* urged the danger which might result from retaining these expressions. When the negroes in the islands found that no fresh importations took place, they would naturally inquire the cause, and when they found that the trade was abolished, and declared to be contrary to justice, humanity, and sound policy, would it not have a material effect in their minds with respect to their own situation, and the means by which they were brought there?—The committee then divided on the question, that the words objected to stand part of the preamble. Contents, 33; non-contents, 10; majority 23. The house resumed, and the report was ordered to be received on Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, February 6.

MINUTES.]—Sir Ralph Milbanke, Chairman of the Saltash Election Committee, informed the house, that the said committee met this morning, pursuant to their adjournment of yesterday, and G. V. Vernon, esq. one of the members of the said committee, not attending, the committee continued to sit for one hour, and then adjourned till to-morrow. Ordered, That the said Mr. Vernon do attend this house, in his place, upon Monday next.—Mr. Johnson, from the office of the chief secretary for Ireland, presented an Account of the Receipts and Disbursements of the commissioners of Public Accounts in Ireland, for the year ending the 5th of January 1807. Ordered to lie on the table.—Ordered, on the motion of Mr. Bathurst, that the committee appointed to search for precedents touching the expulsion of members, have power to send for persons, papers, and records.—A new writ was ordered for the city of Worcester, in the room of Henry Bromley, who since his election had accepted the Chiltern Hundreds.—Lord Temple brought up the Cape of Good Hope Trade bill, which was read a first time.—The house, on the motion of Mr. Vansittart, resolved itself into a committee of supply, and resolved that a sum not exceeding 1,200,000l. be granted to his majesty, for discharging the Interest of such Exchequer Bills as may have been paid off in the year 1806.

[PETITION RESPECTING THE HAMPSHIRE ELECTION.] Mr. *Ashton Smith* rose to present a Petition to the house from several respectable Freeholders of the county of Hampshire, complaining of the improper interference of persons in office for the purpose of influencing the last election for the county of Hampshire.

Mr. *Tierney* wished the hon. gent. would state more explicitly the nature and object of the petition he was about to present.

Mr. *C. Wynne* could not vote for the admission of a paper, of which he was, as yet, entirely ignorant.

The *Speaker* acquainted the hon. gent. that in presenting a petition he was bound to open the matter thereof to the house, and also to state the prayer of the petitioners. If the petition contained a prayer, it undoubtedly was entitled to the attention of the house; but, if not, the house could not receive any statements the petitioners might think proper to make, as a petition claiming its consideration.

Mr. *Canning* observed, that the petition contained a statement of a grievance, complained of by the subjects, and as such, was entitled to the consideration of parliament.

Mr. *Broderick* intimated, that the petition complained of a breach of the privileges of that house, and contended, that it ought to be received.

Mr. *A. Smith* stated, that the petition would not be found defective in any of the usual forms, and took upon himself to affirm, that it did contain a prayer: an alledged grievance was complained against, and it was prayed that that house would interfere to remedy or to remove it. The Petition was then read, and was as follows:—'That the petitioners think it their 'duty to represent to the house, that, pre'viously to the late election of knights to 'serve in parliament for the said county, 'measures of the most unconstitutional 'nature were resorted to by persons in si'tuations of high trust and authority in 'different departments of the executive 'government, for promoting the success 'of Thomas Thistlethwayte, esq. and the 'hon. W. Herbert, two of the candidates, 'whose pretentions were favoured by his 'majesty's ministers, in violation of the 'dearest rights of the petitioners, and as 'they humbly apprehend, of the privileges 'of the house; that, among other instan'ces of such interference, they think it 'right to state more particularly that W. 'H. Fremantle, esq. one of the secre'taries of the treasury, a gentleman who, 'they believe, has no property in the 'county, applied distinctly to the Barrack 'Master General, recommending the above 'candidates to his favourable influence 'and support, and desiring him, as a very 'particular favour, to mention the same 'subject, with the same view, to the other 'gentlemen in the Barrack Department; 'in pursuance of which requisition, the 'most active exertions were used in that 'department, under the specious pretence 'of carrying on his Majesty's service, to 'influence unduly various freeholders, and 'to controul the exercise of the elective 'franchise: these allegations the petitioners 'are prepared to prove at the bar of the 'House, in the humble hope that such mea'sures may be taken, as to the wisdom of 'the house may appear most effectual, to 'prevent a recurrence of such unconstitu'tional practices, practices which, with all 'due deference to the superior wisdom of 'the house, the petitioners venture to des'cribe as calculated to bring into discredit 'the government of the country, and to 'shake the confidence of the people in the 'honour and independence of the house 'of commons; the petitioners have there'fore felt it their bounden duty, not only 'to themselves and fellow subjects, but es'pecially to the house, to bring under their 'notice these outrages, as they deem 'them, against the liberties of the country; 'and they have been cneouraged the more 'to do so, by the Resolution which stands re'corded in the Journals of the house, which 'declares, that it is highly criminal in any mi'nister or ministers, or any servant under 'the crown, directly or indirectly, to use 'the powers of office in the election of re'presentatives to serve in parliment, and 'declares, that an attempt at such influence 'will at all times be resented by the house, 'as aimed at its own honour, dignity, and 'independence, as an infringement of the 'dearest rights of every subject through'out the empire, and tending to sap 'the basis of this free and happy consti'tution."

Mr. *Ashton Smith* then moved, that the petition do lie on the table, and at the same time gave notice that he should submit a motion to the house on the subject, on this day se'nnight.

Lord *Temple* gave his full and unqualified consent to the motion that this petition should lie upon the table. But, whilst he concurred in this motion, he begged to recall to the recollection of the house that, he would not say this particular petition, but a petition of a similar nature, had been determined upon by the petitioners to be presented to that house, previously to the meeting of parliament. As the allegations of the petition involved a question respecting the privileges of that house, it ought to have been brought forward on the earliest opportunity; and it appeared to him somewhat extraordinary that the hon. gent. had kept it back till the present moment.

Mr. *Canning* apprehended that when any petitioners resolved on presenting a petition to that house, complaining of a specific grievance, they had a right, as well as the hon. member who was to present it, to choose the time that might appear to them to be most convenient or favourable for that purpose.

Mr. *Tierney* certainly thought that, if the petition was intended as a party question, it might have been desirable for the framers of it to have public opinion for some time previously directed to the subject. But if the petition was really intended to bring the fact of a breach of the privileges of that house under the consideration of parliament, no time should have been lost in presenting it. These gentlemen who knew of such transactions as amounted to a breach of the privileges of that house, should not have suffered those unworthy ministers of the crown to remain so long exempt from the exposure which their conduct merited. The house, however, would hereafter be able to judge of the motives of the petitioners in keeping back the petition, and also of the motives of those gentlemen who might since have been persuaded to give their support to this proceeding.

Mr. *Perceval* said, he should not impute to the right hon. gent. who had just sat down, any party motive for the observations he had made (a laugh); but he was clearly of opinion, that the persons who had signed the petition, and the gent. who had undertaken to present it, had a right to chuse the time that appeared best to them. The right hon. gent. no doubt, would have been better pleased if the petition had been presented on the first day of the session, because then it would have been liable to an objection, if it had been proposed to take it into consideration previously to the last day for presenting Election petitions. But the allegations of the petition were of so grave and serious a nature, that if any one of them even could be proved, it would be of small comparative importance whether the petition were presented a day, or a month, earlier or later.

Mr. *C. Wynne* contended, that it had never been insinuated from his side of the house, that the charges in the petition were of a slight or unimportant nature. He appealed to the recollection of the house whether they had not, in every instance, been admitted to be of the last importance to have brought forward. The charges contained in the petition would be highly important if proved; they would also be important if not proved, as he trusted would be the case, because they would then fall back upon the heads of those who had given birth to them.

Mr. *Hurst* did not think it of the smallest moment whether the petitioners were influenced by a sense of duty, or by sinister motives; they took upon them to bring against certain persons certain charges, and he rejoiced that it would be now soon decided how far the charges were warranted by proofs, from the rumours that had been so industriously circulated, not alone through the county concerned, but through the country. He was glad that the petition had found its way into that house, and that those rumours would be for ever silenced by the paramount decision of the people's representatives, for he had no hesitation in saying that he anticipated with confidence an issue honourable to the parties so calumniated.

Mr. *Rose* was not willing to question the impartiality of the hon. member who spoke last, but as it had been urged as an objection to the petition, the time of its being presented, he would beg leave to set gentlemen right upon that head. Parliament had met this session at a very unusual time, when few country gentlemen were able to attend. It was desirable to have as full an attendance of that description of members as possible on the discussion of this subject, and it was not till the present period that many of them had attended in the house. As to the motive for bringing forward the petition, he was sure the hon. gent. opposite could not impute any to the hon. member, who had presented it, that he could not fully justify.

Mr. *Sturges Bourne* highly approved of the candid and honourable manner in which the petition was brought forward. The matter to which it related was acknowledged on all sides to be of the utmost importance, involving no less considerations than those of the dearest rights of the subject, and the privileges of that house. He insisted that it would have been trifling with either to hurry on the discussion before there had been a sufficient attendance to give it adequate consideration. He repeated his sense of the candid and honourable way in which it had been submitted to the house.

Mr. *Fremantle* adverted to the state of the house, and asked whether it could be considered such an attendance as the hon. member had thought desirable? As to the petition, he was extremely gratified that it had been produced, and gave his full assent to the motion, that it should be laid upon the table. He was confident that he should be able to shew, that the circumstances of the case had not the bearing represented in the petition, when the question should come to be discussed. He had only one word to add respecting the manner in which this proceeding had been conducted. He had always understood it to be the practice in that house, when any charge was to be brought forward against a member, that some intimation of the proceeding was communicated to the individual concerned. In this case, not a word had been expressed to him on the subject, and though rumours might have reached him respecting the allegation of the petition, it was not till he came down to the house this day, and the hon. member had proposed to present the petition, that he had any certain information upon the subject.

Mr. *Sturges Bourne*, in explanation, said, that in speaking of the necessity of a full attendance, he did not mean any allusion to the numbers then in the house. The petition was not then to undergo consideration, but now that the members in general had come up to their parliamentary duty there was a certainty of a full meeting whenever this petition was to come before the house.

Lord *Howick* thought, that as the charges alledged in the petition were of the most weighty kind, so did they exact from that house the strictest scrutiny, and the most mature consideration. They went to question the honour of that house, and the freedom of the country; for that house could not be honourable, if constituted by the undue influence of power and corruption;

nor could the country itself be free if robbed of its elective franchise. Thinking then, as he did, of the importance of the petition, he could not conceal his surprise that it had not long before that period been presented to the house. When it was considered that it was the practice of that house to postpone all other kinds of considerations to the paramount one of its privileges; when it was considered that the hon. member who presented this petition must have known the serious nature of the charges it contained; when it was considered that every member, having charges to adduce, involving the privileges of that house, had felt dispatch to be his first duty in submitting such charges to that house, it would be difficult to reconcile a strict sense of parliamentary duty with the alledged necessity for delay. The hon. member who spoke last panegyrized the candid and honourable manner in which there had been a plain statement of strong charges explicitly laid before the house. He for his part, should hesitate to term a charge candid, merely because it was a gross one, but should rather feel it his duty to look for evidence in some degree proportionate to the character of the accusation; but however candid or honourable it might be to bring such charges, he was sure that it was not either candid or honourable to circulate industriously through the country rumours calculated to hurry the unthinking into inconsiderate prejudices against those persons whom their accusers had so long delayed to charge before the proper and recognized tribunal. Did the hon. gent. think it very candid to present to that house a paper reflecting in the most serious manner upon a member of that house, without giving that member the slightest intimation of such a proceeding, though such a notice was warranted, or rather required by all the usages of parliament? He should be anxious until the petition was decided upon, and hoped that if the charges therein contained were found, upon due examination, to be slight and frivolous, the house would feel it due to their own dignity, and to the aspersed honour of one of its members, to make the persons who advanced them, feel the consequence of wanton accusation—The petition was then ordered to be taken into consideration on Monday se'nnight.

[MASSACRE AT VELLORE.] Mr. *Howard* rose for the purpose of putting a question to the right hon. the president of the Board of Controul (Mr. Tierney,) respecting some transactions that had recently taken place at Vellore, in India. Some time had elapsed, since letters from Madras had brought accounts of the mutiny that had taken place at that town, and of the carnage that followed, in which above 1000 British and native lives had been lost. Rumour ascribed this disaster to some dangerous and unprecedented measures, which had been resorted to in that presidency, and deserved the most severe animadversion. He should not then enter into any detail of the melancholy transaction; but when the importance of an investigation, both to the interests of British subjects in India, and to the stability of British power in that quarter was considered, he was sure it would be felt that he was entitled to the information he called for. He wished, therefore, to ask the right hon. gent. whether any authentic accounts of that transaction had been received by the Board of Controul, or by the Court of Directors? There were vessels now going out; and a new governor-general and commander in chief were on the point of setting out for India. He thought it, therefore, material to know, for the consolation of the friends of the British subjects now going out, and already settled in India, what information had been received, and whether any instructions as to the measures to be adopted respecting this affair had been sent out. He was of opinion, that it was necessary to shew, that if mismanagement or misconduct had been practised in India, the circumstances would be investigated in England, and decided in a manner consistent with the interests of all parties.

Mr. *Tierney* was not at all surprised at the anxiety felt by the hon. gent. For some time past rumours of the transaction had been in circulation, but unhappily he was unable to give any answer to the hon. gent. on this subject, as no authentic accounts had yet been received either by the Court of Directors or the Board of Controul. But he would assure the hon. gent. that, as soon as the accounts should arrive, they would be laid before the house, so far as they could consistently with a proper regard to the public interest. What steps would be taken, or what instructions sent out, it it was not possible to state before the official accounts should arrive. But the hon. gent. could surely not think that the officers now on the point of setting out ought to be detained till the accounts should arrive. On the contrary, it was desirable that they should proceed to their destination with all expedition, in order to take such measures as their good sense and experience would point out under all the circumstances of the case.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, February 9.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] Lord Walsingham brought up the report of the bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.

Lord *Grenville* stated. that it had been found more adviseable to fix the same period in all the clauses of the bill for the Abolition of the Trade, namely, the 1st of May next, and to introduce a proviso, allowing vessels employed in the trade which had cleared out from the ports of this country for Africa previous to that day, to complete their cargoes in Africa and trade with them to the West Indies until the 1st of January 1808, at which period the trade should be finally abolished. He also thought it advisable, in order to obviate any objection with respect to the construction of the general words of the bill, to introduce words for the purpose of limiting its operation to Africa, the West Indies and other parts of America. His lordship proposed amendments in the clauses of the bill to the effect he had stated, and some verbal amendments, which were all agreed to. The proviso introduced on Friday was struck out, and another proposed by the noble lord, allowing vessels which should have cleared out from the ports of this country for Africa previous to the 1st of May next to take in their lading in Africa, and trade with their cargoes to the West Indies until the first of January 1808.

Lord *Redesdale* suggested, that as the loss of a vessel or other unavoidable accident might prevent the arrival of a cargo from Africa in the West Indies within the time limitted, it might be adviseable to make an exception for such a case.

Lord *Grenville* said, that the period of the first of January, 1808, had been fixed upon for the purpose of making an amply sufficient allowance of time for the voyages to be completed. He had no objection, however, to the introduction of words for the purpose of providing for the occurrence of circumstances such as those mentioned by the noble and learned lord.—After a short conversation between lords Redesdale, Grenville, and earl Stanhope, it was agreed to introduce words, excepting from the operation of the bill those cases where the voyage to the West Indies could not be completed within the time limited, on account of capture, the loss of the vessel, or other unavoidable accident, the proof of which to lie on the party.—On the question for engrossing the bill,

The Bishop of *London* rose and spoke to the following effect; "My lords, I cannot suffer this opportunity to escape, without declaring my sincere and ardent satisfaction at the decision of your lordships. My lords, you have performed a great and signal act of humanity, you have executed a great legislative measure of relief to an oppressed and degraded population. The reasons and arguments which many noble lords have thought proper, with such eloquence snd perspicuity, to introduce, have been felt by me with their fullest force; but there is one of such an important nature and in which such serious interests are involved, that I trust I shall be excused for submitting it to your lordships, more particularly as it has not been adverted to in any previous discussion. The moral and religious consequences which may be expected to accrue from this salutary and humane act of legislative justice, are many and extremely desirable; for hitherto they have been entirely neglected—neglected, not by the clergymen in the respective islands, but it is a neglect naturally arising out of the unjust and unchristian system, which has been acted upon in the colonies. Worked all day upon the estates of their owners, the negroes have been forced to consign every other moment of their unhappy existence, to the cultivation of their own little spots of land, and even on the Sabbath, shame to say! a market was held for the specific purpose of enabling the slave to purchase his Sunday dinner. The number of clergymen has also been too few, compared with the great population of the blacks. In the island of Jamaica, where there are from 2 to 300,000 negroes, there are only 20 clergymen, whose time is in a great degree taken up in the performance of their numerous duties to the Whites. There is another beneficial consequence which will follow from the accomplishment of the present bill; namely, the great increase of population, which the good treatment of the negroes will produce, independent of the cessation of those evil effects which the present indulgence in promiscuous intercourse between the sexes must of necessity occasion. The only true method of obviating the mischief is, to impress upon the moral and religious consideration of the negroes, the danger of a continuance in such irregularities, to their health and constitutions, and, therefore, the immediate and absolute necessity of submitting to this kind of self-denial. It was said by Mr. Pitt, that the Slave Trade with Africa was the greatest practical evil; I can safely say, that the abolition of that execrable traffic is the greatest practical good that can be effected. A good which will immortalize the British senate, and which will display, to an admiring world, the striking contrast between this country, the great stay and hope of the civilized world, and the conduct of that arch enemy of human happiness, who, whilst we are relaxing the oppressive bondage of the unfortunate African, and communicating freedom to a fourth of the world, is pursuing his race of terror and desolation, and subjugating the continent of Europe, in violation of every principle of justice, and in contempt of every maxim of a generous policy.

Earl *St. Vincent* took this last opportunity to enter his protest against the adoption of the measure, the consequences of which he was persuaded, would prove fatal to the best interests of this country. As soon as France made peace with this country (and she would hasten a pacification in consequence of this measure), her first object would be to get compleat possession of the Slave Trade, and if she succeeded in that object, it would soon appear that she had got possession of an engine that would work the downfall of the naval superiority of this country. Such was his conviction, and he uttered it now for the last time. His Lordship then withdrew immediately from the house.—The different clauses were then agreed to, and the bill was ordered to be engrossed, and read a third time to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

Monday, Feb. 9.

[MINUTES.] Mr. Barham reported from the committee appointed to determine the merits of the Plymouth Election Petition, that sir C. M. Pole and Thomas Tyrwhit, esq. had been duly elected; and that the petitions against their return were not frivolous nor vexatious.—Mr. Vernon appeared in his place, pursuant to order of the house, and stated in excuse of his absence from the Saltash Election committee on Friday, "that when the house, on Thursday last, had given power to the said committee to adjourn till this day, on account of the necessary absence of one of their members, he had by mistake conceived that the committee had actually been adjourned till this day; but being informed of his mistake, he had attended the said committee on Saturday and this day; and that he was extremely sorry the committee had been put to any inconvenience on his account." The substance of what Mr. Vernon offered to the house, was taken down in writing; and the same being verified by him, upon oath, at the table, it was ordered, That the said Mr. Vernon be excused for his non-attendance on Friday last.—The Solicitor General brought up the bill for making the Freehold Estates of persons, dying in debt, assets for the payment of their simple contract debts, which was read a first time.—Petitions were presented from the Tanners of Cumberland, Oxford, and several other places in England, against the Oak Bark bill, which were referred to the committee on the former Petitions.—Lord Temple moved that the order of the day for the second reading of the Oak Bark bill should be discharged, on the ground that the committee on the various petitions against the measure had not yet reported. The order was then discharged, and fixed for this day fortnight.—Mr. Fremantle presented, an Account of the net produce of all the Permanent and War Taxes in the years and quarters ending 5th of Jan. 1806, and 5th Jan. 1807.—Sir J. Newport presented the usual annual petitions from the several charitable Institutions in Ireland, which were ordered to lie on the table. The hon. bart. in presenting the petition from the Trustees of the Roman Catholic Seminary at Maynooth, near Dublin, stated, that it was proposed to make a considerable augmentation to the grant to this establishment, in order to provide more adequate accommodation for the education of the students in that seminary, and that this augmentation was recommended to the house on the part of his majesty. The hon. bart. also stated, that it was proposed to make an additional grant to the Dublin

Society of 10,000l. which was not to be incorporated into the funds usually granted to that institution, but to be left at the disposal of that society, to enable them to afford encouragement and support to similar institutions in the interior of the country, and particularly a society that had been established at Cork for the same objects. It was then ordered that Estimates of the Expences of the several Charitable Institutions in Ireland, should be laid before the house, after which the hon. baronet presented the several Estimates, which were ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed.—Ordered, on the motion of Mr. *Johnstone*, that there be laid before the house an account of the Income and Charges of the Consolidated Fund for the years ending the 5th of Jan. 1806, and 5th Jan. 1807, distinguishing each quarter.

[GRENVILLE ELECTION ACT.] Mr. *Simeon*, pursuant to notice, rose to move for leave to bring in a bill to amend certain parts of the said act. He was willing to yield every tribute of just praise to the act in question, which went in some measure to immortalize its author; great, however, as were unquestionably its merits, it was yet, like all other things human, not perfect. The object of the proposed bill would be, to remove perhaps its only imperfection. In a late case (the Maldon petition) the chairman of the committee had not only a casting voice, but a double one. In mentioning this, it was far from his wish or intention to insinuate the slightest reflection upon the gentlemen who composed that tribunal, but what occasioned a double vote in that committee, might produce the same effect in any other. The unavoidable absence of one of the 15 members might produce a parity of voting, and thus involve the committee in this dilemma; they must decide upon the issue before them, or they must not; if they did not decide, justice slept; if they did, one of the 14 had a double vote. Besides, as the chairman of such committees was generally a man whom the rest of the committee had preferred for some superiority in certain qualifications, for talents, good sense, address, arising from habits of business, &c. there might be found in some committees men of that diffident cast of mind that would induce them to look rather to the decision of that chairman, than consult the suggestions of their own understandings. The rules that circumscribed the authority of the Speaker in that house, and precluded him from a double voice, and a casting voice only in the case of a parity of votes, were, he thought, in direct analogy, though he admitted the difference of that house being a legislative, and the other merely a judicial tribunal. It was to be remembered, however, that it was the only court in the empire in which the presiding member had a double voice. He left it to the house to form its own judgment on the circumstances of the case, and decide upon the propriety of the bill he now moved for. He then moved, "That leave be given to bring in a bill to alter and amend the Act of the 10th of the king for the better Regulating the Trials upon Controverted Elections.

Mr. *Bankes* said, that the cause of complaint was of such a kind, and the mode which the learned gent. meant to propose for its redress, was such, that he thought the law was preferable as it now stood; he should therefore oppose the motion upon the present occasion, as he thought it was needless to encourage a bill to be brought in, which was so likely to be thrown out in some future stage. The case stated, was one which very seldom occurred. The act had put it into the most convenient of all forms, because the decision was left to be determined by the casting or double vote of the chairman; who was naturally looked up to on account of his abilities, integrity, and other qualifications which distinguished him. The learned gent. seemed to imply, that this very man who was so held up to notice, on account of the necessary qualifications, should be the only one who should be deprived of the ability to give a double vote, should it happen to be necessary. He saw no remedy in thus taking away the vote of the chairman. The general maxim of law was, that there should be an end put to a dispute by the judicature to which it was originally submitted, and therefore it was better to take the decision of the committee as at present constituted, than that it should be suspended altogether. The chairman was bound to perform the same duties, and to take the same oath, as other members of the committee were; and why should not the decision depend upon his vote, as well as upon others, the more especially as he was the one who paid the most particular attention to the subject?

Mr. *Simeon* explained. He never meant that justice should be asleep by the decision being suspended. He meant only, that in no case should the chairman vote, except in cases of equality, where 7 of the other members had voted on each side; and that in no case should he have a double vote.

Mr. *C. W. Wynne* concurred entirely with the hon. gent. who had spoken last, and who had anticipated almost every thing that he had meant to say on the subject. The analogy between the practice of that house and that of the committee did not seem to him to apply. It was essential to the dignity of the house, that the opinions of their Speaker should not be known, as his interference must thereby possess far greater weight and authority. The committee appointed their own chairman; he as well as the rest, being sworn to a faithful discharge of the trust reposed in them; and he believed, there was no instance for the 30 years that the act had existed, of a charge of partiality being even alledged against any one committee. He could not, therefore, see any propriety, in altering the law, or in saying that the person best qualified to judge on such an occasion, as the chairman must naturally be presumed to be, should alone be precluded from speaking and voting equally with the rest of the committee.

The *Attorney-General* said, that he conceived the election laws to be of such very great importance, that the house should hear some very cogent reasons indeed urged, before they even allowed a bill to be brought in. He believed his learned friend's motives were pure and sincere; but as the subject had engaged much of his (the Attorney-General's) attention, he found himself to be of a very different opinion. In courts of law, the judges were frequently equally divided in opinion, and consequently not able to decide; but ancient usage had been so much respected, that nobody had ever thought proper to propose any alteration in their constitution. In the year 1775, Mr. Grenville brought in that act, which gave the casting vote to the president of committees, and even where the numbers were equal, no case of unjust or improper partiality had occurred. His learned friend seemed to aim at theoretical and unattainable perfection. He appeared inclined to render the very person who was likely to be most intelligent amongst that committee, a mere nonentity. Supposing that a committee were to be reduced to 14, by the indisposition of any one of their number, would his learned friend propose to have the matter decided, by giving a casting or double vote to one of those 7, with whom the chairman was not united in opinion, in preference to having it determined by the others, with whom he agreed? Why not give a double vote to the chairman, as well as to any of the other members of a committee, when found necessary?

Mr. *Simeon* here rose, and said, that as he plainly saw the opinion of the house was different from his own, he should withdraw the motion he had proposed—It was accordingly withdrawn.

Lord *Folkestone* hoped, that the fate of the motion which had just been disposed of, would not have any influence upon that which he rose to make. The object of his motion was to make the notices at present required by an order of that house, respecting the entering into recognizances, a part of the law. The house would be more disposed to agree to his bill, as the effect of it would be to put an end to its interference in such cases, on applications for extending the time for receiving recognizances. He therefore moved for leave to bring in a bill to alter and amend so much of the act of the 28th of his majecty, as relates to Recognizances.

Mr. *C. Wynne* did not think the object of the noble lord's measure corresponded with its title. It would not alter nor amend the act of the 28th of the king, because there was no mention of notices in that act, neither was there any provision in it, respecting the time for presenting petitions. These matters were settled by the regulations of that house, which all parties who came before it as petitioners, were bound to make themselves acquainted with. As there did not appear to him to be any necessity for an act of parliament on the subject, or to make the other house of Parliament a party to the orders by which the proceedings of that house were to be regulated, he should oppose the motion—The motion was then negatived without a division.

[Foreign Property in the Funds.] Mr. *Bankes* rose pursuant to notice. He was happy after the fate of the two last motions, to be able to state that he had one to make, which was not likely to meet with any opposition. The document for which he was to move, was a very important one, and was very material to the house to have on its table, in order that gentlemen might perceive how far the strength and resources of this country were supported by its own property and means, and whether the property of foreigners in our funds was considerable or insignificant. He had also another view in bringing forward his motion, namely, that it might be brought under the consideration of the house, how far the exemption of the property of foreigners from the property tax was, or was not expedient. He did not mean then to enter into any argument upon the subject, but he was inclined to think that the exception of the property of foreigners from the tax had been founded on a mistake, and that this would be made manifest when the subject should come to be reviewed. He had framed his motion not so much with a view to this object, as on the precedent of a similar motion that had been made last year. As an indulgence had been granted to foreigners, he was of opinion that they would not be slow in claiming it, and that, therefore, the document he was to call for might be easily prepared. He took this opportunity of asserting that his opinion on this subject remained the same as it was last session; and so far from having been in the slightest degree altered, it had been strengthened by consideration and reflection. He still continued to think that the property of foreigners should be subject to the tax. This was but an act of justice to our own subjects, to shew where the burthen of the tax fell, and could not be construed into a severity upon foreigners, who invested their money in our funds for its security, not for our advantage. If they enjoyed the protection, they ought to contribute in a just proportion to its maintenance. He would not have it understood, however, that he was pledged to bring forward any motion on the subject, because such a proceeding would, in a great degree, depend upon the support it would receive, and principally upon the opposition it would meet with. At the same time he was of opinion, that, though a motion might not lead to a successful result, there was often much advantage derived from the frequent discussions that took place even upon motions that might have been finally unsuccessful. He did not by any means propose to bring forward this question from views hostile to government. But, as he should very soon have an opportunity of stating his opinion on the general question respecting the finances of the country, he should then content himself with moving, "That there be "laid before the house an account of the "amount of all Exemptions granted to Fo-"reigners, in respect of the duty on Divi-"dends, in the various public funds of "Great Britain, and on the duty on Divi-"dends on South Sea and East India "stock, under the Property tax, for the "year ending Lady Day, 1806."

Lord *Henry Petty* thought it might be more satisfactory to the hon. gent. to have the account made up to a later date, as well as more likely to answer the object he had in view. He was not aware that the account could be furnished to a later date, but would assure the hon. gent. and the house, that if upon enquiry he found that to be the case, the account should be presented. The information called for by the hon. gent. was such, that however he might differ from him as to the result to be drawn from it, he thought it ought, and could not with propriety be kept from the house. As the hon. gent. had with so much candour stated, that the opinion entertained by him last session on this subject remained unaltered, he thought it not amiss to declare, that upon the best reflection he could bestow upon the question, he could see no reason for changing the opinion he had on that occasion expressed of the propriety of granting the exemptions to the property of foreigners in the funds. He was confirmed in the opinion, when he considered the small assistance that could be derived from extending the tax to such property, and the indirect but great mischief that would result from adopting the suggestions of the hon. gent. At the same time he was ready to admit, that whenever the question was brought forward, he should be open to the arguments that he knew would be ably urged by the hon. gent. As to the expediency of bringing forward motions without any prospect of success, and the beneficial consequences of repeated discussions, he trusted that the present session of parliament would afford an instance (the Abolition of the Slave Trade) of the advantages and happy results of discussions upon reiterated motions.—The account was then ordered up to the latest period, to which it could be made out.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, February 10.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] The order of the day for the third reading of the bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, being read,

Lord *Redesdale* rose, and observed, that however the preamble of this bill might set out, that the African Slave Trade was unjust, inhuman, and impolitic, and, however it might be considered unjust, inhuman, and impolitic, to emancipate the Slaves in the West Indies, yet he considered the present measure would be the means of producing, in the West India Islands, all the horrors of a revolution that could possibly be conceived. The Abolition of the African Trade, he considered, should go hand in hand with that in the West India Islands; and however desirable an object the total abolition of the trade might be, he yet considered this instantaneous abolition, not only dangerous in itself, but likely to be productive of no particular good. As the bill stood at present, he could not give his assent to it, however he might be inclined to support it upon general principles; had it been a different description of bill, and went gradually to a general abolition of this trade, it should then have met with his hearty concurrence. He felt, that any attempt to withstand the present enthusiasm upon this subject would be in vain; but he could not help remarking, that when a legislature acted enthusiastically, they did not always act wisely, and he did not think that in the faithful and conscientious discharge of their duty, the opposers of this measure had much to answer for.

The Earl of *Buckinghamshire* denied that the support which had been given to this measure, was to be attributed to mere feelings of enthusiasm. Mere enthusiasm was not calculated to last for 20 years, during which period this measure had been under discussion. It was, on the contrary, in his opinion, founded clearly on the grounds of justice and humanity, as well as upon a mature consideration of the present state of the West Indies. When a member of the house of commons in the year 1792, he voted for a gradual abolition, conceiving that the persons concerned in the trade ought to have sufficient notice. Now, however, he had no doubt that the trade ought to be immediately abolished, not only because it was contrary to justice and humanity, but also because the abolition was the only means of preventing those evils which must otherwise necessarily result from the multiplication of slaves in the West Indies.

The Duke of *Norfolk* approved of the bill, and expressed a confidence that the planters would by a moderate treatment of their slaves, contribute to bring about that state of the colonies which was so much to be desired.

The Earl of *Westmoreland* was at a loss to understand upon what principle of logic it was to be proved, that if the slave trade was contrary to justice and humanity, it was not also contrary to justice and humanity to keep the negroes who had been procured by means of the trade, in a state of perpetual slavery. He was not so mad as to think that liberty ought to be given to the slaves in the West Indies: but he contented, that upon the principles upon which the abolition was now founded, emancipation ought also to follow. If it was however determined finally to abolish the trade, it might at least be conceded to the feelings of the planters, and of those concerned in the trade, to erase the words, declaring it to be contrary to justice and humanity. It was thought, however, by some of the supporters of the bill, that by retaining these words, foreign powers might be humbugged, if he might use the expression, into a concurrence in the abolition. This, however, he did not think at all practicable, and it was surely a consideration of expediency, whether at a time when the continent of Europe was nearly shut against us, we should put an end to our trade with the continent of Africa, and by so doing, greatly injure and distress many persons, and deprive many more of the means of subsistence.

Lord *Grenville* was glad to find that the opponents of this measure were nearly reduced to one argument, and that was, that the bill did not extend to the emancipation of the slaves already on the islands. The attempted application, however, of the same justice and humanity to both cases, resolved itself into this. In abolishing the trade we did justice to the inhabitants of Africa, who were the parties aggrieved, but in giving liberty to the slaves on the islands, we should do the greatest injustice to them in giving them that which they would not know how to use, and which would only be productive to them of injury. That liberty, the blessings of which we were enabled properly to estimate and appreciate, would be to them, in their state of ignorance and barbarism, a poison of the most baleful nature—The bill was then read a third time, passed, and ordered to be sent to the House of Commons.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, February 10.

[Minutes.] On the motion of lord Howick, the call of the house, which stood for this day, for the purpose of insuring a sufficient attendance of members to form the ballot for the Maidstone Election committee, was deferred to Thursday. On the motion of lord Howick, it was ordered, that the Rev. M. Marlow, D. D. be desired to preach before the house on the 25th instant, the day of Public Fast.—The following are the names of the gentlemen on the reduced list, forming the committee to try the merits of the election and return for the Borough of Maidstone. Hon. W. Maule, J. Vaughan, esq. Hon. F. Robinson, Hon. J. Cust, John Patteson, esq. John Palmer, esq. W. Loftus, esq. J. Fuller, esq. Hon. E. Stewart, G. T. Steward, esq. Sir M. B. Foukes, T. Godfrey, esq. T. Shelly, esq. The parties having waved their right of appointing nominees, the committee retired, according to the provision of the act of parliament in such case, and themselves chose sir R. Peel, and the hon. W. Pole. The whole were then sworn at the table.

Sinecure Places and Pensions.] Mr. *Biddulph* rose and spoke as follows: I rise, sir, in pursuance of the notice I had the honour of giving on a former night, to submit to the consideration of the house, a motion, connected with a system of economy, and, in its import, similar to that proposed by an hon. friend of mine in the year 1797. In introducing this motion, I can with truth affirm, that my mind is totally uninfluenced by those passions which may be supposed to agitate public men, in bringing forward plans of retrenchment in the national expenditure, or motions for the reduction of places and pensions. The strong conviction in my mind, that a great practical benefit would result to the country, and to the revenue of the country, is the most striking inducement with me for submitting my motion to the consideration of the house. How that benefit would be best procured, has also been the subject of my inquiry, and in referring to the precedent and example of the motion of 1797, I find, that at that period, the appointment of a Committee of Finance to investigate public establishments, and to sift official abuses, was considered the best and most appropriate method of proceeding. That my present object would be best attained by moving for the appointment of a similar committee, I am inclined to conclude; particularly when I consider the advantage likely to result from an attentive persual of the valuable documents of the former, from the light which the labour and industry of that committee have actually thrown on the subject, and, finally, from the eventual good, which the application of that information, assisted by the result of the intermediate time and circumstances, must in any future inquiry produce. There were certainly many impediments, and difficulties of no trifling nature, in the way of that committee. To some of their inquiries, they found it impossible to get even an answer; and in some cases, particularly those connected with Scotland, they were not only kept in ignorance of the necessary answers to their interrogatories, but were absolutely rendered incapable of extending their researches, from the obscurity and vagueness in which such objects of their inquiry were involved. Without troubling the house with any general reasoning on the necessity of adopting a measure of the nature I propose, I will at present confine myself to the statement of some particular cases, and be satisfied with drawing the attention of the house to those immense emoluments which are attached to offices in the Exchequer, and to other branches of the national establishment, in the investigation of which, the appointment of a committee, founded on a Resolution similar to that of 1797, would, in my opinion, be calculated to produce great and important benefits. The first thing that strikes the public mind, as requiring retrenchment, is the immense emoluments enjoyed by some individuals in the department of the Exchequer. It is difficult to make the public believe that the grants of these emoluments are unalterable, and there are circumstances which induce me to think they are not. The act of parliament of 1782 allowed to two of the Tellers of the Exchequer the antient fees of their offices, but limited the other two to a salary of 4000l. a year. This act did nothing more than to leave the fees on the basis of the regulations and practice of the Exchequer. It therefore becomes necessary to inquire what these regulations and that practice were. By the act of 4th William and Mary, the barons of the Exchequer were directed to inquire what were the antient and legal fees. Those fees were reported and vested by law in the officers. But notwithstanding the title by usage, and the investment by law, an alteration was made in 1702. In that year great exertions being required, the sum which was raised for the public service, 1,600,000l. was considered so great as to render it proper to look to some reduction upon the Exchequer fees, and in consideration of the largeness of the sum a reduction was made. In 1744, on the same principle, the supplies being larger than at any former period, 6,600,000l. being raised for the general service of the year, besides 2,200,000l. for the army, it was agreed by the officers of the Exchequer to reduce the fees one-third. The law and the practice of the Exchequer ought to be no more a bar to the reduction of the fees now, than they were then; and certainly the vast increase in the amount of the public expences, and every other reason, make much more strongly in favour of the reduction at this moment. My motion will embrace all offices and all places, and all incomes deprived from the state. There is one department in particular to which the inquiry I recommend will apply with particular effect. I mean that of the Courts of Justice. In the Report of the Committee of Finance, sinecure offices to the amount of 26,500*l.* in thar department, are pointed out as admitting of total reduction. The committee, in pointing out the propriety of this reduction, and the proper mode of carrying it into effect, quote the opinion of lord Hale, saying, that timely amendment did much good, and prevented much evil, particularly in things connected with the general weal; but that the reform ought not to be made abruptly, nor all at once; but gradually, with as much attention as possible to the rights of individuals. I do not find that any thing has been done upon this Report, or that any part of its recommendations has been carried into execution. Ten years have elapsed, since the Committee in its 27th report, pointed out as worthy of consideration, whether these offices should be abolished as they became vacant, and yet nothing has been done in compliance with that recommendation. Lord Hale says of offices executed by deputy, why are they continued if they are unnecessary; and if they are necessary, why should they not be executed at the charge which is found sufficient for the deputy? Why is the state to be burthened with immense salaries to unemployed principals, who do nothing but bear the name of the office? In the 26,000l. I alluded to, no service whatever is done. In the thirty reports of the Committee of Finance, there are several other instances of offices of the same kind, but I do not think it necessary to trouble the house with detailing any more than the principal branches, in which the propriety of reform is obvious. My motion will embrace every branch of the Public Expenditure. The powers I propose to give to the committee are the same as those granted to the committee of 1797. The Pension List was not referred to the committee of that time, neither would I have it expressly referred to the committee now proposed; but my motion will be framed in such a manner that the committee will be enabled to attend to that branch of Expenditure, as well as to every other. I shall conclude with moving 'That a 'committee be appointed to consider of 'what saving can be made by the reduc'tion of useless Places, Sinecure Offices, 'Exorbitant Fees, and every other retrench'ment that can be made in the expenditure 'of the public money.'

Lord *Folkestone* said, that he had the honour to second the motion.

Lord *Henry Petty* rose and observed, that it gave him the highest satisfaction, that whatever difference of opinion might exist between himself and the hon. gent. as to the words of the motion, yet between him and the hon. gent. and not only that, but between the hon. gent. and all his majesty's ministers, there was a perfect coincidence of sentiment upon the grounds of the present motion. For if there was any thing upon which it might be expected that all should concur, it was this, that the strictest economy should be preserved in the management of the public money, and that all places, offices, and pensions, should be reduced to the smallest charge, consistent with the proper administration of the affairs of the nation. Therefore any measure which had that object in view came recommended by a strong similarity and union of sentiment amongst his majesty's ministers, as well as amongst others. But if he had the satisfaction to concur with the hon. gent., if so far an union of sentiment prevailed, he hoped that there would also be an union of sentiment upon another position, essential to the welfare and stability of government, which was this, that in every country there ought to be rewards for services performed; that it was not fitting that means should be wanting of granting adequate remuneration for general services, and that such rewards ought to form part of the establishment of all well-regulated governments. The only point, then, to be considered was, how far these rewards existed in the manner they ought, for though places ought to exist for the purpose above-mentioned, yet it was right that they should be limited, and they confined to their proper object, and that they should not be allowed to run to excess, either through abuse or neglect. That such excess did formely exist, especially with regard to sinecure places, a point to which the hon. gent. had particularly adverted, he was perfectly aware. But he begged leave to remind the house, that during a course of 20 years it had been a constant object to reduce and confine such places within their proper limits. Such was the object of the commission of accounts established at the close of the American war, when there was so great and so just a public clamour on this subject, a commission which had in the most able manner discharged the duties entrusted to it. In the administration which succeeded, and concluded the peace of 1783, an administration of which a near and dear connexion of his (his father, then lord Shelburne) formed a part, this object was not lost sight of, and the plan was laid for an inquiry, which was carried into effect some time after. It was not lost sight of during the administration of Mr. Pitt, a committee having been appointed in 1786, and then another in 1796, over which the right hon. gent. who now filled the chair (Mr. Abbot) had presided with so much credit to himself and so much advantage to the country. Thus it had been the constant study, for a length of time, to reduce the public expenditure with respect to offices, as far as it could be done consistently with the reservation of certain places of reward for the public servants. If the country had been in the situation of one laying down, for the first time, the commencement of a system of expenditure, it might perhaps be more wise to confer rewards on the higher classes of public servants by means of large pensions, than by sinecure places. But when these places were conisdered as connected with the history of the country, and with the different branches of the Constitution from their first origin, it was unquestionably desirable to preserve and continue them. He was therefore not disposed to count much upon any reduction that could now be made in Sinecure Places and Pensions, if it was determined not to reduce them below what the public dignity and public service required them to be kept up to. Perhaps the manner in which the prerogative of the crown was exercised in bestowing such offices, might not be in every instance satisfactory. But the improper use of the prerogative in these instances, was no reason why the power of using it better should be altogether done away. If there were improprieties in the conduct of the judges, that was no reason why the administration of justice should be stopped. If there were improprieties in the conduct of those at the head of the military department, that was no reason why the country should be left without an army. In the degree then in which such places were necessary to reward public services, these places ought to be maintained. Why then, what had been the result of all the inquires on this subject? He might state generally, first, that all sinecure places in the customs had been abolished. Such also had been the case with regard to the excise. With regard to the great offices of state, some had been abolished, and a certain chamberlainship in the exchequer, and all the offices, with the exception of a very few, had been regulated by commutations being agreed upon, instead of fees, which were liable to a perpetual increase with the increase of the public expenditure. The profits of the tellers and the auditors were thus limited. For the purpose of being perfectly correct in what he had stated with regard to the abolition of sinecure offices in the customs, he ought to have observed, that one place of this nature, that of collector outwards, belonging by patent to a certain noble duke (Manchester) had been reserved. The fact was then, that sinecure places to a certain number were necessary to be retained in order to reward those who had given their time, and industry, and their talents to the public service, in offices which did not afford an adequate remuneration, and to afford them a proper suppor in their retirement. But he could not quit this part of the subject, without alluding to the principles which had been admitted during the progress of Mr. Burke's bill. The principles then admitted were, that those who held offices by grant from the crown, had as strong a title to them, as any proprietor of land had to his landed estate, and that to destroy the one title would be as great an invasion of property as to destroy the other. The reform could apply only with respect to the future holders, and in that view it had been applied in every practicable instance. But where offices were granted in reversion it could not be applied. The reform must remain suspended till the reversion should have expired. There were two principal offices granted in reversion. One was that of Register of the Admiralty Court, granted to lord Arden, with the reversion to a member of that house (Mr. Percéval). The other was that of the clerk of the parliament, held by a right hon. gent. (Mr. Rose) over the way, the reversion to his son. But when these reversions expired, he hoped that measures would be taken to regulate these offices also.—So much with regard to offices in England, where a good deal had been done, except in the law offices, which formed the subject of the 27th report of the commissioners of accounts. It was true that there were a great number of law offices which had been stated by them to be unnecessary, and which might be subject to ameliorations; though they had stated, at the same time, that these being perquisites of the great law officers, the lord chancellor and the lord chief justice, they ought not to be deprived of the patronage and the means of providing for their families which they afforded, without a material increase of their salaries. It was true that the salaries of the judges had since that time been augmented, but he did not know whether the salaries of the lord chancellor and lord chief justice had been raised, so as to compensate for a loss of this sort, and yet it was obvious that the augmentation of their salaries ought to have been particularly attended to, in case of their being deprived of these places and this patronage. However, this was a case, which had certainly been less attended to than others, and therefore, with respect to this the hon. gent's motion came recommended by all the authority that could be derived from this report. A great deal then had been done with respect to England. But as to Ireland, he admitted that much as yet remained to be done. But it would be recollected that a committee had been appointed 3 years ago, on the motion of the right hon. gent. who then held the office of chancellor of the exchequer for Ireland, the object of which was to inquire into the mode of collecting the revenue in Ireland; and although he (Lord H. Petty) was then on the opposition side of the House, yet he took an opportunity of expressing his perfect approbation of that measure, and of promising all the support which he could give. That commission was now actually sitting in Dublin, and its reports were on the table of the house; and the house must have seen with satisfaction that his right hon. friend (sir John Newport) had brought in a bill to abolish no less than 38 offices, in pursuance of the suggestions in these reports. Every one who knew his right hon. friend, or the noble lord at the head of the finance department of that country, or the noble duke who was at the head of the government there, would feel satisfied that all useful suggestions would be taken up by them, and immediately acted upon. Why, then, great progress had been made here also. The only point of difficulty was the practice of granting offices in reversion, which he highly disapproved of, especially in the case of offices where the fees were liable to increase with the increase of the expenditure, as this was in some measure entailing abuses. He knew it would be said that ministers were unfriendly to offices in reversion, and would wish to abolish them because they could not get them for themselves. To those who were of this opinion he would say, that they might discover a more obvious method by which ministers might secure such advantages, if they were so disposed, and that was by making other offices reversionary. But he had the satisfaction to state, that since the present ministry had come into power no offices had been granted in reversion. They had abstained from this practice, having in contemplation the means by which reforms might be accomplished here also, and an end put to the iniquitous effects that resulted from such a mode of proceeding. Things, then, being in this state, there remained little to be done except with respect to the courts of law the offices of which formed the subject of the 27th report. He was not aware that any sinecure of this description had been created since that report had been made. But that other more loose abuses had not taken place he was not prepared to deny, knowing as he did the tendency to abuse which existed where the expenditure was so large as it was in this country. All, therefore, that the government could do was, to use every effort to prevent the growth of such abuses; and to check them where they existed. It had accordingly given an instruction to the auditors of accounts to observe such abuses, and to report upon them from time to time to the treasury. He would read the words of the warrant in which this instruction was conveyed. Here the noble lord read the words, which contained an instruction to the auditors to attend to and report specially upon all abuses and frauds committed at home or abroad. This was part of a warrant under which the auditors acted, and by this means he hoped that a strong and permanent check upon abuses would be established. Why, then, it appeared that great progress had been made in destroying offices, and that there was a disposition in the government to prevent the unnecessary renewal of them. But though little remained to be done, yet he did not contend that that little ought to remain undone. He had no objection, therefore, to the appointment of a committee which should finish a business in which so great a progress had already been made. He was of opinion, that with a slight alteration in the words, the motion deserved the assent of the house, and that a committee should be appointed to inquire into what had been done, and what remained further to be done towards the accomplishment of this great object. Whatever might be the merits of former commissioners, it would be recollected that they were fallible, and that in the best institutions there would be some failure. He expected from this examination, that a foundation would be laid for finally eradicating great abuses in the management of the public money, and that the most material benefit would accrue with regard to the system of public economy. Therefore he not only agreed in the principle of this motion, but also approved of the policy of appointing such committees, at different successive periods, to examine into the real state of the public expenditure. He trusted he had satisfied the house that all due attention had been paid to economy, and there was a disposition in the government to promote that important object by every means in their power. The noble lord concluded by proposing an alteration in the motion, so that, as amended, it stood thus, 'That a select committee be appointed to examine and consider what regulations and checks have been established, in order to controul the several branches of the public expenditure in Great Britain and Ireland, and how far the same have been effectual; and what further measures can be adopted for reducing any part of the said expenditure, or diminishing the amount of salaries and emoluments without detriment to the public service; and that they do report the same, with their observations thereupon to the house.'

Mr. *Wilberforce* thought the liberality and candour manifested by his noble friend who had just sat down, particularly entitled him to the thanks of the country. But at the same time he must say, that his noble friend's opinion as to the necessity of substituting pensions for the established sinecures, struck him with surprise. If the committee so properly moved for, should be appointed with the impression which such an opinion, from so high an authority, was calculated to produce, he confessed that his good wishes towards that appointment would be considerably abated. No principle would be more injurious in its operation, according to his judgment, than that of voting to each public officer a certain remuneration for his services, instead of leaving these sinecures to be applied to such purposes, for which only they could be allowed to exist. He disapproved of the system of voting pensions, because he very much feared that under that system the amount of reward would depend too much on ministerial influence or popular clamour, or might be too much calculated to induce the one or irritate the other. He wished rather that the sinecures might remain for those to dispose of, who were best qualified to appreciate the merits to which they ought to be granted, and there was more likelihood that they would be properly granted. That talents dovoted to the service of the state were by any means so well rewarded as the same talents would be in any of the liberal professions, either of the church, medicine, or the bar, he was fully prepared to deny. He meant of course pecuniary reward; but that was not the object of public men, for their great and generous minds must look to views of a higher nature, and be actuated by motives of a noble character. Indeed, it was for the credit of the country to mention that there were many who had giving up the most lucrative professions, to follow the course to which these lofty motives were calculated to lead; therefore such men were entitled to the liberal consideration of parliament and the country, when there should be no longer occasion for their services, and when they should happen, from their circumstances to require such liberality. Men who had long occupied, and ably acted in, the high offices of the state, should not be allowed to fall from the connections and rank to which they had been accustomed, in consequence of the illiberality of those whom they had served. Such a thing would be degrading to the character of the country, and he trusted it would never be allowed to occur. Of the principle avowed in his noble friend's speech he most sincerely approved; he the more rejoiced to hear the principle stated, because from the knowledge he had of his noble friend's disposition, he was perfectly confident that it would be acted upon. He was fully persuaded that his noble friend was as well disposed rigidly to apply the principle of economy as any minister could be. At the same that he mentioned this, he could not omit stating, that which might be unknown, that his noble friend's predecessor (Mr. Pitt) carried the principle of economy as far as was practicable, never over-looking any opportunity of retrenchment, or of the abolition of useless places. Indeed he knew that his late right hon. friend had, without ever mentioning a word about it in that house, abolished between 30 and 40 places in the customs and excise, to which his noble friend had alluded in the course of his speech, although his right hon. friend was at the time pressed by many of his friends and connections, to grant those places to others. But no, his late right hon. friend preferred the principle of economy to the gratification of his friends, and the merit of that great man was, that he did such meritorious things without having it ever known to the world Like the man of Ross, he "did good by "stealth, and blushed to find it fame." The hon. member conceived that motions like that before the house should not be at all considered as acts of opposition to ministers. From the conduct of his noble friend this evening, it was evident that ministers themselves did not so consider them. On the contrary, their candour clearly shewed the alacrity with which they were ready to receive a proposition of economy from any quarter of the house, which must encourage every man to suggest to them the means which might serve to carry their acknowledged principles into effect. With, however, this concurrent wish of all to pursue economy with every practicable industry, he deprecated the application of it to the purpose of producing any reduction of the salaries allowed to our public officers, who so far from being over-paid, were many of them he was prepared to say, with regard to money, very much under-paid. Considering their situation, connections, names, and talents, the remuneration was, he had almost said, quite too little. In rewarding such men, parliament should ever bear in mind fidelity towards the people, and liberality towards the officers, both which tending to the same point, must urge them to provide that the character of the one should not be degraded, by allowing the comfort and interest of the other to be neglected.

Lord *H. Petty* rose to explain a point upon which he had been evidently, without any intention, misinterpreted by his hon. friend. In his observations with respect to the comparative propriety of pensions and sinecures, he was in fact but endeavouring to answer an argument, which appeared to him likely to arise in the disscusion. But he expressed no opinion. His argument was merely speculative upon the question, whether if we were about to constitute a new system, it would not be better to invest, not that house, as his hon. friend seemed to think, but the crown, with the power of granting pensions as rewards to meritorious public officers, than to create nominal offices for the purpose of such rewards. But those offices being already in existence, rendered the case different, and their continuance was connected with the honour of the crown, and with the interests and good faith of the country. It was however, the duty of that house to take care that such a system was not carried to any unjustifiable excess, by the appointment, from time to time, of such committees as that which was now moved for. The noble lord concluded with moving an amendment to his motion, that Ireland should be included in the inquiry.

Mr. *Wilberforce* professed his unwillingness to mis-state any sentiment of his noble friend's, and that he was quite satisfied with his explanation.

Mr. *Fawkes,* in a maiden speech, declared, that this was a motion upon which, consistently with his own principles, or his duty to his constituents, he could not content himself with giving a silent vote. He hoped, however, that in his first attempt to engage the attention of the house, he should meet with that indulgence which was usually extended to a member rising under similar circumstances. Notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made, and all the expences incurred, in endeavours to rescue our neighbours from subjugation, there still remained to this country sufficient means and resources to enable us to cope with all the adversaries with whom we had, and might have, to contend, if only they should be wisely administered and economically applied. He was persuaded that the country possessed ample means to meet every emergency, and to secure us against every possible danger. But the only means of obtaining this desirable end was, that the government should shew to the people that they were determined to rectify every abuse, and manifest a determination to ameliorate the condition of the people. When he considered the actual state of the country, labouring under a grievous weight of burthens, when he called to mind the declarations made at different times by persons high in office, that the people would be called on to sacrifice, not only the comforts, but even the necessaries of life, for the support of the present contest, he should not think that he performed his duty to those who sent him there, if he did not give his entire and cordial support to the motion then before the house, and every other motion of the same description. The noble lord on the bench below him, had said, that it was desirable to continue some sinecure places, as rewards and retreats for meritorious public officers. Whenever gallantry should be displayed, whenever diligence should be exerted, whenever talents should be exercised in the service of the country, whenever eminent merit should be manifested in the conduct of its affairs and interests, he should not be disposed to quarrel with the grant of adequate and liberal rewards in such cases. But these were times when the public money ought not to be lavished upon persons who had not performed any service to deserve remuneration. The people of this country were fully sensible of the blessings that they enjoyed, and of the dangers that threatened them; and they would be ready to make every effort in support of the present contest. But they had a right to expect indemnity for the past, and security for the future; they had a right to expect a rigid economy in the future application of the public money, not, however, that paltry economy that would narrow the scale of public exertion, and paralise the efforts of the country; but such an economy, as without confining the indispensable services of the state, would husband the resources of the nation. For the practice of such economy he looked with confidence to the gentlemen on the bench below him. He had no hesitation in uttering this sentiment, because it flowed from a pure source; the conviction which arose from the manner in which they had received and treated this motion. He trusted that the plan of reformation, which had been so often talked of, was now at length commenced, and that as ministers had declared their intention not to grant places in reversion, they would put an end to the abuse for the present, and prevent all future ministers from adopting the practise. They appeared to him disposed not only to preach, but to practise.

Mr. *Ellison* highly applauded the disposition manifested by ministers.—The amendment being moved,

Mr. *Biddulph* said, that there then was so little of substantial difference between the motion he had the honour to submit and the amendment proposed by the noble lord, that he was not disposed to press his motion. The objects he had in view would be attained by the amendment. He declared the sincere satisfaction which he felt from the sentiments of the chancellor of the exchequer, and had no doubt that those sentiments would be followed up, not in the abridgment of public liberty, for that he deprecated as much as any man, but in the reduction of those sinecures which were known to have gone in some instances to such an enormous extent as to have excited the general and just jealousy of the public.

Mr. *Calvert* hoped that at all events the noble lord and his colleagues would do that which was now in their power, namely, to prevent the pledging and mortgaging of those sinecure places, which was a system that had heretofore been practised without restraint.—The amendment was then agreed to, and the committee nominated; to whom were referred the Reports of the Committees of Finance, and the Commissioners of Accounts, &c.

[Slave Trade Abolition Bill.] A Message was sent to the house by the house of lords, announcing that their lordships had passed a bill, entitled, An Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and to which they desired the concurrence of the house; the bill being laid upon the table,

Lord *Howick* rose and moved, that this Bill be read a first time; upon which

Mr. *George Hibbert*, in a maiden speech, said, that he could not suffer a measure of such great and critical importance to pass even over this stage without remark: although in seeking to impress upon the house the duty of giving to it the most calm and solemn deliberation, he should be careful to abstain from any argument concerning the principle or provisions of the bill, for which he knew there would be another and a fitter opportunity. It was a bill that, without question, put to risk our West India commerce, a most important resource of the empire, and of peculiar value at the present moment: nothing that had passed in another house of parliament; nothing in the form of resolutions or opinions of a former parliament; no popular sentiment out of doors, however assiduously and enthusiastically excited, ought to affect their deliberations. To this parliament, to which they were called, the question came unembarrassed and unprejudged, and to many of the members of that house its temperate discussion must be novel. They were not a *commitium*, a mere organ of the voice of the multitude, but a deliberate body, limited in their number that they might the better deliberate, bound to maintain the rights, and to consult the interests and the wishes of the people, but bound to decide as their consciences should dictate for the good of the whole, after full and free discussion. He trusted, therefore, that gentlemen would come to this subject with minds impressed with its importance, and open to its calm and dispassioned investigation. He was aware of the disadvantages he must encounter in contending with the hon. gent. (Mr. Wilberforce); he could not for a moment pretend to ascend the heights on which the confidence of that house, due to the hon. gent.'s talents and virtues, had entrenched him; but if he would descend and fight this battle upon the level plain of fact and experience, he, (Mr. H.) should feel it his duty to assume the courage to meet him, and to oppose at every step a measure which he believed in his heart to be grounded on a delusive promise of good which it never would accomplish, and to be pregnant with inevitable, immediate, and extensive mischief.

Lord *Howick* agreed with the hon. gent. in the great importance of the present bill. It was indeed important in the highest degree, not merely to the cause of humanity and justice, but it was also highly important to the real interests of the West India merchants themselves. It certainly would never be argued in that house, that the West India Islands were not an important part of the British empire, and that their interests did not deserve the most serious consideration. When the bill should come seriously to be discussed, it would be considered not only on the ground of humanity, but also of sound policy, as it affected the West India Islands, and the general interests of the empire. He, therefore, wished as much as any man, that this important subject should be considered with calmness and due deliberation. The hon. gent. had spoken of pains taken to raise a popular clamour against the Slave Trade: he, however, knew of no such practices. He knew, indeed, that there had been a most laudable and persevering attention on the part of the hon. gent. (Mr. Wilberforce) who originated the measure, but this attention was never employed to mislead any body, but merely to make the subject generally understood. He had never laboured to excite a prejudice or clamour, but merely to convince the understandings of all dispassionate persons. There certainly ought to be a fair time allowed for the discussion, but when he recollected how much time had been already given, and what notice the persons concerned had already had from the proceedings in the other house, he could not consent to postpone the second reading farther than to Tuesday next; the hon. gent. would then have an opportunity of arguing the subject fully.

General *Gascoyne* thought it could only be from the multiplicity of business in which the noble lord (Howick) was engaged, that it had escaped his notice, that every measure that invention or artifice could devise to create a popular clamour was resorted to on this occasion. The church, the theatre, and the press, had laboured to create a prejudice against the Slave Trade. It had even been maintained from the pulpit, that "England could never expect to be victorious in war, while she persisted in such an abominable traffic." Now this doctrine, which certainly ought never to have come from such a place, had been completely falisfied, for England never was more victorious by land and by sea than in the present reign, and in the present war; and some of those victories had been obtained by men who, in another place boldly professed their opinion to be against this bill. The attempts to make a popular clamour against this trade were never so conspicious as during the late Election, when the public newspapers teemed with abuse of this trade, and when promises were required from the different candidates that they would oppose its continuance. There never had been any question agitated since that of parliamentary reform, in which so much industry had been exerted to raise a popular prejudice and clamour, and to make the trade an object of universal detestation. In every manufacturing town and borough in the kingdom, all those arts had been tried. It was not his intention to speak at present upon the general subject, as he would consider it disrespectful to the lords, if any bill which came down from their house should not at least be read a first time; but as it was a subject respecting which former parliaments had expressed great doubts, and as the bill went to abrogate all the colonial laws of the country, he intreated that the house would give the measure the fullest and most serious consideration.

Mr. *W. Plumer* begged leave to set right the hon. gent. who had last spoken; and to inform him, that no one man, in the whole county he represented, ever asked him to pledge himself upon the subject of this bill. He could assure him, that if any man had asked him to pledge himself upon that, or any subject, he would have refused to accept of his vote. He should, therefore, vote quite free and uncontrouled for the abolition of the trade. He did not know what the hon. gent. might have met with in boroughs; but as to cabinet measures, and cabinet ministers, he cared not for any measures which were so denominated. The time was, when a member would have been called to order for having hinted at such things as cabinet measures.

General *Gascoyne*, in explanation, said, he did not mean to express himself so generally as what the hon. gent. had supposed he had done. He rather meant to say, that there was scarcely a city or borough, that had not imposed restrictions upon the representatives returned.

Mr. *T. W. Plummer* thought it necessary, that a bill of such general interest should not be rapidly carried through its different stages, but that sufficient time should be given for the consideration of the measure. On which account, he concluded, that the proper time to debate the question would be on the second reading of the bill, which he hoped would be fixed for a day sufficiently distant to admit of members being furnished with every information on this important subject.

Lord *Howick* was almost persuaded, that from the number of years which had elapsed since the first discussion of this bill, and from the frequent debates which had since taken place on this subject, as well as the decision of the last parliament, there would be no necessity to postpone its consideration to a more remote period than Tuesday next.

Mr. *G. Hibbert* was of opinion this period would not be sufficient to admit a meeting of those merchants, who were, above all others, concerned in the present measure; and therefore requested the noble lord would put off the second reading until this day fortnight.

Lord *H. Petty* hoped the humane movers of this salutary and merciful measure, would persevere in bringing it, as soon as convenient, again before the house. It had already been submitted, for above a month or six weeks, to the public, during its discussion in the upper house, from which it had come with every recommendation. As that house undoubtedly contained many of the most enlightened and virtuous statesmen, this was a consideration, which he hoped would have its due weight with gentlemen. He concluded with expressing a wish, that the second reading of the bill should not meet with any unnecessary delay.

Captain *Herbert* thought with the hon. gent. near him (Mr. Hibbert) that time should be given to consider the consequences arising from the passing of the bill just now read. This bill, he was of opinion, would not effect the abolition of the Slave Trade, but rather would become the ruin of the British Colonies in the West Indies, and consequently of our finances in that part of the world. As to the argument resorted to by the noble lord who proposed the motion, he conceived it to be very defective, inasmuch as he was not, nor could he devise how he should be, bound to conform to the decision of the last parliament.

Mr. *H. Addington* thought it necessary to defer the second reading to a more remote day. In which opinion he was supported by Mr. Lethbridge.

Mr. *I. H. Browne* said, that, though the uniform enemy of the Slave Trade, and that from a conviction of its injustice, inhumanity, as well as impolicy, yet, when an innovation was about to be made on the private properties of a considerable portion of this commercial country, he could not think the suggested delay of a fortnight unreasonable. He should, if the house divided on this point, certainly vote for the postponement, and therefore could not be content without expressing himself as he had done, lest he might be supposed an enemy to the abolition of this detestable traffic.

Lord *Temple* objected to the day intended for the second reading of the bill, and was at a loss to conjecture the reason of his noble friend's wishing thus to hurry the bill through its stages. He conceived it would be prudent, in a case of this importance, to furnish the house with a printed account of the evidence in the other house. It should be remembered, that this bill was introduced with the blanks filled up, and in this respect, not similar to other bills, on their first reading, which originate in this house. From these circumstances, he was induced to hope the noble lord would concur with him in deferring the second reading for another week.

Mr. *Tierney* thought there was abundance of time for a meeting of the West India Planters; and the same counsel, if it should be thought expedient to hear counsel on the subject, might be employed in this, as in the other house.

Mr. *Babington* thought a meeting of the West India Merchants could easily be called within the time appointed by the noble lord.

Mr. *Hibbert* then moved, as an amendment, that the second reading be fixed for this day fortnight.

Lord *Howick* wishing above all things, that no pretence should be given for cavilling, to the enemies of the bill, he would, if the hon. gent. withdrew his amendment, fix the second reading for Friday week; which being assented to, the motion for the second reading on Friday se'nnight, was put and carried.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday February 11.

[FINANCE COMMITTEE.] Mr. *Biddulph* moved that the name of Mr. Ellison be added to the list of persons appointed yesterday as a select committee for the purpose of examining into the salaries and emoluments annexed to public offices.

Mr. *Bathurst* declared that he could not avoid resisting a motion of this nature. The committee at present consisted of 22 instead of 21, the more usual number of members; and, if the practice of adding names to a select committee were to be encouraged by the house acceding to the proposal of adding any name, however respectable, to a committee already so numerous, as this was, instead of select they would have almost general committees, when they were voted to be select ones, as every other member would have an equal right to propose the addition of whatever person he might think particularly qualified to serve on the committee then spoken of. If one was to be proposed in the stead of another, however disagreeable it might be to their feelings, gentlemen must see that that would be a fair ground of discussion.

Mr. *Calvert* supported the motion on the ground of the probability that some of the members might be absent from their duty at the committee; and adverted to an instance where he had seen only one honourable member, (Mr. Bathurst) acting in a committee-room.

Mr. *Bathurst* explained to the house that he was at that time engaged in making abstracts from the statements which were in the voluminous documents before the committee. It would be perfectly useless for 14 or 15 persons to attempt to perform such a task. In this he could only suppose that he acted as an assitant to the clerk, and not that he personated the committee.

Lord *H. Petty* reminded the heuse that the committee of finance, whose labours were esteemed to be particularly advantageous to the public, and with whom the house was most particularly well satisfied, consisted of only 15 members, and yet, now that the plan was completely designed before them, when the labour must necessarily have been considerably decreased, the house was to be told that 22 persons were not equal to the task. The names had not been chosen by ballot; they were each announced singly in an open manner to the house, and were thus the polled representatives of the whole body of the house. He appealed to the house itself, whether there was any possibility of there being a committee more impartially chosen; they were a selection of the men most eminent for their talent and independence within those walls, and might be said to have been culled from every class of men, except that class which most assuredly the hon. gent. could not think the best qualified for acting on a committee, such as that of which they were then speaking; the class of placemen he meant. He had not, for his own part, the smallest objection to the gentleman alluded to being one of the committee; but then his name should have been mentioned before a committee of 22 persons were actually chosen by the house.

Mr. *Johnstone* declared, that the noble Lord had not satisfied his mind upon this head. The former committee, he agreed with the noble lord in saying, had discharged their duty in a manner highly creditable to themselves, and beneficial to the service of the public. He had no doubt also that the present committee were as eminently qualified as the noble lord had described, to perform the task assigned to them with honour and ability. But still he thought it was rather hard that, after his hon. friend had suggested the propriety of adopting a measure, though he unquestionably was not so capable of supporting it as the noble lord was, and though the noble lord entirely concurred with him, and supported him in the main object of his motion, with only some little variation of terms; he still thought it was rather hard that his hon. friend should not be allowed to name one person for the committee. There had been instances of names being added to select committees on many former occasions.

Mr. *Freemantle* also bore testimony to the respectability of the names on the present list; in fact he could not see that it was possible to select 22 more independent, more capable, or more honourable men. As to precedent, he did not think that it was necessary to be resorted to in such a case as the present; but even on the score of precedent, he understood that it was contrary to the established usage of the house to add any names after the complete appointment of a finance committee.—The gallery was then cleared for a division, but the motion was withdrawn.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday February 12.

[Lord Dunstanville's Indemnity Bill.] The Lord *Chancellor* left the woolsack, to observe, that a noble lord (De Dunstanville), having inadvertently assisted at part of the debate on the Slave Trade bill, without having previously qualified himself by taking the usual oaths and his seat, the noble lord had thereby incurred certain pains and penalties prescribed by an act of Charles II. Their lordships would naturally observe that the members of that house, being hereditary members of the legislature, might readily be supposed to overlook or forget the ceremonies of taking the oaths every new parliament. Such was the inadvertency the noble lord had lapsed into, the same as had been incurred by a noble marquis (Lawnsdowne) some years ago. In that case his majesty's will and pleasure was consulted, and instructions given to bring in a bill to indemnify that noble lord, as quickly as the bill could be gone through. What he had to perform on the present occasion would be squared upon that precedent; and he now held a bill in his hand similar to that proposed in the case of the noble marquis, which he trusted the house would allow to pass through its different stages as rapidly as possible. He should now propose that it be read a first time.

Lord *Walsingham* hinted that the standing orders of the house did not allow the bill to go through more than one stage in a day—After a few words from the lord chancellor, the bill was read a first time.

House of Commons.

Thursday February 12.

[Minutes.] The following members were appointed a committee to try the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election for the borough of Chippenham: N. Calvert. esq. W. Fitzhugh, esq. William Fawkes, esq. hon. A. Cooper, lord Mahon, A. Eyre, esq. W. Odell, esq. J. H. Street, esq. hon. T. Brand, F. Milnes, esq. N. Barnes, esq. W. Mills, esq. H. M. Ogle, esq.—Nominees: lord vis. Marsham. sir Thomas Turton—Mr. Hobhouse brought in the Greenwich royal naval asylum bill, which was read a first time.—Mr. Addington moved for copies of all the correspondence between the governors of the West India colonies and others, since the year 1799, relative to the importation of slaves, which were ordered accordingly.—Lord Howick moved that the house be called over on Tuesday next, which was agreed to.—Lord Temple brought in the Sierra Leone transfer bill, which was read a first time.

[NEW PLAN OF FINANCE.—LORD CASTLEREAGH'S FINANCIAL RESOLUTIONS.] Lord *Castlereagh* said, that in the whole course of his parliamentary experience, he had never felt more difficulty in rising to address the house than he felt on the present occasion. He had to review the new and extended Plan of Finance proposed by the noble lord opposite (lord Henry Petty), and to compare it in all its parts, and all its bearings, with the present system. When he considered with what deliberation the noble lord must have prepared his plan, and what able assistance he had to complete it, it was so disagreeable a thing for an individual like himself to state any thing in opposition to it, that nothing but an imperious sense of duty could warrant or induce him to offer himself to the house with that view. But the difference between his opinions and those maintained by the noble lord was so great, that there must be some material errors on one side or the other. Considering the advantages the noble lord had with respect to the means of viewing the subject, the errors were probably on his own side: but such was the conviction in his own mind of the truth of his own views of the subject, that he felt it a paramount duty to give the house an opportunity of comparing his opinions and calculations with those of the noble lord. He by no means wished to depreciate the noble lord's plan on any general grounds. The facts and the reasons upon which his opinions were formed he would state specifically to the house; and as he had felt it impossible to follow the noble lord opposite in the statement he had made on a former night, in a manner so creditable to him, from its clearness, it was his wish to follow the example of the noble lord and to leave his opinions open to the examination of those who possessed the best means of correcting any errors they might contain, and to give an opportunity to them to come to parliament on the further consideration of this great subject, with the most correct views, formed upon the most deliberate and extensive examination. He hoped that, from these considerations, the house would grant him its indulgent construction, to aid him in the task he had to perform in calling upon parliament to weigh the grounds upon which he was led to doubt of the solidity of the system proposed by the noble lord. He was anxious that the difference between him and the noble lord should not be taken to be greater than it was. There were many views and many general principles in the noble lord's statement, which he was not disposed to question: no principle was more clear than the propriety of considering at what time, consistently with equity towards the Stockholder, the produce of the sinking fund in a certain proportion, might be diverted from its original destination, and applied to the current service. If the Sinking Fund were allowed to proceed in its operation to the extinction of the whole public debt, a new order of things would be created, and the relative value of every thing as it stood now would be destroyed. He therefore agreed with the noble lord, that at some time parliament would be called upon to consider what ought to be the maximum of the Sinking Fund to be applied to the extinction of the debt. He was ready also to allow that the time might come when the principle of raising the expences of war within the year might become oppressive, and proper to be got rid of. He was therefore prepared to say, that a maximum might be put to the Sinking Fund in time of peace, and that even in time of war it might be proper at some period to limit it, and to apply the surplus to prevent war taxes, from being pushed to the extreme. It was difficult to say at what point all the bearings of this question might be made to meet. That was too nice a question for him to discuss here. But the noble lord having built his system upon calculations involving that principle, it became the duty of every man to examine the point, and to state his motive for differing with the noble lord, or for supporting him. He was actuated, not by a wish to differ from the noble lord, but by a fear, that the s perstructure which the noble lord's plan went to rear, was not built upon any solid foundation. Any one who looked to such an extended system of warfare as the present, must be convinced, that it would be unwise not to prepare ourselves to follow it to an indefinite length. He was not displeased that the noble lord had thought it right to go the length of calculation, upon a probable duration of 20 years. But it was too much to incorporate the calculation of the expences of such a length of time into arrangements to be adopted at present. It was impossible that parliament could now provide for occasions so distant, and events so uncertain, without involving itself in infinite contradictions and embarrassments. He therefore owned, he wished the arrangements for the present year had been built on an extensive view without calling upon parliament to adopt arrangements of the same extent, which it was impossible it could do with information or judgment. He admitted that unless data were assumed, it was impossible to reason, or to arrive at any determination. But what he feared was, that by the assumption of fallacious data, far from being enabled to proceed consistently, through a series of 20 years, we should be led into continual errors. The noble lord, in looking to so small an expenditure as 32,000,000l. hoped not only to be able to cover that expenditure, but to provide for its incidental excesses. But the expenditure of 32,000,000l. was an expenditure cut down from 41,000,000l. and in putting it forward as the probable amount of our war expenditure, the noble lord should take care not to mislead the country as to the amount of the burthens it would have to bear. He was sure the noble lord must have derived from the source with which he was so honourably connected, principles which would be very far from disposing him from rendering his countrymen the "Penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos." He was sure the noble lord would be sorry to think that we should be prevented from co-operating, even by money, to the exertions which might still be made for the deliverance of the world from the common enemy. If the noble lord had looked to the average expence of the last war under this head; if he had looked to the average expences of the last four years in particular, he would have found that there was an annual contingent charge of 3,700,000l. for expences, which he had left wholly out of his calculation; and therefore, on this ground, he was sorry, without entering into the prospect of 20 years, that the noble lord had calculated for the present circumstances only. There were at the present time very strong motives for calculating on a different plan. He thought it too much to calculate, that we could hold out for a war of 20 years duration on an expenditure of 32 millions, without any increase. But he was more inclined to close with the noble lord's data, and to come to issue upon his principles, leaving the particulars to be discussed in the committee, where some friends of his, better acquainted with the details of these subjects than he was, would make some observations upon them. He thought he had the means of proving, that the noble lord's plan, if acted upon and carried fully into execution, would be the means of involving the country in great embarrassments, if not in compleat ruin, and what was still worse, in unnecessary and gratuitous ruin. He was sensible of the difficulty of the task he had undertaken. But he trusted that the arguments with which he would endeavour to establish his opinions, would be received with indulgence and liberality, from the consideration that the points to which they referred deserved the fullest attention. In examining the system of the noble lord, he hoped he should be permitted to separate two questions, and that those who heard him would keep them distinct. First, Whether it was wise that any measures should now be adopted with respect to the Sinking Fund? and, secondly, If it was consistent that such measures should now be adopted, whether it was consistent that they should be adopted with a view to their taking place 20 years hence? With respect to the appropriation at the present time, he would not question the fact that the Sinking Fund would afford in 1826, a surplus applicable as the noble lord stated. The noble lord must allow, that the sum of 1,200,000l. to the charge of which, divested from the War Taxes, this surplus would be then applicable, was in itself a fund on which parliament might raise and might charge loans, and on which any system of finance might be built, either the present actual system, or that proposed by the noble lord. The written explanation of the noble lord's plan stated, that, conformably to the mode in which the noble lord wished to raise the loans, the Property Tax of 11,500,000l.

was as liable to those loans as any other part of the War Taxes, but that was a fallacy. In charging War Loans, amounting to a capital of 210 million, the noble lord had assumed that the War Taxes were applicable to the discharge of it. But parliament was pledged to the country to repeal the War Taxes in the event of peace. Thus, the pledge of parliament was to be violated in order to cover with all these absorptions of the War Taxes, a principle which must involve in ruin any individual or any country that had recourse to it, borrowing the interest of loans, and constituting that interest so borrowed into a permanent funded debt. He would ask the noble lord if he had considered the consequences of borrowing any given sum in that way, and compared them with the consequences of borrowing the same sum under the usual system. One of the resolutions he should have to submit would be founded on the principle of this comparison. If the abstract principle of the system had a disadvantage in this respect, the mischievous influence of the principle would extend to every part of the superstructure he had raised upon it. It was a grateful and a proud question for the house, if it could go into the consideration of the propriety of releasing the country from any part of its present burthens. But he wished the noble lord in that view also to consider his own system comparatively with that which he now proposed to substitute. The noble lord proposed to raise 12 millions by Loan, on an appropriation of ten per cent. and 1,200,000l. at 6 per cent. He wished to compare the effect of this with the effect of an operation of the same amount under the old system. The ultimate result would be, under the new system, a charge of 60,144,000l. before the period of extinction, while under the old system, the charge would be only 30,960,000l. Thus there would be a loss to the public of 29,184,000l. This manner of comparative consideration would prove the difference of the advantages with which the war could be carried on, on the old plan or on the new; and those points of comparison which he was about to submit were the only points he could discover. The complicated and extended scale of the noble lord could not be well comprehended without looking at its ultimate results. It would, therefore, be necessary to consider, first, the relative amount of the capital borrowed according to the new system and the old; 2dly, the relative amount of the public debt, and the effect of the operations of the old and the new plan upon it; 3dly, the relative qualities of both systems with respect to the charges they would create in a period of 20 years; 4thly, the relative facility with which they would admit of mitigations of the present burthens; and 5thly, what relative state they would leave the finances in at the conclusion of their operations. By a comparison of the quantity of capital to be borrowed, the noble lord would feel how he would be best enabled to provide for a war expenditure of 32,000,000l. and if it could be shewn that by any means a loan of 11,000,000l. could be raised, without materially adding to our present burthens, which loan, in addition to 21,000,000l. of war taxes, would make the desired sum of 32,000,000l. the advantages of such a plan would be obvious. He would compare the amount of capital borrowed, at this rate, of eleven millions annually, with the amount of capital, at the same time under the noble lord's plan. At the rate of 11,000,000l. annually, only 210,000,000l. would be borrowed on the whole period of 20 years, without any of the embarrassing machinery of the noble lord's plan. According to the noble lord's plan, there would be raised in the same period by war-loans 210,000,000l.; and in Supplementary Loans, 204,200,000l. making a total of 416,200,000l. There was thus an excess of capital, by the operation of the new plan, of no less amount than 190,200,000l. exclusive of 82,000,000l borrowed on the war taxes, and redeemed within the period. Certainly it was not a matter of indefinite importance and policy, whether such an immense sum should be raised beyond what would be necessary under accustomed and more simple arrangements, while the whole of the war-taxes would be absorbed at the end of 14 years, and the whole 32 millions would be to be raised without any aid from them. There was little room to doubt that a necessity for going into the market for a loan of such vast amount would in a few years have as great an effect in destroying credit and capital as that anticipated by the noble lord from the unlimited operations of the Sinking Fund, and the extinction of the whole public debt. Thus the new plan was injurious, not only in respect to the great accumulation of capital borrowed, but also in respect to the vast change it was calculated to make in the market. Another point of comparison was the state of both plans at the end of 20 years; and also the comparative state of the Sinking Fund; for he was ready to allow that an increase of debt might be compensated by an amelioration in the Sinking Fund, and therefore the comparison of the debt alone would not suffice. If 11 millions were to be borrowed every year for 20 years, the amount of the Public Debt at that time, according to the calculations in the noble lord's tables, would be in money value, 270,443,305*l.* The present amount in money value, was 363,793,722*l.* Thus there would be a decrease of debt according to the old system, to so considerable an amount as 93,350,417l. According to the new system of the noble lord, the money value of the debt would be in the present year 364,993,722*l.* The amount in 1826, would be 455,537,932*l.* This would be an increase of debt in money value of 90,544,210*l* which, added to 93,350,417*l.* the diminution that might be effected by adhering to the old system, would make a total disadvantage of 183,894,667l. in amount of debt in money value, together with 196,000,000l. increase of capital borrowed from the adoption of the new plan—He would now proceed to compare the effect of the two plans with respect to the Sinking Fund. According to the old system, the present amount of the Fund was 8,515,042*l.* In 1826 it would be, following still the calculations in the noble lord's tables, 27,115,881*l.* being an increase in 20 years of 18,610,839*l.* According to the plan of the noble lord the amount of the Sinking Fund in the present year would be 8,935,042*l.* In 1826 it would be 26,901,360*l.* affording an increase of 17,966,318*l.* in 20 years; but falling short of the improvement by the old system in 644,421*l.* According to the new plan there would be but a sinking fund of 26,901,360*l.* on an increased debt of 455,537,932*l.* while the present system would, if followed, give a sinking fund of 27,115,881*l.* on the reduced debt of 270,443,305*l.* The proportion of the sinking fund to the debt, under the present plan, would be in 1826, above 1-10th; according to the noble lord's plan, it would be but 1-17th. According to the present system, the interest on the Sinking Fund would go on accumulating at compound interest till the debt would be extinguished. According to the new Plan, having reached its maximum of 28,155,358*l.* in the year 1820, would have descended to 26,901,360*l.* in the year 1825, and would continue to decline so long as the excesses would be applied to pay the interest of Supplementary Loans. He wished the noble lord to continue the calculations of four of his own tables, from years beyond the year 1826. Nothing further would be requisite to prove to him the fallacy of his plan.—The next point of comparison was, the charge of borrowing 11,000,000*l.*—The charge for Interest and Sinking Fund for this loan would be, according to the present system, 733,333*l.* The amount of charges for these Loans for 20 years, or 220,000,000*l.* would be 14,666,660*l.* According to the new Plan, the charge for Supplementary Loans, amounting in 20 years to 204,000,000*l.* would be 14,266,388*l.* And the loss by War Taxes mortgaged for 14 years, till liberated, in successive portions, according to the series in which they had been appropriated, 21,000*l.* The charges of the Supplementary Loans, only under the new plan, would amount to within 370,272*l.* of the whole charges under the present system; with the additional loss of the whole of the war taxes mortgaged away for war loans, for 14 years; under these circumstances the house would not be at a loss to decide to which of the two systems the preference was due.—The next point of comparison was the relative means of relieving the country from taxes, and he admitted that if this could be done without injury to those who had advanced their property for the service of their country, the people who had so manfully borne up against the difficulties and dangers of the present time, were justly entitled to that relief, and it was highly desirable to the legislature to be able to afford it. With reference to this object, he would compare the state of the Sinking Fund according to the effect of its own inherent principles under the present system, and according to the application of the noble lord's plan to it. Could the period be fixed, at which we might look to an applicable success upon the sinking fund above what ought to be applied to its special purpose; and if that period could be ascertained to be at the end of ten years, the 11,122,809*l.* which it was proposed to take from it at that time, for the charge of supplementary loans, might as well be appropriated to the payment of interest of loans, raised according to the present system, or applied to the mitigation of the public burthens, in any other manner. So might the 683,092*l.* of annuities likely to fall in in the 20 years. So might the new taxes of 292,000*l.* annually on an average, or 2,051,000*l.* on the whole proposed to be raised by the noble lord's plan, between the third and the tenth year of his series. These sums altogether making 13,856,861*l.* were equally applicable to the present system, or to any other, as they were to that of the noble lord. As applied to the charges of the Supplementary Loans, amounting to 14,296,388*l.* this amount of Ways and Means of 13,856,000*l.* left a deficiency of 440,388*l.* As applied to the charges of annual loans of 11,000,000*l.* for 20 years under the present system, being 14,656,660*l.* it left a deficiency of 809,799*l.* Deducting from this deficiency of 809,799*l.* the deficiency, under the new plan in the application of the same Ways and Means to the Supplementary Loans only, there would remain a difference of only 369,411*l.*; and that was the whole consideration for which our taxes were mortgaged and alienated. It was an insult to the country, which had so manfully borne up against the difficulties of the time, and had burthened itself with war taxes in order to prevent any accumulation of debt in war time; it was a reproach to it to imagine for a moment, that, however desirous it may be to be relieved from the rigour of its present hardships, it would seek such a pitiful relief at the expence of so great an ultimate sacrifice; it was an insult to suppose, that the country would rather suffer their war taxes to be cosumed by war loans, rather than prevent that evil, rather than charge itself with additional taxes, to the amount of 369,411*l.* which with the Ways and Means appropriated by the noble lord's plan to the Supplementary Loans merely, would enable the country to sustain a War Expenditure of 32 millions. It had never been considered as part of the duty of those who sat on that side of the house, to propose Financial Plans, and those who ventured to propose such plans wandered from their proper line; but when he came forward to dispute the System of Finance proposed by the noble lord, he thought he could do no less than point out another plan, which would enable the noble lord to meet the difficulties of the time without any of the embarrassments and intanglements into which his own plan led him. It would upon more mature consideration appear to the noble lord a strange option to have prefered borrowing upon a double system, rather than to pursue the simple one that had been hitherto used. It would be satisfactory, he hoped, to the noble lord to find, the country might be relieved without embarrassing the war taxes, and that the 13,800,00*l.* which he proposed to appropriate to the Supplementary Loans to that object. This Supplementary Loan began at so low an amount as 200,000*l.* It seemed to be intended as a sort of small charge for the War Taxes; but when it would have reached its 14th year, this little gentleman would have out grown its parent, and would have amounted to 20,000,000*l.* The whole amount of the average want at the end of ten years, would be but 7,733,000*l.* There were to meet this Ways and Means to the amount of 3,200,000*l.* Thus there would be to be provided only a Loan of 4,500,000*l.* It would be madness, after the facility of provision he had shewn, to go to the Jews to borrow, and to find the interest of the Loans. In 1816, the Sinking Fund would not only be capable of furnishing the aid now looked for from it, but also a large sum in addition. Adding, therefore the average annual want of 400,000*l.* to the loan of the year, and carrying the interest and Sinking Fund of it, amounting to 33,000*l.* to be advanced out of the Consolidated Fund to be replaced by the Sinking Fund as soon as it should afford surplus applicable to this purpose, the whole difficulty would be met. Thus instead of 204,000,000*l.* of Supplementary loan, only 4,500,000*l.* would be added to the gross amount of the permanent debt, and only an amount of 33,000*l.* interest and Sinking Fund, to the permanent charge. The whole of the complicated machinery of the noble lord's plan, raised story after story, and crowned with cumbrous scaffolding, which threatened to fall and crush the country with its ruins, would thus be dispensed with. There was another principle, which might, as it appeared to him, be applied to the object of the noble lord, namely, that when the amount of the Sinking Fund should exceed the interest of the unredeemed debt, no provision should be made by new taxes for the interest of the loan, but that it should be provided for out of the interest of the debt redeemed in that year. This arrangement would not interfere with the commissioners for the Redemption of the Debt, because they would still have a large sum to bring into the market, which would keep up the price of stocks. It was one thing to divert the fund in the hands of the commissioners to this purpose, and another to apply the interest of the sums redeemed in the year to the same end. The effect of such a system would be, that the debt would remain stationary during a war, but that the Sinking Fund would again be progressive towards the final redemption of the debt on the conclusion of peace, whilst the system of the noble lord would produce a declining Sinking Fund after it had arrived at its maximum. By the tables of the noble lord it appeared that the Sinking Fund was in the present year 8,515,042*l.* and that it would be in the year 1811, 11,140,274*l.* or 140,000*l.* more than the loan of that year. If this principle, therefore, of which he was not the parent, though he felt it his duty to mention it as one mode of proceeding, were to be acted upon, and the government would go on for four years, it would exhibit the country to the enemy in that proud situation in which it might carry on the war for any number of years without increasing its debt, and at the end of such war might revert 21 millions of War Taxes to the country, which would be available to any future war. According to the tables of the noble lord it appeared, that taking credit for the annuities that would fall in of 496,006l. and including the taxes proposed by the noble lord, amounting to 2,051,000*l.* there would be wanted but the sum of 496,810*l.* to provide for the loans of 18 millions in each of these four years, and as the noble lord had stated, that it was not from any inability to discover new sources of taxation, that he brought forward his system, there could be no difficulty in making a provision to that amount. These two plans were not of his production; but as that of the noble lord seemed to him to be fraught with ruin to the country, he had thought it his duty to point out how he could escape from the difficulties of his system in pledging the war taxes. The noble lord's tables stated, that the excesses of the Sinking Fund at the close of the war, which would amount to 9,900,000*l.* might be applied to setting free so much of the war taxes. This he admitted; but the effect of such an arrangement would be to consolidate the remainder of the war taxes with the general Debt, and to incorporate the Sinking Fund upon it with the old Sinking Fund. There would be then no fund by which they should be enabled to equalize the Peace Establishment with the Expenditure. The Surplus of the Consolidated Fund would be 3,500,000*l.* the Land and Malt Tax, 2,750,000*l.* and the Lottery 450,000*l.* so that taking the Peace Expenditure at fifteen millions, at the lowest, or at twenty millions, the sum to be provided would in the first case be 8,300,000*l.* and in the latter 13,300,000*l.* The system of raising money by double Loans, resembled the usurious terms upon which a distressed man raised money to defray the interest of sums borrowed antecedently. When the noble lord erected his superstructure of two stories on such a basis, he might as well have reared his castle to as many more, like the Indian Pagoda, and by borrowing the interest of the interest of his Supplemental Loans have carried his principle to its ultimate point. It was certainly a most satisfactory consideration, that the noble lord and those who acted with him, now admitted that war might be maintained for twenty years, without adding greatly to the existing burthens of the country. What he had already stated, would save him the necessity of examining the fifth head of comparison, upon which he had proposed to state his sentiments, namely, the comparative state in which the country would be placed by the noble lord's and the present system. He had made out a good case, that the system by single Loan, with the ordinary Sinking Fund of one per cent. on the capital borrowed, would answer every object proposed by the noble lord in the course of 20 years, and that the system of double loans was in the last degree usurious. The noble lord had dwelt much on the necessity of preserving faith with the Stockholder, and he agreed with him that, though the Stockholder had no right that considerations for him should fetter the decisions of parliament, he yet had a considerable claim on the attention of that house. But the plan of the noble lord was unsecured both with respect to the Stockholder and the public, because, by his own statement, there would be a defalcation in his Sinking Fund in the last ten years. The relief would be given to the Stockholder in the first ten years, rather than in the last, as, after the year 1820, his Sinking Fund would be declining; and in the year 1826, the amount of the debt would exceed the aggregate of his Sinking Fund by 6 millions. The Stockholder would prefer a Sinking Fund of 11 millions, and a loan of 12 millions, to a Sinking Fund of 26 millions, and a loan of 32 millions, which would create a capital of from 50 to 60 millions. However the noble lord might mask his principles under the machinery of this bill, the machinery was calculated to take the money out of the pockets of the country, and to dilapidate its resources—He had thought it his duty to submit his views on this subject to the house, not with any intention of derogating from the merit of the noble lord's plan, for he felt a sincere respect for that noble lord, and he felt the reverse of any wish to detract from the value of his proposition. But though he had explained at some length his objections to the plan of the noble lord, he was still anxious to submit them in a more precise form to the house, in the shape of Resolutions. He had as high an opinion of the resources of the country as the noble lord; and he was happy to receive from the noble lord on a former night, his liberal testimony, not only to the extent of the resources of the country, but to the transcendent merits of the great statesman who had laid the foundation of the system which had been so strongly fortified by the vigorous financial measures adopted by the noble lord last session, as well as by the efficient operation of the measures instituted by a noble member of another house (lord Sidmouth) at the conclusion of the late war, and at the commencement of the present. With this system the brightest hopes, and best future prospects of the country were intimately connected. He had said in a former session, that, as far as a powerful navy, a powerful army, though not so powerful as under better and wiser regulations it might have been; and as far as legitimate, steady, and unbounded resources were concerned, no country had ever been handed over by any ministers to their successors in a more triumphant situation than this country at the late change. Whatever might be the want of authenticity in the statement, as coming from him, he had met with a considerable personal rebuke. But he had to express his gratitude to the noble lord for bearing out all his statements, which were rather below than over the truth. If he had then stated what the noble lord did now, that the war might be carried on by the system of double loans without any great increase of the public burthens, he might have been open to animadversion, but certainly his nerves were not equal to that statement. He had then only to submit his Resolutions to the house, which he hoped they would receive with the same indulgence with which they had heard him. He offered them rather as his objections to the system of the noble lord, than as principles upon which he should be disposed to found any system. If they were incorrect, the noble lord would be able to expose the fallacy of them.—The noble lord then concluded with moving his first Resolution, proposing that the debate should be adjourned to Monday next.—The following is a copy of the said Resolutions.

No. I.

"That it is proposed by the New Plan of Finance, that the annual excesses of the present Sinking Fund, above the interest of the debt charged upon it in every given year, should be declared to be at the disposal of parliament, and applicable to the public service. And it appears that the aggregate produce of the said excesses, between the years 1816 and 1826, will amount in the whole to 11,121,938*l.* That annuities to the amount of 685,515*l.* will fall in between the years 1807 and 1826. That it is proposed by the New Plan of Finance to charges on the aggregate produce of the said excesses of the Sinking Fund, and upon the said annuities the interest and Sinking Fund of 201,200,000*l.* Supplementary Loans, and to impose in aid of the said aggregate produce, between the years 1810 and 1816, new Taxes to the amount of 2,051,000*l.* That in addition to the Supplementary Loans so to be provided for, it is proposed by the New Plan to raise War Loans to the amount of 210,000,000*l.* on the credit of the War Taxes, amounting to 21,000,000*l.* That the War and Supplementary Loans of each year added to so much of the War Taxes as may remain unmortgaged, will produce in each year respectively the sum of thirty two millions. That in order to raise the said Sum of 32 Millions in each year, without mortgaging the War Taxes, there would be required, in addition to the 21 Millions of War Taxes, an annual Loan of 11 Millions only. That without any mortgage upon the War Taxes, an annual Loan of 11 millions might be provided for, for nearly 19 years, by the application of the same funds, viz. the annuities, amounting to 685,515*l.* the excesses of the Sinking Fund, amounting to 11,140,274*l.* and the New Taxes intended to be imposed by the New Plan, amounting to 2,051,000*l.* on which the Supplementary Loans are to be charged."

No. II.

"That the proposed System of Finance proceeds gradually to mortgage for 14 years the whole of the War Taxes for the Interest of Loans in War. That these Taxes are not generally of a nature which can with propriety be so pledged, as several of them such as the Tax on Exports, the Duties on Tea and on Spirits must probably either be modified or reduced on a peace, whilst it is proposed by the said Plan that the Property Tax, amounting to 11,500,000*l.* should in that event be entirely remitted; in which case (exclusively of any mortgage at the time affecting the residue of the War Taxes) the portion of them which might be continued without material prejudice to the Public Revenue beyond the war, must be wholly insufficient to equalize the Revenue with the Peace Expenditure.

Suppose a Peace Establishment at 15,000,000*l.*

If the War Taxes were mortgaged, then there would remain—

Land and Malt	2,750,000	
Surplus of Consold. Fund	3,500,000	
Lottery	450,000	
		6,700,000
Annual Deficiency to be provided for by new Loans Taxes		8,300,000
Supposing the Peace Establishment to amount to		20,000,000
The Deficiency to be provided for in like manner would be		13,300,000

No. III.

"That the new plan will require Loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were persevered in.

By the present system, in order to cover a War Expenditure of		32,000,000
There would be wanted in each year in aid of the 21 Millions War Taxes, a Loan of		11,000,000
mounting in 20 years to		220,000,000

NEW PLAN.

Amount of the War Loans for 20 years		210,000,000
Ditto of Supplementary Loans for ditto		204,200,000
Total		416,200,000
Total Excess by the New Plan, exclusive of 82,000,000*l.* borrowed on the War Taxes, and redeemed within the period		190,200,000
The Average Capitals to be annually raised by the New Plan are—		
Annual amount of Loans by the new plan on a 20 Years Average		
War Loan	10,500,000	
Supplementary ditto	10,200,000	20,700,000
Annual Amount of Loans by the present Plan		11,000,000
Average Annual Excess of Loans by new Plan		9,700,000

No. IV.

"That the comparative Increase of the Public Debt which will be produced by the two Plans, and the effect this will have on the proportionate amount of the Sinking Fund, by their operation in 28 years, is as follows:—

EFFECT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

The Amouut of the Money Capital of the Public Debt is, in the year 1807	363,793,722
The Amount of ditto will be in the year 1826, supposing Eleven Millions raised in each year	270,443,305
Decrease of Debt in 20 years, raising Eleven Millions in each year	93,350,417

EFFECT OF THE NEW PLAN.

Amount of the Money Capital of the Public Debt under the New Plan is, in 1807	364,993,722
The amount of ditto will be in 1826	455,537,932
Increase by New Plan in twenty years	90,544,210
Decrease of Debt by the present System, as above	93,350,417
Increase of ditto by the New Plan	90,544,210
Total Increase of Debt by New System	183,894,667

EFFECT OF PRESENT PLAN ON THE SINKING FUND.

Amount of Sinking Fund under the present System on the Public Debt is in 1807	8,515,042
Amount of Ditto will be in 1826	27,115,881
Increase of Sinking Fund in twenty years	18,610,839

EFFECT OF NEW PLAN ON THE SINKING FUND.

Amount of Sinking Fund under the New System is stated to be, in 1807	8,935,042
Amount of ditto under New System will be, in 1826	26,901,360
Increase in twenty years	17,966,318
Difference in favour of present System	644,421

So that the New Plan gives only.......... 26,901,360 Sinking Fund on a Debt of 455,537,932, whilst the present System would give the larger Sinking Fund of 27,115,881. on the smaller Debt of 270,443,305.

The proportion of the Sinking Fund to the whole Debt will be under the present plan in 1826 above one-tenth.

The proportion of the Sinking Fund to the whole Debt under the New Plan will be in 1826 about one-seventeenth.

The Sinking Fund under the present plan above stated, at 27,115,881*l.* continues to increase at compound interest after the year 1826 till the whole Debt is redeemed.

The Sinking Fund under the New Plan having obtained its maximum of 28,155,358l. in the year 1820, descends to 26,901,360l. in the year 1826, and must continue to decline after that period, so long as the excesses shall be deducted.

No. V.

"That an Increase of Charges for the Interest and Sinking Fund of Loans for the twenty years must take place under the New Plan, compared with the like charge, which would take place, were the present System persevered in.

EFFECTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

Annual Loan 11,000,000l. charge for interest and Sinking Fund..............	733,333
Amount of Loans for twenty years 220,000l. a charge for ditto.........	14,666,680

EFFECT OF THE NEW PLAN.

Charge of Suppl. Loans amounting in twenty years to 204,200,000l. expiring annuities deducted.........	14,266,388
War Taxes mortgaged at the end of twenty years, which are to be liberated successively in the next fourteen years, after the year 1826....	21,000,000
Charge as above under the present System....	14,666,660
Charge under the New Plan for the Supplementary Loans only.......	14,299,388
Difference.....................	370,272
War Taxes mortgaged as above for War Loans, according to the New Plan.	21,000,000
Ditto according to the present system.........	Nil

No. VI.

"That the Ways and Means proposed by the New Plan to prevent the necessity of imposing new Taxes to any considerable Amount, viz. the expiring Annuities, together with the excesses of the Sinking Fund, above the interest of the unredeemed Debt, are equally applicable *pro tanto*, to mitigate their increase under any other mode of raising Loans which may be decided on. The means proposed by the New Plan of defraying the Interest and Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Loans are as follows:

Produce of the Excess of the Sinking Fund between 1816 and 1826, above the interest of the unredeemed Debt..........................	11,122,809
Applicable by the falling in of Annuities..............................	683,092
New permanent Taxes, proposed by the New Plan to be raised between 1810 and 1817, to the Amount of,..	2,051,000
Total.........	13,856,861
Charge of Supplementary Loans, Annuities not deducted..............	14,296,388
Ways and Means as above.............	13,856,000
Remains to be provided for.....	440,388
Charge for the total amount of Loans, at the rate of 11,000,000*l.* a year, under the present system, at 733,333*l.* for interest and Sinking Fund, the expiring annuities not deducted..........................	14,656,660
As a Fund to supply this charge, the Ways and Means as above for raising the interest and Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Loans may be applied.........................	13,856,861
Remains to be provided for in order to cover the charge.....................	809,799

That it therefore appears, that the means to be applied under the New System to defray the charge for interest and Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Loans alone, would (exclusive of any mortgage on the War Loans), with the addition of Taxes to the amount of 369,411*l.* defray the total charges of the Loans required to complete the Fund of 32,000,000*l.* annually for War Expenditure, without the necessity of any incumbrance whatever upon the War Taxes.

No. VII.

"That the comparative effects which will be produced on the public income by the two systems, on return of peace, and on the formation of a peace establishment are as follows:—

UNDER THE PRESENT PLAN.

There would be no charge whatever upon any part of the War Taxes. The whole twenty-one millions would remain free. The Property Tax, or whatever portion of the other War Taxes were not required towards making an adequate provision for the peace establishment might be immediately remitted, leaving that resource unpledged and available on the recurrence of war.

UNDER THE NEW SYSTEM.

When peace takes place, a considerable part, if not the whole of the War Taxes, will have been mortgaged. In the latter case there will only remain a clear revenue of 6,700,000*l.* immediately applicable to support the charges of a peace establishment.

It appears that in 1806 the excess of the War Sinking Fund will be 9,967,283*l.* If this sum shall be then preferably applied to liberate a part of the Property Tax mortgaged for the War Debt, the remainder of the Property Tax, and all the War Taxes, will become Permanent Taxes, and Part of the Consolidated Fund, and be mortgaged like the other parts of that Fund, for the redemption of the War Debt, and the present Debt thus consolidated into a Common Debt, and the deficiency on the Peace Establishment must be provided for either by fresh Taxes, or fresh Loans.

No VIII.

" That the sum of 11 Millions a year, required in aid of the 21 Millions War Taxes, to complete the War Expenditure of 32 Millions may be raised (should the principle of applying the excesses of the SinkingFund to the Public Service be decided on) according to the following mode, without mortgaging the War Taxes, or rendering new Taxes of any materially greater amount necessary than it is proposed to lay on by the new System, and without making so considerable an addition to the Debt, as will be made should the new System be carried into execution.

The Sum required as above to provide for a Loan of Eleven Millions per annum, for 20 years, is........	14,666,660
The Resources available amount to..	13,856,861
Deficiency........	809,799

This deficiency of 809,799*l.* exceeding only by 362,431*l.* the charges for Supplementary Loans would remain an additional Charge to be provided for.

As the Charges upon a Loan of Eleven Millions would in each year amount to 733,333*l.* if it should be thought fit, in aid of the Annuities, to raise only the precise amount of Taxes proposed by the New Plan to be imposed in the first ten years, until the excesses of the Sinking Fund shall arise in 1816, the difference between the above Funds and the Annual Charge of 733,333*l.* (amounting on an average to 489,682*l.* a year), must be added, as it arises, to the Loan of the Year, the Interest and Sinking Fund thereon, amounting to about 33,000*l.* a year, to be defrayed, in the first instance, out of the Consolidated Fund; and to be afterwards replaced out of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund as they accrue.

No. IX.

" That nearly the same results may be produced by determining, that, when the Loan of the Year in war does not exceed the amount of the Sinking Fund in the said year, instead of making provision for the interest of the said Loan by new Taxes, the same shall be provided for by and out of the interest receivable on the amount of Stock in that year redeemed by the commissioners of the National Debt; in which case the amount of Debt unredeemed will continue stationary during war.

The Sinking Fund is at present	8,515,042
It will be in 1811 -------	11,140,274

In four years, therefore, from the present time, no new Taxes will be required (the data remaining the same), however long the War may continue; and the War Taxes will remain free at the close of the War, when the Sinking Fund will resume its progressive operation; the purchase of Stock by the Commissioners being continued in the mean time to the full amount of the Sinking Fund.—That the Charge for four years Loans as above, for 11 Millions in each year, taking credit for 385,515*l.* Annuities, amounts to 2,547,810*l.*—Taxes required in each year, for the next four years 623,970*l.*—The Taxes so to be imposed exceed only by 496,810*l.* the total amount of New Taxes, proposed by the New Plan, to be imposed between 1810 and 1817, by which Plan the War Taxes are at the same time progressively absorbed and pledged, for the Redemption of the Loans raised upon them.—According to this Plan, the Debt would continue stationary at 369,390,887*l.* throughout the war.

Amount of Debt in 1826, by New Plan, taken at..................	455,517,932
Ditto, in 1826, by this Plan........	369,390,887
Difference of Debt in favour of this Plan............................	86,147,045

And no War taxes are mortgaged.

No. X.

" That the expence of raising any given amount of Loan on the present system, viz. by a single Loan with a Sinking Fund of one per cent. as compared with the principle of the New Plan of raising the same amount by double and concurrent Loans:, the one raised upon a Fund of ten per Cent. for Interest and Sinking Fund; the other raised upon a Fund of six per cent. for Interest and Sinking Fund, calculating the payments on account thereof from the commencement to the final liquidation of the said Loan, is as follows, the Sinking Fund, in both cases, being taken on the money instead of the nominal capital.

Suppose 12,000,000*l.* to be raised,

NEW PLAN.

10 per Cent. Interest and Sinking Fund on............ 12,000,000*l.* for one year.........................	1,200,000
A like Charge for 13 years more, at which time the Principal is redeemed............................	15,600,000
Total Payments........	16,000,000

To cover the Interest and Sinking Fund of 1,200,000*l.* at six per Cent, a Fund of 72,000*l.* must be provided in each of the fourteen years, the amount thereof is 1,008,000*l.* The latter sum being raised on a One per Cent. Sinking Fund, may be considered as an Annuity of forty-three years.

Payments on account thereof.	43,344,000
Payments as above........ ...	16,800,000
Total Payments........	60,144,000

PRESENT SYSTEM.

The Interest and Sinking Fund, on a loan of 12,000,000*l.* at six per cent. amounts per ann. to 720,000*l.* This Charge being raised on a One per Cent. Sinking Fund, may be considered as an Annuity of forty-three years.

Payments to be made on acct. thereof till its Redemption 30,960,000*l.*

Payments on new system upon a loan of 12,000,000*l.*.....................	60,144,000
Ditto, on present system.............	30,960,000
Excess of the Charge of Redemption by new system	29,184,000*l.*"

Lord *Henry Petty* did not feel it necessary to say more than a few words on the present occasion, because it was neither desirable for the house nor for himself that he should follow the noble lord through his very able seeech, and the clear view he had given of his objections to the New Financial System that had been submitted to the house on a former night. It was, however, necessary for him to make a few observations upon one point, which had been touched upon by the noble lord, in order to prevent any misconception of what had fallen from himself on a former night from going further. The great objection of the noble lord to the system that had been submitted to the house was, that it went to legislate for the future. Though the noble lord admitted that it would be right to look to the future in the arrangement of any system, he did not think it desirable that any legislative enactment should be resorted to for that purpose. He had himself stated, that it would be necessary for the house to look prospectively to the situation of the country, in the adoption of any system; but that it would not be desirable to make any legislative enactment on an assumption of future events, which might prove contrary to all calculation, and were solely under the controul of Providence. He had expressly asserted, that if any essential alteration were to take place in the plan, it would not arise from any such alteration of events, or of the circumstances of the country. What were the changes that were likely to take place? An increase of expenditure, from the demand for foreign subsidies from without, or from the rise of labour, or of the price of stores within. He had particularly adverted to contingent circumstances, and stated, that in proportion as any increase took place in the expenditure from either of these causes, that increase was to be provided for by an increase of the supplemental loans, and an increase of the interest thereon. Another change which he had adverted to was one which might arise from the failure of any of the duties imposed; but for this there was a provision in the plan, because parliament was pledged to make good such deficiency by other duties. He begged to call the attention of the house to this fact, that neither he with his feeble powers, nor those who were much wiser than him, had ever had the presumption to state to the house that they could anticipate the future, or prepare any plan which would cover all the exigencies of a war for 20 years without any change. The noble lord had observed in the same way upon what he termed the narrow view taken by him of the expenditure of the country. But in taking that view, he had no certain criterion to go by but the expenditure of the present year: every other criterion would have been loose and uncertain. The noble lord had said, that he should have taken the average of an extraordinary War Expenditure, but had stated, that it would be unsafe for him, looking to what had happened on the continent, considering the change that had taken place in Europe, to deceive himself by taking any standard of expenditure from such a source. It was rather extraordinary, that, when the noble lord objected to any legislature for the future, he wished to take the possible future expenditure, in the event of a British army being employed to co-operate with the powers of the continent, in the course of 3 or 4 years, in which time they might be wholly subjugated, or, what they all most desired, might have re-established their independence, as the criterion of expenditure. Having stated this, he had only to request of the house and of the country, that they would receive his proposition such as it was, and as it candidly professed to be, and not look upon him as responsible for any alteration that might take place. If he continued to fill the situation which he then held, it would be his duty to explain the cause of the change when it occurred. He could not but remark, that, in the plan that had been submitted by the noble lord, he had availed himself of what had never been laid down by him as a single or separate principle. The noble lord had taken advantage of the excess of the Sinking Fund, without adverting to the concurrent principle of adding to that Fund, which was a leading feature of his system. He had himself, however, proposed to equalise the operation of the Sinking Fund by adding to it now with a view to take from it hereafter; but the noble lord had taken all the beneficial result, and left out of his plan the operating cause. He should not then enter farther into the consideration of the plan of the noble lord, but trusted that the adjourned debate would take place on the most convenient day, which he supposed would be Monday next, the day of the discussion of his own Resolutions, beyond which day he could not consent to have the discussion deferred, in consideration of the effect that the delay might have on the Ways and Means of the year. He was ready to give the noble lord all the assistance in his power, and assured him that he would, not only in this instance, but at all times, be ready to attend to any suggestions from him, or from any of the hon. gentlemen near him.

Mr. *Rose* did not propose to enter then into the discussion of the Resolutions that had been submitted. He wished merely to state, that he was not satisfied with the data of the noble lord opposite, or of his noble friend, though he thought those of his noble friend less liable to objection. On Monday he should state his opinions on the subject, though he should not throw any obstacle in the way of the ways and means of the year. The plan of the noble lord, however appeared to him a permanent one; and, if once adopted, it would not be possible to make any alteration in it for 20 years, without convulsing the whole system. —The debate was then adjourned to Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, February 13.

[PETITION RESPECTING THE HAMPSHIRE ELECTION.] Mr. *Asheton Smith* rose pursuant to notice, to submit a motion to the house on the subject of the Petition, which he had the honour to present on a former day (see p. 684). But before he should proceed further, he thought it regular that the Petition, and also the Resolution of that house of the 10th of December, 1779, should be read. The Petition was then read, as likewise the Resolution of 1779, which declared. 'That it is 'highly criminal in any minister or ministers, or other servants under the crown of 'Great Britain, directly or indirectly, to use 'the powers of office in the election of representatives to serve in parliament; and an attempt at such influence will at all times 'be resented by this house, as aimed at its 'own honour, dignity, and independency, 'as an infringement of the dearest rights 'of every subject throughout the Empire, 'and tending to sap the basis of this free 'and happy constitution.'—The hon. gent. then proceeded to state, that in bringing this question under the consideration of the house, he was actuated solely by a sense of public duty. So far from entertaining any hostile disposition towards the hon. member who was particularly alluded to in the petition, he felt the highest respect for him, and considered him only as having acted under the directions of the government. The petition, it would be recollected, charged that hon. gent. with having written to the Barrack-Master-General, directing him to use the whole extensive influence of the Barrack Department, in order to promote the election of the candidates recommended by the ministers for the representation of the county of Southampton. This interference was the more extraordinary and unprecedented, because the influence of the government was otherwise very extensive in that county. The consequence of this letter from the Secretary of the treasury to the Barrack Master General, and of the activity of that department, was, that an hon. gent. who had represented that county for 16 years, with fidelity and credit, had been unsuccessful at the last election. If the freeholders of the county had been left to the free, unbiassed, and independent exercise of their suffrages, he was confident that that gentleman would now be seated as their representative in that house. It was for this invasion of their rights, that the petitioners laid their case before parliament, and were anxiously wishing for an opportunity of proving the allegations in their petition to that house. They had an anxious hope and wish that the house would take such steps, as in its wisdom would seem meet, in order to prevent in future the occurrence of such unconstitutional practices. Otherwise the representation of that great county would be under the controul of the government, and the most valuable rights of the people would be annihilated. He trusted that the house of commons would ever be ready to resist such unjustifiable attempts to infringe the franchises of the electors, and thereby to undermine the independence and integrity of the representative body of the nation. He therefore moved, that the Petition be referred to the Committee of Privileges to examine the matter thereof, and to report the same, together with their opinion thereon, to the house.

Sir *Henry Mildmay* rose to second the motion of his hon. friend. The allegations of that petition had been ably brought under the view of the house by the manliness, the moderation, and the talents of his hon. friend. In touching upon the subject of this petition, he confessed he felt considerable difficulty, because of the prominent share he had borne on the occasion to which it refered; because any observations he should make upon it, might perhaps be considered as the result of his feelings of disappointment. But under all the circumstances of the case, he considered it not only a duty he owed to the individuals, whose rights had been invaded, but a still greater duty to the house, to the public, and to himself, to trace, to detect, and to expose such unconstitutional interference on the part of his majesty's ministers. This interference had been exerted in a most unjustifiable and open manner on that occasion, not only in defiance of the principles of the constitution, but in the teeth of a resolution of that house. His hon. friend had not, by his motion, called upon the house to come to any hasty or premature decision; he had only proposed to them to adopt a proceeding analogous to what had been pursued on a former occasion, of nearly a similar nature. On searching for precedents, however, he admitted that there were none to be found precisely analogous to the present case. But the unconstitutional interference with the freedom of election was no less a subject worthy of the attention of that house. When this petition had been presented, a noble lord opposite (lord Temple) had stated, that the petition had for a long time occupied the public attention, and that much pains had been taken to poison the public mind upon the subject of it. From the gestures of the hon. gents. on the treasury bench, he supposed they conceived that to have been the case; but the statement was utterly unsupported by any proof, and, as far as the petitioners were concerned, was wholly unfounded in fact. He was glad that the petition was at length submitted to the consideration of the house, and he agreed entirely with the noble lord, that if they should fail in substantiating the charge contained in it, on them the whole blame and censure should fall. But, if they should succeed in proving the allegations of the petition: if they should make out a stronger case even than the charges in the petition amounted to, he trusted the noble lord would agree with him that the house was bound to adopt some proceedings with a view to do justice between the parties, with a view to redeem the solemn pledge, which it had given in the resolution of 1779, in which it declared it highly criminal in a minister of the crown to use the power of his office for the purpose of influencing an election. He trusted too, that the noble lord would not employ the weight of his commanding eloquence, nor the government extend the protecting shield of its power, in order to arrest the measures which might appear to the house necessary on such an occasion. And here he wished to advert to certain particularities in the situation of the county of Southampton, which rendered the transaction still more culpable. There was no county of equal extent, population, and wealth, in which the government, independant of the interference complained of in the petition, had so much influence as in Hampshire. There was more of church, collegiate, and copyhold property, which gave no right to the elective franchise in that county, than in any other of equal extent, consequently there was less of freehold property and fewer electors. The interference of government, therefore, struck more effectually at the independance of the representation. There was also in that county one of the principal naval arsenals of the kingdom, the number of persons employed in which, that had freeholds, exceeded 400. These were persons, constantly, regularly, and exclusively employed by government in the docks, and subject to its controul. There was also in the neighbourhood of Portsmouth, an infinite variety of persons, who were frequently employed by the navy board, the whole of whom could be controuled by the executive government. This he stated only by way of explanation, as it did not form any part of the matter of the petition. If no addition were to be made to this influence, which had increased, was increasing, and must continue to increase, as long as the extent of the British navy should be augmenting, it would give the government a powerful interest in that county. But not content with that, the administration had enlisted the whole barrack department into its service, and employed the persons engaged in that department, as its agents to promote the election of its favourite candidates. So that it was impossible for any private individual to grapple with the power of government in that county, and the executive possessed the means of reducing it to the condition of a close borough, for which they could nominate the representatives. But in order to come nearer to the subject, he should beg leave to read the documents upon which this proceeding rested; and first, the paper, which was the foundation of the whole business. Here the hon. baronet read an extract from the first letter of sir Wm. Heathcote to the Hampshire club, stating the application of lord Temple, authorised by lord Grenville, to himself, intimating to him, that government would not oppose his re-election, in the event of a dissolution, if he did not coalesce with Mr. Chute, against whom government proposed to set up a candidate, Mr. Chute having put himself in systematic opposition to government. By this it would appear, that the interference of the executive in that county had not originated with the secretary to the treasury, nor with the comptroller of the navy, but was a preconcerted, premeditated, and predigested plan of the government, to dictate representatives to the county of Southampton, and to exclude a respectable gentleman who had represented that county for 16 years. It was, however, in candour, necessary for him to state, that the noble lord had given a subsequent explanation of that transaction, and without at all imputing any wilful misrepresentation to either of these persons, there appeared to him a contradiction in their statements. It would be for the house to decide which was most likely to be correct, sir Wm. Heathcote, who retired to his closet after the interview to make a memorandum of what passed, with a view to its publication, or the noble lord, who, without the aid of any memorandum whatever, three weeks after, gave an explanation of it. The next letter he had to notice was one dated Sept. 22, from William Fremantle, esq. one of the secretaries of the treasury, to the barrack-master-general. This letter had been sent by the barrack-master-general, general Hewitt, inclosed in one from himself to major Davies, deputy barrack-master-general. General Hewitt, in his letter, stated that he could not better carry into effect the recommendation of Mr. Fremantle, than by inclosing this letter to major Davies. The hon. baronet here read the letter from the secretary of the treasury to the barrack-master-general, recommending the government candidates, the hon. Mr. Herbert and Mr. Thistlethwaite, to his favourable influence, and requesting him to mention the same to the other gentlemen of the department. This letter had been marked "on his majesty's service," and the copy which he had of it had been taken from the letter which had been in the possession of major Davies. In consequence of it, every exertion had been made, and with success. To this major Davies had replied, that the committee were of opinion that his canvass would be more effectual at Lymington and the Isle of Wight. The next letter was from general Hewitt, to major Davies, informing him that he might go to Lymington if he could obtain the permission of the commander of the district, but at the same time that he could not be allowed any thing to defray the expences of his journey, this being a species of service which could not be inserted in the public account. The impression on his mind from this letter was, that there were two accounts kept in the barrack department, one public and the other private [a cry of no? no?]. Well! this showed more than any thing else the necessity of going into the committee, in order to ascertain whether or no there was any private account. The next letter was from major Davies to the barrack-master-general, stating that his destination had been fixed for Lymington and the Isle of Wight, and that his route had been sketched by lord Carnarvon, to that point, as not very far from the residence of Mr. Rose. Now, he could not see how this noble personage should appear in such a transaction. He knew there was such a person as earl Carnarvon, who had been formerly a distinguished member of that house, and who was a near connexion of one of the candidates, but he could not suppose that the noble personage would make himself a party to any such unconstitutional proceeding. But he could tell him that he might hereafter spare himself the trouble of sending to canvass that neighbourhood, because the experience and weight of his right hon. friend's character and public conduct insured to him and to his connections the support of his neighbours. The next letter he had to notice, was one in which major Davies stated, that the duke of Cumberland would not suffer him to depart for Lymington, till he should himself set out for Wales, which he imputed to a fear, on the part of his royal highness, lest his efforts should produce an effect inimical to his political connections. This, no doubt, was matter of conjecture only; but if he understood any thing of the character of that illustrious personage, with whom he had had the honour of being a considerable time acquainted, he was convinced he could not be influenced by any such feelings. The last letter which he had to notice, was one dated January the 1st, 1806, which ought evidently to be 1807, in which it was stated, that Major Davies was prosecuted by Mr. Deverell, on the opposite side, and thus he had an offer made to him by Colonel St. John, on the part of one of the most respectable men in the county, of relieving him from all his embarrassments, if he would give up the treasury letters in his possession, which proposal he had rejected. He was as curious as any man, to find out who this "most respectable" man of the county was; for though he had been 40 years resident in Hampshire, if he were asked to point such a person out, he should find it difficult. However, as this person who could so bully and bribe with the same breath, who was so ready to discharge major Davies from his embarrasments, might also have means of injuring him, he was bound to state that he had obtained copies of the letters from a person who had them in his possession, previous to the election. From this written evidence they could shew, that the government had issued its mandates to the barrack department, and that its directions had been faithfully executed, "Ex uno disce omnes." The same course had been adopted in all the other departments, and particularly by the comptroller of the navy. If they could prove the fact in one instance, that would be sufficient to prove their case. He felt, that in this instance the principles of the constitution were involved, and that there was no borough, so hermetically sealed, to which this influence, if countenanced, might not extend. This was a case that involved the honour, the dignity, and the independence of parliament. If the house were to suffer such practices to pass uncensured; if it were to forfeit the solemn pledge contained in its former resolutions, it would forfeit its own character, honour and authority. Here he begged leave to read the letter of the duke of Chandos, which had given rise to the resolution of 1779, and which only recommended to some friend, to attend the county meeting at Southampton, in order to add to the respectability of the assembly. Yet the duke of Chandos was a person who had considerable property in the county, and wrote only to a private individual, whilst the secretary of the treasury, who had written in this case, had no property in the county, and had set a whole public department in motion. He had done his duty, in promoting the application by petition to that house, and in tracing the case through its whole progress, and should therefore in this instance, follow up that duty by voting, that the petition be referred to the committee of privileges.—On the question being put,

Mr. *Fremantle* said, that in rising to vindicate himself from the charges that had been brought against him, he felt considerable fears, not from any consciousness of guilt, but from the difficulty which unavoidably arose from his not having been accustomed to parliamentary speaking. But how much greater must his difficulty be, when he reflected that his own character and conduct, and the character and even the very existence of the government under which he acted, was committed in the present charge? He had only therefore to throw himself upon the indulgence of the house, whilst he repelled the charges to the best of his ability. From the moment of the dissolution of parliament, rumours had been in circulation upon the subject of the interference of government in the county of Southampton. He trusted that he should be able to shew that these rumours had been magnified and exaggerated beyond what the case would warrant. No wonder, therefore, that the public mind should have been affected by such statements. He was confident, however, that he should be able to shew that he had not committed either the government or himself upon this occasion. When the charge was brought forward against him personally, he should have thought he was entitled to the same attention as any other individual who might happen to be accused. He could not account, therefore, for the conduct of those who had signed and brought forward the petition against him. He was satisfied with the explanation that had been given by the hon. gent. who presented it. He had been long known to that hon. gent. and was not sensible of having incurred either his displeasure or animosity. As to the other gentlemen who signed the petition, he had been known to many of them, and was equally ignorant of his having, in any one shape, deserved their hostility. One of the hon. members who had signed the petition, whom he did not then see in his place (Mr. Dent), had within a very few days given him, as a pledge of the continuance of his former feeling towards him, a splendid and hospitable entertainment at his house. If he could trifle either with the subject or with the house, he should say that he had been invited to be fattened and pampered for a public spectacle. However, he might acquit that hon. member of such intention, because he believed he had signed the petition ignorant and unconscious of what it contained, and he begged him, if in the house, to be persuaded that he felt no resentment against him.—This was not the petition that had been sanctioned by the freeholders of the county, but a perfectly new one, that had been framed within a few days. The hon. member to whom he had alluded, had only lent his name to what he conceived a general charge against the government. The rumours that had been circulated respecting the unconstitutional interference of the government had been kept up with such industry, though not founded in fact, and he should add, resting only upon falsehood, that it was no wonder if they had made some impression upon the public mind. But he was ready to answer for the fact, and he should be ashamed ever to put pen to paper, if he could shrink from a responsibility, for every syllable he had written. It was unnecessary for the hon. baronet to have taken so much pains, respecting the letter he had written, of which however, he had obtained but a copy. It would be for him to state that no charge could be substantiated against any person, on the bare ground of an unauthenticated copy. He did not by any means intend to take that course, though if he were so inclined, he appealed to the House, whether he might not object to such a foundation of a charge against him; but he did not deny the letter, on the contrary, he had taken some pains to procure the original, for which he could appeal to his friends, in order to enable the house to form a judgment of the merits of the case. As the hon. baronet had read that letter, he trusted the house would permit him to read it also. The hon. gent here read the letter, which had been read before by the hon. baronet. The letter was dated Treasury Chambers, Sept. 22, some time previous to the dissolution, and was marked "private." He should not say that many letters on official business might not be sometimes marked in this manner, but certainly the gentlemen opposite, who had so much more experience in the business of office than he had, must know that letters so marked were never preserved by official copies in the office. He only recommended the candidates whom he wished to succeed, to the favourable influence of the barrack-master-general, and requested of him to recommend them to the other gentlemen in that department. These were the expressions he made use of, and he was ready both to claim and to justify them. Now, as to the charge "that William Fre‘mantle, esq. one of the secretaries, who ‘had no property in the county, had employ‘ed the power of his office to influence the ‘election," he could easily dispose of that. It was one of the unfortunate consequences of the petition having been brought forward without any communication being made to him on the subject, that such a statement as that had found its way into the petition. If the honourable members who brought forward the petition, had informed him of its contents, he could have saved them the trouble of presenting it at all; he would have saved them the disgrace they must feel from the indignation of the house, or he would have saved the house the trouble of listening to his justification. The answer that he had to make to that charge was, that he was a freeholder of the county of Southampton, that he had a property in that county, and that he had as good a right as any of the gentlemen who had thought proper to sign the petition, to employ all the means which his property, influence, or connections afforded, to promote the election of those candidates whom he wished to succeed. He had for many years possessed a property in that county; and his nearest and dearest connections lived there, who were in the habit of consulting him, and who would be influenced by his advice, had properties in that county equal to any, and larger than the properties of most of those whose names were to the petition. Though he had been settled at the Treasury, it did not follow that he was to be denied that which was the birthright of every Englishman, the right of giving his support and influence to the candidate whom he preferred. If he were to be deprived of that right by his office, he would not hold the office for five minutes.—So far he had considered the question on the ground of private feelings. He should next ask the hon. baronet, by what law it was that he was deprived of this right, merely because he held the situation of secretary to the treasury? The resolution of the house in 1779, extended only to persons who should use the power of their official situations to influence elections, but did not preclude persons holding offices from giving their votes and interest to whatever candidate they pleased. He was not aware of any law to that effect, and he begged the house to look at the situation it would be in, was every member of the government of this country, whatever might be their talents, their wealth, their consequence, or their other claims to be high in the estimation of their countrymen, deprived of all the influence natural to such qualifications, solely because they happened to fill an office in the government. Was that a doctrine that could be supported in that house or tolerated in this country? Having thus stated that he was not restricted by any law from pursuing the course he had followed, that his property gave him the right, and that that right was strengthened by the consideration of the property possessed in the county by his nearest and dearest connections, he had next to state another motive, which had induced him to take an interest in the election for Hampshire. Mr Thistlethwaite, one of the candidates, was his cousin by marriage, and their families were connected by all the ties of affinity and friendship. Under such circumstances, he should have been wanting in the proper feelings of attachment if he had not exerted himself to promote the success of a candidate in whom his nearest and dearest connections had such an interest, provided, that in so doing, he did not employ the power of his official situation. He begged here to bring back the attention of gentlemen to the letter, and he would then ask whether there was a single expression in it which could be construed to convey the command of office. He had written in precisely the same terms that any gentleman not holding an official situation, would, to the head of a department with whom he was acquainted. He had known general Hewitt, and had understood that major Davies was a freeholder in the county of Southampton, and had applied to general Hewitt for the purpose of obtaining that vote. Whether he had been rightly informed as to major Davies having a vote, he could not tell, but he had reason to believe that he had not voted either for Mr. Herbert. or Mr. Thistlethwaite. The hon. baronet had stated, that the whole barrack department had been put in motion, and that considerable influence had been thereby created in the decision of the election. But he challenged the hon. baronet or any of the gentlemen by him, to prove the influence thus charged. If he was well informed, not a single individual connected with the barrack department, had given a vote at the election, and even major Davies had not voted, either for Mr. Herbert, or Mr. Thistlethwaite. The hon. baronet had likewise brought forward several letters which had been written on the subject of the one originally written by him. But he trusted the house would not think him responsible for any letter but that of which he had himself been the author, and which, he trusted he had shewn, could neither implicate him nor the government under which he acted. The hon. baronet had also read a letter of the duke of Chandos which had given rise to the resolution of parliament in the year 1779. It would be recollected that the duke of Chandos had been a peer of parliament, and consequently disqualified by a resolution of that house from interfering with elections. He was a freeholder of the county, and possessed as good a right as any of the petitioners to canvass his tenants or his friends, in favour of the candidates he preferred. So far he trusted the house would feel that he was justified in going. Having said thus much of the charge contained in the petition, he should now begin to state the only two grounds of crimination against ministers, for an exercise of undue influence. The first was, when they abused their patronage either by holding out menaces or rewards to persons employed in the public departments, with a view to influence their voices at an election. On this head he could only say, that neither a menace of punishment nor a promise of reward had been held out by the treasury, at the last election, to any person in any department of the state; and if any such proceedings had taken place, they must have passed through his hands. There had been no abuse of the patronage of government in any department in the kingdom. But the allegations of this petition were not expressive of the sense of the county of Southampton. The petition had been obtained surreptitiously, privately and clandestinely, and was signed only by 112 persons, who could not be said to express the sense of a county in which there were 6000 electors; the petition therefore did not contain the sense of the county. Was there a fact brought forward to prove its allegations, or was it supported by any charge from any other part of the kingdom? It rested solely upon the credit of the 112 gentlemen who had signed it, and who had signed it on a belief that he had not been a freeholder of the county, and had consequently no right to interfere. The second ground, upon which charges of undue interference could be made against government, was the profligate use of their power in the abuse of the disposal of the public money. As far as his knowledge went, no such practise had, or could have taken place, though he had heard that other governments had resorted to such means of influence. He could with the greatest confidence assert, that no money, not a single shilling, had been issued from the treasury, directly or indirectly, for the purposes of the late election. He wished this to be well understood by the house, and to go forth to the public and to the world, and he would not pledge his credit and character upon the assertion, if he had not the most positive certainty of its truth. There had not been a single shilling issued, neither of secret service money, nor of any other fund, levied upon the public, for such an unworthy purpose. These were the only two points upon which charges could be brought for undue interference against government. He had answered the charges that had been brought against him to the best of his judgment, and he took that opportunity of protesting against the doctrine, that the individuals who may compose an administration, had not the same right as others to give their individual influence and support to such candidates as they may prefer. The hon. gent here briefly recapitulated his former statements, and declared that the exercise of any unconstitutional influence was as repugnant to his own feelings as it would be hostile to the wishes of those with whom he was connected, and by whom he had been placed in the situation he then held. If he had been guilty of such conduct it would have deprived him of the good opinion of those whose approbation he most coveted, and the apprehension of what he most valued was, next to his own principles, the best security against such unconstitutional conduct. He might have had an opportunity of recriminating by charges of a much more dangerous tendency than those preferred against him, but he would have been ashamed of himself, if he could descend to such a course. As he trusted he was incapable of acting in the manner imputed, he should with confidence throw himself upon the justice of the house.

Sir *Henry Mildmay* in explanation said, that he had not asserted that the petition had the sanction of a county meeting.

Mr. *Broderick* expressed his surprise at the speech of the hon. secretary of the treasury, and had never heard sentiments avowed in parliament so directly in the teeth of the resolution of the house. He said that he had property in the county, and he believed that the fact was so, but his situation in the treasury would be more attended to by barrack-masters and others, over whom the treasury might be supposed to have some influence. The hon. secretary had said, that this was not the petition of the county. Certainly not. It had never been presented as such. But it was not his business to say how the voters, who wished to petition, were to assemble. He (Mr. B.) was not in the habit of attending clubs, and knew nothing about their mode of proceeding. But the hon. secretary's friends on the bench near him, might give him any information on that head he might require. As to the right of government to interfere in elections, the hon. secretary had said, that no threat, no improper influence, could have been used by the government without his knowledge; so extensive was his connection with all its members. This circumstance would prevail much more with the barrack-masters than any consideration of the hon. secretary's property in the county. It had been said by a right hon. gent. the other night, that this petition ought to have been presented sooner. He hoped that upon reflection he would take a longer view of parliamentary duties. When any one had a matter of great and serious moment to the interests of the house and of the country to propose, he ought to have credit for his motives, and to be allowed to bring it forward at the time which, in the exercise of his own discretion, he might think proper.

Mr. *W. Herbert* expressed his satisfaction that the stream of calumny which had been so industriously spread all over the country, which had been swelled by every possible means abroad, and nourished by insinuations even in that house, had been at last brought to the test of public investigation. But, however much he felt satisfied at this, he must say something respecting the conduct of those who presented this petition. They ought to have presented it at an earlier period. But an hon. gent. had said, that they had been desirious of presenting it at the opening of the session, but that they had thought proper to delay the matter till a full attendance of county members might be expected. But what could he say to justify himself, if it should appear to be true that the petition did not exist at the opening of the session, nor had been even in contemplation; but that another petition, different from this, and containing no distinct charge against his hon. friend, was then intended to be presented, but was afterwards abandoned from want of grounds? He did not say this lightly; and he took the liberty of adverting to it in order to enable the house to judge whether this petition was presented from party motives, or with a view to the interests of justice. He then adverted to the assertions that had been made respecting the interference of government in the dock-yards, and denied that any improper interference had taken place there. For this he had the authority of the commissioners, and other officers of the dock-yards, who declared that they had exercised no improper influence over the artificers, nor had endeavoured to detach such of them as were connected with the other party from their friends and connections. This affair of the dock-yards was the subject of the other petition, which had been abandoned. But having ascertained that there were no substantial grounds for this, they had resorted to this unfounded charge against his hon. friend. Threats and calumnies had been used on the other side, however, even by some invested with magisterial authority. Such threats had been used, not only to procure votes, but to force voters to violate their pledges. After the able and manly defence of his hon. friend, little remained for him to say on the merits of the charge; but he would ask the hon. baronet (sir H Mildmay) how he could produce papers there that had been disavowed by another hon. baronet, who had first made the statements contained in them. That hon. baronet had confessed that he could not pledge himself as to their accuracy, as he was dull of hearing. He insisted on the right of the individuals composing the government, to interfere in elections like any other individuals, and expressed his hope that the house would join with him in censuring the conduct of those who had presented this frivolous and unfounded petition.

Mr. *Jeffery* said, that after the bold assertions made by the secretary of the treasury that no influence had been used by government, either in Hampshire or any other place, he could not rest satisfied with giving a silent vote on the question, for fear it might be taken as a sympton that he assented to the truth of those assertions. He would therefore request the attention of the house till he gave a few reasons, which came within his own knowledge, and which in fact related to himself, to shew the house why he, for one, could not place confidence in those assertions. That very hon. gent. the secretary of the treasury, had openly and plainly told him, that if he again offered himself as a candidate for Poole, he must not expect the influence of government in his favour, which he had formerly experienced, because he had in the last parliament opposed and voted against the government: that they were therefore determined to oppose him. Here some murmurs taking place, Mr. Jeffery said, "Nay, hear me out, I have not half done yet." He then proceeded to say, that the secretary of the Treasury went on to inform him, that if he persisted in standing as a candidate, government would endeavour to open the borough, and try the right of the commonalty, which had once before been done without effect. He stated further, that after the first government candidate had tried a canvass, and afterwards declined the contest, it had been publicly notified that the patronage of government was to be given to Michael Angelo Taylor, esq. Places which were before promised to certain persons, were actually given to others, in order to obtain their support of the candidate who opposed him in his native place. These and many other instances of a similar kind, shewed, beyond contradiction, that the undue influence of government had been exerted; and therefore that the secretary to the treasury should deny there was any such thing, he should have thought impossible.

Mr. *Biddulph.*—Sir, the hon. gent. who spoke last but one, has, in an ardent and energetic manner, called upon the house to express its disapprobation of the principle and allegations of the petition, on which the motion of the hon. gent. near me is founded. Really sir, with the feelings which I entertain on this subject, and without the least party bias, for, in this house, or out of it, I am attached to no political party, I can by no means subscribe to the hopes and wishes of the hon. gent. nor conceal my opinion that the petition is a proper one, introduced on proper grounds, and for the introduction of which, whatever delay may have been occasioned, the persons who have taken it up, deserve the warmest gratitude of parliament. There have fallen sentiments from the hon. gent. whose name is particularly alluded to in this petition, which I do confess have struck me with no small share of astonishment; indeed, when I heard him this night asserting the positive right of government to interfere, as a government, in the exercise of the elective franchise, I felt not only astonished, but actually dismayed. This, sir, is a principle against which it is the duty of this house to make a stand, and which should not be suffered to escape, without the individual reprobation of every member of this house, together with the expressed and recorded disavowal of the legislature. That hon. gent. has also declared, that no kind of undue influence was exerted, during the late election, by any department or individual of his majesty's government; that if such influence had been exerted, from the situation which he held as Secretary of the Treasury, it could not have escaped his notice and observation; in fact, he has told us, that it must have actually gone through him, as the official channel. With this voluntary statement from the hon. gent. upon this plain and perspicuous acknowledgment, I put it to himself and to the house to decide, whether a considerable suspicion does not naturally attach to the interference of a person so connected with his majesty's government, in the elective rights of the people, and whether it did not become a peremptory point of duty with the hon. gent. to exercise the most scrupulous caution and delicacy, in any step, either personal or official, which he might have been induced to take, with reference to the election of members of parliament? It has this night come out, that he, a public character, did write to the head of the Barrack Department of the county of Southampton, a letter, dated from the official Chamber of the Treasury, the purport of which was, to desire his influence with all those connected with that department, to obtain their votes for the gentlemen who had started on the ministerial interest. In what way, I ask, was such a communication to be received by the officers of that department? or what impression must such a request, on the part of a gentleman who held a high official situation in a branch of the government with which the Barrack Department had frequent intercourse, have made on the persons thus addressed? I do seriously contend, that such a communication must be considered as one of those suite of orders they were in the habit of receiving from the Treasury. Arguing from my own view of the case, I conceive, that such was the natural impression of that request, and that the officers or persons to whom the application was made, did consider such application directly official. But the house has been told, that not one of the officers employed in that department, did actually vote for either of the candidates, who were supposed to possess the influence of government. Such a circumstance, in no degree changes the view of the case, nor in any manner lessens the charge of undue influence, if that charge be otherwise well-founded. The influence was not to operate on the officers of the Barrack Department alone; but it was to be exercised by those officers over the numerous persons they may be fairly supposed to be connected with, and under the direct controul of, the Barrack department. For instance, the owners of barns hired out for barracks; the dealers in hay, oats and those various other articles, which that branch of our establishment so particularly demands. With the merits of this petition, I was totally unacquainted, until this night. My opinion I have formed from what has fallen from the hon. gent. who have preceded me in this discussion. From the acknowledgment of the hon. gent. the Secretary of the Treasury, I do feel, that the privileges of this house, and the liberties of the people, have received, by his influence, in the county of Southampton, a constitutional stab, and that it becomes a paramount duty with the representatives of the people, to immediately interfere. With such a conviction, I shall certainly support the motion for referring this petition to a committee of privileges.

Mr. *Fremantle*, in explanation, said that he meant that the individuals in the government had as good a right to interfere as those of a corporate body. As to the other position, he only said that unconstitutional interference could not have come through the Treasury without his knowledge; for other departments he had distinctly stated others would be responsible.

Mr. *Charles Jenkinson* rose, and in a maiden speech, addressed the house as follows:—I rise, Sir, with feelings of pride and satisfaction, to acknowledge myself as one of those who have lent their names to the petition which at present engages the attention of the house. I subscribed it from the strong conviction I felt of the truth of its allegations, and with an ardent hope that the house of commons would interpose its constitutional protection between the privileges of the elective body, and the destructive strides of ministerial encroachment. These feelings originated in my mind, not from the solitary case of the county of Southampton; they were justified by the conduct and hostility which I myself experienced, as one of those individuals against whom the shafts of ministerial influence were strongly, but unsuccessfully directed. At Dover, for which port I have the honour of being a representative, there are two parties; the one immediately under the influence of the Victualling Board, the other controuled by the Ordnance Department. From such causes, a number of the electors had determined to give one vote at the request of the principals in these respective branches, reserving to themselves the right of supporting me with the second. This determination was not in unison with the inclinations of his majesty's government, and a communication was absolutely made to all persons in the various gradations of employment under the boards I have mentioned, that whoever voted for my return, would be dispossessed of the situation he held and be actually deprived of his livelihood. To the honour of some of my constituents, they waited on me, and apprised me of their intention to adhere to their promises, even at the hazard of their personal interests. The house will do me the justice to believe, that, under such circumstances, I immediately released them from their previous engagements to me; whilst the fear of ministerial persecution operated so much with others, as to force them, at the altar of their God, to disregard the sacred pledge they had given; the place of election being there held in the Church, by a peculiar custom. From this plain statement, the house and the country will be able to decide on the merits of his majesty's ministers, and on the general principle which governed them during the late election.

Mr. *Tierney* observed, that the opener and seconder of the motion had, at least, the merit of having been candid and explicit in their statement of facts, and these being completely in the possession of the house, there was no occasion to go into a committee for the purpose of further investigation. What further had the house to learn? The hon. baronet had read the papers once, and some of them even twice, and had made his observations upon them. What, then, could be gained by going into a committee? And he would ask, whether such a breach of privilege had been proved, as rendered the matter worthy of investigation by a committee of privileges? It had been stated, that he had said that the petition had been too long delayed. He had said so, and avowed it. It was signed, he observed, by several members of parliament, and these might have brought forward the business without any petition, and ought to have done it the first moment it was possible. Such was the anxiety of the house to consider questions of privilege, that they had the pecedence of every other business, and this question might have been discussed even before his majesty's speech. The inference he drew from this was, that they did not think this breach of privilege as one of much consequence, and had accordingly allowed it to sleep for a time for some purpose or other. It had been said, he did not know with what truth, that it was in order to find the right petition; which an hon. member had signed, supposing it to be another petition, and he was sorry he was not present, for if he had been in the house, he thought it possible he would have confessed that he did not know what he had signed. His hon. friend (Mr. Fremantle) had observed, that he had no previous notice of the charge which it was meant to bring against him. But what could be said of an hon. gent. (Mr. Jeffery,) who had brought a most serious charge against an hon. member, not only without notice, but even in his absence? A more indecorous, a more unprecedented proceeding, and a conduct more improper from one gentleman to another never was witnessed.—(A loud cry of order, order.)

Mr. *Spencer Stanhope* rose and said, that during the long time that he had sat in parliament, he never heard more improper and more unparliamentary language from one gentleman to another. He called upon the Chair to say whether that was proper language to use in that house.

The *Speaker* said, that certainly in the sense in which the hon. gent. understood them, the words might as well have been spared.

Mr. *Tierney* in continuation asked, whether it could be thought that it was his object to make two gentlemen quarrel? If his words could be supposed to have that tendency, the hon. gent. had to be sure very much mended the matter. He would not, however, be led away by the broad hint which the hon. gent. had thrown out. A right hon. gent. over the way (Mr. Rose) had said on a former night, that this was unprecedented conduct on the part of government. Such a petition as this might, indeed, be called unprecedented, and yet after all the search of the right hon. gent. he could find nothing but this charge, which in truth amounted to nothing. If it had been brought in as an illustration of something else, as other illustrations had been made use of, then it might have been good for something, but as it stood now it was nothing. What was the letter? It was one by which his hon. friend begged a favour of another person. To be sure; if he had been an older practitioner he might have dated his letter from Stanhope-street, where he lived, and sent it by his servant. That was the whole of the argument with respect to the date from the Treasury Chambers. But the gentlemen on the other side were all aghast at the Treasury Chambers. But general Hewitt would know very well who Mr. Fremantle was, without the mention of the Treasury Chambers, and could no doubt tell, at any rate, what part government would wish him to take. If the letter had been sent to general Hewitt to be handed about, to be sure that would have been another matter. But it was a private letter entirely. Then, what effects had it been attended with? What advantage had it produced? It was not pretended that it had produced any. The fact was known. His hon. friend had sent a letter to general Hewitt, general Hewitt applied to major Davies, and major Davies refused to comply with the request, except he had permission to go from his commander in chief. Did this look like a deep laid plan? The resolution of the house against interference meant the exercise of improper influence; it supposed an order. But here there was no order, but merely a request that general Hewitt should assist one who was the writer's particular friend. He would ask whether the house ought to waste one moment by going into such a committee as was proposed? If general Hewitt was here, and if the question should be put to him, whether he had received the letter, he would answer that he had; that he had sent it to major Davies, and that major Davies wrote that he would not go without the consent of his commanding officer; and that he, general Hewitt, had told major Davies, that if he went it would not be at the public expence. All this was perfectly well known, and there was therefore no occasion for going into a committee. The hon. baronet knew the voters, and yet he could specify none that had been procured by corrupt practices. None were given or withheld in consequence of threats. He could collect no precedents, because no opposition ever presented such a petition. He defied them to shew one instance in which a threat had been employed by government to influence a vote. If any such instance could be shewn, it certainly should not have his countenance. To ask a man for his vote was no offence whatever, but to threaten to turn him out of office unless he voted for a particular person was certainly a breach of privilege. But nothing of this sort was charged. Gentlemen might say what they pleased in their speeches, but all that they proved was, that a letter had been sent from the treasury chambers, which an old practitioner would have dated from a different place. This was the whole of the proof, and, he would ask whether, after all the abuse which had been heaped upon government, they did not rise in credit when it was perceived on what frivolous grounds all this abuse was founded? The hon. baronet might wish to go into a committee; and if there was any thing new to be proved, then, when it was known what it was, it would be proper to consider whether the motion should be agreed to. But really this petition was the most extraordinary, and on the part of the members of parliament who had signed it, one of the most foolish that he had ever witnessed. Out of 112 votes, there were 6 or 7 members of parliament who thus presented a petition to themselves. No county meeting had been called. A certain number of gentlemen in opposition had, after 9 weeks consideration, at last framed this petition, and got some of their tenants and dependants to sign it. He knew none of these voters except the members of parliament. However, said the right hon. gent. you view this measure, or in whatever way the house may please to consider it, it will be found a mere party thing, manufactured for party purposes, and which certainly reflects no credit on the manufacturer. But, sir, the hon. gentlemen are young in opposition, and as all trades must have a beginning, we may fairly infer, that that great reformer, the right hon. gent. on the other side (Mr. Rose), may, in the course of some few years, arrive at considerable eminence on the opposite bench—(a laugh) Again, I do insist that no case has been made out to warrant a proceeding, never instituted but against an actual infringement of the privileges of this house, or a violation of the liberties of the people. For the extravagant length to which party views may drive hon. gentlemen, I can make some allowance; but there are limits to party feelings, which should not be overleaped; and, indeed, I must declare my conviction, that a question of this kind and description, coming from such a quarter, can provoke no other sensation than that of disgust (Hear! hear!) That a Secretary of the Treasury, for the last 16 years, under all the well known and admitted circumstances of those 16 years, should accuse a present Secretary of unjust interference in the rights of election, and of an unconstitutional system of menace, in promoting that influence, is one of those extreme examples of human audacity, which the history of an irritated faction can only display.

Sir *H. Mildmay* in explanation said, he had stated only the written evidence. There was much other evidence ready to be produced before the committee, not only with respect to the interference of the treasury, but also of other departments of government, and particularly involving the conduct of the comptroller of the navy.

Mr. *Canning* hoped that the right hon. gent. who spoke last on the other side, would permit him to qualify his observation, that nothing was so extraordinary as a motion of this kind proceeding from the quarter in which it originated, by telling him, that it was equally extraordinary that such a motion should meet with such a reception in the quarter in which it was opposed. In the earlier part of his parliamentary life, he remembered motions of parliamentary reform, strongly urged by the right hon. gent. and those about him. It was fortunate for the country that those gentlemen were now placed in a situation in which their influence upon the councils of the sovereign, and the share they had in directing the measures of parliament, gave them an opportunity of carrying into effect their ideas upon this subject. The public would now know what were the hon. gent.'s improved and correct ideas with respect to the object for which they clamoured so loudly before. The whole of the parliamentary reform they meant to carry into effect was, the unlimited and barefaced interposition of that government influence, the exertion of which, they without foundation, imputed to other governments as the worst of crimes. It was argued by the hon. gent. that because he and his friends had thought proper on former occasions to prefer groundless complaints of this nature, they might now in reality retort the evil, tenfold, and this was the way the hon. gent. and his friends redeemed their pledges of parliamentary reform. The hon. gent. told the house, that it ought to see no ground of suspicion in a letter written by the secretary of the treasury to the head of a principal department of the public service, a department having greater influence in Hampshire than in any other county, to use his influence in favour of a particular candidate. He would not himself say, that such a letter was a ground for pronouncing the writer and his principals guilty. But he thought the house would hardly be of opinion that there was not in it strong ground for suspicion, and for inquiry. He professed the highest respect for the hon. gent. whose name was coupled with the charge preferred to the petition. He had never heard the hon. gent.'s name mentioned otherwise than with respect, except in the petition. He had never witnessed a more honourable, a more candid, or a more affecting appeal to the sense of the house, than the hon. gent. had made. There was no part of that appeal which was not creditable to the hon. gent. as an individual. Any complaint that his interposition in the election might be liable to, could attach only to his official capacity. Nothing was more true than that the persons composing a government were not disqualified from exerting their rights as individuals, in common with every other subject; but they should exert them with caution, so that it should always appear to be the individual right they exerted, and not the power and influence of the government. The hon. gent. might have written to his private connections and dependants, with all possible zeal and ardour to exert themselves to promote the election of his friends. But the ground of complaint was, that the letter was addressed, not by Mr. Fremantle, a gentleman of property and a freeholder of Hampshire, to general Hewitt, a person of private connection in that county, but from Mr. Fremantle, secretary of the treasury, to general Hewitt, head of the barrack department, claiming the exertions of his influence through all the ramifications, connections, and dependancies of that department. It could not justly be assumed, that this was the only instance of the undue interposition of government in this election. The expression of his hon. friend "Ex uno disce omnes," was in itself an assurance that there were many similar instances; and the petition stated this one, only as a specimen of a multitude of other facts which were to be brought forward, and which the petitioners were ready to prove. It was not for him to say, how far the allegations of the petition would be made out; but as a member of parliament, he would say, that the petitioners having stated such facts, and having declared themselves ready to prove them, it would require much stronger reasons than he had heard, to justify the dismissal of the petition without proper attention and respect. The hon. gent. towards the close of his speech, cited a former instance of a friend of his (Mr. Jervoise), who had been turned out of the representation of the county of Hants, by the interposition of the power of government; and the hon. gent. argued from this, that the interposition of government to turn out the old representative in the present instance, was but a fair reprisal. But what excuse was it to the freeholders of the county of Hants, that their independence was to be continually invaded, because the reprisal was allowable on the part of those who might happen to be at the time in power, and whose friend might have formerly received a wrong, which they thought proper to retaliate? But, was it to be argued or suffered, that from this assumed right of party reprisal, the county of Hants should be eternally disfranchised? If such reprisals were suffered, it could be only on the principle, that as Hampshire was accustomed to such invasions of its rights, it could suffer no pain from any fresh instance of it; a principle more unjust and more outrageous than any he had ever heard maintained. The petition which had been alluded to by the hon. gent. and in which the mover and seconder of the present motion were complainants, was exactly similar to the present; the only difference was, that some of those who then complained of the invasion, argued now, that it would be foolish to listen to a complaint of similar invasion. The complaint was then backed by lord Carnarvon, and now lord Carnarvon was on the other side. That was the only difference between the cases. The general principle of the hon. gent. was, that because Hampshire was used to being wronged, its wrongs should never be redressed; for when injuries of the highest magnitude were stated, it was thought quite sufficient in bar of redress to turn round short, and state, that others had been guilty of similar invasions. There was another peculiarity with respect to Hampshire, that the case on which the house came to the resolution, condemning the duke of Chandos, arose in that county. The resolution of the house upon that case declared it to be highly criminal, and a breach of the privileges of the house, to be visited by severe animadversions, that an officer of the government should interfere directly or indirectly in the election of members to serve in the commons house of parliament. If the interference in that instance were compared with the interference in the present instance, no man would hesitate to say, that the interference in the present instance was more direct and immediate. It was argued, that the duke of Chandos was as a peer prohibited from interfering by law; but it was his interference as an officer of government that the resolution stigmatized. Another complaint was, that the facts contained in the complaints of the petitioners had not been brought forward as soon as the hon. gent. opposite wished, that they were not prepared as the hon. gent. wished, that they were not the same facts he wished; other modes of bringing the matter forward ought to have been resorted to, according to the opinions of the hon. gent. and individuals ought not to have been feasted and pampered up for the purpose of sacrificing them on the occasion (a laugh). It was very likely that the entertainment, as it was served up at present, was not to the taste of the hon. gent.; but was it to be argued, that when government had invaded the rights and independence of a county, and pleaded custom as a ground for denying redress, the house of commons should refuse to inquire into the grounds of a petition complaining of the injury, and invade another right of the subject, merely because the form of the petition in question might be disagreeable to those whose crime was its substance? Was the house to call for and compare all rough drafts, and amendments of the several petitions that had been sketched previous to the one finally presented? Was the house, in assuming a right which it did not possess, to lose sight of the due exercise of a duty which was incumbent upon it? He had heard it was maintained in another place, that the influence of government was a sort of paternal influence, which might as properly be exercised over the people as that of a landlord over the tenant. He had not heard that sentiment uttered here so broadly. But when so important a person as the secretary of the treasury stated any thing bordering upon it, it became the house to guard against it in the outset, particularly when that secretary of the treasury stated that he had come into office at a critical period, and that the whole business of the elections was in his hands. He was glad to find the hon. gent. had estates in Hampshire; but he could not have estates in every county, or houses in every borough. He must think, upon the whole of the circumstances, that the letter to general Hewitt was written, not as a letter from one private freeholder to another, but in the character of Mr. Fremantle, secretary to the treasury, having the charge of managing the general election, to the person at the head of the barrack department, claiming the exertion of his extensive influence. But it was argued the house ought to have no jealousy of a petition complaining of this interference, and an hon. gent. who represented the county of Hants, recommended that the petition should be dismissed, and thrown back with disgrace upon the heads of those who had preferred it. This would hardly be of service to the hon. gent. in another similar crisis of difficulty, whether he might or might not happen to have a friend in the situation of secretary to the treasury, and having a freehold in Hampshire. He had trusted that it would not have been necessary for him to speak upon this question; and though he had a high respect for some of the petitioners, he would have remained silent, had not the arguments offered on the opposite called for these observations. He had hoped that such a petition, moved and seconded by such persons, would have met with universal concurrence. He was ready to allow, that if the petitioners could not prove their allegations, the strength of the language in which they expressed their complaints ought to subject them to some censure. But that the strength of the language should be made a ground for rejecting the petition, when those who signed it professed themselves ready to prove their allegations, was what appeared to him most extraordinary and most unjustifiable, and therefore he would give one vote at least to preserve the house from the censure that must fall upon it, if the petition should be dismissed without proper consideration.

Mr. *William Adam* considered this as a question of general parliamentary law, which ought to be discussed upon general principles. He thought the concluding doctrines of the right hon. gent.'s speech were not fit to be delivered in that house. He thought, besides, that it was not candid or fair for those gentlemen who were long in the habit of speaking in that house, who had learned the perfect management of their ideas in the delivery of them, and who, in the midst of their speech, could exercise their judgment and deliberation on every sentence they uttered, to lay hold so eagerly of an expression that fell from a member who was utterly inexperienced in public speaking, and who immediately explained that expression which at first sight appeared so objectionable. He did not think it was fair or candid to take such an advantage of a mere slip of the tongue—a lapsus linguæ of a member inexperienced in debate. This was a question which certainly was not to be determined by the peculiar circumstances of Hampshire, but upon the general constitutional law. In the first place, it could not be said that there was any act of parliament which prevented a Secretary of the Treasury from canvassing, as well as any other man, for those persons whose interest he espoused. There was a positive law which disfranchised certain revenue officers, but that did not at all apply to the case of the secretary of the treasury. If there was no act which bore upon the present case, neither was there any resolution of that house. The resolution of 1779 was on very different grounds. It had been resolved, tha it was a breach of the privileges of that house, for a peer, or a lord lieutenant of a county, to interfere in the election of members to serve in that house. The duke of Chandos, on whose letter the resolution of 1779 was founded, was both a peer and a lord lieutenant of the county; and he was at the same time a lord of the bed-chamber. Those circumstances which made it a breach of privilege for the noble duke to interfere, did not at all apply to the present case. The right hon. gent. had allowed that it would be perfectly fair for the hon. gent. to canvass his friends, tenants, and connections. Where then, was the line to be drawn? Would it be said that he might canvass his friend A. but not canvass his friend B. because he had a place? As it was not stated that any thing new would come forth before a committee, which had not already been stated to the house, he thought it would be contrary to their dignity to refer frivolous matters to a tribunal of such importance as their committee of privileges. He thought the issue of the examination must be an acquittal of the hon. secretary.

Lord *Folkestone* observed that the learned gent. need not have entered into an apology for the hon. secretary, as he was of opinion that the hon. secretary himself had already urged, with some effect, that this letter was not within the law of parliament. Yet he was still of opinion, that this letter, which was but a small part of the grievances stated in the petition, though it could not by itself substantiate a direct charge against the hon. secretary, might, in conjunction with the other accusations stated in the petition, be a very fit subject to be laid before a committee, should the house think fit to adopt the motion. He allowed that the members of government had a right to interfere in elections as private individuals; but he could consider the letter from the secretary of the treasury to the barrack-master-general, in this case, only as an official letter. It was understood as such by those whose conduct it was to influence. He was surprised that the gentlemen on the other side should not assent to the motion, in consideration of their own honour, of the honour of the county of Hants, and of the house of commons. He understood that much further grounds of crimination were to be brought forward; and particularly a letter from one of the other public boards, signed by the secretary. On this ground he wished to go into the committee.

Mr. *Johnstone* thought that there could not be a more serious question submitted to the house, as touching its own privileges, than whether a secretary of the treasury should be allowed in his office, perhaps using the seal of office, and sending his dispatch by official messengers, to write to all those under the influence of government, and direct them how they were to give their votes in the election of members of that house. He would readily agree with the hon. and learned member, that the hon. secretary, as well as every other member of government, might lawfully exert themselves for the success of their friends in their individual capacity. But there was not, he thought, a man in the house, nor in the country, who could really believe, that it was merely in his individual capacity that the secretary of the treasury acted, upon the late election for Hampshire. A letter to the barrack-master, to use his influence in his department, could be hardly understood as the mere canvass of an individual. The letter had also in its direction, "On his majesty's service." This added, if any thing could be added, to the official character of the letter written by the secretary of the treasury. He was surprised that this should be mentioned as a single case, for he believed that almost every member in that house knew that this was no detached case. but that letters nearly similar were written, by the same secretary of the Treasury to almost every corner of the kingdom. He could himself have produced a letter which he had seen (if he had been prepared for this debate), which the same secretary of the treasury sent to a poor voter in Yorkshire, whose name he even did not know, and that was in his public capacity. It never could be said, that all these letters were written merely in his individual capacity as Mr. Fremantle. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Tierney), once belonged to an administration that did not exercise that sort of influence, and who did not direct their secretaries of the treasury to write such letters. Under that administration, a parliament was chosen about four years ago, by the free choice of the voters; and it was, probably, because it was so chosen, that the present ministers could not suffer it to exist any longer. He called upon those who wished to prevent the undue influence of government from extending to every county, city, and borough in the county, to vote for going into the committee.

Mr. *Bathurst* saw no reason to go into a committee of privileges, when there were no facts touching privilege to be authenticated. The facts in this case were clear, and the construction was obvious. If any gentleman thought there was foundation for a motion of censure, he might bring it forward. The house of commons would hardly go into a committee of privileges to fish out grievances now unknown. The fact stated in the petition was all the house could attend to. It was extremely improper to introduce the name of the comptroller of the navy, or of any other person, without a specific foundation. Mr. Fremantle had declared that he had written the letter merely in his individual capacity, and there was no reason to presume the contrary. The petition stated, that the petitioners believed Mr. Fremantle had no property in the county of Hants, but it now appeared he had; and thus far the petition proceeded on grounds. It was an unfair exaggeration to state that it had been argued by his hon. friend (Mr. Tierney), that because the county of Hants had been often violated, it was not entitled to redress. His right hon. friend, while remarking upon the extraordinary zeal shewn on this occasion by some hon. gentlemen on the other side, had contended that there was no violation in the present case. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) had declared, he did not mean to impute any guilt, but merely inferred ground for suspicion. Some persons were always disposed to put the worst construction. He hoped the house would not do so. He thought it no disgrace to the petition not to go into a committee upon it. No two cases could be more distinct than the present and that of the duke of Chandos, who was lord lieutenant of the county, and a peer of parliament. The facts, and the construction in this case were clear, and, therefore, there was nothing for which to go into the committee.

Mr. *Perceval* began by observing, that he had heard in the course of the debate a general expression of surprise: one set of gentlemen were surprised at the manner in which this charge had been brought forward: another at the charge itself. A noble lord, who had just sat down, had freely expressed his surprise at the strange reception this petition had met with from his majesty's ministers in that house; and the noble lord was surprised at such a reception, because the noble lord thought such a line of conduct inconsistent with those professions in favour of free and liberal inquiry into all alledged abuses of a public nature, which were ever in the mouths of the men comprising the present government of the country. He, for his part, could not be brought to think that the reason assigned was at all a satisfactory one, for to be told that the present administration were in every instance acting in direct inconsistency with their professions when out of power, would have produced in his mind sensations very opposite to those of surprise. No; of all other emotions, surprise was that from which he was at that moment most free. What had been the conduct of ministers upon that night he had long since learned to anticipate from what had been their conduct upon all occasions that involved the sincerity of their former professions, in the bold and unblushing contradiction of their practice. He therefore was prepared to receive that fresh instance of their good faith and consistency, as completely of a piece with all their other proceedings; for however they might, night after night, uniformly pursue that conduct which when out of office they as uniformly decried, they had been, since they came into office, at least consistent in their systematic perseverance in contradicting, both in their language and their measures, all the mighty professions and high-flying theories which in so great a measure characterized that deceased body of reformers. What, for instance, had been the language upon the former night when that petition was presented? No less than mutual congratulation was given and exchanged by the gentlemen upon the opposite side; they were rejoiced, forsooth! that the period of triumph and inquiry had at length arrived; that investigation the most strict would end in acquittal the most honourable; that the poison of calumny which had been so generally and insiduously circulated would be checked in its dissemination, and that its propagators would be justly exposed to the vengeance due from injured innocence and honour, to the latent promoters of malevolent aspersions, and wanton acccusations. Such was the language of the other side a few nights since, and what had it been then? No longer courting inquiry; no longer vaunting their anticipated triumphs of tried and approved innocence over groundless calumny, but evading past protestations, shrinking from the investigation called for, and to which they had pledged themselves; one night congratulating the country upon the prospect of immediate inquiry, and the next generously threatening to punish and to disgrace the very man who had given them this so much desired opportunity of inquiry by presenting that petition, and praying that that house would admit them to prove upon incontrovertible evidence the truth of the alledged charges upon which that petition rested. He confidently put it to ministers, if they could have the courage to ask a house of commons to pass a vote of censure on the man who had been instrumental in bringing about an inquiry upon a great question involving the privileges of that house? He put it boldly to those gentlemen, whether they would be tempted to proceed to such a length, as not only to resist inquiry, but to punish the promoters of that investigation which the gentlemen themselves a few nights since thought so necessary to the great ends of general justice, to the assertion of the rights of the country, to this vindication of the impeached and questioned character of the government, and to the due maintenance of the dignity of the house of commons? Was it, he asked, treating the country, or the privileges of that house, or their own involved character, with common decency, to meet a grave and solemn charge with such a ludicrous mixture of levity and fear, flying from all the most serious arguments and a statement of the most weighty facts, to the miserable refuge of a joke, or to the as frivolous attempt of justifying criminality by affected recrimination? When he heard gentlemen say that they did not wish to recriminate (because for the very best reasons that they could not), and yet do so by insinuation, he could not think highly either of their candour or their logic. As to the gentlemen concerned, he was glad to see that it had not been taken up in any personal way by gentlemen on either side. He did not think it at all went to affect the hon. gentleman's personal character; he did the best he could to recommend himself to the government under which he acted; and there was no doubt that he had, in that instance particularly, recommended himself to the noble lord at the head of the treasury; and he was sure that that noble lord would not in the least degree think the hon. gent. a worse secretary on account of his zeal and activity in that instance. As to the objection of there being but a single fact upon which the motion for going into a committee rested, he thought it a sufficient answer to refer to the allegations in the petition itself, and particularly the form of words, from which it was impossible not to infer a generality of charges, as in the terms with which the charge against the honourable gentleman was introduced "among other instances," and also that the same undue influence had been resorted to "in various departments": did these words warrant the strange assertion that the committee was to go into inquiry upon *one fact* only? But even of this fact the document was attempted to be questioned. What was this document?—A letter from the secretary of the treasury to lieutenant-general Hewitt, at the head of the barrack department. It had been said that the hon. secretary was a freeholder, but did it appear that the general was a freeholder? From the formal manner of the note too, it was evident that if the two gentlemen were at all acquainted, it must have been in the slightest degree; and yet the object of this letter was to solicit no less an obligation than the general's influence and support on an ensuing election. He begged the general to use his influence. and with whom?—not with his tenants; not with his friends, but with those immediately in his department—with major Davies and others in the barrack department. Would it not, then, be a mockery to contend any longer that such a letter was merely an innocent communication between two innocent freeholders? But, if the interpretation of this letter was still to be a question, he would have recourse to the usual mode of determining the interpretation in such cases—the manner in which the English was understood by the Englishman to to whom that English was addressed. And how did general Hewitt interpret this ambiguous enigma? In such a manner as prompted him to act up to its true spirit, by promoting the influence he had been officially commissioned to promote; and in his letter, how had the general spoken of the honourable secretary? Not as a freeholder—not as a private gentleman having certain weight and certain connections in the county; but merely as secretary of the treasury—as an officer of the government communicating the will of the government, in order thereby to influence the decision of an entire department, comprehending in itself no small proportion of the interests and feelings of the county in queston. If the house rejected this petition, notwithstanding the strong grounds upon which it was supported, what would be the consequence? What a proud precedent will ministers have to boast of in this precious sample of their treasury correspondence! Then may they fix a treasurer in every county, in every town, in every borough, then may each member circulate through his respective barrack department, the decree of the government against the subject's birthright; provided only that they keep within the cautious limits of their precious precedent; provided only they do not pronounce actual menace; provided only they do not convey, through the medium of an innocent freeholder's letter, a bribe taken from the public money; provided they keep within such limits they were safe; the precedent of that night would bear them out, and they would again find a house of commons who would countenance them in the breach of that house's privileges, and in the violation of the subject's constitutional rights, provided only that in the act of such breach and violation, the forms of discreetness and decorum prescribed in the present precedent, be observed. The hon. and learned gent. concluded with an earnest advice to ministers to depart from that line of conduct which no talents could ultimately rescue from the indignant animadversion of the country; friends might be for the time partial, but rectitude of intention, integrity of principle, and consistency of conduct, were the best, perhaps the only means of permanently securing that power, which he hoped they would endeavour to maintain by better means than those by which they had succeeded in acquiring it.

Lord *Howick* remarked that the hon. and learned gent. with the most studious attention, and with the utmost exertion of his ingenuity, could not find any means of fairly censuring his majesty's government. If, however, he had not been able to bring their conduct collectively as an administration before the house, and before the public, he nevertheless had found some opportunity of attacking them in the person of a gentleman connected with his majesty's government, and in so doing, he had made one of the most declamatory speeches that had ever been heard within the walls of that house; he had outdone all his former outdoings, he might be said to have out-Heroded Herod himself. He had repeated what had been upwards of twenty times before repeated in that house—a charge than which, from the generality of its nature, none was more easily made, nor more difficult to be refuted; he had charged him and the persons with whom he acted, with having deserted those principles which regulated their conduct when they sat on the other side of the house. In answer to this, he would beg to remind that hon. and learned gent., that in the course of the many years to which he referred, there never had been a single instance of such an individual and private personal opposition brought before the house. And would that hon. and learned gent. be so bold as to say, that during the course of those 20 years there was no interference of persons connected with administration in election affairs; or would the hon. and learned gent. contend that he (lord H.) and all the friends with whom he then acted, were so dull of intellect, and that matters were then so skilfully conducted, that they could not discover the influence that was at that time made use of? Whenever the authority of office was glaringly or imperatively exercised over any one in matters of election, it was the duty of every independent member of parliament to expose it; but they had uniformly abstained from calling the attention of the house to the conduct of any individual in such cases. Would gentlemen, however, say, that during that time there was never any interference of a minister, of a secretary of state, or of a secretary of the treasury? He did not mean to justify himself, or those connected with him, merely by a declaration that others did the like; but it was fit that the attention of the house should be called to the quarter from which these complaints proceeded. However, it was said that a person might not speak to a person who was not in office for his vote and interest. What, if a man had a particular friend, a near relation, or a person with whom he was acquainted by means of their both being in offices under the crown, he was not to be spoken to? a man was to apply for support, or the furtherance of his friend's interest to every man in England but those with whom he was acquainted; he was to be allowed to apply to every one that could not, or would not be of service to him, but if he came near the door of his friend or those who were likely to assist him he must cry, "Procul, O! procul este, profani!" He must not presume to use his influence, or ask for any friendship there. Now, he recollected that on a former occasion, a letter was written on the business of an election at Canterbury; he had a copy of it in his pocket, signed George Rose. Here he read the letter. That letter called upon Mr. Smith, who was in the barrack department, to use his influence with Mr. Baldock, a contractor for the ordnance office, in favour of a particular candidate. We might adopt some forms of regulation, but it was impossible entirely to prevent people in office, any more than out of office, from soliciting a friend to support another friend of their own at an election. There was another instance in which the same gentleman was concerned—a Westminster election, where it was stated that two accounts were kept, one for the treasury, and another for lord Hood; but of these two instances no notice was taken in parliament. There was another instance, however, where the same gentleman was also concerned, concerning which a motion was made in that house, that was for a committee to inquire into abuses, as far as related to the mitigation of penalties or suspension of a prosecution under the excise laws, in consequence of what had been done at an election for Westminster; but this motion was lost, and those members of the present parliament who had then a seat in that house, and voted against the motion, could hardly think the present a censurable case. But here a gentleman, a member of that house, who was also in office, had not only a friend, but a near relation, who was a candidate for a seat in that house, and he wrote to another friend simply in a friendly way, with the word "private," written on the letter also, to endeavour to forward the interest of his relation. This was the very head and front of his offending. Great stress, however, had been laid on the expression, that the travelling expences could not be allowed, as it could not be introduced into any public account. Now, he would desire to know, how it was possible for the most conscientious and scrupulous servant of the public to make a more candid, or a more honest declaration? Perhaps this major Davies had thought that the letters did not go far enough, and the expences might have been hinted at with a view to entrap the gentleman who was spoken of. That gentleman had himself spoken more ably than he could upon the subject; but it was to be observed, that he had never interposed the weight of his official influence, and so powerful was the influence on the other side, that it was proved by the hon. baronet himself, that a person in an official situation had been sent out of the way, because he was supposed to be friendly to government. The petition itself was another proof of the very little influence that was made use of by those who were friendly to his majesty's government, and of the very great exertions that were made on the opposite side; it was signed by two persons who, he was informed, were servants to the hon. baronet, by another who was secretary to the militia, where lord Bolton was lord lieutenant, another signature was that of a person who was clerk to the collectors of taxes, and who was now soliciting the situation of surveyor from that terrible government which bore down every thing with its authority. It was idle to talk of a committee to inquire, for the facts were clear before the house, and all that remained was, for the house to declare by its vote that night, whether they would pronounce their censure on the conduct which had been so proved, or whether they would dismiss the accusation as one that was unworthy of being entertained by that house. The learned gent. opposite (Mr. Perceval) had said that there were many other cases where the influence of government had been made use of; but it might fairly be said, "ab uno disce omnes," and, as no doubt, the gentlemen on the other side did not direct their organ to bring forward his weakest case first, the house might fairly infer that the others, if any, were not such as would be likely to be productive of very dangerous consequences to the liberties of England. When a motion was made (that of Mr. Biddulph) for inquiry into the extent of salaries and emoluments in various public offices, a motion which was certainly not of a nature that was likely to strengthen or be favourable to any administration, it was, however, thought to be one that might tend to the advantage of the public, and accordingly it was most cheerfully acceded to, and most zealously, as well as most ably supported by his noble friend (lord H. Petty). But neither his majesty's ministers nor the house, he trusted, would suffer themselves to be led away by any groundless accusations that might be brought before them.

Mr. *Rose* said, that he had come down to the house with a determination not to say a word upon the question; but after the personal attack that had been made upon his conduct, it was impossible for him to remain altogether silent. As to the letter read by the noble lord, and addressed by him to a person who had offered his services in favour of the member he would recommend, there was nothing in it similar to the case now before the house; nor was the disclosure of that letter a proof of much gratitude on the part of the gentleman in behalf of whom it had been written. Had he deserved the blame that was imputed to him, not only should he have deserved the censure of that house, but also the forfeiture of his employment. As to the libel against him, alluded to by the noble lord, it was not matter grave enough to be brought before that house: but it had got into a newspaper, and he had laid his hand upon the printer, and called upon him to make good his charge. He did not institute a criminal prosecution against the man: such was not his object; for his only wish was to clear his own character. Under that impression, he brought his civil action, and obtained a verdict and damages. This libel had lately been re-published, and there was room to believe, under the direction of a distant relation of the noble lord opposite to him (lord Temple). He could see no ground of charge against him in it now; for if there was, he had given a fair opportunity to prove it, and the proof had failed. His motives for countenancing the present petition were very different from those imputed to him: it was not to support his popularity, or to wound the feelings of the hon. gent. against whom it was directed; no man could entertain more sincere regard for that hon. gent. than he did. But there were several facts that called for censure, and which might be proved if the house acceded to the present motion.—He should now chiefly refer to the conduct of an hon. gent. (Mr. Calcraft) in the town which he had the honour to represent, to which that hon. gent. came and used entreaties and threats, to influence the election of the municipal officers of that town; when afterwards parliament was dissolved, letters were brought down by the same gentleman, under the hand and seal of the secretary of the treasury, to instigate the custom-house officers, who were disabled by law from taking any part in such matters, to exert themselves in support of the friends of government. In another instance, a military man had received the same instructions; and the burgesses were hunted from one end of the town to the other, when, after all, not more than one vote could possibly be obtained. He certainly, at more than one public meeting, had inveighed against such practices of government; and he was now ready to declare, that he never knew of any such practised by any administration in this country. For his part, he never had recourse to such means, either to support himself or his near relation in another town. There were about 700 votes in Southampton; and out of that number he did not think that his son got more than two from the recollection of any kindness conferred upon the freemen by him or his connection. Indeed, some who had promised him their votes, were deterred from keeping their promise; for they were afraid that if they did, they might expect to lose their situations. Such was the system of terror acted on by ministers, of which he should adduce a variety of proofs, if the committee moved for was appointed. The right hon. gent. related an anecdote of one gentleman who promised him, and afterwards broke his word, alledging that he dared not vote otherwise. Mr. Garrett, the brewer, at Portsmouth, had, it was true, done great services in favour of the unsuccessful candidate, but he lost the supply of the Dock three days afterwards. He declared that he never had an action brought against him but by Smith, and he certainly should have acted the part of an ideot, had he withstood his demand on any other ground than justice. He defied the whole world to prove that he had ever wounded the feelings of individuals for the purpose of extorting their votes.

Mr. *Calcraft* repelled the charge which the right hon. gent. had advanced against him. He declared that he never heard that the letter referred to was in the hands of any person, until about two months since, when he was informed by the secretary of the treasury that he had got such a letter, with his answer to it, which he had quite forgot to have ever written. That he had ever used any threat to the magistrates of Christ-church he most solemnly denied, and therefore the right hon. gent. ought not to rely on their information. Indeed, if such informers were to be trusted, they told some strange stories of the right hon. gent. himself. For the only time he saw those magistrates was at the house of a respectable inhabitant of Christ church who was present at the conversation; and they stated that the right hon. gent. told them that he was not in opposition to government, that he never thwarted the measures of ministers, but that on the contrary, he was on the most intimate footing with many of the principal members of the government, and that he was assisting the chancellor of the exchequer (a laugh.) Would the right hon. gent. then advise that credit should be given to such authority? But with reference to the question before the house, the right hon. gent. ought to have had the candour to state that these very magistrates voted, for him, and yet they were never disturbed in the offices which they held under government, and yet that government was, according to the right hon. gent.'s sentiments, capable of abusing its power for the purposes of revenge and undue influence.

The *Solicitor General* thought it very singular that the right hon. gent. (Mr. Rose) should, as he stated, have formed a resolution not to speak in the course of the debate, considering the important facts which he had alledged, and the written evidence which he had brought with him to support those facts. But really the right hon. gent. could not himself rely on the truth of such allegations, or he would not have neglected, with all the solicitude which he professed and felt to preserve the freedom of election, to bring them forward in the first instance; for they were surely much stronger than the case to which the motion referred. But, in point of fact, it was not to be supposed that the hon. gent. would have declined to put these strong cases in the front line of his attack on ministers, if he thought they could have been maintained, much less that he should have determined not to state them at all, if he had not been irritated by something which fell from his noble friend below him (lord Howick). Therefore this important communication from the right hon. gent. was not owing to an anxiety for public justice, or the maintenance of a free election, but to personal resentment.—After a few words from lord Howick, Mr. Rose, Mr. Asheton Smith, and Mr. Herbert, the house divided, when there appeared,

For the motion 57
Against it 184
Majority against the motion ——127

List of the Minority.

Baker, W.
Barne, S.
Beach, H.
Biddulph, M.
Bourne, W. Sturges
Brodrick, hon. W.
Brook, lord
Bruce, lord
Burrell, Sir C. M.
Canning, right hon. G.
Cartwright, W. R.
Castlereagh, lord
Champernowne, A.
Cowper, hon. E. S.
De Ponthieu, J.
Fane, J.
Fellowes, hon. N.
Fitzhugh, W.
Hill, hon. W.
Huntley, lord,
Jeffrey, J.
Jenkinson, C.
Joddrell, H.
Johnstone, G.
Knatchbull, sir E.
Kynaston, P.
Lethbridge, T. B.
Lascelles. hon. E.
Leslie, C. P.
Leigh, R. Holt
Long, right hon. C.
Long, R.
Magens, M. Dorien
Osborn, J.
Patteson, J.
Peale, sir R.
Perceval, hon. S.
Robinson, hon. F.
Rose, right hon. G.
Rose, G. H.
Ryder, hon. R.
Smith, J.
Somerset, lord A.
Stanhope, S.
Stewart, hon. E. R.
Stopford, lord
Sutton, C. M.
Strutt, J. H.
Taylor, W.
Townshend, hon. W.
Tremayne, J. H.
Turton. sir T.
Vyse, R.
Ward, R.
Williams, R.
Wright, J. Atkins
Wood, T.

Tellers.

Sir H. Mildmay.
T. A. Smith.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, February 16.

[Scotch Judicature Bill.] Lord *Grenville* said, he had the honour to present to their lordships the bill of which he had some time since given notice, for the better Regulation of the Courts of Justice in Scotland. On entering into the discussion of this subject, he could not begin better than by obviating a misrepresentation which had been industriously circulated, and which had stated his object to be, to assimilate the law of Scotland to that of this country. He had no such view, nor could he conceive any theory more erroneous, any project more wild and pregnant with danger, than that of endeavouring to impose the laws of one country upon another, without considering the difference of habits and manners. It was no part of his intention, nor had he ever so stated it, to propose any alteration in the law of Scotland; his object was that that law should be better administered. That some measure of this nature was absolutely necessary must be obvious to their lordships. Their table was now loaded with Appeals, the greater part of which were from the Court of Session in Scotland, and which increased so much faster than it was possible for their lordships to decide upon them, appropriating for that purpose all the time which they could devote consistently with the other duties which they had to perform, that their lordships' house had nearly become bankrupt with respect to the administration of justice. He meant not to throw the slightest imputation upon the learned persons who composed the court of session: nor did he wish in this discussion to make the least reference to individuals. It was the constitution of the court of session itself which was faulty, and which rendered it impossible to do justice to the suitors in that court; above all, to do speedy justice, which was most essential to the due administration of law. The accumulation of business in the court of session had arisen from causes which were highly satisfactory; from the great improvement which had rapidly taken place in Scotland since the American war, in commerce, in manufactures, and in agriculture. The extension of commerce and of manufactures necessarily gave rise to a great number of suits frequently involving questions highly complicated, and which at the same time were in a great degree new to the court of session. Thus it had happened that the business of that court had so greatly accumulated, that were no new suits to he instituted, it would require two years to get through the business already before the court. It was obvious, therefore, both with respect to appeals to that house from the court of session, and with respect to the business of that court itself, that an evil of great magnitude existed, to which it was necessary to apply a remedy. He had stated last session the existence of this evil, and had proposed Resolutions which were adopted by the house with the view of leaving the subject open for consideration. He now proposed to carry into effect the measure, the outline of which was then suggested, with such alterations and improvements as had been suggested by further consideration. The first leading point to which he wished to call their lordships' attention was the division of the court of session into three chambers, consisting of five judges each. He was decidedly of opinion that justice would be much better administered by three courts or chambers thus constituted, and having a co-ordinate jurisdiction, than by all the 15 judges sitting as at present in one court. With the smaller number of judges much less time was taken up in delivering opinions, and there was a less chance of difference of opinion arising. If these 15 judges were to deliver their opinions, and each of them, as in the court of session, had to examine voluminous written documents, it must unavoidably happen that differences of opinion would frequently arise, and that considerable delay would take place before a decision could be had upon any suit before them. It was, besides, of the greatest advantage that there should be two or three courts of justice of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the decisions in which openly made, and the opinions of the judges of which openly delivered, would be immediately canvassed by an enlightened bar, and would be soon examined by public opinion. The suitor having his choice to commence his suit in either of these courts, public opinion would soon point out by the preference given, in which, if in any, there was the superiority of learning or the more enlightened decisions. The proposed measure of the three chambers would do no violence to the constitution of the court of session, which was originally analogous to the parliament of Paris, and which might be naturally divided in this way. It was thought by some that it would be better to divide the court into two chambers, which in that case must consist of eight and seven judges. He was decidedly, however, of opinion, for the reasons he had stated, that the three chambers would be much preferable. The next point to which he had to call their lordships' attention was, the proposed alteration of the trial by jury in Scotland to civil cases. Of the inestimable advantages of the Trial by Jury, every Englishman must be perfectly convinced, and it was surely not giving way too much to any prejudices, which he, as an Englishman, might have in favour of this admirable institution, for him to suppose that it might be extended to Scotland with infinite advantage in civil cases, as it had been in criminal cases, and in suits respecting the revenue. Nothing was more conducive to the due administration of justice than the clear distinction of law and of fact, that the facts of a case should be brought to an issue of fact, upon which a jury might decide, and that the law, as applicable to those facts, should be clearly distinguished: thus, confusion would be avoided, and the law and the facts of each case being accurately pointed out, justice would be administered with clearness and precision. This would alone be effected by the trial by jury, and by the facts of a case being brought to that point of issue in which a jury could decide. In proposing, however, to extend this institution in civil cases to Scotland, it was proposed to confine it to suits respecting what he would denominate personal rights, and to extend it to suits respecting landed estates. The reason of this was, that from the nature of the law of Scotland, with respect to landed estates, the rights to these estates became wholly a question of law, and involved no question of fact upon which a jury could decide. The only remaining point which he had to touch upon was the institution of an intermediate court of appeal. The necessity of some such arrangement was obvious, in order still further to prevent too frequent appeals to that house. It was proposed that appeals to that house should only lie against final judgments and not against interlocutory decrees. With respect to the constitution of the intermediate court of appeal, some doubt had arisen as to how far it was competent for the legislature to institute a court paramount to the court of ssesion, it having been provided by the act of union, that that court should retain all the privileges which it then possessed. It was however, also provided in that act, that it should be competent to the legislature to make such regulations as it should deem advisable for the better administration of justice in Scotland. Their lordships would likewise be aware that at the time of the act of union the court of session consisted of 14 lords, and of 4 extraordinary lords. It was however deemed advisable in the reign of George I. to add one to the 14 lords, and to take away the 4 extraordinary lords. The court of session, therefore, as at present constituted, was not the court of session as existing at the time of the act of union, but as constituted by the act of George I. and the competency of the legislature to make such alterations in the constitution of that court as it should deem necessary for the better administration of justice in Scotland was completely recognized. The mode in which this intermediate court of appeal or court of revision was proposed to be constituted was, by empowering his majesty to appoint a president of that court, and also to appoint the lord chief baron of the exchequer in Scotland a lord of session and a member of this court, and the three presidents of the three chambers into which the court of session was proposed to be divided to be also members of this court. Thus constituting a court of 5 judges, one of whom would necessarily be the president of the chamber, where the suit respecting which an appeal was brought, had been in the first instance decided upon, and at whose option it would be to attend the court of revision upon the hearing of the appeal respecting such suit, but whose presence the other judges might on many occasions deem advisable in order to give them information respecting the suit over the decision of which in the inferior court he had presided. Having thus detailed to their lordships the outline of the proposed plan, he submitted it to them, trusting that it would be maturely and deliberately considered, assured that they would not impute to him the vanity, and in his situation the criminality, of being so attached to his own plan, as to reject any alteration, hoping that their lordships, in their deliberative wisdom, would on the contrary suggest such alterations as they might deem advisable, with the view of rendering this measure more perfect, more adequate to the object which was proposed to be effected, and which he was convinced their lordships would deem not only expedient and advisable, but absolutely necessary for the due administration of justice to his majesty's liege subjects in Scotland. To carry into effect an object of this magnitude and importance, required all their lordships' deliberative wisdom, but he was convinced that with the amendments and alterations which might be suggested, after the subject had undergone still further consideration, the proposed plan might be rendered productive of the greatest utility and advantage to Scotland. He submitted the plan to the exercise of their lordships' judgment and deliberation. He proposed, in order to give time for the due consideration of the subject, that the second reading of the bill should not take place until that day three weeks. His lordship concluded by presenting a bill for the better regulation of courts of justice in Scotland.

The Duke of *Montrose* expressed some doubts with respect to the efficacy of the proposed plan, and particularly with respect to the extension to Scotland of the trial by jury in civil cases. This part of the plan would he thought create considerable alarm in Scotland, if proposed to be extended to the whole of that country, as it would alter the value of securities at present perfectly legal.

Lord *Eldon* expressed his entire approbation of the general principle of the bill, and declared his wish to give every assistance in promoting the great object which was proposed to be attained, which he considered of the most essential importance, and with respect to which it had been his intention to propose some measure with the view of remedying the evil which undoubtedly existed. He acceded to the proposed measures of having three chambers or courts and a court of revision, convinced that the most essential advantages resulted from the three courts of law in Westminster Hall, which were in fact courts of revision with respect to each other, the decisions made in each becoming subjects of discussion in the others, and the opinions of the judges upon important points of law being perfectly well known. He had no doubt that although for some time probably, if this measure was carried into effect, the court of revision would have a great influx of business, yet that from the advantages resulting from three courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, that court of revision would, in the course of a few years, be as seldom called upon as the court of error or exchequer chamber in this country. He wished to impress their lordships with respect to the trial by jury, that the court of session was a court of equity as well as a court of law, and therefore that it would require considerable care in framing provisions for the purpose of forming issues of fact to be tried by a jury. He thought it would be more advisable to fix the second reading for that day month, instead of three weeks.

Lord *Hawkesbury* concurred in opinion with respect to the principle of the measure, except as to the extension of the trial by jury, as proposed in the bill, respecting which he had considerable doubts. He thought it would be better to detach this from the bill, and make it the subject of a separate bill.

Lord *Ellenborough* was decidedly of opinion that the extension of the trial by jury was essential to the proposed measure, inasmuch as they must look to that for the purpose of lessening the quantity of appealable matter to that House. He was so thoroughly convinced of the essential advantages to be derived from this part of the plan, and that it was so great a boon to Scotland, that nothing but petitions from the whole population of Scotland against the measure could convince him that it was unwise or inexpedient.

Lord *Grenville* expressed great satisfaction at the liberal manner in which this measure had been received by the house. With respect to the second reading of the bill, it was his wish that if the measure passed that house it should be sent down to the other house of parliament in a reasonable period of the session, and with that view he wished the bill to be committed previous to the Easter recess. He thought, therefore, that if it was understood that the second reading should take place on that day three weeks, and the commitment on that day four weeks, it would meet the wishes of the noble and learned lord.

The Earl of *Suffolk* approved of this arrangement, but thought the salaries of the judges in Scotland not adequate to their situations.

The *Lord Chancellor* highly approved of the proposed plan. With respect to the trial by jury, he considered it totally unnecessary to say a word in its praise; its benefits were too obvious to need his commendation; to this measure it was of essential use, in order that questions of fact might be decided upon, and that appeals might be confined to their proper province, questions of law.—The bill was then read a first time and ordered to be printed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, February 16.

[NEW PLAN OF FINANCE.] Lord *Castlereagh* rose for the purpose of moving the postponement of his Finance Resolutions from this to some future day. He knew that in considering the Resolutions of the noble lord, (H. Petty) his own must of course come under review, but he hoped that the noble lord, considering the magnitude of the subject, would be disposed to grant some further delay. At all events, he was desirous of entering upon some explanation of the modification of the noble lord's plan, which he had offered the other day, as he was aware that from the short time allowed him for consideration, there might be some objectionable points in it. What he had offered was merely a modification of the noble lord's plan, and he presented it only with a view to relieve the noble lord from the embarrassment to which he must otherwise be exposed. He, however, felt that an explanation was the more necessary, because though from this it should appear that this modification was more objectionable than was at first apprehended, yet the noble lord in pointing out the defects of this, would give an illustration of the defects of his own plan, and combat his own proposition rather than prove the expediency of the modification. He wished therefore that his modification should be clearly understood, though it would not give relief to the extent which he at first supposed. His lordship then acknowledged that his resolution stated a smaller charge than would really be necessary. It stated, that in the ninth year a loan of between four and five millions would be necessary to be charged on the consolidated fund. But he had not noticed the progressive sums, and consequently the progressive charges on the consolidated fund. It was in fact necessary to provide, not only for the sum advanced but also for the sum staken from the consolidated fund, and that thus for 9 years taxes to the amount of 6,019,000l. would be requisite at the close of the ninth year. The two grounds on which he wished to modify the noble lord's plan, were these: 1st. To relieve him from the necessity of mortgaging the war taxes; if his modification did not do that, it did nothing; 2dly, To limit the amount of the loans within the year, and consequently the charge. By the noble lord's plan, the loans would rise from 12 to 32 millions, and what he wanted was to relieve the market from the dangerous effects that would result from the borrowing of such an enormous sum as 32 millions within the year. His modification was expensive for the present, but, if acted upon, it would come to this, that at the end of nine years, you would have an alternative of acting according to circumstances for the next eleven years. If the war continues for the whole twenty years, then he admitted that it could not be carried on without additional loans, and an addition to the permanent taxes. But if peace should be made on or before the 9th year, then no new taxes would be required in addition to those which the noble lord proposed, for the excesses of the sinking fund would be disposable for the loan of the preceding year. But supposing the case of war, then 3 millions must be raised to be distributed over a period of 6 years, and the balance in favour of his plan, even on the supposition of twenty years war, would be the difference between 6 millions and 21 millions pledged. He objected to the system of double loans; first a loan, then the interest, and next a loan to pay the interest of the interest. But if this plan was to be acted on, then it ought to be for a period as short as possible, and he thought it should be confined to 9 years, instead of 20. Whatever embarrassment there might be in the modification, it arose out of the noble lord's own complicated system. The spirit, therefore, of his 8th resolution was still just, though greater loans would be necessary than it supposed. But the objection did not at all attach to the 9th resolution. His modification would still relieve the noble lord from the mortgage of the war taxes, and from his loans of 32 millions. Whatever advantage the noble lord would derive from his increased sinking fund, yet that would not counterbalance the inconvenience to the money market. It was sufficiently obvious that they wished for no vexatious delay; he had exposed himself to the risk of falling into mistakes, from his anxiety that the outlines of his view of the subject should be before the house before the discussion of the plan. But yet he was under considerable embarrassment from not having been able to obtain from the noble lord the subsequent tables, which were wanting to enable him to complete his own view; though he admitted that this did not proceed from any unwillingness in the noble lord to furnish them. But certainly the embarrassment was excessive, to be called upon, with such a short preparation, to decide upon a plan not for one year, but for 20 years, a circumstance in which the credit of parliament was materially involved. The noble lord proposed to call upon the house to decide upon the first resolution. He admitted that this did not preclude the parliament from taking up the subject again, but it was unseemly for parliament to be placed in such a situation, that it must adopt a plan for 20 years, and then be obliged, like children, to revise it in a year or two. This exercise of discretion would be attended with great embarrassment and loss of parliamentary character. He really therefore wished that in the further proceedings on this subject, some method should be agreed upon, which would prevent this embarrassment, and enable parliament to decide on a full view of the subject. For this purpose, two courses might be adopted. The noble lord might allow it to lie over for some time, till the members should have had full time to consider it in the present session; or if that should not be agreed to, then as a dernier resort he would propose that the noble lord should only act upon his plan for one year, and leave parliament free to investigate it in the interval between this and the next sessions. It was so embarrassing and difficult, that the noble lord, or his successor, must desist from the execution of it. This was his opinion, and he hoped the noble lord would not press it into a committee at present, when he must know that parliament was so little prepared to enter upon the consideration of the plan. The accounts which he had called for would soon be before the house, and then the noble lord might proceed in the present session, but now it was merely a question of confidence on the part of the ministers, and submission on the part of the house. He hoped the noble lord would not proceed with this intended plan on the spur of the moment. This improper haste would be attended with great mischief, and in the end prove highly derogatory to the character of parliament. He concluded by moving, that the consideration of his Resolutions should be postponed to that day se'nnight.

Lord *Henry Petty* did not think it necessary to enter upon that part of the noble lord's speech, which contained his amended statement. He certainly would not object to any day for the consideration of the noble lord's resolutions, only, he must observe, that they must come under review in discussing the present plan. He wished only to say a few words with respect to the delay solicited by the noble lord. He denied that this was a question of confidence on the one part, and submission on the other. Ministers wished to adopt the plan, not from a vain confidence in themselves, but upon a full and deliberate investigation by parliament. It would be recollected that he had first moved the resolutions two or three weeks ago, that a fortnight was allowed to consider them, that this period ended last Wednesday, and that it was only on that day that the proposal was made for going into the committee. All he asked now was, to vote them in the committee: the report would come up next Wednesday, and they might then be further considered and discussed. They might also be discussed in the different stages of the bill, which it was desirable to carry forward with all reasonable dispatch, that ministers might proceed to the general financial plan. This dispatch was not required from any difficulties arising from the want of an immediate supply, but because it was desirable to proceed to contract for the loan as soon as possible.—The motion of lord Castlereagh for the postponement of his own resolutions was then agreed to.

Lord Henry Petty moved that the House should resolve itself into a committee to consider further of the Finances of the Country, which was agreed to. On the motion for the Speaker's leaving the chair,

Mr. *Long* rose. The noble lord, he observed, must recollect that he had told the house that various tables were to be distributed, in order to enable that house to acquire a full and complete view of his plan. Gentlemen had had them but for a short time, and he submitted to the noble lord's candour, whether it was possible even for those who were conversant with subjects of this nature, to make themselves masters of it within a period so limited. It would certainly give more satisfaction if the consideration should be postponed for a few days. However as the house was called upon to discuss the noble lord's plan, he would now offer the few observations that at present occurred to him.

Lord *Henry Petty* observed, that the right honourable gentleman had better state these in the committee.

Mr. *Long* replied, that he thought it more regular to proceed now, as his objection went rather to the principle of the plan than to the detail. He observed, however, in continuation, that he did not object even to the principle to a certain extent. It might possibly be a fatal error to adhere too pertinaciously to the present plan of taxation, and though he thought that the noble lord's plan was carried to too great an extent, yet he was fully aware of the difficulties attending his situation. He did not, however, consider the difficulty which the noble lord found last session, in finding out proper objects of taxation, as a proof that new taxes could not be raised. But he fully admitted that it was highly expedient to impose no new taxes, for the present, if it could be avoided. This was his opinion, and it was sanctioned by that of the noble lord's predecessor. New taxes to any great extent would occasion a very heavy pressure on the people at present. Then what other resources were there? There were two, namely, the war taxes and the sinking fund. His noble friend (Castlereagh) objected to the plan of compound loans. But whether the borrowing was from the consolidated fund or the war taxes, there must be supplementary loans. To a certain extent, therefore, he saw no objection to borrowing from the war taxes. But he must object to the system of pledging the whole of the war taxes, independent of the property tax, and at last the property tax also. The noble lord ought to borrow only on such as might be supposed to yield their fullest amount in time of peace. He might continue the war for five years, by borrowing on this portion of the war taxes. The sum of 11 millions might be annually borrowed in this way, or 13 millions, if necessary, and for those sums the permanently productive war taxes, with the expiring annuities, would afford an ample provision for five years. He thought the war taxes ought not to be pledged to a greater amount, as it was contrary to the policy of this country. The convoy tax, for instance, could not properly continue beyond the duration of the war. The taxes on tea and spirits also would certainly be diminished in their amount during peace. Could the noble lord possibly expect that these would always yield their present amount? He surely could not, and yet this plan took the whole of these taxes at their highest amount. The noble lord might so manage as to increase the amount of the war taxes, when the loans must be procured on disadvantageous terms, and diminish their amount when the loans could be contracted for on easy terms. He ought to recollect the nature of his system of ways and means. He ought to consider the furious objections made to the property tax, which was called a system not of taxation, but of confiscation. He ought therefore to pause before he pledged this and other taxes.—But if he had great doubts as to the propriety of pledging the war taxes to the full extent proposed by the noble lord, he had still stronger doubts respecting the data on which the plan was founded. The noble lord supposed that the war expences would not exceed 32 millions annually during the whole period. He could not reasonably conclude that there was any probability that this would be the case. He ought to have taken into account the subsidies that might be wanted, and the depreciation of money which must take place in the course of that time. It was true that the noble lord had stated, that for subsidies a distinct provision must be made, but at the same time they ought rather to have been taken into the general account of expenditure, as it was unusual to provide for subsidies distinctly by that name. The right hon. gent. then stated his objection to the system of the accumulation of the sinking fund, and providing for the loans at 5 per cent. instead of one per cent. according to the old plan, as it afforded an undue advantage to the stockholder, at the expence of the public. He had great objections to the plan of accumulation adopted in 1802. It never was the object of the original proposer of the sinking fund that it should be allowed to accumulate so as to extinguish the debt. The intention was principally to keep down the debt, so as to prevent it from becoming inconvenient to the public. For the proof of this it was only necessary to look at the plan of 1786. The maximum of 4 millions was then established, and after the fund had attained to this, then the interest was to be at the disposal of parliament; so, from the year 1808, 200,000*l.* of taxes might be taken off annually, or applied to other purposes, as the case might be. But the noble viscount who was chancellor of the exchequer in 1802, altered this plan, and undoubtedly then had the full assent of a right hon. friend of his (Mr. Pitt) now no more. No one was more ready to submit to the superior judgment of his right hon. friend alluded to than he was, and especially on a matter of this sort, but still he felt great objections to the plan then adopted, and since that time he certainly had seen no reason to alter his opinion.—But he did not object to the borrowing from the war taxes, if this should be confined to 5 years. The noble lord imposed no new taxes for the first 3 years. He highly approved of that, not merely on account of the relief which it afforded to the people, but also because it rested upon principles of sound policy. For by this means taxation might be had recourse to with greater vigour afterwards if this should be necessary, and besides, this circumstance would have the best effects upon the permanent taxes. If, therefore, the period had been confined to five years, he could have had no objection to the plan. The noble lord might have, in the mean time, observed the progress of the sinking fund, of the war taxes, and of the permanent taxes, and borrowed upon these as he should find it expedient. But to take a period of twenty years, and to proceed upon the supposition that thirty-two millions only would be required for the war expenditure, was to legislate on grounds the most uncertain and erroneous that could possibly be conceived.

Mr. *Tierney* rose. The right hon. gent. who had just sat down, objected to the period of 20 years, and thought that the fittest stage to stop at was 5 years. But his reasoning proceeded on erroneous grounds, when he supposed that this plan was intended to legislate to 20 years. It did no such thing. It merely held out what might be done in 20 years, certain data being allowed. It did nothing whatever to tie up the hands of the house, or to prevent them from adopting such alterations as circumstances might render necessary. It was no disadvantage to argue with a view to a period of 20 years, as the argument was not to be conclusive or binding; but to satisfy the house that so much might be done in twenty years, would not prevent them from exercising their discretion afterwards. The right hon. gent. agreed, that it would be inconvenient to impose new taxes at present: that was conceded by the noble lord near him, and by the general voice of the country, not only by those who merely wished to be relieved from the pressure of taxation, but generally by those who looked to the policy of the thing. It did certainly afford a hope that recourse might be had with more vigour to the permanent taxes, and he was glad the right hon. gent. had said so, because this served to remove the objection which he himself had made with respect to the amount of the permanent taxes. As to the permanent taxes, he agreed that some of them might fall short of their present amount, but this was no objection whatever, unless the plan went to cut off the power and the means of imposing taxes hereafter. Now, so far was the plan from doing this, that even by the right hon. gent.'s own confession, it tended to render the sources of taxation more productive. The plan was not absolutely wedded to the present taxes. Others might be imposed, if there should be a deficiency. The whole proceeded on this, that such was to be the amount of loans if the war continued for such a time. Where the taxes proved unproductive, others must be provided to supply their place, and according to the right hon. gent.'s own shewing, it was better to have recourse to taxes afterwards, if they should be wanted, than to raise them at present.—The next point that called for observation was, the extent to which the war taxes were to be pledged. The right hon. gent. agreed that it was a proper thing to pledge the war taxes, but not to the extent proposed, and thought that it was improper to have a 5 per cent. sinking fund, instead of one per cent. as formerly. But this was entirely of the nature of a bargain with the stockholder. He agreed with his right hon. friend that the sinking fund was not originally intended solely for the benefit of the stockholder. The advantage was given to the stockholder, but the fund was principally intended for the benefit of the public. He thought the measure of 1802 an improper one, and he and another were the only persons who spoke openly against it on that occasion; and contended that the allowing of the sinking fund to accumulate would be inconvenient to the country. Then, what was the remedy? The noble lord had chosen the proper medium by his plan. He had given the stockholder the benefit of the 5 per cent. instead of one per cent. at present, with a view to the great loans that might be necessary afterwards, so that the whole was for the benefit of the country, which was the great object of the sinking fund. It was intended to facilitate the loans, the immediate increase of the sinking fund. That was the reason why so large a per centage was allowed at first.—Why, then, the right hon. gent. talked about the improbability of the war expenditure being confined to 32 millions. But his noble friend had not pledged himself that this alone should be the amount of the expenditure. His object was to shew, that supposing the war expenditure should not exceed the enormous sum of 32 millions, still the war might be continued for so long a time without any additional taxes. This was a circumstance which must occasion astonishment in every one, and must excite amazement from one end of Europe to the other. The right hon. gent. might say, that an additional sum would be wanted; why, then, loans must be provided to answer that. The right honourable gentleman had then adverted to the subsidies, and said that these had not been usually provided for distinctly as subsidies, but had been included in the loans. But he had never heard of a loan where the object of subsidies was concealed. They were generally provided for distinctly by way of loan, or by a vote of credit, which was understood to apply to unforeseen expences. The plan took the basis of 32 millions, because some basis must be adopted. Any one might take 34 millions if he pleased, and calculate the advantages of the plan upon that. He would only have to make the requisite allowances, and that was all the difference. But in the mean time it was a good thing when 32 millions could be produced, and the only question was, whether this was the best mode of managing that sum. There was no doubt as to the sum being produced. That being the present sum requisite for the war expences, and that sum being produced, this plan proceeded upon the supposition that thirty-two millions would be the amount of the war expenditure. As to the depreciation of money, he did not very well understand what the right hon. gent. meant by that argument, for, if there was any mode better than another to prevent the depreciation of money, it was to prevent any additional taxation. It was curious then to have this thrown in the teeth of those who were doing that which of all other things tended most to prevent the depreciation which was apprehended. That this depreciation might take place, however, to a certain extent, was not at all unlikely; but it was one of the advantages of this plan that it confined it within proper bounds. This was all that was necessary in reply to the right hon. gent. as he had not entered into the details of the plan. His objections, therefore, to the principle appeared to be ill-founded.—The house then went into a committee.

Mr. *Rose* addressed the Committee nearly as follows:—I am aware of the disadvantage under which any one must rise in this committee, to make observations at all unfavourable to a plan which holds out to the country a certain prospect of not being subjected to taxes for 3 years to come; and that for a considerable period, such as shall be necessary will be to no considerable amount. Objections, however, of so serious and important a nature press upon my mind upon the subject that unless they shall be removed by the noble lord, they will compel me, in the discharge of my duty as a member of parliament, to resist at least the immediate adoption of it, especially on the basis proposed; under a persuasion that if, contrary to the present impression on my mind, the scheme shall be found to be a good one, other means than those proposed must be devised for carrying it into effect. High eulogiums were bestowed by the noble lord in the course of his opening Speech, on the system of the Sinking Fund, and on the one for raising large sums within the year, towards carrying on the war; and great praise was very liberally given to the incomparable man (Mr. Pitt) whom this country and the world have had the misfortune to lose, for having established those systems. I naturally expected, therefore, to hear some proposal similar in principle to those: the Resolution, however, under our consideration is the converse of that principle, as it not only has a direct tendency to interrupt the progress of the old Sinking fund, in paying of the present debt, but anticipates our resources instead of providing new ones. The truth is, which cannot be concealed, that instead of following up the principle established and acted upon by my late right hon. friend, of increasing the sinking fund, and diminishing the debt, it is proposed to us to adopt one, which in the course of its operation, will have the effect of diminishing the Sinking Fund, and increasing to an immense amount the capital of the debt. Any wise and practicable plan that could be devised for avoiding, as far as may be prudent, the imposition of taxes, arising out of the systems alluded to, must be received with as much partiality by me as by any member in this house, considering who was the author of those; but nothing can lead me to approve of any diversion of the Sinking Fund from the purposes to which it is now applicable by law, without all the consequences of that having been previously and most attentively weighed. I was averse to the departure from it in 1802, foreseeing the danger of a further deviation; and it was with reluctance that Mr. Pitt gave his consent to it, as is well known to others as well as to myself. The authors of the present scheme admit, as they must do, "that they take in aid certain excesses to accrue from the present Sinking Fund." which is explained by a statement, that it is meant the application of the old Sinking Fund shall cease when it shall be equal to the interest of the present debt; by which I take it for granted is meant, the amount of the debt at the time when the income of the Sinking Fund shall be equal to the interest of the debt, and not to the amount of the interest of the debt at this time. It is true that when Mr. Pitt established the Sinking Fund, it was limited to 4,000,000*l.* and the surplus was to be at the disposal of parliament; but if that had not been altered in 1802, to compensate for the Sinking Fund having been provided by Mr. Addington, for 86,000,000*l.* of capital then funded, there can be no doubt but that the surplus above the 4,000,000*l.* and the annuities as they shall fall in, would have been left to the aid of the Fund. I must at the same time, do Mr. Addington the justice to say, that, so far from shrinking from proposing taxes, he made an addition to them considerably beyond the amount of the interest of the debt created; and that, by the alteration then made, the ultimate liquidation of the debt is somewhat accelerated.—I wish, however, not to be understood to express an opinion, that in no possible case should there be a diversion of any part of the Sinking Fund:—great expectation has been held out to the public (whether prudently or not is, perhaps, not worth enquiring about) of an exemption from taxes. I am aware too that many gentlemen may think we have done enough for posterity, and that we should now consider of some relief for those who have already made great sacrifices, and have cheerfully submitted to heavy pressures; but even if the committee shall be of that opinion, I shall still contend that the mode proposed for affording that relief would, in its consequences, be most mischievous. I am anxious, therefore, before the plan proposed by the chancellor of the exchequer is adopted, that sufficient time should be allowed to consider whether any other can be suggested, which, although it may not afford all the relief we have been led to expect, may at least avoid the dangers I am about to point out, and be free from most of the objections I am about to state. In the view of the subject I am now taking, I forbear to enter on detailed observations upon the tables on which the calculations are made; the most superficial inspection, however, of the one marked N. (See Appendix) would satisfy any one of the danger of the plan being adopted without further investigation, which would have been still more apparent if that table had been continued a few years more. The noble lord seems to have fallen into three considerable errors respecting his plan; and to have given no weight whatever to the important consideration of what provision it may be necessary to make for our peace establishment although he mentions it. I allude 1st, to the assumption that each loan will be paid off in 14 years, by its accompanying Sinking Fund at 5 per cent. 2d. That the War Taxes will be sufficiently productive in peace to do what is required of them. 3d. That our War Expences will be kept so low as 38,000,000*l.* As to the first, the noble lord proceeds on an expectation that the 3 per cents will be stationary at 60*l.* without considering that the sums so raised may, and in all probability will be paid off with the same stock at 80*l.* 90*l.* or at par. There can be no doubt but that the redemption of the debt is much more likely to be retarded by such rise, than it is to be accelerated by future loans being made at a lower rate of interest, in consequence of the increased value of the stock. These objections struck me very forcibly on the noble lord opening his plan, as I observed to a learned friend near me; and on the best and most mature reflection I have since been able to bestow on the subject, I am strongly confirmed in them. I cannot express myself too strongly respecting a continuance of the part of the War Taxes I have alluded to for an indefinite term, according as the price of stocks may be, under a firm and clear conviction founded on experience, that with the exception of those on goods and shipping, and on malt, (to which I have objections of a different nature) the taxes at their present rates would so lessen the lawful consumption of most of the articles on which they are levied, as to reduce the old duties on the same to at least as great an extent as the amonnt of the War Taxes; if I am right in that, the revenue would of course profit nothing by a continuation of the latter, but would probably sustain a loss. —Tea—the war duty on which produces nearly 2,000,000*l.* When Mr. Pitt came into office, the duties, according to the rate and to the value, were about 85*l.* per cent. on the value. The legal consumption was then 4,313,000 pounds on an average of ten years, which much exceeds former accompts. The duty was lowered in 1784, to 12*l.* 10s. on the value, and gradually raised in Mr. Pitt's time to 40*l.* per cent. on the higher priced teas, under which the consumption got up to an average in the ten years to 1806, to about 20,000,000 lbs.: here then is an increase of more than 15,000,000 lbs. Supposing the average value of the tea sold by the Company to be 4s. a pound, the duty, which is now 95*l.* per cent. including the War Tax of 45*l.* on the present consumption, would be about 3,800,000*l.*; if that very high amount should reduce the consumption in peace to any thing like what it was before the Commutation Act, it was evident the revenue would sustain a loss by a continuation of the War Tax. There are indeed other considerations respecting this duty, deeply affecting our manufactures and navigation, as well as the interests of the East India Company; the Custom-house value only of British manufactures exported to China from 1773 to 1784, was 110,000*l.* which from 1785 to 1805 was on the average 680,000*l.* and on the average of the last five years more than 1,000,000*l.* And the shipping from China, which from 1774 to 1784 was only 5256 tons, increased to an average of 18,555 tons. —Of Tobacco I shall only observe that the war tax of 6d. a lb. will afford great encouragement to the smuggler in peace; the consumption of which has been nearly doubled since 1786.—Rum—When Mr. Pitt came into office, the duty was 6s. 6d. a gallon, which in 1784 was lowered to 4s. 8d. and that not succeeding, it was farther reduced in 1786 to 4s. The legal consumption then was 842,000 gallons, and on on average of ten years 1,342,000 gallons, but got up on an average of ten years to 1806, to 2,441,000 gallons. The duty is now 11s: 0½d. of which 3s. 5½d. is a War Tax, leaving 6s. 11d. permanent.—Brandy—When Mr. Pitt came into office the duty was 9s. 6¾d. a gallon, which was reduced in 1807, to 5s.; the consumption then was 754,000 gallons, and on an average of ten years 611,965 gallons, but increased to an average of 1,580,000 gallons, on the average of ten years to 1806. The duty is now 13s. 8½d. of which 4s. 2½d is a War Tax, leaving 8s: 5d. permanent. If therefore the War Taxes on these two articles should be allowed to expire with the war, the remaining duty on the former would be something higher than when the consumption was the lowest, and on the latter would be within 1s. a gallon. It is therefore clear, without going into a minute calculation, that in both rum and brandy the revenue would lose considerably by a continuation of the War Tax in peace, if the consumption should be reduced to any thing like what it was previous to the reduction of the duties. It was indeed frequently urged to Mr. Pitt that he would not be able to continue the whole of the permanent duty in peace, and he always admitted the possibility of its being found necessary to reduce even that.—British Spirits—Another productive article, the duty on which has always borne a proportion to that on foreign spirits, would necessarily be given up if the War Tax on foreign spirits should be allowed to expire. —Goods and Wares—Under this head, by much the most productive article is sugar;—it was understood the merchants and planters had assurances the duty should expire with the war, on its having been made evident that a continuance of it in peace would be ruinous to them, from a certainty that the price of the article would, as in former instances, fall much lower than the saving by insurance and freight.—Cotton Wool, as a raw material, is a manufacture, in which we are in some branches rivalled on the Continent, cannot certainly bear a tax in peace.—Wine—The whole duty in this article is permanent, but Mr. Pitt considered the last 20*l.* a ton as a War Tax; and therefore, did not apply it to pay the interest of any Loan. The duty before the consolidation in 1787, was 47*l.* 9*s.* to London—it was then reduced to 31*l.* 10*s.*—and the quantity retained for consumption was in 1786, 14,626 tons, and on an average of ten years 13,932 tons; rose to an average of 25,571 tons in ten years, to 1806.—Goods and Shipping—I come next to the duty which is likely, beyond all comparison, to be attended with the most pernicious and extensive consequences on a return of peace to our revenue, navigation, commerce, and manufactures. The effects which must inevitably be produced by it that it is utterly inconceiveable to me how they have escaped the noble lord. This is a duty, (a most productive one now) of from 1*l.* to 4*l.* per cent. on all British goods and manufactures exported, according to the different parts of the world to which they were sent (except cotton goods), and a tonnage duty on ships from 6*d*, to 3*s.* a ton, varying also according to the different parts of the world to which they shall be bound. The pledge given that it should not be continued was under a clear conviction that it would be highly impolitic to do so. During such a naval war as the present, while we have nearly the exclusive supply of foreigners with our manufactures, no considerable risk is incurred by the duty, but immediately on the return of peace, other countries will come, as we well know, in very close competition with us, and the same with respect to the navigation. —In the reign of Charles II. when the subject of political economy was little understood, a duty was imposed on our exports; but so early as the reign of king William, the duty on woollens was taken off, and in 1722 the whole were repealed [refer to the preambles of the 11th and 12th W. 3d. ch. 20, and the 8th Geo. I. ch. 15, reciting the importance of taking off the duties to the manufacturing and commercial interests of the country]. In the year preceding the general repeal in 1722, the value of our exports from England was 4,500,000*l.* which was the average of the four years preceding. In 1722, they rose to 5,293,000*l.* and the average of the four succeeding years was 5,070,000*l.* The value is now, not less from England, than 22,000,000*l.* I state from England only, and on the Custom-house value, because we have no accounts of the exports from Scotland in the former period. With such experience before us, if danger were not self evident, it would surely be an extraordinary dereliction of our duty if we should continue this impost in time of peace. The ship owners we know are already alarmed, and have taken measures for calling the attention of ministers, or parliament, to the importance of the subject; nor can it be doubted, but that the manufacturers in almost every branch, as well as the merchants who export the goods, will do the same.—There remains then only the Malt Duty; the produce of which will perhaps not be effected by the return of peace: but, let me call the attention of the Committee to the circumstances attending this; previously to the war of 1793, the whole duty on the article was 1*s.* 3¾*d.* a bushel. In 1791, a further duty of 3*d.* was imposed (among other articles) to continue for 3 years to pay off the debt of 3,000,000*l.* incurred for the Spanish armament, but it was so loudly and universally complained of, and found so oppressive, as to induce a repeal of it at the end of the first year. Mr. Addington added 1*s.* 3¼*d.* a bushel permanent; and the war duty is 2*s.* making a total of 4*s.* 4*d.* exceeding the duty before the war by 3*s.*—when in 1792, it was thought 3*d.* was oppressive. Is it then too much to ask of the committee to pause before they decide to leave such a pressure, which bears principally on the middling and lower classes of society, while it is understood that the whole of the Income Tax, by which the higher orders are principally affected, is to cease on a peace? it would be fair at least to let the latter share the burthen; 1*l.* per cent. on that would be about equal to half the Malt Duty.—I have now gone through the whole of the War Taxes; and if I am not very much deceived myself on the subject, I must have convinced the committee of the impolicy of continuing in peace all but the last, and the positive injustice of that. The noble lord stated with exultation that the permanent taxes, which were only 10,200,000*l.* in 1784, had been increased to 32,000,000*l* in 1806; it was natural for him to do so, and I am rejoiced he has discovered that the resources of the country are not in that dilapidated state they were represented to be in when his colleagues came into office: The merits of my late right hon. friend in being the chief instrument to bring them up to that sum, will appear most conspicuous when it is adverted to, that the taxes were so judiciously selected as to admit of the manufactures, commerce, and navigation of the country, nearly keeping pace with the increase of our burthens, instead of being at all depressed by them. It will be sufficient to state that the value of the British manufactures exported from Great Britain in that year, ending January 1784, was 10,409,000*l.*; and in 1805, was 25,004,000*l.* It was not however exclusively by the imposition of Taxes that Mr. Pitt improved the Revenue, but by a constant and watchful care: proposing the lowering and raising duties, as he thought advisable from time to time;

The Revenue 1781, the first year of his Administration was	10,194,000
Taxes of 1784 and 1785 were	938,000
Gained by the Consolidation in 1787, turning Fractions into Integers, Wood and Cambric	85,000
Taxes imposed in 1789	60,000
	11,277,000
And the Produce of the same Taxes in the year ending January 1803, was	15,433,000
Leaving a clear gain by improved management of	4,156,000
Of which total, Spirits, Wine, Tobacco, and Post Horse duty, amounted to	1,165,000

If I had no other reasons to offer against putting out of our power the war taxes, I should think I have said enough to induce the committee not to decide hastily in favour of a measure which cannot be effected without our doing so; but I wish further to press on their consideration, that any substitutes for those it may be found necessary should expire, will not be within our grasp. I allude to the necessity of looking to a provision for our peace establishment; it is observed indeed in a paper circulated by ministers, "how far some parts of the War Taxes are of a description to remain in force after the war; and what may be the provision to be made hereafter for a peace establishment; probably much larger than in former periods of peace, are considerations which at present need not be anticipated!!" Are we than to shut our eyes against a situation which (however hopeless the present prospect is) we may be in within a year or two? Are we now entirely to exclude from our deliberations the prudence of divesting ourselves of all power over taxes which we may want for our peace establishment, if we shall find by enforcing existing regulations and enacting new ones we can hereafter even continue any part of them? However difficult it may be to ascertain the exact amount of that establishment, no one will doubt for a moment but that it must be infinitely larger than the former one. I will state one lower than I am sure his majesty's ministers can entertain the remotest hope of its being reduced to, and opposite to it the means we have to provide for it.

CHARGE.

Interest of Debt	27,466,000
Annual Contribution to Sinking Fund	1,200,000
Charges on Consolidated Fund as in 1805, probably some increase	1,338,000
	30,004,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills; it will be much more	300,000
Miscellaneous Services; they will certainly be more	350,000
Army.—Two-thirds of Lord Sidmouth's Peace Establishment, adding nothing for Mr. Windham's Plans	7,400,000
Navy.—Two-thirds of Lord Sidmouth's Peace Establishment, adding nothing for Lord Howick's increase of Pay	4,864,000
Ordnance.—The Peace Vote in 1802 was 919,000*l.*	500,000
Militia and Volunteers.—Very difficult to form any Estimate of; I will suppose so very small an amount as	300,000
Barrack Establishment, &c.	
Charge	43,718,000

INCOME.

Produce of Taxes stated by Lord H. Petty at 32,000,000*l.* I will state at	33,000,000
Land Tax unredeemed, and Tax on Pensions	1,400,000
Malt	550,000
Lottery	450,000
Imprests	100,000
Income	35,500,000
Deficiency	8,218,000

This statement leaves a deficiency of more than 8 millions. Will not the providing for that on a peace (if nothing shall be done towards it, in mean time) furnish sufficient employment for the wisest application of any means without the additional task being imposed on us of finding substitutes for taxes we are now about to appropriate? Sir, exclusively of the mistakes and oversights already noticed, there is still one more which must have a considerable influence on the plan before us; I mean estimating the future war expenditure so low as 38,677,000*l.* or that of 1806, to which sum it is reduced by excluding subsidies to the amount of 1,500,000*l* and the sum requisite for the Loyalty Loan, as if there had not been in almost every year of war extra expences beyond those sums; such charges will be found to have amounted in an average of the last twelve years to 2,744,000*l.*; on an average of the last seven years to 3,934,000*l.*; and in the last year to 5,188,000*l.* The noble lord will hardly tell us that a determination has been taken to give no more subsidies to princes on the continent, however tempting the occasion may be, notwithstanding the communication made to the French minister in the late Negociation, of the opinion entertained by our ministers of the rashness and folly of further coalition to reduce the power of France. A moderate and reasonable allowance for unforeseen expences will unavoidably increase the Supplementary Loans, and will compel necessarily the imposing taxes to a considerably larger amount than the noble lord has led us to expect. If on the degree of consideration we are allowed time for all the circumstances I have alluded to, it shall be thought expedient to decide now on pledging a part of the War Taxes, let gentlemen weigh well in their minds, whether, reflecting on all the disadvantages and objections I have stated to the collection of those under the management of the Customs and Excise, it may not be desirable rather to avail ourselves of the Income Tax to a limited amount. I am aware of the unpopularity of that; notwithstanding which, under all the disadvantage of offering suggestions to government, I am willing to take a full share of; for I sincerely believe that every man who spends a reasonable part of his income, will, at the end of the year, pay less in that shape than by any taxes on consumption. My entreaty to the noble lord however is, not that he will relinquish his plan, nor even that he will at present make any alteration in the detail of it; I beseech him only to limit the experiment to the present year; it will answer all his purposes completely and effectually, and will afford him and his majesty's other ministers opportunity to consider it more fully themselves, and to advise with others, as well as to the public to understand it better than they do now. With that entreaty I shall close what I mean to trouble the committee with; observing only, that I am persuaded what is well intended by the noble lord as a relief to the people at present, will prove out of all proportion more mischievous to the permanent prosperity of the country. My anxiety for her prosperity is undiminished, which cannot be felt more warmly by the noble lord or by his friends at the treasury, than it is by me.

Lord *Henry Petty* said, he should have felt considerable reluctance in addressing the house before they had gone into a committee, as the right hon. gent.'s opposition to the Speaker's leaving the chair had it been persisted in, would have compelled him to advance in support of his motion, the same arguments with which he had already troubled the house, and thereby have involved him in an unpleasant repetition, that must have been to him extremely painful, as it could not have been to the house otherwise than irksome. He should begin with answering the earnest injunction that had been imposed on him by the right hon. gent. in the conclusion of his speech. He would assure that right hon. gent. that if he could be brought to think that delay in this instance could possibly be productive of any one serious good effect, or even that it would not be productive of material inconvenience, he should be extremely happy to meet his wishes, and should be the last person to press it to a speedy conclusion. And here he should take occasion to remark upon a mistake that had too generally gone abroad; it had been said that he had bound himself as responsible for any future contingencies that might in a greater or less degree affect his plan. One of the principal merits of that plan he took to be, that while it looked prospectively to futurity, it did not go to impose any inconvenient restrictions; with respect to the future, it was proposed that the War Taxes to the amount of 1,200,000*l.* should be mortgaged, and he was at a loss to conceive how any mischief could result from that plan that could for a moment weigh against the great and paramount advantage of a year's repose to the country from the burthens of additional taxation. The right hon. gent. had commented with some force upon the state of the war duties, but nothing had fallen from the right hon. gent. of which he had not been before apprized, and which had not made upon his mind a due impression. He admitted the difficulty of raising the War Taxes in time of peace, but begged leave to deprecate and protest against the opinion that what had been raised as necessary to support the prosecution of war, should, when that war was over, continue to be levied and rendered permanent in a peace establishment. At a season when events might arise which it was not in man to anticipate or predetermine on, a representative value for a certain portion of taxes had been suggested. He would ask the right honourable gentleman what substitute could be found for the plan? How could the same relief be afforded by a system which would every year make a great addition to the permanent taxes? He would shew it was impossible to stop taxation otherwise than by mortgaging the war taxes. When the war taxes could no longer be available, those permanent taxes the right hon. gent now recommended might be substituted:

> "Like you, Sir John!
> That we can do when all the rest is gone."

If the war taxes would not be productive in the same amount in time of peace, some of them would be, and a considerable part of the charge at least, might be continued on each article. What had been mortgaged, would besides be successively falling in; and if one tax must be given up, another might be substituted. He looked with confidence to the industry of a body of able officers as those of the revenue were, in preventing smuggling, particularly when encouraged by an improved system of reward, making them participate in the benefit of seizure, which they did not at present. The vessels and implements of the smugglers should be destroyed, and fines imposed upon the persons upon whom those vessels and implements should be found. By these means, if not altogether extinguished, the evil would be greatly checked. With a view to this object, a large peace establishment would be highly beneficial: and if chargeable in one view, it would be economical in another, as it would be the means of improving the revenue, which would go to defray its expences. These were the grounds of his hope, and he held forth only a hope, that this plan would answer the ends proposed. Here he would take occasion to give some explanation with respect to the property tax, which he was supposed to have pledged himself to repeal. That was not the nature of his pledge, but that the means for repealing it would exist, and that parliament would be free to consider the propriety of applying them. His own opinion was inclined to concur with that of the right hon. gent., that a small portion of the property tax would be less burthensome than those taxes on consumption, which, though less immediately felt, were ultimately more burthensome and less productive, as being charged with a profit by every person through whose hands the article passed, and diminished in a similar succession by every hand employed in the collection. The propriety of the continuance of such a small property tax, would, however, remain to be regulated by the public feeling, and the public convenience at the time. He agreed with him as to the difficulty of continuing the war taxes. One thing however the right hon. gent. was mistaken in. There were no war taxes on foreign goods for exportation. He allowed it was impossible to calculate precisely on the redemption of the mortgaged taxes in 14 years. But from a moderate calculation that would be the period of redemption. If from the rise of stocks, the sinking fund upon these war loans should be slower in operation, it would be larger in amount; there would then be only 4 per cent. for interest, and 6 for sinking fund. There would be besides a great advantage in the terms of future loans, so that what would be lost in one way would be gained in another, and as the whole was to be comprehended in one general account, a rise in the funds would be upon the whole beneficial. As to the objection made by the noble lord and the right hon. gent. opposite, and made elsewhere also, that this system of borrowing money at compound interest was attended with double expence, that was true; but the charge was more than compensated by the comparative benefits that would be afforded by preventing the exhausting of the country, and by renovating and invigorating its resources. If the country was in that state, as the right hon. gent. opposite argued, that the increase of taxation would diminish the consumption and the produce of the tax, we were in that situation, that a perseverance in the old system would wear away from under our feet the ground upon which we stood, it was absolutely necessary to adopt some plan to prevent additional taxation, and this was the only plan that would answer that object. The best mode of judging the merits of this plan was to compare it with that of the noble lord opposite (Castlereagh). It was objected to this plan, that it went to legislate for the future; that it assumed a certain amount of expenditure, and that too low an amount, without taking into the calculation, the means of judging of the real amount of the wants that would be provided for. Nothing was more futile than this objection, as the plan would lend itself to any increase of expenditure that might arise. The only two ways in which it could fail to afford alleviation were these: first, if the war taxes should fail during the war; if that should be the case, it would not be the consequence of this plan more than any other. The failure would be in the nature of the tax itself, and would happen under any one plan as well as another. But if from any cause any of the present war taxes should fail, the house would tax other articles so as to keep up the present amount of revenue from the war taxes. Thus the plan did no more than we were liable to under the present system. As to the other point, that an increased expenditure was to be looked for, he took the actual state of our expenditure only as a secure foundation to reason upon. With respect to expeditions to the continent, or subsidies, there were no data to go upon. All he meant was, to shew the facility of providing for the present common expenditure to any length of time; but he should be sorry in doing so to adopt any plan of a nature to preclude the house from accommodating the basis of that plan to any circumstances that might arise. Any plan not so applicable would be a very unfit basis for a system of finance. He did not like to assume at random an amount of contingent expences, or an increase of common expences, which would afford room only for reasoning as fallacious as its foundation. He had shewn that the falling in of annuities after those applied to the deferred stock would prevent the necessity of having recourse to any taxes for 3 years; in the subsequent seven years 292,000*l.* a year would be wanted; in the next ten years nothing. Supposing an expenditure of two millions for the continent, the foundation of the plan would not be undermined, nor its firmness shaken. The only consequence would be, that from the increase of the war loans by this demand, the war taxes would be applicable in an inferior proportion to the supplementary loans. There would be 3 years still exempt from taxation by the falling in of annuities. In the subsequent 7 years 505,000*l.* annually would be wanted instead of 292,000*l.* to be raised by new taxes. In the five following years no taxes would be wanted, and in the last five years of the series only 330,000*l.* Thus, in the constant succession of the war taxes, and the relief from all further taxation for three years, the plan would be obviously beneficial, and only a moderate increase of taxes would be necessary in some parts of the period. He stated thus much to shew that he did not assume to legislate for the future without going on firm ground.—He was next to come more immediately to the plan proposed by the noble lord in his resolutions. These resolutions divided themselves into three points. The first and sixth related to the comparative effect of the present system and proposed plan; and the ninth and tenth adopting the vices, as they had been termed, of his plan, were intended to shew, that the same means of relief would be afforded by the existing system as by the new plan. But the noble lord had assumed as a right, on his part, of the public to take from the sinking fund without giving any equivalent to the stockholders. He agreed with his right hon friend (Mr. Tierney), that the sinking fund was first created not for the interest of the stockholder, but of the public. It was a boon in 1786, granted by Mr. Pitt to the stockholders; but what was the situation of the stockholders who had since lent their capital on the credit of that fund? The house should pause before it should touch that sacred ground. The noble lord, with his plan, interposed between the public and public creditor, by proposing to take the excesses of the sinking fund after the year 1816, and without giving any equivalent to the stockholder. The effect of the noble lord's plan on the redemption of the public debt would be, that ninety millions would, at the end of the period, remain unredeemed, and the whole would not be paid till the year 1832; whereas, by the new plan, the whole would be redeemed in 1826. The noble lord's plan, therefore, would retard the redemption of the debt eight years;

> "Anxious the public debt to pay,
> "Like prudent Fabius, by delay,"

the noble lord took all that could retard the redemption of the debt, and left out all that could accelerate it. The plan of the noble lord proposed to take the excesses of the sinking fund between 1816 and 1826, in which period only they could accrue, and as it would be necessary for him to provide for the loans of the year between the present year and the year 1816, an amount of 6,947,000*l.* would be necessary. If this sum were not provided by new taxes, it must by ruinous loans, and if ultimately to be provided for out of the excesses of the sinking fund in the last period, it would anticipate these excesses, and render them unavailable when they should accrue. As to what had been said relative to a future peace establishment, he had only to observe that that subject had not been excluded from the view of his majesty's ministers. The means of providing for that establishment would exist in a higher degree than at the close of the late war; certainly in a much higher degree than at the close of the American war, when the right hon. gent. opposite (Mr. Rose) admitted that the public revenue was wholly insufficient. In 1786, the peace establishment was five millions, and the revenue, exclusive of the additional taxes, amounted only to between three and four millions, which improvement was a consequence of the growing prosperity of the country. At the close of the late war, Mr. Addington, though burthened with fifty-six millions charged upon the income tax, by one stroke of manly and vigorous financial policy, relieved the country from the income tax, and funded the debt charged upon it, providing at the same time for the interest, and sinking fund upon it. On the next peace there would be an amount of seven millions, arising out of the annual taxes, the surplus of the consolidated fund, and the produce of the lottery, applicable to the establishment; and, as after the year 1810, considerable sums would be set free in each year, any small sum that might be necessary to fill up the peace establishment might be appropriated from them. He should not say what might be the amount of the peace establishment, for that would depend on the state of France, and of Europe; but he could look with confidence to the resources of the country to supply ample means for providing for such an establishment. He complained that the noble lord in calculating the comparative effect of the new plan, had given an unfair view of the question by stating, as he had truly done, the amount of the debt created, but witholding the effect of the sinking fund for its redemption. As to the plan of the noble lord, contained in his eighth resolution, for keeping the sinking fund stationary when it should amount to an equality with the loan, and for adding the interest of the sum borrowed to the amount of the loan in each year, whilst the interest, and sinking fund upon that interest, was to be defrayed out of the consolidated fund, to be afterwards replaced out of the excesses of the sinking fund, he considered that as the most ruinous system that could be devised. The sum to be provided in the first year would be small; but without troubling the committee with the intermediate accumulation, he should state, that before the excesses should accrue in 1816, the sum to be provided in the year would be eleven millions, the aggregate sums borrowed would be one hundred and forty-eight or nine millions, and the charge upon the consolidated fund would be five hundred thousand pounds. Such a system would be much more ruinous than this plan of supplementary loans. The general result of the two plans would be, that by the noble lord's plan the amount of the debt created would be, in 1826, 273,560,531*l.* with a sinking fund of 8,960,987*l.*; and by the new plan, the amount of the debt would be 304,884,442*l.* with a sinking fund of 19,368,000*l.* So that with a small increase of the public debt, there would be more than double the amount of the sinking fund. As to the other plan of the noble lord, it departed from the principle of giving immediate relief to the country, by providing that we should go on as at present, till the sinking fund should equal the amount of the loan. To this he had a fundamental objection, because it proposed to lay on 730,000*l.* taxes annually, till the sinking fund should reach the assumed limit, at a time when it was universally agreed, that all taxation should be avoided. This plan did not include the possibility of an increase of expenditure, which would overturn the foundation upon which it rested. An increase of expenditure would create an increasing debt, whilst the sinking fund would be stationary.—Having proceeded somewhat further in the discussion of the comparative merits of the system he had the honour to bring forward, and that recommended by the opposite side of the house, the noble lord dilated upon the benefits which his system promised to produce. Among other advantages, he stated that it was peculiarly calculated to occasion that which was most important in a country like this, namely, to keep up the price of stocks. If they were inclined to advance, this system would serve to promote that advance; and, on the other hand, if they were upon the decline, this system was of such a nature as must operate and counteract that tendency. Indeed, the effects of this system upon the stocks had been already experienced. The happiest omen of its character had been manifested in the rise of stocks, even within the period that had elapsed since its original proposition. It was, in fact, evident that it served to encourage the confidence, and confirm the hopes of that most intelligent body of men, the monied interest, who were not to be deceived by imposing schemes or fallacious calculations—who were not likely to attach themselves to any project, the ruinous tendency of which was, according to the gentlemen on the opposite bench, perfectly obvious. Another effect of this system would be to keep down the price of provisions, or at least prevent those fluctuations in prices which so mischievously tended to depreciate the value of money. For as it precluded additional taxation, it must naturally serve to promote the end of placing provisions and other articles affected by taxation, on terms more easily within the reach of Government and the people. The noble lord concluded with observing that those two important effects pleaded most powerfully for the adoption of the system he had the honour to submit to their consideration.

Lord *Castlereagh* intended to compress in as small compass as possible, the observations he had to make upon the subject before the committee. As to what had been said of the objection imputed to him and his right hon. friend (Mr. Rose), that the new plan was to legislate for the future. he had only to state that they did not contend that any enactment on this subject would preclude parliament from taking such measures as would hereafter be deemed necessary. They had only contended that parliament should not involve itself in a measure which it would have hereafter to alter or abandon. There was but one sentiment on all sides of the house with respect to the expediency of relieving the country from taxation. There was something coercive in the language of the noble lord respecting the sinking fund. If he understood the noble lord, he had said that the sinking fund was not to be touched, unless by a kind of bargain with the stockholder, who was to have his *quid pro quo* from the public. But he wished to be informed what *quid pro quo* was to be given to the stockholder when the noble lord came to take the excesses of the sinking fund. The principle laid down by the noble lord on this subject could not be acted upon, and he would be obliged to abandon it. Parliament had unquestionably a right to exercise its discretion respecting a sinking fund; but here he begged to state, that he should not wish for any measure to be adopted that would prove injurious to the public creditor, and he contended that the interest of the public creditor would be best consulted by the adoption of either of his suggestions than by the plan proposed by the noble lord. If the sinking fund was to be touched at all, it would in either of the cases suggested by him be touched in a manner less liable to objection than in the manner proposed in the new plan. The excesses as calculated on in the new plan would be available both in war and in peace, and at the disposal of the minister, whereas according to his plan the excesses could only be taken during war, when loans would be necessary. His plan would afford a greater principle of limitation on the discretion of parliament respecting these excesses; besides, the interest of the stockholder was materially concerned in keeping up the value of capital in the market, and it would be impossible to effect that, when in the last period a loan of thirty-two millions annually would be raised, nay of forty or fifty millions, in consequence of the rise of stores, the depreciation of money, and an increase of expenditure. Small loans with a small sinking fund, would be much more beneficial to the stockholder than a loan of that amount with a sinking fund of twenty seven millions. The noble lord had that night, in express terms, admitted that his system was founded upon a principle of raising money upon a compound interest, though he contended for the advantage of a compound benefit. But he had no doubt, that the noble lord upon reflection, would perceive how unwise a principle that was. The noble lord proposed to borrow money to pay the interest of his war loans, as well as the interest upon that interest. What would be the effect of such a statement going forth to Europe? and he could not see any other view in bringing forward the plan at present, but to exhibit it to Europe. There were good calculators, he wished the noble lord to recollect, in Europe, and particularly in that part of it with which we were at present at issue, and they could not fail to discover the fallacy of a system built upon compound loans and compound interest, a system which must inevitably lead to bankruptcy. There was only one authority upon which the noble lord could justify such a system, and he thanked God, that his late right hon. friend afforded no such authority. There had been but one person who, as a public man, could declare to a nation that he would provide for the expences of a war, and for the interest of the debt incurred, by loan without taxes. That man was Mr. Necker; and he trusted the example was one which the noble lord would not be ambitious to imitate. After the difficulties experienced last year with respect to taxes, and the gloomy representations which had been made, without foundation, as it appeared to him, of the finances of the country, it was somewhat extraordinary to have this plan proposed for raising above four hundred millions upon a fund of two millions and fifty-one thousand pounds. The noble lord seemed to have found the philosopher's stone, and certainly it would appear to Europe, as if there was conjuring in it. But from the effect of his plan, it would appear that the noble lord had discovered the negative philosopher's stone, which his right hon. friend (Mr. Tierney) would explain to him—the power of spending money without creating resources. He here begged leave to repeat, that the noble lord's system would increase the public debt ninety millions; and contended, that there was a most striking difference between its effect, and that of the pure operation of the present system, or of either of the plans which he had himself suggested. The amount of debt under the noble lord's system, at the end of fourteen years, would be 429,386,000*l.* the amount of debt under his suggestion, 369,955,000*l.* which would give an increase of debt of 59,000,000*l.* The sinking fund, in the former case, would be 27,000,000*l.* in the latter 11,140,000*l.* the war taxes however, would be completely bound in the former case, and be completely free in the latter, and allowing for the reduction by amount of excesses, it would be brought within a fraction of the same proportion to the debt under the noble lord's plan, as the sinking fund would bear to the debt under his present suggestion. The noble lord had said that the whole of the war taxes would be pledged, yet on the return of peace it would be open to determine what taxes might be substituted for any part of them. The consequence would be, that the whole amount would be to be laid on in a period of peace, when the energies and zeal of a period of war would be relaxed, in the place of being gradually laid on as the occasion may require; and the minister of the day would be placed in the situation of devising means for raising the whole at once, amounting to eight or nine millions, instead of having the twenty-one millions of war taxes at his disposal. There would be ten millions two hundred thousand pounds of the war taxes made permanent, and there would consequently remain but 10,800,000*l.* to be successively set free. Against such a doctrine he entered his protest. As to the plan he had suggested, he had thought that by the explanation he had given, he had saved the noble lord the trouble of making an attack upon his own principles. The whole of what the noble lord had said on that head, went to prove, that it would be more dangerous to act upon his principles for nine years, than for twenty years. His plan went on the ground of a nine years expenditure; and certainly, with the same funds, would add much less to the debt, than the supplementary loans of the noble lord. He agreed that he could not go on further without fresh taxes, but if a peace should take place at the end of that period, or before, no new taxes would be necessary. The system of double loans and compound interest of the noble lord would only lead to bankruptcy and ruin, and certainly would bear no comparison either with the present system or either of the suggestions which he had the honour to make by way of modification of the noble lord's plan.

Mr. *Giles* declared that he would not have risen at that late hour, but that he saw one general error pervade the whole system of the noble lord (Castlereagh), which he thought it was incumbent on him to state to the noble lord and the house. If he proved the existence of this one fundamental error throughout the whole of the noble lord's statement, he thought that that might in itself be sufficient to induce the house to reject those calculations which had so much of fallacy in their foundation. The noble lord proposed a loan of eleven millions, for twenty years, without ever mentioning, or taking into his consideration, according to the calculations in his own papers, the accumulating interest for that period. The sum borrowed would amount to 220 millions; the interest to accumulate on the different sums so borrowed would be twenty-three years for the first sum of eleven millions, nineteen for the second, and so on in proportion. This would amount to something upwards of 144,000,000*l.* of interest, in the whole, at the end of the time stated. The noble lord had stated, that the interest, according to his calculation, would amount to only the sum of 14,656,000*l.* or something thereabouts. This immense difference arose from his mistake in not having taken any idea of the accumulating interest along with him as he proceeded. The plan of his noble friend (lord Henry Petty) whilst his calculations were fair and correct, had also this advantage over that of the noble lord (Castlereagh), that at the expiration of the term proposed, it would leave the sinking fund entirely free and unfettered as to its future operation.

Lord *Castlereagh* insisted that the error was not his; he had taken the statement from the tables C, F, and G, of the chancellor of the exchequer's plan.

Mr. *Giles* observed, that was where the noble lord was in error. He only took a view of part of the amount of interest, whereas if he had looked into table L, he would have found that it summed up the whole.

Mr. *Davies Giddy* highly applauded the plan of the noble lord (H. Petty). He had made some calculations upon the subject himself, and had taken some time to consider the plan which that noble lord had laid before the house; and he found that it united all the physical and moral powers that were necessary for the attainment of the object which he had in view. It was with arithmetical calculations as with the machinery used in mechanics; the operating power must be proportioned to the weight or sum which it has to raise. On this principle he found the noble lord's system to be correct in all its parts with making only the necessary allowance for any thing that might hereafter accidentally impede the operations of the machinery. It also possessed the moral power of exciting the confidence and energy of the people.—The resolutions were then read and agreed to. The house resumed, and the report was ordered to be received on Wednesday next.

House of Lords.

Tuesday, February 17.

[Minutes.] In the committee of privilege, Mr. Adam was heard on behalf of the claim of Charles Augustus Ellis, an infant, to the barony of Howard de Walden, and the Attorney General on behalf of the crown. After counsel had withdrawn lord Arden moved, that the chairman should be directed to move the house that the proper officer should attend with the enrollments of patents of peerage granted in the reign of queen Elizabeth. A conversation ensued between lords Hawkesbury, Auckland, Arden, the duke of Norfolk, lords Eldon, Holland, the earl of Suffolk, the lord Chancellor, and lord Redesdale, the result of which was, that lord Arden withdrew his motion. After some further observations from the duke of Norfolk and lord Hawkesbury, the further consideration of the claims was deferred till this day three weeks.—The Controverted Elections Trial bill, the Barrack Commissioners bill, and the Cape of Good Hope Trade regulation Bill, passed through the committees and were reported.—The bill for the Regulation of Courts of Justice in Scotland was, on the motion of lord Walsingham, ordered to be read a second time on Monday, the 9th of March, and the lords to be summoned for that day.—The earl of Rosslyn moved an Address to his majesty, praying for certain papers consisting of returns respecting the effective strength of the military force of the country. Ordered.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, February 17.

[MINUTES.] A message from the lords announced their lordships' assent to the Irish Customs Regulation bill.—The house was ordered to be called over on Thursday next.—The following members were appointed by ballot, to try and determine the merits of the petition, complaining of an undue election for the borough of Liskeard: sir Charles Pole, sir Charles Mordaunt, E. R. Portman, esq. John Maitland, esq. Michael Sims, esq. Joseph Cripps, esq. John Hudson, esq. John Leveson Gower, esq. hon. Courtenay Boyle, Richard Trevanion, esq. Edward Long, esq. Charles Edmonston, esq. R. H. Bradshaw, esq.: Nominees, Thomas Creevey, esq. right hon. Charles Long.—The following members were appointed to try the merits of the petition, complaining of an undue election for Sudbury: lord Brooke, Michael Hicks Beach, esq. hon. sir A. Wellesley, hon. Robert Curzon, lord Grenville Leveson Gower, Jas. Graham, esq. hon. W. Augustus Townshend, William Mellish, esq. sir C. M. Burrell, bart. lord Archibald Hamilton, Henry Swann, esq. hon. A. C. Bradshaw, sir William Paxton; Nominees, sir John Doyle, bart. Robert Hurst, esq.

A petition of the tanners of Ulverstone and its vicinity, in the county of Lancaster, was presented to the house, and read; taking notice of the bill for indemnifying persons who have incurred penalties for regrating and engrossing Oaken bark; and for repealing so much of an act of the 2d year of king James the first, as prohibits the same; and praying, that the same may pass into a law. A petition of the tanners of the district of Armagh; and also, A petition of the tanners of Gorey and its vicinity, in the county of Wexford, were also severally presented to the house, and read; likewise taking notice of the said bill; and setting forth, that if the object and clauses of the said act of the 2d year of king James the first, to prevent the regrating or re-selling Oak bark, should be carried into execution, the annihilation of the tanning trade in Ireland would be the inevitable consequence; and therefore praying, that the house will not permit the provisions of the said act to be enforced. And the said petitions were severally ordered to be referred to the consideration of the committee, appointed to take into consideration the act, made in the 2d year of king James the first, intituled, "an act concerning tanners, curriers, shoemakers, and other artificers occupying the cutting of leather."—Sir Edward Knatchbull reported from the committee, to whom the bill for extending, to sums of greater amount than forty shillings, the provisions of three acts, passed in the 5th, 6th, and 10th years of his present majesty, for the recovery of small debts within the hundreds of Blackheath, Bromley and Bekenham, Rokesley otherwise Ruxley, and Little and Littleness, in the county of Kent, and of Wallington, in the county of Surrey, and for amending the said acts, was committed; that the committee had examined, and found that the standing orders of the house, relative to bills for the more easy recovery of small debts, had been complied with; and that the committee had examined the allegations of the bill, and found the same to be true; the report and amendments were read, and agreed to.—Ordered, that the bill, with the amendments, be ingrossed.

Sir Charles Mordaunt reported from the Committee, to whom the petition of several inhabitants of the town of Birmingham, and the hamlet of Deritend thereto adjoining, in the county of Warwick, was referred; that the committee had examined the matter of the said petition, and had directed him to report the same, as it appeared to them, to the house; and he read the report in his place, and afterwards delivered it in at the table, where the same was read. Ordered, that leave be given to bring in a bill to alter, amend, and enlarge the powers of an act, passed in the 25th year of his late majesty, for the more easy and speedy recovery of Small Debts within the town of Birmingham, and hamlet of Deritend thereto adjoining, in the county of Warwick; and that sir Charles Mordaunt and Mr. Dugdale do prepare, and bring in, the same.—Resolved, that when the house shall have proceeded upon Thursday next to the appointment of select committees for the trial of the several petitions which are appointed to be taken into consideration upon that day, and the names of the members shall be drawn and called for that purpose, Mr. Speaker do direct the name of every member so called, who shall be absent from the house, to be set aside; and that a list of the names of such absent members be reported by Mr. Speaker to the house, at such time as the house shall think fit to appoint.—Resolved, that, upon the report of the list of the names of such absent members, the members for whose non-attendance, on the appointment of the said select committees, a sufficient excuse shall not be made, and allowed by the house, shall be forthwith ordered to be taken into the custody of the serjeant at arms attending this house, and shall not be discharged out of custody without the special order of this house.—A petition of the master, wardens, and commonalty, of the art or mystery of the curriers of the city of London; and also, a petition of the master, wardens, and commonalty, of the mystery of cordwainers of the city of London, were severally presented to the house, and read; taking notice of an act, made in the 2d year of king James the first, intituled, 'an act concerning tanners, curriers, shoe-'makers, and other artificers occupying 'the cutting of leather;' and setting forth, that the petitioners are interested in many of the provisions contained in the said statute, and the more especially in such parts thereof as regulate the well tanning and drying of leather; and therefore praying, that, before any alteration is made in the said act, they may be heard, by themselves, their agents, or counsel, in support of such parts thereof, as they conceive to be beneficial to themselves and the public at large.—A petition of the master tanners of the city of Waterford; and also a petition of the tanners of Stradbally, in the queen's county, were likewise severally presented to the house and read; taking notice of the bill for indemnifying persons who have incurred penalties for regrating and engrossing Oaken Bark, and for repealing so much of an act of the 2d year of king James the first as prohibits the same; and praying that the same may pass into a law. And the said petitions were severally ordered to be referred to the consideration of the committee, appointed to take into consideration the said act.—Resolved that an humble address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this house, copies of any commissions issued by his majesty, for the Sale of Lands in the British West India Islands, between the years 1765 and 1775, inclusive. Ordered, that the said address be presented to his majesty by such members of this house as are of his majesty's most honourable privy council.—Earl Temple reported from the committee appointed to consider of the expediency of permitting the use of Sugar and Molasses in the Distillery and Brewery, for a time to be limitted, under the circumstances now affecting the trade of the British Colonies in the West Indies, and to report the same, with their observations and opinion thereupon, from time to time, to the house; and who were empowered to report the minutes of the evidence taken before them; that the committee had considered the matters to them referred, and had directed him to report the same, as they appeared to them, to the house, together with the minutes of the evidence taken before them; and he read the report in his place; and afterwards delivered the same, with an appendix thereunto, in at the table, where the report was read. Ordered, that the said report do lie upon the table; and with the appendix, be printed for the members of the house.—Mr. Hobhouse reported from the committee of the whole house, to whom the bill to provide more effectually for regulating the Drawbacks and Bounties on the exportation of Sugar from Ireland, and for allowing British plantation sugar to be warehoused in Ireland, was committed; the amendments which the committee had made to the bill, and which they had directed him to report to the house; and he read the report in his place, and afterwards delivered the bill, with the amendments, in at the table, where the report was read. Ordered, that the said report be taken into further consideration upon Friday next.—Mr. Hobhouse reported from the committee of the whole house, to whom the bill to amend several acts for the sale of his majesty's Quit Rents, crown and other rents, and of certain lands forfeited and undisposed of, in Ireland, was committed; the amendments which the committee had made to the bill, and which they had directed him to report to the house; and he read the report in his place, and afterwards delivered the bill, with the amendments, in at the table, where the amendments were read, and agreed to by the house. Ordered, that the bill, with the amendments, be ingrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.—The bill for extending to German Yarn the provisions of an act, made in the last session of the last parliament, for permitting Prussian yarn to be imported in foreign ships, on payment of the like duties as if imported in British ships, was read a second time, and committed to a committee of the whole house, for to-morrow.

[Petitions against the Slave Trade Abolition Bill.] A Petition of Joseph Marryat, esq. agent for the island of Trinidad, was presented to the house, and read; setting forth, "That the petitioner observes, with inexpressible concern, that a bill is now depending before the house for the Abolition of the Slave Trade; and that the operation of such a measure, if passed into a law, will inevitably ruin many British subjects, who have embarked their property in the island of Trinidad, confiding in the encouragement held out by his majesty's ministers; and that the whole of the sugar estates in the said island are in a state of infancy, all of them having been cleared and put into cultivation since the year 1784, and many of them since the year 1797, when the island was surrendered to the British arms; and that, in consequence of the encouragement held out to British subjects by his majesty's ministers, purchases were made from the Spaniards of those estates which had been settled under the cedula of Spain, at the very high prices of from 50*l.* to 60*l.* sterling per acre, and large sums of money have been expended in erecting works and buildings upon the different plantations, for the manufacturing of sugar and distillation of rum, upon an expectation that the planters would be able, as their capitals increased, to acquire by gradual purchases a sufficient number of negroes to cultivate their estates to advantage; and that none of the estates in the island are as yet sufficiently stocked with negroes; and, if this bill should pass into a law, the lands thus cleared and purchased, and the buildings thus erected, would become of little or no value, from the impossibility of cultivating the one, or making the intended use of the other; and that the government of Spain has lately issued cedulas inviting settlers to the Spanish main, by the offer of liberal grants of land, an open trade with all nations, the free importation of slaves, and exemption from taxes and from duties on imports and exports for ten years, advantages which, from the facility of the communication between the adjacent Continent and Trinidad will, after the abolition of the Slave Trade, be powerful temptations to the inhabitants of that island to emigrate with their negroes to the opposite coast, and thus to depopulate a British settlement to aggrandize those of the enemy; and therefore praying, on the part of his constituents, that the said bill may not pass into a law; and that he may be heard by counsel at the bar of the house, and may be permitted to give evidence in support of the case of his constituents."

A Petition of the planters, merchants, mortgagees, annuitants, and others, interested in the British West India colonies, whose names are thereunto subscribed, was presented to the house, and read; setting forth, "That the petitioners observe, with the deepest concern and alarm, that a Bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade has passed the house of lords, and is now depending before this house; and that the trade to Africa for labourers has been, for a great number of years, sanctioned, approved, and encouraged by royal charters and proclamations, and by repeated acts of the British legislature, which declare, in the strongest terms, a most anxious desire to regulate, extend, secure, and preserve this trade, pronounced by parliament to be highly advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for supplying her plantations and colonies with a sufficient number of negroes; and that the British West India colonies were settled, and have ever been cultivated, under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and of those laws which have confirmed the West India colonists in the most perfect assurance and confidence that they should continue to obtain supplies of negroes from Africa; and that the cultivation of those colonies cannot be carried on without supplies of African negroes; and that the settling of the interior of those islands, which is greatly conducive to their safety, cannot be promoted, if the slave trade shall be abolished; and that, if the bill should be passed into a law, the worst consequences will ensue from it, destructive not only to the properties of the British planters, and of their creditors, whose fortunes have assisted in cultivating the plantations in the West Indies, and are now secured upon them, but also deeply injurious to the interests of the British empire at large, as all descriptions of property in this kingdom must suffer most severely by the effects of a plan that shall operate to destroy the great capital invested in the British West India colonies, and to cut off a commerce which pays in duties annually to Great Britain upwards of three millions, employs more than sixteen thousand seamen, contributes one third to her whole exports, and one third to her imports, consumes annually of her manufactures and produce six millions, and which is preeminently distinguished as the most secure and independant source of national prosperity, and a principal support of the naval superiority of this country; and that this measure, if it should be carried into effect, must diminish, in a very few years, the property invested in the British West India islands, and open the means of hastening the progress of rival colonies; must forbid the supply of losses of negro population, which general causes, or accidents, or diseases peculiar to the climate, occasion, and which humane and provident management is unavailing to prevent; must stop the completion of establishments already begun, at a great expence, and put an end to the increase of small settlers in the interior of the islands, so necessary for their security; and, in short, must inflict extreme present injury, and eventual decay and ruin, upon those colonies; and that an immediate consequence of the abolition will be the loss of the white population of the colonies, at present composing the militia, the principal defence of the country, by taking away the hope and the means of bettering their fortunes, their only inducement for venturing to those islands; and that many persons in the West India colonies, already settled and attached to the soil, will, from the same causes, emigrate to countries where they will meet with more encouragement and protection; and that those who must, from necessity, remain, will be left exposed to all the calamities attendant upon revolt and insurrection; and that the operation of the bill, if it shall pass into a law, will be to violate the system of colonial law, relative to property, the provisions of families, and the securities of creditors; and that the petitioners assure the house, that their statements are founded on the basis of truth; that they are advanced by those, whose local knowledge, and whose due and fair regard to their own welfare, afford them the best opportunities of forming correct conclusions, and that they can be established by evidence; and that the agitation of the question of an abolition of the slave trade is at all times pregnant with great mischief; and that the petitioners must view, with peculiar alarm, a renewed discussion of that question, at a period when the existence of a black power, in the neighbourhood of the most important British island in the West Indies, affording a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade, ought most powerfully to have inculcated the necessity of discountenancing all such discussions, which tend to alienate the minds of the negroes in the British West India colonies from a state of subordination, and which hold forth no prospect whatever of real good, but, on the contrary, if persevered in, will be a fruitful source of enormous evil; and that the petitioners shrink, with horror, from a contemplation of those scenes, which that country has frightfully exhibited; and that confiscation cannot be authorized without proof of delinquency; and that the characters of the petitioners have been traduced, but delinquency has never been proved; and that the petitioners, duly weighing these considerations, and apprized of the constant exertions displayed by the commons in parliament assembled, in raising this country to its present state of power and security, are desirous of expressing their reliance, that the wise interposition of the house will reject a measure, which cannot be adopted without occasioning so great a sacrifice of the national resources, at a juncture when those resources are more than ever necessary to enable the country to make head against the most formidable enemy it ever had to contend with; and therefore praying, that the said bill may not pass into a law; and that they may be heard, at the bar of the house, by themselves, or their counsel, against the same, and that they may be permitted to produce evidence."

A Petition of Edmund Pusey Lyon, esq. agent for the island of Jamaica, was also presented to the house, and read; setting forth, "That the petitioner observes with the deepest concern and alarm, that a bill for the Abolition of the Slave Trade has passed the house of lords, and is now depending before this house; and that the fatal tendency of the measure of abolishing the slave trade, and the destructive consequences which must result from its accomplishment, have impelled the petitioner's constituents to instruct him to give the most strenuous opposition to this bill; and that the trade to Africa for labourers has been for a great number of years sanctioned, approved, and encouraged, by royal charters and proclamations, and by repeated acts of the British legislature, which declare in the strongest terms a most anxious desire to regulate, extend, secure, and preserve this trade, pronounced by parliament to be highly advantageous to Great Britain, and necessary for supplying her plantations and colonies with a sufficient number of negroes; and that the British West India colonies were settled, and have ever been cultivated under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and of those laws which have confirmed the West India colonists in the most perfect assurance and confidence, that they should continue to obtain supplies of negroes from Africa; and that the cultivation of the island of Jamaica cannot be carried on without supplies of African negroes; and that the settling of the interior of that colony, which is greatly conducive to its safety, cannot be promoted if the slave trade shall be abolished; and that if the bill should be passed into a law, the worst consequences will ensue from it, destructive not only to the properties of his constituents, and the proprietors of the other British West India colonies, and of their creditors, whose fortunes have assisted in cultivating the plantations in the West Indies, and are now secured upon them, but also deeply injurious to the interests of the British empire at large, as all descriptions of property in this kingdom must suffer most severely by the effects of a plan that shall operate to destroy the great capital invested in the British West India colonies, and to cut off a commerce which pays annually in duties upwards of three millions to Great Britain, employs more than sixteen thousand seamen, contributes one third to her whole exports, and one third of her imports, consumes annually of her manufactures and produce six millions, and which is pre-eminently distinguished as the most secure and independent source of national prosperity, and a principal support of the naval superiority of this country; and that this measure, if it should be carried into effect, must diminish in a very few years the property invested in Jamaica, and the other British West India islands, and open the means of hastening the progress of rival colonies, must forbid the supply of losses of negro population, which general causes, or accidents or diseases peculiar to the climate occasion, and which humane and provident management is unavailing to prevent; must stop the completion of establishments already begun at a great expence, and put an end to the increase of small settlers in the interior of the islands, so necessary for their security; and, in short, must inflict extreme injury and eventual decay and ruin upon those colonies; and that an immediate consequence of the abolition will be, the loss of the white population of the colonies, at present composing the militia, the principal defence of the country, by taking away the hope and the means of bettering their fortunes, their only inducement for venturing to those islands; and that many persons in the British West India colonies, already settled and attached to the soil, will from the same causes emigrate to countries where they will meet with more encouragement and protection; and that those who must from necessity remain, will be left exposed to all the calamities attendant upon revolt and insurrection; and that the operation of the bill, if it should pass into a law, will be to violate the system of colonial law relative to property, the provisions of families, and the securities of creditors; and that the petitioner assures the house, that his statements are founded on the basis of truth, that they are the result of the full and mature consideration of his constituents, whose local knowledge, and whose due and fair regard to their own welfare, afford them the best opportunities of forming correct conclusions; and that they can be established by evidence; and that the agitation of the question of the abolition of the slave trade is at all times pregnant with great mischief; and that the petitioner must view with peculiar alarm the renewed discussion of that question, at a period when the existence of a black power in the neighbourhood of the island of Jamaica, affording a memorable and dreadful lesson recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade, ought most powerfully to have inculcated the necessity of discountenancing all such discussions, which tend to alienate the minds of the negroes in the British West India colonies from a state of subordination, and which hold forth no prospect whatever of real good, but on the contrary, if persevered in, will be a fruitful source of enormous evil; and that the petitioner shrinks with horror from a contemplation of those scenes which that country has frightfully exhibited; and that confiscation cannot be authorized without proof of delinquency; and that the characters of the petitioner's constituents have been traduced, but delinquency has never been proved; and that the petitioner, duly weighing these considerations, and apprized of the constant exertions displayed by the commons in parliament assembled, in raising this country to its present state of power and security, is desirous of expressing his reliance, that the wise interposition of the house will reject a measure, which cannot be adopted without occasioning so great a sacrifice of the national resources, at a juncture when those resources are more than ever necessary to enable the country to make head against the most formidable enemy it ever had to contend with; and the petitioner therefore prays, that the said bill may not pass into a law: and that he may be heard at the bar of the house, by himself or his counsel, against the same; and that he may be permitted to produce evidence in support of the case of his constituents."

A petition of the planters, merchants, and others of the city of Glasgow, connected with the island of Trinidad, was also presented to the house, and read; setting forth, that the petitioners were induced to invest their capital in the settling of lands in the said island of Trinidad, upon the faith of the assurances held out by his majesty's government, when it was ceded to this country, that they would be allowed to clear and cultivate the property in the manner usually practised in the West India islands, by the labour of negro slaves, which alone is adapted for that purpose; and that, by the bill now pending for abolishing the slave trade, the importation of negroes into this new colony is prohibited; and, if it should pass into a law, the interest of the petitioners will be most materially affected, the capital sunk in the improvement of the lands will be greatly diminished, if not altogether lost, and the time and labour already consumed in the prospect of future and distant returns will be totally misspent; the petitioners therefore repose in the good faith of his majesty's government, upon which his subjects have always had the surest grounds to rely, and upon which the petitioners in particular acted with the most unlimited confidence when embarking on this business, that such consequences will be averted, and that the interest of the settlers in this colony will be preserved; and therefore praying, that the house will give permission to import negro slaves into the said island until the lands actually granted have been duly and sufficiently supplied, or to permit the petitioners to be heard, by counsel at the bar, for their special interest, or to take such other means for their relief as to the houſe may seem meet."

A petition of John Anderson and Alexander Anderson, of Philpot Lane, London, merchants, proprietors of Bance Island, in the river Sierra Leone, on the windward coast of Africa, was also presented to the house, and read; setting forth, "that by an act, made in the 25th year of his late majesty, intituled, "an act for the application of a sum of money therein mentioned, granted to his majesty, making compensation and satisfaction to the Royal African Company of England;" "that whereas it appears, that a certain island, situate in the river Sierra Leone, on the said coast of Africa, called Bance Island, with a fort and buildings thereon, having been formerly in the possession of the said Royal African Company, was, in the year 1728, deserted by the said company and their agents; and the said fort has been some time in the possession of Alexander Grant, John Sargent, and Richard Oswald, of London, Merchants, who have disbursed a considerable sum in the preservation and improvements of the said island and fort, for which it is just and reasonable they should have a recompence: Be it therefore enacted, that the said Alexander Grant, John Sargent, and Richard Oswald, shall be at liberty, notwithstanding the present act, to continue in the quiet possession of the said island, fort, and buildings thereon, and that the same shall henceforth continue and be absolutely vested in them, their heirs and assigns;" and that upon the faith and right granted, and the protection afforded to them by the said act, the said Alexander Grant, John Sargent and Richard Oswald, established large factories upon the said island, called Bance Island, with many dependent factories in the neighbourhood, and laid out and invested a very great capital therein; and that the petitioners afterwards purchased the right and interest of the persons entitled to the said island, with the slaves and other property thereon, and are now the sole proprietors thereof; and that in the year 1794, by an invasion of American and French subjects, the property of the petitioners, in the said island alone, to the amount of 20,000*l.* sterling, and upwards, was destroyed, and the petitioners have since replaced, and laid out, the amount of such property so destroyed; and that the petitioners have, at great risque and labour, and at an immense expence, established a great trade at the said island, called Bance Island; and that the Petitioners did so upon the assurance and belief that, by the said act, the property of the said island was as perfectly vested in, and secured to them, as any other species of property which the subjects of these realms possess under the sanction and protection of the law; and that the petitioners apprehend the bill now depending in parliament, to put an end to the slave trade, will render their property on Bance Island of no value, and likewise prevent their being able to collect the debts due to them, as the people on the coast of Africa have no other means of making payment but by slaves; and therefore praying, that the said act may not pass into a law, and that they may be heard by counsel, and they hope their prayer will not seem unreasonable, considering they hold the property under an act of parliament, in which is acknowledged the justice of recompence to the proprietors, for the money disbursed in the preservation and improvement of the said island."—And the said petitions were severally ordered to lie upon the table, until the engrossed bill from the lords, intituled "an act for the abolition of the Slave Trade," be read a second time; and that the petitioners be then heard by their counsel, agents, and witnesses, against the said bill, upon their petitions, if they think fit.

[SCOTCH CLERGY.] The *Lord Advocate* rose, pursuant to notice, to bring forward a motion upon this subject. The noble lord, after some remarks upon the propriety of enabling the clergy to preserve that independence of circumstances, and that decency of appearance which were necessary to secure the due deference of their station, and not unfrequently to give effect to their instructions, called the attention of the committee to the manner in which the clergy were provided for in Scotland. In many instances their provision was extremely inadequate, and his object was to remove that inadequacy. With a view to that, he conceived it necessary that the commission of Teinds, which had heretofore belonged to the court of session, should be transferred to the court of exchequer. The reason for this transfer must be obvious to those who were at all acquainted with the comparative engagements of these two courts. In the court of session there was, in fact, such a crowd of business, that that court had not leisure to attend to the discharge of this commission, while the court of exchequer was fully enabled, without any inconvenience, to execute every thing that appertained to it. The one court was really a bankrupt in its business to the country, notwithstanding the extraordinary activity and diligence of the judges, and particularly that of the chief judge, who was indeed a model of industry; while the other court was comparatively disengaged. The removing therefore the superintendence of teinds to a tribunal which had time to attend to it, was of course desirable. In the next place, he proposed to create a fund for the provision of the clergy, from the stipends received by patrons from the death of an incumbent to the induction of his successor. Such receipts patrons had heretofore disposed of for such purposes as they thought proper to consider pious; but it was now generally felt, that the erection of the fund he had mentioned, would be by much the most pious application of it. The noble lord concluded with moving "for leave to bring in a bill for repealing certain parts of the act of the parliament of Scotland passed in the fourth session of the first parliament of queen Anne, intitled, 'Act anent Plantation of Kirks and Valuation of Teinds;' and for vesting in the Court of Exchequer in Scotland, the said powers: and for regulating the proceedings of the said Court of Exchequer, as to the exercise of such powers."

The *Speaker* observed, that as this motion concerned religion, the regular mode of proceeding, according to the standing order, would be to take it into consideration, in the first instance, in a committee of the whole house.—After a few words from lord A. Hamilton, the house resolved into the committee suggested by the Speaker, the resolution proposed was agreed to; and on the house resuming, the chairman obtained leave to bring in the bill.

The house, after lord H. Petty had announced his majesty's acquiescence in the measure, resolved itself into a similar committee on the motion of the Lord Advocate; and the noble lord proposed that leave should be given to bring in a bill to improve the stipends of such of the parochial Clergy of Scotland as are precluded from farther augmentation by the exhaustion of their teinds.

Mr. *W. Dundas* hoped he should not be represented as hostile to the interests of the Scotch clergy, who were a most respectable body, and for whom no man had a higher respect than he had, if he thought it right to state here that in making a suitable provision for their maintenance, regard ought always to be had to the situation in which the order had for two centuries stood. That situation was that of a middle rank, between the common people and the gentry, moderating the pride of the latter and the turbulence of the former. He thought the application of the revenues of vacant benefices might exceed the moderate and suitable provision he proposed.

Lord *Archibald Hamilton* considered this a measure of the utmost importance. He had received many communications respecting it, and hoped that time would be allowed to all parties to investigate its merits.

The *Lord Advocate* was disposed to accede to any period of delay that could be reasonably expected, and he had no doubt that upon a fair consideration of its merits, such persons as might at present misunderstand it, would be reconciled to its provisions. To afford therefore to any who opposed the measure an opportunity of correcting their errors, and amending their feelings, he proposed if the bill should be read a first time, to move that it be printed, and the second reading fixed for this day three weeks.—The house having resumed, the report was received, and the chairman obtained leave to bring in the bill moved for by the lord advocate.

[Sugar Drawbacks.] On the motion of lord Henry Petty the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole house, to consider of granting relief to the West India Trade, Mr. Hobhouse in the chair.

Lord *H. Petty* stated to the committee, that as the subject which he was about to bring under their consideration, was so generally known, and the principles upon which the measures he proposed to adopt were grounded were so obvious, that it would be necessary for him to trouble the committee with a very few words indeed. The great stock of sugar on hand, arising partly from the situation of the continent, and partly from other circumstances, called for legislative interference, and the house he was sure, would take the necessary measures for that purpose. The object of the resolutions he had to propose was, to encourage the exportation of sugars, and the consumption of rum. The first he proposed to do by allowing bounties, and permitting sugars, which might be taken out of the warehouses for home consumption, to be returned to the warehouses for exportation, with proper provisions to prevent their being taken out again for home consumption, without paying the necessary duties. This regulation would have the effect of inducing foreigners to make this country the depot for the supply of the continent. The other object was to be effected by laying an additional duty on brandy. This was the article of regulation to which he had alluded in opening the ways and means for the year; and he trusted the house would agree in the propriety of adopting it. Upon all due consideration of the subject, it appeared, that brandies would bear an addition of 2*s*. 6*d*. per gallon on all brandies imported for home consumption, and of 1*s*. per gallon on brandies imported for re-exportation. The noble lord moved the following resolutions: "That a bounty of ten shillings per cwt. be allowed on the exportation of all double-refined sugar, over and above the allowances now made on the exportation of refined sugars. That a bounty of two shillings per cwt. be allowed on the exportation of all raw and muscovado sugars, under the price of forty shillings per cwt.; and of one shilling per cwt. on all raw and muscovado sugars, of between forty and forty-five shillings per cwt.; whenever it shall appear by the notices in the London Gazette that the average prices for the antecedent quarter have been of the respective amounts stated. That an additional duty of two shillings and sixpence per gallon shall be imposed on brandy or foreign spirits, imported for home consumption: and of one shilling per gallon on all brandies imported for the purpose of re-exportation." The resolutions were agreed to, and the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, February 18.

[Minutes.] A new writ was ordered for the county of Armagh, in the room of viscount Acheson, now earl of Gosford.—Sir Charles Price presented a petition from the governor and company of merchants trading to the South Seas and other parts of America and for encouraging the Fishery, 'taking notice of the bill for repealing so much of an act, made in the ninth year of queen Anne, as vests in the South Sea Company, or Corporation, by the said act erected, the sole and exclusive privilege of carrying on trade and traffick to and from any part whatsoever of South America, or in the South Seas, which now are, or may at any time hereafter be, in the possession of his majesty, his heirs, or successors; and setting forth, that, if the same should pass into a law, it will totally deprive the petitioners of their chartered rights and privileges, which they obtained for a valuable consideration; and therefore praying, that they may be heard, by their counsel, against the said bill passing into a law.' Ordered, that the said petition do lie upon the table until the said bill be read a second time; and that the petitioners be then heard, by their counsel, against the said bill, upon their petition, if they think fit.—Mr. Patteson seeing the right hon. secretary to the treasury in his place, wished to ask, whether it was the intention of government to continue, or make any alteration in, the duties imposed on Malt last session, which would expire on the 25th of next month? Mr. Vansittart informed the hon. member, that the subject had occupied the earnest attention of the Treasury, and that it would shortly be his duty to bring the question under the consideration of the house.—Mr Vansittart presented to the house, pursuant to their orders, 1. "A return of the number of men wanting to complete the establishment of the regular army on the 1st January 1805, 1806, and 1807, distinguishing the British from the foreign troops, and the cavalry from the infantry. 2. A return of the number of persons employed on the 1st January 1807, to levy men for the army under the orders of the 27th October 1806, distinguishing whether on half pay, retired from the army, or not having at any time held a commission therein; specifying the number of men raised in each month by such persons: 3. A return of the number of casualties by deaths, discharges, and desertions, which have taken place in the regular army, from the 1st January 1805 to the 1st January 1807, distinguishing each year; also specifying the dates to which the casualties have been reported from the several foreign stations; 4. A return of the number of desertions which have taken place in the army at home during the years 1805 and 1806, distinguishing each month, and specifying the number of men in each month out of which such desertions have taken place; 5. A return of the number of out pensioners on the establishment of Chelsea Hospitals, distinguished into their respective classes as to amount of pension, as estimated at Christmas 1806: 6. A return of the number of men for whom bounty has been charged, as enlisted at the head quarters of the several regiments serving in Great Britain, from the 25th of September to the 24th of Decem-

'ber 1806 inclusive, so far as the Accounts 'have been received.'

[Barrack Abuses.] Mr. *Robson*, pursuant to notice, rose to move for certain papers relative to abuses in the barrack department. As the papers he had to move for were precisely the same as those which had been ordered last session, but which, in consequence of the dissolution of parliament, could not be regularly returned to the present parliament, he did not apprehend any objection to his motion. But as it had appeared to some of his friends that he was too anxious in prosecuting the inquiry into this subject, he should make one or two observations in answer to such opinions. Four years had elapsed since he had first recommended and pressed an inquiry into the expenditure department, and since that period six millions had been granted for that service in Great Britain, and two millions for Ireland. If his suggestions had been acted upon, there would have been a saving of two millions effected for the public, out of the sums paid for the hire of buildings, the repairs of buildings, and the rent of temporary barracks. In the Second Report of Military Inquiry there appeared a case which he should refer to in support of this assertion. It was there stated, that a Mr. Page, who became barrack-master at Winchester, in 1801, leaguing with a Mr. Green, a lawyer, bought a house which had been before rented as a barrack, for 63*l.* per annum, but which was not worth more than 30*l.* after which the government had been charged 163*l.* The whole sum that had been paid for this barrack, since the year 1794, amounted to 1700*l.* though according to the usual allowance of officers, only 33*l.* 10*s.* ought to have been paid for it, as it did not appear that the barrack had been occupied by officers for more than one year of the whole term. This certainly called for inquiry. He begged also to call the attention of the house to the case of a barrack called the Queen's Barracks, near Weymouth, which he had visited in the middle of Sept. This barrack contained 700 and sometimes 800 men, and though so great expence was incurred, the accommodations for the officers and men were extremely bad. The building was in a low situation, in a narrow street, near a public brewhouse, without any convenience of water, but from a pump, which was at a distance, and often dry, without any place for exercising the troops, so that sixty guineas a year were paid for a piece of land, at a considerable distance for that purpose. The stories of the building were but five feet high, and extremely inconvenient, and there were no drains to carry off the water. He was sure, when he stated these circumstances, that the house would not think him too anxious in pressing the inquiry. In bringing the question forward, he did not mean to impute blame to any man; the evil originated in a bad system, from which it had grown up to its present extent, and his majesty's ministers might not yet have had time to take the necessary measures for preventing the state of the barracks from being a reproach to the country. He knew not whether the barrack he had adverted to was rented or had been purchased, but his motion would reach that fact. It was unnecessary for him to state to the house the utility of economy. He understood that the barrack department in Ireland was in as bad a state as in Great Britain, and he was the more alarmed at this, because he looked at the expenditure of that country in the gross, which was now nearly equal to the charge for Great Britain, and could not but reflect, that fifteen-seventeenths of whatever sums should be expended for barracks in Ireland, would be to be defrayed by this country. The honourable gentleman concluded by moving, "That there be laid before this house a return of all the buildings of every description, rented or hired by government, and used as barracks or places for lodging, or containing officers or soldiers of the army, or of persons or horses attached to the army; that the said return do embrace every building which has so been rented, or hired, and so used, in the whole of Great Britain and Ireland, between the 1st day of January, 1793, and the 1st day of January, 1807: that the said return be exhibited in fifteen columns, placed in the order and containing the several heads here following, viz. 1st. the date of the year and of the month and day when each building respectively was taken; 2d, the county and parish in which the building is situate; 3d, the name or phrase describing the building; 4th, the number of officers that are, or have been generally quartered or lodged in the building; 5th, the number of non-commissioned officers and men, and of horses, that are or have been generally quartered or lodged in the building; 6th, the name of the proprietor of the building; 7th, the name and rank of the officer or person by whom the building was taken on the part of government; 8th, the weekly rent or hire of the building; 9th, the yearly rent or hire of the building; 10th, the name and rank of the officer or person, or officers or persons, through whose hands the rent, or hire, has been paid to the proprietor of the building; 11th, the time when any alteration (if any) in the rent or hire of the building was made; 12th, the weekly rent or hire of the building, subsequent to such alteration; 13th, the yearly rent or hire of the building, subsequent to such alteration; 14th, the time when the building was given up, if not now occupied by government; 15th, the account of the whole of the sums which have been expended in repairs upon the building; and the said returns do exhibit all the names and descriptions of the said buildings, following one another in due chronological order, the building first taken by government standing first, and the building last taken, standing last."

Lord *Howick* said, he felt no inclination to withhold any information that could be conveniently produced on this subject; but from the extent and wording of the hon. gentleman's motion, he had some doubts of the practicability of obtaining the returns to it in any reasonable time. It was well worth the attention of the house not to lose sight of this subject. The hon. gentleman had stated, that his motion was precisely the same as one that had been agreed to last session; but on reference to the barrack department, he found that the returns to that motion could not have been prepared without the aid of twenty additional clerks, and for a long period. The house would consider, whether it would be expedient to order the accounts now called for to be produced at the expence of so much time and labour, when the attention of two commissions, the military commission and the other commission appointed at the suggestion of the military commission, for examining persons upon oath, were both employed in investigating this subject. If it should appear that these commissioners were negligent or inattentive, it would be for the house to determine how far it would be right to comply with the motion.

Colonel *Barry* said, he could contradict the assertion of the honourable gentleman with respect to the barrack department in Ireland, from an experience of ten years. But he agreed with the hon. gentleman that it would be desirable to avoid, as much as possible, the use of temporary barracks. But when it was found necessary to march a body of troops to a particular point, where there were no accommodations, it was necessary to hire buildings at any rent that should be demanded. The barrack-master-general in Ireland felt the propriety of putting the barracks of that country on the same footing as in this, and attended particularly to the economy of expenditure in his department.

Mr. *Robson*, in reply, said, that he was persuaded if the noble lord would take the trouble to read the motion at length, he would then see whether or not such an account already existed in any public office, and if it could not be produced in a day or two, he should still insist that the house ought not to separate till his motion was consented to. Such a document ought to be ready by this time, considering the length of the notice given upon the subject. There were no less than 591 established clerks in the Barrack Department, and therefore it could not be alleged that there was not sufficient help to enable the Barrack Master to comply with the request of a member of parliament. Last year he confined his inquiry to one parish or district in the Isle of Wight, and in that place he had since found that the rents of Temporary Barracks were reduced one half. Barns hired for that purpose, and rated at 2,200*l.* were now lowered to 1,100*l.* by means of the motion he had formerly made upon this subject. All this he could prove to have taken place, although he was now to be refused the production of that which would enable him not only to bring several Barrack-masters to the bar, but also to save the sum of two millions to the public. As he believed, however, that some reform was in agitation by ministers themselves, he could assure them, that he was not disposed to satisfy any revenge upon this occasion, but merely to press upon them the necessity of a speedy reformation in these abuses. All he wished to know was, where the new account in that department began, and where the old one ended? But since he felt an opposition to this inquiry, merely on account of the mode he proposed, in order to attain this object, he should have no objection to give up his motion without dividing the house.

Lord *Howick* begged the hon. gentleman and the house distinctly to understand, that he had not refused him any papers, which could, with propriety, be produced. If his motion could possibly have been complied with, without interfering with the commissioners already appointed, nobody could be more ready than he was, to support such inquiries.—The motion was then put from the chair, and negatived without a division.

Mr. *Robson* further stated, that he should, upon a future day, submit a motion to the house, that would reach the Barrack Departments upon foreign stations. He hoped the charges abroad, (for instance, in the Island of Sicily) would not be found such as were formerly existing in the Island of Corsica.

[SOUTH SEA TRADE BILL.] Lord Temple moved the order of the day for the second reading of the South Sea Trade bill. On the motion that the bill be now read a second time,

Sir *Charles Price* observed, that as he had but that day presented a petition from the governor and directors of the South Sea Company against the bill, the petitioners were not prepared with counsel. If, therefore, he should suffer that stage of the bill to pass, he hoped the house would allow them to be heard by counsel, touching their rights, which would be invaded by the bill, in the committee.

Mr. *Rose* stated, that though the South Sea Company had not for forty years carried on any trade to the South Sea, it was yet not legal for any ships to trade in that sea, without a license from the company. It had been mentioned to him, that the ships which had sailed for Buenos Ayres on the first accounts of its capture, had sailed without such licenses, in which case the voyage was illegal from the outset; and in this view, the question was an important one, because this circumstance would have a very serious effect upon the policies of insurance on these vessels. Not having seen a line of the bill, he wished to be informed, whether it was proposed to give it a retrospective operation.

Lord *Temple* said, he had intended to explain the object of the measure, if even he had not been called upon by the right hon. gentleman. By the charter of the South Sea Company, no vessels could legally be embarked in a trade to the South Sea without a licence from that Company. The vessels had sailed to Buenos Ayres without such licence, and, consequently, their voyages were illegal. They were consequently liable to seizure, not alone by the agents of the South Sea Company, but by any privateer or letters of marque, which might fall in with them. He had not been himself in town when this event took place, but as soon as the illegality of the transaction was adverted to, his majesty's ministers had determined, on the meeting of parliament, to propose a measure for legalizing these voyages. They had conferred with the directors of the South Sea Company, and discussed the question. On the 14th of January a draft of the bill then before the house was communicated to the directors, which was returned on the 15th, with such alterations as they thought necessary to be made in it. Government had acceded to and adopted these amendments with a single exception, and therefore, he did not think that any case had been made out for deferring any stage of the bill.

Mr. *Jacob* contended that the South Sea Company had not carried on any commerce for sixty-five years past, since the commencement of the war that began in the year 1740. Antecedently to that period, they had carried on a little trade to South America, by which they lost more than they gained; the expences of their factories at Carthagena, Porto Bello, Panama, and Lima, having exceeded the profits of their commerce; so that there had remained to them but a small part of the assiento contract. The South Sea Company, therefore, could not benefit by this trade. It was besides impossible that they should, as they had no capital; and before they could again embark in that trade, it would be necessary for them to come to parliament to be enabled to raise a fresh capital. Though they could not benefit by the trade to South America, a trade which was extremely beneficial to the country had risen upon the ruins of this trade, namely, the Southern whale fishery trade, which afforded a considerable nursery for British seamen. The company came, therefore, with a very bad grace to parliament, to press a right which they could derive no benefit from, to the exclusion of a trade from which the public would derive advantage. But by the act of 1802, all persons had a right to trade to the Western coast of South America, without any license, either from the South Sea

Company, or from the East India Company, both of whom claimed a monopoly in these seas. Though the country had been put to much expence by the Spanish armament in 1791, to establish the right to carry on the fur trade at Nootka Sound, that trade had since fallen into the hands of Americans. As to the question respecting the policies of insurance, he had the best legal authority for saying, that the defect in law existed, and therefore he thought that the matter demanded the pressing attention of the house.

Mr. *Tierney* stated, on the part of the East India Company, that they had only been apprehensive that the trade, when permitted, might be extended to other parts; for instance, to China; these were in the contemplation of the government, and, when they had received satisfactory assurances that the trade should not be extended beyond its precise limits, they had ceased to have any objection to the bill.

Sir *Charles Price* stated, that the object of the petitioners was to have their right ascertained, and for that purpose they had presented themselves to the house, without meaning any opposition to the whole principle of the bill.—The bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be printed. On the motion that it be committed on Monday,

Mr. *Rose*, now that he understood that the bill was to have a retrospective operation, approved of it so far as related to the covering the vessels from capture; but with regard to its retrospective operation as to the policies of insurance, he had some doubts. The underwriters had a legal right to decline the obligation of the policies, and though it would not be very honourable in them to take advantage of that circumstance, he did not think it clear that parliament should take such right from them, if they should think proper to act upon it.—The bill was ordered to be committed on Monday.

[SUGAR DRAWBACKS.] Mr. *Hobhouse* reported from the committee of the whole house, to whom it was referred to consider of the several acts relating to the Drawbacks and Bounties on Sugar exported; and also, of an act made in the 43d of his present majesty, for granting to his majesty, until 12 months after the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, certain additional duties of excise in Great Britain, the Resolutions which the committee had directed him to report to the house, which are as follows, viz. 1. "That it is the opinion of this committeee, that a Bounty of 10*s.* be allowed for every hundred weight of all double refined Sugar exported from Great Britain, over and above the bounty allowable on the exportation of refined Sugar in loaf complete and whole, and lump duly refined. 2. That whenever it shall appear by notice in the London Gazette, that the average prices of Brown or Muscovado Sugar for the preceding quarter of the year, taken in manner directed by an act of the 32d of his present majesty, shall not have exceeded 40*s.* for an hundred weight, exclusive of the duties of customs paid or payable thereon, on the importation into Great Britain, then, and in every such case, there shall be paid and allowed a Bounty of 2*s.* for every hundred weight of Sugar the produce of the British Plantations exported from Great Britain; and if, by such notice as aforesaid, it shall appear that the said average prices of Brown or Muscovado Sugar shall have been at or above the price of 40*s.* and shall be under 45*s.* for an hundred weight, then, and in every such case, there shall be paid and allowed a bounty of one shilling for every hundred weight of such Sugar exported as aforesaid. 3. That the bounties now payable on the exportation of sugar and sugar candy be allowed on depositing the same in warehouse for exportation. 4. That it is the opinion of this committee, that an additional duty of 2*s.* 6*d.* be charged upon every gallon of foreign brandy, spirits, aqua vitæ, or strong waters (other than rum, spirits, or aqua vitæ of the produce of the British colonies or plantations in America), imported into Great Britain, or taken out of any warehouse in which the same may have been secured for home consumption. 5. That an additional duty of 1*s.* be charged upon every gallon of foreign brandy, spirits, aqua vitæ, or strong waters (other than rum, spirits, or aqua vitæ, of the produce of the British colonies or plantations in America), imported into Great Britain and exported therefrom, or taken out of any warehouse in which the same may have been secured for exportation to parts beyond the seas (except to Ireland)." The three first Resolutions being read a second time, were agreed to by the house. The subsequent Resolutions were postponed.

[ADDITIONAL DUTY ON FOREIGN BRANDY.] The house having resolved itself into a committee of Ways and Means,

Lord *Henry Petty*, conformably with his notice of yesterday, moved the following Resolutions, 1. "That towards raising the supply granted to his majesty, an additional duty of *2s. 6d.* be charged upon every gallon of foreign brandy, spirits, aqua vitæ, or strong waters (other than rum, spirits, or aqua vitæ, of the produce of the British colonies or plantations in America), imported into Great Britain, or taken out of any warehouse in which the same may have been secured for home consumption. 2. That an additional duty of 1*s.* be charged upon every gallon of foreign brandy, spirits, aqua vitæ, or strong waters (other than rum, spirits, or aqua vitæ, of the produce of the British colonies or plantations in America), imported into Great Britain, and exported therefrom, or taken out of any warehouse in which the same may have been secured for exportation to parts beyond the seas (except to Ireland). 3. That the said duties shall be charged on all foreign brandy, spirits, aqua vitæ, or strong waters, for which all the duties charged or chargeable thereon shall not have been paid on or before the 19th day of February, 1807."

Mr. *Rose* observed, that the duty on brandy was at present 13*s. 6d.* per gallon, and would by this additional duty be raised to 16*s.*; that the original cost was but *2s. 6d.* per gallon, and that such a high duty, compared with the prime cost of the article, would become an extreme temptation to smuggling, and would not operate as any material relief to the West India trade. Besides, he did not think the regulations for the prevention of smuggling would be as effectual as was expected.

Lord *H. Petty* stated, that the system of rewards to vigilant and active revenue officers, would have a very beneficial effect, and that the West India merchants were of opinion, that the addition to the duty on foreign spirits would afford them relief.

General *Gascoyne* was of opinion, that this additional duty on brandy continued, with the preference to be given by the public boards to the consumption of rum, would be of material assistance to the West India trade.—The resolutions were then agreed to.

[Freehold Estates Bill.] The *Solicitor-General* moved the order of the day for the second reading of the bill for making the Freehold Estates of persons who die in debt, assets for the payment of their simple contract debts. On the question for the second reading being put,

Mr. *W. Herbert* rose with regret to oppose any measure brought forward by the hon. and learned gent. who was the author of the bill. He lamented that he had not heard the statement of that hon. and learned member, when he obtained leave to bring in this measure; but he had read the bill since it had been printed, and objected to it because it went to alter the whole of the law of landed property in this country. If he understood it right, its object was to make all cases of simple contract debts of men who should die in debt, without making any will providing for such debts, a charge upon their real estates. This would change the whole law of landed property, which was coeval with the constitution. There were various ways of charging landed property by mortgages and other legal instruments, and there were sufficient processes for recovering of simple contract debts. Whenever any change had been made in the common law, it had been generally for the worse. He did not see any urgent occasion for the alteration now proposed, much less on so loose and vague a ground as to provide for simple contract debts. It would have the effect of lowering the value of freehold property. Another objection he felt to the measure was, that it would interfere with the elective franchise, which depended altogether on freehold property: and if it was to be made liable for simple contract debts, in cases of small freeholds, the heir might be thereby deprived of one of the most valuable of his rights. He should have no objection to the measure, if it was to be confined to the cases of persons who die suddenly or violently; for he was sure no honest man who had time to make a will would neglect to provide for his debts. On these grounds, he felt himself inclined to oppose the bill.

Mr. *Fellowes* thought that the bill should extend to copyhold as well as to freehold property, because in many cases the freehold and copyhold property were so blended, that it might be difficult to sell the one, without, at the same time time, selling the other.

The *Master of the Rolls* thought the hon. gent. who began the debate, was right in considering this bill as making a very material change in the law of freehold property. The law as it at present stood, established the limits of real and personal property. There were but two ways of charging real property, either by deed sealed, or by will. He had doubts of the policy of increasing the modes of affecting freehold property. At present it was impossible to charge it by a single scrap of paper, or by any parole agreement. The effect of this measure would be, to do away that solemnity which the policy of British law required in transactions that affected freehold property. The fact was, that the parties, by their own act, decided the terms of the contract. The creditor who trusted to the simple contract, knew, that he was not in the same situation as if he had a bond, and he who had a bond knew he was not in the situation of one who had a mortgage. He could see no reason why the law should put the creditor in a situation which he did not bargain for. He might have demanded a higher security if he was not satisfied with the lower, and the debtor might have refused it. Why, then, should the law say that a man might have the advantage of the best contract which he could have made? If the principle were to be recognized it would go much further. A tenant in tail might, by suffering a common recovery, cut off the intail, and make the estate his own, and liable to his debts. If he should die, omitting to suffer such recovery, as the specialty creditor to be let in, who, as the law now stood, was barred? Was the law, because the debtor might have rendered the estates liable to his specialty debts, to supply his act, and let in such creditor? Was the creditor to have every advantage by the operation of law, which his debtor by his act could have given him? Was the principle to be maintained, of legislating for the purpose of putting the creditor in a situation which his own act did not place him in? This principle was not necessary for the future, and would be unjust as to the present. After the passing of this bill, the freehold property of every man, who had contracted any obligation for which that property was known not to be liable, would if he died, be charged therewith in the hands of his heir. This would be an instance of positive injustice, because it would place the parties in so different a relative situation from that in which they were at the time of making the contract. When he threw these observations out, he did it only by way of stating the difficulties he felt; not of giving a conclusive opinion, as he had not yet heard the grounds upon which the measure had been founded. There did not appear to him to be either necessity for the measure or any utility in it. One of the objects of the measure, he understood to be, to prevent frauds by persons who might involve themselves in debt, and, with the money borrowed, purchase freehold property, which would descend to their heirs without becoming responsible for these debts. This was a case that had sometimes occurred, and which ought to be prevented. But the measure went, in one respect, beyond its object, and in another fell short of it. Such cases of frauds were confined to properties purchased by the debtor, and the bill, by extending to all freehold property, went beyond its object. But, by being limited to freehold, and not including copyhold property, it fell short of its object. It would tell the fraudulent debtor to purchase copyhold and not freehold property; and copyhold property would more effectually enable him to defraud his creditors, because copyhold property was not liable even for specialty debts. In the bill which had been brought in for the same purpose in 1772, copyholds and customary freeholds had been included with freehold property. Having said thus much, it was not his intention to object to the second reading of the bill, or even its going into a committee; for in the committee his hon. and learned friend would feel the necessity, for the attainment of his own object, to make some alterations in the measure.

The *Solicitor General* would have been extremely glad if the opposition then made had been made before, because he would in that case have had the advantage of knowing the objections that were felt to a measure, which he conceived to be of the highest importance. He must say that it would have been more fortunate if he had heard the objections stated by the right hon. and learned gent. who had spoken last, sooner, because, though he was convinced, that every hon. member was actuated in making objections to any measure by the purest motives, it would have been particularly desirable for him to have heard the objections just stated earlier, both because he had endeavoured to collect the opinion of his right hon. and learned friend on the bill, and had submitted a copy of it to him, and because he could then have given an answer that might have been more satisfactory to the house, than the answer he could now give might prove. He admitted that it was incumbent upon any member who proposed any alteration in the existing law, to state the grounds upon which he founded such alteration. If his right hon. and learned friend had not been present when he stated the grounds of this measure, the fault did not lie with him. He had on that occasion stated, that the law of landed property had been framed with a view to a feudal state of society, which no longer existed. It was to pay too great veneration to the wisdom of our ancestors, as it was called, to continue that law unaltered, when the state of society had undergone a change that rendered it inapplicable to the existing state of society. This country had become a great commercial country, and therefore it was necessary to adapt the law of property to such a situation of things. The ordinary obligations in the course of business were not specialty but negociable securities, drawn at a short date. If specialty contracts were to be rendered necessary, that would put an end to commercial business. The case stated by his right hon. friend, had not been urged by him as the ground of his measure. But it was sufficient reason for the adoption of some such measure. Breaches of trust were, as the law now stood, but simple contract debts. Personal property bequeathed in trust for the use of infant children, might be sold by the trustee, and the money laid out in the purchase of freehold property, which, when devised over to his own children, would not be liable to these claims. In like manner, the proceeds of an estate devised in trust to be sold for the use of children, might be vested in the purchase of lands, which either when devised over to the trustee's own children, or in case of his death, would not be liable to the claims of the persons for whose use the estate was devised. The children in both cases would be simple contract creditors, and if there should not be assets sufficient, would be driven to the support of casual benevolence, or parochial relief. This state of the law was a reproach to the country. There were cases that frequently occurred in courts of equity, and yet the gentlemen of his profession, who alone perhaps were capable of framing the remedy, had viewed them with patient acquiescence. The state of the law was peculiar to this country and Ireland. In Scotland, and in the rest of Europe, no property could descend to the heir, without being chargeable with all the debts of the ancestor. An heir could be deprived of his whole property by a single stroke of a pen, in the presence of three witnesses, and was it fit that the only case in which the property should be inalienable from his heir, was when it was to be made liable for his father's debts. The honourable member who had spoken first in the debate, had said that no honest man would omit to make a provision by will for his debts, but this bill was to place every man in the situation of an honest man. He appealed to any gentleman who heard him, whether he would wish his estate to descend to his heir without being liable for his simple contract debts; and he asked, why require for another what they would be ashamed of for themselves? It had been said, that credit had already been carried to too great an extent in this country. If that were the case, they had an effectual mode of checking it, that would be attended with considerable mutual advantages, by abolishing imprisonment for debt. When a man was ready to give up all he possessed, he ought not to be imprisoned for not doing what it was impossible for him to do. Real estates were affected as well by judgments obtained on actions proved by parole testimony, as by sealed instruments or wills. In the former case, the charge amounted to a lien on the property. This measure would neither create a lien nor lower the value of freehold property. The same provision in Scotland was not attended with any diminution of the value of freehold property. The objection that the measure ought to extend to copyhold property, he could not answer as satisfactorily as the others. The bill that had been alluded to, had been brought in by a very learned member of his profession (Mr. Ambler), and had failed, perhaps, from having included in it copyhold and customary freehold property. It would be better to proceed gradually. This as a first step of a system would be an important measure; as a single measure it would be highly beneficial. It would be extremely desirable that copyholds should also be made liable; but if the house adopted his measure, he trusted they would not stop there. As to the objection, that this principle would take in estates in tail, he should only say, that he knew not why they ought not to be liable. It was a maxim of the court in which his right honourable friend presided with so much benefit to the country, that a man should always be taken to do that which he ought to do; and certainly as the tenant in tail might, by his own act, have made the estate liable to his specialty debts, there was no good reason why the principle ought not to be extended to such estates.

Mr. *Canning* observed, that though feelings of veneration for every institution of our ancestors ought not to be carried to excess and bigotry, they ought to operate so far as to prevent any rash alterations. Innovations of this nature ought to be regarded with the utmost jealousy, and to be examined with the utmost scrupulousness. Without meaning any disrespect to the hon. and learned gent. who proposed this bill, (for as to his abilities there could be but one opinion) he must say, that it was in his own opinion, and that of many others, that a measure of this nature ought rather to have originated in the other house, where it might have, in the first stages, undergone the revision of the great law magistrates. This ought to have been the case, though the hon. and learned gent. had heard of no difference of opinion on the subject; but if there was a difference of opinion existing there that point well deserved the hon. and learned gent.'s consideration. The particular object of this bill was to meet the cases of fraud with regard to freehold estates, but he admitted that with regard to copyhold and entailed estates the room for frauds would still be left open. But he insinuated that this was only meant as a preliminary step to similar alterations with regard to copyhold and entailed estates. In this view he had strong objections to the bill. The hon. and learned gent. admitted that one door would be left open for fraud in the purchase of copyhold estates; he would ask him whether previous debts were intended to supersede subsequent settlements of freehold estates, and to be good against purchasers? If they were not, the object of the bill would be evaded; if they were, then you would only be doing away one opportunity for fraud, in order to create a stronger. The hon. and learned gent. had stated, that this was becoming in a great degree a commercial country, and that in that respect its situation was become different from what it was when this law with regard to property had been established. This was certainly true, but though he felt well disposed towards the commercial interests of the country, yet he did not think that they ought to be promoted at the sacrifice *pro tanto* of the permanent landed interest. He did not think that this was wanted. But why did not the hon. and learned gent. make his bill exactly commensurate with his object? Why did he not apply it merely to the landholder engaged in commerce, and adopt the suggestion of the right hon. and learned gent. (the Master of the Rolls) for confining it to the first purchasers of freehold estates. You might secure the object by extending the bankrupt laws to these cases. But as to the general doctrine of the adaptation of laws to the supposed state of the country, it would open a door for all reformation. In the reign of the philosophers of France, there was nothing great or venerable in antiquity that was not attacked, before the great revolution which rendered these changes odious to all the world. If we were to look generally at the fitness of things, he would undertake with half the ingenuity of the hon. and learned gent., to prove to the conviction of speculative men and many others, that there was nothing that had been hitherto held venerable in our law, that did not require reformation. He could prove, that the right of primogeniture ought to be abolished, and that it was improper to leave almost the whole to lazy drones of elder brothers, and leave the rest to make their way in the world as they could. If you began with these notions, there was no end to them. He had therefore, his doubts as to the propriety of passing this law, and these doubts were not removed. He would not, however, oppose the second reading, because he wished to observe what amendments might be made in it, but he rather thought that he must be under the necessity of opposing its ultimate success.

The *Solicitor General*, in explanation, denied his having said that it was his intention to proceed further. He had merely stated, that it might possibly appear proper to parliament to make other alterations in the course of time. He had no personal object whatever in this measure. His sole motive for bringing it forward, was a conviction of the benefits which the public would derive from it.

Mr. *Canning* disclaimed having imputed any personal motive to the hon. and learned gentleman.

The *Attorney General* supported the bill on the grounds of justice and morality, and his only wonder was, that a measure of this nature had not been brought forward sooner. The object was to compel the heir to do that justice which his ancestor might be prevented from doing by various causes. Our veneration for the institutions of our ancestors must be limited by a regard to justice. He denied that the evil which this bill went to remedy was merely a specific and partial one. The tendency of our law was to facilitate the alienation of landed property, and to get rid of feudalties, and that was certainly not a partial remedy which went to render the real estates of persons dying in debt, and perhaps wishing to discharge them, liable for these debts. It would be a great satisfaction to many persons, who without any fraudulent intentions found themselves, at the moment of dissolution, unable to make arrangements for paying their debts as the law now stood. It would be a great satisfaction to them to have the conviction that their debts would be paid from their real estates. He denied that a bill of this kind ought with any peculiar property to originate in the other house. The great law magistrates would have the measure before them in due time, if it passed this house. He thought that the house and the country were under great obligations to his hon. and learned friend for his bill. He was glad that the subject had been brought forward and laid open to public discussion.

Mr. *Perceval* was, upon the whole, rather disposed to favour the bill, for the object of his hon. and learned friend was one which ought certainly to be promoted, if that could be done without injury to the proprietors of land, and he was glad that there seemed a disposition on all sides to canvass this business more maturely. The very reason that rendered it proper to pause upon it was that which the hon. and learned gent. (the Attorney General) had urged in its favour. He had expressed his surprize that such a measure had not been proposed before. This might be owing to some difficulties attending it which were not at present observed, and therefore it was proper to proceed with caution. The cases of copyhold estates and of estates sold subsequent to debts contracted, mentioned by his right hon. friend near him (Mr. Canning) would be very material difficulties. However, the bill had so much merit, with regard to persons dying and leaving their debts unsettled through inadvertence, and not from any dishonest intention, that it had his most hearty approbation at present.

Mr. *Morris* observed, that the case of subsequent settlements mentioned by the right hon. gent. (Mr. Canning) over the way, had been already provided for by the statute of Elizabeth. The case of primogeniture was not at all like the present. No remarkable grievance arose from that. He was glad to find that the right hon. and learned gent. below (the Master of the Rolls) had not given this measure a decided and deliberate opposition.—The bill was then read a second time, and ordered to be committed to-morrow se'nnight.

[NEW PLAN OF FINANCE.] Mr. Hobhouse brought up the report of the committee on the Finances of the country. On the motion that the resolutions be read,

Mr. *Sturges Bourne*, suggested the propriety of delaying the further consideration of this important question, which went to subvert the principles on which the whole financial system of the country; and that, too, without the house being in possession of several necessary documents. There was no estimate on the table of the produce of the war taxes, and on this subject the house had only the assertion of the noble lord, which, however respectable, was not of itself a sufficient authority. At that period of the night, too, he could hardly think that the noble lord would press the discussion. What necessity was there for haste? If the measure was to be followed by taxes, it might be expedient to lose no time in passing the bills through the house; but this was not the case; and with respect to the loan, the loan of last year was contracted for at a much later period, and he was satisfied that no inconvenience could arise from delaying it for at least two months. He had no party views in what he stated, but he was convinced, that the house had not had time to render themselves competent to decide on this momentous question. If, however, they were to be compelled to come to a decision, he for one felt it impossible to vote for the first and second resolutions, because they went to mortgage the war taxes, many of which would not be available in time of peace, and many others, which policy ought to induce us at that period to repeal or modify. Of this latter class, were the duties on spirits and tea. Justice also demanded that the tonnage duties should cease with the war; and there was another duty which bore with peculiar severity on the lower classes of the people, and which ought to be got rid of as soon as possible; he meant the last duty on Malt, to which he should even prefer retaining the Property tax. For these and other reasons he could not agree to the first and second resolutions. As to the general principle, he confessed he was not prepared to enter into it any further than by stating, that it appeared to counteract that which had been hitherto our object, namely, the restraining of the Funding system. To that object we had closely adhered until the year 1802, when a partial departure was made from it; but we were now called upon to do away what was the justification of that departure. He warmly agreed to giving the country repose from taxation for several years; but he wished that the noble lord would not look so far into futurity, but content himself with proposing a plan for 4 or 5 years, at the expiration of which period, the house and the country would become better judges of the system which it would be eligible to adopt.

Mr. *H. Thornton* requested to know, whether it was intended that the debate should proceed at that hour?

Lord *H. Petty* observed, that the debate was last week fixed for that evening. If at a late hour, it should appear that there were some gentlemen yet desirous of giving their opinions, it would be in the judgment of the house to adjourn the further discussion of the question.

Mr. *Rose* could see no possible objection to a postponement of the debate. On a measure of such immense consequence he could not think that the noble lord would press the commencement of a discussion at between 8 and 9 o'clock. Many gentlemen, he for one, were anxious to deliver their opinions, and there would be no chance of ending the debate that night. All he wished for, was a postponement until to-morrow; and he had no doubt that the hon. gent. (Mr. Whitbread), who had a motion which stood for to-morrow, would readily agree to put it off.

Lord *H. Petty* observing that his hon. friend was not present, declared that he could not answer for him on that subject, but that he had strong reason to believe, that as he had three times postponed his motion, he would not consent to any further delay. If, however, the hon. gent. opposites would take the chance of the debate on the present question commencing to-morrow, after that motion should be disposed of, he had no objection to its standing over.

Lord *Howick* expressed the same opinion as his noble friend, as the motion of his hon. friend was one of considerable importance (the Poor laws), and would not conveniently admit of further procrastination.

Lord *H. Petty* at length left it to the discretion of the gentlemen on the other side, whether the report should be discussed now or to-morrow, and the consideration of the report was accordingly postponed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, February 19.

[MINUTES.] The royal assent was given by commission to the Irish Treasury Bills bill, the Irish Militia Service bill, the Irish Gunpowder Importation bill, the Canada Yarn bill, the Seamen and Soldiers' Seduction bill, the Annual Indemnity bill, the Controverted Elections Trial Amendment bill, the Cape of Good Hope Trade Regulation bill, the Barrack Commissioners bill, Bowyer's Lottery bill, and Lord de Dunstanville's Indemnity bill. The commisioners were the lord chancellor, lords Walsingham and Auckland.—The Newfoundland Fish Importation bill, was read a second time.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, February 19.

[MINUTES.] At four o'clock the house proceeded to ballot for a committee to take into consideration the petition complaining of an undue return for Rochester. Soon after, Mr. White appeared at the bar with the reduced list, which was as follows: F. C. Cooper, esq. R. Dawson, esq. H. Shelley, esq. sir R. Barclay, bart. S. Stevens, esq. C. Cockrell, esq. E. Bastard, esq. J. Blackburn, esq. J. Brogden, esq. C. Moore, esq. H. Bankes, esq. J. Asdell, esq. C. O'Hara, esq. Nominees, Hon. J. W. Ward, M. A. Taylor, esq.—In consequence of the absence of a professional person, the house could not proceed to a ballot for a committee on the Down Patrick petition; it therefore necessarily stood over until to-morrow, when it was ordered, on the motion of lord Howick, that the house should be called over.—A new writ was ordered for the

Borough of Derby, in the room of Edward Coke, esq. who, since his election, has accepted of the Chiltern hundreds.—Sir Ralph Milbanke, from the select committee appointed to try and determine the merits of the Petition of the hon. Richard Neville and William Henry Fremantle, esq.; and also of the Petition of Nicholas Vincent, esq. John Scott, esq. the Rev. Rob. Hughes, clerk, Edward Herring, John Smith, and Edmund Nepean, gentlemen, severally complaining of an undue election and return for the borough of Saltash, in the county of Cornwall, informed the house, That it appeared to the said Committee, That the merits of the petitions did depend upon the right of election; and that therefore the said committee required the counsel for the several parties to deliver, to the clerk of the said committee, statements, in writing, of the right of election for which they respectively contended; that in consequence thereof, the counsel for the petitioners delivered in a statement as follows: 'That 'the right of voting for members to serve in 'parliament for the borough of Saltash is 'in the mayor and free burgesses of the bo'rough of Saltash, being members of the 'corporation within the same:' That the counsel for the sitting members, Matthew Russell and Arthur Champernowne, esq. delivered in a statement as follows: 'That 'the right of election of members to serve 'in parliament for the borough of Saltash, 'in the county of Cornwall, is in every 'person seised of an estate for life, or some 'greater estate, in an entire ancient bur'gage tenement, situate within the borough 'aforesaid, whereon an ancient dwelling 'house now stands or formerly stood, and in 'no other persons.' That, upon the statement delivered in by the counsel for the sitting members, the said committee have determined, That the right of election, as set forth in the said statement, is not the right of election for the said borough of Saltash; that upon the statement delivered in by the counsel for the said several petitioners, the said committee have determined, that the right of election, as set forth in the said statement, is the right of election for the said borough of Saltash, so far as the said right is therein described: that the said Committee, having duly considered the said statements, and the evidence adduced before them, touching the right of election for the said borough of Saltash, have determined, that the right of voting for members to serve in parliament for the borough of Saltash is in the mayor and free burgesses of the borough of Saltash, being members of the corporation within the same, and in no other persons.—That the said committee have also determined, that Matthew Russell and Arthur Champernowne, esqrs are not duly elected; that the hon. Richard Neville, the petitioner, ought to have been returned a burgess to serve in this present parliament for the said borough; that the said hon. Richard Neville, is duly elected a burgess to serve in this present parliament for the said borough; that the said committee have determined, that W. H. Fremantle, esq. the petitioner, ought to have been returned a burgess to serve in this present parliament for the said borough; that the said W. H. Fremantle esq. is duly elected a burgess to serve in this present parliament for the said borough: and that the opposition of the said M. Russell and A. Champernowne, esqrs, to the said several petitions, did not appear to the said committee to be frivolous or vexatious. Ordered, That the deputy clerk of the crown do attend this house, to-morrow, with the last return for the borough of Saltash, and amend the same, by rasing out the names of M. Russell, esq. and A. Champernowne, esq. and inserting the names of the hon. R. Neville, and W. H. Fremantle, esq. instead thereof.—Mr. Praed, from the select committee appointed to try and determine the merits of the petition of T. Berney, J. Howard, J. Petchell, jun. E. Smith, M. Smith, and J. Howard, freeholders of the county of Norfolk, complaining of an undue election and return for the said county, informed the house that the said committee have determined, that the right hon. William Windham, and Thomas William Coke, esq. are not duly elected knights of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the said county: and that the opposition of the said right hon. W. Windham and T. W. Coke, esq. to the said petition, did not appear to the said committee to be frivolous or vexatious. And the said determinations were ordered to be entered in the Journals of this house.—Ordered, that Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the clerk of the crown, to make out a new writ for the electing of two knights of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Norfolk, in the room of the right hon. W. Windham and T. W. Coke, esq. who have been declared to be not duly elected.

[Poor-Laws Bill.] Mr. *Whitbread* rose and spoke as follows:—Mr. Speaker; I rise to submit to the consideration of this house, one of the most interesting propositions which ever occupied the attention of any deliberative assembly upon earth. I wish to engage you in an attempt at the solution of the most difficult of all political problems; namely, how to reduce the sum of human vice and misery, and how to augment that of human happiness and virtue amongst the subjects of this realm.—Sir, this attempt has been often and fruitlessly made; nevertheless I do not think the success of it impossible. However great the difficulty, it is our duty to endeavour at least to overcome it.—Sir, I will not now detain the house by an investigation of the original constitution of society; or enter into the abstract right of man to the succour and support of his fellow creatures. Whether that right exist or not; as individuals, we could never refuse relief to innocence, or even to guilt in distress; neither, as part of a legislature, could we ever be brought to say that such assistance shall not be attainable through the medium of the law. More than two centuries have elapsed, since after a succession of efforts, tending to the same end, there was embodied upon your statute-book, the great Christian principle, "that you should do unto others as you would that others should do unto you." What theory could be more delightful? As a state, you undertook to feed the hungry—to clothe the naked—to visit the sick—to protect the fatherless—to assist the widow—to find employment for the healthy and necessitous—and to compel work from the dissolute and the idle.—Sir, these plans were devised during the reign of Elizabeth; the glories of which are still vivid in the annals of our history. They were projected and carried into execution under the auspices of some of the wisest statesmen that ever presided in the councils of any country. They were not the sudden production of one particular period. They had occupied the attention of the legislature during the whole of that long and prosperous reign. From the 5th to the 14th—to the 18th—to the 39th down to the 43d of the queen, we find a constant succession of statutes, bearing testimony to the constant direction of the care of the government towards that object: till, at last, the work was complete.—But, sir, as if it were to confound the speculations of human wisdom, and to humble the pride of man, these schemes, reared upon a foundation apparently so solid, by workmen so able, have been inadequate to the object they had in view. It is an assertion now pretty generally made, that the system of our poor-laws has served to degrade those whom it was intended to exalt, to destroy the spirit of independence, throughout our land; to hold out hopes which cannot be realized; to encourage idleness and vice; and to produce a superfluous population, the offspring of improvidence, and the early victim of misery and want. That which in speculation ought to have been our glory, has been turned to our reproach. A committee of this house, appointed to enquire into the state of the poor of Ireland (where great wretchedness is said to prevail) and to suggest some remedy, have solemnly rejected the system of your poor-laws, as likely, not only to be exceedingly oppressive to the land-owner, but to aggravate the distress of those for whose relief they would be enacted.—Sir, there has been a great revolution in the public mind. Till within a very few years of the period in which I am speaking, the 43d of Elizabeth was, if I may be allowed the expression, considered as the *bible* on this subject. Many persons observing the rapid increase of the burthens imposed by that statute, have projected plans of reform, and the legislature has adopted many new acts: but they have all proceeded upon the same principle. No one ever ventured to surmise that the system itself was radically defective and vicious: and even the last projector, Mr. Pitt, to whose benevolent intention I wish to bear sincere testimony, proceeded upon the supposition that the base upon which we had so long stood was stable and sound. His plan proved abortive, and indeed in most of its parts it was, I am confident, absolutely impracticable. I might presume to mention myself as having, about the same time, and before, at a still earlier date, proposed to the house the adoption of some regulations, which I then thought would be beneficial. The house did not, in either instance, think proper to pass them: and, sir, having now in view objects of a much more extensive nature, it is not my intention again to revive those regulations. But, sir, the period is arrived, in which I think it seems, by common consent, to be admitted, that some steps must be taken. You have lately had severe visitations from the hand of Providence, which have roused your attention to the state of your community. It has been said, that those calamities have been greatly increased by the depression they have occasioned of the character of your labouring poor. It has been said, that necessity having overcome the honest pride which formerly withheld a man from resorting to parochial relief, he no longer cares to recover his independence, but now voluntarily resorts to that assistance which he would before have indignantly avoided.—That such was the effect during the continuance of scarcity (and even since it has ceased) no man can deny: but, sir, I am willing to believe, and not without ground, that that effect is gradually wearing off; that the mind of the labouring class is recovering its elasticity, and that the proper pride of independence has, in a degree at least, resumed its place.—Sir, by the accurate returns which have of late years been laid before parliament, your situation is exposed to your view. The spectacle is indeed fearful, but it must be contemplated. In order to cure any wound, we must know its exact situation and depth.—By the abstracts then upon your table, which were made up in the year 1803, it will appear, that upon a population in England and Wales, (exclusive of your army and navy) of 8,870,000 souls; not less than 1,234,000 are partakers of parochial relief. That is, that nearly one seventh part of your population is indebted to the rest wholly, or in part, for their support: and by far the larger part of that number is wholly subsisted without any exertion of their own. Sir, it is also proved that, exclusively of all collateral expence, such as army, militia, &c. which is raised at the same time with the rate for the relief of the poor, and paid out of it; there had been raised, in the year ending at Easter, 1803, for the maintenance and relief of the poor alone, the sum of 4,267,000*l.*; being almost double the sum raised for the same purpose, on the average of the years 1783, 1784, 1785, and nearly treble the sum raised in 1776.—Sir, that a remedy for an evil so great and so rapidly increasing, ought immediately to be sought, all will be ready to agree: and I stand up before you, under the persuasion that I shall be able to propose to you improvements, regulations, and modifications to effect that end, which will not be found wholly unworthy of your attention.—However small my personal claims to consideration may be, I am sure in the contemplation of my task, I shall meet with the favour of this house. I desire no support from my best friends, but that which the merits of my plan may seem to deserve. I am sure I shall encounter no opposition but that which its demerits extort; and I am equally sure that at this moment there does not exist an individual throughout the nation, who does not wish me success.—Sir, I desire here to put in a rational claim to your attention, by assuring both you and the house, that I am no visionary enthusiast, seeking after universal plenty and comfort, and imaginary perfection. I know the laws of God to be immutable, and bow to their uncontroulable force. I believe man to be born to labour as the sparks fly upwards; that a certain portion of misery is inseparable from mortality; and that all plans for the lodging, clothing, and feeding of all mankind, with what may be called comfort, are quite impossible in practice.—Sir, there is a saying upon record, of one of the most amiable monarchs that ever filled a throne, (I mean Henry IV. of France) which from its benevolence is so captivating, that it has spread through all languages, and passed through every mouth. He is said to have expressed a wish, that he might live to see the day when every peasant in his kingdom should have a pullet in his kettle. Sir, I will not indulge in such a wish with regard to the subjects of this kingdom, because I know that physically it cannot be accomplished. The earth does not produce wherewithal to gratify such a desire; and whatever may be the first impulses of our feeling, in order to do good, we must chastise and reduce them within the sphere of action.—Sir, I have read in an account of the settlements in New South Wales, that some of the unhappy convicts who were transported to that distant clime, laboured under an unaccountable delusion, that adjoining to the land in which they were destined to dwell, there existed a region wherein the earth brought forth her fruits spontaneously, and her productions could be enjoyed without toil, in luxurious and sensual indolence. So strong was the impression, that they actually set out in quest of this fancied spot. Their fate need not be told. Some, after incredible toils and hardships, returned exhausted with hunger and fatigue; the rest perished in the wilderness, and their carcases became a prey to the beasts of the desert and the birds of the air.—Thus, sir, if any politician under a similar species of delusion, were to profess that he could lead mankind by any path to the attainment of universal plenty and comfort, he and his followers would immediately be overwhelmed in the wilderness of error.—But here, I must stop to say, that after the most anxious and patient research into the state of society in these kingdoms, during a long period, I believe the situation of the lower and more useful classes to be better in every respect than at any former time: and he who shall attempt to persuade them to the contrary, must be either weak, misinformed, or wicked.—Sir, I have in view the practical benefit of mankind. In order to form myself for this day, I have had recourse to principles and unerring experience. Sir, I have been undoubtedly assisted by data upon your table, furnishing grounds of action, such as none of my predecessors had the good fortune to possess; and the subject has lately been submitted to an investigation much more accurate than any it had ever before undergone. One philosopher in particular has arisen amongst us, who has gone deeply into the causes of our present situation. I mean Mr. Malthus. His work upon Population has, I believe, been very generally read; and it has completed that change of opinion with regard to the poor-laws, which had before been in some measure begun. Sir, I have studied the works of this author with as much attention as I am capable of bestowing upon any subject. I am desirous of doing the most ample justice to his patient and profound research; to the inimitable clearness of his demonstration, and to the soundness of the principles on which he proceeds. I believe them to be incontrovertible. But in many of the conclusions to which he comes, I materially differ from him. Although I believe the design and intention of the author to be most benevolent, and that so much is to be collected from his writings, I think any man who reads them, ought to place a strict guard over his heart, lest it become hardened against the distresses of his fellow creatures; lest in learning that misery and vice must of necessity maintain a footing in the world, he give up all attempt at their subjugation.—Sir, this philosopher has delivered it as his opinion, that the poor-laws have not only failed in their object, but that they have been productive of much more wretchedness than would have existed without them: that "though they may have alleviated a little the intensity of individual misfortune, they have spread the evil over a larger surface." [Malthus, v. ii. p. 149.] Many persons agreeing in this position, have wished that the whole system was well expunged from our statute book; and perhaps I should not go too far in saying that such is the prevailing sentiment.—But, sir, I think no one has been bold enough to propose a total and immediate abrogation of the poor-laws. Sir, I need hardly say, that no man could be bold enough to propose that, which must in its operation generate a most formidable political convulsion, when the good to be obtained would be at best problematical and uncertain. But supposing the ultimate good to be certain: could we, to obtain it, give our consent to a measure which, in its dreadful execution, would be more widely fatal than any edict which ever proceeded from the hand of any tyrant conqueror upon earth; which would spread desolation, famine, and death throughout your land; and consign to a premature grave, infirmity, age, infancy, and innocence. Sir, the immediate abrogation of these laws is absolutely out of the question. I will dwell no longer upon it.—But their gradual abolition has been suggested as practicable: and I recollect two plans only which have been laid before the public for that purpose. The one bears the name of Mr. Arthur Young, and was also patronized, as I have been told, by an hon. baronet, formerly a member of this house, sir William Pulteney; one whose opinion must always carry with it great weight. The other is suggested by Mr. Malthus himself. Mr. Young's plan is to take the amount of the rate raised for the relief of the poor at a given time, and to enact that it should not on any account be increased. Ultimately, I suppose the intention to be (or else it would not tend to an extinction of the rate, however it might confine it) to draw the line more and more narrow, until at last the rate should be totally done away. I confess, sir, that I can by no means concur in the wisdom, or even the practicability of this scheme. But it has been so ably discussed by Mr. Malthus, in the appendix to the second volume of his work, that I will thank the house to attend to me whilst I read the passage; and it is remarkable enough, that in a note upon this passage, Mr. Malthus gives us a quotation from a work of Mr. Young's wherein Mr. Young completely refutes himself. Mr. Malthus says, "under such a law, if the distresses of the poor were to be aggravated tenfold, either by the increase of numbers or the recurrence of a scarcity, the same sum would be invariably appropriated to their relief. If the statute which gives the poor a right to support were to remain unexpunged, we should add to the cruelty of starving them, the extreme injustice of still professing to relieve them. If this statute were expunged or altered, we should virtually deny the right of the poor to support, and only retain the absurdity of saying, that they had a right to a certain sum; an absurdity which Mr. Young justly corrects with much severity in the case of France." [Malthus, vol. ii. p. 529.]—Then, sir, comes a note, which contains an extract from Mr. Young's travels in France, and it is as follows:—"The national assembly of France, though they disapproved of the English poor-laws, still adopted their principle, and declared, that the poor had a right to pecuniary assistance; that the assembly ought to consider such a provision as one of its first and most sacred duties; and that with this view, an expence ought to be incurred of 50 millions a year. Mr. Young justly observes, that he does not comprehend how it is possible to regard the expenditure of 50 millions a year as a sacred duty, and not extend that 50 to 100, if necesity should demand it; the 100 to 200, the 200 to 300, and so on in the same miserable progression which has taken place in England."—Sir, I think I need not detain the house by adding much to the argument here so conclusively stated; but supposing an act to have passed, which should direct that in each parish or district no more should be raised for the relief of its poor than what had been raised in the year preceding; that that sum should have been necessarily and unavoidably expended in ten months, or upon a certain given number of paupers; all other cases of distress which might arise after that period, must be totally neglected; and yet it would be difficult to distinguish between the right to relief possessed by those who should have received it before the fund was exhausted, and those who might make application for relief after it was gone.—Besides, sir, instances might occur wherein the obedience to such a statute might be productive of the most terrible mischief. I have myself witnessed such an instance. It was the case of a parish afflicted with a contagious fever; wherein, if it had not been possible to have raised a sum of money equal to the exigency of the case; not only the inhabitants of that parish would have been almost exterminated, but the scourge itself must have spread throughout the whole of the adjacent district. In short, sir, if legal relief be allowed at all, it appears to me, as well as to both the writers quoted, that it must be made co-extensive with the necessity to which it is to be applied.—The next plan we have to consider is Mr. Malthus's own: "He proposes a regulation to be made, declaring that no child born from any marriage taking place after the expiration of a year from the date of the law; and no illegitimate child born two years from the same date, should ever be entitled to parish assistance." [vol. ii. p. 396.] It is unnecessary to state the details wherein he gives an account of the method whereby he would have such a law promulgated. By this measure the poor-laws would absolutely cease, after the expiration of a very short period, as to the rising generation. But putting all other considerations aside, what a scene of confusion would ensue during the interval which must elapse, till the present generation should have all passed away, and the condition of all your people should have become the same. Divided as they would be into two distinct classes, the one possessing a claim upon you, the other none; what end would there be to their discontent, jealousies, and quarrel! what jarring, wrangling, and conflict! what difficulties of proof and discrimination in the first instance, and what harshness and severity in the second after proof should have been obtained!—Sir, I am perfectly certain, that if the legislature could be induced to pass a law pregnant with such cruelty, within two years after the commencement of its operation it must be repealed. Neither of these plans then, in my estimation, hold out any rational prospect of success towards the gradual abolition of the poor-laws.—But, sir, supposing *any* plan for that purpose to be adopted, we must, before we venture upon it, anticipate its consequences; and in order to enable us to do so, we must look a little back into our history, and see what was the condition of society before the enactment of any law at all for the relief of the poor. Sir, we shall find that as the feudal system passed away, and the villein ceased to look up to, and depend upon his lord for support, poor began to be known: and there being no legal provision for their support, they obtained alms in the character of beggars. Mendicity was known and licensed by act of parliament under particular restrictions. But it became, as we may collect from our statute-book, a very formidable evil; so formidable, that laws of great severity were enacted against unlicensed mendicants under the description of vagabonds and sturdy beggars. During the prevalence of the Roman Catholic religion, the monasteries afforded great relief to the evil. After their dissolution, it must have increased with great rapidity, and raged with great violence; for in the first year of Edward VI. a statute was passed, containing enactments of such atrocious cruelty, that those who have not read it, will hardly believe in its existence. It is thereby enacted, "that if any person shall be found idle for the space of 3 days, he may be seized upon as a slave, and having been branded in the breast with a red-hot iron, with the letter S, he shall be fed upon bread and water, and compelled to work for the person so seizing him, however vile the work may be, by beating, chaining, or otherwise. Further, that if he absent himself from his said master for the space of 14 days, he shall be branded on the forehead, and adjudged a slave for ever."—True it is, this statute was not long suffered to disgrace your book, for it was repealed in the 3d and 4th year of the same king; but it sufficiently serves to shew how dreadful the state of the lower orders of the community must have been, to induce a legislature to think of such horrible remedies. The laws, however, against beggars and vagrants, were still very severe and cruel. Notwithstanding the very statute I have above recited, and divers others before that time, contained provisions for the relief of the poor, by encouraging the distribution of alms, and at last by compelling the gift of them, it was not until the enactment of that system of laws, during the reign of Elizabeth, on which we now act, that these severities all disappeared. A right hon. gent. over the way, (Mr. Rose) who has paid great and commendable attention to this subject, in a very useful pamphlet on the Poor-Laws, has justly observed, that every expedient had been tried before recourse was had to the present plan. We ought, therefore, to consider, before we consent to its destruction, what the probable consequences would be. If you were to say to men, that they had no right to any assistance or support from you under any circumstances, you could not impose any restraint upon them as to their habitations or settlement. You could not condemn them to starve, and therefore you must allow those in need to beg. Are you prepared to encounter that host of sturdy and valiant beggars, who under the cloak of the distresses of those who were compelled to beg in order to preserve life, would extort from you wherewithal to indulge their profligate idleness? If you should absolutely deny their right to support out of your property, they might have recourse to the original right of occupancy. For each man born has surely a right to occupy a spot of ground, which may have been left unoccupied by those who had come into the world before him; although he may not possess any right to the ground occupied by another, or to any part of the fruit of his labours. But if all the land be occupied, so that those who are born can settle no where in order to maintain themselves, and you deny their right to assistance, your metaphysical positions may be unquestionable, but you would create a set of dangerous enemies. Might they not become a most formidable body? and what step could you take to cure or correct the evil you thus improvidently created?—Sir, I cannot look forward to such a situation without great dread and apprehension, nor can I consent to break that chain, which, with all its imperfections and disadvantages, binds the different classes of society indissolubly together, and which I hope to preserve undissolved, and to be able to render light.—If then, sir, a total and immediate abrogation of your poor-laws is out of the question, and if no practicable plan presents itself for their gradual abolition, what remains to be done? Why, sir, "thinking it unadvisable to abolish the poor-laws, I have endeavoured to obtain a general knowledge of those principles which render them inefficient in their humane intentions, and to apply it so far as to modify them, and regulate their execution, so as to remove many of the evils with which they are accompanied, and make them less objectionable." [Malthus, vol. ii. p. 552.] In proposing to the house my ideas on the subject, I am happy that I have it in my power previously to inform them, that I shall urge nothing which has not the sanction of the highest authority to recommend it, or the support of long-tried experience and practice to justify its adoption. Sir, my wish is not to get rid of the poor-laws, but, I think, by taking proper steps, they may hereafter become almost obsolete. And I am sanguine enough to hope that if what I have to propose should meet with the concurrence of parliament, in the lapse of half a century they would be little used; but I would have such a code always remain upon your statute book, in order that there might be a sure and legal refuge under any change of circumstances, or society, for indigence and distress.—The principles on which I would proceed, to effect this most desireable object, are these: to exalt the character of the labouring classes of your community. To give the labourer consequence in his own eyes, and in those of his fellows, to make him a fit companion for himself, and fit to associate with civilized men. To excite him to acquire property, that he may taste its sweets; and to give him inviolable security for that property, when it is acquired. To mitigate those restraints which now confine and cramp his sphere of action. To hold out a hope of reward to his patient industry. To render dependent poverty, in all cases, degradation in his eyes, and at all times less desirable than independent industry.—Having accomplished this first grand object, I would endeavour to lighten the burthens which must inevitably be borne, by making their distribution more equal. I would propose some material alterations in the mode of affording relief; to put some of your present institutions on a more orderly footing, and to enable you to distinguish between your criminal, and innocently necessitous poor.—In pursuing these objects, it has been my wish, and I hope I have succeeded, to steer clear of all new sources of litigation; not to disturb any of those decisions of the courts of justice which have formed the guide for the conduct of magistrates, and those intrusted to their care; and not, in the smallest degree, to alter or vary the ancient boundaries and divisions of the kingdom. I should further add, that I do not intend to regulate for any of those places whose concerns are provided for by special acts of parliament.—Sir, there is another principle upon which I wish to proceed, and in which I hope I shall obtain the universal concurrence of this house; I mean that of non-interference with the concerns of the poor, until necessity calls for it.—Sir, I hold that I have no more right to meddle with the private concerns of the labourer, to tell him how he shall be lodged, or fed, or clothed, than he has to interfere with mine, until he applies to me for relief. Then the right begins, and again it terminates when he is again able to provide for himself. I am as sure of the sound policy of the doctrine of leaving the poor to their own management, as I am sure of the right they have to be so left: and notwithstanding the instances of unthriftiness and dissolute selfishness which we witness in some characters, generally speaking, they manage for themselves much better than we could manage for them.—Having, sir, however unwillingly, felt myself under the necessity of detaining the house with this preliminary matter, I shall now proceed to open to you the details of the plan I would propose. Sir, I think the house must anticipate that in the front of my plan for the exaltation of the character of the labourer, must appear a scheme for general national education. So it is; and upon its effects I mainly rely for the consummation of my wishes. Sir, it would be needless, in speaking before an assembly so enlightened as that which I have now the honour to address, to dwell upon the beneficial effects of the general diffusion of knowledge. I have of late heard it magnificently said from the chair in which you preside, that this house would at all times open its doors wide to receive the petitions of the people. Sir, I would borrow that expression, and bid you throw open wide the portals of the human understanding to the introduction of light and knowledge, in order that virtue and happiness might follow in their train. If there could exist a doubt about it in the mind of any man who hears me, I would refer him to the contemplation of the character of savage, uncivilized man. More helpless than the brutes amongst which he obtains a precarious subsistence, but more dangerous than them to his fellow creatures, because under the influence of malignant passions by which they are not excited or tormented. Look into the pages of that writer whom I have so often quoted; see, and shudder at the description of a totally uncivilized human being in every quarter of the world, from the northern to the southern extremity of the globe. Trace man from that rude state, step by step, till he arrives at the highest polish of refinement in a civilized society, such as that in which we have the good fortune to live, and I think you will be compelled to confess that every step towards civilization, notwithstanding the adventitious vices which undoubtedly attend its progress, is a step towards morality and order.—Sir, in a political point of view, nothing can possibly afford greater stability to a popular government than the education of your people. Contemplate ignorance in the hand of craft; what a desperate weapon does it afford! How impotent does craft become before an instructed and enlightened multitude.—Sir, view the injustice and cruelty of ignorance; the violence and horrors of a deluded and infuriate mob; destroying its victims without selection or remorse, itself ultimately the victim of its own infatuation and guilt.—I would fain illustrate to you what I feel, by calling your attention to a story of remote antiquity; and I would ask whether the great Aristides could have suffered the injustice he met with from the Athenian people, had the ungrateful crowd whom he had so faithfully served, been sufficiently instructed to appreciate those services? Could any but a wretch as ignorant as the one who asked him to engrave his own name on the shell which was to condemn him to banishment, have been weary of hearing him called "the Just?"—Sir, to come nearer to our own times, could the great pensioner De Witt and his unhappy brother have met with their cruel and ignominious death from the hands of an enlightened populace? To bring it immediately home, could the disgraceful scenes of 1780, have taken place in this metropolis, had there prevailed amongst you a general system of national education? Sir, I think none of these things could have happened, where the light of knowledge and of truth had universally beamed. Sir, I have contended for parliamentary reform in this house, and I am still a sincere and decided friend to the reformation of parliament: but I do not believe that any scheme could be devised, so totally unobjectionable in its means, and so entirely efficacious to its object of increasing the purity of this house, as the general instruction of your people. Nothing could so tend to diffuse the principles and practice of Christianity. You translate the Scriptures into the vulgar tongue, that all may have an opportunity of knowing, weighing, and following the divine precepts they contain. Open the eyes of your people, that they may read what you have so written, and your work is done.—Sir, I have the greatest authorities of the living and the dead, to recommend what I propose. Adam Smith, Mr. Malthus, the right hon. gent. opposite to me (Mr. Rose), the benevolent editor of the tracts which come from the Society for bettering the Condition of the Poor, all agree in recommending national education as the first step towards the alleviation of your burthens, and the amelioration of the condition of your people. Added to this, we have example and experience before our eyes. Look at Scotland. See her enviable state with regard to her poor. That country is the theme of panegyric amongst all who have visited her, on account of the situation of her labouring classes; and yet she has your system of poor-laws *; the enactments are the same; they are still in force, they have been in

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* As much misapprehension prevails in this country on the subject of the Poor-Laws in Scotland, many persons not believing in the existence of the laws themselves, and others better informed as to that fact, having erroneously asserted that they are not now in force, I have thought it advisable to give the following brief but very perspicuous statement of the law, and the facts upon it, for which I am greatly indebted to Mr. Horner and the Rev. Sir Henry Moncrieff.

Note on the Scotch Poor-Laws, by Mr. Horner; *Feb.* 17, 1807.—" STATUTE LAW. The most ancient
" enactments in the Scotch statute book on the subject of the poor, are of these dates; act 1424,
" c. 25.—1503, c. 70.—and 1535, c. 22. Their object is to check the increase of vagrants, by suf-
" fering none to beg but those who were licensed to wear a badge.—After the dissolution of the catho-
" lic establishment, some of the leaders of the reformation tried to obtain, under the new system, a
" plan for the regular support of the poor. In the parliament held in 1560, it was proposed, that the
" revenues of the abolished church should be applied towards the maintenance of ministers, the educa-
" tion of youth, and the *support of the poor*. But this proposal was not listened to. The first general
" assembly of the kirk was held in Dec. the same year, 1560; they drew up the first book of disci-
" pline, which they presented to the convention of estates, held 15th Jan. 1561, and the same plan for
" a distribution of the church revenues was hinted at. But the nobles, we are told by John Knox, re-
" jected the scheme as ' a devout imagination.'—The act of the year 1579, with a few amendments
" subsequently made, forms the Scotch code of poor-laws. It is almost a literal transcript of an
" English statute, passed seven years before, the 14th of Eliz. c. 5, which, though not printed in the
" modern editions of the statutes at large, may be found in the older collections; as in the second vo-
" lume of Rastell. Sir F. Eden, in consequence of having overlooked this original statute of Elizabeth,

general use, they may be and are still often resorted to, and time was when the state of the poor on the other side of the Tweed, as I shall presently shew you, was more wretched, and their violence greater, than was almost ever known in the southern part of the island. Now, the poor-laws are almost totally in disuse, and all is regularity and order. What was the day-star then which shone forth and calmed these troubles? Education. To borrow a quotation from the beautiful speeches of the late Mr. Burke, wherein he describes education to have calmed the disorders of some parts of this island:

> Simul Alba nautis
> Stella refulsit,
> Defluit saxis agitatus humor;
> Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes:
> Et minax (sic Dî voluêre) ponto
> Unda recumbit.

Such was the effect of education upon Scotland, and I will prove to you that that effect was produced by education alone. Sir, the system of our poor-laws was introduced into Scotland by an act passed in the year 1579, which was almost a literal transcript from the act passed in the 14th of Elizabeth: a variety of other statutes followed, shewing by their preambles that the provisions of the first act had been executed. Some of these acts were passed in the time of Charles II. Late decisions of the court of session shew these laws to be now in full force. Most of the information I have obtained on the subject of the Scottish law relating to the poor, I owe to an hon. member of this house (Mr. Horner), who has been well known in the republic of letters, and at the bar of Scotland; and who is sure to become an ornament of this assembly.—Now, sir, I will trouble you to direct your attention to a

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has fallen into a very remarkable mistake, when he intimates his opinion, that the English system of assessment was borrowed from the Scotch act of 1579. On the contrary, the latter is so closely copied from the English statute, that the execution of the act in country parishes is committed 'to 'them that sall be constitute justices be the king is commissioners;' and justices of the peace were not introduced into Scotland till 1689. It is also worthy of being remarked, that the only general regulation, which the Scotch legislature in 1579, did not copy from the 14th of Eliz. is that which directs the surplus of the poor's fund, to be employed in providing work for able-bodied vagrants —We learn from the preamble of an act of the year 1592, cap. 149, that the system of the act 1579, for the maintenance of the poor had already been carried partially into execution. The act 1597, c. 272, to obviate the want of justices, committed the execution of the act 1579, in country parishes upon the kirk sessions.—In the three next acts, 1617, c. 10, 1663, c. 16, and 1672, c. 18, there are various provisions for a scheme of erecting workhouses for vagrants; which fortunately proved abortive. The second of those statutes, however, contains a most important enactment, with respect to the mode of assessing the heritors and their tenants; one half of the rate being ordained to be paid by the heritors of the parish, and the other half by the tenants and possessors.—The last period of Scotch enactments relating to the poor, is the reign of king William. During the severe dearth, which lasted from 1692 to 1699, (the *seven ill years* as they are still called by the common people), there were four proclamations of council, and three acts of parliament, enforcing the execution of former acts for the relief of the poor. They are merely declaratory of those acts."

Decisions of the Court of Session.—" There are in the books of Scotch law, for the last hundred years, down to the present day, many cases upon the construction of the foregoing statutes, with respect to the mode of their execution. There is no doubt of their being in full force; though in point of fact, the rate is assessed only in some districts of Scotland. A short notice of two or three leading cases, will sufficiently prove the actual existence of a statutory assessment in that part of the kingdom.—By a decision of the 6th of June, 1745, the court of session, decreed, in a question between two parishes in Berwickshire, and upon construction of the acts of Charles II. that a residence of 3 years in a parish, gives the pauper a right to relief. The decree of the court directed, that the heritors of the parish of Dunse should meet, and assess themselves accordingly.—In the case of the parish of Humbie, which was decided on the 15th of Feb. 1751, with regard to the joint administration by the heritors and the kirk session, the whole system of the Scotch poor-laws was investigated very minutely; and not only the decree, but all the arguments on both sides, proceed upon the supposition that the act 1579, with the subsequent amendments, was fully in force.—Since the last scarcity, a case had been determined in the court of session, which turned upon this question; viz. whether, under the Scotch poor-laws, those persons are entitled to relief, who, without any personal infirmity, are rendered unable by the high price of provisions to maintain themselves in time of dearth? And, whether an assessment for the relief of such persons was legal? The court decreed, on the 17th of Jan. 1804, that such relief and assessment were legal under the statutes: and the arguments used to obtain a contrary decree were, not that the statutes were not in force, but that they did not strictly include this particular case. This came likewise from the parish of Dunse in Berwickshire."

Note on the Scotch Poor-Laws, by the Rev. Sir Henry Moncrieff.—" Assessments are made by law in many parishes of Scotland, for the relief of the poor. They have been regularly made in some parishes for 40 years past; and become from obvious causes, more frequent every year.—In many parishes they have been hitherto unnecessary; the collections at the churches every Sunday, and in many instances, other funds, in the hands of the kirk sessions, being sufficient without assessments to provide for the parochial poor; this is the case still in the greatest number of parishes.—In small country parishes, or in parishes where there are no considerable towns or villages, the assessments passage which I shall take the liberty of reading from the second discourse of Mr. Andrew Fletcher, on the affairs of Scotland, written in 1698. The system of national education had been enacted in the year 1696; but of course its operation could not have been felt in so short a period. Mr. Fletcher says—“That there are at this day in Scotland (besides a great many poor families very meanly provided for by the church-boxes, and others who, by living upon bad food, fall into various diseases) 200,000 people begging from door to door. These are not only no way advantageous, but a very great burthen to so poor a country. And though the number of them be perhaps double to what it was formerly, by reason of this present great distress, yet in all times there have been about 100,000 of these vagabonds, who have lived without any regard or subjection either to the laws of the land or even to those of God and nature. Fathers incestuously accompanying with their own daughters, the son with the mother, and the brother with the sister. No magistrate could ever discover which way one in a hundred of these wretches died, or that ever they were baptised. Many murders have been discovered among them; and they are not only an unspeakable oppression to poor tenants (who if they give not bread or some kind of provision to perhaps forty such villains in one day, are sure to be insulted by them), but they rob many poor people who live in houses distant from any neighbourhood. In years of plenty, many thousands of them meet together in the mountains, where they feast and riot for many days, and at

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“are levied according to the valued rent of the lands, the one half being paid by the heritors, and the other half by the tenants. The cess-books of the county ascertain the valued rent.—But the practice in large parishes, where there are towns and villages, is different. The assessments are there made according to the real annual rents of lands and houses, a fourth part being deducted to the proprietors of houses for reparations; the half of the assessment is paid by the proprietors or landlords, and the other half by the tenants or possessors.—The assessments are made annually, by a joint meeting of the heritors and kirk session of the parish, held, by act of parliament, on the 1st Tuesday of August, or 1st Tuesday of February, who appoint a collector who makes a new rental each year of lands and houses.—The kirk sessions are, by law, the legal guardians of the poor, and have authority to manage and distribute the funds provided for their maintenance; but the heritors of each parish have a controul over their management; are entitled to inspect their accounts, and sometimes appoint committees of their own number to act along with them. In general, however, the kirk sessions manage alone, and have the confidence of the country, and in all cases they do their duty, without any remuneration whatsoever.—Where there are parish workhouses, the management is commonly entrusted to the kirk session and heritors jointly: and in some of the great towns, to the magistrates, ministers, and others connected with the town councils or corporations.—The necessitous have a legal claim to relief, according to a rule, sanctioned by repeated decisions of the court of session, which gives a pauper a title to the charity of any parish in which he has resided 3 years, supporting himself during that period by his own industry.—There is a law relating to the settlement of paupers, which entitles the managers for the poor, in each parish, to send to the next parish any pauper who has not acquired the residence which entitles him to their charity; and he can be legally conveyed from parish to parish till he reaches the place of his nativity, or the parish in which he has acquired a title. This is sometimes done: but the practice is not general, or even frequent. As a pauper being a pauper when he comes into a parish, or before he has resided on his industry 3 years, never acquires a title, hê is commonly left to find his way to his own parish, or to depend on private charity.—The master of a parochial school is not bound to teach the children gratis. Sometimes the children of paupers are sent to him, at the expence of the kirk sessions; but he is always entitled to his fee. There are many charity schools, supported by public societies or private benefactions, which the children attend gratis: but fees are always due to parochial schools.—By an act of parliament lately passed, 1803, the heritors of each parish, who have property to the extent of 100*l.* Scots of valued rent, in conjunction with the minister, have a right to fix the salary and fees to be paid to the schoolmaster. They are authorized to augment the salaries at the end of every 25 years, and may at all times regulate the fees; there is of course, some variation in the fees, as well as in the salaries of different parishes. But the most common fees may be as follows: for teaching to read, 18*d.* per quarter; for writing and arithmetic, 2*s.* or 2*s.* 6*d.* per quarter; for Latin, 2*s.* or 2*s.* 6*d.**—The parents very generally avail themselves of the parochial schools; and in the low country especially, would be held as infamous if they neglected them.—The children are all, without exception, taught to read; and in particular, to read the Scriptures. They are minutely instructed in the catechisms which contain the general principles of religion; they are very generally taught to write, and to understand the common rules of arithmetic, and all may be so. In most parishes, a few who desire it are taught Latin; and if they prosecute it, may, by means of the parish school, be qualified to attend the Universities.—The males and females attend the parish schools together; but the females in the lowest ranks generally confine themselves to reading, catechetical instructions, and sometimes go no further. Many even of them, however, are taught both writing and figures.”

* The highest salary is 400, and the lowest 300 marks. The schoolmaster has, besides, a house, a school-house, and a small garden.

"country weddings, markets, burials, and "other like public occasions, they are "to be seen, both men and women, perpe"tually drunk, cursing, blaspheming, and "fighting together.—These are such out"rageous disorders, that it were better for "the nation they were sold to the gallies "or West Indies, than that they should "continue any longer a burthen upon "us. But numbers of people bring "great riches. Every government is to "blame that makes not a right use of "them. The wholesomeness of our air, "and healthfulness of our climate, af"fords us great numbers of people which "in so poor a country can never be "all maintained by manufactures or public "workhouses, or any other way but that "which I have menioned." In another part of the same discourse, Mr. Fletcher says, "The better education of our youth "would be very necessary."—Now, sir, I beg to call your attention to another description of Scotland, given in the year 1803, by the lord advocate of Scotland, when persuading this house to the adoption of a bill for the more liberally providing for the schoolmasters of that country; which bill was afterwards passed into a law, and in its preamble recites, "that the school"masters of Scotland are a most useful "body of men, and essential to the public "welfare."—Sir, the lord advocate, Hope, is upon that occasion reported to have said—"He ascribed to the establishment "of those schools all that intelligence "which was so observable in that part of "the United Kingdom, and which so "much attracted the attention of strangers "who visited it. To it also was to be "ascribed the good morals, the social "order, the loyalty, the paucity of crimes, "the proper attendance on divine worship, "and the increasing wealth of that part "of the country. The paucity of crimes "was so remarkable, that there were more "convicts transported in one quarter ses"sions from Manchester, than from all "Scotland in the course of the year. He "also observed, that the executions in "Scotland, on an average, did not amount "to more than 6 in the year. He there"fore thought an establishment, produc"tive of such good, deserving of the great"est encouragement, and that without it "the institution would sink into disrepute, "and become a nuisance instead of a be"nefit. The low salary of the school"masters had within the last 20 years, "caused several schools to be without "masters."—Sir, can there be a greater contrast than is exhibited in these two descriptions? and is not all the improvement observable in the latter, when compared with the former, traced, by one who was the most competent judge that could have been selected, entirely to the system of national education? Sir, to bring the matter still nearer to a point, I am induced, and not without foundation, to believe that the necessity for the compulsory relief, which has been had recourse to of late years in Scotland, more frequently than before, has been owing to the circumstance of many schools having been abandoned on account of the lowness of the salaries of the masters. Sir, I trust the act of 1803, which has made a more liberal provision for the schoolmasters, will re-produce all the original and beneficial effects.—I propose then, sir, a general system of national education, by the establishment of parochial schools; not compulsory upon the poor, for that would destroy its object: but voluntary, and I am confident that it will soon so work its way, that every man in England and Wales will, as in Scotland, feel it a disgrace not to have his children instructed. Sir, the details of this plan will be found in the bill which I shall ask permission of the house to introduce: and I say nothing of the expence, for I am sure no statesman, who views the importance of the establishment as I do, will hesitate on that score alone to adopt it, for in the saving of poor's rate it will repay itself an hundred, and in order, morality, and virtue, ten thousand fold.—Sir, I cannot help noticing to the house, that this is a period particularly favourable for the institution of a national system of education; because within a few years there has been discovered a plan for the instruction of youth, which is now brought to a state of great perfection; happily combining rules, by which the object of learning must be infallibly attained with expedition and cheapness, and holding out the fairest prospect of eminent utility to mankind. Sir, the meritorious person with whom parts of the plan of education, to which I have alluded, have had their rise, who has also had the good sense unostentatiously to add the acknowledged discoveries of others to his own, is well known to many members of this house, and to a large part of the nation; and he is patronized by persons of the first distinction, in this and a neighbouring kingdom; he has further obtained the high honour of the royal sanction and support. The gentleman whom I mean to point out to you, is Mr. Joseph Lancaster[*]. Sir, I know that he has been the object of much opposition from bigotry and prejudice, but I believe him to be on every account, deserving of encouragement and protection; and I am happy to find that the unfounded clamour which has been raised against him, has in no degree prevailed; that he still enjoys that distinguished and discriminating support I have before mentioned, and as it frequently happens, that what was intended to overturn, has tended only to strengthen and support him,—The principles upon which he proceeds at the free school in the Borough, are, upon examination, so obviously founded in utility and economy, that they must prevail, and will finally, I have no doubt, furnish a mode of instruction, not only for this country, but for all nations advanced in any degree in civilization.—Sir, I by no means intend to introduce any enactments into the bill which I shall propose to you, compelling any particular mechanical mode of instruction; but I have thought this a proper opportunity of stating my opinions relative to what I think must prove a great practical benefit to this country and the world.—Sir, when the bill itself shall come into the hands of gentlemen, it will be found that the main spring of all that is good on earth, I mean religious instruction, is attended to; and that the interests of the establishment are strictly guarded. Sir, I might here dismiss the subject of education altogether; and indeed, I reluctantly call your attention to one illustration of the advantages to be derived from it, and the great disadvantages attending its total absence from any country when I mention the state of the poor in Ireland; there are in that country no poor-laws, to which the misery and wretchedness of the lower orders of society can be traced. But they have no instruction. In Scotland they have instruction, and therefore they are contented and happy, and do not use the poor-laws which they have. Sir, I perfectly well know, that my noble friend, who is, fortunately for her interests, at the head of the goverment of that country, is a decided friend to general instruction, and that he is a patron of the improved plan I have discussed, as well as of the person who carries it into effect. I know that the other members of his majesty's councils for the more immediate government of that country, are doing their endeavours towards the instruction of that brave, patient, and generous people. I have also learnt with the greatest pleasure, that the people themselves are eagerly desirous of availing themselves of the light which I hope will speedily and abundantly shine upon them. With a combination of circumstances so fortunate, we are entitled to expect the happiest results. Sir, the next step which I would recommend to the house to take towards the desireable end of exalting the character of the labourer, is to encourage him to become possessed of property, that he may taste its sweets; and to give him full security for the possession of what he shall acquire. All persons who have thought deeply on the subject of the poor, have felt the force and justice of this principle; but some have differed as to the species of property of which it is most desirable they should become possessed. Some have thought a property in live stock most beneficial; and in that has originated in some parts of England what is called the Cow System, whereby a labouring man is enabled either to purchase or acquire a certain property in a cow. The services of that useful animal to the family of the labourer, are esteemed of greater importance than any other possession. This system may locally be exceedingly beneficial; but there are some obvious objections to it: such as the precariousness of the life of the animal, and the great loss which must arise from any accident to it, in most cases irreparable, which put it altogether out of the question, as to general adoption; and flings great doubt upon its application to those parts of the kingdom even most adapted to it. Money, sir, I apprehend to be the only sort of property which it is worth our while to give encouragement to the labourer to acquire; which is convertible into whatever other species of property he may think fit to purchase. The consideration then is, that of a plan by which the savings of the poor may be safely and profitably invested. If a labourer spends the whole of his earnings, he necessarily becomes a charge to the parish, upon the first accident he meets with, or the first attack of sickness; and if he is fortunate enough to escape both, the burthen is only suspended till age renders him incapable of work. A great proportion of the labouring poor thus become in succession claimants upon the parish; and this must in some degree continue until the poor can be induced to lay by something in health, as a provision for sickness or age. Such of them as make the experiment, and have once felt the satisfaction of possessing something of their own, ordinarily succeed beyond all expectation. Advanced one step towards independence, they go on to improve their condition; and in this class are found some of the most industrious, frugal, and meritorious members of society. That so few are found to make any saving may in a great degree be accounted for, by the difficulty of putting out the little they can raise at a time. A poor man would often be glad to put out small sums to interest, who cannot make up enough to induce a man of property to take it; and in the length of time necessary to raise a larger sum, so many temptations occur for spending the little fund, that it requires a degree of forbearance and self-denial which few possess, to resist them. Thus, the poor man not knowing where to place the money he has saved, spends it unnecessarily, or trusts it with some plausible neighbour, and loses it, or puts it in his drawer, and is robbed of it; or places it in the hands of his master, who in some instances has iniquitously defrauded his industrious and confiding servant. Thus men are discouraged from the renewal of an unsuccessful attempt: and others are deterred by such examples. The obvious remedy for this evil, is to find out a method adapted to the situation of the poor, by which they may put out their savings with security, at a fair interest, for this purpose. The establishment of friendly societies opens a very general and useful resource: and I am glad of this public opportunity of expressing my decided approbation of those excellent institutions; and my sense of the obligation due to the right hon. gent. opposite to me (Mr. Rose), under whose auspices an act has been passed for the regulation, support, and encouragement of those societies, which by increasing the number of subscribers to them has proved highly beneficial to the country; I mean the act of the 33d of the king, c. 54: but, sir, it is to be observed, that some institution, such as I shall venture presently to suggest, are wanted in aid of the operations of those societies. Sir, the lower orders of the people, are jealous, and naturally so, of any interference or controul over their property; and many who from motives of jealousy are prevented from placing their savings in societies of this description, would place it out to profit, or upon contingencies, when the whole of the management would remain exclusively to themselves. Sir, to shew how much this sort of jealousy operates, one might remark, that although the advantages held out by the act in question are very great, and that the effect has been, as I believe, greatly to increase the number of members in those societies, still the interference of the law has certainly alarmed some others; and I have heard of instances where clubs have been broken up in consequence of it; the balance, however, I am sure, is in favour of the act. These prejudices would certainly operate most, when the act was new. They will gradually wear away, and the country will receive the full measure of its benevolent provisions. Sir, no man can be a greater friend than I am to the institution of friendly societies; and in the county in which I live, I do all in my power to encourage and support them. I know only of one objection to them, and that is inseparably attendant upon them; it is I believe without remedy, and is by no means of such magnitude as to counteract their general value. I mean the frequent meetings they demand; the loss of time, and expenditure of money at the public houses. I am no enemy to relaxation and social meetings amongst the lower classes; they have a right to their enjoyments when confined within the bounds of sobriety and moderation; but I do not wish that the temptations to indulgences, in which the head of the family alone can partake, should be multiplied.—Some persons, struck with the benefit of these friendly societies, have carried their love for them so far, as to propose a general national club, to which every healthy labourer should be compelled to contribute. Sir, I need hardly say, that such a scheme is quite impracticable; and that by compulsion we should entirely destroy that which is the effect of, and can be supported only by, free will. The impossibility of watching the members of such a club, with the vigilance necessary to guard against fraud, and all the numerous difficulties attending the scheme, are too obvious to be dwelt upon: but I have mentioned the matter, in order to shew that it has not escaped my observation. Sir, what I shall propose, is to assist the intention of the benevolent societies, but not to put them aside or interfere with them.—Mr. Malthus has proposed the establishment of county banks. I confess I see many objections to that plan also, arising out of its complexity, and the difficulty there would be in making any general and perfect responsibility for so many different and dispersed establishments; but I approve his principle, and would extend it.—I beg gentlemen not to start at what I am about to suggest, which to many who hear me may be quite new, but to afford it their cool and deliberate consideration. I would propose the establishment of one great national institution, in the nature of a bank, for the use and advantage of the labouring classes alone: that it should be placed in the metropolis, and be under the controul and management of proper persons, to be appointed according to the provisions contained in the bill I shall move for leave to introduce; that every man who shall be certified by one justice, to his own knowledge, or on proof, to subsist principally or alone by the wages of his labour, shall be at liberty to remit to the accountant of the Poor's Fund (as I would designate it) in notes or cash, any sum from 20*s.* upwards; but not exceeding 20*l.* in any one year, nor more in the whole than 200*l.* That once in every week the remittances of the preceding week be laid out in the 3 per cent. consolidated bank annuities, or in some other of the government stocks, in the name of commissioners to be appointed; to avoid all minute payments, no dividend to be remitted till it shall amount to 10*s.*, and that all fractional sums, under 10*s.* be from time to time re-invested, in order to be rendered productive towards the expences of the office. The plan will be more amply detailed in the bill itself, and such regulations are provided as will, with the intervention of the post-office, give ample facilities to its execution. Gentlemen need not be told, that the perfection attained in the management of that great machine is such, as to give the most easy and rapid means of communication with the metropolis, much greater indeed than usually subsists between the remote parts of any county and its capital town. Sir, the advantage of such a plan as that which I have just sketched out, would be very much increased, if in addition, an opportunity were given to those who might wish by an annual payment up to a given age, to purchase an annuity for the remainder of their lives: or to insure the payment of a gross sum to their families upon their death; or upon any of those calculable events, which are the usual objects of insurance.—There are offices in which the higher and middle classes, may by proportional annual payments, make a provision for themselves or families; but the lowest of the requisite payments, are above the reach of the labourer; to whom such a provision is still more necessary. I would therefore propose, that at the same place, there should be established, under the same direction, an insurance office for the poor: that tables should be calculated for the assurance, in consideration of annual payments of gross sums upon the death of the assured, of an annuity for the remainder of a life after a given age; or of an annuity to a wife surviving a husband; or of payments upon a child's attaining a certain age. The same description of persons to be entitled to the benefit of this part of the plan, and upon similar certificates. No annual payment to be less than 10*s.* or more than 5*l.* That the calculations be at such rates of interest, and probabilities of the duration of life, as to be likely to give such an advantage only to the insurers, as would cover the expence of the establishment. That the receipts be invested in stock. That no insurance be made upon any life without the testimony upon oath of a medical man, that such person is in good health; nor without proof on oath of the age, and the certificate of a justice, that he is satisfied of the facts. On proof of fraud or misrepresentation, the insurance to be forfeited.—I should also propose, that all remittances to and by the accountant of both these offices, and all necessary correspondence, should be free of postage; and that no bill, certificate, or policy, should be subject to any stamp duty; nor probates of wills in respect of this fund only; and that all dividends and annual payments, should be wholly exempt from the property tax. In this part of the plan, I have followed up the principle laid down in the act relating to the friendly societies; and it is obvious, that the revenue would lose nothing by such exemptions; because, without such offices, no such correspondence or instruments would exist as are here proposed to be exempted from postage and duty: and the annual payments would all be below those sums which it has been in the contemplation of parliament to subject to the operation of the property tax.—Such, sir, is the general outline of the plan I would propose to encourage the labourer to acquire property; and to secure to him the certain and profitable possession of it when acquired.—I beg the patient attention of the house and the country to the consideration of it; and I have the greatest hope of a happy effect from its being put in practice. If the poor should be found to avail themselves of it to any extent; the advantages to them and to the country, would be incalculable, and the expence attending it would speedily be covered: if it should not succeed, the trial can cost but little.—The next point which I wish to urge to the consideration of the house, is the law of settlement. Sir, I believe it to be now universally admitted, that the code of laws which exist upon that subject is grievously oppressive to the poor, and injurious to the common wealth. Here again all eminent writers concur with me in reprobating the system of settlement as carried into practice, and in wishing that it should be much relaxed. Mr. Rose in his pamphlet on the poor-laws, justly prides himself on having first shaken this obnoxious fabric; and the bill passed in the year 1796, commonly known by the name of its learned author, Mr. East, gave it another material shock. Sir, I am glad to perceive the feelings of the house to go along with me so cordially in the opening of this part of my plan, it will be the less necessary for me to occupy their time in the demonstration of a point which seems so evident. I at the same time anticipate the decision of the house, that the law of settlement could not be entirely done away with safety or convenience. Sir, an erroneous opinion pretty generally prevails, that the law of settlement had its origin in the famous statute of the 13th and 14th of Charles II. which did indeed modify it, and in such a manner, as to open the door to more acrimonious disputes than are to be traced to any number of laws, however great, upon your table: wherein the substance of those who have contributed, has been wasted for the purpose of harassing and vexing those for whose relief it was intended. But, sir, the custom of settlement had its origin in very remote times, and we find very early traces of it in the statute law. So early as the 12th year of Richard II. cap. 7. the place of a man's birth is declared to be the place of his settlement. By the 11th of Henry VII. c. 2. the settlement of a man is deemed to be where he was best known or born; and by the horrible statute before cited, of the 1st of Edw. VI. cap. 3, a man's settlement is declared to be in the place of his birth, or where he has last resided for 3 years. At length came the act of the 13th and 14th Car. II. cap. 12. which conferred a settlement by a residence of 40 days. But, sir, it at the same time gave the power of removing persons likely to become chargeable, and thereby became the inexhaustible source of legal vexation. It is curious, and may be instructive to those who would wish to get rid of settlements altogether, to look at the state of the country at the time this act was passed, which is depicted in the preamble to the act itself. It is there said,

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[*] "Dr. Bell, late of the establishment of Fort St. George in the East Indies, and rector of Swanage, claims the original invention of the system of education practised by Mr. Lancaster. So early as the year 1789, he opened a school at Madras, in which that system was first reduced to practice, with the greatest success, and the most beneficial effects. In the year 1797, he published an outline of his method of instruction, in a small pamphlet, intitled, 'An Experiment on Education made at 'the Male Asylum of Madras.' That pamphlet has been extended, and very valuable details given to the public by Dr. Bell, in two subsequent publications of the years 1805 and 1807. Mr. Lancaster's free school in the Borough, was not opened till the year 1800. So that Dr. Bell unquestionably preceded Mr. Lancaster, and to him the world are first indebted for one of the most useful discoveries which has ever been submitted to society.——Dr. Bell and Mr. Lancaster have heretofore had much communication with each other; and Mr. Lancaster, 'in acknowledging the obli'gation he has to Dr. Bell, wishes not to detract from his honour or merit; nor to arrogate to him'self any thing to which Dr. Bell is entitled;'[†] at the same time he asserts that many of the very useful methods practised in his school are exclusively his own. On the other hand Dr. Bell, with the feeling worthy of so great a benefactor to mankind, allows, that 'to the zeal, perseverance, and ad'dress of Mr. Lancaster, the mechanical parts of the system are under the greatest obligations.'[‡] ——The system itself is what I wish to recommend to public notice, and at the same time to do justice to the two persons who in its invention, improvement, and propagation, have rendered such distinguished services to the world. Under the patronage which each so liberally enjoys, their plan of education, founded on the basis of utility and truth, must prevail: and the union of all parties in the unprejudiced acknowledgement of the respective merits of Dr. Bell and Mr. Lancaster, cannot fail materially to advance the period of its universal adoption."

[†] Extract of a letter from Mr. Lancaster to Mr. Whitbread, March 2, 1807.

[‡] Extract of a letter from Dr. Bell to Mr. Whitbread, Feb. 26, 1807.

"That whereas, by reason of some defects "in the law, poor people are not restrained "from going from one parish to another, "and therefore do endeavour to settle "themselves in those parishes where is "the best stock, the largest commons or "wastes to build cottages, and the most "woods for them to burn and destroy; "and when they have consumed it, then "to another parish; and at last become "rogues and vagabonds, to the great dis-"couragement of parishes to provide "stock where it might be destroyed by "strangers:—be it therefore enacted, &c." —Now, sir, this uncontrolled power to the labouring poor, of planting themselves indiscriminately in any place, is not what I should think it wise for the legislature to give, as long as you hold forth the hand of the nation to relieve their wants. By the 1st of James II. cap. 17. the 40 days were to be accounted from notice given to the overseer; and by the 3d and 4th of Will. & Mar. cap. 11, it was further required, that the notice should be read in the church. This power of gaining a settlement by a residence of 40 days was thus rendered quite nugatory, because the delivery of the notice would at all times operate as a warning to the overseer, to obtain the removal of the pauper, as likely to become chargeable. The 8th and 9th of Will. & Mar. cap. 30, introduced the machinery of certificates, which went but a very little way towards the cure of the evil; and by a statute which passed in the 35th of the king, which I shall presently name, the use of certificates is quite done away.—By the law therefore as it now stands, no length of residence will of itself gain a settlement. Vexatious removals are indeed greatly diminished, by the humane provisions of 35 Geo. III. cap. 101. whereby it is enacted, that no person shall be removed till he shall become actually chargeable. But no settlement, by any length of residence can be gained.—It frequently happens therefore that a man settled by birth, or who has a derivative settlement from his parents, or who has acquired a settlement by apprenticeship, or service early in life, is fixed in a distant part of the kingdom, till age renders him incapable of any longer getting his living; and he is then removed from a parish which has had all the benefit of his labour in active life, and from every neighbourly connection, to linger and die, where he knows and is known to no one; and there are not wanting instances of such removals after 50 years residence in a parish.—I propose therefore, that in addition to the means by which a settlement may now be acquired, that a residence, as a householder, for 5 years in any parish without being chargeable to that or any other parish, shall confer a settlement on any householder. But I would add, that such right to settlement should be forfeited by the person claiming it, if he should be proved to have been convicted of any crime, or to have incurred any infamous punishment during the period. By this restriction, I have in view the preservation of the morals of the country, to which I think it would very greatly conduce. The period of residence by which I would confer a settlement corresponds with that introduced by Mr. Pitt into his proposed bill, and I think it will appear to the house, to be a more reasonable limitation of time, than 3 years, as prescribed by the old customs and statute for England and Wales; and by the law of Scotland, as has been determined by very recent decisions of the court of session.—Under the head of settlements, there is another case for which it is extremely desirable to provide. The act of 35th Geo. III. cap. 101, having taken away the oppressive power of removing a pauper upon the ground of his being likely to become chargeable, there is no way of obtaining a judicial decision on his settlement, or even taking an examination upon it, till he becomes actually chargeable: and it is not perhaps till the distress occasioned by his last illness, or that of his family in consequence of his death, has produced an application to the parish officers, that it is in their power to put the question, however disputable, in a course of trial; when from the length of time the facts have become more difficult of proof, and the testimony of the pauper, who is usually the best witness of his own settlement, will often have been lost.—The remedy I propose is, to authorize two justices upon the application of the overseer, to enquire into and on sufficient evidence to make an order of adjudication of the settlement of any person likely to become chargeable, in the same way that orders of removal are now made, leaving out the clause of removal; that a duplicate of the order of adjudication should within a month be delivered to the overseers of the parish in which the settlement is adjudged to be; that such parish be at liberty to appeal against the order to the quarter sessions, upon the usual legal notice; and that the order of sessions upon the appeal, or the order of the justices, if not appealed from, be conclusive on the settlement, as in the case of orders of removal. I propose, if the order is made within 20 days of the sessions, to allow an appeal to the second sessions, that the parish in which the settlement is adjudged to be, may have sufficient time to make enquiry into the case, and that the parish obtaining the order should be bound to produce the pauper who is the subject of the order. I would also propose that an order, not appealed from, should be recorded at the second session by the parish obtaining it, on proof of the delivery of a duplicate to the other parish.—Sir, it will be perceived that by this proposition I would alter nothing of the old law of settlement, but merely superadd the power of obtaining a settlement which I have described, to those already in existence. That I therefore interfere with none of the decisions of the courts of justice in that long string of settlement cases which have come before them for their opinion. By the provision for the previous adjudication of settlement I hope to take away the ground of much expensive litigation, under circumstances which render proof difficult and sometimes impossible.—The principle of the previous adjudication of settlement, will be found in the Friendly Society act, and I have almost copied the provisions of the clause which it contains relative to this matter, adding only a further guard against vexation to the labourer; by ordering that in all cases where he is compellable to appear as a witness for the purpose of having his settlement adjudged, the expence accruing from his loss of time shall be paid to him. From all these provisions I expect the best effects, in the additional freedom it will give to the person, together with increased independence to the mind of the labourer, and the greater equality which it will create between the demand for labour and its supply.—The next matter in order, in which I would wish parliament to make some alteration, is the constitution and power of vestries. By the act of 43d Eliz. cap. 2, the churchwardens and overseers are required once in every month after divine service, to meet in the church, there to consider of the course to be taken for fulfilling the purposes of the act. By the 3d and 4th Will. & Mar. cap. 11, s. 11, "the parishioners are to meet in the vestry "yearly, in Easter weeek; or as often as it "shall be thought convenient, and the "lists of those receiving relief are to be "called over, the reasons for relief ex"amined, and new lists made of such "persons as they shall think fit, and allow "to receive collection; and no other "to receive any collection without the "order of a justice, except in cases of "pestilence, or small-pox." The yearly meeting appears to me to be much too distant, and the words "as often as it shall "be thought convenient" much too loose, and to leave too much in the discretion of the parish officer. I believe the custom still to prevail in some parishes, of assembling once in the month, or at some stated periods; but such meetings are not now deemed necessary, are not regularly summoned, and are frequently conducted without regularity or decorum. I shall propose, therefore, to restore the monthly meeting, directed byt he 43d of Elizabeth; and as the interests of the inhabitants are so deeply affected by the administration of the poor laws; to give them a more effectual controul over the raising and expenditure of their money. I propose, that vestries shall meet monthly, and on notice at intermediate times; that the church wardens and overseers be required to take their opinion, and observe their direction upon the assessments to be made, the persons to be relieved, and the relief to be given, in all cases which do not require immediate attention. But to prevent an abuse of this power by undue influence, or popular clamour, it will, I think, be proper to do something as to the constitution of the vestries, as far as regards the execution of the poor-laws. Gentlemen very well know, that the meetings of vestries are too frequently disorderly and tumultuous; and that the more respectable part of the inhabitants of a parish often withdraw themselves from all attendance on parochial business, from the disgust they experience at such assemblies. At present every person rated to the poor's rate, in the smallest sum, has an equal voice in the vestry with the proprietor who pays the highest proportion to the rate; and a few very inconsiderable renters sometimes have it in their power to dispose of the parish money against the opinion of the more substantial and better informed inhabitants. In order therefore to give to those who contribute most to the fund, a due weight in the application of the money, I would propose, that a person assessed in a certain sum, should have two votes, and in a certain other larger sum, three votes, and the largest four. The act passed in the present reign, 22d Geo. III. c. 3. commonly called Mr. Gilbert's act, directs, that in parishes adopting the provisions of that statute, no persons shall be entitled to vote in vestry, who are not assessed to the relief of the poor, in the annual amount of 5*l.* I would not wish to see that regulation generally adopted. I think that all who contribute ought to have their proportionate controul over the distribution of the money. In order to ensure decency and order in the meetings themselves, I would propose, that the officiating clergyman of the parish should in all cases, when present, preside: in his absence, the senior churchwarden; then the junior churchwarden: after that the overseers in succession; and failing the attendance of all I have named, the person present paying the highest sum to the rate; and in all cases of equality of opinion, that the chairman should have the casting vote. By such provisions as I have described, and which will of course be more accurately and amply set forth in the bill, I should hope to secure a more perfect controul over the expenditure of the money; more care in the method of raising it; and to convert an ineffectual, noisy, and tumultuous meeting, into a decent, effectual, and orderly scene of business, to the great comfort of the poor, and the great saving of the parties assessed.—Sir, the next matter which I would submit to the consideration of the house, is one of the very first importance, I mean that of the rate itself, out of which the relief is given. Sir, I think I have shewn in the earlier part of my speech, that enormous as is the present amount of the rate raised for the relief of the poor, and rapid as the increase of it has been, it is not practicable to restrain it within any precise boundary. The reduction to be hoped for, must depend upon the success of the measures which may be enacted for reforming the habits, and improving the resources of the poor, such as I have already proposed, and to which I have still some to add. Sir, the law for a compulsory rate grew out of very ancient statutes, which recommended the giving of alms. By the 27th of Henry VIII. cap. 25, collectors were appointed to receive the alms given; and persons were forbid to give, except to those collectors. By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI. cap. 2, the bishop was directed to exhort those who should refuse to give alms. By the 5th of Eliz. cap. 3, the bishop was directed to bind over such as should refuse to give alms, and they were to be imprisoned. By the 14th of Eliz. cap. 5, justices were directed to assess in every place. By the 39th of the same queen, cap. 3, overseers were appointed for the management of the rate; and at length by the celebrated statute, so often mentioned, the rate was directed to be assessed after the manner which continues in force to this day. The only statutes, I believe, which have been passed since that period on the subject of the rate, are the 17th of Geo II. cap. 3, which directs, that notice shall be given of the allowance of a rate, without which notice, it shall not be valid; and also gives power to the inhabitants, to inspect the rate: the 17th of Geo. II. cap. 38, which directs overseers to deliver over the books to their successors, and gives power of appeal against the rate, to parties aggrieved by it; and the 41st of the king, cap. 23, which makes some further provisions about appeals. But the rate itself is or ought to be raised at this day, according to the intentions and enactments of the 43d Eliz. cap. 2: I say, ought to be, because the intention of that statute has evidently been departed from in practice, whereby a very gross inequality has been created in the distribution of burthen necessarily imposed for the relief of the poor. Sir, the words directing the levy of the rate are as explicit as to the persons on whom the levy is to be made, as can well be devised. They are the following: "to raise weekly, "or otherwise, by taxation of every inha- "bitant, parson, vicar, or other, and of "every occupier of lands, houses, tithes "impropriate, propriations of tithes, coal- "mines, or saleable underwoods in such "parish," &c. By these words I think it was clearly designed that every person having personal property in a parish should be assessed in regard of that personal property; and indeed that such is the true interpretation of the law, may be collected from the repeated decisions of the court of King's Bench. The rating of personal property had long fallen into disuse, but the law was not altered, and upon a case which came before the court on an appeal, although the rate appealed against was quashed for informality, Mr. Justice Aston said, "if it be the law that personal pro-

"perty is rateable, it must be rated although it was never rated before." Lord Kenyon in another case said, "There is no doubt that personal property is rateable." In another case, of the King against White, it was decided, that "ships are rateable property like stock in trade, and confirmed a rate made upon White in respect of such ships, to the amount of 13,500*l.*" But, sir, the practice of rating personal property has been so little resorted to, that the land has borne almost the whole of the burthen, and very unjustly. For certainly nothing can be more unjust, than that a person carrying on a lucrative concern within a parish should contribute only in proportion of the value of the land he holds, and nothing in respect of his productive capital; whilst his neighbour must pay in the same proportion for his occupation, although his resource for income should be in the land alone. I am perfectly aware that by the enforcing of this provision of the statute of Elizabeth there will be some difficulties to encounter; and I would by no means vest in any hands the sort of inquisitorial power necessary to ascertain the income of persons as is done for the purpose of levying those large taxes which perhaps must be raised during a war. But all productive capital must, in its operation, be to a certain degree visible. Such estimate must be made of it as can be best collected from circumstances; and the power of appeal affords the remedy to the party assessed. I would propose then to declare that, with the exception of farming stock, all local and productive personal property is rateable. Few persons, perhaps, will be more touched by such a declaration of the law than myself, in more than one instance; but, sir, in this house in order to do their duty, men must divest themselves of all personal and selfish considerations; and although I do not pretend to greater disinterestedness than other men, and should, perhaps, be as eager as others to relieve myself from any unusual payment, when called upon in my individual capacity, I have now objects of far greater magnitude in my view, and wish at my own expence, as well as at that of others, to procure a more equal and general distribution of inevitable burthens, in order that they may sit lightly on all. The great bulk of personal property will still be out of the reach of legal taxation; but the opulent are seldom found deficient inhumane attention to the wants of the poor. Sir, there is another grievance under the head of rating, which ought long since to have been redressed. As the law now stands, every occcupier is rateable to the poor-rate; and, till a late statute, upon proof on any appeal against the rate, of the omission of the smallest tenement, the court was bound to quash the rate. The act alluded to allows the rate to be amended, but the property still remains liable to be rated; and the cottage of an industrious labourer or workman, struggling to support himself and his family, is still often assessed and compelled to pay, what to him is a considerable sum, to be bestowed on less deserving objects. In some parishes it is the practice to leave out all persons below a certain yearly value; in others they exempt by name such as they think too poor to pay. I would propose to you, sir, to legalize the exemption, by authorizing the vestry to order such occupiers of cottages as they shall think too poor to pay, to be left out of the rate; to declare that such omission shall not be a ground of appeal against the rate; and also to give power to the justices upon application to strike out of the rate the name of any person who shall occupy a cottage not exceeding five pounds in yearly value, and that such exemption shall not in any case be considered as parochial relief. To prevent abuse also, in cities and boroughs, I would provide that no person should ever be exempted except upon his own application expressed in writing. By such enactments, sir, I entertain great hopes that we shall impose upon the rich such a proper share of the burthen, as they cannot severely feel, and will most cheerfully bear; and take from the poor a load, which, however inadequate to general assistance, is to him, grievous and oppressive.—Sir, I must detain you still longer on the subject of the parochial rate; and I mean to suggest some remedy to the extreme inequality of burthen now subsisting between one parish and another. In doing this, we should only restore the spirit of the 43d of Elizabeth. Sir, by that statute, although the assessments for the expences of the poor are to be raised in every parish; yet a discretion is given to two justices, if they shall find the inhabitants of any parish not able to pay sufficient sums within themselves, to tax "any other of other parishes within the hundred." And if the hundred shall not be thought fit and able to relieve the several parishes unable to provide for themselves; the justices in their general quarter sessions are required "to rate "and assess any other within the county." The inability here spoken of could not mean that the whole parish, in the first place, or hundred in the second, should be reduced to poverty before the rest of the county should be resorted to; the intention must have been to guard against gross or oppressive inequality in the charges; but the terms of the act are so vague, and the means of judging of the comparative inability so defective, that notwithstanding some parishes have been subjected to rates equal to their whole rental, the power of taxing others in aid, has very seldom been exercised. Why, sir, there are many gentlemen who hear me (and I particularly call upon one of the hon. members for the borough [Mr. Henry Thornton] who, during the great scarcity experienced a few years ago, was most humanely active, to attest the truth of my assertion) who know that within the precincts of this metropolis, and immediately adjoining, there are parishes at this moment labouring under the most grievous affliction because they cannot raise the money necessary for the relief of the indigent. Sir, I mean to allude more particularly to the parish of Spitalfields. A description of the sufferings of that parish has lately been given to the public by a deserving gentleman of the name of Hale, who has long officiated in the parish to the advantage of the inhabitants and his own credit. That district is unfortunately inhabited by none but the poorest classes of the people; manufacturers who resort there for the cheapness of lodging, and who, in the event of sickness, or stoppage of trade, or any other casualty, are instantly obliged to have recourse to the parochial fund. That fund is to be raised from persons of their own condition, so that the relief which is to prevent the starvation of one family, is, of necessity, wrung from another, to whom the loss of the pittance paid produces a state almost approaching to famine. The opulent employers of these manufacturers, all live in other parishes. Is it not fit, sir, that some remedy should be applied to this evil, and evils like this? If what I shall propose to you shall not be enacted, or, if enacted, shall not reach the case, some special parliamentary provision must be made for it.—Sir, that the intention and letter of the statute of the 43d of Eliz. are what I have represented them to be, I can prove in this case also, by decisions of the court of king's bench. In the case of "the king against Boroughfen," "a taxation had been made of several persons in a parish, in aid of another parish. It was objected, that it should have been of all the persons in a parish. The court thought it unreasonable that several persons in a parish should be charged, and not all. But the words of the statute are very strong, and did not quash the order for that objection." In the cases of the "king against the tithing of Milland," the "king and Knightly," and the "king "and the parish of St. Peter and Paul, in Marlbro';" in similar assessments, the orders were all affirmed by the court.—Now, sir, I hope to have devised a means of remedying this inequality generally, and by the same expedient, to produce a competition in economy amongst all the parishes of a county. I should therefore propose to empower the court of quarter sessions, at the second session which may take place after the passing of the act, and at the expiration of the seventh and every succeeding seventh year from that period, to require from the overseers of the poor within their respective jurisdiction, returns of the rental and other profits upon which the poor-rate is charged; and the charge per pound. In the first place, sir, I apprehend that the publicity of the proceedings of every parish, would create a desire, that those proceedings should be such as to bear the light. The comparative state of the rate in each parish would, at one view, be before all the land-owners: and those whose property was most burthened, would naturally enquire into the circumstances and management of those whose rates were the lowest, and from the example of others, might correct the improvidence of their own parishioners. Sir, it is by no means my intention to propose, that each parish and district throughout the kingdom, should not, as at present, maintain its own poor out of its own rate. I know that it has been a favourite project with some, to make the divisions of the kingdom larger, for the purpose of assessment and relief; and some have even gone so far, as to declare an opinion, that as the object is national, the fund and the management of it should be national also. Sir, I confess that in speculation, I should be wholly against such a change: and experience amply proves to me that such a change would be unwise. The gentleman who so accurately and laboriously arranged the returns made in the year 1803, Mr. Poole of Somersetshire, and whose information on the subject of the poor-laws is extensive, and his willingness to communicate it, most praiseworthy, has furnished me with data, which I will shortly state. In districts so small, as that the whole of the poor's rate collected in one year, does not exceed 100*l.*, the average of the rate is 3*s.* 4*d.*; from 100 to 200, 4*s.* 7*d.*; from 200 to 300, 5*s.* 1*d.*; and so on in regular progression till you come to districts, where from 2 to 3 thousand pounds are collected, and then the average of the rate collected, amounts to 8*s.* 2*d.* in the pound. Sir, the reason of this is manifest, that in the smaller districts the concerns of the whole are much more under the eye and management of each contributor, than they can be when more extensive; and this I think furnishes an irrefragable argument against the alteration or extension of the established boundaries of the kingdom, as well as against a general national, or even county fund, for the relief of the poor.—But, sir, an object of great importance may be obtained, by the plan I have suggested of the periodical returns of assessable property within a county, I mean the general equalization of the county rate throughout England and Wales. Sir, it is universally known, with what inequality that rate falls upon the public; the proportions in which it is at this day collected, are those which were established in the time of king William, and whatever alterations may have taken place in the value of land, there is no power any where to correct the great injustice arising out of the change of circumstances on the one hand, and the adherence to ancient rules on the other. This has been so strongly felt in some counties, that application has been made to parliament for redress. Some of these applications have been successful; and in the counties of Middlesex and Leicester, the county rates are equalized by special acts of parliament. With the provisions of those acts I would not interfere; but I would propose, that the county rate throughout the kingdom should be equalized, by directing that it should be charged on every parish, in proportion to the assessed property stated by the overseers, according to the returns proposed to be made by them at the expiration of every 7th year. Having put this fund derived from the county rate, on an improved and more equitable footing; I would propose out of it to relieve such parishes within the county, as shall be most burthened with the poor-rate. Not to establish an equality throughout the county; for that would destroy the motives to economy: but that any parish, whose charges upon an average of 3 years, shall have been more than double the average of the parish rates throughout the county, shall have liberty to apply to the court of quarter session, and that upon proof that the expenditure has been necessary and unavoidable, the justices shall be empowered to grant out of the county stock, such relief as they shall think reasonable; so as not to reduce the charge from the parish applying, to less than double the average of the rate raised for the relief of the poor, in the different parishes throughout the county. By this provision it seems to me, that an easy method would be found for relieving extreme pressure, and at the same time, that the burthen left upon the parish making the application would be so heavy, as to afford an undiminished stimulus to economy and good management.—I am well aware that opposition to the equalization of county rates, may arise from interested motives in various quarters; but I think the general feeling must be, that the levying them in the present mode is improper, and that that feeling is founded in justice, and that the good sense of parliament will prevail over all selfish considerations, which may operate to impede the progress of the great work the house of commons will, on this day, take in hand.—Sir, I believe I have stated to you all that I have to propose, with regard to the rate, and I am now naturally led to mention the power I would wish to be given to magistrates, to apply a part of the county rate towards the exaltation of the character of the labourer. No one, sir, is so little conversant with the nature of man, as not to know that the passions of the human mind may be influenced to the greatest possible advantage.—That hope, however remote, will console him, from whom it is not entirely cut off; and cheer the gloom of the most difficult and laborious existence; and that the love of distinction is so deeply implanted in the human breast, that it may be used to excite him to the performance of the most severe and meritorious duty, as well as tempt him to acts of the most atrocious and deadly cruelty.—Sir, these passions are as much alive in the heart of the labourer, as in that of the man of the most eminent rank.

I would therefore encourage him to hope for reward from extraordinary patience and virtue, and I would awaken his laudable ambition to be distinguished above his associates. In Mr. Pitt's bill he introduced provisions, allowing the claim of the labourer to parochial relief, under certain circumstances of heavy pressure, arising from the largeness of family. Sir, I totally object to the principle of any such claim, which he had extended to a degree which it would have been impossible to have provided funds to satisfy. Mr. Malthus, who is certainly no friend to the claim of right, on the part of the poor, has gone the length of saying, that if a man shall have 6 or more children, he ought to be entitled to some aid towards their support. I would not give any such right, nor allow of general relief, on those grounds; but I would propose to parliament, to impower the justices in quarter sessions, to bestow a reward upon the labouring man, who shall upon the earnings of his labour, have brought up 6 or more children to a certain age without parochial relief. It is certain that the claimants for such prizes would not be very numerous, but the merit of such claimants must inevitably be very great, and ought to be at least within the possibility of being rewarded. I would also limit the reward to be given to the most deserving, to a sum so moderate, that it could not be any where felt as a burthen, and I would give a power to the magistrates to add some token of distinction, in cases of pre-eminent merit, to the pecuniary reward that a man might be known to have obtained the approbation of the court. This might be done by the gift of a coat or a hat; or if that was not deemed advisable, a parchment certificate, with the county seal affixed to it, might be given to the labourer to be hung up in his cottage, as a gratification to himself during his life, and an incentive to his children after his decease. The expense attending the execution of this part of my plan I would throw upon the county rate. The discretion of exercising the power entrusted to them, would rest entirely with the magistrates, and if the claimants increase in number, the advantage would be extraordinarily great. But, sir, I anticipate an objection. That considering the severe seasons which have taken place, and the almost universal necessity they have occasioned for parochial relief, your law would be in this respect nugatory, for that you could not expect any claimants at all. To that I would reply, first, that if you had no claimants, no expence could be incurred, and therefore your enactment could do no harm; and secondly, that experience justifies me in asserting, that claimants would appear. Sir, we all know that agricultural societies have been established in many parts of the kingdom with the most beneficial effects; and that amongst other of their praiseworthy objects, has been that of rewarding meritorious labourers. Premiums have been generally offered by those societies, for such men as shall have brought up the largest families upon the wages of labour, without parochial relief. Such a society was instituted in the county in which I live, under the peculiar direction and patronage of that great patron of all that was wise, patriotic, benevolent, and good, the late duke of Bedford; it is still patronized and effectually supported by his worthy successor. The Bedfordshire Agricultural Society was formed immediately after the pressure of the scarce years, and I confess that at the time I assented to the proposition for premiums of the sort I have described, I did not entertain any expectation that they would ever be adjudged. How astonished and delighted then must I have been, as I truly was, to find swarms of candidates for the inspection of their certificates! those certificates having been required in a way to preclude the possibility of fraud. What heartfelt joy was experienced by the great and ever-to-be-lamented personage, who at our first meeting distributed the rewards to the successful candidates, and by all who assisted at this useful institution. When I saw the honest glow of self-gratification beaming on the rugged countenance of industrious labour at the sight of the unexpected boon; the tear of joy trickling down that furrowed cheek which had been often moistened with the tear of anguish and disappointment; I could not help exclaiming to the farmers assembled round me, "Do you see this sight? Could you have believed the existence of these men, if they had not been produced before your eyes? Let it be a lesson to us. The idle, the profligate, and the clamourous, are constantly obtruding themselves upon our notice. They defraud, irritate, and fatigue us, and we are apt to judge and condemn all their brethren in consequence of their misconduct. Virtue is patient, silent, and unobserved; it behoves us to bring her into notice, and reward her. May this society then flourish and be perpetual, if only for the purpose of rewarding meritorious industry, and creating in the labourers an emulation to do well; in their employers a determination to do their duty by them, and an improved opinion of human nature!" Sir, that which I then contributed to make local, I now wish to make national, and from experience of its beneficial operation on a small scale, I propose it to your adoption on a general one, and I repeat the remark I have made, that if it fails, it can cost nothing; if it succeeds, it must be of inestimable value.—Sir, I would next advert to a circumstance very materially concerning the health and comfort of the poor, and which certainly requires the interference of the legislature; I mean the building of cottages. Sir, you well know, that by the 5th section of the 43d of Eliz. c. 2, the churchwardens and overseers of the poor are empowered to build cottages for the habitation of the impotent poor, upon the wastes, with the consent of the lord of the manor. But the execution of this power has fallen almost totally into disuse, and indeed, from the altered circumstances of the country, has in most cases become totally impracticable, the division of property under acts of inclosure having become so general, and decisive, as to leave no spot of which the parish could take advantage, and there being no power to buy land for the purpose of building upon. Sir, I would propose to revive and give effect to the power formerly given to the churchwardens and overseers, of building cottages; to which I would add the power of buying land to a certain extent, not exceeding perhaps in the whole five acres. By the limitations and restrictions I shall impose upon it, I am not afraid of incurring the opposition of those who have stated that the scarcity of habitations is the only preventive check to that morbid increase of population which they assert it to be the direct tendency of the poor-laws to produce. Necessity overturns theory, and is paramount to controul, and the want of habitations for the poor is in many places so great that even in villages, two, and sometimes more than two, families are crowded into a cottage barely sufficient for one. Parents and children of both sexes and of all ages are obliged to sleep in one room, to the injury of their health and in violation of all decency. This has arisen partly from the increased expence of building and repairs, and much from the increased population. I would propose to give to the parishes a power to lay out in building, sums not exceeding a limited amount, proportioned to their rates. The immediate distress for habitations might thus in some degree be lessened, and the comfort, the health, and the morals of the poor so far promoted. But, sir, I should wish parliament to direct, that all cottages built under this power, should be let at fair and full rents, and even that the overseers, in letting the cottages, shall obtain for the parishes to which they belong, the benefit of the competition arising from the scarcity of dwellings, for as the bulk of the habitations of the poor must be the property of individuals, who justly expect a reasonable profit for this part of their capital, it would be unfair towards them, and ultimately injurious to the poor, to let the houses built by the parish, at less than the private proprietor can afford to take for his. The rents of cottages are so low as to discourage any interested man from building new ones or even from repairing those already built. The scarcity however must in this as in all other instances occasion an advance in the price; and till that happens, the distress for houses must continue. This furnishes a countervailing argument to the minds of those who might apprehend that from such an enactment we should take away the preventive check on marriage which Mr. Malthus has stated to be found in that scarcity of habitations: but Mr. Malthus never intended to push his principles to extremes; and I trust his admirers will not fall into that error.—The observations I have made on the rents of cottages are not intended to restrain parishes from allowing families to occupy any of the parish houses rent-free, in cases where relief shall be needed, and that may be thought the best way of giving it; but where this is done, the parish should have a power under the authority of the magistrates of displacing those who shall not longer be in need, or worthy of this benefit: and it will be useful to give a summary power of ejecting for sufficient cause the occupiers of all parish cottages.—Any gentleman who has acted as a magistrate in the country must know the difficulties which occur in getting rid of an idle and profligate tenant of a parish cottage; whilst those, ten times more deserving of assistance and comfort, are without shelter, and the parish is unable to afford it to them.—The next and last subject on which I must detain the house is one of primary importance and comprehends a variety of details. Sir, I mean the mode of administering relief to the poor, the quantum of relief to be given, the distinction to be taken between the different applicants for relief, and the method of employment for those who are healthy and capable of work. I must set out by declaring what I believe I have mentioned in a former part of my speech, that I deem it of most essential importance to maintain the character of independent industry, above dependent poverty; and that I think it a matter of injustice to the labourer, who is struggling by his own efforts to maintain himself and a numerous family without parochial relief, to place the man who does not make such efforts in a more desirable or more favourable situation as to food, lodging, or raiment. To age, infancy, and sickness, I would hold out the hand of support, protection, and care, widely extended, filled with all the blessings the most copious charity could afford.—Sir, the impotent poor are to be considered under the two heads of the unfortunate and criminal, for the purpose of discrimination, of doing justice to misfortune, and of punishing profligacy.—And first to dispose of the criminal class. In the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries, many acts were passed for the punishment of idleness in labourers and workmen, some of which I have already quoted, and they are full of horrible severity. But the only existing law for the punishment of idleness, unattended with other crime, is the 17th Geo. II. c. 5, by which "all persons who not having wherewith to maintain themselves, live idle, without employment, and refuse to work for the usual and common wages given to other labourers in the like work," are declared to be idle and disorderly persons; and are subjected, upon conviction, to imprisonment, not exceeding one month. But as long as a man can maintain himself and his family without applying to the parish, he is not, in practice or in law, liable to any penalty, and may spend as much of his time as he pleases in idleness without any legal punishment. Desirable as it is to prevent rather than to punish, it does not seem to be practicable to frame any power of restraint, without breaking in upon that freedom of action which is the right of every man in his own concerns. But where a pauper applies to the parish for relief, there is fair ground to enquire whether he has abused this right; and if it appears that he has by profligate waste and extravagance become a burthen upon others, he ought to receive the punishment he has merited. I would propose therefore, that upon complaint made by the overseers by direction of the vestry to the justices of the district at the overseer sessions, or at any special sessions, that any person who shall by himself or family have applied for and received relief of the parish, has reduced himself to want by idleness or extravagance, the justices shall enquire into the case, and if, upon sufficient evidence after hearing the pauper, they shall find the charge to be true, they shall commit him to the house of correction for a time to be limited; there to be employed in such labour as he shall be capable of, and after his release, he shall, so long as he shall be a burthen to the parish, be distinguished by a badge denoting his crime with the name of the parish, in large letters on his outer garment, and that his allowance shall be no more than will provide him bread. I would empower the justices, however, upon proof of orderly behaviour for a given time, either to dispense with the criminal badge, or to put the offender on the same allowance as the unfortunate poor, or to do both. A sufficient power of appeal will of course be given.—Sir, with regard to the great class of unfortunate poor, excepting again, and always, the cases of age, infancy, and sickness, which are sacred; parochial relief should be confined to necessaries, whether in or out of the poor-house.—Sir, it is here fit I should state to the house that I am an enemy to the workhouse system. That I believe where it has been acted upon, it has almost universally increased the burthen of the poor's rate; and instead of adding to the comfort of the poor, or to the improvement of their morals, it has furnished seminaries of idleness and vice. At the same time, it is not my intention to propose to you to abolish workhouses altogether.—Sir, it is known that workhouses were first introduced in London by the 13th and 14th Ch. II. and they were authorized as a general measure by the 9th of Geo. I. by which act, "for the greater ease of parishes in the relief of the poor," churchwardens and overseers, with the consent of vestries, are empowered to purchase or hire houses for the maintenance and employment of all or any of the poor desiring relief; and there to entertain or employ, and take the benefit of the work of such poor, and none were to be entitled to relief who should refuse to be maintained and logded in the workhouse.—As the law long stood then, all relief was forbidden in those parishes where workhouses were established, to those who should refuse to be lodged and maintained therein: and it is only for a limited time and under particular circumstances, that relief can now be given out of the workhouse. It will be well to enquire whether this measure has answered one of its objects, "the greater ease of parishes;" the answer is decidedly in the negative.—Sir, by the returns of the year 1803, it is proved, that the number of persons maintained in workhouses, and houses of industry in that year, was 83,468, and the expence of their maintenance, 1,015,445*l.* or 12*l.* 3*s.* 6*d.* each. That their earnings accounted for to the parish, were at the rate of 17*s.* 0¼*d.* each. That the number of poor permanently relieved at their own habitations upon the most accurate calculation were 651,347, at an expence of rather less than 4*l.* 6*s.* 4*d.* each. Sir, I do not trouble the house with the very minute detail of figures, by which this indisputable fact is ascertained; they are before you, and my statements will be found correct. The inference is obvious, that as far as expence goes, the workhouse system has quite failed of its purpose. But let us compare the expence upon each individual in a workhouse, with the sum which a labouring man, living upon the wages of his labour, can afford to spend upon each head in his family; and we shall find, that upon a high average of wages, he could by no means afford to lay out upon each, any thing like the sum spent upon each head in a workhouse. This disparity ought not to exist, and we must endeavour to remove it. I believe it will be found in workhouses in general, not only that a much larger proportion of food is consumed or wasted for each individual contained in them, than the labouring man can bestow upon himself and his family, but that the consumption of bread and meat is greater than their numerical share of the consumption of the country, taking rich and poor. The fact is, that the frugal poor make their money go so much further than any other management can do for them, that they find means to live decently and save something out of an income, which no calculation would make adequate to their support: a strong argument for not interfering in their concerns, wherever it can be avoided. The burthen, therefore, to the parishes has been increased, instead of being diminished, by the establishment of workhouses.—As to the poor themselves, the effect has been to break every tie, to force them from their relations and friends, to deprive the aged of their best consolation, and by exposing the young to the influence of the worst examples, to form nurseries of depravity. Sir, there are doubtless many and happy exceptions. I am speaking generally. Workhouses may in some instances have tended to ease parishes, by terrifying the most meritorious from applying for relief, and it is too true that they have been established in some parishes for that iniquitous purpose. Fortunately the humanity of the nation has generally taken a contrary direction, and has prevented the evils of workhouses from being so great as they otherwise might have been; by overlooking the law which prohibits relief out of the house: and the rigour of that law has been in some degree mitigated by 36 Geo. III. c. 23. allowing occasional relief; but the restraint ought, in my opinion, to be entirely taken away. I would propose then to repeal so much of the act of Geo. I. as imposes that restraint. But as parish houses will be necessary for orphan children, for sick, aged, and infirm poor, who have no relations or connections to whose care they can be intrusted; and such houses may, in some cases, be necessary for the temporary lodging of those who have no home, I would propose that the provisions of 9 Geo. I. for purchasing and hiring such houses, should be continued; and to facilitate their execution, that parishes should be authorised to borrow, on the security of their rates, limited sums, to purchase, build or repair such houses, and I should wish to see enacted some regulations for their internal management. I propose that the parish shall meet in vestry on some fixed day, in every month, and that all applications for relief, and all cases requiring it shall be then considered, conformably with the spirit of 3 and 4 Will. & Mar. c. 11, that such of those entitled to assistance, as shall have settled habitations, and shall be in a situation to take care of themselves, or to be taken care of by their families, or by any relation or friend, a suitable allowance shall be made at their residence.

That the overseers be impowered to place sick, or infirm persons, having no connections, under proper care, and to agree for their maintenance. I would also propose to limit the rates of allowance, except in cases of sickness, and that no relief, except in urgent cases, be given by the overseer, without the consent of a vestry, or the order of a justice. I would further remedy one very great grievance, which prevails as much to the disadvantage of parishes, as to the oppression of the objects relieved. I mean the custom of depriving a man of every worldly possession before relief is administered. Sir, I would propose, in case of sickness, or other great emergency, that the possession of furniture, tools and live stock, to the value of 30*l.* and a cottage, not exceeding the annual value of 5*l.* should not preclude the possessor from receiving relief. Thus a man, who, as the law now stands, must, by the acceptance of the most trifling assistance, be overwhelmed, will be able to get afloat again in the world, and recover his independence when the visitation shall be at an end. I would enable overseers to continue the present poor-houses, or build others, or hire them for the reception of persons such as I have before described, and to raise money for that purpose on the credit of the rates to a limited amount. I would also impose restrictions in the mode of contracting for the maintenance of the poor. I would provide, that contracts should not be valid for more than one year; and that they should not be made for a gross sum; to prevent the interest of the contractor clashing with his duty, but that every contract should be made by the head. That no contract should be valid until submitted to and approved by the justices in special session; and that a duplicate of the contract should be filed. Sir, I will not trouble the house any further, there will be ample details in the bill; I would only add, that following up the principle I originally laid down, that dependent poverty should not, as under the workhouse system it frequently happens, be supported at a greater expence than independent industry can possibly sustain, I would regulate the quantity of meat and bread to be furnished to each individual in health, maintained in a parish house; taking care that there should be at all times an ample supply of other wholesome and nutritious food. For the purpose of these regulations, it will be necessary to give the justices in quarter session, the power of enquiring into and declaring the price of bread and labour, within their jurisdiction, at certain periods, but by no means of interfering with either. Such a declaration would also be useful towards the execution of some acts already in existence, such as the act for the relief of the wives of militiamen, &c. Sir, I had almost forgot to mention the employment of the able bodied poor; a provision which I am sure will be looked for by many gentlemen of this house. But I must here premise, that I do not think, upon the most mature consideration which I have been able to give the subject, that that part of the 43d of Eliz. which enjoins "the churchwardens "and overseers to take order for setting "to work, all persons having no means "to maintain themselves, and to provide "for that purpose a proper stock of hemp, "wool, and other materials," ever was or ever could be, generally executed. This enactment appears to me to rest altogether upon the false supposition that the nation could, in the character of a great capitalist, employ all its labourers. We are now sufficiently enlightened to know, that individual capitalists alone can employ their capital to advantage in commerce; and that all attempts to establish manufactures for the purpose of making the poor support themselves out of their compulsory labour, (excepting very few cases) have either failed, or been kept alive by extraordinary exertion, and pecuniary aid. Sir, I agree with Mr. Malthus in his position that the general execution of that part of the statute of Elizabeth, is a physical impossibility; and I refer gentlemen to his reasoning as conclusive on the subject. (See vol. ii. p. 184.) But, there are now, comparatively, very few places in this country, where fair wages may not be obtained for labour, and wherever from particular circumstances there is not sufficient employment, the parish officers are not likely to be able to create it. If that want of employment should be likely to continue, the further relaxation which I have proposed, in the law of settlement, would enable persons with the greater facility to transport themselves to those places where these workmen were the most scarce. In many agricultural parishes, labourers who cannot get work, are sent by the overseer to the different farms in the parish by turns. The employer usually pays something less than the ordinary wages of labour within the district; and the overseer, where necessary, makes an addition from the rates. This practice however is not authorised by any law, it could not be generally adopted, and there are material objections to enforcing it. Do not let gentlemen imagine from what I have said, that I would by supporting persons in health, without work, give a bounty upon idleness. It is the furthest from my intention. In the case of a pauper making application to the overseer for work, I would propose to authorize such overseer, to contract with any other person for the labour of the applicant, in his own or any other parish within a limited distance; or to employ him in repairing the highways, or cleaning the streets, or any other public work of the parish, and where his earning should not exceed a certain sum, the difference to be made up out of the rates; always, however, keeping the wages of a person so employed, below the rate of wages in the parish, by way of creating a stimulus to the pauper to obtain work for himself. An extension of course to be given in proportion to the size of the family of the labourer: the applicant, upon refusal to do the work assigned, to be punishable for such refusal. These provisions, sir, are principally taken from the 32d section of the 22d of Geo. III. cap. 83; Mr. Gilbert's act. But notwithstanding my conviction, that the provisions of the act of the 43d Eliz. to which I have last referred "for setting "the poor to work" can very seldom be applied to advantage, I propose to leave that part of the act untouched, that where it can be advantageously resorted to, the power may remain. I have contented myself with proposing powers which may be used where the provisions of that act are not found to succeed. Sir, I believe that I have gone through all the matters which have suggested themselves to me in the wide range of the poor-laws, as fit to be regulated, amended, or enacted by parliament, and I have advanced so far in digesting them that I hope, in the course of a very few days, to be able with the permission of the house, to present them at your bar, in the shape of a bill. In this, and every part of my task, I am under the greatest obligation to a very valuable friend, [Mr. Wilshere of Hitchen, in the county of Hertford] well known, and highly respected by several members of the house who now hear me; who has contributed his talents and experience to the furtherance of this great work: and I am glad of the opportunity afforded me to express, how much I owe to his friendly assistance. I am sure, therefore, that my intentions will at least be perspicuously stated. Sir, I am conscious that none of the plans I have opened are wholly new, and that more than one person, perhaps, may claim to himself the merit (if it be one) of having made the discovery of each that I suggest, either by way of original enactment on your statute book, or of remedy to some subsisting grievance. I do not aim at novelty but utility; and I do not wish to take from any of the persons who may have written on the different subjects, either publicly or privately, their claims to invention. To different minds reflecting deeply on the same practical evils, the same practical remedies will suggest themselves, and the more general the concurrence of sentiment, the more likely it is that those remedies should be applicable. If I have brought together in one view, the most striking of these evils, and suggested such provisions as are not altogether without the chance of affording relief, I shall consider my pains as amply repaid.—I would, however, ask one favour of the house and the country, which is, not to pass a hasty or premature judgment upon me. I would also intreat of those gentlemen who may, in their own particular districts, have been exerting themselves for the benevolent purpose of bettering the condition of their labourers, not to argue from the success of the particular experiments carried on under their own eye, to the general practicability of such schemes. There are particular local advantages belonging to every part of the kingdom, which, if skilfully improved by the land-owner, may contribute abundantly to the comfort and prosperity of the labourer; but which, if attempted generally, would utterly fail. To such laudable efforts, and to all local institutions adapted to particular situations, all I can say is, *floreant!* they will add to the general stock of comfort amongst the most useful of our countrymen; they do not interfere with, nor are they in any degree cramped by the plans I have opened. I would also request of gentlemen not to be led away by the pictures some may have in their minds of parishes where the poor-laws in their present form, have produced comfort, industry, and order. That picture cannot be made general. Sir, I have had the good fortune, with the assistance of able hands, to produce, by the operation of the poor-laws alone, in the parish where I reside, a situation of things, than which none can be presented more agreeable. Where there is not one wretched being, nor one well founded cause of complaint; and where the workhouse exhibits regularity, industry, economy, cleanliness, and health, testified by the countenances of all who inhabit it. But this could not be effected with machinery so complicated and imperfect, without great assiduity and exertion; neither could it be maintained without continued vigilance, and a combination of circumstances, which cannot be generally expected to take place. If it could be universal, I should nothing more; but I am not misled by the success of my own experiment. There are some matters collateral to the poor-laws which I hope will hereafter arrest the attention of the legislature, such as the laws respecting vagrancy, apprenticeship, &c. but they form no part of the poor-laws properly so called; and to meddle with them in this scheme, would only be to embarrass myself, with what may be better taken up separately. I submit the whole with the most perfect deference to the wisdom of parliament, to be adopted, rejected, curtailed, or amended as shall seem most expedient. I am open to conviction, and shall be glad to learn the opinion of the house of commons and the country, for which purpose I should wish that the bill, when introduced, should be read as first and second time, and committed *pro formâ,* that it should then be printed, and generally circulated, and that after the quarter sessions it should be taken into further consideration. I cannot, however, refrain from saying, that till better instructed, these are all favourite projects with me. During the hours of anxious thought and laborious investigation which I have passed, I have been charmed with the pleasing vision of the general amelioration of the state of society, and the eventual and rapid diminution of its burthens. In the adoption of the system of education I foresee an enlightened peasantry, frugal, industrious, sober, orderly, and contented, because they are acquainted with the true value of frugality, sobriety, industry, and order. Crimes diminishing, because the enlightened understanding abhors crime. The practice of Christianity prevailing, because the mass of your population can read, comprehend, and feel its divine origin and the beauty of the doctrines which it inculcates. Your kingdom safe from the insult of the enemy, because every man knows the worth of that which he is called upon to defend. In the provision for the security of the savings of the poor, I see encouragement to frugality, security to property, and the large mass of the people connected with the state and indissolubly bound to its preservation. In the enlarged power of acquiring settlements the labour directed to those spots where labour is most wanted. Man, happy in his increased independence, and exempted from the dread of being driven in age from the spot where his dearest connexions exist, and where he has used the best exertions, and passed the best days of his life. Litigation excluded from our courts, and harmony reigning in our different parochial districts. In the power of bestowing rewards I contemplate patience and industry remunerated, and virtue held up to distinction and honour. In the various detailed alterations in the mode of rating, and the equalization of the county rate, I perceive the more equitable distribution of a necessary, but henceforth I trust decreasing burthen. In the constitution of vestries, the benefit universally resulting from arrangement, order, and economy, derived from the more attentive inspection by each of the general concern. From the power to exempt cottagers from the rate, a great relief to individuals at a very trifling expence to the public. In the power to build habitations for the poor, their comfort and health. Lastly, in the reform of the workhouse system, and the power of discrimination in administering relief, an abandonment of filth, slothfulness, and vice, and a desirable and marked distinction between the profligate and the innocent. If it were possible that all this should be only an allusion, at least it is one that has charmed me through the labours I have undergone for my country's good. But, sir, if the opinions of the wisest of mankind are not altogether ill founded, if the test of practice and experience does not in this single instance fail us, what I have proposed, corrected and improved by the wisdom of parliament, will give ease to those who contribute to the necessities of their fellow subjects, and diffuse happiness over those who are the immediate objects of its care. Sir, I move for leave to bring in a bill "for promoting and encouraging industry amongst the labouring classes of the "community, and the relief and regulation "of the criminal and necessitous poor."

Mr. *Rose* thought the hon. gent. entitled to the highest degree of gratitude for his able view of a subject of this magnitude; but he feared the object of the hon. gent. would not be effected, without a general plan for the employment of the poor.

Mr. *Whitbread* feared that labour was not practicable on the plan alluded to by the right hon. gent.; but he wished the overseers to have a power of contracting for such labour as could be made productive, and to carry it towards the fund for their maintenance. National employment would be a losing and indeed impracticable scheme.

Mr. *Rose* stated, that till within these few years the poor had been employed in a very useful manner in Lincolnshire, where the employment failed at length from the deficiency of that private attention which alone could keep it alive. He recommended to the hon. gent. to divide his bill into two or more bills. It might go to the quarter sessions in its present shape, but the division ought to take place before putting the matters to the final sense of the house. Mr. Pitt's bill had failed chiefly by being too comprehensive.

Mr. *Lee Keck* stated, that in Leicestershire there was much extraparochial land, the holders of which had voluntarily subjugated themselves to the county rates, not wishing to be exempt from their fair share of the burthens borne by their neighbours.

Mr. *Calvert* thought the hon. gent. entitled to the gratitude of the country for his able consideration of a subject of such magnitude. He saw much good in the hon. gent.'s plan, and little that was not beneficially practicable.

Mr. *Ellison* maintained, that no blame was due to the gentlemen of Lincoln, for the failure of the plan for the employment of the poor. The plan was impracticable, and it was a delusion to expect much from it. The hon. gent. had taken an able view of this very extensive subject, but he feared the complexity of the hon. gent.'s plan would lead to more difficulty than what he wanted to get rid of. The act of Elizabeth contained the great principles of every good system; and all that was required was to simplify and improve the system established upon those principles. The great man whose loss the house deplored, and would deplore for ever (Mr. Pitt), had failed in an attempt to introduce such a bill as that proposed by the hon. gentleman. If the hon. gentleman should, however, succeed in remedying the present evils, he would confer a lasting benefit on the country.

Mr. *Spencer Stanhope* allowed the existence of every grievance which the hon. gent. ascribed to the present poor-laws. He was not prepared to say, how far the present plan contained adequate remedies. The opinion of the justices could not be collected at the next quarter session, and it would be material to the facility of collecting that opinion, to divide the bill into three or four parts.

Lord *Howick* said, there could be but one feeling with respect to the ability with which his hon. friend had recommended this great subject to the house, and the zeal which he had bestowed in making himself perfectly master of it. However, his hon. friend had no intention to press the business forward precipitately, but it was desirable to apply a remedy to the existing evils as soon as possible. He would express no opinion of its merits farther, than that there was much in it that he approved, and if there was any thing in respect to which he differed, he would be ready to yield to his hon. friend who had considered the subject with much greater attention. In every discussion the measure would be amended. On the whole, much benefit was to be derived from the plan; and he hoped, that if not the whole, at least, it would be executed in the principal parts during the present session.

Mr. *Sturges Bourne* wished the bill to be in the hands of the country gentlemen at the assizes, as well as the quarter sessions. It would thus meet a superior consideration. Without meaning to hurry the hon. gent., he hoped that before the next month it would be ready to be transmitted.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, that before Monday, he meant to present the bill, which he would expedite to the hands of the magistrates by all means in his power.

Sir *J. Newport* thanked the hon. gent. for so essential an improvement of the poor-laws, an improvement which rendered those laws more nearly applicable to Ireland, where the condition of the poor was such as to require immediate relief; though the poor-laws, as they stood at present, had been universally rejected by the gentlemen of Ireland. The houses of industry in Ireland were cheaply and well administered, and had afforded a comfortable refuge to many. The annual expence in one of those houses which he was particularly acquainted with, was 7*l.* for each individual, though there were many idiots and lunatics in it.

Mr. *Bathurst* recommended to have a great number of copies of the bill printed, and to have them circulated through the country, with every facility of conveyance that government could give. The bill would be better considered altogether, in the first instance; it might afterwards be divided; and if the whole of it should not pass this session, he hoped some parts of it at least would, as many parts of it would be highly beneficial.

Mr. *Whitbread* said he should be pleased if any part of the labour he had bestowed on the subject, should meet the approbation of the house; but he would not lose sight of any amendment he thought requisite, till he should have effected it.—Leave was given to bring in a bill, and Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Pym, Mr. Brand, Mr. Lee Antonie, and Mr. Horner, were ordered to prepare and bring in the same.

[NEW PLAN OF FINANCE.] Lord *Henry Petty* moved the order of the day, for taking into further consideration the report from the committee of the whole house, to whom it was referred to consider farther of the Finances of the country.

Sir *James Pulteney* contended that it was erroneous to suppose any violation of faith towards the stockholder in diverting the sinking fund. It was not alone from the quantity of sinking fund brought into the market, but from the proportion of the sinking fund to the debt untouched within the year. The price of stocks was at its highest in 1790, when the 3 per cents. were at 96, and at that time there was scarcely any sinking fund; the price of stocks was therefore not proportioned to the amount of the sinking fund. The quantity of capital to be invested in stock was always the best security for keeping up the price. It was agreed that the accumulation of the sinking fund should stop at some time; he thought it should stop now. The accumulation of debt would thus be prevented, and the situation of the stockholder not deteriorated. Then the hon. baronet went into a series of calculations to shew the effect of the noble lord's plan and his own. He contended, that the comparison was much against the noble lord's plan. A great accumulation of debt would be avoided, and the war taxes would be preserved uncharged. He contended also, that even on the plan of taking the war taxes, his system was better than that of the noble lord's.

Mr. *H. Thornton* deprecated equally the continuance of heavy taxation, and the immediate invasion of the sinking fund. On these considerations he was inclined to approve of the noble lord's plan, and also because the most maturely weighed of the plans brought forward on the other side approximated very nearly to that of the noble lord. He complained of the statement of the noble lord opposite (Castlereagh), that in his calculation he had omitted the charge of the yearly loan of 11 millions, which would require the payment of interest for 14,000,000*l.* It was unpardonable to delude the public with statements representing the charges of the new plan as comparatively burthensome, and to exclude from the comparative view all this consideration of the great expence of interest belonging to the plan of the noble lord opposite. The noble lord's plan for taking the excesses of the sinking fund was an invasion, which called for every friend of the sinking fund to come forward in its defence. Here the hon. gent. went into a history of the progress of the sinking fund from its origin. The benefits we had experienced, ought to bind us in policy and in gratitude to preserve the source of all these advantages. The interference of Mr. Addington, and that of the noble lord near him, with the sinking fund, had been coupled with benefits which compensated the invasion. But the noble lord's plan invaded the security of the stockholder, by taking the excesses of the sinking fund, without offering any compensation. The plan of taking the excesses of the sinking fund, and raising only the difference between that and 11,000,000*l.*, would be very unjust as well as very impolitic. There was extreme danger in laying down the principle, that the sinking fund was to be diverted to the current service in every war. Taking the surplus of the consolidated fund to pay the interest of the debt contracted in the year, was a violation, if he might so express it, of public credit, at best. But it might happen that the consolidated fund would barely cover the charges imposed upon it; and what was to be done in that case? With respect to the war taxes, no pledge was incurred to continue them, but only taxes to the same amount to extinguish the sums borrowed. The objection of borrowing at compound interest was answered, by exhibiting the compound already produced, and about to be produced by this plan, and by the noble lord's recent measure. It was the noble lord that had raised these very war taxes last year nine millions above their former amount, and had thus furnished a foundation for the whole superstructure of this plan. The plan was supposed to under-rate the expenditure, but it provided in fact for an expenditure to that amount, with an increased facility of raising larger sums, if that should be necessary. He hoped the experience of one year would confirm the favourable expectation entertained of the noble lord's plan, and prove its efficacy towards raising a great part of the expenditure, not directly in the same year, but so as to be redeemed in a few years. This little island was carrying on war almost against the powers of the world, for the benefit of the world, and with such an extent of colonial empire to secure, it was necessary to preserve our sinking fund, and to reduce and diminish the public debt, so as to allow us, if necessary, to go into a new war with ample resources. Though that was not done as much as he could wish by the noble lord's plan, it was very nearly done. The national debt was certainly a great and awful weight upon the exertions and industry of the country; but it was still a pleasing reflection to consider, that the annual income of the nation was brought within 2,500,000*l.* of the expenditure; that whilst the enemy had supported the expences of warfare by confiscations, by a diminution at one period of the public debt, and next of the interest on the debt, by an illusory system of assignats, by spoliations on foreign states, and extorting from others a tribute, as the price of a mock independence, Great Britain, in the progress of a war avowedly undertaken and conducted against her resources, had risen superior to her difficulties, and had in this period of its progress almost equalised its income with its expenditure. In expressing his approbation of the plan of the noble lord, even on its own merits, he felt that opinion considerably strengthened, by contrasting it with those recommended by the hon. gentlemen on the opposite side, which increased the public burthens in the present instance, and in no degree diminished the accumulation of the public debt.

Mr. *Johnstone* could not hope to make himself understood in what he had to say on this subject, if the statement of his noble friend (lord Castlereagh) had failed of conveying a clear idea of its purport. Before he entered on what he had to say, he purposed to make one or two observations on the preliminary topics which had been introduced into the discussion. The debates on this subject would have the effect of shewing to the public, that the expenditure of the country, which had been taken at 38 millions, would not be the whole of the expenditure, and therefore of removing any delusive hopes that might arise from such an impression. But though the noble lord could not have accurately estimated the amount of the actual expenditure, yet an increased expenditure ought to have been provided for, and he understood that they were likely even in the present year, to be called on for a much larger sum than any that had been yet mentioned. Either Russia was to be abandoned, and peace to be the consequence on the continent, or this country should advance the necessary subsidies to our allies. There was also a charge of 500,000*l.* due from government to the East-India company, which ought to have been included in the civil expenditure of the country. The document that had been circulated to the public, held out a more favourable prospect than was borne out by the papers before the house, upon which it was founded. That paper represented that the addition to the debt under the proposed system, would be on the average of 20 years, 3 millions and a half, whereas it would in fact be 4 millions and a half. If, as had been said by the last speaker, the additions made to the taxes last session, had been adapted with a view to this plan, it seemed strange, that in the speech at the opening of the session, his majesty was made to lament the necessity of adding to the burthens of his people; this plan being intended to prevent further taxation. It had been the fashion formerly to argue for the necessity of relieving posterity from burthens, but now the argument was to relieve the present moment, and leave the burthens to posterity. He was a friend to the plan of leaving the burthens to affect posterity, because he found the system had not been prejudicial to us, so far as concerned the burthens handed down by our ancestors. But he had an objection to the complicated machinery of the noble lord's plan, which, under the specious garb of complicated details, was, in fact, only to raise two millions and a half a year, over the amount of the sinking fund. The hon. gent. then said, that if 11 millions were to be raised annually, in addition to the war taxes, and interest to be provided only for the difference between the amount of the sinking fund and the loan, the difference between the sums raised by his plan and that of the noble lord, would be 44 millions; and by the noble lord's plan 2,051,000*l.* permanent taxes would be imposed in 20 years, whilst by his only 1,700,000*l.* would be imposed, and the whole of the war taxes would, in the former case, be mortgaged, which, in the latter, would be free. It was natural for every person to be attached to the production of his own brain, and he certainly thought his plan superior to that of the noble lord's; as, according to his plan, each loan would be paid off in 45 years, according to the engagement to the public creditor.

Mr. *Bankes* thought that the hon. member who had just sat down, had taken the sinking fund into his calculation two ways, both as a means of redeeming the debt, and as a fund applicable to the service of the year. There was a fallacy, therefore, in his reasoning. If the government was only to provide for the interest of the excess of the loan, over the amount of the sinking fund, and to provide for the remainder out of the proceeds of the sinking fund, that fund would be stationary during the war. Should the war last ten years, its progress would therefore be interrupted, and the redemption of the loans would be effected in 55 instead of 45 years. He objected to all the projects that had been proposed as substitutes for that of the noble lord opposite, because they all were founded on the principle of invading the sinking fund, which was sacred, and not to be touched, except in cases of extreme necessity. The plan of the noble lord afforded more prospects to the country than any other, because it was to release it from taxation for 3 years, without diminishing its resources; and these 3 years were likely to be more important, than the same number of years in any period of our history. This relief to the country was wise, in the hope that Providence, who had so often signally assisted this country, would again interfere in its behalf. He did not think it wise, however, of the noble lord, to have stated the expenditure of the country so low as 32,000,000*l.* because if any addition were to be made to that expenditure, it would create disappointment to the public. He trusted if such an addition should be necessary, it would induce the noble lord to make not parsimonious but economical retrenchments in the public expenditure. It had been said, that the sinking fund might become too great, but he had no apprehensions of that description, as that fund had been intended to act against the debt, and he wished to see that reduced as early as possible. The appropriation of the war taxes had been stated to be a violation of the pledges given to the public, and a disappointment of their reasonable hopes, but necessity called for it, and it was only to be feared, that under a pressure of future circumstances, the minister of the day might make the additional appropriation of 4 per cent. the ground of future loans. If the taxes appropriated should not be productive, parliament would be bound to make them good. But he thought the property tax more equalized between the landed and moneyed interest, not descending so low as at present, with an allowance to persons having small incomes, with larger families, and facilities of recovery of the tax when proved by those who had no right to pay, would be better retained than the other war taxes. Taxes which came in by a circuitous operation were felt more than a direct tax. But if any thing could keep down the price of articles, and insure the economical expenditure proposed by the noble lord, it was the cessation from taxation for 3 years. As to subsidies to foreign powers, he had never been a friend to them and did not approve of the grant of them in older or more recent times. He regretted the whole of the expenditure of that description, because the powers of the continent always pursued their own objects and interests. It was difficult, nevertheless, for an individual member of that house to oppose such grants, when recommended on the great and grave authority of persons who had access to documents shewing the views of foreign powers. He approved of many parts of the plan of the noble lord, and he lamented that other parts of it should be contained in it, but on the whole he thought that the plans which had been recommended by his hon. friend, would not obviate any of the imperfections of the noble lord's plan, and would augment many of them.

Mr. *Rose* observed, that the hon. gent.

who had spoken last had approved of the plan of the noble lord, which was only an anticipation of the war taxes, though he had expressed a doubt of the taxes being productive in time of peace. The hon. gent. had stated, that it would be better to continue the property tax than the other war taxes. But he apprehended that the appropriated war taxes would not redeem the loans for which they might be mortgaged in 14 years, but would require a much longer time, in proportion as the price of the funds would rise, and with this impression he thought it would be madness to pledge the war taxes. The right hon. gent. then repeated his former observations to prove that none of the war taxes, except the property tax, could be expected to be productive in time of peace. He was not prepared to agree to any one of the many projects that had been submitted to the house, but as no inconvenience could arise from the delay of one year, he again pressed the necessity of putting off the final adoption of the measure till next session. He particularly objected to the continuance of the duty on tonnage after the war. This country was at present in possession of the whole trade of the world, and no person could be so sanguine as to suppose, that we should not have rivals for that trade in time of peace. A duty on tonnage and landage had been laid on in the reign of Charles II. when the principles of political economy were not so well understood as at present, but this had been taken off in the reign of William III. so far as related to woollen manufactures, and was entirely done away in 1720, in the reign of George II. Was a duty repealed in that reign to be resorted to in the present? It would be a serious motive for the consideration of the house, that the German linens rivalled our manufactures of that article in our West-India islands, and even undersold them. The plan of the noble lord resembled that of Mr. Neckar, which had been the chief cause of the French revolution. He could not reconcile it to himself to give a silent vote on the subject, considering, as he did, the resolutions of the noble lord fraught with the greatest mischief to the country.

Mr. *Corry* observed, that the right hon. gent. had impugned the plan of the noble lord, on the ground that the taxes would not be productive during peace. But if so, the parliament would be bound to make good any deficiency that might arise, or to substitute other taxes in their place. But it appeared to him a strange illustration of the impolicy of continuing the tonnage tax, that the German linens rivalled our linens in the West-India market, because no German linens could reach our islands but through this country.

Mr. *Perceval* at any other time and under any other circumstances, would have been disposed to trouble the house more at length, than at that hour of the night he was inclined to do. When the bills should be brought in, on the resolutions of the noble lord, he should have sufficient opportunities of delivering his sentiments upon them, and he should feel it his duty to oppose them in every stage. The taxes proposed to be continued by the first resolution, were represented as not likely to be productive in peace, and to this it was answered, if they were unproductive, parliament would be bound to make them good. If they were to be made permanent only with a view to have them afterwards repealed, this would be to make the act of the legislature speak a language which it did not mean. In the same way the property tax, which the house had been given to understand, in the opening speech of the noble lord, was to be repealed at the end of the war, had been in his subsequent explanations represented as liable to be continued in peace, yet the second resolution pledged the house positively to the repeal of the war tax the moment the war should cease. The first resolution was to pledge the war taxes, which were afterwards to be repealed; and the second resolution declared, that the property tax, which was likely to be continued, should be repealed. If the taxes mentioned in the first resolution were to be repealed, why enact their continuance? and if the property tax was to be continued, why resolve that it should be repealed? He thought that it was improper in the house to legislate for futurity. These observations he made with a view to press the suggestion of his right hon. friend that the provision for the loan should be charged upon any fund, and the discussion of the noble lord's plan deferred to next session. It had been said, that the duties, if appropriated, might afterwards be repealed; and this he looked upon as the best argument that had been urged in favour of the measure. The plan of the noble lord might be very good, and his majesty's ministers might have bestowed all due attention upon it, but yet the house had not had sufficient time to consider so complicated a question. It was only that day that some of the papers, necessary to form a judgment on the subject, were laid before the house.

Lord *Henry Petty* maintained that the resolutions contained no pledge whatever for the continuance of any particular tax. The object of the plan was to provide for the exigencies of a protracted war, and at the same time, by abstaining from imposing fresh taxes, to relieve the country, to repair its strength and recruit its resources, whilst its operation would provide the means of resorting again to taxation, if that must be the case, a resort which would still remain, even supposing the plan totally to fail. His lordship entered into a comparison of the plan he had proposed, and those suggested on the other side, and contended that his plan had this great advantage, that it would operate to increase the sinking fund, in a larger proportion to the debt, up to a certain point when its excesses were to be taken, whilst the plans proposed on the other side would operate to increase considerably the debt, and leave the sinking fund as it now stood. He proposed, after a certain accumulation of the sinking fund, to appropriate the excesses; but they would attack that fund immediately. He remembered a story of a man who said he had a sure method of curing sheep of all disorders, and that was by cutting their throats; so gentlemen on the other side would get at the sinking fund by immediately taking it, and this constituted the boasted simplicity of their plans. His plan, on the contrary, by the proportionable magnitude of the sinking fund, would insure to the stockholder a certain market for his stock, and instead of mortgaging all the resources of the country, as some hon. gentlemen had contended, there would, if it continued to operate, be a sum of 25,000,000*l.* available for the service of the country in the year 1822.

Lord *Castlereagh* contended that the system before the house was a much greater infraction of the act of 1786, than that which had been done in 1802, which had been alluded to in the course of the debate. After touching on several other points, his lordship observed, that he would speak more fully on the subject next Monday, when the resolutions which he had submitted to the house would be under consideration.

Mr. *Huskisson* had heard much of the delicacy and scrupulosity which gentlemen on the other side professed to feel for the strict observance of the public faith. Yet if on any side there was any disposition to infringe it, that disposition or tendency was to be found in the plan of the noble lord. Let the different acts be referred to, more particularly that of 1792, for securing inviolate the public faith respecting the sinking fund, and it would be seen how far the present plan was reconcileable either with the spirit or the letter of these acts.

Mr. *Vansittart* pledged himself to prove upon the same occasion, that there was no inconsistency between the plan of his noble friend, and the acts referred to by the hon. gent.

Mr. *Canning* declared his most decided objection to the whole principle of the measure: at that late hour he should not trespass upon the time of the house, but should reserve himself for a more convenient opportunity.—The question was then loudly called for, and the resolutions read a second time, and agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, February 20.

[Minutes.] This day the following members were chosen by ballot to try the merits of the Downpatrick election:—R. P. Scudamore, esq. B. Cook, esq. W. M. Pitt, esq. hon. W. Howard, D. Giddy, esq. A. Strahan, esq. lord Althorpe, F. J. Wilder, esq. D. P. Coke, esq. hon. C. Herbert, J. Wharton, esq. hon. W. Broderick, Thos. Kemp, esq. nominees, H. Martin, esq. C. W. Wynne, esq.—Mr. Grenville (from the commissioners for executing the office of lord high admiral) acquainted the house, that their lordships having judged it expedient that captain sir Home Popham should be tried by a court martial for having quitted the Cape of Good Hope, for the purpose of attacking the Spanish settlements in the Rio de la Plata, without having received any direction or authority whatever for that purpose, had accordingly issued their warrant to the marshal of the high court of admiralty for taking him into custody; that, as captain sir Home Popham is a member of this house, their lordships had thought it a respect due to the house, to inform them of his commitment, and to lay before them a copy of the warrant, by virtue of which he is now in custody. And Mr. Grenville delivered in at the table, a copy of the warrant to the marshal of the admiralty, to take into his custody the said captain sir Home Popham: and the said copy was read. Ordered, that what Mr. Grenville hath now communicated to the house, and also the said copy, be entered in the journal of this house.—The house having, upon the motion of sir J. Newport, resolved into a committee of ways and means, the right hon. bart. proposed a resolution for discontinuing certain duties, and enacting others in their room. He read over a list of new duties which he proposed to impose, namely, upon every man whose house and land was above the value of 4*l.* per annum, and less than 7*l.* one shilling and sixpence a year; if more than 7*l.* and less than 10*l.*, two shillings, if not liable to the hearth tax; if more than 10*l.* and less than 40*l*,. three-pence in the pound; and for every pound above 40*l.*, four-pence in the pound, if not liable to the window tax. He also stated his proposed scale of taxation upon windows and hearths, and concluded with observing, that it was the intention in all matters of personal taxation to make bachelors pay double as much as married men. Upon the paper manufactory the right hon. baronet proposed to impose a tax according to the number of vats used by the manufacturer, instead of mills, which were heretofore the criteria, and which had led to a great loss of revenue. There were several duties heretofore annual, which the right hon. baronet announced his intention of proposing to be made permanent. In answer to a question from colonel Barry, the right hon. baronet stated, that an increased tax upon horses was meant to be imposed upon those who had four or more horses, unless for purposes of agriculture, but that the increase was not to go lower.—The resolution was then agreed to.

[MUTINY BILL—ROMAN CATHOLICS.] Lord *Howick* moved the reading of the order for the second reading of the mutiny bill on Tuesday next, with a view, as the noble lord stated, to move the postponement of this order to a future day. The propriety of this postponement in the absence of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham) would, he had no doubt, be readily admitted. But there were other objects which rendered further delay necessary, in order to afford time for the preparation of some additional clauses which it was intended to bring forward. It would be remembered by many members, that in the year 1793, a clause was inserted in the Irish mutiny bill, allowing catholics to hold a certain rank in the army, and this clause it was now proposed to make general. It was also proposed that all catholics in the army should be allowed the free exercise of their religion. This was, no doubt, the practice already; but it was understood that it would afford much more satisfaction if it were made the law. In addition to these there were other clauses of less moment which it was proposed to submit to the house. Such were the reasons which urged the noble lord to move a further postponement of this measure.

Mr. *Yorke* asked, whether it was likely that the discussion would be brought forward upon the day mentioned by the noble lord, or whether it would be postponed any further?

Lord *Howick* saw no reason to apprehend that any farther delay would be necessary. The noble lord moved, that the order for the second reading of this bill should be fixed for Tuesday se'nnight.—Ordered accordingly.

[WESTMINSTER ELECTION PETITION.] Mr. *Sheridan* rose, pursuant to notice, to move that the order for the appointment of a committee to consider the petition upon this subject should be discharged, with a view to move for the further postponement. The right hon. gent. was so much of opinion, from what had passed when last this question was before the house, that a motion for further postponement would be immediately assented to if required, that he confessed he heard with considerable surprise of the intention to oppose the motion, particularly on the part of the noble lord (Folkestone), by whom a similar proposition was last submitted to the house. Had he happened to have stood in the predicament of being unable to bring forward such a motion, he really thought that the noble lord would have been ready to propose it himself. At least he felt that he should be warranted, from the noble lord's former language and conduct, in relying upon his readiness to second him in this proposition. Of the grounds of this reliance, and the justice of his opinion, the house would be able to judge from a short review of the history of the case. When the petition before the house was presented, which was about the 23d of December, the first or second day after any petitions could be received, the noble lord announced the desire of the petitioners that the earliest day possible should be appointed for the ballot, and that they were ready at once to go before a committee. Accordingly the 13th of January was appointed. But, notwithstanding the declaration of the noble lord, and the publicly proclaimed resolution of the petitioners, he received, not many days afterwards, a note from the noble lord, stating, that it was through a mistake he presented the petition so soon, and that the parties were not ready to go into the investigation on the day originally appointed. The noble lord, therefore, requested his consent to a further postponement, as a matter of personal accommodation to himself, and a matter of justice towards the petitioners, who would otherwise suffer through his error. Having had an acquaintance with the noble lord, he was certainly disposed to accommodate him, but yet he felt himself bound, before he complied with the noble lord's request, to consult the opinion of his friends, and they decidedly objected to the delay required. However, when he came down to the house upon the day appointed for the motion, the noble lord applied to him again: and again asking his consent to the motion as a personal favour, he did grant it. So far as he had gone, he believed the noble lord could not say, that what he had stated was not strictly true. But as to the conversation which took place the day the noble lord's motion of postponement was agreed to, he held in his hand a document which contained it. He knew that he could not distinctly allude to the evidence he had adduced, because according to the orders of that house, strangers were understood to be excluded. But somehow a memorandum of what was said on the day alluded to, did find its way into print, and certainly it was detailed with considerable accuracy. In looking over this memorandum, it would be seen that all the arguments advanced by the noble lord made against his motion, and of course it was a very natural inference that the motion owed its success to something else. That something was his concurrence; and he recollected very well, as it appeared from this memorandum, that he mentioned, at the time, his apprehension that the 24th of Feb. would go too near the circuit, which would render a farther postponement necessary, as his counsel would be out of town. Such was his statement then, and it was only upon the express condition that farther delay would be acceded to, if necessary, that he gave his assent to the noble lord's motion. This he could aver from his own memory, but there were not less than 20 or 30 gentlemen present, who also heard the noble lord, and who could bear testimony to the noble lord's observation. The noble lord did state upon that occasion, that when he mentioned the 24th of Feb. he was not aware that the circuit was so near, and that if that day should in consequence become inconvenient, there could be no objection to a farther postponement. This declaration the noble lord was understood to have made by several friends near him. The house, he had no doubt, would agree with him in thinking, that when the petitioners urged the noble lord to move for the former postponement on the ground that they did not wish for the trial on an early day, that the noble lord was not aware of the resolution relative to a speedy trial, which these petitioners had just before published, and in all probability the noble lord was equally unaware of this circumstance, that the counsel for the petitioners did not go any circuit, while those retained on his part did. But of this the petitioners were fully apprised, and they would fain urge him to trial without the advantage of his counsel. It might be asked, why he did not make this proposition of postponement somewhat sooner? He would candidly answer, because, as he stated before when this subject was under consideration, he really did not think the petition would be persisted in, but from what he had heard of their proceedings within the last few weeks, he was led to believe that his opponents were much more sanguine, even than he suspected, and that they were resolved to persevere. Upon the whole, however, the right hon. gent. could not persuade himself to suppose that that house would call on any gentleman to enter upon such an important investigation, stripped of the aid of his counsel; and he could not help observing that the attempt to take advantage of him in this instance, was not a very liberal return for the manner in which he gave way to the noble lord's motion upon a former occasion.

Lord *Folkestone* wished that he could return the compliment which the right hon. gent. had thought proper to bestow upon his accuracy; but he differed from him entirely as to his report of the conversation which took place on a former day. So far from the right hon. gent. having expressed a wish for further postponement, he had treated the proposition at the time as an omen of the petitioner's total abandonment of the case. Without referring to any of the newspaper reports brought forward by the right hon. gent. he had no hesitation in positively asserting that he never made any such pledge or promise of agreeing to farther postponement, as that stated by the right hon. gent. But he would go farther. He denied that the right hon. gent. so understood him at the time of the discussion, or so understood him since. But the right hon. gent. was not more inaccurate in his text than in his preface, particularly relative to the private note. For he denied having ever asked the right hon. gent.'s consent to his motion. He merely sent him a line, as he thought himself bound in courtesy to do, apprising the right hon. gent. of his intended motion. But he would deem it very improper indeed to apply for the leave or concurrence of the right hon. gent. As to the observations made by him upon the subject of the circuit, he did not recollect, nay, he was certain, that he did not utter, one word that could warrant the conclusion drawn by the right hon. gent. He merely said that the propriety of farther postponing the ballot in consequence of the approach of the circuit might become matter for subsequent consideration. But he made no pledge, nor did he think the right hon. gent. either then or since believed him to have made any pledge upon this subject. The noble lord, after re-stating the manner in which he was led into the mistake of presenting this petition sooner than the petitioners wished, and commenting upon what he called the 'right hon. gent.'s perversion of the fact,' declared that he did not know until the preceding day, who were the counsel employed on either side, and concluded with expressing a hope that the house would not countenance a motion supported upon such light grounds, and brought forward only four days before the day fixed for the ballot.

Lord *Howick* thought the house should be always jealous of motions of this nature, and decide upon them with the utmost impartiality. With regard to what had passed on this subject on a former occasion, he could not hesitate to say that the impression upon his mind, from what the noble lord had said, was precisely the same as that stated by his right hon. friend. He would enter into no contest with the noble lord as to accuracy of memory, or as to the precise words he used: but most certainly he understood the express condition of his right hon. friend's assent to the motion was this, that if the circuit should interfere with the day then named, the noble lord would concur in a farther postponement. It was under these circumstances, for the house to consider, whether his right hon. friend had made out such a case as entitled him to the indulgence for which he applied.

Lord *Folkestone*, in explanation, again denied that he made any pledge.

The *Attorney-General* declared, that having heard the noble lord, the last time this subject was under consideration, the impression upon his mind, from what the noble lord said, was precisely the same as that which his noble friend who spoke last entertained. Without at all implicating the noble lord, whom he conceived as much above joining in such a thing as any man in that house, he could not help observing that the circumstance of naming the 24th of Feb., a day which it was known would be so near the circuit, had very much the appearance of a statagem on the part of the petitioners. For they were not unaware that the two able counsel, Mr. Serjeant Lens and Mr. Scarlet, who were retained for his right hon. friend, would be on the circuit, while their eminent advocate, Mr. Plumer, would be in town.

Mr. *Perceval* could not speak with confidence as to the words used in the conversation which took place when this subject was last before the house, for his attention to it was not so diligent as to justify any reliance on his memory. But, from the general impression on his mind, he could not say that he understood the noble lord had made any such pledge as that referred to. Nor did the right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan) appear to him to have at all pressed any point as to counsel; for he spoke rather in an air of triumph, as if he relied on the total abandonment of the petition, and that the house would hear no more of it. The absence of counsel on the circuit he thought very insufficient ground to allege for the postponement of a question of this nature; for upon that ground all the petitions before the house might be postponed.

Mr. *Peter Moore* regretted that the liberality of his right hon. friend should have prompted him in a former instance to consent to the postponement of this measure. But he recollected well the condition upon which that consent was given, although this condition seemed now so entirely forgotten by the noble lord. With regard to the petition, if the petitioners would forego the aid of their counsel, he was sure his right hon. friend could, unaided by any counsel, have no hesitation to go to trial at once with them, notwithstanding all the confidence of their boasting, all the activity of their enquiries, and all the acrimony of their contrivances.

Lord *Folkestone* contended that the learned gent. (the attorney-general) was not warranted from any part of the conduct of the petitioners, in imputing to them any description of fraud or stratagem.—After some farther converеation, the house divided; for Mr. Sheridan's motion 167; against it 12; majority 155. The order for a ballot was then fixed for Tuesday the 14th of April.

[IRISH MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES.] The house resolved itself into a committee of supply, to which the various accounts respecting the Irish Miscellaneous Services had been previously referred. Sir John Newport moved, and it was resolved by the committee, that the several sums in the respective estimates, be granted for his majesty's further services to which they referred, for the year ending the 1st of January, 1808.

Mr. *H. A. Herbert* observed upon the resolution voting a certain sum to the association for discountenancing vice and promoting the knowledge of religion and virtue, that however he might respect the individuals composing that body, he could not entirely approve of any self-created corporation, not relying upon their own voluntary contributions.

Sir *J. Newport* said, that the grant now called for, was for the purpose of enabling the association to purchase a quantity of Bibles and Testaments, in order to retail them at a very low rate to the lower orders of the community.

Mr. *Corry* wished it to be generally understood, that the sums now called for, for the miscellaneous services of Ireland, were in principle guaranteed by the union compact; as to the association interested in the resolution now before the committee, that association was incorporated before the union, and sanctioned uniformly by the parliament of Ireland, and most deservedly so, for the country had derived the most inestimable advantages from its unwearied zeal in the cause of religion and morality.

Mr. *Wilberforce* thought the diffusion of Bibles and Testaments the best possible way of promoting the moral and intellectual improvement of the lower orders in any country, but above all in Ireland.

On the Resolution that a sum of 5000*l.* be granted for the Roman Catholic college, at Maynooth, in addition to the sum of 8,000*l.* annually, which additional grant was for the erection of other buildings, for the further accommodation of the students in that seminary, a short conversation took place.

Mr. *Perceval* had no objection, as this establishment had been founded previous to the union, to granting the sum of 8,000*l.* as usual; but as he looked upon the present proposed addition as the commencement of an increasing expenditure, which would tend to make that institution rival the university of Dublin, and tend to the establishment of the catholic religion, he felt it his duty to express his dissent to it in the first instance, though he did not then mean to press his opposition to a division. If he was rightly informed, the youth of the Roman catholic gentry were educated in the university of Dublin, before the establishment of this institution; which practice had wholly ceased since. If this addition were in this instance to be granted, it would be the foundation for a further application next year, and he was against the policy of giving any encouragement to the growth of the Roman catholic religion.

Sir *John Newport* observed, that the question was, not whether the catholic clergy should be educated in foreign countries, or at home; for, in the present state of Europe, they could not go for education to foreign countries. The question therefore was, whether they should be educated at all. Every gentleman would admit, that the catholics could not, by being educated abroad, be rendered better subjects, and that a domestic education for them was most desirable. Since the establishment of the institution by the disuse of foreign education, the demand for a supply of catholic clergymen had increased, in order to replace the infirm or the dead, and had increased to such a degree that the college did not afford sufficient. It had on that account been recommended by the government of Ireland to increase the grant, for the purpose of providing greater accommodations. The petition was solely for the education of the catholic clergy; but a lay seminary had been established near the college, which had the benefit of the professors of the college. The catholics had not been allowed to enter the university of Dublin till the relaxation in 1793, and this institution had immediately been founded.

Mr. *H. A. Herbert* said, that there was not an item in the whole accounts, to which he should give so hearty and cordial an assent, as that which was now before the committee; he insisted, that if we were in earnest with the people of Ireland, if Maynooth college was not a mockery, we should not hesitate to give the grants necessary for its maintenance.

Mr. *Perceval* said, that many of the catholic gentry were educated in the protestant university of Ireland, before the erection of Maynooth college; but that since that impolitic measure, the number of catholic pupils in Dublin college had considerably diminished.

Sir *J. Newport* thought, that the right hon. gent. must have been misinformed on that head, as before the year 1793 no Roman catholic students were admissible.

Mr. *Perceval* further contended against the policy of any institution for the encouragement of Catholicism in Ireland, to the manifest injury of Protestantism.

Sir *J. Newport* denied that there was a lay institution of the nature asserted by the hon. member; the college founded and supported by government, was for the education of the priesthood, and the priesthood only; instruction to the laity however, he admitted, might have been a secondary object.

Mr. *Grattan* said, that the question lay within a narrow compass; whether the Roman catholic was to go abroad; form foreign connections; involve himself in foreign relations, and bring home foreign affections to his country; or whether he was to remain in his native land, and there acquire the instruction he was there to disseminate? If this could be as well effected in the college of Dublin, he should rejoice at it; for he would ever wish to see the catholic and protestant walking hand in hand together; he would wish to have them acting in such co-operation as to have in common the one grand impulse, and the one grand end; but the expence of instruction was complained of. What was the expence? 13,000*l.*; and what was got by that 13,000*l.*? the instruction of 3 millions and a half of people; this would be more than economy; it would be worse than parsimony; keep the Roman catholic at home; home education will promote allegiance; foreign education can engender no great loyalty; kept at home and taught to love his country, he must revere its government.

Mr. *Bankes* thought the institution highly impolitic, and maintained that catholicism in Ireland should be discouraged rather than upheld.

Captain *Herbert* warmly supported the institution, and illustrated its policy, by an allusion to a certain occurrence in the French revolution, at the expulsion of the priests, and the consequent degradation of the protestant clergy.

Lord *Stanley* approved of the principle of the institution.—The resolutions were then agreed to, and on the house resuming, the report was ordered to be received on Monday.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] Lord Howick moved the order of the day for the second reading of the Slave Trade Abolition Bill.

General *Gascoyne* suggested the propriety of deferring the hearing of counsel till Monday, on the ground that on the first reading of the bill, it was understood that the whole of this day was to be occupied with this most important question, and that at that hour of the evening it was not likely there would be such an attendance to hear the arguments of counsel with patience and decorum, as the magnitude of the measure required.

Lord *Howick* was as much disposed as any man to consider this as a question of great importance: perhaps it was the most important that had ever been submitted to a legislative body; but when the house was told that this was an inconvenient hour to hear counsel, and to hear counsel alone, for it was understood that no debate was to follow, he did not see how such an assertion could be supported. He certainly regretted that such a delay had occurred, which was to be attributed to the unexpected time that had been occupied by the public business that had been brought forward on that evening. It was not a very late hour, and he was of opinion, that there was a fuller attendance at that time than could be expected at the hour proposed by the hon. gent. opposite.—Gen. Gascoyne declaring that he did not mean to persevere in his recommendation of postponement, counsel were then called in, in the following order: Mr. Dallas, for the merchants and planters of Jamaica; Mr. Alexander, for the merchants of London trading to Africa; Mr. Scarlett, for the merchants and planters of Trinidad; Mr. Clarke, for the mayor, corporation, and merchants of Liverpool. After Mr. Dallas had pleaded at considerable length, he prayed, that evidence might be called in to prove the truth of his assertions. He was then ordered to withdraw, and gen. Gascoyne moved, that evidence should be called to the bar. Mr. Fuller seconded the motion.

Lord *Howick* was persuaded, that the hon. gent. could not believe that the motion would be acceded to. Not any thing that the counsel had stated was new to the house, except one point, the relative situation of St. Domingo and Jamaica, and this was a mere matter of opinion. If after so many years of enquiry, the house still went on to investigate this subject, they would never come to a decision.

Mr. *Fuller* deemed it extremely unfair to prevent evidence from being heard in support of the opinions of the learned counsel. As to what the noble lord said about opinion, what was the state of this country? was it not governed by opinion? Was not the admiralty influenced by the opinion of a noble earl, a near connection of the noble lord's (earl St. Vincent), who had the other evening made a speech on this subject in the house of lords? He was desirous of hearing the evidence of those who were acquainted with the subject; and, when such an immense property was at stake, if there was any fairness, propriety, or decorum in the house, they would agree to the motion.

General *Gascoyne* expressed himself surprised at the opposition of the noble lord. If any evidence could illustrate this momentous subject, it was the evidence of the two respectable persons whom the learned counsel wished to call to the bar. Did the noble lord mean to say, that all that had been urged by the learned counsel was matter of opinion, and that nothing new had been stated by him? The mere hearing of counsel, without allowing evidence to be called to support their statements, was a mockery.

Mr. *Hibbert* recommended that evidence should be called in.

Sir *C. Pole* urged the production of evidence, and declared that he could prove that the immediate abolition of the slave trade would be the most barbarous proceeding, even to the negro himself.

Mr. *Wilberforce* had not heard in the whole of the pleadings of the learned counsel a single new point, except that which had been justly termed by the noble lord matter of opinion. Evidence was therefore unnecessary. It was still less so in the present case, because one of the witnesses alluded to was a member of that house who would be heard in his place with that deference to which he was so justly entitled. Nor did he think the governor of a West-India island the most proper person to examine as to the state of a negro slave. If any one wished to enquire into the condition of a peasant in this country, would he ask persons of rank and consequence? Would he not rather apply to those who were of an humbler class, who were more intimately acquainted with the subject? With regard to any further evidence, he was convinced that the house would see no reason for it, when they considered that for the last three years, both down stairs and in committees, every species of evidence that could possibly elucidate the question, had been gone into.—The question was put, "That the counsel be again called in, and directed to proceed with his evidence," and negatived without a division. Mr. Alexander then proceeded with his pleadings, and afterwards Mr. Clarke. At the close of the speeches of each of the learned counsel, he requested that evidence might be called in; and general Gascoyne made successive motions to that effect, which were negatived without a division. Mr. Scarlett was then heard for the island of Trinidad; he also concluded by requesting that evidence should be adduced; and after having retired, was again called in, on the motion of lord Howick, to state the points on which he wished that evidence should be examined. They were in substance, the loss that would be sustained by certain persons who had been induced by the British government to become settlers. After the learned gent. had again withdrawn,

Mr. *Wilberforce* remarked, that this was not the proper time for hearing such evidence. If the question of compensation should, at a subsequent period, be brought before the house, that would be the opportunity for receiving it.

Mr. *Howarth* warmly urged the propriety of hearing evidence. He trusted justice would be done to the white, as well as the black, and moved that the counsel be called in, and directed to proceed with his evidence.

Lord *Howick* opposed the motion. The learned counsel had stated two points which he wished to establish by evidence. The first was, that no more ground could be cleared in the island of Trinidad without fresh importation of slaves; the second that great loss would be sustained by the settlers by the abolition of the trade. The first was a self-evident proposition, and, would lead merely to a question of policy: the second would be a question of future consideration. Those who demanded compensation, might hereafter submit their case to the house, who were never backward in listening to the claims of justice.

General *Gascoyne* could not forbear expressing his satisfaction that the principle of indemnity seemed to be acknowledged by the noble lord.

Lord *Howick* in explanation said, that he had only stated a general principle.

Sir *P. Francis*, was not willing to allow the possibility of a case in which the public ought to compensate an individual for any losses which might arise from the abolition of such iniquitous practices.

Mr. *Roscoe* declared, that, after having performed the great duty of abolishing the Slave Trade, which had so disgraced the land, he thought the house bound to consider the situation of those who should suffer from the annihilation of a system so long sanctioned by the Legislature.

Mr. *R. Thornton* thought that there would be few cases entitled to compensation. Those engaged in commercial concerns were necessarily exposed to risks, and sufficient warning had long been given to those engaged in this abominable traffic.

Mr. *S. Stanhope* conceived that it would be convenient if the principle on which compensation would be allowed was stated before the passing of the present bill.—The motion was then negatived without a division. After which, lord Howick moved that the bill be committed, and the debate motion on that was adjourned till Monday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, February 23.

[Minutes.] Mr. Fuller, chairman of the Maidstone committee, appeared at the bar, and reported to the house that George Simson, and George Longman, esqrs. were duly elected to serve in this present parliament, and that the petition against them was not frivolous nor vexatious.—Sir E. Knatchbull gave notice, that he would on Thursday, make a motion of complaint against a person who had this day appeared before the committee on the Sandwich Road bill.—Mr. D. P. Coke reported from the Downpatrick committee, that they had met, and pursuant to the act, issued a commission to take evidence in Ireland, on which they adjourned as the act directs; and they had directed him to apply to the house for leave to adjourn, until the commissioners should make a report.—Mr. Eyre reported from the Chippenham committee, that Charles Brook, esq. was not duly elected; that James Dawkins, esq. was duly elected, and ought to have been returned, and that the opposition to the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious. It was then ordered that the deputy clerk of the crown should attend tomorrow, to amend the said return, by erasing the name of the former, and inserting that of the latter.

[Poor-Laws Bill.] Mr. *Whitbread* presented to the house, according to order, a bill for the promoting and encouragement of Industry amongst the Labouring classes of the community, and for the more effectual relief and regulation of the criminal and necessitous Poor. In answer to a question from Mr. E. Morris, relative to the 2d reading of the bill, Mr. W. stated, that he proposed to move the 2d reading of the bill the next day, and hoped the house would have no objection to its going through a committee *pro formâ*, with a view to have the blanks filled up in order that it might go to the country in an intelligible shape. No gentleman, of counsel, would be pledged in any respect to the measure by acquiescing in this course, and as it was to be re-committed after the holidays, it would be competent to any hon. gent. to oppose the principle if he could not approve of it, or move an instruction to the committee for dividing the bill, on the motion for the speaker's leaving the chair.

Mr. *Morris* stated, that it had been his intention to oppose the whole bill; but if it were to be divided, he should not object to that part which provided for the education of the poor. As the other parts of the bill would go to an alteration of the whole system of poor-laws, of the law of settlement, and of the county rate, he could not give them his assent. He conceived that the 2d reading the next day would be the most convenient stage for him to state his objections to the measure, especially as he was not aware that it would be necessary for him to occupy the time of the house at any great length, and he thought it desirable that the objections should go with the measure to the consideration of the public.

Mr. *Whitbread* thought it would be better that his hon. friend should wave his opposition for the present, and reserve what he had to urge against the bill till some further stage of its progress. A partial discussion could not lead to any good purpose, and particularly on a proceeding that was merely *pro formâ.* His hon. friend, no more than any other gentleman, would be pledged to the measure, by allowing it to pass unopposed through this formal stage. He hoped, therefore, that his hon. friend would not persist in his intention of stating his objections at present, but reserve them for some future stage.

Mr. *Morris* was proceeding to state his reasons for wishing to submit his objections to the measure the next day, when

The *Speaker* thought it right to apprise the hon. member, that, though it was undoubtedly his right to press his objections in this instance, it was neither usual nor customary, according to the practice of the house, for any hon. gent. to resist the framers of any measure, which was to introduce a new system, in bringing it forward in whatever manner they might deem most convenient.

Mr. *Morris* thanked the Speaker for his intimation, and agreed to wave his right.—The bill was then ordered to be read a second time to-morrow.

[SLAVE TRADE ABOLITION BILL.] Mr. *Manning* observed, that in the event of the bill for the abolition of the slave trade passing into a law, he should feel it his duty to move, for the appointment of a committee to consider of the propriety of granting compensation to certain classes of persons, whose interest would be affected by it He wished to ask his majesty's ministers therefore, whether they were authorised to accede to such a proceeding? The compensation he had in view, was much more limited than might be supposed, and he thought this the proper stage for him to lay in his claim on behalf of a few classes of persons, whom he thought justly entitled to the consideration of the legislature. The first class were, those who had purchased land under commissions granted by his majesty for the sale of them. The next class, were those who had purchased lands on the faith of parliament, previous to the first agitation of this question. Another class, consisted of those who had suffered in their properties by insurrections of the negroes, or by wars or invasions on the part of the enemy. He did not propose that any compensation should be granted, except in cases where the claims should be approved of by commissioners appointed for the purpose. There were other classes of persons whose cases, though deserving attention, he did not then think it necessary to allude to, and he mentioned those he had enumerated, just to shew that his views of compensation were more limited than was generally supposed.

Lord *Howick* replied, that he was certainly not authorised, in this stage of the business, to give any consent to such a proceeding: at the same time he admitted the candid manner in which the hon. gent. had stated his views of the limited amount of compensations. He took the opportunity of repeating what he had said on a former night, that it was contrary to the practice of parliament, to declare beforehand what might be the amount of compensation to be granted for possible losses by proposed political regulations. This was all he could say then on the subject, as he was not authorised to consent to the proposition of the hon. gent.

The order for resuming the debate on the question for going into a committee on the Slave Trade Abolition bill, being read,

Lord *Howick* said, he never came to the discussion of any subject with more embarrassment, than on the present occasion. The question had been so often agitated, that every hon. member could not but be acquainted with all its details. Yet the measure was of such importance in itself, and he felt so much more deeply interested in it, than in any other measure that had been brought forward since he had a share in the administration of public affairs, that he could not reconcile it to himself to bring the measure forward in that new parliament, without stating those facts, and that evidence upon which alone this question ought to rest. And in this he felt the difficulty of selection, lest he should tire the house by being too prolix, or omit any material part. There was at this moment no disposition to question the principle of this measure. It was universally admitted by the merchants, the planters and all descriptions of persons, that the slave trade, so far as regards Africa, was unjust and impolitic, founded in robbery, kidnapping and murder, and affording an incentive to the worst passions and crimes. He was relieved, therefore, from proving that part of the case. He was also relieved from the necessity of demonstrating the evils of the middle passage. No man, after the discussions that had taken place, could be prepared to contend for the luxuries of the middle passage. He left the hon. general to the enjoyment of his feelings, who had considered the slave trade so great a blessing, that if it were not in existence at present, he should propose to establish it. This traffic was said to be supported by the sanction of Scripture; but to that observation he should reply in one sentence, that it was contrary to the fundamental principles of Christianity, irreconcileable with that summary of Christian duty, "to do unto others, as you would they should do unto you." The principle was now given up, and the ground of justification narrowed to a question of policy and justice. It was said not to be politic to abolish a trade that afforded such ample revenues for our commercial prosperity, and it was represented as unjust to the merchants, shipowners, and planters, whose properties were to be affected by the measure. He admitted that they were bound not to act unjustly to our own merchants, and shipowners, but in doing justice to them they should take care that they did not commit injustice against the inhabitants of Africa. No ultimate good was to be procured by means of immediate evil. But in place of doing injury to the West-India property by this measure of abolition, which was now about to be accomplished, he should shew that the West Indies would be benefited and improved by it. The persons interested in this measure were either the merchants engaged in the trade, the shipowners, or the planters; and if he should shew that none of their interests would be injured by the measure, he was confident all opposition to it must cease. The noble lord here entered into a comparative statement of the amount of the tonnage engaged in the trade to Africa, and in the general export trade of this country, not including the export from Ireland, or the coasting trade, the result of which was that in the year 1805, the African tonnage was not quite 1-52d part of the whole export tonnage; and the seamen employed, not quite 1-23d part of the seamen in the general trade. He wished gentlemen to consider, therefore, whether, in the flourishing state of our commerce, employment would not be found for this shipping, if not embarked in this traffic. The noble lord then shewed by a similar comparative statement, that the proportion of the capital embarked in the African trade, was, on the average of ten years preceding the year 1800, one 24th part of the whole capital of the export trade. That capital must have since been reduced to a still lower proportion, by the operation of the slave carrying bill, and the bills which prohibited the importation of slaves into the colonies conquered from the enemy. What remained now was only a remnant of the trade for the supply of the old British colonies. The measures he had alluded to, had reduced that capital 4-7ths, so that there remained in the trade a capital which was not more perhaps than 1-80th of the whole export trade capital. The number of slaves yearly imported was but 15,000, which gave a capital of 250,000*l.* The value of the whole of the exports of this country was in 1805, 55 millions; so that, assuming the capital in slaves at double what he had stated, or 500,000*l.* it would be but 1-110th part of the whole export capital; and when they considered the increase and prosperity of our commerce, notwithstanding the unjustifiable means taken by the enemy to stop its progress, there could be no doubt that various ways might be devised of employing the capital to advantage. It had been stated that the measure would ruin Liverpool, and cause the loss of the whole of its revenue from dock duties, which revenue, however, was stated at only 5000*l.* To shew the fallacy of such a statement, he had only to direct their attention to certain facts contained in the accounts upon the table. In 1772, this country employed 175 ships in the African trade, of which 100 were from Liverpool; the number of vessels in this trade was reduced in 1779 to 28, of which 11 were from Liverpool. In the same year, the dock duties produced but 4,552*l.*; whereas, in the latter, they had produced 4,957*l.*; a satisfactory proof that the dock duties did not depend upon the slave trade. It had been said that this trade afforded a good supply of seamen to the navy. But this he denied. It appeared by the muster-books from Liverpool, which had been laid before the house in 1793, that the mortality amongst the seamen in that trade was to the mortality in the West-India trade as eight to one. A traffic, therefore, so destructive of the seamen employed in it, could not be considered beneficial to the navy. The readiness with which the men entered the king's ships on their arrival in the West Indies, shewed what their opinion of that trade was. The practice was for men to desert to the merchant service in every other branch of trade, but from this they voluntarily entered the king's ships. What was to be thought of the policy of procuring such an improvident supply, if even it were to be admitted, that the trade did afford a supply to the navy?—Having thus proved that no material loss would result from the abolition in point of tonnage for exportation, or in point of supply to the navy, the noble lord proceeded to consider the effects of this measure upon the West-India islands. Those who were averse to the abolition, did not insist so much upon its effects with regard to the further improvement of the islands, as upon the loss which would be sustained in their present cultivation by the excess of the deaths over the births. But, before he entered upon the general principle of population, and the experience of other countries, he would examine how the case stood with regard to those islands. Returns had been procured from various islands previous to the year 1800; and subsequent to that, queries had been put to them with a view to obtain additional lights respecting their situation. To these the answers were partial and defective, but as far as they went, they confirmed the calculations made by Mr. Pitt in the year 1792, the results of which were, that the number of births was increasing, and the number of deaths diminishing: and when the causes were considered that checked the population of the West Indies, there was reason to believe that, by the regulations which the abolition would produce, nature would there, as in other countries, accomplish her own ends, and that the population would maintain itself. The calculations had been stated often, but in a new parliament to restate the results would be useful. In Jamaica, from 1761 to 68, the excess of the deaths above the births was 25,000; from 68 to 74, 11,000; from 74 to 87, 20,000; and in 1804-5, it appeared that the excess of deaths was only 258 in eight parishes in Jamaica. In the first period, the decrease was 2 and a quarter per cent., in the second 1 per cent., in the third 3-5ths per cent., and in the fourth 1 out of 1456. This last decrease was so minute, that the balance was nearly equal; and it must be observed, that in this statement, the deaths among the newly-imported slaves, where by far the greater proportion occurred, were always included. In Dominica the births exceeded the deaths, and also in the Bermudas and Bahamas; but he did not much rest upon them, because the climate and the nature of the labour might be stated as the cause. The importations were considerably diminished in Barbadoes, Montserrat, &c. &c. So much with regard to the West-India islands in their present state. But, according to the principle of population confirmed by experience, the numbers would increase, unless checked by some powerful cause. The slave population in North America, according to Mr. King, if they continued to multiply at the rate they did when he wrote, would double their number in twenty years. In St. Helena, since the importation of slaves was prevented, the slave population increased. The Maroons increased in Jamaica under all their disadvantages; as did the Caribbs in St. Vincent's. In Bencoolen, the most unhealthy place in the world perhaps, the population increased. The cold climate in North America, as well as the labour, consisting in the cultivation of the ground for rice, was peculiarly hostile to the negro constitution, and yet there, as it appeared, they multiplied with rapidity. What, then, were the causes that checked the population in the West Indies? Two principal causes were assigned: the disproportion between the sexes, and the promiscuous intercourse among them. With regard to the former, the planters had full warning; and might have provided against the circumstance. The disproportion, he believed, was greatly magnified. With regard to the latter cause, the remedy lay with the planters themselves, who ought to promote the education and morals of their slaves. But there were other causes that checked the population: bad food, severe treatment, and want of proper accommodation. The effect of the abolition would be to remove these causes, and to promote the morals and comfort of the negroes. He meant no reflection on the planters, who in general were respectable men. The blame lay with their agents abroad. That bad treatment impeded the population, appeared from Mr. Long's history of Jamaica; who, though no friend to the abolition, stated that the population increased in proportion to the good treatment and moderate labour. He denied that the prevention of importation would increase the labour of those that were left, for the slaves had been imported to supply the vacancies by the excess of deaths, and for the purpose of extending the cultivation. To shew that bad treatment and severity diminished the usefulness of the negro, he mentioned the fact that a negro, in cultivating the piece of ground given to himself, did more in half a day than he would do in a whole one under the lash of an unfeeling overseer. The argument was peculiarly striking when applied to the female sex, who were often employed so as to destroy the child before it was born, or so as to prevent its being brought up. A proper care and attention, he was persuaded, would produce a rapid increase. —We, said the noble lord, are told by the enemies to this measure, that the West-India Islands will be put in a state of revolt, if we agree to the abolition; that it will create a spirit of disaffection and rebellion. The preamble to the bill is particularly complained of, because it declares, that the traffic in slaves is contrary to the dictates of justice and humanity. Is it necessary, sir, to tell the negro, who is torn from his native land, his wife, his children, and his friends, that that act of violence, which tears him from all his former endearments in life, is contrary to humanity? This is a principle which is implanted in his breast by the great hand of the Almighty. Yet it is said, it is told them by the preamble of the bill! If he cannot see it upon the wounds inflicted on the back of his fellow sufferer, if he cannot hear it in the cries of his fellow slave, are we to suppose that he will read it in the preamble of a bill? Such an argument is futile and absurd; and what is more, too, I may say, that the planters and West-India merchants themselves do not believe it, or if they do, never was the conduct of men more imprudently regulated. Afrer 20 years, during which this question has been often agitated, is the house to be told, that all the debates which have taken place, all the motions and resolutions which have been made by the house of commons, all the reports that have in consequence gone forth, declaring that their slavery was contrary to humanity, have had no effect in inducing that conviction, which is so anxiously, at present, wished to be avoided in the preamble of a bill? Has not the Jamaica Gazette, on various occasions, stated the very means by which that insurrection might be produced, by which their plans of revolt might be organized, and a stimulus and incitement afforded to the negroes to carry their operations into effect? Look at the state of these islands for the last 20 years, and say, is it not notorious, that there never were so few insurrections, amongst the negroes, as at the very time they knew that such an abolition of this infamous traffic was under discussion? But, it has been argued, that the non-importation of fresh negroes would tend to impose additional labour upon the old ones already in the islands; but this is a consequence which I am far from thinking would follow; for is it not well known, that the newly imported negroes are not calculated, at least for a length of time, to diminish the labours of those who are actually employed in clearing and cultivating the new grounds? What source of consolation could it be to the old negroes to behold fresh importations of their unhappy countrymen, doomed to endure similar slavery with themselves? The only effect this could produce, would be that of sowing the seeds of continual insurrection. But the prohibition to import fresh negroes, could not be fairly adduced as a motive why the old ones should revolt. It was proved by experience and fact, that in those islands, where there was no regular supply of fresh negroes, no insurrection ever took place. With respect to the general security of the islands, the danger does not arise from those negroes who have been long settled in them, and used to their masters, but from those who have been freshly imported, and are smarting under recent wrongs. The case of the island of St. Domingo has been cited by the anti-abolitionists, as an example of caution. I, sir, in my turn, would beg leave to cite the events which took place in that island, as a warning how we encourage successive importations; for, is it not well known, that in that ill-fated island, there had been unusually large importations from Africa, previous to the insurrections and intestine commotions which prevailed? Other causes, indeed, might have co-operated, and have had their effect; the passions of men had been set loose and inflamed, at the commencement of the French revolution, throughout every part of that empire: hence St. Domingo became a prey to intestine commotions, and was divided into different political parties, each of which in their turn endeavoured to avail themselves of the assistance of the blacks; but the fresh and large importations from Africa which were carried on during that period, so far from diminishing, tended greatly to increase the danger. If, indeed, it were proposed by the present measure, that the negroes should at once be emancipated, I acknowledge that there would be just reason to apprehend scenes of terror; but nothing of this sort is in contemplation. It has been stated, that endeavours have already been made to excite the slaves at Jamaica into insurrection, from the example of St. Domingo. I allow it possible, that emissaries from the latter island may have been sent to Jamaica; but as the best means to render abortive such attempts, I would say, attach your negroes of Jamaica to your service by good treatment and a kind system; at any rate, new importations would not diminish, but rather increase the danger of insurrection. Experience confirms the fact. In Surinam, when a Dutch colony, the masters made use of the most rigorous treatment towards their slaves, and there insurrections broke out; whereas, in the islands where the negroes have been treated with kind usage, they have even protected their masters, when threatened with attack. But, on this subject, we, who are advocates for the abolition of this traffic, have been branded as theorists and enthusiasts, whilst we have, almost exclusively, facts and experience to allege, in opposition to the objections of the anti-abolitionists.—But, it has been also objected, that this measure will tend to diminish the white population in the islands, and that it will discourage those who go out from this country to the islands as book-keepers and overseers, with the hope of procuring plantations and making their fortunes; but the expectation of making large fortunes, cannot be considered as the main inducement for such persons to go from this country to the West Indies, but rather that they may obtain such a competent provision as they were not so likely to meet with at home. But, perhaps, it may be fit matter of enquiry, whether adequate measures have been adopted by the colonists themselves to keep up the white population, and such a militia as may be needful to controul the negroes. But, are there no modes of employment, in which the whites may be usefully engaged in the West Indies, as an encouragement for them to settle there? I think, sir, that much may be done to encourage their settlement in these islands, and that a great deal of what is now performed by the blacks, might be performed by means of machinery, as well as that there are a great many articles of useful labour to which the whites are competent. I hope, therefore, that one good effect of the present measure will be to encourage the whites to settle in the West Indies, and to pursue such trades as those of blacksmiths, coopers, &c. and thus to increase the proportion of whites to blacks. There have been repeated emigrations from the Highlands of Scotland to America; but in the upper lands of Jamaica, if I am not misinformed, there are better soils, where such as are driven by necessity from their native country might be usefully employed.—In short, sir, were I called to state my belief of what would be the measure of the greatest security and advantage to the West Indies, I would state this very measure. The negroes in the islands would then become attached to the soil, and to their masters, from kind treatment, and afford the increased means of defence from a foreign enemy.—But, there are one or two general topics more, on this subject, to which I must briefly advert, before I sit down. We have been told, that if this be considered as a measure of justice, we do not follow up our own principles; for, if slavery be in itself unjust, we ought to abolish it altogether. I think it sufficient to say, that the result of this measure will, I trust, lead to the abolition of slavery, encouraged and assisted by such regulations as the wisdom of parliament may afterwards think fit to adopt. I trust, that by this measure slavery will gradually wear out without the immediate intervention of any positive law, in like manner as took place in the states of Greece and Rome, and some parts of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom, and that such regulations may be adopted as have been in some of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. In all the states of America, with the exception of one, the slave trade has actually been abolished; and not only so, but in some of the states, measures of gradual emancipation, by means of education, and the like, have been adopted; and, I believe, that in some private estates, particularly that of general Washington, the slaves have been actually emancipated: and I would ask, whether any instance can be pointed out of insurrections and revolutions, in consequence of such measures? or rather, whether they have not, in such states, been peaceable and orderly? But, on the contrary, nothing is so apt to excite revolt, as where the negroes in our islands witness the superior advantages which their brethren possess in America. But the abolition of slavery must be gradually and not suddenly effected, and this, both on the principles of justice to the planters, as also to the slaves themselves. For, in the present reduced circumstances of the slaves, to propose their immediate emancipation, would be to produce horrors similar to those which have already happened at St. Domingo. But it has been objected, that if we abandon this trade, other nations will take it up. The same objection may be made use of by them: thus, this argument proceeds in a circle, without leading to any satisfactory conclusion. I confess, sir, I am far from being sanguine, that even if peace were to take place tomorrow, any such general and liberal measure would be adopted; but let us at least hope that France, which is contending with us for power, when it sees us take the lead, may be ashamed to confess itself inferior to us in liberality and virtue. At all events, this appears to be the most proper moment for effecting the salutary measure; for the trade of France and Holland are nearly annihilated; Denmark and America have already abolished the traffic in slaves; Portugal alone continues it; and her trade is not 1-6th part of ours; and may we not hope, that Portugal herself, when she sees that other nations have abandoned this trade, will also relinquish it?—I shall now, sir, only notice one other general argument, which has been made use of by the enemies of the abolition; namely, that this trade has been sanctioned by antiquity, as well as by the best of satesmen, particularly by lord Clarendon, and Mr. Locke. I entertain as great a respect as any one for such names; although, as to the former, I do not look upon him as the best authority that could be quoted in favour of freedom; but surely it is attempting to prove too much, that because the slave trade was an abuse which they did not attempt to resist, therefore, we must continue it. The same argument might be made use of against the reformation, because sir Thomas More did not immediately encourage it; and even in favour of torture, because this very sir T. More encouraged the use of it in his own court. With all due deference for authority, it must still be permitted us to judge for ourselves; and when we are convinced that any institution is founded in inhumanity, by whomsoever it may have been sanctioned, we are bound to resist it. It is possible that this trade in its infancy may not have attracted notice, or that those who countenanced it may not have been aware of its dreadful consequences; and Mr. Locke may not, probably, have examined this subject with the same attention or accuracy with which he examined other subjects. But if, after all, we are to rest upon authority, I do not think it entirely rests on one side. I might mention the name of one as much entitled to respect, the president Montesquieu, who condemned this traffic; but, not to quote other names, I cannot but recall to memory those illustrious statesmen, this house and country have so lately lost—men who felt so deeply interested in the welfare of the state, and who bent all the force of their minds on this great question, where all rivalship ceased. The names of Pitt and Fox are not inferior to any other, and we know how anxiously they wished for the abolition of this trade. Let me call upon this house, then, in this first session, to pay that tribute to their memories; and, if we are satisfied on the ground of facts, of experience, of justice, of humanity, and of Christianity, let us rear this monument, more dear and splendid to their memory than any other that can be erected. This measure these great men left as a legacy to this house and to their country: the success of it lay near their hearts, and was one of the last wishes expressed by my illustrious predecessor. Upon this great question, which was nothing less than to give peace and happiness to Africa, all other differences for a moment subsided: "Concidunt venti, fugiuntque nubes." This is a subject which is most worthy of the attention of the house of commons, and I trust it will be successfully carried.

General *Gascoyne* lamented, that on this subject he had to contend not only against argument but prejudice, and without that evidence, which, if admitted, would have shewn the dangerous tendency of the present measure. He declared himself, upon every view of the subject, and after mature consideration, confirmed in his former opinion. But that opinion had not been fairly represented. The noble lord had said, that there was an individual so charmed with the slave trade, that even if it were abolished, he would move for its re-establishment; but his (gen. Gascoyne's) words were to this effect; that seeing all the consequences which resulted from the slave trade, and the flourishing state of the colonies, and that no other method had been found out for bringing them into that state but the cultivation by slaves, and that under this system our navy and commerce had so flourished, he should, rather than that our colonies should remain uncultivated, wish the slave trade to be continued. Had the noble lord been candid enough to have agreed to the production of evidence, he could not have denied this statement; but having rejected that evidence, which the learned counsel had offered to produce to substantiate their allegations, nothing remained but matters of mere assertion and opinion. This was a question of great importance to the commercial interests of the country in general, and to the town of Liverpool in particular. The noble lord had first adverted to the evidence which had been given in the year 1792, with respect to enormities in this trade then existing; but what proof had he brought forward of any thing similar now? The noble lord had stated what had been the case 20, and in some instances 40 or 50 years ago, and quoted them as present existing evils. He had stated many of those evils which formerly existed in the middle passage, before the restrictions and regulations of late years had been adopted. He had made an appeal to the passions whilst he excluded the evidence of existing facts. There was no one who would say that slavery was better than freedom; at the same time, looking at this subject as a matter of policy, it was requisite to consider, first of all, what immediately related to ourselves, rather than what respected others. The noble lord had even applied the epithets of robbers, murderers, &c., and that not to the traders alone, but also to the colonists. What! did the noble mean to represent them as so cruel that no justice was to be expected from them? Surely this was a gross and an ill-founded charge! But this he would maintain, that never had a proceeding of such magnitude been brought into that house, wherein there had been such a want of justice and candour as to refuse the production of evidence. The noble lord had demanded, who were the persons that would appear, but such as were interested? Undoubtedly, those persons would have appeared, who felt themselves injured by this measure. It had been proposed to adduce, also, the evidence of two most respectable persons, one a member of the upper house, and the other a member of this, who had been governors of colonies, but they also were refused. It had been insinuated, that the evidence proposed was the offspring of self-interest and party opinion; and, after all this, to talk of candour and justice, what was it but a mere mockery of the name? The noble lord had made various calculations, and drawn inferences from them, but the papers he had read his calculations from, were not before the house; he had never seen them, and therefore he could only consider all the arguments deduced from those papers to be mere gratuitous assertions, and in some instances he knew them not to be founded in fact; and he would have proved this to have been the case, had the opportunity of calling in evidence not been refused. He much questioned whether the noble lord had received any information upon the subject. It appeared to him that he had mistaken the arguments of one counsel for another, and that his lordship had so blended the two subjects, as not to have drawn proper conclusions from them. This was a subject of magnitude in a commercial point of view; for it was no small matter of capital which employed two millions, with 40,000 tons of shipping, and 4,000 seamen; but all this had been treated as if unworthy of notice. The noble lord had argued as if the African trade was injurious to the navy; but it was unfair to infer the loss of seamen in the African trade, in as much as many of them were afterwards pressed in the West Indies; so that there was no more argument to prove the loss of men on board these ships, from this circumstance occurring, than of seamen, in ships from the East Indies or elsewhere, coming home in time of war. Had evidence been gone into, he should have proved that the seamen, on board these ships, coming from Africa to the West Indies, were not in such a state as had been represented by the noble lord; and that so far from that mortality taking place, there had been no more mortality on board these ships than on board men of war; and that a greater mortality was experienced in carrying troops in transports from hence to the West Indies, than happened in the ships going from thence to Africa and the West Indies. But from the manner in which this question had been treated, he confessed he had no expectation that justice would be done by the production of documents. One of the papers the noble lord produced, had formerly been laid on the table of the house, and consisted of the opinions of certain governors in the West Indies; and yet he now objected to the *vivâ voce* evidence of two most respectable men, the successors of these very governors, and who would have stated differently. So much for the feeling and candour of the noble lord and his friends! The noble lord had then proceeded to state the disproportion between the males and females in the West Indies, and, without informing the house whence he drew his conclusions, asserted a variation very different from the counsel at the bar, who would have proved by evidence the disproportion to have been betwixt four or five to one. From particular instances, the noble lord had drawn general conclusions; he had also thrown the greatest defamation and slander on the West-India planters with respect to their treatment of the female slaves, in cases of pregnancy, and after child-birth. But can it be supposed that the planters should be so adverse, not only to the dictates of humanity, but to their own interest? for every female that had a child, thereby became more valuable to the owner. He declared that if he had not heard such language spoken in that house, and had it been reported to him out of doors, he could not have believed it. But if, after all, the present bill should pass, and if any insurrection should take place in the islands, (as he really dreaded,) he declared, that he should have a right to conclude, that it was because this act had passed, more especially as the noble lord had acknowledged that for 20 years past no such insurrection had occurred. In his opinion, had a French general landed in any of the islands, with an address to the blacks to excite them to insurrection, no such attempt would have proved more successful than the preamble to the present bill. The noble lord thought, that some sort of machinery might be substituted in place of the labour of the slaves; but was it not most extraordinary that the planters themselves, who were so materially interested, should not have conceived such a thing practicable? The noble lord said, with one breath, that this was the proper time, and yet, with another, he fairly acknowledged that no hopes could be indulged of the concurrence of France. But, for his own part, he could not but consider it as a most improper time for bringing forward such a proposition, for, without obtaining the co-operation of other states, the promoters of this measure would defeat their own object; and, surely, if the slave trade was allowed to exist at all, according to the late regulations, it appeared to be carried on with more lenity by this than by any other government. It sufficiently appeared, that Bonaparte would never become a party to such a bill as the present; his object when applied to was obviously to evade, and now that the fanatic ideas of humanity and policy were broached, would he be ready to take it up? With regard to the Portuguese, he understood that they had actually written to Liverpool to engage captains and ships for this trade, merely in consequence of the resolutions of the last parliament. But, supposing the trade to be abolished, it would even then be impossible for all the frigates of the British navy, without the concurrence and co-operation of the colonists themselves, to prevent the importation of slaves; it was the interest both of the traders and colonists to have slaves introduced. As to America, their prohibition merely extended to the introduction of slaves into America; but if permitted to trade at all, they would immediately adapt their trade to the introduction of slaves into our colonies. The noble lord had given no estimate of the loss which the colonists would sustain by the abolition of this trade, which amounted to a property of 90 millions sterling, and the imports into the West Indies to between 4 and 5 millions,—a momentous part of the subject, but which the noble lord had kept totally out of view! With regard to the emancipation of the slaves, he had only to say, that the opinion of those who had the best local information on the subject, was, that such a measure would produce the downfall of the empire. With regard to the gradual abolition of the trade, he should not have objected to it under proper restrictions and regulations; but should the present bill pass into a law, his belief was, that before 12 months were at an end, conspiracies and insurrections would take place; and with regard to emancipation, that might take place in a way that was little wished for.

Mr. *Roscoe* was desirous of saying a few words on the present bill, both to satisfy his own feelings, and to fulfil the duty he owed to his constituents. Whatever might have been supposed, the inhabitants of the town of Liverpool were by no means unanimous in resisting the abolition of the slave trade. The noble lord had so ably discussed the general principles of the measure, that he had very little in addition to offer: one obvious effect he would notice, namely, that where the comforts of life were easily acquired, nature would fulfil her own designs, and the multiplication of the species would be secured. From excess of misery, disappointing these her benevolent intentions, the slave trade at first was resorted to; and when it became the interest of the planters to promote the happiness of this laborious class, the obstruction to the increase would be removed and the population would answer all the beneficial purposes conducive to the prosperity of these settlements. It would banish that horrid maxim so familiar on the islands, that it is better to buy than to breed slaves; and the principles of humanity would be so fortunately blended with the notions of commercial policy, that the felicity of that unfortunate class of beings would be finally consulted. So far was he from thinking that the islands would be sacrificed by this measure, that he was sanguine enough to believe it would be their salvation. He remembered that the Restriction bill was as much opposed as the present measure of total abolition; and yet the house had heard from counsel at the bar the other night, that those restrictions had been productive of essential benefits. He could not help strongly condemning that branch of this disgraceful traffic, which supplied the Africans on the coasts with the means of vice and debauchery, in furnishing them with brandy and fire-arms in exchange for their slaves. He had been doubtful if the gradual abolition of the trade would not be preferable to any sudden interruption to it; not, indeed, for the sake of those whose fortunes, whether as merchants or planters, were involved in it, but for the sake of the immediate objects of it. He was fearful, that when these were brought to the coast, and no market was found, they might be massacred on the shores of their country. Feeling this apprehension, he enquired what would be the time necessary to apprize the native slave merchants and prevent this calamity, and he was told that a notice of six or nine months was competent for this purpose. The time, therefore, mentioned in the bill would be sufficient in Africa; and in the West Indies, they had been already aware of the proceedings in that house, and had been, from regard to their own interests, preparing for the event. He did not think he should discharge his duty to his constituents, if he did not urge the claim the West India merchants had on the public for compensation. But he hoped that the merchants of Great Britain would find in a more extended commerce, a more lasting compensation than a pecuniary one could bestow. It was natural, under the pressure of our present heavy expenditure, to look to the East and to the West for resources to support us through our present arduous struggle. We ought to oppose a great colonial to a great continental power. He thought that our East-India possessions were inseparable from the interests of Great Britain, as a free and independent nation, but there ought to be no exclusive trade in the East-India company. The trade of India ought to be thrown open to the whole body of British merchants. He saw no reason why the harbours of India should be open to the whole world, and shut against British merchants. He hoped the same enlightened policy, which had so eminently distinguished the measures of the present administration, would dictate some measure which would do away this monopoly, and thus compensate for any loss which the slave trade might occasion to the merchants of Great Britain. I have, said the hon. gent., long resided in the town of Liverpool; for 30 years I have never ceased to condemn this inhuman traffic; and I consider it the greatest happiness of my existence to lift up my voice on this occasion against it, with the friends of justice and humanity.

Mr. *Lushington* was greatly surprised to hear the opponents of this bill enter into cold calculations of loss and gain; for his part, he could never stop to balance imports and exports against justice and humanity. Statements had been made by the noble lord, which put it beyond doubt that oppression and cruelty had been practised towards the negroes in the West Indies. He did not want to have all the facts proved at the bar of the house, for if one half or a third of them were true, enough was established to induce the British legislature to interfere in behalf of those wretched creatures, who had been made the instruments of gratifying avarice and the basest passions. Here the hon. gent. entered into a statement with a view of shewing that the disproportion between the numbers of the males and females in the colonies was not as great as had been stated by the counsel for the petitioners. On the whole, though he believed that the slaves were better treated now than they had been heretofore, yet he thought that this was no reason against the abolition of the trade with Africa, which he considered to be the parent and fertile source of all the evils and calamities which the blacks suffered from their masters. He never, therefore, gave a vote with greater cordiality than he should in favour of the present measure, which reflected the highest credit on ministers, and would, he had no doubt, confer benefit and security on the West Indies.

Mr. *Fawkes* rose and spoke to the following effect:—Mr. Speaker; the abolition of the slave trade has been, for the last 20 years, so repeatedly submitted to the consideration of this house, and to the discussion of the great and pre-eminent talents which have characterized and adorned the parliamentary history of this country, for that period; that, in addressing the house on this night, I feel my insufficiency to add any argument, either more new, or more cogent, than those which have on so many former occasions been introduced. But, sir, I rise to perform a solemn but voluntary pledge made to my constituents, that I would mark, with my express reprobation, a traffic, the most unjust and execrable; a trade, which has, during the whole course of my existence, excited the strongest abhorrence in my mind, and to resist the continuance of which is this night a proud and satisfactory feeling, enhanced by the grateful recollection, that I have been enabled to join with my hon. and respected colleague (Mr. Wilberforce) in the accomplishment of that object, which was the steady, unerring, and virtuous aim, of his private exertions and his public duties. The noble lord who, with his wonted eloquence, and unanswerable reasoning, moved this subject, has, I trust, fully convinced this house, that the measure which he supports and recommends, is founded on the true principles of a sound and liberal policy. It is unnecessary for me to follow that noble lord through the clear and precise statements which he made, or to advert to those calculations and inferences, which were so ably and fairly deduced. There are still powerful reasons which imperiously sway me to support the abolition of this trade in slaves, and which justify every opposition to the continuance of a system bottomed on injustice and inhumanity. Amongst those which I shall take the liberty of stating to the house, the claims of plundered, persecuted Africa, shall not be forgotten. Nor shall I satisfy myself with viewing the question as to the mere circumstance of dragging these unhappy beings from home and country, and from relatives and friends, for transportation in a foreign land; but shall extend my enquiry to the means and expedients by which they are obtained. The condition of savage life, sir, is sufficiently deplorable, without employing human ingenuity to aggravate its incidental calamities. Man, instructed and enlightened man, should at least endeavour to avoid increasing the miseries of the untutored, and not pervert the superiority of reason, by augmenting evils, which it is his duty to diminish. It has been said, that though you abolish this measure, the wars in Africa will still continue to be waged. It is unhappily the lot of civilized, as well as uncivilized life, that human contentions will prevail, and that the conflicting passions of nations, as well as of individuals, will be exasperated into mutual rancour and reciprocal hostility. Is it therefore because such is the unhappy condition of our natures, that means are to be used, and expedients resorted to, for the diabolical purpose of fomenting them? Is it because it is impossible to subdue the lust of aggrandizement, or to circumscribe the unprincipled progress of rapine and aggression, that an unjust and inhuman pursuit must be continued? and that the laws of civilized states, the laws of this our common country, shall encourage or countenance the inhuman slave-dealer, whilst he hangs on the rear of the army, which he has stimulated to carnage and slaughter, for the purpose of purchasing the flesh and blood of his fellow-creature, to satisfy the cravings of a sordid and criminal avarice? Often has the poverty of the suffering African been the sole cause of his persecution, and often has his person been consigned to irremediable slavery, as an equivalent for the portion of brandy with which he has been drugged, to rob the mind of its reason, and the body of its liberty. Human nature is unfortunately prone to propensities, which frequently require the restrictions of legislative wisdom, and the checks of salutary controul. Crimes, which, if committed at home, under the cognizance of those laws which restrict the criminal passions, would have excited the strongest sentiments of abhorrence, may be committed in Africa, without revolting the feelings of the scrupulous, at the same time that they stifle the conscientious remonstrances of the agents. I shall not disgust the house by a recital of those atrocities on the innocent and unoffending. We have heard enough of floating dungeons, and the merciless treatment to which these unhappy children of Africa are subjected, in consequence of that cruel necessity which tears them from all the revered connections of life, from the social endearments of father, husband, and wife; and which, not satisfied with this extreme of injustice and persecution, consigns them to a foreign shore, after a beastly exposure, to the disposal of the highest bidder, to be appreciated by him, not as his fellow being, endued with mind and feeling, but as an inanimate effect, on the profits of which he may voluntarily speculate. Will the house of commons tolerate a traffic always commencing in injustice, and frequently terminating in murder? Will it lend its countenance to a system communicating misery to the whole continent of Africa, and entailing indelible dishonour on the character of Great Britain? No; the time has at length arrived, when the arm of the slave-dealer must be arrested; and when men who are anxious to grow rich, must first learn to be humane. To assert that such are not the dreadful effects of this trade, is to assume, that the documents on your table are palpable fabrications. But it has been said, that the situation of the African slave in the West-India colonies, is preferable to that of the British peasant. First, let me be convinced, that the slave in the colonies enjoys the benefit of that unequalled blessing, the trial by jury; that he possesses the option of exchanging the niggardly and parsimonious employer, for the open and generous master; and that he is animated with that proud feeling of country which pervades every British bosom, from the lowest to the highest class of our community. Alas! with all these blessings, the wretched African slave is perfectly unacquainted. To the proud and ennobling sensations of patriotism, his oppressed heart is wholly a stranger. Africa and anguish must be the constant feeling which torments and overloads his grief-burthened soul. Was there a possibility of making the experiment; or was the proposal made to permit the African labourers, in your colonies, to embark for this country, the whole tonnage of England could not convey the crowds of anxious expectants, which would be assembled on the shores of your different West-India islands. And when they arrived in this country, how would their astonishment be excited, in observing the same people, who, in the colonies had devoted them to slavery and wretchedness, disencumbering them of their shackles, entitling them to the benefits of equal laws, and elevating them to the broad distinction of being free men in the freest country upon the earth! Among the many attempts to justify this iniquitous traffic, and amongst the variety of authorities cited to prove its propriety, the Holy Scriptures have by some been quoted. That the Divine Author of the Christian faith, who engaged in his worldly mission for the exclusive purpose of saving sinners, and who, authorised by his precepts, as He sanctioned by his example, the sublime and benevolent maxim of charity to all men, that his exalted dispensations should be perverted into a justification of a monstrous, unjust, and inhuman policy, is a principle at which religion shudders, and morality revolts! It is a principle, hostile to our present views and future expectations; it disrobes the Gospel of its purity, and plunders mankind of their hopes. But we are also told that slavery has been co-existent with the formation of the world; that it has continued through all the progressions of succeeding ages: so, I answer, have other vices; and will it be admitted, that in the seventh year of the nineteenth century, an enlightened legislature is called upon to support a system of injustice and persecution, upon flimsy pretexts, arising out of the ignorance, the arrogance, or the criminal passions of former ages? Rather let us, with the sentimental writer of our country, exclaim, "Disguise thyself as thou wilt, slavery, still thou art a bitter draught; and though thousands in all ages have been made to drink of thee, thou art no less bitter on that account." Would it not, I ask, be more consonant with the wisdom of our Creator, to suppose, that in the gradual march and progress of human knowledge, the hour had arrived when the fetters of the oppressed and uncivilized African were to disappear before the light of reason and religion; when the children of that persecuted continent were to be admitted to a participation of that bread of life, which was never communicated to individuals or nations, without imparting the benefits of improvement, and the blessings of general happiness?—One task yet remains for me to perform: a task from which I only shrink, convinced of the inefficiency of my talents to do justice to the deserving object of my panegyric. In anticipating the result of this night's debate, I naturally look with reverence and respect to that exalted and benevolent individual (Mr. Wilberforce), who has made this signal act of mercy and justice the leading feature of his public life. I look with feelings of pride to the result of those labours to which my honourable and esteemed colleague has so undeviatingly devoted himself. His actions stand not in need of individual eulogium; he has raised a monument to his fame, founded on the basis of universal benevolence:

> "Quod non imber edax, non Aquilo impotens
> Possit diruere, aut innumerabilis
> Annorum series, et fuga temporum."

I rejoice with him on the final and glorious victory which he is about to obtain. I rejoice in my country, and in this house, for the great act of humanity they appear willing to complete. The age in which we live, teems with wonders; and in the events which are daily witnessed by Europe, the great struggle for its liberties may take place on English ground. Let us not go forth with the wrongs of Africa as a weight upon our hearts; but rather let us rid our country of the sin, and in the passing of this act of legislative wisdom and justice, make some atonement for the too-long injured and insulted rights of humanity.

Lord *Mahon* rose, and, in a maiden speech, addressed the house as follows:—In rising, sir, to address you on the present occasion, I do not intend to trespass long upon the indulgence of the house, for I have not the presumption to suppose that I can add any thing to what has been so ably and so eloquently stated by the noble lord who opened the debate. I am impelled, however, by a sense of duty, to deliver my opinions on the subject which is at present under consideration, and which is undoubtedly one of the most interesting and important that was ever debated within these walls. I am aware that though this subject has been often discussed, though it has received upon many former occasions, the fairest and fullest investigation, yet that a difference of opinion unfortunately prevails respecting it. I deeply lament, sir, that this should be the case, but in whatever light the subject may be viewed, and whatever variety of sentiment may prevail upon different poins, I should wish to believe that with respect to the principle of the slave trade there could exist but one sentiment in this house and in the country. It is important to distinguish the principle of the slave trade from those additional circumstances which have served to aggravate the evil, but which might perhaps be alleviated by wise and salutary regulations. I allude, as is obvious to every gentleman who hears me, to the miseries of the middle passage, and to the cruelties and enormities which are proved to have been practised in the West Indies. These facts cannot, I think, be disputed; they have been proved and circumstantiated by the clearest evidence, and if you admit the facts, you must also admit the atrocity of the slave trade. But, sir, it is immaterial to the present question whether those facts be or be not admitted, whether even those cruelties and enormities did or did not exist; the mere possibility of their existence, the circumstance that so many innocent and unhappy men groan under a government which is one of the most arbitrary and oppressive that the world ever witnessed, this alone is sufficient to stamp with infamy so iniquitous a system. To excite our indignation and abhorrence, it is only necessary to know, that man is bought and sold by man. I complain, sir, of the principle of the slave trade, of the principle which is intimately and inseparably united with it, of the fundamental principle upon which it rests, and by which alone it is supported. The principle is, that British subjects are allowed to tear by violence from their home their fellow creatures; to take them from their family, and from their friends, and from all the endearments of social, though not of civilized life; to convert them from freemen into slaves, and to subject them for the remainder of their lives to the arbitrary will and wanton caprice of others. This, sir, is the principle of which I complain, and which, I contend, is inconsistent and incompatible with every notion of humanity and justice. If we consider this subject according to that great rule of Christianity, of doing to others as we would they should do unto us, we should suppose that we ourselves were in that situation in which we have placed the unhappy nations of Africa. I need not ask, sir, what would be the feelings which would in such a case pervade not only every member of this house, but every individual in this country. Then let us act upon the principles of equal and reciprocal justice, and let us not oppress and injure a nation, which is helpless and unprotected, but which is at the same time innocent and unoffending. Much more, sir, might be said upon this part of the subject, it is indeed a copious theme; but I will not repeat what has been so often said by an hon. relation (Mr. Wilberforce), who was the original mover of this great question, and whose name will descend to the latest posterity, with neverfading honour, for his zealous and indefatigable exertions in the cause of suffering humanity. He has treated this subject in language much more eloquent, with arguments much more forcible, than any which I could use, and I am sensible that no words of mine could do justice either to the cause itself, or to my own feelings, upon the subject.—With respect, sir, to the policy of the slave trade, I shall say only a very few words, because I do not imagine that a shadow of doubt can remain upon the mind of any one after the conclusive reasonings which we have heard. I cannot coincide in opinion with those who represent the slave trade as politic and expedient. I believe it will be found upon this as upon every other subject, that nothing is really politic, that nothing is really expedient, or conducive to the interests of this or of any other country, that is not conformable to the principles of humanity and justice. Whenever this subject has been agitated in the house, a number of petitions have been presented, complaining of the evil consequences which it is apprehended would result from the abolition of the slave trade. These petitions are founded, however, on the assumption of a proposition, which is wholly inadmissible. It is maintained, that if no slaves are imported into our West-India islands, those colonies could not be cultivated. This is a proposition not only false and unfounded, but which has been repeatedly confuted by those who are better qualified than myself to discuss it. I believe the contrary to be the case; I believe that if the importation of slaves were to be stopped to-morrow, those colonies would flourish, and would prosper, and, I am sure that their population would considerably increase. Now, upon this proposition so false in itself, they found a long train of consequences; like the ancient philosopher, who exclaimed, Give me but a place to stand on, and I will lift the earth. In the same manner your petitioners have said, Let us have but the benefit of one false assumption, and with that we will prove the ruin and destruction of your West-India trade. These petitions contain certainly many allegations well calculated to alarm the house, but they do not deserve to be considered, unless the proposition upon which they are founded, could first be established. If we look at the present state of St. Domingo, if we reflect upon the situation in which it now is, and in which it will probably continue, we shall then see whether just, humane, and beneficent measures are not necessary to prevent the contagion of that example from extending to our own colonies. This appears to me, sir, to be a weighty and important consideration; but if it even did not exist, I feel so strong an abhorrence of this inhuman and barbarous traffic, that I would not hesitate one moment in voting for its immediate and entire abolition. I would appeal to those sentiments of justice, of humanity, of benevolence, which are, I am sure, inherent in the breasts of all those whom I have now the honour of addressing. I would call upon them in the name of suffering humanity, in the name of an oppressed and injured nation, in the name of those wrongs which have been suffered, of those rights which have been violated, I would call upon them to stop this odious and execrable traffic. It is a traffic, sir, which has been forcibly but truly described as a traffic in human blood and tears, in misery and suffering. I would call upon the house to act in conformity to the resolutions passed in the last session of the late parliament, and which form the foundation of the measure which is now proposed. And here I beg leave to remind the house of the opinions which were entertained upon this subject by that illustrious stateman whose loss we all deplore; to whom I was connected by every tie of blood, of private friendship, and of personal obligation; and whose memory I shall ever cherish with sentiments of love and gratitude. This great man, of whom it is impossible to speak or to think but with respect, employed, upon many occasions, his splendid eloquence and transcendant talents, in urging the adoption of that measure which is now proposed. I trust upon all these grounds, that the house is now arrived after full, mature, and deliberate discussion, at the completion of this great work, the most honourable and glorious that was ever consummated. We are now called upon to decide whether we will sanction the continuance of a system which would disgrace times and countries the most barbarous and uncivilized; whether we will suffer this stain to tarnish the lustre of our national character; whether, when we complain so often and so loudly of the injustice, violence, and oppression of our enemies, we will suffer still greater instances of injustice, violence, and oppression, to exist in any part of the British dominions? I earnestly hope that the house will not separate this night, that the members of it will not retire home without the heart-felt satisfaction of discharging a sacred and solemn duty which they owe to themselves, to their country, and to their God. There is, sir, only one consideration more which I wish to mention before I conclude. Engaged as we unfortunately are in a war of unparalleled danger and indefinite duration, contending with an enemy the most powerful that ever existed, standing alone, as we do, amidst the wreck and ruin of surrounding nations, it behoves us not only to think, but to act conformably to that part of the king's declaration, in which it is said, that his majesty relies with confidence on the protection and support of Divine Providence. Sir, I ask with what right we can venture to expect the protection and support of the Almighty, if we continue in so flagrant a manner to violate his laws, if we continue a system founded in injustice, and which is necessarily productive of violence and oppression? Let us wash our hands clean of this foul pollution, let us act upon the principles of equal and impartial justice, and we may then look, with pious but firm confidence, to the protection and support of that Supreme Disposer of events, in whose hands victory is placed; who disposes of the fate of empires, and who can in an instant crush and annihilate that tremendous and gigantic power, which for reasons known only to Himself, He has thought fit to raise up for the terror and punishment of Europe. It is only by these means, it is only by acting upon these principles, that we can hope for success, and that we can be enabled to look without dismay to the issue of this awful and mighty contest. I have only, sir, to apologise for having trespassed so long and so unworthily on the patience of the house, which I feel was unnecessary, after the long speech fraught with eloquence and wisdom, which was delivered by the noble lord (Howick), who sits on the bench below me, and I shall therefore conclude with declaring my zealous and cordial concurrence in the motion which he has made.

Lord *Milton*, though he felt extreme diffidence in offering himself to the house, could not suffer a subject of such interest and magnitude to pass, without offering his sentiments upon it. The arguments offered on the other side, so far from weakening, had tended to strengthen and confirm the opinion he had always entertained, that the slave trade was contrary not only to justice and humanity, but also to sound policy. That the slave population did not keep up its numbers in the course of nature, was to him a sufficient proof of bad treatment; and when the abolition of the trade should have created an interest to give them better treatment, he was certain the species would multiply. As long as the trade was continued, Britain would be giving a premium to rapine and murder, and preventing the progress of civilization on the coast of Africa. "Fiat justitia; ruat cœlum." Though the merchants of Liverpool might suffer some loss, let this foul stain be washed from the character of the nation. He had often heard the sentiments of that lamented statesman, whom he was proud to call his friend, (Mr. Fox) on this subject, and he was happy in giving his aid to the completion of the valuable bequest which that distinguished man had left to his friends and country in this great measure.

Mr. *Bathurst* said, that though he coincided with the different members who had spoken as to the principle of the trade, he was not prepared to go so far as the policy of immediately abolishing it. He thought the present population not equal to the cultivation of the colonies, and that if the importation of negroes from Africa was immediately stopped, either the planters would suffer considerably in their properties, or illegal means would be resorted to, to obtain a supply. He recommended a tax on the importation of fresh negroes, as a measure which would ultimately lead to a total abolition. Sufficient notification had not been given, in his opinion, to the parties interested; this being the only time during the discussion of the question, that the two houses of parliament were likely to agree in this measure. The hon. gent. entered into a calculation of the number of births and burials, and concluded with some observations on the causes which operated against the increase of negro population.

Sir *John Doyle.*—Mr. Speaker; I am aware how hopeless the wish, even if I possessed the power of engaging the attention of the house, upon a subject already so exhausted; and, therefore, if I cannot hope to be new, I shall at least endeavour to be short; but I feel also, that in addressing a British audience in the cause of justice and humanity, an apology would be little less than an offence. The able statement of the noble lord (Howick), and the eloquent speech of the hon. member for Yorkshire, have, by anticipating much of what I had to offer, considerably increased my difficulties in addressing the house, for I feel that it would be as injudicious with regard to myself, as injurious to the cause I have at heart, were I, by repetition, to weaken what has been so strongly and so irresistibly established. I shall, therefore, confine myself to observing upon what has been urged by the counsel at your bar, and what has fallen in the course of this night's debate. The learned counsel (Mr. Dallas), in his ingenious speech, laid much stress upon the policy of continuing this trade. Now, sir, I positively deny that any policy can be sound, that is grafted upon injustice and oppression; but least of all can British policy rest upon such foul and hollow grounds. But, if I had any doubts on the score of policy, they would have been removed when I reflect, that the two greatest men this or any other country ever produced, differing upon almost all other points, agreed, not upon the humanity and justice merely, but upon the sound policy of the measure, as connected with the general interest of the empire and its colonies; thus clubbing, if I may say so, their great talents in favour of the present measure. But, sir, an additional proof of its policy is deducible from the undivided sentiments of his majesty's present ministers; not, indeed, from their power, for that would never induce me to give an opinion contrary to my feelings, or to what I conceive to be the true interest of my country, but because the great responsibility rests with them, of giving a due direction to the policy of the country; and, beside, they are free from the influence of personal interest or of local prejudice, whereas, many of those who oppose the measure have an interest in the event, or are pleading for friends who have; and though I impute none but the purest motives to those gentlemen, yet it is in the nature of man, that a bias will imperceptibly and involuntarily insinuate itself into the opinions of men, whose personal advantage is mixed with public measures; whereas personal interest, if it could have any weight with ministers, must operate in a contrary direction, for we all know that the anti-abolitionists have a strong force in parliament, whereas there is not a single vote to be got on the whole continent of Africa. He also called for your justice and humanity, but, strange to tell, he applied those terms, not to the oppressed, but to the proud oppressor—not to him who suffered, but to him who did the wrong.—The next argument of the learned counsel was, that our ancestors having permitted the Slave Trade for 250 years, we should continue it. Now, sir, with every respect for our ancestors, I never can admit this doctrine; first, because I do not believe the last age more enlightened than the present, for we have their experience added to our own, and that in periods more eventful than they lived in; and next, because if once admitted, the same compliment must be paid to *their* ancestors, and so back *ad infinitum*, until it terminated in a paradox, that the darkest ages were the most enlightened—and as to the length of time, if they have had the benefit of this iniquitous trade for 250 years, they may be tolerably well satisfied to part with it now. But it is said, that the petitioners are taken by surprise, and they pray that the abolition may be gradual. Why, they must have been asleep for the last 20 years: if they have laid out money within that period, they must be wretched speculators, or they would have seen that the question must force itself upon the legislature—"Magna est veritas et prævalebit." The learned counsel, as also the member for Liverpool, have stated that a number of ships have been built for the Slave Trade which would not answer for any other, and that docks have been built for those ships which would be useless if the bill took place, and that if Liverpool gave up the slave trade, other countries would take it up. This argument would justify robbery of any kind; and let us see to what an extent it might be pushed. Suppose a highwayman should urge as an excuse, that it is true he did rob the man, but it was because he knew that if he did not, Will Bagshot's gang would, and that moreover it turned out a profitable job; and suppose that when pressed to relinquish so disgraceful an occupation, he should answer, "but I have gone to great expence in purchasing horses, which would be fit for nothing else but the highway. I have built stables, but they will suit none but highwaymen's horses, and I have purchased pistols and blunderbusses at a great expence, which would be useless in any other calling." I mention this, merely to shew how far the argument might be carried, and not as a comparison; for though no man has been more unhandsomely treated by highwaymen than myself, yet I would not degrade their profession by comparing it with the slave trade. The robber may be compelled by hunger; besides, he risks his life in the attempt, and he has not the presumption to say, that he benefits those he robs; moreover, he does not ask compensation for giving up the trade.—St. Domingo, has been mentioned, and spies are said to have been sent from thence to excite revolt in Jamaica. I admit that St. Domingo, in its present state, is not a good neighbour, but emissaries would be sent if this question were never agitated, and the effects of the abolition would be to counteract any such attempts, as it would tend to make the situation of the negroes more comfortable, and therefore they would be less likely to revolt, and especially as the newly-imported African was much more dangerous than the man born in the island; and it must be remembered that Dessalines himself was an imported African. If spies were sent by the black government, it must proceed from sympathy, and if sent by the French, it would have been done to injure the British interests, equally, had the abolition never been mentioned. It is said it is a benefit to the African to be carried to the West Indies. What! to be torn from the bosom of his family at the midnight hour, and in the unsuspecting security of sleep, and be transported in chains to eternal slavery, and this is the gracious boon of the slave captains to the wretched inhabitants of that ill-fated country! I admire their ideas of humanity. O amiable philanthropists! O benevolent crusaders! thus to become voluntary missionaries in this perilous pilgrimage, purely to impart happiness to the sable sons of sorrow! But how is this kindness returned?—by ingratitude, worse than the sin of witchcraft. The African is so stupid and so sulky, that he neither perceives nor acknowledges the blessings thus conferred upon him. But how presumptuous is man, to square the happiness of other beings by any ideal standard of his own! To what absurdity, as well as cruelty, would this lead! I remember seeing a poacher in a warren sewing up the mouth of his ferret to prevent it injuring the fur of the rabbits, and upon my remonstrating against the cruelty, he positively asserted that the animal liked the operation. Great stress has been laid upon the opinions of governors, and particularly those of the two gentlemen last in the government of Jamaica. Sir, I have long known the character of those excellent officers to be in the highest degree respectable. But the situation of governor does in a great degree prevent the possibility of obtaining accurate information. Every thing he hears must be through an interested medium. On his visits he would see nothing but cheerfulness. Every face whether white or black, would be dressed in holiday smiles—he would never hear the secrets of the prison house. Besides, the domestic slaves and the artizans, being under the immediate eye of the master, are free from the tyranny of the driver. If governors in general are liable to be deceived by appearances, those who have been in that situation pending this question cannot be less so; the higher you go in rank for information, the lower you descend in the scale of evidence; what you might gain in weight of authority, you would lose in weight of testimony. Here the hon. general stated several striking facts illustrative of the cruelty exercised upon slaves, which had fallen under his own observation, during the former war in the British Province of South Carolina. These instances I adduce, (said he) as bearing upon the general question of the slave trade; but which I disclaim as having any reference to the West-India traders, and planters, for whom I unfeignedly profess a high respect; for many of them, individually, sincere personal regard; and particularly my hon. friend on the opposite side (Mr. Barham), who has manifested the disinterestedness of his manly mind, by voting for the abolition of the slave trade, though evidently injurious to his personal interest. But the oppression I have witnessed, tends to shew the danger of trusting man with unlimited power over his fellow man, particularly where the base and low are "clothed with a little brief authority." The impression has ever since rested upon my mind; for, "taught by that Power that pities me, I learn'd to pity them." But a new and monstrous doctrine has lately sprung up, that the slave trade is justified by Scripture: what shall we say to the presumption, that calls down the divine attributes of Justice and Mercy, in aid of this unhallowed traffic? will any one presume to say, that the black man is not called into existence, by the same fiat of Omnipotence, that has summoned the white man from the dust, to bear the image of his Maker? Are we not taught "to do unto others as we would they should do unto us?" are we not commanded to "love our neighbours as ourselves?" This benevolent doctrine does not apply solely to the man who lives next door; but to all our fellow sojourners in this transitory world. There is no restriction as to colour. We are not told to love the white and hate the black neighbour: strange, that the subtle fluid, which, circulating under the membrane of the skin, gives to divers nations their various hues, should be the boundary between liberty and slavery—between love and hatred! but above all, can we forget the great commandments, "thou shalt not steal, thou shalt do no murder?" And, though I do not impute those crimes immediately to the British trader; yet if by exciting the cupidity of the native princes we should encourage war and rapine, for the purpose of obtaining slaves, we should not, I fear, be held guiltless in the sight of Heaven, of the sin attendant upon those crimes. Before I sit down, let me congratulate the hon. member (Mr. Wilberforce) upon the effects produced by his unwearied industry, his indefatigable zeal, and his impressive eloquence, in thus bringing to a happy conclusion, a measure, which does so much honour to his head and heart, and which washes out this foul stain from the pure ermine of the national character.

The *Solicitor-General* said, he was sorry the right hon. gent. who spoke last but one, had displayed the principles that had fallen from him; for, in the present state of the sentiments of the house, it was not those who claimed humanity and justice, not for the negroes, but their oppressors, that the advocates of the abolition had to fear, but those who, while they agreed in the propriety of the abolition, were for deferring the execution of it. The immediate abolition was the only remedy for the evils. Mr. Parke had proved that the negroes who were not sold, far from being massacred, were kept in a milder sort of slavery in Africa. There was no evidence of any such massacre having ever taken place. He argued to the fact, that no such massacre ever took place from the frequent variations in the amount of the demand for negroes, and consequently the supply to answer that demand. When the demand was suddenly increased, as it was on the settlement of Trinidad, whole families must have been dragged forth to answer the demand. He cited several cases of horrid cruelty, in which the law was inadequate to do justice to the Blacks, and with respect to which the Whites acknowledged no community of law, nor of justice, nor of species. He concluded with an eloquent representation of the gratitude the vote of this night would call forth from posterity, and of the happiness which many of the younger members, who were present, would have in beholding what they had anticipated with all the generous ardour of youth, expressed by some of them in a corresponding glow of language upon the benign effects of this measure upon the negroes, the whole property of the colonies, and upon the prosperity of the empire at large. When he looked to the man at the head of the French monarchy, surrounded as he was with all the pomp of power, and all the pride of victory, distributing kingdoms to his family, and principalities to his followers, seeming, when he sat upon his throne, to have reached the summit of human ambition, and the pinnacle of earthly happiness, and when he followed that man into his closet or to his bed, and considered the pangs with which his solitude must be tortured, and his repose banished, by the recollection of the blood he had spilled, and the oppressions he had committed; and when he compared with those pangs of remorse, the feelings which must accompany his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce) from that house to his home, after the vote of that night should have confirmed the object of his humane and unceasing labours; when he should retire into the bosom of his happy and delighted family, when he should lay himself down on his bed, reflecting on the innumerable voices that would be raised in every quarter of the world to bless him; how much more pure and perfect felicity must he enjoy in the consciousness of having preserved so many millions of his fellow-creatures, than the man with whom he had compared him, on the throne to which he had waded through slaughter and oppression.

Mr *Hibbert* rose, and spoke in substance as follows:—I rise very reluctantly, sir, to trespass upon the house at this late hour, and immediately after a speech as impressively eloquent perhaps as any that was ever delivered within these walls; but extensively connected as I am, and have long been, with the commerce of the West Indies, and having now for the first time a seat in this house, during any debate upon this question, it may be expected that I should not let it pass with merely a silent vote; and I will hope too, that, although the subject has been so fully and so frequently canvassed within these walls, I may be pardoned, should I appear, thus circumstanced, either to recur to what may have been amply discussed, or to question what may have been generally admitted in the course of former debates in this house. I am aware that, in declaring my connection with the West-India trade, I subject myself directly to the charge of a bias of interest, which we have recently been told has clouded the understandings and blunted the feelings of that class of persons. Sir, there are others in this house who can better judge than I can, whether my understanding and my feelings have, in fact, been so perverted, and whether, in extending relief to the calamities which in this life, and in this country, one sees, God knows, often enough occurring around us, I am or am not as prompt and zealous as my neighbours: and yet, sir, I must say, that after more than 25 years extensive connection with the island of Jamaica, during the greater part of which period this question has agitated the public mind, and the deliberations of the legislature, I have, as impartially as I knew how, given to it my utmost attention—derived, from every source I could command, information concerning it—endeavoured to obtain results consistent and satisfactory to my mind—and am still but the more and more confirmed in opposition to the object of the bill now before us. I cannot, however, but think it hard, sir, that West-India proprietors and merchants, persons not destitute of talents and education, and certainly having the mean being well informed on this subject, are yet in a manner banished from the court, while their interests and their properties are litigated: they are not allowed to be either judge, jury, witness, or party; for they are told that they quite mistake their own interests, and that others know much better than they do what is good for them. Now surely, sir, they should either be listened to as disinterested evidence, or their partial interest should be admitted as proof of the risk which their property is incurring; and the public, so far as it is concerned with them, ought to be aware of the extent of the sacrifice which it may be called upon to make.—Whatever concessions may have been made by those who have preceded me in the debate, I cannot, sir, grant at the outset, that this bill is unquestionably grounded upon humanity and justice, and then debate it as a matter of expediency and policy. There can be no dispute about the obligation of those great principles—it is eternal and immutable as is their nature; and if you admit that the present measure is their necessary dictate, the dispute is at an end. I cannot stand here, and, in opposition to them, calculate the advantage of an increased production of sugar and coffee: but if I had been told, not of this measure now proposed to us, but of any measure that, although it was indisputably enjoined by every principle of justice and humanity, yet that in the course of almost 20 years discussion, it had not been able to make its effective progress through the British parliament (recommended, at the same time, by the cry of the people out of doors, and by an union of the greatest talents within), until it received the protecting hand of his majesty's principal minister in either house, I should say, "it is impossible; there must be some mistake in the application of these great principles to the measure;" it is one of those perhaps which, grounding itself upon existing and acknowledged abuses, attempts to accomplish objects beyond the reach of legislation, assumes a standard of human perfection which experience does not justify, and puts into hazard existing establishments, which, though imperfect, confer much public and much private benefit, with a promise of substituting what exists only in visionary theory. If so, the measure must be the occasion of just jealousy to a wise legislature, as approaching, in feature and character, to those wild projects of reform, to which the spirit of modern philanthropy has given birth, and of which the civilized world has lately seen the terrible results—projects, sir, that have universally proved subversive of their objects, and have collaterally caused a mass of misery and destruction, of which, to give even a faint and imperfect description, will puzzle the most eloquent of those who shall attempt to convey to posterity a record of the present times.—What is it, sir, that could have resisted a measure, which had been unquestionably built upon those great principles? Is it the opposition of the West-India body in parliament? Alas, sir, who ever heard of them as combined into a political phalanx or squad, displaying, in this or in the other house, a compact and regular front in critical moments of the battle, and, by judicious manœuvres and co-operations with other bodies, giving and receiving mutual assistance and support? I will not say, whether, had they done so, they would have stood here now defenceless as they do; but I have known the West-India body long, and never saw them thus arrayed and disciplined. In fact, they have felt their intimate connection with all the leading interests of the mother country; they could trace all the profit of their labours into every channel where it might benefit the British capitalist, manufacturer, and landholder; they have looked upon the merchant, the banker, the manufacturer, the landholder, the soldier, and the seaman in this house as their representatives, and they have experienced occasionally support from them all: more particularly must I declare, with heart-felt gratitude, that in every rank of the British navy, the colonists have found friends. I believe, sir, I may say, that the British tars are with us to a man: this I cannot but look upon as a favourable omen to our cause; and since those gallant fellows have protected and saved their country in the hour of its greatest danger, and fixed the British name beyond all competition in the brilliant track of glory, they may, in a like extremity (as I consider it), save from ruin the West-India colonies. In this sense it may indeed be said that the West-India interest has influenced the question; but of such influence I feel proud—it is not the influence of intrigue or of party.—Sir, I will now meet the question fairly, and look to the application of these great principles of justice and humanity. Is it pretended, that the mere possession, or use, or transfer of a slave in Africa, is unjust or inhuman? Is it unjust? By all the laws and customs of Africa, existing from the remotest antiquity, it is authorized; and the abstract rights of man cannot be profitably applied to societies existing under established laws. What is consistent with those laws, must be accounted just. Is the same thing in Africa inhuman? Surely not. We have abundance of evidence to prove, that during famines, which are frequent in Africa, multitudes of the natives fly to slavery as a refuge, and without it must inevitably perish: and suppose them, at such times, transferred from a poorer to a richer master—is that inhuman? I could not but shew an expression of dissent to-night, when an hon. gent. (Mr. Fawkes) so positively told us that slavery, and the sale of slaves, were forbidden by the Divine law. Sir, I did not look for this part of the discussion; but as it has been brought forward, I must say, that in the sacred books I can find no such authority. In the Old Testament, the slave trade, or the sale of men, is spoken of indifferently just as other trades. The New Testament inculcates justice and humanity in every station; but it is remarkable that it interferes with no political relations whatsoever, whether high or low; inculcating only those duties which tend in every condition of life to make men happier and better. If we look narrowly there for any thing that refers to slavery, I need not tell the hon. gentlemen who hear me, that the Greek word, which in our version is every where translated *servant*, does really mean *slave:* and since the subject has been started, I shall mention, that in the Epistle of Paul to Philemon, Paul sends back Onesimus (whose very name bespeaks his station), who was Philemon's slave, and had run away from his master—he sends him back, I say, to resume his station without one word expressive of his disapprobation of slavery, or in vindication of Onesimus, who had fled from it. The hon. gent. cited that admirable rule, "Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you," as decisive on this question; but how does the hon. gent. read that divine rule as applied to this matter? Does he maintain, that because being a British labourer, I should be glad that my master would pay me wages for doing nothing, that therefore I, being a master, ought so to treat my labourer? As applied to slave and master, I understand that rule to inculcate no more than this; that a slave may reasonably expect from his master protection and kindness, in return for diligence and fidelity; and a kind and careful master has the same right to expect fidelity and diligence from his slave. Sir, it is not the Slave Trade, but the abuses incident to that trade to which the preamble of this Bill can be properly applied. There can be no question concerning the injustice, inhumanity, and impolicy, of these abuses; but the preamble of the Bill as it stands is, strictly speaking, untrue, and is liable also to many other objections, which, at a proper time, will be suggested to this house.—The authorities of the many great and eminent men who have opposed this trade in parliament, have been brought forward; and the noble lord (Howick) has appealed with triumph to the united sentiments of those eminent characters, Mr. Fox and Mr. Pitt, upon this subject. Of those two great men, sir, I now believe that the veneration is equal on both sides of this house; but this was not the only subject upon which their opinions were in unison. Sir, I recollect, more than 25 years ago, sitting in that gallery, when their eloquence, like the streams of two mighty rivers, which, from their source, had held a separate course, united its prodigious and impetuous volume against one common barrier—the state of the representation of the people in this house; and what followed? The house was delighted, instructed, transported, but not convinced. And yet was there any doubt that the state of the representation of the people was unequal, nay defective and faulty? Was there not, as upon this question, a most prevalent and clamorous opinion out of doors? The machine too was in our hands; no co-operation was needed; we could trace effect directly to its cause; we could substitute instantly the new fabric for the old one; what was it then that stopped our hands? Sir, the house acknowledged the evil, but dreaded the remedy. It was the sentiment of the majority in that day,

> "Rather to bear the ills they had,
> Than fly to others which they knew not of";

and they added one instance more to many which are on record, in which a wise and cautious legislature has felt itself bound to delay the remedy of an acknowledged evil, contrary to the sentiments of the people out of doors, and of the greatest orators within.—It is unfair then to call those who oppose the present bill the abettors of slavery and of the slave trade. If a bill were brought into this house with a view to abolish forgery, it might take for its preamble properly enough, "Whereas forgery is contrary to justice;" but if it were to go on to prohibit the use of paper as a medium of exchange, and a representative of money in commerce, and enact, that in future all payments should be made in bullion only, although such a provision might effectually tend to render forgeries less frequent, yet those who should perceive the inexpediency and impracticability of such a measure, in the present state of commerce, and should therefore oppose the bill itself, ought they to be denominated the friends and abettors of forgery? I find myself, sir, exactly thus placed, in respect to the bill now under consideration. No one values more the blessing of liberty, or regrets more the existence and the baneful effects of slavery; no one is more ready to promote whatever may remedy the abuses of the slave trade, or mitigate the miseries of a state of slavery; but this bill, sir, is not, in my opinion, calculated to accomplish those objects, although it professes to be so: and if, acknowledging the evil, we are not to be allowed to call in question the insufficiency and inapplicability of the remedy, we are treated exactly as a mountebank treats his audience. He pathetically describes every disorder to which the human frame is subject, he touches some spring of sympathy in every one of his hearers, and then offers them his pill, neatly boxed and labelled—"Can you bear to hear of your pains and your sufferings, and not wish to ease them? Here is your cure; take it upon my credit, don't examine into its composition, or enquire into its operation. You have my word for it, it is safe and easy of digestion, and infallible in its effects." And yet, sir, you would not think that man imprudent, who, before he swallowed the pill, should open and analyze its contents.—The noble lord (Howick) might have spared himself the proof of the small comparative value of the African part of the trade; it has been reduced by successive acts of parliament into the mere means of necessary supply to the population of our old colonies; and, had not those colonies seen abolition suspended over their heads, their supply would have been much smaller than the average of late years shews it to have been. There is, in fact, sir, no encouragement to the extension of cultivation in the colonies, under the expence of purchasing negroes for that purpose; and a hasty and somewhat improvident importation and purchase of negroes has been here and there occasioned by the dread of immediate abolition. I do not believe, that were you to remove that dread, our old colonies would require annually more than 7000 imported slaves: and looking to this limited trade as necessary for the welfare of the colonies, and for the advantage of a population of about 600,000 slaves, already existing there; looking to it as subject to wise and humane regulations, belonging to the British trade alone, and which I think, sir, should not have been opposed (those who opposed them, however, were jealous of an interference, the extent and full purport of which they could not foresee); looking also, sir, (and this is material,) to what is and has been the state of society in Africa, and the practice there, I cannot think that this remnant of the trade, thus existing, and for these purposes, calls upon us for its abolition.—Sir, there has been a great and very prevalent misrepresentation of what was the state of Africa previous to the colonial demand for slaves. I have seen publications coming from respectable quarters, and extensively circulated by the abolitionists, which in positive terms assert, that, before the Europeans began to take slaves from the coast, Africa enjoyed internal tranquillity, and that its wars and its miseries, as we find them existing at this day, are all imputable to the European slave-trade. There is a pamphlet which has the respectable name of a noble lord* (Muncaster), a member of this house, affixed to it, which, adverting to the account given by Leo Africanus (who wrote about the middle of the 15th century) of the negro nations, states, upon his authority, that the Africans never made war; and his lordship adds, that "this full and positive declaration of the most intelligent historian of Africa, clearly proves that the whole of the slave trade now carried on by the Europeans has been alone the work, has been entirely brought about by the maritime nations of Europe." To the same purport his lordship reports—"That the amazing numbers which the Europeans are said to have purchased, but which they have unquestionably carried out of this unhappy country, have been clearly from a trade created, not diverted." Now, sir, it may seem extraordinary, but it is nevertheless true, that although the "intelligent historian," upon whose authority the noble lord grounds these assertions, does indeed, in his introduction to his seventh book, state, that, according to the accounts of some preceding traveller, the inhabitants of Negro Land lead a brutal life, waging no wars, nor seeking conquests out of their own limits; yet he, who travelled through these countries himself, and who thinks it necessary to state, as an apology for being less particular respecting one city, that he only staid there a month, Leo goes on to describe the different districts of Negro Land, and his account differs little from what we read of that country at this day. I have the passages in my hand, sir, but I will not detain the house by reading them, in which he states of many of the sovereigns of those parts, that they were perpetually at war, and liable to frequent predatory incursions from their neighbours. The sovereign of Tombuctou, in particular, by his account, was a most savage and insidious tyrant, invading, both by force and fraud, the domains of all the petty princes near him. Slaves were publicly sold to the Moors and to the Egyptians, and at so cheap a rate, as that fifteen to twenty were paid for one horse—and for what were these horses wanted, sir?—for the purposes of war: he was the most formidable potentate, who could bring the most numerous cavalry into the field, and these were the instruments with which he invaded and plundered his neighbours. Leo relates of one district, that, being placed betwixt two powerful and warlike states, and having no outlet for its productions but over mountains impassable by camels, the slaves were compelled to carry over these mountains each a weight of 100lbs. on their heads, for a space of ten miles, and sometimes twice in a day, so that they became bald with the grievous pressure.*—Of Borno, a district of not less than 500 miles in extent from east to west, Leo relates, that the king was perpetually picking quarrels with his neighbours; keeping up a large military force, yet having but little income, excepting what he obtained by frequent predatory excursions; so greedy, that, although he possessed plenty of gold, he yet obliged the merchants who traded with him, to take slaves in exchange for what they bought, and sometimes detained them from year to year, much against their will, until the season arrived for his military expeditions. Here sir, is Africa, at this early day, inviting the slave trade, not the slave trade seducing Africa. I might quote other passages from this "most intelligent historian," equally tending to shew how unjustifiable is the noble lord's conclusion, upon his authority, but I will beg to refer gentlemen, who may be anxious for correct information, to the book itself, and to the voyages of Cademosta, who wrote about the same time, and whose evidence has also been grievously misrepresented. These accounts are not, sir, actually anterior to the commencement of the Portuguese trade upon the coast, although contemporary with its infancy, and they have not the smallest connexion with that trade, which commenced, as I understand, in another and more southern district of the coast. I will, also, sir, beg leave to call the attention of gentlemen to the accounts of the travellers Bruce and Parke, and more especially of the latter, which relate more directly to the scene of the colonial slave trade; and whatever use may be made of some pathetic incidents which Parke has related, I will venture to say, that the whole tenour of what he tells us of the Negro nations does not lead to a conviction that we shall better their condition by abandoning this trade. We know that he, after all he had seen, has expressed his doubts upon the subject in the plainest terms—doubts which he would not have expressed had they not been strongly prevalent in his mind. I have read and heard, sir, that we are to look to Parke's facts, and not to his opinions; and it has been insinuated, that his editor, Mr. Edwards, has foisted those opinions into the book. It happened to me, sir, once to converse with Mr. Parke, at a meeting of the Linnean society, when this very topic was started, and he assured me, that, not being in the habits of literary composition, he was obliged to employ some one to put his manuscript into a form fit for the public eye; but that every sheet of the publication had undergone his strict revision, and that not only every fact, but every sentiment of it was his own. What Mr. Parke has written of the Negro nations, may be advantageously compared with the comment which Mr. Malthus has connected with it in his book upon Population. I do not, sir, know the sentiments of Mr. Malthus upon the subject of the slave trade; but from what I read in his book, I gather no hopes of accomplishing a salutary revolution in the state of society in Africa by the operation of this bill.—I beg pardon of the house for thus trespassing upon its patience, but I think it material to shew that the public has not had a candid summary of the evidence on this question laid before it, in the publications which have been so assiduously circulated. Most heartily do I wish, sir, that every hon. gent. who is to give his vote upon this question to-night, could lay his hand upon his heart, and say that he had attentively perused the evidence which lies upon your table. I do not mean all the voluminous accounts and figures, but that which is substantial evidence of facts: that he had consulted the originals, and not relied upon extracts, for I am no friend to extracts, either in literature or morality; they are seldom made with an intention of leading us impartially into the spirit of the work from which they are selected.—These are my reasons, sir, for doubting whether even a concurrent abolition of the slave trade would erect the Utopia in Africa which the imagination of the abolitionists has projected; but a *partial* abolition, an abandonment of that small share which we now carry on for the sake of our old colonies, and which we carry on under the strictest regulations for the prevention of abuses, cannot pretend to have the smallest effect towards that object. It has the double disadvantage of precluding the hope of our ever bringing about a concurrent abolition, and of inviting our rivals to assume, as soon as they can, our place in the trade, infinitely to the disadvantage of Africa in point of humanity. It opens the door to France to form and to extend colonies upon terms the most advantageous, and forbids us, under all possible circumstances, either of our own, or of rival colonies, or of Africa, to support and recruit those we possess by an imported population. Is it, sir, a doubt whether France will greedily avail herself of this opportunity? Is it not, on the contrary, an acknowledged axiom of French policy, that her colonial and naval power must rise and fall together? We have the recent declaration of him who is now at the head of her government, to this effect; and the history of the French commerce and maritime strength justifies the policy. In 1715, when Louis the XIV. died, she had only 100 ships of small tonnage in her colonial trade; at the time of the revolution, when she was become a formidable naval power, she had in that trade more than 800; from the city of Bourdeaux alone, with the colony of St. Domingo, more than 400 vessels, of an average of 400 tons each, and carrying a larger proportionate number of seamen than our ships do, were constantly trading. Her whole export tonnage to all Europe, English America, and the Levant, in 1789, was 580,000 tons, of which only 152,000 were French; so that her colony trade was that alone to which she could look for her useful seamen. Is it then a doubt, sir, with any man in this house, whether France will, at a peace, seek to render her West-India colonies flourishing, and seek to do it by recruiting their population from Africa? As to the Spanish share of the trade, I have it in my power to relate a fact, which ought to make a stronger impression than any general reasoning. An hon. baronet, once an intelligent member of this house, and then one of the first, if not the very first, merchant in Europe, now retired both from trade and politics, but whose near relations in this house can confirm, if need be, the circumstances I state, was, soon after the peace of Amiens, at Paris, where he was applied to by one of the most respectable mercantile houses of that capital, in conjunction with another at Madrid, to undertake the furnishing of 15,000 African slaves for Cuba. Some time was to be allowed for doing it; but 6,000 were to go immediately. My friend replied, that his house had no concern in the African trade: however, considering the respectability of those who applied to him, he undertook to furnish them with the correctest possible information from Liverpool and London upon the subject. He did so; and the result was, that they thanked him for the information, which they said had been useful in convincing them that they could be supplied otherwise upon cheaper terms. However humane our regulations might be, they rendered the freight of the negro too dear, and that would not suit them. This, sir, is a single fact, but it is an authentic and recent one, and of magnitude enough to lead us to reflect how far we conduce to the advantage of Africa, by abandoning our part of this trade.—It cannot be doubted, sir, that in the West Indies the treatment of slaves has been progressively ameliorated. The accounts which have been produced and cited by the noble lord (Howick) tend to prove it. It is stated in those accounts, that the increase by births in proportion to the deaths, has, as far as it can be ascertained by these accounts, been advancing. and what are we to gather from this, sir, but that the planters do not need the compulsion which you pretend to lay upon them by this bill, to treat their slaves with humanity? If this fact be connected with the small amount of that supply which the islands now need, do we not see that all the objects which the abolitionists profess to have in view are gained or gaining—that the supply itself is lessening, and the need of that supply lessening too? And this we find is progressively effecting without violence, without a measure that may elevate the Blacks into a phrenzy, and plunge the Whites into despair. Admit however, that population by natural means is generally on the advance, or rather that, barring accidents, the decrease is less rapid than it has been, this will not reach individual cases, nor will it remedy those accidents which humanity and vigilance neither can foresee nor prevent, and which have so often depopulated particular districts and whole islands.—There have been, sir, in the course of the debate, different measures of gradual abolition proposed, as substitutes for this bill. I cannot engage to support them; but, considering the disposition now prevailing in parliament, it may be said that his majesty's ministers, in respect to this measure, are all powerful; they need no concurrence on our side; and the responsibility rests upon them not to inflict a severe and a dangerous remedy, if a safer and a milder will answer the purposes of humanity as well. Of the instances of cruelty which an hon. general (sir John Doyle) has detailed to the house, two, I observe, were perpetrated by females; and I hope that the trite observation, *corruptio bonarum pessima*, may be applied to these cases. If there exist the smallest doubt whether the general treatment of the slaves in the West Indies be kind and humane, why not send out, as has been suggested, a parliamentary commission, to enquire into and to report the facts, rather than subject a large class of British subjects to the odium of their countrymen, by presenting, under aggravated colours, a few instances of atrocity, committed by individuals, of whom good and bad are to be found in every society? I can state, with the utmost truth, that I have been connected as a merchant with about 60 estates in the island of Jamaica, and that, in the late distresses of the trade, we have been compelled to observe the utmost economy in the amount and value of the supplies sent out; and yet in not one single instance have we curtailed, or been desired to curtail, the articles which have been sent out for the use and comfort of the negroes, although, in almost every instance, we have done so in respect to those for the use of the whites.——There is not yet, sir, any distinct understanding whether this bill is or is not to be accompanied with a provision of compensation for those whom its operation may injure; and, unless some pledge to that effect be given, I must consider that the injustice it may inflict upon individuals is a fair argument against its principle. The noble lord (Howick) has stated, that it has not been usual for parliament on similar occasions to provide compensation prospectively; and yet, sir, in those recent instances in which the legislature judged it fit to interfere merely with ancient usages (not with rights established under acts of parliament) for the sake of effecting improvements in the port of London; I mean in the West-India and London dock acts—a provision of prospective compensation, most liberal in its extent, is made for every description of persons to whose loss or injury those bills might operate. This, sir, is what we have done; and let me state a case which may happen, nay, which probably will happen, if the spirit of reform be consistent. There are, sir, in this country, and more especially in the northern counties, many large factories built, where 3 or 400 persons are often confined together employed in the spinning of cotton and silk: I am prepared to say, sir, and there are many in this house who can confirm it, that those establishments, although highly advantageous in a commercial view, are fatal both to the health and to the morals of his majesty's subjects: now, supposing that the philanthropic spirit were to be extended to them, and their further extension at least forbidden; supposing we were to say, "We pretend not to interfere with what exists already; keep the labourers you have got, we will not emancipate them, they are not fit for emancipation, they are corrupted and disordered, and incapable of the regular duties of life; but not one more ruddy-cheeked boy or blooming girl shall you seduce from their ignorant and deluded parents, and immure in your putrid haunts of vice and disease. Tell us not of your ventilators and your artificial gasses; the thing is contrary to first principles, and it must be discontinued." Now, can we believe that he who had just built, at a considerable expence, one of these factories, and had partially, or not at all, supplied it with labourers, would not in this case call aloud for compensation? and could that compensation be justly denied to him? And yet, sir, the silk and cotton factor has not greater legislative authority to plead than has the West-India planter for his establishment; nor is the supposed case which I have put of the former harder than the real one of the latter, after this bill passes; and, independently of the general case, there are individual cases of peculiar hardship, those of minors, of lessors, and of proprietors of estates under trust, whose estates, immediately after this bill passes, will be either considerably depreciated, or of no value at all.—There are some, sir, who will admit the truth of many of the considerations I have urged: they will admit that we are about to make a sacrifice that is to cost us much, and to profit others little or nothing. "But," say they, "there is connected with the slave trade much abuse and much inhumanity, and, at all events, we will wash our hands of any share in it; we will have nothing to do with that which is either the offspring or the parent of vice." Gentlemen should consider, sir, how far they would follow this principle, and whither it would lead them: it would certainly go the length of suppressing the licensing of alehouses, and the continuance of lotteries: can the mischiefs with which these are connected in society be doubted? If, sir, I were inclined to attempt the feelings of gentlemen in this house with a pathetic story, I could shew them, and at no great distance from the metropolis, an industrious mother with 6 or 8 children, their countenances pale, their limbs emaciated, and their bodies swoln with famine, picking up a scanty and insufficient subsistence by the only labour which such feeble hands can execute, while the father of this family, he who ought to support them, is taking what is called a plunge at the neighbouring alehouse, spending the fruits of one week's labour, and mortgaging that of another; and this after having carried away the leathern bag from the cottage roof, which contained the pence and sixpences, the hard savings of the year (saved to pay the rent at Lady-day), and having sunk the whole of it with one of those itinerant propagators of ruin who now invade the privacy of your remotest villages with a cart stuck over with lottery bills. This, sir, is not a fictitious nor an uncommon case, and yet our philanthropists do not make it the theme of declamation or the object of reform. This is too near and too obvious for them; their aim is more distant, their scope is larger; the spirit of modern reform does not act, sir, like the rational principle of self-love so beautifully described by the poet, which first puts the centre in motion, and then extends itself in progressive circles of beneficence to the extremities; the spirit of modern reform attacks at once the connecting chain of the system, and, if the whole do not fall to pieces at its touch, it works inwards till it shakes the centre. I must, for the reasons I have given, vote against the second reading of the bill.

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* Historical Sketches of the Slave Trade.

* The circumstance of their becoming bald, is in the French, and not in the Latin, translation of Leo.

Mr. *Wilberforce* replied to the principal arguments which had been urged against the bill. He observed, that ever since he had engaged in this discussion, he had always endeavoured to avoid any expression which might be considered unjustly injurious towards those who opposed him. But it was not to be expected that the friends of the abolition were to overlook the general effect of human passions. Despotic power could not be possessed without much abuse in the exercise of it. All that he imputed to the West-India planters was, that they had yielded to the circumstances under which they existed. The children in the islands were accustomed to see an order of beings around them which they were taught to consider as inferior. Thus their prejudices were formed. It was not them, therefore, that he blamed, but those who, though not placed in a situation to be misled on the subject of this traffic, and who had the opportunity of seeing its horrors in their true colours, who possessed the power of putting an end to the evil, and yet had suffered it to exist. He referred to Mr. Parke's book, to shew the evils which the slave trade created in Africa. It had been contended that Mr. Malthus, in his Essay on Population, had favoured the slave trade; the fact, however, was not so. Indeed, Mr. Malthus had called upon him that day, and expressed his surprise to have learned, that in some publications of the day he was regarded as a favourer of the slave trade; and stated that he had written an appendix to his work, to remove that impression. It was said, why not put an end to the lottery, and other evils in this country? He acknowledged that he considered the lottery a very bad mode of raising money, and would concur in any measure for putting an end to it, if there were any prospect of success in the attempt; but he was sorry to see gentlemen reduced to arguments of this sort. They searched out every recess of misery and vice in their own country, they looked around them every where for evils, and hugged them all to their bosoms. With regard to the complaints that had been made of his conduct towards the West-India planters, he had always been as just towards those gentlemen as he could. He had never behaved to them with any harshness, but he could never carry complaisance so far towards them, or any set of men alive, as to compliment away the rights and happiness of millions of human beings. The hon. gent. pronounced an eulogium upon the display of character and talent which the house had that night witnessed on the side of humanity and justice, particularly on the part of the younger members; whose lofty and liberal sentiments recommended and enforced by the elevation of their rank, and the purity of their form, must tend to produce the happiest effects upon all classes of the community. Such an indication of mind and feeling must afford gratification to any reflecting man, and diffuse the most salutary lessons throughout the country; must shew to the people, that their legislators, and especially the higher order of their youth, were forward to assert the rights of the weak against the strong; to vindicate the cause of the oppressed; and that where a practice was found to prevail, inconsistent with humanity and justice, no consideration of profit could reconcile them to its continuance. The generous and humane principles which had been that day unfolded, were worthy of a British parliament to teach, and of a British people to learn.

Sir *John Doyle*, in explanation, stated, that the instances of oppression and cruelty which he had cited, had taken place in Carolina, when under the government of this country.

Mr. *Manning* was convinced that the abolition of the African slave trade would not be attended with the injury apprehended to the West-India planters. The negro population of our colonies would, he was sure, be kept up without it. He had no estate in the British colonies. But in the Danish island of Santa Cruz he had an estate; and there his Danish majesty, by an edict in 1783, put an end to the importation of slaves, after the lapse of ten years; and ever since then the negro population required no aid from African importation.

Mr. *Hiley Addington* could only be induced to assent to the measure upon one principle, namely that of the modification proposed to be introduced in the committee by his right hon. relation (Mr. Bathurst), for postponing to a more distant period the final abolition, and for a gradual progress in the measure.

Earl *Percy* suggested, that a principle which he should wish to introduce into the bill, towards the final emancipation of the negroes, would be to declare every negro child free, who shall be born in his majesty's dominions after the 1st of January, 1810.—The question was now loudly called for, and the house divided. Ayes 283, noes 16, majority 267. The house then resolved itself into a committee *pro formâ*, and at half-past four adjourned.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, February 24.

[MINUTES.] The following is a list of the committee appointed to take into consideration the petition complaining of an undue return for the county of Mayo: J. Woolmore, A. H. Holdsworth, W. E. Lockhart, hon. G. Elliott, hon. C. H. Butler, hon. T. C. Onslow, P. C. Bruce, C. Leigh, J. D. Porcher, G. Skene, T. D. Drake, lord R. S. Fitzgerald, T. Tyrwhitt; nominees, hon. J. Butler, hon. T. Knox.—On the motion of lord Temple, the house resolved itself into a committee on the South Sea Trade bill. Counsel being declared to be in attendance on the part of the South Sea company, Mr. Cripps moved that they be called in. This produced a long discussion. On the one hand, it was contended by lord Temple, Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Corry, Mr. Courtenay, and Mr. C. Wynne, that no case had been made out to prove the necessity of the delay, which the hearing of counsel must occasion. The petition from the South Sea company did not state, that they sustained any injury from the bill. Without a clear proof of injury could be shewn, they were not entitled to be heard by counsel. Their charter had been granted to them with this express limitation, that they should trade to the possessions of the king of Spain alone, as was demonstrated by the exceptions in that charter. One million and a half of British property was at stake, the security of which depended on passing the bill with promptitude; for if any of the valuable ships that had been freighted to Buenos Ayres should chance to be lost before the bill should be so passed, the underwriters would not be responsible. The bill had been brought in with the consent of the company; for when it was first discovered that the voyages to South America were illegal, his majesty's ministers had thought it their duty to bring in a bill in order to render them legal. In December last, a draft of the bill was sent to the directors of the South Sea company for their opinion, and in January a committee of the directors attended the privy council, when a discussion of the principle of the bill took place. Several alterations suggested by the directors were agreed to by the privy council, and the directors then signified their approbation of the bill, of which the bill then before the house was a copy, word for word, with the exception of those changes of expression which the recapture of Buenos Ayres required. If any claim could hereafter be made out for compensation, the justice of the house would induce them to listen to such claim with the attention which its merits demanded.—On the other hand, it was maintained by Mr. Cripps, sir T. Turton, and Mr. H. Thornton, that the petitioners ought to be heard by counsel, and that the petition could not throw any obstacle in the way of the plans of government, or the commerce of the country. The directors of the South Sea company had a great duty to fulfil. They were the guardians of the property of the holders of their stock to the amount of above 26,000,000*l.* The statement made on a late evening, that for 65 years the company had allowed their right to lie dormant, was untrue; for during the whole of that period they had been in the habit of granting licences, although it was allowed that those licences were not of much value. The right which their charter conferred upon them was valuable and transferable, and were it offered to the ports of London or Liverpool, might doubtless be exchanged for a large consideration. During the last week the directors had received numerous letters from proprietors, in different parts of the country, urging them, should Buenos Ayres again fall into the hands of the English, to avail themselves of their privileges. With regard to remuneration for the loss of these privileges, a very moderate one was desired.

The duty on goods exported to and imported from Buenos Ayres was 12½ per cent. This duty might easily bear the addition of an eight per cent. which would afford the small remuneration required.—The motion for hearing counsel was then negatived without a division. The blanks in the bill were filled up, and the report was ordered to be received on Thursday.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, February 26.

[MINUTES.] This day a ballot took place for a committee to try and determine the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election for Malmsbury, and the following members were chosen: R. Ferguson, lord Mahon, James Dawkins, T. P. Symmonds, W. Wingfield, M. P. Andrews, S. Boddington, R. Morris, H. Swann, W. Jacob, viscount Newark, J. Buller, T. Stanley; nominees, viscount Marsham, H. Joddrell, esq.—Sir E. Knatchbull stated, that some circumstances had occurred which had induced him to abandon the notice he had given for that day, relative to the conduct of a certain witness before the Sandwich road committee. The hon. baronet took occasion to disclaim any other motive in the proceeding than that of a desire to maintain the dignity and character of that house. At the same time that he made this statement, he could not suppose that any member would be inclined to suspect him of being actuated by any other view.

[MR. PAULL'S PETITION RESPECTING THE WESTMINSTER ELECTION.] Lord *Folkestone* called the particular attention of the house to a petition which he held in his hand from James Paull, esq. the petitioning candidate for Westminster. The noble lord stated, that the petitioner complained of a breach of the standing order of that house which regarded witnesses, and requested that it might be read. It declares, "That if it shall appear that any " person hath been tampering with any wit- " ness, in respect of his evidence to be given " to this house, or any committee thereof, or " directly or indirectly hath endeavoured " to deter or hinder any person from ap- " pearing, or giving evidence, the same is " declared to be a high crime and misde- " meanour; and this house will proceed " with the utmost severity against such of- " fender."—The noble lord then presented the following Petition, which was read by the clerk at the table:

"To the honourable the commons of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in Parliament assembled: The humble Petition of James Paull, esq. one of the candidates to represent the city of Westminster at the last election for members of Parliament to serve for the said city,

"Sheweth, That at the said election the right hon. R. B. Sheridan was returned a member to serve in parliament for the said city. That your petitioner presented a petion to this hon. house, against the return of the said R. B. Sheridan, charging him, among other things, with having procured the same by means of undue and illegal influence, by threats and menaces, and by divers acts of bribery and corruption. That the said petition was appointed to be taken into consideration on the 24th of this instant month of February. That this honourable house thought fit, at the instance of the said R. B. Sheridan, to postpone the consideration of the said petition until the 14th of April now next ensuing. That your petitioner has lately discovered that the said R. B. Sheridan, in defiance of the standing orders of this house, and to the manifest subversion of every principle of justice, has, by divers nefarious ways and means, tampered with and endeavoured to corrupt, and has attempted to persuade and to deter and hinder, certain persons whom your petitioner intended and still intends to examine, and who are and will be material witnesses upon the trial of the said petition, from appearing on the day when the said petition shall be heard, and from giving their unbiassed, or any, testimony on behalf of your petitioner, and against the said R. B. Sheridan.—That one Wm. Drake was and still is a material witness summoned on behalf of your petitioner, and that the said W. Drake having, on or about the 10th of this instant February, informed the said R. B. Sheridan that he had been so summoned, and having enquired of him the course he was to pursue, the said R. B. Sheridan told him to leave that business to him, that he would procure him a situation abroad, and he would also provide for the father of the said W. Drake, and added, that the said W. Drake might have any money he pleased, and wished the said W. Drake to keep out of the way, and endeavoured to persuade the said W. Drake not to give, and to intimidate, and deter, and hinder him from giving, complete and unbiassed testimony before the select committee of the facts known to him relative to the said election, and did offer to give money to the said W. Drake for him to procure for the said R. B. Sheridan a certain letter, in the possession of one Emanuel Harris, and which letter the said E. Harris had been required by an order of the right hon. the speaker to produce before the said committee; and that the said R. B. Sheridan did also, on or about Thursday, the 19th of Feb. instant, again offer the said W. Drake money, and a situation of profit, with the same view, and did likewise on the last mentioned day, endeavour to persuade one Tho. Weatherhead, not to give an unbiassed testimony on the trial of the said petition. And that one Alex. Johnston, one Frederick Homan, one Edwards, and divers others the agents and partisans of the said R. B. Sheridan, did also tamper with the said W. Drake, and endeavour to persuade and to deter, and to hinder him from giving unbiassed testimony before the said committee; and the said A. Johnston and F. Homan did also endeavour to persuade and induce the said W. Drake to procure the aforesaid letter from the said E. Harris.—That the said R. B. Sheridan, by one Henry Burgess, one James Wallace, and one John Gallant, and divers others his agents and partisans, did also tamper with divers other witnesses summoned by your petitioner to give testimony on his behalf: and in particular that the said James Wallace and John Gallant did inform one Wm. Sperring, one Wm. Warren, one Jeremiah James, one John Pullen, one Daniel Richardson, one John Balam, and one Christ. Richardson, whom he knew had been so summoned, that it was intended to move this hon. house to postpone the consideration of the said petition until a future day, by which means the orders to attend the said committee, with which they had been served, would be invalid and of no use; and that if it were postponed but for one day, there would be time for them all to get out of the way to avoid their being served a second time; and added, that when they had succeeded in putting it off, each person should have money to go out of the way to prevent his being summoned; and your petitioner has been informed and verily believes that the said W. Sperring, D. Richardson, and W. Warren are now out of the way, and have been persuaded and induced so to do by the means aforesaid.—That the said R. B. Sheridan, and the several persons, agents, and partisans, aforesaid, with divers others, have conspired together, in manner aforesaid, and in divers other ways, for the purpose of depriving your petitioner of his just right, and preventing him from establishing by his witnesses before a committee of your honourable house, his claim to represent the said city of Westminster.—All which transactions of the said R. B. Sheridan, his agents, and partisans, are to the great injury of your petitioner, in the manifest violation of the standing orders of this hon. house, in defiance of justice, in breach of the law, and to the utter destruction of equal trial. Your petitioner therefore prays that he may be permitted to prove the facts above stated, at the bar of this hon. house, that he may be heard by his counsel at the bar, and that this hon. house will take his witnesses under its protection, and give such relief as in justice shall to this hon. house seem fit. And your petitioner shall ever pray, &c."—Upon the motion that the petition should lie on the table,

Mr. *Sheridan* rose to ask the noble lord, whether it was his intention to follow up this petition by any grave proceeding, because, if so, he would reserve what he had to state upon this subject, until such proceeding should be proposed?

Lord *Folkestone* replied, that he meant the next day to ground a motion upon this petition, of which he took that opportunity to give notice.—The petition was then ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. *Wilberforce* reminded the noble lord, that a question of considerable importance stood for the next day.

The *Speaker* observed, that as the motion of the noble lord referred to a breach of privilege, it naturally took precedency of every other question.

Lord *Howick* concurred with the opinion the house had just heard from the chair, that it had always been usual to proceed to the consideration of any charge connected with a breach of privilege with all convenient expedition. Indeed, the prompt investigation of such an important point was so desirable, that he should wish it to be gone into that night. If the noble lord were inclined to proceed, he could not suppose that there existed on any side of the house the slightest indisposition to hear him.

Lord *Folkestone*, after all that he had heard of the doctrine of notices, was not prepared to expect that the house would be willing to entertain a question of this nature without a previous notice. Such notice being always usual upon grave occasions, he confessed that he was not ready to enter into this question at present; nor did he believe the parties interested for the petition were ready either. For neither he nor they could have expected that the house would have felt disposed to deviate from its general practice in this particular instance.

Mr. *Sheridan* felt it his duty to abstain at present from any remark upon this extraordinary petition. Indeed, if he were now to enter into its allegations, he very much apprehended that he might be led to speak of it in warmer terms of scorn and contempt than would be quite becoming, after the order which the house had just made. His hope and desire was, that the consideration of this subject would be proceeded upon as soon as possible, and he sincerely wished that the noble lord might collect and present petitions, containing all the charges circulated against him, either during the progress, or since the termination of the Westminster election. He would be glad to have the whole of that transaction brought before the house, and fully investigated. It was not one act alone, but every part of the proceeding that it was his wish to have discussed. He had no reason to be afraid of any thing that could be proved. It was the loose allegation which originated in falsehood, which was propagated by craft, and shrunk from enquiry, that could alone affect his interest. With regard to the charges against him, contained in the petition before the house, he did not know whether it would be decent to say that every word of them was a gross falsehood. But this he knew, that he was fully prepared to shew at the bar, if permitted to prove, that all the witnesses examined at the bar were forsworn, but that, he said, would be matter for future observation.

Lord *Howick* rather wished the house should not separate without some farther proceeding upon the subject of the petition. As to the doctrine of notices, he did not conceive it by any means so sacred as the noble lord professed to think. It certainly was not a settled practice, or a standing order, although it had of late been generally observed. This practice, therefore, need not be adhered to on the present occasion. His desire was to avoid any unnecessary delay, and that the noble lord should at once move to refer the petition to the committee of privileges; and after such motion, he would then suggest to the noble lord the propriety of appointing a day for the house to resolve itself into such committee. He was sorry, as the noble lord adhered to notices, that he did not, on some former day, give notice of this petition, and then there could be no reason for the delay that noble lord now proposed. Without entering at present into the general merits of the petition, he had no hesitation in saying that there was one part of the prayer with which he could not concur. Indeed, it would be quite unusual to introduce counsel upon such an occasion. But independently of custom, the house must feel that it would be inconsistent with its dignity to have counsel at its bar, discussing the nature of its own privileges, and the means of preserving them. That part of the prayer of the petition, therefore, he should feel it his duty to oppose. He again said, that he should wish the noble lord to proceed at once upon this important question.

The *Speaker* observed, that as the house had already ordered the petition to lie on the table, it was now too late to make any other order.

Lord *Folkestone* was not aware that it had ever been the practice to give any notice of the intention to present a petition. If such had been the custom, the noble secretary would not have had to express any regret on this occasion. The only notice which he understood custom to require, he had not neglected in this instance, namely, that of apprising the individual concerned of his intention to present such a petition. For he himself left a note the preceding day at the house of the right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan) acquainting him of his intention of presenting the petition this day. With respect to the nature of his future proceeding, he felt some difficulty in determining, in consequence of the declaration which the house had just heard from the noble secretary of state, as he had calculated upon the necessity and propriety of counsel to examine the witnesses. This new difficulty rendered him of course still less capable of proceeding with the promptitude which the noble secretary professed to desire. At this desire he could not help feeling some astonishment, considering how much the doctrine of notices had been often insisted upon, recollecting, indeed, that the neglect of previous notice had been sometimes deemed a fatal objection to the adoption of a motion. But to return to the noble secretary's wish for proceeding that night, the fact was, that such a course would serve to render the whole business nugatory, and would indeed operate to stifle the enquiry, as none of the necessary witnesses were then in attendance, nor could, perhaps, be immediately found. He therefore should postpone the subject until the next day.

Lord *Howick*, influenced by what had fallen from the chair, did not mean to press any farther proceeding that night. But, in order to obviate the possibility of any misconception or misconstruction arising out of what the noble lord had said relative to the idea of rendering this business nugatory, or stifling enquiry, he thought it necessary to repeat the substance of what he had before stated. In urging the noble lord to move at once for referring the petition on the table to a committee of privileges, he by no means proposed that the noble lord should at once be called on to produce his witnesses, and go into the enquiry; on the contrary, he had distinctly stated, that a future day should be appointed for the committee to sit. Therefore, no expression whatever had escaped him which could warrant any man in supposing that he wished the noble lord to be taken by surprise, or hurried into the enquiry without ample preparation. Now, in order that full time should be allowed the noble lord to prepare and bring forward his witnesses, he proposed that the further consideration of this subject should be postponed till Monday.

Lord *Folkestone* expressed his willingness to adopt the suggestion of the noble secretary of state, by postponing till Monday his intended motion upon the subject of Mr. Paull's petition.

Mr. *Adam* wished to know the precise nature of the noble lord's motion, in order that gentlemen should have an opportunity previously to consider it: for with all the desire that he felt to have a charge of such aggravated character probed to the bottom, still he might feel himself under the necessity of negativing the noble lord's motion, should it prove to be incorrect in its nature.

Lord *Folkestone* felt himself unable to give a precise answer to the learned gent.'s question, particularly in consequence of what had fallen from the noble secretary of state. He therefore could not at present say distinctly what would be the form of his motion; but he had no objection to state generally, that the object of it would be to have witnesses called to the bar for examination as to the charges alleged in the petition.

[New Plan of Finance.] Lord *Castlereagh*, before he proposed to name another day for the consideration of the Financial Resolutions he had laid before the house, wished to take this opportunity of submitting three other resolutions which he proposed to bring under its consideration. He did not wish to enter into any detail that could provoke discussion or call for reply. His object was, simply to state the object of the new resolutions he meant to propose. He felt himself called upon to bring forward these resolutions, and particularly in consequence of certain expressions which fell from an hon. gent. (Mr. H. Thornton), whose opinions were much looked up to on all subjects, but particularly on subjects of this nature. That hon. gent. had complained that his (lord C.'s) resolutions instituted comparisons between the noble lord's system and the old mode (Mr. Pitt's) of raising the expences within the year, and not with either of the plans he proposed to substitute, and that this was not fair at a time when it was universally agreed that further taxation ought to be abstained from. Two of the resolutions he had now to propose, were to shew that the noble lord's plan would bear as little comparison with the modifications of it which he had proposed, as with the old system. The third resolution was to shew, that by the noble lord's mode of managing the sinking fund, more injury would be done to the stockholders, than by the former system, or either of the plans proposed by him. He wished to make a few verbal amendments in the resolutions now before the house, in order to put the house fully in possession of his views. Upon the fullest consideration, he saw no reason to alter the opinion he had at first formed of the noble lord's plan, and his objections to it were rather confirmed and increased, than diminished.—The further consideration of all the resolutions was then deferred till Monday fortnight. The whole of the Resolutions moved by the noble lord were as follow;

No. 1.—"That it is proposed by the New Plan of Finance, brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer, that the annual excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the debt charged upon it in any given year, should be declared to be at the disposal of parliament, and applicable to the public service. And it appears that the aggregate produce of the said excesses, between the years 1816 and 1826, will amount in the whole to 11,122,809*l.* (E.)*—That annuities to the amount of 683,062*l.* will fall in between the years 1807 and 1826. (K.)—That it is proposed by the New Plan of Finance, to charge, on the aggregate produce of the said excesses of the sinking fund, and upon the said annuities, the interest and sinking fund of 204,200,000*l.* supplementary loans (B.); and to impose, in aid of the said aggregate produce, between the years 1810 and 1816, new taxes, to the amount of 2,051,000*l.* (C.)—That, in addition to the supplementary loans so to be provided for, it is proposed by the New Plan to raise war loans to the amount of 292,000,000*l.* on the credit of the war taxes, amounting to 21,000,000*l.* (C.)—That the war and supplementary loans of each year, added to so much of the war taxes as may remain unmortgaged, will produce in each year respectively the sum of 32,000,000*l.* (B.)—That, in order to raise the said sum of 32,000,000*l.* in each year, without mortgaging the war taxes, there would be required, in addition to the 21,000,000*l.* of war taxes, an annual loan of 11 millions only.—That, without any mortgage upon the war taxes, (supposing the charge and the permanent provision for the interest and sinking fund of the same, to arise proportionably in the respective years) an annual loan of 11 millions might be provided for, for nearly 19 years, by the application of the same funds; viz. the annuities, amounting to 683,062*l.*; the excesses of the sinking fund, amounting to 11,122,809*l.*; and, the new taxes intended to be imposed by the New Plan, amounting to 2,051,000*l.*, on which the supplementary loans are to be charged."

No. 2.—"That the proposed system of Finance proceeds gradually to mortgage, for 14 years, the whole of the war taxes for the interest of loans in war.—That these taxes are not generally of a nature which can, with propriety, be so pledged as several of them (such as the tax on tonnage and exports, and the duties on tea and on spirits) must probably either be modified, or reduced, on a peace; whilst it is proposed by the said Plan, that the property tax, amounting to 11,500,000*l.* should in that event be entirely remitted; in which case (exclusive of any mortgage at the time affecting the residue of the war taxes) the portion of them which might be continued, without material prejudice to the public revenue beyond the war, must be wholly insufficient to equalize the revenue with the peace expenditure.

Suppose a Peace Establishment at £.15,000,000:
If the War Taxes were mortgaged, there would remain,

Land and Malt	£.2,750,000	
Surplus of Consolidated Fund	3,500,000	
Lottery	450,000	
	£.6,700,000	6,700,000
Annual Deficiency to be provided for by New Loans or Taxes		8,300,000
Supposing the Peace Establishment to amount to		20,000,000
The Deficiency to be provided for, in like manner, would be		13,300,000

No. 3.—"That the New Plan will require loans to a greater amount, to be raised in each year, than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were persevered in.

By the present System, in order to cover a War Expenditure of	£.32,000,000
There would be wanted in each year, in aid of the twenty-one Millions War Taxes, a Loan of	11,000,000
Amounting, in twenty years, to	220,000,000

NEW PLAN:

Amount of War Loans, for twenty years (B)	£. 292,000,000
Ditto of Supplementary Loans, for ditto (B)	204,200,000
Total	£.496,200,000
Total Excess by the New Plan	£.276,200,000

The average capital to be annually raised by the New Plan is,

Annual Amount of Loans, by the New Plan, on a 20-years' average:

War Loan	£. 14,600,000
Supplementary Ditto	10,200,000
Total by New Plan	24,800,800
Average Annual Excess by New Plan	13,800,000

No. 4.—"That the comparative Increase of the Public Debt, which would be produced by the two Systems, and the effect they will have on the proportionate amount of the sinking fund, by their operation in 20 years, is as follows:

EFFECT OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM,
As existing under 26, 32, & 42 Geo. III. cap. 31, 55, & 71.

The Amount of Money Capital of the Public Debt is (by Table N.) in the year 1807	£.363,793,722

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* Note.—The letters refer to the tables in the printed papers, in which the price of the 3 per cent. stock is taken at 60.

The Amount of ditto will be, in the year 1826, supposing 11 millions raised in each year - - - - - -	270,443,305
Decrease of Debt in 20 years, raising 11 millions in each year - - - - - - - - - - - - -	93,350,417

EFFECT OF THE NEW PLAN:

Amount of the Money Capital of the Public Debt, under the New Plan, is, in 1807,	£. 364,993,722
The amount of ditto will be, in 1826,	455,537,932
Increase by New Plan in 20 years	£. 90,544,210

Decrease of Debt by Present System, as above - - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 93,350,417
Increase of ditto by the New Plan	90,544,210
Total increase of debt by New System	£. 183,894,667

EFFECT OF THE PRESENT PLAN ON THE SINKING FUND:

Amount of Sinking Fund, under the Present System, on the Public Debt, 1807, (N)	£. 8,515,042
Amount of ditto will be, in 1826 (N)	27,115,881
Increase of Sinking Fund in 20 years -	18,610,839

EFFECT OF THE NEW PLAN ON THE SINKING FUND:

Amount of Sinking Fund, under the New System, is stated to be, in 1807 - - - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 8,935,042
Amount of ditto under the New System, will be, in 1826 - - - - - - -	26,901,360
Increase in 20 years - - - - - -	£. 17,966,318
Difference in favour of present System - - - - - - - - - - - - -	644,421

So that the New Plan gives only 26,901,360*l.* sinking fund on a debt of 455,537,932*l.*; whilst the present system would give the larger sinking fund of 27,115,881*l.* on the smaller debt of 270,443,305*l.* (N.)—The proportion of the sinking fund to the whole debt, would be, under the present Plan, in 1826, above one-tenth.—The proportion of the sinking fund to the whole debt, under the New Plan, will be in 1826, about one-seventeenth. (N.)—The sinking fund, under the present plan, above stated at 27,115,881*l.* continues to increase at compound interest, after the year 1826, till the whole debt is redeemed.—The Sinking Fund, under the New Plan, having attained its maximum of 28,155,358*l.* in the year 1820, descends to 26,901,360*l.* in the year 1826; and must continue to decline after that period, so long as the excesses shall be deducted."

No. 5.—"That an Increase of Charges for the interest and sinking fund of loans, for the 20 years, must take place under the New Plan, compared with the like charge, which would take place, were the present system persevered in.

EFFECTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.

Annual Loan £. 11,000,000.—Charge for Interest and Sinking Fund (L)	£. 733,333
Amount of Loans for twenty years, £. 220,000,000.—Charge for ditto (L.) - - - - - - - - - - -	14,666,680

EFFECT OF THE NEW PLAN:

Charge of the Supplementary Loans, amounting in 20 years to £. 204,200,000. Expiring Annuities deducted (C)	£. 14,266,38
War Taxes, mortgaged at the end of 20 years, which are to be liberated successively in the next 14 years after 1826 - - - - - - - - - -	21,000,000

Charge, as above, under the present System (L) - - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 14,666,660
Charge under the New Plan, for Supplementary Loans only (G.) - -	14,299,388
Difference, exclusive of Charge of Distribution, as stated in Resolution 8. A. - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 370,272

War Taxes, mortgaged as above for War Loans, according to the New Plan - - - - - - - - -	£. 21,000,000
Ditto, according to the present System - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Nil.

No. 6.—"That the Ways and Means, proposed by the New Plan, to prevent the necessity of imposing new taxes to any considerable amount, viz. the expiring annuities, together with the excesses of the sinking fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, are equally applicable, *pro tanto*, to mitigate their increase under any other mode of raising loans which may be decided on. The means proposed by the New Plan, of defraying the interest and sinking fund of the supplementary loans are as follows:

Produce of the Excess of the Sinking Fund between 1816 and 1826, above the interest of the Unredeemed Debt (F) - - - -	£. 11,122,809
Applicable by the falling-in of Annuities - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	683,062
New Permanent Taxes proposed by the New Plan to be raised between 1810 and 1817, to the amount of (K) - - - - - - - - - -	2,051,000
Total - - - - - -	£. 13,856,871

Charge of Supplementary Loans, Annuities not deducted (C) - -	£. 14,296,388
* Ways and Means as above - - - -	13,856,871
Remains to be provided for, exclusive of the charge of equalizing the Ways and Means, with the charge, so far as they do not arise proportionally within the respective years,	£. 439,517

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* Vide Res. 8. A.

Charge for the total amount of Loans, at the rate of 11,000,000*l.* a year, under the present System, at 733,333*l.* per annum, for Interest and Sinking Fund; the Expiring Annuities not deducted (K)	£.14,666,660
As a Fund to supply this Charge, the Ways and Means, as above, for raising the Interest and Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Loans, may be applied, *pro tanto*	13,856,871
Remains to be provided for, in order to cover the charge, exclusive of the charge of distribution, as above	£.809,789

It therefore appears, that the means required to be applied under the New System, to defray the charge for Interest and Sinking Fund on the Supplementary Loans alone, would, with the addition of taxes to the amount of 370,272*l.*, and the charge of distribution, as above, defray the total charges of the loans required to complete the fund of 32,000,000*l.* annually for war expenditure, without the necessity of any incumbrance whatever upon the War Taxes.

No. 7.—"That the comparative Effects which would be produced on the Public Income by the two Systems on return of peace, and on the formation of a peace establishment, are as follows:

Under the Present Plan:

There would be no charge whatever upon any part of the war taxes. The whole 21 millions would remain free. The property tax, or whatever portion of the other war taxes were not required towards making an adequate provision for the peace establishment, might be immediately remitted, leaving that resource unpledged, and available on the recurrence of war.

Under the New System:

When peace takes place, a considerable part, if not the whole of the war taxes, will have been mortgaged. In the latter case, there will only remain a clear revenue of 6,700,000*l.* immediately applicable to support the charges of a peace establishment,—By table R. it appears that in 1826, the excesses of the war and present sinking fund, will, if peace be then made, amount to 10,720,730*l.* If this sum shall be then preferably applied to liberate a part of the property tax mortgaged for the war debt, the remainder of the property tax, and all the war taxes, will become permanent taxes, and part of the consolidated fund, and be mortgaged, like the other parts of that fund, for the redemption of the war debt, and the present debt thus consolidated into a common debt; and the deficiency, on the peace establishment, must be provided for either by fresh taxes, or fresh loans."

No 8.—"That the sum of 11 millions a year, required in aid of the 21 millions War Taxes, to complete the War Expenditure of 32 millions, may be raised (should the principle of applying the excesses of the Sinking Fund to the public service be decided on) according to the following mode, without mortgaging the war taxes; without swelling the loans to be raised within the year to the inordinate amount of 32 millions sterling; without rendering new taxes of any materially greater amount necessary than it is proposed to lay on by the New System, and without making so considerable an addition to the debt as will be made, should the New System be carried into execution.

The sum required as above, to provide for a loan of 11 millions per ann., for 20 years, is	£. 14,666,660
The resources available, amount (exclusive of the charges of distribution) to	13,856,871
Deficiency	£. 809,789

The deficiency of 809,789*l.* exceeding only by 370,272*l.* the charges for supplementary loans, would remain an additional charge to be provided for, in addition to the charge of equalizing the ways and means with the annual demands within the respective years.—As the charges upon a loan of 11 millions would, in each year, amount to 733,333*l.*, if it should be thought fit, in aid of the annuities, to raise, in the first 9 years, only the precise amount of taxes proposed by the New Plan, until the excesses of the sinking fund shall arise in 1816; the difference between the above funds, and the annual charge of 733,333*l.* may be added as it arises in the said period, to the loan of the year; the interest and sinking fund thereon being defrayed, in the first instance, out of the consolidated fund, till otherwise replaced."

No. 8.—(A.) "That the comparative effects of the Plan in Res. 8. as contrasted with the New System, may be stated as follows:

First Case.—Supposing peace to take place at the end of the ninth year, that is, in 1815:

Capital borrowed in 9 years by New System.

War Loans - - - - - -	£. 130,000,000
Supplementary Loans - - -	30,200,000
Total borrowed by New Plan	£. 160,2000,00

Capital borrowed in 9 years by Resolution 8.

Ordinary Loans, at 11 millions annually - - - - - - - - - - -	£. 99,000,000
To equalize Ways and Means with the charge, within the respective years, including the advances from the Consolidated Fund - - -	29,791,234
Total borrowed by Resolution 8 -	128,791,234
More capital borrowed by New Plan	£. 31,408,766

Debt remaining unredeemed at the end of 1815; also, Comparative Amount of Sinking Fund, supposing peace then to take place, the excesses of the war sinking fund in New Plan being previously deducted, in order to liberate the larger proportion of war taxes:

	Debt:	Sinking Fund:
By New Plan - -	384,480,570	—18,278,435 - $\frac{1}{21}$
By Res. 8. - - -	378,249,442	—15,645,001 - $\frac{1}{24}$
More Debt by New Plan .	£. 6,231,128	

By New Plan, War Taxes pledged, and rendered permanent after the excesses of War Sinking Fund have been deducted - - - - - - - - - - - - -	£ 9,517,749
By Resolution 8. War Taxes pledged -	Nil.
By New Plan, Loan raised in 1815 - -	24,000,000
By Res. 8. Ditto, including a sum equal to the advances from Consolidated Fund	17,019,360

In the above case no new taxes, beyond those to be imposed by the New Plan, will be required; as the excesses of the present sinking fund arising in 1816, will fully supply the permanent provision for the postponed charge of the loans raised in the preceding 9 years.

SECOND CASE.—Supposing war to continue to the end of 20 years:

Capital to be raised by New Plan.

War Loans - - - - - - - -	292,000,000
Supplementary Loans - - -	204,200,000
Total borrowed by New Plan	£. 496,200,000

Ditto, by Resolution 8, 11 millions in each year - - - - - - - - - - -	220,000,000
To equalize Ways and Means up to 1815	29,791,234
To equalize ditto up to 1826, supposing 500,000*l.* New Taxes, (in addition to those proposed by New Plan) to be imposed in each of the 6 years successively from 1816 to 1821, both inclusive - - - - -	16,807,600
Total Capital borrowed by Res. 8 -	£. 266,598,834
More Capital borrowed by New Plan -	229,601,166

Debt remaining unredeemed at the end of 1826; also, Comparative Amount of Sinking Fund, supposing peace then made, the excesses of the war sinking fund being previously deducted in order to liberate the larger proportion of War Taxes:

	Debt	Sinking Fund
By New Plan, in 1826	428,636,572	—17,525,698—$\frac{1}{24}$
By Res. 8. in do. -	341,960,615	—15,740,171 - $\frac{1}{21}$
More debt unredeemed by New Plan.	£. 86,675,957	

By New Plan, War Taxes pledged, and rendered permanent after the excesses of the War Sinking Fund have been deducted - - - -	£. 10,279,270
By Res 8. War Taxes pledged - - - -	Nil.

By New Plan, loan to be raised in 1826 -	32,000,000
By Resolution 8 - - - - - - - - - - -	11,000,000

There is, however, to be set off against the 10,279,270*l.* war taxes rendered permanent by New Plan, the 3,000,000*l.* New Taxes to be laid on between 1816 and 1826, supposing the whole period to be one of war. In the event however of peace taking place between 1816 and 1821, these New Taxes, according to the period at which it shall happen, may be altogether dispensed with, or proportionably reduced. Whereas the amount of the war taxes, which will be pledged and rendered permanent, even at the commencement of 1816, is 9,517,749*l.*"

No. 9.—"That nearly the same results (viz. the having abstained from mortgaging the war taxes, and the having kept the loan of the year within moderate limits,) may be produced, by determining, that when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking fund in the said year, instead of making provision for the interest of the said loan by new taxes, the same shall be provided for by and out of the Interest receivable on the Amount of Stock in that year, redeemed by the commissioners of the national debt: in which case, the amount of debt unredeemed will continue stationary during war.

The Sinking Fund is at present (N)	£. 8,331,709
It will be, at the close of 1810 - - -	10,956,941

In about 4 years therefore, from the present time, no new taxes will be required (the data remaining the same) however long the war may continue; and the war taxes will remain free at the close of the war, when the sinking fund will resume its progressive operation; the purchase of stock by the commissioners being continued, in the mean time, to the full amount of the sinking fund,

That the charge for 4 years Loan, as above, for 11 millions in each year, taking credit for 385,515*l.* Annuities, amounts to	2,547,810
Taxes required in each year, for the next 4 years	626,952

The taxes so to be imposed exceed only, by 496,810*l.* the total amount of New Taxes proposed by the New Plan to be imposed between 1810 and 1817; by which Plan, the war taxes are at the same time progressively absorbed and pledged for the redemption of the loans raised upon them.

According to this plan, the Debt would continue stationary throughout the war, at	358,955,705
Amount of Debt at close of 1826, by New Plan (N)	428,636,572
Ditto in 1826, by this plan	358,955,705
Difference of Debt in favour of this plan	£.69,680,867

And no War Taxes mortgaged.

Any excess of annual expenditure above the 32 millions, is supposed in this, as in the New Plan, to be separately provided for in the usual manner."

No. 9 (A.) "The Comparative Effect of the above Plan (Res. 9.) as contrasted with the New System, may be stated as follows:

1st Case.—Supposing peace to take place at the end of 7th year, 1813:

Capital borrowed in 7 years.

By New Plan, War Loans	98,000,000
By ditto Supplementary Loans	15,800,000
Total borrowed by New Plan	113,800,000
By Res. 9, 11 millions in each year	77,000,000
More borrowed by New Plan	£. 36,800,000

Debt remaining unredeemed at the end of 1813; also Comparative Amount of Sinking Fund, supposing peace then made, the excesses of the War Sinking Fund in New Plan being previously deducted in order thereby to liberate the larger proportion of war taxes.

	Debt:	Sinking Fund.	
By New Plan	£. 377,653,730	15,915,952	$\frac{1}{23}$
By Res. 9.	358,955,705	10,956,941	$\frac{1}{32}$
More Debt by New Plan.	18,698,625		

By New Plan, War Taxes pledged and rendered permanent after the excesses of the War Sinking Fund are deducted	£. 7,773,921
By Res. 9. War Taxes pledged	Nil.
By New Plan, New Taxes imposed	1,172,000
By Res. 9 ditto	2,547,810
By New Plan, Loan to be raised in 1814	20,800,000
By Res. 9. ditto in ditto	11,000,000

2d CASE.—Supposing peace to take place at the end of 14 years, 1820:

Capital borrowed in 14 years,

By New Plan, War Loans	210,000,000
By ditto, Supplementary Loans	94,200,000
Total borrowed by New Plan	304,200,000
By Res. 9. 11 millions in each year	154,000,000
More borrowed by New Plan	£. 150,200,000

Debt unredeemed at end of 1820; also Comparative Amount of Sinking Fund, supposing peace then made, stated as in preceding case:

	Debt:	Sinking Fund:	
By New Plan	£. 401,231,629	17,744,021	$\frac{1}{22}$
By Res. 9.	358,955,705	10,956,941	$\frac{1}{33}$
More debt by New Plan.	42,275,924		

By New Plan, War Taxes rendered permanent	£. 9,180,896
By Res. 9. War Taxes pledged	Nil.
By New Plan, New Taxes imposed	2,051,000
By Res. 9. ditto	2,547,810
By New Plan, Loan in 1820	32,000,000
By Res. 9. ditto in ditto	11,000,000

3d CASE.—Supposing peace to take place at the end of 20 years, 1826:

Capital borrowed in 20 years,

By New Plan, War Loans	292,000,000
By ditto Supplementary Loans	204,200,000
Total borrowed by New Plan	496,200,000
By Res. 9, 11 millions in each year	220,000,000
More borrowed by New Plan	£. 276,200,000

Debt unredeemed at end of 1826; also, Comparative Amount of Sinking Fund, supposing peace then made, stated as in the preceding cases:

	Debt:	Sinking Fund:
By New Plan	£. 248,636,572	17,524,698
By Res. 9.	358,955,705	10,956,941
More debt by New Plan	69,682,867	

By New Plan, War Taxes rendered permanent	10,280,000
By Res. 9. War Taxes pledged	Nil.
By New Plan, New Taxes imposed	2,051,000
By Res. 9. ditto	2,547,810
By New Plan, Loan in 1826	32,000,000
By Res. 9. ditto in ditto	11,000,000

That the improvidence of the mode of raising money, proposed by the New Plan, will best appear, if, instead of having the whole of the war taxes free upon a peace, as is the case by Res. 9. a portion of them equal to the amount pledged, and rendered permanent in 1826 by the New Plan, viz. 10,279,270*l.* should be then given over to the sinking fund, as it will stand by Resolution 9. in that year. The comparison of debt and sinking fund would then stand thus; the war taxes being equally mortgaged :

	Debt.	Sinking Fund.
By New Plan -	£.428,636,572 -	£.17,525,698
By Res. 9. - - -	358,955,705 - -	21,236,211 $\frac{1}{16}$
By New Plan, more Debt.	£.69,680,867 less Sinking Fund	£ 3,710,513

The same observation applies to both the preceding cases.

If the measure of imposing the 2,547,810*l.* new taxes, required by resolution 9. in the first four years, be objected to, and it be deemed expedient that the imposition of new taxes in the next three years be wholly abstained from, their commencement may be postponed till the fourth year, by simply confining the provision in the first 3 years to a sum sufficient to cover the difference between the eleven millions to be raised, and the stock purchased within the year, by the sinking fund, that is, to the sum of 2,668,291*l.*, the annual interest and sinking fund on which amounting to 177,886*l.*, will be nearly covered by the annuities which are to fall in, in the two first years. A small increase of taxes beyond the 2,547,816*l.*, viz. of 533,658*l.* will result from this temporary indulgence in the following years; but, on the other hand, credit may be taken for the annuities, amounting to 298,092*l.* which are subsequently to fall in."

No. 9.—(B.) "That much prejudice and embarrassment is likely to result both to the interest of the stockholder, and to the money transactions of the country, from the large and rapidly increasing loans which must be raised, according to the New Plan, in each year of war, the annual amount of which, in the latter years of the operation (if to their estimated amount, viz. 32 millions, be added the sums which will be required for the service of Ireland, for subsidies, and other unforeseen expences, and for the progressive advance of charge upon any given establishment) will probably not fall short before the close of the period, of from 40 to 50 millions money capital; which, supposing the 3 per-cents. at 60, would require the creation of a capital of from 66 to 82 millions annually.—That the making of loans to such an inordinate amount (increasing in each year in a greater proportion than the sinking fund) must, by the great influx of new stock to be thus created, and sold in the market, have a tendency to lower the price of the public securities, and consequently to reduce the value of the property of the stockholder.—That the negociation of loans to so large an amount, and the augmented issues which will be required to be made from the exchequer in execution of the said Plan, must lead to an extension of the circulating medium of the country, to increased charges of management on the part of the public, and to the accelerated depreciation of the value of money, on the stability of which the interest of the stockholder, and those who may enjoy fixed rents, so peculiarly depends.—That the principle of placing at the disposal of parliament the excesses of the sinking fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed, as proposed by the New Plan, is calculated to lead to a much more extended diversion of the sinking fund from its application to the purchase of stock, than the principle proposed in Resolution 9. viz. that of applying in war, not the fund itself, but the interest of the stock redeemed within the year by the fund, as a provision for the loan of that particular year; inasmuch as the latter only proposes to derive aid from the operations of the sinking fund during war, and only to the precise extent of the interest of the sums redeemed within the year, leaving the fund entire to resume its operation at compound interest, upon a peace; whereas the former Plan opens the excesses of the sinking fund to the absolute disposal of parliament, in peace as well as in war, "for such public services as parliament may direct," without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802, shall be redeemed within 45 years from that period, instead of 24 years from the present time, as it would be reduced by the operations of the fund, as it now stands, under the provisions of the 42d Geo. III. cap. 71. thereby annually subtracting from the fund itself after the year 1816, and rendering it, even in peace, a declining instead of a growing fund.—That the equivalent which, it is alleged, is to be given to the stockholder for so extensive and permanent a disappropriation of the sinking fund from the redemption of the debt; viz. the additional 5 per-cent. sinking fund on the war loans, cannot be deemed, for the reasons above stated, even in time of war, to operate as any compensation or equivalent whatever, as the value of his property is likely to be more injured by the unnecessary and improvident accumulation of loans in the market, than improved by the addition thereby made to the sinking fund of the year by borrowed capital. But as the benefit (if it really were one) can accrue only during war, and must cease with it, the stockholder is called upon, for the temporary enjoyment of this questionable advantage (possibly only for a few months) to submit to have the sinking fund, which is now expressly pledged by the 5th section of the 42d of Geo. III. cap. 71. to the uninterrupted liquidation of his debt, largely diverted from that object even in time of peace, when no adequate public exigency can be alleged to justify the same; and when, from a variety of intervening causes, (at least there are no grounds upon which parliament can at this day safely conclude to the contrary) the interests of the stockholder, as well as those of the public, may be best consulted, by suffering the accumulation of the sinking fund to proceed, as hitherto, at compound interest, in reduction of the national debt, and in conformity to the provisions of the existing law."

No. 10.—" That the expence of raising any given amount of loan on the present system; viz. by a single loan, with a sinking fund of one per-cent. as compared with the principle of the New Plan, of raising the same amount by double and concurrent loans; the one raised upon a fund of ten per-cent. for interest and sinking fund; the other raised upon a fund of six per-cent. for interest and sinking fund; calculating the payments on account thereof from the commencement to the final liquidation of the said loan, is as follows; the sinking fund in both cases being taken on the money, instead of the nominal capital:

Suppose 12,000,000*l.* to be raised:	
Ten per cent. Interest and Sinking Fund on 12,000,000*l.* for 1 year - - - - -	1,200,000
A like charge for 13 years more, at which time the Principal is redeemed - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	15,600,000
Total Payments - - - - - £.	16,800,000

To cover the interest and sinking fund of 1,200,000*l.* at six per-cent. a fund of 72,000*l.* must be provided in each of the fourteen years;—the amount thereof is 1,008,000*l.*

The latter sum, being raised on a one-per-cent. sinking fund, may be considered as an annuity of 43 years.

Payments on account thereof -	43,344,000
Payments as above - - - - - - -	16,800,000
Total Payments - - - - - £.	60,144,000

Present System :

The Interest and Sinking Fund on a loan of 12,000,000*l.*, at six per-cent. amounts, per annum, to 720,000*l.*

This charge being raised on a one-per-cent. sinking fund, may be considered as an annuity of 43 years.

Payments to be made on account thereof till its redemption - - - £.	30,960,000

Payments on New System, upon a loan of 12,000,000 - - - -	60,144,000
Ditto on present System - - - - - -	30,960,000
Excess of the charge of Redemption by New System" - - - - - - - - - - £.	29,184,000"

[Carnatic Papers.] Sir *Thomas Turton* rose and spoke as follows:—Pursuant to a notice I gave on a former day, I rise, sir, to call the attention of the house to the subject of the Carnatic. The papers which I think necessary for the elucidation of that subject, and which will be specified in the motion I shall have the honour of making, and to which, I trust, there will be no objection, since they have already been laid upon the table of this house, and remained there for a considerable time—the papers alluded to were called for by an hon. gent. not now a member of this house, and they were moved for originally on reasons which I hope will apply now. After a short statement of the case, I am inclined to believe there will be no objection to my motion, because the documents it calls for are necessary for the purpose of justice, as well towards the party accused, as to the accuser. When the motion was formerly made on this subject, the facts were then recent in the recollection of the house, from the history of the transactions which was then given. Sir, it is in the recollection of almost every man, that intelligence arrived in this country, of the death of Omdut ul Omrah, commonly called the nabob of the Carnatic, and of the circumstances of his lineal successor, as he would have been by the Mahomedan law, being dethroned, and another placed in his room. Many persons acquainted with Indian politics, perfectly well know the circumstances attending that deposition—but none could reconcile the act on any principle of justice; for every one knew, from the youth of the prince, as well as from his mode of conduct, that the act could not have arisen out of any proceedings of his own. He had not had an and against whom his motion was to be directed. Did he mean to attack lord Wellesley, or lord Powis, or the directors, or the board of controul, or the late ministers? He wished to know what he was driving at, if he knew it himself, for he seemed to have some doubts about the matter. In the mean time he hoped that the house would not allow the characters of the executive officers to be complimented away by the praises which the right hon. gent. and the hon. baronet, had thought proper to bestow on each other. He contended that the conduct of the executive officers had been approved of by the directors and the board of controul, the cabinet, and this house. They had only executed the orders they had received, and the responsibility therefore did not rest with them, though he did not admit that they had by any means even lent themselves as instruments to any improper act. He then adverted to the injustice done to persons accused, by allowing the charge to hang over. He also said, that from his own knowledge, he could affirm that the revival of old charges was attended with great mischief to our Indian government. It shook the confidence of the natives in its stability, and nourished a desire of change, which prevailed in a particular degree in these people, and was generally the case in arbitrary governments. He wished to know specifically what was the design of the hon. baronet before he gave his assent to the motion?

Mr. *Grant* said, though he did not flatter himself that much benefit would result from this discussion, yet, as a friend to discussion in general, and considering the house of commons as the only security which the inhabitants of British India had for protection and redress, and the only place in which an investigation into the affairs of India could be instituted, it was necessary that he should take notice of some assertions which had been made in the course of this debate. It was asserted, that they had recommended, if not ordered, the revolution which took place in India, by the assumption of the territories of the Carnatic, to which it must first be answered, that they disclaimed all interference in the nature of compulsion, and he read an extract from their minutes, by which such an interference was expressly disclaimed, and then asked how such a proceeding should be tortured into an approbation, much less an authority, for the revolution which took place? He could state, that the court of directors never did approve of that measure; for the sake, therefore, of having the conduct of the court of directors investigated, he was friendly to the present motion. He was very glad that the friends of lord Wellesley were so desirous of entering into this investigation. He declined, however, to enter into the merits of the revolution in 1801, and he could speak with the greater freedom, as he had not at that period any share in the direction. It was to be observed, however, that the board of controul took that affair into their own hands, and superseded altogether the court of directors. And the right hon. baronet (Sir J. Anstruther) opposite to him, was completely mistaken in considering the secret committee, and the court of directors, as being connected; it was, in point of fact, a complete mistake, in form as well as in substance. The secret committee was the express, direct, and immediate organ of the board of controul. Their proceedings were utterly unknown to the court of directors. The secret committee was subject in no way or respect whatsoever to the court of directors, who were indeed entirely ignorant of the proceedings of the secret committee. This act, therefore, of the secret committee, which the right hon. baronet treated as the act of the court of directors, was an act in which they had no share, of which they had no knowledge,—an act with which they had not the slightest concern; and it was an act on which the board of controul had exercised its authority; and as that board was superior in India concerns, it became extremely difficult for the court of directors even to express an opinion, much less exercise a judgment on a decision of the board of controul, without incurring the imputation of resisting superior authority. It was liable to the objection of leading to great derangement in their affairs. Another reason which prevented the interference was, the subject of the asumption of the Carnatic had become the subject of parliamentary enquiry, which superseded both the board of controul and the court of directors.

Sir *John Anstruther* denied that he wished to oppose enquiry. He only said that it ought not to be allowed to drag on for years. The court of directors had instructed their officers to pay the same deference to the orders of the secret committee as to those of the directors themselves, and as the secret committee had approved of the conduct of lord Wellesley, he was fully warranted in saying that the directors through them had expressed their approbation of it.

Mr. *Grant* denied that the court of directors submitted themselves entirely to the guidance of the secret committee.

Sir *Arthur Wellesley* said, he was disposed to pursue the same line he had adopted last session, and was, therefore, willing to accede to every motion for papers, that could enable the house to decide upon the whole case. Neither would any friend of his noble relation give any opposition to the production of such information. But it was his opinion, that all the papers should be reprinted, and with that view he should feel it his duty to move, as well for those omitted by the hon. baronet, as for any others that might be necessary for the elucidation of the transaction. He wished the house to consider the situation of his noble relation with this charge hanging six years over him. It appeared by the papers, that the court of directors had sent out instructions to take possession of the Carnatic, at the commencement of the war with Tippoo Sultan, and not to restore it to the nabob. It was rather extraordinary, therefore, that a charge should be brought for a transaction commanded and approved by the court of directors, and sanctioned by his majesty and by act of parliament.

Mr. *R. Thornton* complained of the accusations thrown out against the directors without documents on the table to warrant them. He regretted the delay which had taken place, but maintained that no blame rested with the directors. The reasons given by the right hon. gent. over the way (Mr. Sheridan), for his abandoning the case, did not appear to him satisfactory. When he had brought forward the question, he thought he was going hand in hand with him, but he soon found that he himself was to be accused. There were some points with respect to the government in India that required the interference of that house, which was the dernier resort in such cases. But the court of directors were not the proper persons to become accusers. If they put themselves forward in this way, they might do a great deal of mischief to our interests in India. From the nature of their situation, it was not expedient in any view that they should come prominently forwards, unless assured of effectual support. The hon. baronet (sir J. Anstruther) had himself before gone a considerable way back in an enquiry into Indian transactions. It was but reasonable that he should allow the same privilege to others. He was glad that the subject had come under investigation, and was not much alarmed as to the result. He denied that the directors had given any instructions to sanction the revolution in the Carnatic. The court of directors were quite distinct from the secret committee, which was not responsible even for such papers as had its own signature.

Mr. *Tierney* would not object to the reprinting of the papers which had been before produced, and agreed that that house was the dernier resort in such cases. But he lamented that the subject had been now brought forward, as he could see no good that could result from it. It had before been properly brought forward, and he lamented that it had not then been proceeded in. He begged of the house to consider the consequences. The subject was one of the deepest importance, particularly with a view to the transfer of property, which had taken place since the transaction which had been adverted to. But, at the same time, he admitted that even the inconvenience that might result from the disturbance of property, ought not to deter the house, if it was called upon, from investigating the case, and applying its censures where censure was due. He was sorry that the hon. baronet had not mentioned more distinctly whom he intended to accuse. He admitted that the board of controul was responsible for the secret committee, but he denied that this committee was such a nullity as some might suppose from the description of it which had that night been given, and he cautioned gentlemen against speaking of it in these terms, as they might, by these means, propagate an opinion that it was useless. He gave no opinion respecting the merits of the transactions. He agreed to the motion of reprinting the former papers; but it was doubtful whether the others could be granted, till the hon. baronet should state what they were, and till he had an opportunity of examining whether they could be produced without detriment to the public service.

Lord *Folkestone* contended, that with respect to the assumption of the government of the Carnatic, blame lay somewhere, and that it was a matter of serious investigation to ascertain where all the censure of that most extraordinary revolution should devolve. The hon. baronet had been pressed to state distinctly his object in calling for those papers; he did not think this fair; it might be impossible for the hon. baronet distinctly to state his object, until he had been previously furnished with the necessary evidence by those papers; but before that evidence should be furnished, he thought it a subject of too great magnitude to warrant any member in distinctly pledging himself to a specific charge.

Mr. *Hiley Addington* begged gentlemen to recollect, that there had been more papers relative to India called for, and produced in the last session of the late parliament, than for six sessions before; he was entirely of opinion, that in calling for papers upon any subject, the object should be distinctly stated; he acquitted the hon. baronet of being actuated by any sinister motives of party or vanity in bringing forward his present motion, and praised the manly and ingenuous conduct of the gallant general (Wellesley) in every question relating to Indian enquiry.

Mr. *S. Stanhope* thought it a most extraordinary mode of opposing the hon. baronet's motion, by refusing to assent to the production of the papers called for, until the object had been distinctly stated, which object the papers in question were alone to ascertain. He complained of a radical defect in the present state of the government in India, and knew not whether more governments had been subverted by it in the East or by Bonaparte in the West.

Sir *T. Turton*, in reply, said that when it appeared from the arguments upon both sides, that it was a question whether the court of directors approved or disapproved of the conduct of their servants in India, he did not think a stronger argument than this very doubt could possibly be advanced in favour of the motion he had submitted to the house: his object was substantial justice, and in the pursuit of that, however deficient in other respects, he should not be found defective in zeal, diligence, and perseverance. As to the voluminous papers with which he had been threatened from the other side, if such papers contributed in the least degree to the defence of the accused, he himself should gladly second the motion for their production. He had been urged to state distinctly the object of his motion; it was impossible to state in a case of such magnitude, on whom the evidence found in these papers might especially bear; and it was, therefore, in the present stage of the business, impossible for him distinctly to pledge himself, further than avowing it as his intention to submit a motion committing the house to a censure of the East-India company, or its servants, in the assumption of the government of the Carnatic. The hon. baronet concluded with an appeal to the feelings of the house, in which he alluded to the melancholy fate of the deposed prince, who, he could prove, had perished in a dungeon.

Sir *A. Wellesley* explicitly denied that the prince, as stated by the hon. baronet, was imprisoned in a dungeon, or died by any other than natural causes. He thought it became a gentleman of the hon. baronet's profession, to be more cautious in making such charges.

Sir *T. Turton* maintained that the papers fully bore him out in his assertion, though he did not in the least implicate lord Wellesley in that dark transaction.

Mr. *Fuller* thought the enquiry should be fully gone into.

Mr. *Sheridan*, while he acquitted in the fullest manner the noble lord (Wellesley), had not a doubt upon his mind, that the young prince came to his death by foul and extraordinary means.—The motion was then put and carried.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, February 27.

[Insolvent Debtors.] Lord *Holland* presented a petition from the debtors confined in the king's bench prison, praying for such relief as to the house should seem meet. His lordship observed, that, after what passed last session respecting this subject, it was almost needless for him to say, that it was not his intention to propose any bill for the relief of insolvent debtors. The petition, indeed, did not pray for any such bill, but rather for a general law respecting debtor and creditor, by the operation of which they might be restored to their families. Of the necessity of some law of this nature there could be no doubt; and he was happy that a noble friend of his, who had formerly called the attention of the house to this important subject, had again applied his mind to its consideration; and that, in another place, a part of the subject had been taken up by a gentleman of distinguished talents and benevolence. From these circumstances, he looked forward with the greatest satisfaction to the adoption of some measure respecting this subject, which would have the effect of removing many of those evils which at present existed. He should merely now move that the petition do lie on the table.—Ordered.

[Taxation.] The Earl of *Warwick* entreated the indulgence of the house, whilst he endeavoured to state to their lordships the outline of a plan which he wished to propose, with a view of introducing a more equal and equitable system of taxation. At a period like the present, when the great aggrandizement and insatiable ambition of France called upon this country for every exertion that could be made, in order to carry on the war with vigour and effect, when peace was placed at a distance not to be calculated upon, and when all Europe looked to this country as their great stay and hope, it was of the utmost importance to consider how that amount of revenue which must necessarily be had, could be raised with the least pressure upon the people. He objected to the present complicated system of taxation, as not calculated to attain the desired object, and as proceeding upon erroneous data; at present, whilst taxation pressed heavily upon some classes, others in a great degree escaped. His great object was that it should be borne equally and equitably by all. To effect this, he had formed a plan which was totally novel, and which had never yet either been spoken or written upon. The more he had considered this plan, the more he was convinced of its efficiency, and of the inadequacy of the present system of taxation. He objected to making property the criterion of taxation, because it was difficult to define what property was; he would only consider property by means of its sign, labour. The great objection to the tax upon property was, that whilst it got at some descriptions of property, persons engaged in commerce, in manufactures, in professions, and in various speculations, made what returns of property they pleased, and paid accordingly. He wished that taxation should be equal and equitable, and at the same time general and compulsory, not partial and voluntary. He had made several calculations for the purpose of establishing the efficiency of his plan, the result of which had astonished him, and would no doubt surprize their lordships; the basis he took was expenditure. Being doubtful whether his voice would enable him to convey all that he wished to say upon the subject, he had on the preceding day put down his ideas upon paper, and, with their lordships' permission, he would read them. His lordship read to the house several observations similar in purport to those he had previously made, and afterwards stated his plan, which proceeded upon the calculation of 12,000,000 of population; then taking 3,000,000; at 6*d.* per day expenditure, the amount would be, for 3 millions, at 6*d.* per day, 27,375,000*l.*; for one million, at 1*s.* per day, 18,250,000*l.*; at 2*s.* per day, 36,500,000*l.*; at 3*s.* per day, 54,750,000*l.*; at 4*s.* per day, 73,000,000*l.*; at 5*s.* per day, 91,250,000*l.*; at 10*s.* per day, 182,500,000*l.*; at 12*s.* per day, 219,000,000*l.*; at 15*s.* per day, 273,750,000*l.*; at 20*s.* per day, 365,000,000*l.*; total, 1,341,375,000*l.* The classes up to 5*s.* inclusive, his lordship reckoned the employed, and the other classes the employers. Taking the population at 12,500,000, there would remain 500,000 persons, whom he would suppose to spend 1000*l.* a year each, amounting to 500,000,000*l.*; but even supposing that to be the case, he would make a present of that amount to their lordships, and rely upon the remainder, a small per centage upon which would produce considerably more than the property tax did at present, whilst it would fall equitably upon every one, and each would at once know what he was to pay. He thought the best mode of proceeding would be to refer his plan to a committee, and concluded by making a motion to that effect.

Lord *Grenville* thought, that in point of form the motion could not be entertained by the house, as there was no paper before their lordships which could, consistently with the forms of the house, be referred to a committee. With respect to the plan proposed by the noble lord, he had considerable doubts of its efficiency. Expenditure was undoubtedly taken as one of the criterions of direct taxation, it being the sign of wealth; but where the exigencies of the country required a large sum to be raised, the more the amount of taxation necessary to be raised was diffused in different channels, it would be found that the less was the pressure upon the people. It was unquestionably an object of the greatest importance where burthens were to be imposed upon the people, to make them fall as lightly as possible, and the great advantage of indirect taxation was, that it fell to a certain extent upon articles, respecting which it was in the power of the consumer to lessen his consumption of those articles, or leave them off altogether; and thus the payment of these taxes was voluntary, as depending upon the consumption of the articles. He admitted, with respect to the property tax, that it did not reach every description of income, but an approximation was continually making to its more effectual operation upon those classes whom it was its object to include. The object of the noble lord appeared to be to simplify taxation, but he thought the effect of that simplification, as stated in the noble lord's plan, would be much more oppressive than the system it was proposed to supercede, particularly as, according to the plan of the noble lord, the proposed taxation would fall heavily upon the poorer classes of the people, whilst the surplus property would escape its operation.

The Earl of *Warwick* said, his object was not to tax the poorer classes, the employed, but the employers.

The Earl of *Selkirk* observed, that in the amount of population stated by the noble lord, a great number of children must be reckoned, where expenditure of course could not be taken at the proposed rate, but their maintenance must be included in the expenditure of the family.

The Earl of *Warwick* said, that that was provided for in his plan, and if the house would allow it to go to a committee, he was convinced that he could prove satisfactorily, by calculations in detail, all that he had stated.—After a short conversation, the motion was withdrawn, as informal, and another substituted by the earl of Warwick for the appointment of a committee to consider of the best mode of raising the revenue; which was put and negatived.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, February 27.

[Minutes.] The following members were chosen a committee to try the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election and return for Wick, Dornock, &c.: J. Shaw, T. Brooke, H. Thornton, B. Hobhouse, R. E. D. Grosveror, sir W. Middleton, H. Fane, R. Sharp, R. Wigram, T. Baring, W. Jones, R. H. Bradshaw, lord Bernard. Nominees, Peter Moore, right hon. H. Erskine.—Lord Folkestone begged leave to call the attention of the house to the Petition of Mr. Paull, which he had presented the preceding day, and upon which he had given notice of a motion for Monday next. His object in presenting the petition had been to have witnesses called and examined at the bar, touching the allegations contained in it. As no order had yet been made on it, he proposed to move then, that the petition be taken into consideration on Monday, with a view to move afterwards that certain witnesses should be ordered to attend at the bar of that house, at the time when the petition was to be taken into consideration. He had mentioned the course he proposed to pursue to a right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), whom he did not then see in his place, and he was authorized to state to the house that neither that right hon. gent., nor any of his friends, had any objection to his motion. The petition was then ordered to be taken into consideration on Monday, and W. Drake, W. Drake jun., Ann Drake, T. Weatherhead, John Richards, and several other persons, were ordered to attend the house at the same time. Mr. Sheridan, if he had been in his place at the time, would have seconded the motions of the noble lord. Neither these, nor any other motion that could be brought forward by that noble lord, which would have the effect of expediting the decision of the charges contained in the petition, would meet with any opposition from him, or from any of his friends. As he was on his legs, he thought it not amiss to give notice, that he should on Monday next present a petition from certain electors of Westminster, charging upon the petitioner in this case, and upon his agents, subornation of perjury.—Mr. Sheridan presented a petition from certain landholders in the city of Westminster, praying for leave to bring in a bill for the erection of a bridge over the river Thames, between Westminster and Blackfriars bridges. The right hon. gent. stated, that the plan for the bridge was in considerable forwardness, and that the part of the river over which it was proposed to erect the bridge, was that which was nearly in the line of Southampton-street; and that a high road was to be constructed to the Obelisk, St. George's-fields, Surrey. The petition was then brought up, and referred to a committee composed of the members of the cities of London and Westminster.—Mr. Hibbert presented a petition from certain West-India merchants, planters, &c. stating the losses which they should sustain by the abolition of the slave trade, and praying for compensation for the same. Ordered to lie on the table. Mr Hibbert gave notice, that on the 9th of March, he should move to refer this petition to the consideration of a select committee (see March 12.)—Mr. Hibbert then rose, in pursuance of his motion of the preceding day, on the subject of compensation. No case was more deserving of consideration, than that of the planters who had been induced to settle by grants of land. There were many precedents of similar compensations. He now, therefore, begged leave to ask his majesty's ministers, whether they were authorized to give the royal assent to the proposition for compensation, which he should in that case bring forward. Lord Howick replied, that his majesty's ministers were not authorized so to do. This was all which it was his duty to state upon the subject, for it would be highly improper for him to go into the grounds on which the refusal was founded. This alone he would say, that any claims for compensation might be brought forward at some future period, but not at the present.

[PETITION RESPECTING THE WESTMINSTER ELECTION.] Mr. *Biddulph* presented a petition from certain electors of Westminster, inhabitants of the parish of St. Martin's-le-Grand, complaining of a breach of privilege, and praying for the interference of the house. The petition was read by the clerk, and stated in substance: "That the petitioners have learnt with alarm and regret, that on Thursday the 19th of February last, the house had, on the motion of the right hon. R. B. Sheridan, postponed the day for taking into consideration the petition from J. Paull, esq. complaining of an undue return for the city of Westminster. That by that postponement, the petitioners were disfranchised during its continuance, and remained unrepresented in parliament, for one of their representatives, sir S. Hood, was abroad in the execution of his professional duty, and the right hon. R. B. Sheridan, being charged with having procured a colourable majority by means of bribery and corruption, James Paull, esq. their other legal representative, was by the proceeding of which they complained, prevented from taking his seat in the house. The petitioners were convinced that the motion of the right hon. R. B. Sheridan, esq. was intended and was calculated not to further, but delay the ends of public justice, for they were certain, and could produce evidence to prove the truth of their allegation, that, contrary to the standing order of that house, and to all law and decorum, the said right hon. R. B. Sheridan, had, both by himself and by his agents, tampered with the witnesses, and by bribes and threats endeavoured to induce them to withhold their testimony, the truth of all which the petitioners were prepared to prove at the bar of the house. That such a transaction was contrary to a standing order of the house, which declared it to be a high crime and misdemeanour. The petitioners therefore demanded and insisted that the house should proceed with the utmost severity to the punishment of the offender; and the petitioners prayed that an early day might be appointed to prosecute the investigation of this business, which involved in it not only the rights of the city of Westminster, but the character and privileges of the house of commons."—The hon. gent. said, he hoped he should not be considered as personally responsible for the allegations in the petition. It had been put into his hands by some electors of Westminster, and being an elector of Westminster himself, he could not refuse to present it. He moved that the petition be referred to a committee of privileges.—Mr. Sheridan seconded the motion.

Lord *Howick*, while he allowed that a member who presented a petition was not responsible for the truth of the matter which it contained, was yet clearly of opinion, that it was his duty to take care that such petition was not couched in improper and disrespectful terms. He was not disposed to quarrel with any inadvertency of expression; but if there appeared on the face of a petition a studied intention to use insulting language, the house would ill consult its own dignity in not severely animadverting on such an attempt. The present petition set out, in a most unusual manner, by complaining of a vote of that house, which, according to the statement of the petitioners, had disfranchised them, and which had deprived their legal representative of his seat. He believed a petition containing such a complaint could not be entertained. He would remark, by the way, that the first example of postponement was given by the noble lord who presented the original petition to the house against the return of his right hon. friend. But if the petition set out in an unusual tone, the subsequent parts of it were still more extraordinary. He perfectly understood it to be the right of the people to petition that house, and to be the duty of that house to listen to their petitions. But when petitioners insisted and demanded that the house should proceed with severity against one whom they termed an offender, before the investigation of the subject had commenced, they conducted themselves in the most disrespectful manner, and deserved severe reprehension. It was not his intention, however, to propose any proceeding to the house on the present subject, although he certainly thought it right not to let it pass unnoticed. With regard to the case stated in the petition, he trusted that it would undergo the most minute investigation, and that on whichever side the delinquency should be found to exist, the punishment should fall.

Mr. *C. Wynne*, with all his deference for his noble friend, thought that there would be considerable danger in establishing the precedent of allowing a petition couched in such terms to be received. To the matter no man could object, but the manner was such, that in his opinion the house would compromise its own dignity in permitting such a petition to be referred to a committee of privileges.

Lord *Temple* concurred in the opinion that the door of the house ought to be thrown wide open to petitions; but it had a right to demand, that they should be couched in decent and decorous language. He did not, therefore, think that the house was bound in duty to receive a petition conveyed in such terms as these.

Mr. *Fuller* agreed with the noble lord who spoke last. The words were, demand and insist, and the house could not receive a petition conveyed in such terms as were contained in this—[here the hon. gent. threw the petition on the ground]. The house would always feel it a duty to attend to and redress grievances, but it was not bound to receive petitions couched in language that shewed a manifest intention to insult the house. This he maintained, and cared not a farthing who heard him.

Mr. *Whitbread* suggested to his hon. friend the propriety of withdrawing the petition, as the general sense of the house appeared to be against it, and presenting another, couched in more proper and moderate terms. It was not the custom to present petitions against the proceedings of the house in affairs of this nature, and the words insist and demand, were certainly objectionable. But that was not the most objectionable part of it, and he should be inclined to pass over this if there had been nothing else to object to. But the petition insisted that the house should proceed with severity, with regard to one against whom nothing had been proved. If the petition could not, in point of form, be withdrawn, then, supposing it to be rejected, the petitioners had full time to present a fresh petition on Monday. This they would do if they were really in earnest, and only wished for justice. If they did not do this, then it would be clear that they were not in pursuit of justice, but only intended to insult the house.

The *Speaker* said there was nothing in point of form which would prevent the withdrawing of the petition.

Mr. *Biddulph* stated, that the petition had been put into his hands, and that he had promised to present it, without having looked at it immediately. He had some doubts after reading it, but having shewn it to some friends of his, members of the house, he had been told by them that it would not be improper to present it. As to that part which related to the proceeding of the house, it was rather a narrative than an accusation. The words insist and demand had been caught at in rather an extraordinary way. All that the petitioners insisted upon and demanded was, that the house should act upon its own orders. This was the way in which he understood them. The evidence he knew nothing of; but he was not prepared to view the petition in that offensive light in which it appeared to some; and therefore did not feel satisfied that he ought to withdraw it, or confess that he was liable to the imputation of carelessness thrown out against him.

Mr. *Montague* put it earnestly to the hon. gent. whether it would not be adviseable to withdraw the petition, as by such a prudent proceeding, extremes upon either side would be avoided, the dignity of the house would not be compromised, and the right of petition would not be intrenched upon. He could not agree with the hon. mover, that the words demand and insist, were merely used as urging the necessary consequences in a clear deduction; for what man, for instance, ever similarly applied such words as to insist and demand that two and two made four? Did Euclid, he asked, ever insist and demand that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones? He besought the hon. member to relieve the embarrassment of the house by withdrawing the petition.

General *Vyse* did not think that the petition, being once presented, could be well withdrawn. He thought the words objected to were not of such moment, and believed that they were to be imputed to ignorance or inadvertence.

Mr. *Lyttleton* was for rejecting the petition. No man was more a friend to the subject's undoubted right of petition than he was; but he was also a friend to the cause of that house's dignity and honour. In rejecting the petition, he thought he not only consulted the respect of that house, but the dignity of the great body that created it. The people suffered from any insult cast upon its representative body, and no portion of constituents should be allowed to violate the common forms of decency and decorum due from all constituents to the commons house of parliament.

Mr. *Lamb* did not think it quite fair that an opinion hazarded by him in private, upon a casual glance of the petition, should be adduced as an authority in that house; he should not, however, shrink in public from any opinion he had maintained in private; he did not think the words of the petition so objectionable: the words alarm and regret, in its commencement, were by no means unparliamentary terms, to express the sensations of petitioners produced by any antecedent act of that house; the other words so much complained of, insist or demand, seemed to be misunderstood, they were addressed to the house as in its judicial capacity.

Mr. *Sheridan* fully concurred with an hon. gent. as to the necessity of dismissing from their minds every consideration that tended to irritate or influence. He was aware that it was necessary to hear with temper, in order to decide with firmness. He had gone through the election contest without heat, intemperance, or animosity upon his part, and he should not now be hurried to abandon that moderation to which he had been recently so much indebted. He flattered himself that he had the good fortune to have the best wishes of the hon. member who presented the petition; he had been benefited by his intercourse, and had occasionally been honoured with the enjoyment of his hospitality; he did therefore think that the hon. gent. would have done more justice to his well-known candour, if he had in his application to different friends upon the subject, had some previous communication with him (Mr. S.), before he had presented a charge in which he was so personally involved. He was still more at a loss to account for this omission, when he recollected that a noble lord (Folkestone) had done so upon a similar occasion. As to the petition now before the house, he believed he had given the strongest proof in his power of his earnest anxiety, that the prayer of that petition should be promptly acceded to, and that all practicable dispatch should be resorted to, in order to facilitate enquiry the most strict and extensive into the grounds of all allegations complaining of a breach of the privileges of that house, or relating to any conduct of his, touching the late election of Westminster. As to the wording of the petition, he had two reasons for not wishing to reject it on that head; his parliamentary conduct was evidence that he had been uniformly a zealous advocate for the subject's right of petition, and would now be the last man in that house to reject a petition for having indiscreetly made use of hot and hasty words; but he had another and a paramount reason for not rejecting the petition, and that was, that he believed in his soul, that if that petition went to a committee of privileges, it would be to the chagrin and utter disappointment of the petitioners themselves. He argued against the inconsistency of coaxing an hon. member to withdraw his petition, in order not to compromise the dignity of the house, as such solicitation went effectually to compromise it; and denied that the house could ever feel a difficulty in a question that involved the assertion of its honour.

Mr. *Robinson*, though in a very small minority upon a former night, against the right hon. gent., felt it now equally incumbent upon him to resist the motion that gentleman had seconded; he thought the language of the petition extremely indecorous. The petitioners complained of their being disfranchised, and the two reasons upon which they grounded that opinion, were truly extraordinary. The first was, that one of their representatives was engaged in the service of his king and country, and could not attend to his duties as a senator. This circumstance, if it constituted either disqualification or disfranchisement, was well known to them at the time they elected him for Westminster. The other reason was, that in consequence of the decision of this house, their legal representative was prevented from immediately taking his place in this house. If this could be considered as a cause of disfranchisement, it most certainly existed, previous to the decision of the house, which enlarged the period for taking that return into consideration. Under the impression he had, he should conceive it his duty to vote for the rejection of the petition, unless it was withdrawn.

Mr. *Adam* submitted to the judgement of the house, whether the present petition did not require alteration? It was universally admitted, that the right of petitioning was certainly inherent in the constitution; but it was equally a matter of fact, and generally understood, that the member should attentively consider, and be responsible for the allegations of the petitions which he should think it his duty to present. The first question was, whether the present petition should be referred to a committee of privileges? In the mean time, another question had arisen, with respect to certain indecorous terms inserted in it. The opposition was not to the substance or mode, with an intention of refusing its prayer, but was solely directed against the language which it breathed, as being inconsistent with the dignity and forms of the house. If the object was to obtain full and substantial justice, he recommended to the hon. gent. to withdraw it for the purpose of alteration, pledging himself to bring it forward on a future occasion. By such conduct the dignity of the house, the right of petition, and the privileges of the people would each be respectively preserved.

Mr. *Biddulph* declared himself unwilling to trespass on the time of the house, but he found himself called upon to reply to some observations which had fallen from hon. gentlemen on the other side. He could assure one hon. member (Mr. Lamb), that he had not the remotest idea of an improper allusion to him, nor did he make any incorrect use of the authority of his name. The right hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan) had charged him, in a way more or less gentlemanly, of a want of frankness, in not communicating his intention with respect to this petition. On this point he could only say, that the necessity never occurred to him. Was it a new case, and had it not been previously brought before the house, he certainly would have apprised the right hon. gent. With respect to the petition itself, he should consider himself a very bad advocate, were he to persevere in pressing it, contrary to the general feeling of the house; but he might be allowed to state his opinion, that it was the strong expression of unlettered men, without any view of insulting the dignity of that house, or trenching on its privileges. To such a class of men, he conceived it his duty to give every facility of laying the statement of their grievances before the legislature. He should now move to withdraw it, if the right hon. gent. who seconded the former motion, was inclined to coincide.

Mr. *Sheridan* said, he was forced to yield his consent, more to comply with the wish of the house, than any inclination of his own. The petition was accordingly withdrawn.

[Slave-Trade Abolition Bill.] On the order of the day being read for the house resolving itself into a committee on the slave-trade abolition bill,

Sir *Charles Pole* declared himself so impressed with the impolicy of the abolition, that he was induced, in every stage, to thwart a bill, ruinous to the colonies and to the commerce of the country; a measure which would put into the hands of the enemy, those objects on which he had so steadfastly fixed his attention, and the want of which, in a great degree, restrained the progress of his arms, and prevented the accomplishment of those menaces, with which he had so long threatened this empire. It was a great sacrifice to risk one-third of the British exports, besides imports to a large amount, independent of the employment given to such a number of seamen, as were annually engaged in the trade with Africa. He wished not to delay the house, but he strenuously recommended a prolongation of the time when the bill should begin to operate, and a total change of the preamble of the bill.

Mr. *Hughan*, on rising for the first time to address the house, solicited the indulgence usually extended to young members, and declared, that a consciousness of his own inexperience in debate would have deterred him from delivering his sentiments on the present occasion, did not an imperious sense of duty, an irresistible impression of the magnitude and importance of the question to the best interests of the state, rise paramount to all other considerations, and induce him to appeal to the sober and deliberate judgement of the house, against that strain of eloquent declamation which, on a former evening, had been so zealously and successfully employed to rouse the passions, to overpower and mislead the reason. He trusted that an humble individual might be permitted to raise his voice in defence of that system of our ancestors under which our commercial prosperity had attained its present extent, and our naval strength its power. He was the more anxious to make this attempt, from observing that no one possessing personal knowledge, or local experience of the real condition of slavery in the West Indies, had yet offered any information to the house, and having spent a considerable part of his life in the most important of our colonies, and having therefore some knowledge of the subject, he would endeavour to convey juster ideas of the present state of negroes in these settlements than seemed now to prevail. Indeed, the representations which had been made, and descriptions given, were of that nature, that they had excited no small degree of astonishment in his mind; so much so, that doubts might have arisen (if these relations were deserving of credit) whether all that he had heard or witnessed during a residence of 10 years in the West Indies, must not have passed in a dream; and he would tell the hon. members, from his own personal observation, that there did not exist a more happy race than the slaves in our colonies, if any trust was to be placed in outward appearances, which universally indicated cheerfulness and contentment. If the statements which had been given were correct, if the enormities which had been related were practised, he had no difficulty in saying, that man must be destitute of the common attributes of humanity, who, believing such accounts, did not cordially join the advocates of the present measure in voting for the abolition of the trade; nay, for the abolition of slavery itself. But he must totally deny the truth of these general accusations, and demand proof: neither could he admit, that one or two instances of severity or oppression, if established even, (such circumstances must and do happen in every country,)—could be admitted as evidence of the delinquency of the system at large; and it was singular, that the most exalted characters, those heroes, the ornament and pride of their country, and who had been employed in the colonies almost to a man, bore testimony to the mild and lenient treatment of slaves in the West Indies.—Here the hon. gent. lamented, that the legislature had thought fit to deny itself the benefit of all additional information, by evidence, on this important question, on the alledged ground that nothing new could be adduced. During the period which had elapsed since the enquiry on this subject was closed, he would ask, had no new occurrences taken place, which ought to influence opinion and govern the judgement? Did the rebellion in Grenada, the Charib insurrection in St. Vincents, the Maroon war in Jamaica, and, above all, the revolution in St. Domingo, afford no lesson, no experience by which our decision might be guided? It could be clearly shewn, that the latter most disastrous event had its origin in, and was accelerated by, doctrines similar to those which were now espoused in this country, first promulgated in France, and afterwards most industriously disseminated, until, in their natural course, they buried that devoted and ill-fated colony in devastation and ruin. In a case of so much moment to the parties, he also contended, that they had a right, an undoubted right, to be patiently heard in their own defence; and he must, therefore, regret, that those highly respectable characters who were offered as witnesses at the bar, had not been received. The mode in which the question had been treated, he (Mr. H.) strongly deprecated. Out of doors, the grossest exaggeration and misrepresentation had been resorted to, and in that house, declamation was substituted for argument, and pathetic addresses to the feelings for sound reasoning. The noble lord who introduced the bill, had set the example, which had been universally followed, and an hon. and learned gent. (the solicitor-general) had been carried so far by the spirit of disingenuous animadversions, that he did not scruple to ascribe all the laws of the colonial legislatures which had been passed for the security and protection of the negroes, to an insidious design merely to impose on the public of this country, with the view of stifling farther enquiry or discussions as to slavery, and, as he alledged, none of them were put in force. To a man acquainted with the facts, such an assertion appeared monstrous; and when that learned gent. quoted the words of an obsolete law of Barbadoes to shew the estimation in which, in legal language and proceedings, negroes were held, it would have been more candid had he at the same time stated the date of that law, and mentioned that it was passed upwards of a century ago. Even the hon. member for Yorkshire (Mr. Wilberforce), in a recent publication, had been compelled to admit that the consolidated slave law of Jamaica was enacted previous to the agitation of the question of Abolition, and could not therefore have been framed with the intent imputed to the West-Indians by the solicitor-general. To that law he (Mr. H.) would refer for a refutation of such charges: let its provisions be examined, and it would be seen, whether the interests and protection of the slaves were so completely overlooked as had been asserted. So much for the means which had been employed for the accomplishment of this measure.—With regard to its general tendency and result, he would not hesitate to affirm, that it must prove as little beneficial to the Africans themselves, as it would be injurious to the colonial interests and naval superiority of the empire. Throughout the whole discussion, cause and effect had been studiously blended; slavery with the slave trade. The slave trade in Africa was the result of slavery, and slavery was produced by the barbarism of the inhabitants. History, ancient and modern, proved the universal existence of slavery in all the countries of Africa, inhabited by negroes, and that this system prevailed ages before the commencement of the European slave-trade. Mr. Parke, the favourite author of the abolitionists, informed us, that three-fourths of the negroes were in a state of slavery; and from one fact which he mentioned, it might be presumed that in this calculation the numbers of slaves were underrated; for he tells us, that of 900 prisoners taken in one battle, only 70 were free persons. Such, then, being the state of the population of Africa, where the inhabitants were totally ignorant of any other distinction than that of master and slave, how would the condition of these slaves be ameliorated by the extinction of one branch only of the trade? The European trade in slaves was derived from that description of individuals who were slaves in their own country, and if put an end to, not one less would exist in Africa. But this was not all; for the proposed act only abolished the British slave-trade. Would the French, the Dutch, the Spaniards, the Portuguese, or the Americans abandon it? It was not even pretended that any of the former nations had shewn the smallest disposition to relinquish the traffic, and the latter understand their own interest too well to give it up. The French knew the value of this trade, and that their colonial commerce, the chief support of the naval power of every European state, depended on it. Indeed, their own experience was more ample than that of any other country. France, previous to the revolution, as she possessed the most extensive colonies, had the greatest share of this trade. From Nantz alone, 320 ships were employed in it, and 150 from Bourdeaux; and the French minister had lately told our negociator what co-operation we had to expect from that nation; fairly acknowledging, that France would be guided by a sense of her own interest, and not by any fanciful and speculative notions of what is termed benevolence and philanthropy. The fact therefore was, that this measure could not produce any reduction in the number of slaves in Africa, and that not one less would be exported from that continent; a temporary interruption of the trade might perhaps take place, and involve the objects of it in horrors on the coast, to which they were not during its continuance exposed.—With respect to the carrying trade, it was under the controul of humane regulations; if the acts already passed were not sufficient, the legislature might and ought to adopt other measures; but it was worthy of remark, that all the enormities which had been cited and dwelt on, referred not to the present state of the trade, but to the period antecedent to passing sir W. Dolben's regulation act, and if any instances of atrocity had recently occurred, it was fair to presume, that the abolitionists who had access to the journals of each voyage, which were by law lodged at the different custom-houses, would not have failed to make use of them. Indeed, it could easily be shewn, that, so far from these descriptions being consistent with truth, it was no uncommon thing for a slave ship to perform a voyage without losing a negro during its continuance.—In the West Indies, this act would be received with dissatisfaction and disgust. It would endanger the existence of the colonies, and must produce their ultimate decay, if not their immediate destruction. The negroes, who had always been accustomed to look to a reinforcement of strength by the purchase of Africans, as a boon to themselves and an alleviation of their labours in cultivating the plantations, would become discontented; and as they could not distinguish between the nice refinements of justice, that discontent was likely to ripen into resistance to their masters, when they found that they alone were to be the objects of slavery. The white population of the islands must be diminished, and the security against external and internal danger thereby destroyed; no adventurers would hereafter be found to hazard their lives in an unwholesome climate, because the stimulus was taken away. The road to competence and independence amongst the white persons employed in the plantations, who composed the militia and strength of the islands, was the application of their first earnings to the purchase of a few Arican negroes, whose numbers were progressively increased by additional purchases, until of sufficient importance to establish a new plantation or invigorate an old. All the plantations which had been recently opened, and on which great sums had been expended in the construction of buildings, the clearing of lands, &c., and which were approaching towards maturity, would be immediately checked, and for want of the assistance of fresh labourers, calculated on, and absolutely necessary for their cultivation, must eventually be abandoned.—That the negro population of the West Indies could not be supported without importation, was demonstrated by experience, admitting a few exceptions from rare and peculiarly favourable circumstances; and this part of the question never had been fairly stated or met by the abolitionists. The inequality of the sexes, and many other causes, contributed to produce this effect; and it must be enquired, whether what was termed a waste of human life, although improperly so denominated, was a sufficient reason for abandoning any great resource of the revenue or bulwark to the safety of the state. If so, many of the manufactories carried on in England, and the whole system of national defence, ought to be abolished; for it could not be pretended that some of the most lucrative branches of manufacture, or the great establishments of our army and navy contribute to keep up the population of the empire.—The whole system of the colonies depending on long-sanctioned usages and established laws, would be abrogated, and all this was to be effected to gratify false philanthropy and mistaken philosophy. Let the house consider the importance of these colonies to the general interest of the nation, and then weigh the consequences. The West-India trade composed one third of the whole amount of the trade, both import and export, of Great Britain. Put not this great stake to hazard. Reflect that a separation of interests must cause an alienation of the minds of the colonists. If their lives and property were hazarded, these men, although actuated by the most loyal principles, could not but view this measure as an infringement of their rights. While they were sacrificed, the prosperity of their neighbours and rivals must necessarily be advanced; for the obvious effect of this measure would be to afford greater facilities to the improvement of the colonies of our enemies, by reducing the cost of slaves to cultivate them.—A detail of but a small part of the advantages which resulted to Great Britain from her colonial commerce, would occupy too much of the time of the house, and was the less necessary as these advantages were generally admitted: all these were to be hazarded, nay to be sacrificed, for the attainment of a phantom. He therefore entered his solemn protest against the adoption of a measure fraught with ruin to the colonies and to the empire.

Mr. *Anthony Browne*, not having succeeded in procuring the speaker's notice, on the second reading of the bill, was desirous of explaining briefly the grounds on which his opposition was founded. He did not defend the slave trade, with reference to Holy Writ, or to any existing moral or political evil of our own government; on the contrary, he admitted that the trade was a great political evil of itself; but yet it was an evil interwoven with the most important interests of the country, and with a complication of private interests on which thousands and thousands of our fellow subjects depended; the redress of which should be relatively considered, and taking into view, on the one hand, the radical barbarous internal situation of Africa, the inadequate and incomplete object of that abolition which was proposed by the bill, and on the other, the magnitude of the danger to the colonies, he was of opinion, that the remedy was worse than the disease, and that we were incurring a most fearful risk, without the power or the means of extending to Africa, the practical benefits of those principles of justice and humanity on which the bill was speciously founded. He entered into a minute description of the situation and circumstances of Africa, to shew that a state of slavery was the radical and incurable inheritance of her soil, not induced by the slave trade, but arising from the petty divisions of her states, the jealousies inseparable from those opposing authorities, and that state of incivilization and barbarism in which Africa remained, amidst the improvements of other nations. Besides this objection, he said, that the bill was incompetent to effect the abolition of the slave trade. Great Britain possessed not more than one-fifth of that trade; she could do no more than abandon that part of the trade which she possessed, she could not compel Africa to abolish the trade: such an object could only be accomplished by the concurring opinion of the other nations of Europe that maintain the trade for the same political reasons that we do. We must establish a sincerity of feeling on the other nations, of the injustice of this trade; leading to an active honourable pursuit of the same object, and by one common voice to that complete and entire abolition of the trade, from which alone the consummation of that great object could be accomplished. This view was sufficient to raise a doubt of the practical advantages of the bill to Africa, and when contrasted with the danger which threatens our colonies, was decisive of the necessity of rejecting it. The danger to the property of the colonies, arose from the necessity of a continued supply of negroes for the cultivation of property, without which experience had proved, that the supply could not be maintained even in the old islands, under every system of meliorated treatment which could be devised, and under the advantages of religious establishments. The happy effects of which on the minds, habits, and regularity of the negroes, in the island of Antigua, he could unequivocally assert from his own knowledge. The danger arose also from the probability of a diminished white population; on that part of it especially which constitutes the yeomanry of the colonies, and its permanent military strength, by withholding the only means of advancement which the limited circumstances of the colonies afford. From the probability also of a diminution in the value of West-India property, and the serious consequences to those who stood in situations of pecuniary embarrassments. All those were exposed to utter ruin; for it could not be expected that a creditor will rest satisfied with security of deteriorated value and security, if it might be so called, exposed to daily annihilation. But, said he, there is another danger still more alarming, a danger to the lives and existence of our fellow subjects, which it is not in my power to estimate. I view those consequences with fearful anxiety, as leading, necessarily leading, to a fatal paroxysm of disaffection and insurrection, and to a renewal of those revolutionary horrors, from the effects of which Europe is not now free, and which will live in the recollection of mankind, an aweful lesson of the dangerous effects of innovating schemes of great national import, and a just and powerful motive for a reverential deference to those long-established habits and institutions which may be reckoned the foundation of national prosperity and happiness. When the negroes in the islands learn that the parliament has pronounced their condition to be unjust and inhuman, and that they are not to be benefited by the bill, it will be sufficient to animate them to a spirit of discontent and a desire of redress, from which a scene of misery and horror may be contemplated, equal in enormity to that which has lately disgraced the character of France. And can it be the policy of Great Britain to encounter all these fearful hazards, from a doubtful chance of benefit to the native African, who is in a situation not to be benefited by your exertions, a situation of hopeless and hereditary slavery?

Mr. *Barham* entered into an exculpation of the planters in the West Indies, from the charge of cruelty to the slaves, and quoted several instances of kindness and humanity on the part of the overseers towards the slaves, and the gratitude of the latter in return. He considered that, in order to promote any thing of civilization and religion among the negroes, it would be necessary to educate them, and to accomplish that, it would be necessary to give them more liberty: this, however, would be a dangerous experiment, and he was at a loss to say, what would be the best mode to remedy the evil. From his own experience, he was not warranted in supposing that the negro population could be kept up in the colonies. He had not, on his plantation, neglected any means that humanity or prudence could suggest to keep up his stock, to which he had determined, for years back, not to add a single newly purchased slave, and yet he had not been able to succeed. If any means could be devised for so desirable an end, he should be very happy to make the experiment; but he much feared that none such was likely to offer. Still he was determined, upon the principles of humanity, to support the Abolition, regretting merely that it had so long continued, but deprecating any reproach on the merchants and planters concerned in it. For, of any guilt that attached to this trade they were at most but partners with the parliament which tolerated it, and the country which profited so much from it. These planters, therefore, ought not now, in his opinion, to be dismissed with censure, or without that fair and honourable compensation to which they were entitled.

Mr. *Courtenay*, as the great majority on the second reading of the bill had been ascribed by some of the members to a pathetic and persuasive appeal to the passions which had hurried the house into a precipitate vote, remarked, that the abolition bill would have passed many years ago, if oratory alone governed and directed the decisions of the house; for many members of the house, he said, still must remember the strenuous and noble exertions of two eminent statesmen of the most distinguished and splendid talents, who had displayed the superior power of their capacious minds on this most interesting question. The vigour, the logical precision, the commanding and luminous eloquence of the one, blended and associated with the copious, brilliant, and impressive eloquence of the other, penetrated the most callous and obdurate hearer, and carried conviction to the most prejudiced and interested understanding. No more rivals for power, or divided on some great political principle, but cordially united like brothers in the sacred cause of justice and humanity, we have only to lament that they no longer exist, the pride and ornament of the country, to enjoy the glorious triumph of their genius and virtue. I shall now presume to add a word on the merits of another gentleman, the original mover of the question. The great and brilliant eloquence we so lately heard, still vibrates on the ears of the house; but he has his reward—

> "What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy,
> "The soul's calm sunshine, and the heart-felt joy"

of having rescued thousands of the unhappy, oppressed natives of Africa from the scourge, avarice, and tyranny of Europe, he has at last the conscious pleasure of seeing his laudable exertions, his unwearied zeal, his indefatigable perseverance, crowned with success, and he has been singularly happy in throwing a sacred lustre over his moral and pathetic reasoning, by the affecting fervour of his religious sentiments.

Sir *Ralph Milbanke* could not do justice to the sentiments of his constituents, nor to his own, if he were to give a silent vote in favour of the bill. He therefore offered a few observations in support of it.

Mr. *Montague* spoke in favour of the abolition, to which he had, from his earliest years, devoted himself with a zeal and attention inferior only to those of his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce). He would ask one of the opposers of the bill, who was a member of the board of aldermen of London, whether he would think it a happy change, to be snatched away from one of the city banquets, and crammed into a slave ship as the blacks were? He blamed the planters for not making preparation in compliance with the notices they had received.

Mr. *Hibbert*, in reply to his hon. friend, observed, that he was now in the very situation he had described. He was now no longer an alderman of the city of London; he no longer banqueted upon the luxuries of the civic board, but bore the burthen of a slave; for he had embarked all his property in our West-India colonies; he felt the shackles of the slave about him, and he no longer enjoyed that freedom he was before possessed of. After some general observations, he concluded by expressing his decided opposition to the measure in its present shape.

Mr. *Bathurst* objected to the principle of the bill, as well as to the consequences which would unavoidably result from passing it into a law. He recommended a gradual decrease.

Mr. *Jacob* contended, that the abolition itself would furnish ample compensation to the planters, as it must naturally tend to enhance the value of their present negroes and plantations, while he argued that a continuance of this traffic would, by operating to increase the means of cultivation, serve to extend the produce, which was already superabundant, and thus lead to the ruin of the planters more immediately and effectively than could, by any calculation, be apprehended from an immediate abolition.—Amidst a loud cry of question! question!,

Mr. Secretary *Windham* rose, and said, from the lateness of the hour and the eagerness which the house very naturally felt to go into the committee, he should reserve the sentiments which he entertained upon this important subject for another stage of this bill. Differing, as he did upon this question, from many of those whom he most respected and esteemed, he was naturally desirous for an opportunity of stating the grounds which appeared to his mind to justify this difference. With all the reverence which he felt for the principles of justice and humanity, still he confessed that he had not courage to come to the decision which the advocates of this measure proposed; contemplating as he did the effects which its adoption threatened to produce; and apprehending from it, and at no very distant period too, no less than the ruin of the country. He most fervently wished that these apprehensions might prove to be unfounded; but yet they had made such an impression on his mind, that, considering the necessity for the passing of this bill was not, on the score of morality, so overruling as to leave no option, he could not forbear, consistently with his sense of duty, to resist it. As those gentlemen who supported this bill, were anxious to wash their hands of the guilt which appeared to them to attach to the traffic it proposed to abolish, so he was equally anxious to wash his hands of the consequences which that abolition, in his judgement, threatened to produce.

Mr. *Whitbread* said, when a man of such enlightened mind, and such known humanity as his right hon. friend, thought it necessary to get up at that hour to state his perseverance in his opposition to the abolition, and to his own original sentiments, he felt it incumbent on him to declare his conviction of the justice and truth of the uniform consent he had given to the sentiments, and the propriety of the support he had given to the efforts of the hon. gent. who was the chief promoter of that measure, (Mr. Wilberforce). The able speeches he had heard in the recent discussions confirmed the opinions he had entertained. The same exploded arguments, the same groundless and disproved assertions which had been so often refuted on former occasions, were all that could be now advanced against this bill. The cruelties, incapable of being exaggerated by any mouth or mind, which the house was called upon to abolish, were inherent in the thing, and not the result of the individual disposition of the planters, many of whom were, he was sure, men of great humanity. The islands had had sufficient warning, and if they were not prepared for the abolition of the trade now, they never would. If we abolished the trade on our part, we should have done our duty, and given to other nations the example of theirs. It was complained, that too much feeling and too much passion had been carried into this discussion. He complained, on the contrary, that it had been made too little a question of feeling, and that it had been made almost intirely a matter of cold calculations of profit and loss between English money and African blood. It was thought necessary to prove to the house, that the country could not lose by abstaining from murder. It had been proved by Mr. Pitt, from the most undeniable calculations, that the islands and the empire at large, would gain in revenue, in seamen, in commerce, in strength, and in profit, by the abolition; and when France would see these beneficial effects, she would be induced by interest, if not by feeling or principle, to follow the example. There was one circumstance connected with the trade, which had been communicated to him by a friend, and which he thought necessary to state to the house. A fine young slave had been purchased for his estate, who at first seemed afflicted and sullen, but whose discontent was expected to wear off with time. After a short period, however, another cargo of slaves arrived, and the newly imported negroes, upon meeting with the former, prostrated themselves before him as their chief. The violence of his emotions at the contrast between what he was and what he had been, drove him within twelve hours to commit suicide. One such instance as this was enough to shew the iniquity of the traffic.

Mr. *Fuller* was of opinion, that the abolition of the slave trade would have the effect of rendering the condition of the slaves much worse in the West-India islands. The negroes upon his estate were more comfortable than labourers in this country, and it would be his desire to place them upon the same footing in every respect. This, however, was impossible, because the fertility of the soil was such in many parts of the West Indies, that by the labour of a day and a half per week, one negro could procure support for a whole family, and in that case would not be disposed to work; so that it was necessary to keep them employed by moderate disicipline.

Mr. *Herbert*, of Kerry, in pursuance of the instructions of his constituents, was bound to vote for the abolition, and after all he had read and heard upon the subject, he could not conceive any good ground for the continuance of the trade.

Lord *Howick* was far from expecting that, after the solemn decision which had already taken place on the bill, it would again have undergone such a protracted discussion. At so late an hour he would not enter into any reply to predictions of ruin, &c. to the country, if this measure was adopted. Another occasion would offer for that purpose, when he trusted he should be able to prove, that, so far from being in any degree detrimental to the interests of the country, it must powerfully conduce to its prosperity and glory. At so late an hour, he should not attempt to go into the nature of the clauses which it was his intention to move in the committee; but if the house was inclined to save much of their time and attention, they would agree to what he should now propose, namely, to pass the bill through the committee, *pro formâ*, fill up the blanks, have the bill printed, and in the hands of the members, previously to its being recommitted, and then get through it with a more perfect and satisfactory knowledge of all its bearings and tendencies; he hoped however that another long debate upon the principle of the bill was not to be entered into.—On the motion that the speaker do now leave the chair,

General *Gascoyne* said, that he had no wish on his part to renew the debate, but that if any other gentleman thought proper to do so, he should not think himself precluded from answering many of the objections that had that night been urged against the opposers of the bill.—The question was now universally called for, and carried without a division. The house then went into a committee upon the bill *pro formâ*, and the blanks being filled up, and the house resumed, it was ordered to be recommitted on Wednesday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 2.

[MINUTES.] Lord Grenville presented a message from his majesty respecting the treaty with Prussia, and an advance of subsidy, (see House of Commons). On the motion of lord Grenville, his majesty's message was ordered to be taken into consideration to-morrow, and the lords to be summoned.—On the first reading of the bill for repealing so much of the act relating to the South Sea company as confers on that company an exclusive right to trade to certain parts of South America, lord Redesdale presented a petition from the South Sea Company, praying to be heard by counsel against the bill. Lord Auckland declared his intention of opposing any motion for the hearing of counsel. The bill before the house was one which did not in any manner call upon the house to hear counsel. The South-Sea company, although legally entitled to an exclusive trade to a great part of South America, had not for many years employed a single vessel in that trade. Conquests having been recently made by his majesty's arms upon that continent, a large capital had been embarked in the trade to South America, upon the supposition of its being perfectly legal. It had since been discovered that it was not so, and that the legal right was vested in the South Sea Company: but under all the circumstances of the case, he could not conceive that a doubt could exist as to the policy and expediency of the present bill. Lord Redesdale did not mean to pledge himself as to any opinion upon the subject, but conceived that the petitioners having legal rights which would be affected by this bill, were entitled to be heard by counsel. Lord Auckland gave notice, that he should move the second reading of the bill to-morrow, if the printed copies of it were then on the table. Conceiving the hearing of counsel to be to totally unnecessary, he should oppose any motion for that purpose. The petition was ordered to lie on the table.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 2.

[MINUTES.] The Speaker acquainted the house, that he had received from major-general sir John Stuart, the following letter, in return to the thanks of this house, signified to him, in obedience to their commands of the 22d of December last:—"Baker Street, 28th Feb. 1807. Sir; it is since my return to England that I have been honoured with an authenticated copy of your letter of the 24th Dec. (of which the original had been addressed from Mr. secretary Windham's office to the Mediterranean), transmitting the unanimous vote of thanks of the house of commons of the 22d of the same month, to the general and other officers, to the troops, and to myself, in token of its satisfaction at the conduct and result of the action with the French forces, on the 4th of July last, on the plains of Maida in Calabria. I shall fulfil a most grateful duty in obeying the command of the house, to communicate to the army, as above directed, the great and public "honour by which their discipline and gallantry on that occasion have been remunerated. And I venture to anticipate the sentiments of pride and gratitude they must feel, conjointly with myself, on thus receiving, in the unanimous thanks of parliament, the most distinguished and most expressive token of national approbation to which a British soldier can possibly be encouraged to aspire. While I presume to request you, sir, to become the channel of conveying to the house my individual impressions on this subject, I am to solicit that you will receive also the expression of my own acknowledgement for the flattering terms of personal compliment with which you have been pleased to notify to me the high distinction conferred upon me in the Resolutions. I have the honour to be, &c. J. Stuart, major-general."—Mr. Walter Jury was, according to order, brought to the bar, where he received a reprimand from the speaker, and was ordered to be discharged out of custody, paying his fees. The reprimand was as follows; viz. "Walter Jury; A select committee of this house, appointed to try and determine the merits of a petition, complaining of an undue election and return for the borough of Maidstone, have reported, that you being called before them as a witness, did upon your examination misbehave yourself, grossly prevaricating, and refusing to give evidence. For that offence you were thereupon ordered into custody; and by this house afterwards committed to his majesty's gaol of Newgate. The tribunal before which you were summoned, is justly dear to parliament and the country; and this house will not endure that its dignity should be insulted, or its authority eluded, with impunity. Sworn to declare the truth between the parties, and again admonished of the solemn obligation under which you stood, you nevertheless thought fit to persist in your prevarications, until it was manifest that your obstinacy was wilful and criminal: and this house has accordingly branded your misconduct, by sentencing you to an imprisonment with malefactors and felons. At length by your petition it appears that you acknowledge your offence, and express your contrition: the ends therefore of public justice are attained; and it remains only for you, by a sacred regard to veracity, through the remainder of your life, to endeavour at redeeming yourself in some degree from the heavy disgrace into which you have fallen. In compliance with your petition, this house has ordered that you be now discharged; and you are discharged accordingly." Ordered, *nem. con.*, that the said reprimand be entered in the journal of this house.—Lord Howick presented the following message from the king: viz. "G. R. His majesty thinks proper to acquaint the house of commons, that a treaty of peace has been concluded between his majesty and the king of Prussia, a copy of which, as soon as the ratification thereof shall have been exchanged, his majesty will communicate to this house. And his majesty thinks it proper further to apprise this house, that his majesty's minister, who signed that treaty, has, in pursuance of an authority granted to him by his majesty for that purpose, and in consequence of the great urgency of the state of affairs in those countries, which are now the seat of war, taken upon himself to make an advance of money to the Prussian government, to the amount of about 80,000*l.*, which advance his majesty has been pleased to approve; and he trusts that this house will enable him to make good the same. G. R." On the motion of lord Howick, the above message was ordered to be referred to a committee of supply.

[Mr. Paull's Petition respecting the Westminster Election.] Lord *Folkestone* moved, that the order of the day for taking into consideration the petition of James Paull, esq. be now read.

Mr. *Sheridan* begged leave to make one observation before the order should be read. He had heard that it was the intention of certain gentlemen, during the investigation, to insist upon the exclusion of strangers. He was aware, in an allusion of this kind, that he was not strictly confining himself within the prescribed limits of order, but his situation was a peculiar one; assailed in the most public manner, he earnestly wished that his defence should be as public. He was anxious not only that his conduct should be known to all, but that all should be enabled to understand the mean and perfidious calumnies that aspersed it.

Mr. *P. Moore* said, that he held in his hand 3 petitions from some most respectable gentlemen, who, feeling themselves grossly traduced by the allegations set forth in the petition of Mr. Paull, prayed to be allowed to meet and confront such allegations; to give their evidence at the bar of the house touching the proceedings during and since the late election for Westminster. Mr. Moore then alluded to the extraordinary petition that had been on the last night presented by an hon. member (Mr. Biddulph), and said that he had it in his power to prove by evidence at the bar, that the mode resorted to for the purpose of obtaining signatures to that petition was a foul fraud against the very respectable electors of Westminster, whose names had been thereunto subscribed.—He then presented a petition to the purport above mentioned, signed Henry Burgess, James Wallis, F. Homan, and A. Johnston.

Lord *Folkestone* thought the petitions premature, as they seemed to pre-suppose the allegations in Mr. Paull's petition already substantiated.

Mr. *Sheridan* was convinced that the noble lord did not mean any thing unfair or dishonourable, and that therefore he could not mean to summon witnesses against him, and deny him the opportunity of refuting their assertions by opposite testimony. Arraigned as he was of having either himself or by his agents, tampered with witnesses, it surely could not be intended to deny him the privilege of disproving the truth of the charge at the bar.

Lord *Howick* thought that the petition had a just claim to be laid on the table of the house, and that when the proper time came, the petitioner ought to be heard at the bar, in his own defence.—The petitions were then ordered to lie on the table.

The order of the day having then been read, for taking into consideration the petition of James Paull, esq., the same was accordingly taken into consideration, and lord Folkestone moved, that the petitioner be heard by himself, his counsel, and witnesses, in support of the allegations contained in his petition.

Lord *Howick* declared, that feeling every desire that this transaction should be investigated in such a manner as to satisfy the public, and anxious to remove the slightest pretence for accusing the house of an intention to deprive the petitioner of the means of supporting his charge, he, for one, would be willing to allow, that the counsel should be heard; but he wished the house to observe, as a guide to their proceedings, that since the passing of Mr. Grenville's bill, it had been the practice to abstain from hearing at the bar, evidence which might tend to defeat the ends of justice in a subsequent committee. He trusted that the house would confine the examination simply to the point of tampering, and that if, in the outset, any question should be proposed affecting the merits of the election, the examination would be stopped.

Mr. *T. Grenville* was of opinion that the present case ought to go to a committee. While the house looked only to the examination of facts in having the case proceeded upon at the bar, a precedent might be established which might tend to much inconvenience, and much mischief hereafter. He was, he confessed, more inclined than others seemed to be, to doubt of the propriety of the house having proceeded even so far as it had already done. But if it was improper to have gone so far, it would be much more improper to go farther. The question before the house seemed to him, if not an integral part of that which was reserved by the Grenville act, for the decision of a select committee, at least so nearly to border on it, as that it would be impossible to keep the two objects distinct. He had no doubt that under the Grenville act, a committee was perfectly competent to do the justice required in this case, if the facts alleged could be substantiated or completely falsified. The committee might make a special report, if either should be found guilty of improper practices. If no inconvenience could arise to public justice, as he thought none could in this case, he was of opinion the house ought not to interfere with a jurisdiction so nearly connected if not altogether identified with that which it had, by a solemn act, put out of its own hands, and delegated to its committees. He did not suppose that the members in the house unsworn were a less desireable tribunal than the sworn members of a committee. But there was no doubt, that a sworn committee, with its attention particularly directed to the objects it was to try, was as eligible a tribunal as the house unsworn. He was so strongly convinced that this was a case that ought to be reserved to a committee, that he felt an indispensable duty to state his opinion to the house, though he could not hope that any opinion of his would have such weight with the house as to lead its decision. If, notwithstanding the considerations he had thrown out, the house should persevere in the present course, he was of opinion that there would be great danger in hearing of counsel. By the interference of counsel, it would be rendered next to impossible to keep this case wholly distinct from the question of the validity of the late election which was to be tried by the committee between the parties in this case; a question which the house was by law prohibited from interfering in. If the whole matter was not sent to the committee, the only way the house could reserve that part which belonged exclusively to the committee, was by keeping the examination of the witnesses in its own hands. An advocate who looked only to what was best adapted to his present object, could never act up to the delicacy which became the house upon this head, and there would thus be an endless necessity for the interposition of the house. If, however, the house should agree to have counsel, as well as to examine this matter itself, he hoped that it would not be permitted to such counsel to attempt to instruct the house with respect to its privileges; and that particular care should be taken to prevent him from involving the two cases, which it was so essential to keep distinct.

Mr. *Baker* thought the house ought to protect the witnesses summoned to give evidence at its bar, and that no gentleman having a seat in the house ought to speak of witnesses about to come to the bar, in the terms of reprehension lately used by a right hon. gent.

The *Attorney-General* thought it necessary to oppose himself a moment to the impatience of the house, in order to suggest the justice and propriety of allowing the benefit of witnesses and counsel to all the parties, as well as to the one that was already allowed to be so heard.

Mr. *Sheridan* wished the house to go directly into the business. As to counsel, he had no objection to give his opponents all the counsel in the realm. For himself he asked no counsel, but the justice and rectitude of that honourable house. What the petitioners connected with him might wish for, he knew not.—On the suggestion of lord Howick,

The *Speaker* was instructed to acquaint the counsel when called to the bar, that it was the pleasure of the house that he should confine himself to the matters of fact alleged in the petition, to which he meant to adduce evidence.

Mr. Warren, counsel for Mr. Paull, was then called in, and being instructed by the Speaker to this effect, he proceeded to state the matter of the petition, the charges contained therein, and the nature and character of the evidence by which they were to be supported. The first witness, Mr. Drake, was a lieutenant in the navy, and had had a share in those glorious actions which had attached so much glory to that service. The second witness, Weatherhead, was also in the navy. The other witnesses were men of low and humble stations. But it was only persons of low situations that any one would attempt to tamper with, and the evidence of guilt should be sought from the scenes where it had been committed. The story Mr. Drake would tell, would perhaps strike the house with so much astonishment, as almost to appear incredible. But he would here again represent to the house, that the effect should be taken in the mass, and that each part ought to be regarded as confirmatory of the rest. With respect to the object of these charges, he was a man of very high talents and character, unstained in the present instance; as such, Mr. Paull, as well as himself, were willing to describe the right hon. gent.; and they wished the present transaction might not be found of a nature to give an opinion different from what had been entertained. When the whole of the evidence should be before the house, he was sure it would not seem too much to ask for the interposition of the house. Mr. Paull asked the house to take his witnesses under its protection till the trial of his petition. Without that it would be vain to expect justice. It was in vain, if tampering with witnesses were allowed, to hope that the house would be fairly constituted, or the people fairly represented.

William Drake was then called, and deposed that he had been a lieutenant in the navy; that he had entered it, to the best of his recollection, in 1785, and quitted it in 1802; that he had married a natural daughter of Mr. Sheridan, and had been acquainted with him upwards of 5 years; that he became acquainted with Mr. Paull after the election, and that this acquaintance had begun in consequence of the manner in which Mr. Sheridan had treated him; that he had got a great many votes for Mr. S. during the election; that he at that time saw Mr. S. every day, and that Mr. S. made him several promises; but that after the election he could not procure access to Mr. S., whose porter had grossly insulted him; that Mr. S. had afterwards sent several people to him with a view to bias him; that he had been sent for by Mr. Sheridan in February last to the house of Mr. Homan, where he had drank several bottles of wine; that he had a private conversation with Mr. S. in a room in the house of a Mr. Edwards, where Mr. S. had offered him money to procure for him a letter which Mr. S. had sent to E. Harris, a Jew; that Mr. S. had offered to provide for him and his father, and told him to keep out of the way, and offered him money, and said that he would settle the matter about the summons; that he had several communications with Mr. S. on the subject of the letter; that no one except himself was present at the writing and signing of that letter by Mr. S.; that he had informed Mr. S. that E. Harris could procure 6 or 8 votes, but would not do it except he signed the letter. The letter had been signed by Mr. Sheridan in his own house, 3 or 4 days after the commencement of the election, but not in presence of any person but the witness. The letter had been signed between 11 and 1 o'clock in the day, but he could not exactly say on what day of the month. He had delivered no other letter, either during or since the election, to E. Harris from Mr. S., but had delivered one to him previous to the election, which had been signed also by Mr. S. E. Harris had offered him a sum of money to procure a letter for him from sir P. Parker, or sir S. Hood. In the interview he had with Mr. S. at Mr. Edwards's, Mr. S. told him that he had acted improperly, in having gone out of town during the election, though he had constantly attended, and sent in the names of the voters he brought up every morning. When he asked Mr. S. what he was to do with respect to the summons he had received to attend the committee, Mr. S. desired him to get out of the way, and to leave the rest to him. Mr. S. said, he would provide for him, as they were old friends, by getting him a situation under government, which he had been promised many years. Mr. Johnson had also asked him to get the letter from Harris, and he had replied to Mr. Johnson, that if Harris did not give it up, "by G—d he'd knock him down." Mr. Homan, also of Frith-street, had said to him that he was wrong in writing to Harris, and that it would be a good thing to get the letter, if possible, from him. Mr. S. had told him, when he asked him to get the letter from Harris, that he should not want any money, as Mr. S. and he were old acquaintances; and he had reason to believe that this money was offered him to induce him to procure the letter from Harris. Witness being further examined, would not say that Mr. S. authorized him to offer any specific sum to Harris to get back the letter, or that he even ever mentioned the word money, but insinuated in general, that every possible means should be used to get it back, observing, that the getting back the letter was of the most serious and important consideration. He had, however, offered 30*l.* to Harris, to prevail upon him to return the letter, which money he would pay out of his own pocket, and of his own authority. He had got acquainted with Mr. Paull, by means of a letter he had written to him, stating the ill-treatment he had received from Mr. S. and his servants; but Mr. Paull had not instigated him by money or any other inticement to get possession of the letter, but merely advised him to tell what he knew, but to advance nothing that he would not be ready to swear to. When he got possession of the letter, he never mentioned the circumstance to Mr. Paull or to any of his agents, nor, indeed, to any person whatever, before he mentioned it this night at the bar of the house. Yet, upon cross-examination upon this point, he confessed, that he himself had not only seen the petition that had been presented to the house, but that he had dictated a part of it to Mr. Powell, more particularly that part which referred to the letter, and this he had done a few days before the petition was presented. Mr. Paull certainly expressed a wish that the letter might be got and produced before the committee, but he never promised money, or any kind of reward for that service. He allowed, however, that his intention was when he got hold of the letter, to use it against Mr. S. He never heard that any suspicion existed that the letter was a forgery; but he destroyed it himself, because he did not conceive it to be of any use. He got a second letter from Mr. S. during the election after the first had been destroyed; did not know the date of it; had seen Mr. S. sign it in one of the rooms at the Shakspeare tavern; when cross-examined, he said, that the letter was signed in Mr. S.'s drawing-room, while he himself was in another apartment, and therefore did not see him actually write his name upon it; but verily believed that it was Mr. S.'s hand-writing; made different anwers, at different times, respecting his means of procuring money; had half-pay as a lieutenant in the navy, and several pensions from the king, and also one from the Patriotic Fund, yet was never confirmed a lieutenant in the navy; never had been examined at Grenwich, nor had ever presented any memorial to obtain his pensions.

During the examination of the witness, frequent questions were started, and discussions naturally arose as to the propriety of the course of examination adopted by the learned counsel. The witness and counsel were of course ordered to withdraw, and await the decision of the house on such points.

General *Phipps* observed, that when counsel and witnesses were ordered to withdraw from the bar, it was not to be allowed that a petitioner should take the advantage of an indulgence which the house granted in such case, not to insist on the witness withdrawing more than a foot or two below the bar, instead of outside of the door; it should not be permitted that a petitioner should lay hold of such an opportunity for conversing with the witness, or making observations on whatever might fall from any hon. member of that house.

Mr. Paull, from below the bar, lamented that he had not an opportunity of fairly answering what was said in that house with reference to himself. But when he heard an observation so gross as that which had been made by the hon. general—— Here the petitioner was prevented from proceeding any further, by the authority of the chair, and was ordered to withdraw.

The *Speaker* observed, that the house would judge for itself what it was proper for it to do after the proceeding that had just taken place, and which appeared to him so extraordinary that he should abstain from denominating it. He wished also to collect the sense of the house as to its practice, in the case of petitioners who prayed to be heard by themselves or their counsel, whether having made their election to be heard by their counsel, they did not relinquish their right to be heard by themselves.

Lord *Howick* had been so surprized at the extraordinary conduct of the petitioner, that he had only been prevented by his feelings from calling the attention of the house to the gross, insolent, and outrageous proceeding. He thought the house was called upon to adopt some measure, in vindication of its own dignity; and recommended that the petitioner should be brought to the bar, and acquainted by the Speaker with the sense entertained by the house of the impropriety of his conduct.

Lord *A. Hamilton* urged in mitigation, not in justification of the petitioner, the feelings that must have been excited by the statement made by the hon. member under the gallery.

Mr. *Whitbread* had never had his eye off that part of the house since the commencement of this investigation, and assured the house that Mr. Paull had never gone out.

Mr. *Baker* submitted whether it would not be better that the house should not have any direct communication with him, but that whatever was to be done on the occasion should be done through the serjeant at arms.—The motion of lord Howick was then agreed to, and the petitioner and his counsel having been called in,

The *Speaker* addressed him in the following terms: "Mr. Paull, I am directed by the house to acquaint you, that, in its judgement, you have been guilty of great impropriety of conduct, and committed a gross outrage upon the privileges of the house. I am also directed to acquaint you, that you having made your election to be heard by your counsel, are no longer entitled, according to the practice of this house, to be heard by yourself. I am also again directed to inform the counsel that they confine their examination to matters of fact respecting the tampering with witnesses, and suppressing of evidence."

T. Weatherhead was next examined. He stated, that he had been long acquainted with Drake, who had been a shipmate of his. Drake and he called at Mr. Sheridan's, in Somerset Place, on the 19th of Feb. He there saw a very motley crew, such as he had never met before, and such as he wished never to meet again. He waited some time in a large room with this company; when Mr. S. came in. Mr. S. addressed himself principally to Drake, with whom he continued in close conversation, elbow to elbow, for above ten minutes. They were at the opposite side of the room from where witness stood. He did not hear any part of their conversation, nor did he think it was audible to any other person in the room.

There was a confused noise among the persons present, some of whom stood between him and Mr. S., and prevented that gentleman from addressing him, as he several times attempted. At length, however, Mr. S. did address him, and talked to him about the motion which he meant to propose in the house of commons, for postponing the trial of the election, saying, he knew he had rascals to deal with, and would act accordingly. Witness told Mr. S. at this time, that what was said of the letter in possession of Harris, was unfounded, and that Mr. S. was misinformed, for that he was sure Drake would have nothing to do with a spurious letter. Drake wrote the second letter in the presence of himself and Harris. Witness saw this letter before it was signed, and afterwards, and the words "treasurer of the navy" were attached to the signature. All but the signature was in the hand-writing of Drake. Mr. S., after finding that he was unemployed, promised him (witness) an appointment at the interview of the 19th of Feb. He desired him to call at Somerset-Place about two o'clock on the next day. He did so call, conceiving it very improper to make an appointment and not keep it. In this call he was accompanied by Drake. When they entered the room, they found an old woman in black, an old man also in black, and a young man strutting about the room. By-and-by another character appeared, and soon after Drake called him, saying, "you are not aware of what suspicious company you are in here: that fellow, who is just come in, is a Bow-street officer." Upon this, he and Drake withdrew from the room; but, on their way out, he was met by a man of the name of Burgess, whom he understood afterwards to be Mr. Sheridan's solicitor. This man immediately saluted him with great familiarity, and claimed an acquaintance with him. But what struck him was, that the man could not point out any place where he had ever met him, and he could not remember to have ever seen the man before in his life. While Burgess was in conversation with Drake and himself, Harris came up and joined them; and told Drake that Mr. S. meant to take him up on a charge of forgery. Drake was indignant, and he and witness went away, and at the first convenient tavern Drake took out his pencil and sent a very sharp note of reproach to Mr. S. Witness received the Speaker's warrant to attend the committee on the 24th of Feb., and received another summons since. He met Mr. Johnstone about the 12th of Feb. at Mrs. Drake's, and heard Johnstone complain of Mr. Drake's misbehaviour towards Mr. Sheridan, and state that Drake was in a carriage with Johnstone the night before. Witness admitted that he had been discharged by capt. Trollope, under whom he served; but denied that any crime was imputed to him. His discharge was merely the result of the captain's pleasure. The first letter for the use of Harris was written by him; but the second, which was much stronger in its terms, was written by Drake himself. The first was objected to by Harris, principally because it had the letters M. P. annexed to Mr. S.'s signature. He did know who wrote these initials; though he wrote the letter, he had nothing to do with the insertion of M. P.; when Drake brought him this letter signed by Mr. S., he saw, for the first time, the letters M. P., and they, as well as the signature, were quite wet. Harris did certainly propose to Drake to give him some money if he would procure him a letter from sir H. Parker or some other flag-officer, recommendatory of him in his business of slop-selling. He never saw any money paid on this score, but was aware of the contract. He really did believe the signature to the first letter was that of Mr. S., but he thought M. P. quite absurd, as no parliament existed at the time. He advised Drake to destroy the first letter. Drake thanked him for the advice, after he had acted upon it. He never gave this advice under any impression that the signature was a forgery. He entertained no such uncharitable suspicion. He had no more disposition to suspect the genuineness of the second than that of the first letter. Witness was asked by Mr. S. whether there were not 4 or 5 witnesses present at the only time that he ever happened to see him? Yes.—Did I not say in your presence, that I never conversed with any one upon the subject of the Westminster election unless three or four witness were present? A. Something to that effect.—Q. Were you not introduced to me by Drake, upon that the only time I ever spoke to you, as a clergyman? A. No, I am no cushion-thumper.—Q. Did not Drake describe you as the Rev. Mr. Weatherhead? A. It might be so, but I did not notice it.—Witness further deposed that Drake was to be remunerated in money for his trouble in getting the second letter from Mr. S., and that Harris promised his vote and interest for Mr. S. at the election. Witness was present at the supper given at the Bath Hotel in Piccadilly, where Harris, Daws, and Drake were. He heard no conversation about the letter in the possession of Harris. He did not hear any sum of money offered by Drake to Harris, to induce him to give it, nor any request whatever, upon the subject. John Richards stated that he had been employed in the election by Mr. Downes, and that he had received money from Burgess by recommendation of Downes, for his services and expences. On being cross-examined by Mr. S., he said he had never seen Mr. S. with Mr. Burgess. He had not written a threatening letter to Mr. Downes, but he was obliged to acknowledge that he had, since the election, written a letter to Mr. T. Sheridan, complaining that he had not been sufficiently remunerated, and threatening to go to Mr. Paull's side, and to do every thing in his power against Mr. S., unless his demands were complied with. Being examined by the petitioning counsel, he stated, that he had been present at conversations in which Wallis had stated, that the warrants of the Speaker would be out when the consideration of the petition was postponed, and those who chose might go out of the way, and would receive money to that purpose.—Jeremiah James likewise spoke, to different meetings at the Peacock, and afterwards at the Barley Mow, Drury-lane, where Pullen, Richards, and Sperring, had met Wallis, who, he said, had treated them with a dinner at the Barley Mow, and allowed them money for their loss of time in meeting him on the days mentioned. Wallis had told them that the warrants would be out in consequence of the petition being postponed, and that those who went out of the way would get money to do so. W. had asked him what he meant to do; but he would not tell him. W. said, every one in danger might go away. Witness being asked what he meant by that? he said that he imagined the danger referred to was of those who had voted being bad votes.—Daniel Richardson, spoke to the same circumstances. He himself had no occasion to go out of the way. The witness was pressed to explain what he meant by that danger; or, why it should have been proposed that any should go out of the way. He gave no precise answer. At last he dropped down overcome with fatigue or agitation, and was carried out.—Ann Richardson spoke to the conversation of Wallis, at the Peacock and the Barley Mow. She added, that he said money to the extent of 6 or 7 guineas would be given to those who would go out of the way. Wallis had given 5*s.* a day to her husband, James, &c. for the loss of their time the days they met him; but at last he declined making them any more allowances, as, he said, he had lost 7*l.* in the lottery.—J. Balam said he had seen Wallis on the 8th of Jan., who had requested him to speak to Sperring to keep out of the way, and that Mr. Sheridan would find the money. He had been at the house of Burgess with Wallis, Pullen, and Sperring; that Burgess gave him 5*l.* for his loss of time. Sperring had told him, that he had voted for Paull and Hood, on the first day in his own name, and on a subsequent day had voted for S. in the name of Bryan, giving a different description of his abode. Sperring said, he received 10*s.* from Stephen Taylor, in the presence of Burgess. Wallis said, he was employed by Burgess. When pressed to state why he was to keep away, or make others do so, he could state no particular reason. He said, he had given information to Mr. Paull's agent, of what he had mentioned. He had seen Mr. Powell frequently, had told him what had passed when he saw Burgess, and Powell had taken down what he had to say.—Christ. Richardson knows Balam. He had gone to see Burgess, and met Wallis coming out of Burgess's house in Curzon-street. He went with one Gallant and Wallis to a house in Halfmoon street, when Wallis told them that when the petition was postponed their services would be of no force, and those who chose might go out of the way. The witness had no reason to keep out of the way. He said, he had communicated to Mr. Powell what he did in trying to see Burgess, and in meeting Wallis. It was one John Balam that took him to look for Burgess; and the object was to see whether Burgess would offer them any money to keep out of the way. They did not see Burgess. He had seen Mr. Powell a day or two after, and Powell had given him 10*s.* for his loss of time the two days he went with Balam to Curzon-street. He had gone from Carey-street, where Mr. Paull's committee sat. He had seen one Percy at the committee in Carey-street, who knew he had been at Burgess's, and who, after he had gone the first day, encouraged him to go back to see what Burgess would say. Being asked whether it was his object to get money from Burgess? he said: "No:" but a former answer being read to him, in which he had said the contrary, he admitted, the object was money. He had gone not to ask, but to see if Burgess would offer any money. Being examined by Mr. Sheridan, he denied that he had lately been locked up with a parcel of pickpockets, in the black-hole, Catharine-street; but he had not very lately been at Marlborough-street office.—There not being any more witnesses to be examined, the learned counsel were informed that on Thursday next they might proceed with their summing up, being mindful, however, that, as they had been directed to do in their opening, they should confine themselves to such matters only as went to support the allegations in the petition.

Mr. *Whitbread* observed, that, in a case where a wish was expressed to punish others for impeding or preventing the regular course of justice by tampering with witnesses, he had never heard of a set of witnesses who more justly merited the censure of the tribunal before which they gave their testimony, than those who had then been examined at the bar of the house, particularly the witness Richardson.

Sir *J. Anstruther* thought that the hon. gent. was too limited in his idea of censure; he (sir J.) was of opinion that Balam was the principal man: it was he that employed Richardson; and it was necessary, for the ends of justice, that some means should be taken to secure the witnesses, as was usual in a court of criminal judicature, to answer for their scandalous prevarication.

Mr. *Sheridan* intimated that, if he should think it necessary to go into any evidence on his case, it would amount to a recrimination against those who brought the present charge before the house.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, March 3.

[PRUSSIA.] The order of the day having been read for taking into consideration his majesty's message,

Lord *Grenville* said, with respect to that part of the message in which his majesty informed the house of the conclusion of a treaty with Prussia, as it was also stated that a copy of the treaty would be laid before the house as soon as the ratifications were exchanged, he thought it unnecessary then to enter into any detail respecting it, the proper time for discussing the subject being when the treaty should be before the house. With respect to the other part of his majesty's message, relative to the advance of 80,000*l.* the minister employed in that transaction, was, it was well known, a member of that house, a nobleman distinguished by his military exploits in the service of his country; distinguished also by his great talents and capabilities of mind. That nobleman had, in consequence of the pressing exigency of affairs in those countries which were the theatre of war, and in the exercise of the discretionary power entrusted to him by his majesty, advanced money to the amount of about 80,000*l.* This was not the exact sum, the payments having been made in foreign money; but it was about that sum. He thought there could be little difference of opinion in that house, as to the expediency of entrusting to the nobleman to whom he had alluded a discretionary power to advance a limited sum, in case circumstances should require it; their lordships would, also, he thought, readily believe that there might have existed that pressing exigency of affairs, which would have rendered the advance of this sum in the way stated, highly adviseable and expedient; and he was persuaded their lordships would be of opinion, that such a discretionary power could not be entrusted to better hands. He should therefore merely move, That an humble address be presented to his majesty, thanking his majesty for his most gracious communication, and expressing the readiness of that house to concur in such measures as might be necessary to enable his majesty to make good the said sum.—Ordered.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 3.

[FINANCE RESOLUTIONS.] Sir *James Pulteney* rose for the purpose of moving his Resolutions on Finance, pursuant to his former notice. He did not propose to enter into any detailed observations on his plan, till his calculations should be before the house, and should then content himself with shewing that a considerable saving would accrue from the adoption of his views, without any inconvenience whatever. The necessity stated by the noble lord, on a former ocasion, of giving an advantage to the stockholder, by increasing the amount of the sinking fund, would be met by his plan. If it should be necessary to increase the sinking fund, that might be done at any time, and any to amount, by a loan, which would bring a large sum into the market, and keep up the price of stocks. If he could shew this, he should hope to persuade the house to adopt his plan, and avoid the ruinous consequences of that of the noble lord. By his mode, he proposed to take advantage of the war taxes during the war, and to mortgage them only at the end of the war, and then to charge the war debt upon the war taxes. By this plan there would be a smaller amount of permanent debt, and a larger sinking fund created, than by the new one proposed by the noble lord. In this case, the supplementary loans would not be felt during the war, and the amount of the war loan would be but 11 millions annually, the interest of which he proposed to provide for in part out of the proceeds of the sinking fund. If the noble lord should, on looking into his calculations, think them worthy of his attention, he should be happy to furnish him with every information on the subject; and he had no doubt that he could prove to him, that his own ideas could be better carried into effect by this, than by the new plan. The hon. baronet concluded with moving the following Resolutions:

1. "That, in the New Plan of Finance, it is proposed to mortgage, during each year of war, a certain portion of the War Taxes, to provide for the payment of the Interest and Sinking Fund of part of the Loan, which shall be made in that year; and also to provide what shall be further wanted for the Public Service by a Supplementary Loan."

2. "That, the War Expenditure being stated at 32,000,000*l.*, it will be necessary, in addition to the War Taxes unpledged, to make Loans in the first year to the amount of 12,000,000*l.* in order to meet that expenditure, and Loans to a larger amount in each subsequent year."

3. "That if no part of the War Taxes were to be pledged, a Loan of 11,000,000*l.* annually would be sufficient for this purpose.—That the amount of the present Sinking Fund is 8,331,709*l.*, and therefore the Annual Interest of a Loan to that amount might be provided, by appropriating for that purpose the Interest of Debt redeemed annually, without causing any diminution in the present amount of that Fund.—That the interest of 2,668,291*l.* being the difference between the present amount of the Sinking Fund, and the sum of 11,000,000*l.*, with the usual Sinking Fund of one per cent. upon the nominal Capital, would be 177,886*l.* per annum, supposing the 3 per cents. to continue at 60: and that if it should at any time be thought expedient to appropriate for the interest of such sum, viz. 2,668,291*l.*, a part of the Interest redeemed by the operation of the Sinking Fund within the year, there would be on that account, a reduction of such Sinking Fund in each year to the amount of 133,418*l.* That the employment of a considerable sum in the purchase of Stock, at successive periods throughout the year, under the provisions which now regulate the purchase of Stock by the Commissioners for the Redemption of the National Debt, has a tendency to keep up the price of the Funds, and is consequently, in the time of war, of advantage both to the Public and to the Stockholder."

4. "That the Sinking Fund may in each year be carried to the amount proposed for such year in the New Plan, by making a Supplementary Loan equal to the amount of the difference between the Sinking Fund, as it would otherwise stand for such year, and the amount proposed in such Plan for the purpose of supplying that difference."

5 "That such Supplementary Loan, when added to the Sinking Fund, by reducing an amount of Interest equal to the charge of Interest increased by raising the same, it is obvious, that, whatever advantage might result from so large an increase of Sinking Fund, operating in the market, (if an increase to the amount proposed by the New Plan, and wholly produced by adding to the Loan of the year, can really be deemed advantageous,) might equally be obtained by this mode, without any additional burthen to the public.'"

6. "That the smallness of the Loan for the service of the year, in proportion to the Sinking Fund, must also have a tendency to keep up the price of Funds."

7. "That this advantage will result in a greater degree from the system of borrowing 11,000,000*l.* only in each year, than by having recourse to the larger Loans, which would be required for the service of each year under the New Plan."

8. "That this mode of providing for the War Expenditure, would consequently be more advantageous to the public, and to the Stockholder, than the New Plan; and that if, upon the return of peace, a portion of the War Taxes exactly equal to what would be pledged at the same period, by the New Plan, were then to be pledged, to meet the annual charge of such portion of the Total Debt, as that amount of taxes would provide for at an interest of 10 per cent., including the Sinking Fund upon the

same, the remainder would be the permanent Debt, leaving the present annual charge of the portion of the debt so deducted and provided for, to be added to the amount of the permanent Sinking Fund."

9. "That the debt on the War Taxes, being in the same manner deducted on the return of peace, from the Total Debt which may have then been contracted upon the New Plan, the remainder would be the Permanent Debt incurred by that Plan, and that, the Sinking Fund of the War Taxes being deducted from the total Sinking Fund, which may have arisen within the same period, the remainder would be the Permanent Sinking Fund."

10. "That the operations of the mode now proposed, whilst they afford some comparative advantage during the continuance of the War, would place the Finances of the country in a much more favourable situation, at the restoration of peace, than those of the New Plan, at whatever period peace may be concluded; and that at the termination of the period of 20 years the comparison would be as follows:—

Permanent Debt by the New Plan	£.318,311,495
Permanent Debt by the mode proposed	285,595,705
Less Debt by the mode proposed	£.32,715,790
Sinking Fund, mode proposed - - -	14,359,900
Sinking Fund of the New Plan - - -	12,762,691
Larger Sinking Fund by mode proposed	£.1,597,209
Amount of Taxes imposed by the New Plan - - - - - - - - - - -	£.2,051,000
Amount of Taxes imposed by mode proposed - - - - - - - - - - - - -	1,985,228
Less amount of Taxes by the mode proposed - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	£.65,772

The resolutions were ordered to lie on the table, and to be printed, and the debate on them was adjourned to Thursday se'nnight.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, March 4.

[MUTINY BILL—ROMAN CATHOLICS.] Lord *Howick*, adverting to the notice which he had given for this day, relative to the introduction of additional clauses into the Mutiny bill, for allowing Roman Catholics to hold certain commissions in the army, and for granting soldiers of that persuasion the free exercise of their religion, informed the house that on more mature consideration of the subject it had been deemed more proper to bring in a separate bill for that purpose; which bill he proposed to move for leave to bring in to-morrow. At the same time he thought it right to state that it was intended to extend the same privilege to Roman Catholics in the Navy service. As to the Mutiny bill, there were many amendments to be moved in it, to which he did not understand there would be much objection; it was proposed therefore, that it should go through the committee *pro formâ*, for the purpose of having the additional clauses introduced into it, after which the bill would be re-committed on Monday next, and from the advanced period of the season, gentlemen would be aware of the necessity of passing the bill with all convenient dispatch.

Mr. *Yorke* was glad that the noble lord had adopted the plan of bringing forward his regulations respecting the Roman Catholics as a separate measure.

[COMMITTEE OF SUPPLY—PRUSSIA.] The house went into a committee of supply, on the motion of lord Henry Petty. The king's message of Monday relative to Prussia having been read,

Lord *Henry Petty* stated, that it was unnecessary for him to recall to the recollection of the house the circumstances under which lord Hutchinson had left this country for the continent, and the state of the continent at that period. That noble lord had been dispatched, as well for the purpose of communicating such information as might be necessary to this country, as to afford such aid as could be conveniently granted to the king of Prussia in the unfortunate circumstances in which he was then placed. Shortly after his arrival at his destination, he had made an advance of 80,000*l.* to that monarch, for a purpose the importance of which the house would, he had no doubt, readily admit, namely, the defence of the remaining fortresses. Strong representations had been made to him, that, without such an advance, it would not be possible to pay the army intended for the defence of those fortresses, some of which, however, had since unfortunately been taken. He did not feel it necessary to say more than to move, that it be the opinion of the committee that a sum, not exceeding 80,000*l.* be granted to his majesty, to make good a like sum advanced to the king of Prussia, in consequence of the urgency of the state of affairs on the continent.

Mr. *Bankes* wished to know when the noble lord intended that the report of the committee should be brought up, as he had some observations to make upon this subject.

Lord *H. Petty* answered, that it was his intention to have it reported to-morrow; but if it should be wished, he had no objection to propose its being postponed till the day following. No reply being made, the resolution was agreed to, and the report ordered to be received to morrow.

[COMMITTEE OF WAYS AND MEANS—BUDGET.] The house having resolved itself into a committee of Ways and Means,

Lord *Henry Petty*, pursuant to notice, rose to state the terms of the Loan, and to recapitulate the Supplies and Ways and Means of the year. As an opportunity had already been afforded him, from the nature of the Plan of Finance, which, on a former occasion, he had opened to the house, of adverting in a detailed view to the extent of the supplies and ways and means of the year, he did not feel it then necessary for him to go at large into the statements he had formerly submitted to the house. But, as the loan had since been negociated, and as the time that had elapsed, enabled him to make the several statements with more accuracy than in the first instance he might have done, he hoped for the indulgence of the committee, whilst he shortly recapitulated the several branches of the supply and ways and means of the year; after which he proposed to state the terms upon which the contract for the loan of the year had been concluded, and then to explain what part of the Ways and Means of the year would be permanent:

SUPPLY.

Navy, exclusive of 422,500*l.* Sea Ordnance		16,997,837
Army, Great Britain	£.10,202,968	
Ireland	3,445,130	
Making together		13,648,098
Barracks, Great Britain	£.506,237	
Ireland	469,450	
Together		975,687
Commissary-General's Department		841,526
Making altogether for the different branches of the Army Expenditure		£.15,465,311
Extraordinaries, Great Britain	£.2,950,000	
Ireland	600,000	
Together		3,550,000
Excess of Extraordinaries this year		793,710
Making the Total Army Charge		19,809,021
Ordnance, including 422,500*l.* for Sea Ordnance for Great Britain		3,264,469
Ireland		479,246
Making together		3,743,715
Miscellaneous Services for Great Britain		1,200,000
Ireland		660,000
Vote of Credit		3,000,000

The noble lord observed, that there was an excess in the extraordinaries, of 793,710*l.* this year, which he had not been aware of when he had submitted his former statements to the house; but, in consequence of the deduction of the expenditure of the commissary-general's department from the extraordinaries, the sum voted this year was less than the sum voted last year, and he had the satisfaction to state that his former estimate would cover the future extraordinary expenditure. It was proposed to make good the advance that had been made to the king of Prussia, of a sum of 80,000*l.* out of the vote of credit, and also to pay a subsidy of 230,000*l.* to the king of Sweden, in pursuance of existing treaties. An advance was also to be made to the emperor of Russia, of 500,000*l.* out of the vote of credit. These were all the subsidies that he was then aware of as necessary to be paid, and at all events he had no doubt that the vote of credit of 3,000,000*l.* would be sufficient to cover what might accrue in the present year.

The apportionment of the Votes of Credit was, for Great Britain	2,800,000
For Ireland	200,000
Together	£. 3,000,000
The whole of the joint charges as he had stated, would be	45,396,575
To which was to be added Interest of Exchequer Bills	1,200,000
Loyalty Loan to be paid off	350,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax, 1805	200,000
Which made the Total Charge	47,046,575
Deduct 2-17ths for Ireland	5,545,677
Remains to be defrayed by Great Britain	41,500,898

He had next to state the Ways and Means by which these supplies were to be covered;—

Land and Malt	£.2,750,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund	3,500,000
War Taxes this year	19,800,000
Lottery	320,000
Vote of Credit	3,000,000
Loan	12,200,000
Surplus of Ways and Means, 1805	171,185
Making a Total of	£.41,671,185
Excess over Supplies	170,286

He had stated the Loan as a part of the Ways and Means of the year, and he had next to inform the committee of the terms upon which that loan had been contracted for; a duty which he should perform with satisfaction, from the advantageous terms upon which it had been negociated. The terms of the loan were for every 100*l.* subscribed,

Three per Cent. Reduced	£. 70	0	0
Three per Cent. Consols	70	0	0
Navy Five per Cents	10	12	0
Being at an Interest of	4	14	7

The committee would be sensible of the advantageous nature of this contract for the public, by calling to mind the terms upon which last year's loan had been negociated; terms that were then considered advantageous. The loan of last year had been negociated at an interest of 4*l.* 19*s.* 7*d.* for every 100*l.*; so that the public gained 5*s.* per cent. on the present loan.—Having stated the several items of Supply and Ways and Means, and explained to the house the terms of the loan, he should think he had fulfilled his duty if he had not thought it necessary to add another statement, to shew, that, notwithstanding the excess of the extraordinaries, the sum of 32 millions would be sufficient for the expenditure of the year, and for future expenditure, exclusive of subsidies and extraordinaries arising from the rise of the price of articles of stores, &c. He wished to put the committee in possession of the grounds upon which he supposed that the Ways and Means, offered by 32 millions, would be sufficient to cover the expenditure, with the exceptions he had stated. This he should shew, by deducting from the supplies all that was due on arrears, all that was due on subsidies, and the excess of extraordinaries, in which case there would remain, as he conceived, sufficient to provide for the same expenditure as in the present year; and also, by deducting all of the Ways and Means of the present year that was extraordinary, and not available for a future year. The noble lord then entered into a statement to shew, that by a deduction of the supplies that were extraordinary in the votes of the present year, such as the payment of the Loyalty Loan, the subsidies to the emperor of Russia, to the king of Sweden, and to the king of Prussia, the remainder of the sum voted on credit, and the excess of the extraordinaries of the present year, the supplies to be prospectively to be raised would be reduced from the supplies of the present year, viz. 41,600,898*l.* to 38,100,130*l.* He was not aware that it was necessary for him to say any thing further on the subject; and he should therefore move the first resolution.—On the question being put,

Mr. *Rose* wished to call the attention of the house to the statement of the noble lord. The noble lord had excluded from his consideration, in the first formation of his plan, any estimate founded upon the subsidies that might be necessary, and yet scarcely a month had elapsed, when the noble lord came forward with a provision for subsidies to the amount of nearly one million. He asked, therefore, whether it was not a fallacy to leave out an item of expenditure, which followed so closely on the noble lord's first statement in arranging any financial plan for the future. He could not conceive how he could have overlooked the excess of the extraordinaries of the present year, as he admitted, at the time of bringing forward his first statement. It could not have been for want of having the accounts made up, for that was regularly done in the offices. He knew of no way in which such an excess could arise, except from the arrival of bills from abroad, as all the bills that had already arrived must have been entered in the offices, at the time the noble lord brought forward his plan. Was the house to suppose, that in the space of six months an excess of nearly 800,000*l.* had accrued in the extraordinary expenditure? He had always been of opinion, that the noble lord's supposition, that 32 millions would be sufficient prospectively for the country, was totally fallacious, and he had, therefore, recommended to the noble lord to assume a larger expenditure for the purpose of guarding against a failure in his statements.

Lord *H. Petty* replied by appealing to every gentleman who had heard him, whether he had not distinctly excepted extraordinary expenditure by subsidies, and produced by a bill of stores and other articles, from his estimate of 32 millions? He wished again to set himself right with the right hon. gent. and the house on this point. The expenditure of the present year afforded the only comparatively certain data whereon to found any calculation of the prospective expenditure of the country. The expenditure in subsidies could not be anticipated, and therefore ought not to have been taken into any certain calculation.

Sir *T. Turton* observed, that the noble lord had kindled with the warmth of a generous mind at the charge of fallacy; but this was not meant in any invidious sense. The event had proved, that from some cause or other the expenditure could not be confined to 32 millions. If the idea, therefore, had gone out among the public, that this criterion was correct, there was, no doubt, a fallacy with respect to the public. He asked, whether the 500,000*l.* subsidy to Russia was in consequence of the treaty of 1805, or any new treaty? [Mr. Vansittart intimated that it was in consequence of the old treaty.] Then he would wish to know whether the 80,000*l.* to Prussia was the whole that was intended to be given, or whether it was the commencement of something further? If it was only a previous step to something further, he meant to propose a motion on that subject. He thought that subsidies to Prussia in the present state of that country would be wasting money. It would produce no good whatever: the fortresses, for the preservation of which this 80,000*l.* had been given, had been captured, and there were little hopes that any assistance of this sort would be of service.

Mr. *Vansittart* replied, that it was to wind up the account of former years. He entered into a short explanation of the subject before the committee; after which the resolutions were agreed to, and the house having been resumed, the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.

[IRISH MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES—ROMAN CATHOLIC COLLEGE.] Mr. Hobhouse brought up the report of the committee of supply. The resolutions (grants for the service of Ireland) were read and agreed to, until the resolution for granting the sum of 13,000*l.* for defraying the charge of the Roman catholic seminary at Maynooth, in Ireland; on which a discussion arose.

Mr. *Perceval* rose to oppose the said grant. Since he had last stated his opinion to the house on that subject, he had taken no slight means of acquiring information, and the result of his enquiry went more stedfastly to fix the motives of his opposition. It was not the amount of the sum, increased as it was in the present instance, that solely excited his hostility; it was in the growing nature of the demand, that he saw the strongest ground of alarm. As the Irish parliament had thought such a measure of policy advisable, he was still willing to retain the principle of meeting that determination; indeed, the united legislature were bound by the principles of good faith to continue the grant. But there was a wide difference between the allowance of a grant, averaged annually at 8000*l.*, and the concurrence in demands, which were progressively increasing, and has, in the present estimate, actually amounted to 13,000*l.* There was, in his mind, another very strong ground of objection to the enlargement of this catholic seminary, that it operated to the prejudice of the University of Dublin. The house, by adverting to the Journals of the Irish house of commons, would find, that it was a growing practice with the Roman Catholic gentry in Ireland, to send their sons to that university, previous to the foundation of the Maynooth seminary. On a former occasion, when these estimates were submitted to a committee of the house, he had argued on the great and numerous benefits which would arise from the joint education of both Roman Catholics and Protestants, in the same university. It was affirmed by the right hon. baronet opposite, (sir J. Newport,) that, from the shortness of the period since the relaxation of the penal statute, which precluded the education of a catholic in the university of Dublin, it could not be expected that a great number of catholic students should have embraced that opportunity. But the actual number, whether great or small, could not affect the question; if the opportunity was taken advantage of by any catholics, however few, it went to prove, that in their minds there existed no prejudice against a participation with their protestant countrymen in the same collegiate education. The Journals of the Irish house of commons gave important information upon that point. In perusing them he had found, that at the period when the measure of founding the Maynooth seminary was submitted to the Irish parliament, the Catholics themselves presented a petition against the inexpediency of excluding the Protestants from the option of being educated there. The prayer of that petition was grounded on the great national benefits a communion of opinion and mutual good-will were so likely to produce. They certainly felt, what every true friend to England and Ireland must feel, that friendship and conciliation would follow, from the professors of the two religions being associated in their education; and it was with no light source of regret that the circumstances of the case made it necessary to declare, that the opportunity of effecting such beneficial consequences was suffered to escape. Had the public money been at that time expended in enlarging the university of Dublin, instead of adopting the policy of a separate institution, a great object would have been obtained, the benefits arising from which, would be found every day to increase. Indeed it was not saying too much, to assume, that the interests of the Protestant university appeared sacrificed to the advancement of the Catholic seminary. Within a few years, the professors of the latter institution were doubled; that is, from 9 professors originally, there were now 18; and for this increase there was no distinct notice ever given to the house. With respect to the other, or contiguous seminary for the education of laymen, there was something in the formation of it very inconsistent; inasmuch as the private subscriptions on which the parliamentary grant for the education of Catholic clergy was founded, were altogether applied to its support; and thus that annual grant, which was intended only as an aid, had now become the primary and only fund for defraying the expences attending the education of the priesthood. In the University of Dublin, provision was only made for 100 persons, including fellows, senior and junior scholars, and sizers; whilst the public were called on to defray the expences of 200 Roman Catholic professors and students in the seminary at Maynooth. The question then was, to what description of persons was this preference given? To a class of subjects, who, in their religious tenets, withhold from their lawful sovereign the admission of his supremacy. But, it had been contended, that it was wise to prevent the Catholic priesthood from being exposed to the mischiefs of a foreign education. It was to him rather extraordinary to lay so much stress upon the place of education, when the true and strong principle of danger and hostility, existed in the principles of that religion, in which, whether at home or abroad, they were uniformly educated. He wished to have an enquiry instituted into the nature of their bye-laws altogether; there seemed to him a great mystery about this institution. There was nothing like a visitorial inspection, no enquiry as to the mode of doctrine and discipline instilled and exercised on a number of youth, educated, if not in aversion, at least in hostility to the principles of the Protestant establishment. He felt it his duty to impress on the house, that, during the first years of this Catholic institution, the various grants given by parliament were founded on petitions. In the present case, he could not say whether a petition was ever presented; but of this he was aware, that no committee was ever appointed to enquire into the nature and extent of those plans, upon which this application was grounded. It was by accident that he had taken notice of this grant on a former occasion; the danger of admitting the growing principle, and of this house giving encouragement to such permanent expences and increasing demands, had made a considerable impression upon his mind; an impression which should induce him to move, "That the sum of 8,000*l.* be substituted for the sum of 13,000*l.* at present inserted in the resolution of the committee."

Sir *John Newport.*—Mr. Speaker; I feel myself able to convince the house, and I hope the hon. and learned gent. on the points of difference between us, by adverting to the acts of the Irish parliament which particularly referred to the catholic seminary at Maynooth. If, indeed, the learned gent. had adverted to them, his surprise that the demand for that institution had increased from the average grant of 8,000*l.* would have been considerably lessened; for he would have found, that the sums voted by the Irish parliament, varied almost every year from 8 to 9 and 10,000*l.* In fact, it would have been found, that, though the sum of 8,000*l.* was the averaged annual grant, yet the Irish parliament expressly recognized the principle of varying the amount of the grant, according to times and circumstances. With respect to the objection of the hon. and learned gent. that the existence, much more the enlargement of the Maynooth seminary, was prejudicial to the interests of the university of Dublin; this is an objection, which I by no means admit; but before I enter on an investigation of that objection, I beg leave to appeal to that liberal and manly spirit, which marked the conduct of the Catholics, when, in the petition alluded to by the hon. and learned gent., they strongly deprecated the intention of excluding their Protestant countrymen from the right of being educated at the college of Maynooth. But what was the true state of the question, and how did the facts fully exemplify that it operated in no such way? that the increase of Catholics at the university of Dublin had been progressive, and at this moment there was double the number than at any former period. But it was not in the university of Dublin that the number of catholic students had increased; many of the higher orders of that body are to be found at the universities in England—at Edinburgh and Glasgow. But the hon. and learned gent. has said, it would have been a wiser policy to have enlarged the university of Dublin, and directed the public money expended on the Maynooth seminary, to meet the provision for the education of catholics there. Enlarge that University, I answer, as you please, and you advance not one step to the object of your wishes. And the reason is obvious, because persons who are to be instructed in the doctrine and discipline of the Romish faith, persons whose intention is to instruct their flocks in certain articles of faith, and in the observance of certain religious ceremonies, will never be induced or forced to embrace a system of education foreign from those intentions, and which, though not hostile, are very different from the opinions of those whom you would select as their preceptors. Was the house to adopt such a line of policy, there would, under the present circumstances of the world, remain to the Catholic but one alternative, namely, no education, no religious observance. They are, at present, deprived, in a great degree, of foreign education; the monasteries and institutions, which were formerly noted for those pursuits, have been entirely overturned. To Flanders, Spain, and Italy, it is impossible for the Irish catholic to repair for education; and will not the house take advantage of such circumstances, and duly appreciate the great national benefits vhich must arise from granting to them a domestic education? To restrict them to the University of Dublin, is, in other words, to compel them to a state of ignorance. The thing would be an utter impossibility; it is indeed extravagant to expect catholic acquiescence in a scheme directly in defiance to the religion they profess; nor would the professors of Trinity college do their duty, unless they performed that part, which the Catholic could not conscientiously approve. The hon. and learned gent. has asserted, that the accounts, attaching to this branch of the miscellaneous expenditure, have not been vouched. Had he thought proper to have extended his enquiries, he would have found, that the commissioners of the imprest accounts had as regularly certified this branch of services as any other. The two seminaries have been said to be in a state of rivalry and hostility. If such rivalry and hostility exist, I am sure they exist not with the Catholics. We have also been assured, that there is no visitorial power, although it is distinctly specified by the statute, that the lord chancellor and the judges of the country shall be visitors of the morals and conduct of the scholars, as connected with civil policy; wisely and prudently abstaining from any interference either in their religious doctrine, or discipline. If this measure had not been over and over discussed by the parliament of Ireland, if its eligibility had not been generally admitted, if the diminution of catholic incumbents was not by deaths and other causes very considerable, then there might be some strong reasons for not voting this branch of expenditure without mature enquiry. But I am sure it is in the recollection of the house, that when I proposed the miscellaneous services of this year, I did most particularly advert to the increase of the Maynooth grant; and I was induced to make the observation, anticipating as I did, an opposition, either to the principle or amount of the grant, from a certain quarter in this house. I did think there were certain persons disposed to quarrel with that measure. But why quarrel with me, and not quarrel with my predecessor in office? The objection, in consequence of its not being referred to a committee, as a money grant, was formerly as valid as it can be now. I have introduced nothing new, but have undeviatingly adhered to the plan, which was previously chalked out. But I cannot conclude, without impressing on the house the small provision which is claimed for the education of the priesthood of at least three millions of people. Every principle of humanity and sound policy seems to me to call on this house for its acquiescence.

Mr. *Bankes* objected to the additional grant now moved for, because its object was to double the number of the students for catholic priesthood in Ireland, and would consequently make the sum of 5,000*l.* annual. He did not mean to say that the catholic priesthood should be neglected; on the contrary, he thought that it should be supplied, but this should be done in a different manner from that now proposed. He was certain that the object could be accomplished by means of private contributions. The house was aware that several institutions were supported in this way, and he could not discover why a catholic seminary might not be adequately supported in like manner. The state had not been formerly made a party to such an institution; he did not see, therefore, why it should be incumbered at present. On the whole, he apprehended that this measure would have the effect of making popery rival the protestant establishment in Ireland.

Mr. *Grattan* thought that in a question of this kind, that involved the education of a great portion of the population of the empire, any sect of Christians should be tolerated, as any one sect of religion was better than no religion at all. He was astonished to hear from an hon. gent. over the way, that if the Roman Catholics of Ireland were to be educated in the principles of their faith, it was little matter whether they received that education in Ireland or in France. He was surprized to hear this, because it went to say that it was immaterial whether three millions of the king's own subjects were educated at the expence and under the protection of his majesty's government, or whether they should be pensioners on the bounty of the emperor of France. From the jealousy hitherto entertained of the growth of Catholicism, that jealousy was founded not upon the mere doctrine; not against it as a religion; but against its foreign views, its foreign connections, its foreign relations. But here the objection was changed; no danger was apprehended from those foreign relations; the Roman Catholic might go abroad; but if kept at home, if educated in the bosom of his country, then he would be dangerous. Was this the doctrine? If it was, let it only be repeated in order to be refuted. And if it was not; if foreign connections were dangerous, why promote those views and strengthen those connections, by exiling the Roman Catholic for the purpose of educating him? As to economy, 43,000*l.* had been just voted to the Protestant charter-schools; 21,000*l.* voted to the Foundling Hospital; that is, with a ready hand, 21,000*l.* had been given to the crimes of the depraved, and it was to be disputed whether 13,000*l.* was to be given to enlighten and to instruct three millions of a bold and hardy peasantry. Why so much freely to the Protestant, and, why dispute the little to the Catholic? Did not this do that which was complained of? Did it not encourage the rivalry so much apprehended, by setting up one religion against another; and was it justice so to do? He had heard it apprehended that the institution might tend to encourage the Roman Catholic professors in that seminary, in the latent dissemination of disloyalty: was it remembered that that seminary was subject to the controul of visitors, the chancellor and the judges of the land, and under their controul nothing in that way could be apprehended? He wished gentlemen to look more largely at the institution; it originated in wisdom, and would be productive of good.

Lord *Mahon.*—Mr. Speaker; I can by no means coincide with the opinion and conclusions of the hon. and learned gent. opposite with respect to this measure of support to the Catholic priesthood. In my mind, it should be considered on the more enlarged principles of national policy, as one of those great and desirable means of connecting that religion, and the views of its professors with the interest of the state. The influence of the Catholic priests in that country, is well known to be extensive; unfortunately, the events of the rebellion have too strongly exemplified this; and, under such a conviction, I ask, is it not an inestimable benefit to have the care of their education committed to the government? I do contend, sir, that such a measure is more than a necessary one; it is a great act of national policy, and even were it not a legacy bequeathed by the Irish parliament, I, for one, should give my vote, even at this time, for a similar establishment.

Mr. *Wilberforce* felt unaffected pain in offering his sentiments upon this subject. He wished, however, to be candidly understood. He was not, he confessed, one of those men who entertained those large and liberal views on religious subjects, insisted upon with so much energy by the right hon. gent. on the other side (Mr. Grattan); he was not so much like a certain ruler, of whom it had upon a late occasion been so happily said, that he was an honorary member of all religions. He could not help saying, that he thought the institution in question would tend to discourage the growth of protestantism in Ireland. He must add, however, that he thought the policy of this country's conduct towards that part of the empire had been a most illiberal and ill-judged one. This dangerous system of intolerance and persecution had been too long preserved, and could not be too speedily abated. At the same time, if protestantism was to be encouraged in Ireland, certainly the Maynooth seminary did not contribute to that most desirable effect. As a sincere friend to the Protestant religion, he was unwilling to extend an establishment which would prevent the propagation of that religion. He allowed it was not only criminal but cruel in the highest degree to oppress or restrain the Catholic religion; but it was no oppression not to favour it to the detriment of the Protestant establishment.

Lord *Howick* agreed in the principle of his hon. friend, that it was not only criminal but cruel to persecute any religious sect, but it was something very like persecution to refuse the means of education to the ministers of the catholic religion. He was sure that his hon. friend would be the last man in the world to recommend the adoption of intolerance, yet, when he proposed to withdraw the protection of the state from the catholic priesthood, he recommended something like persecution. He was, from principle and conviction, a member of the established religion, because he thought it the best and the purest on the face of the earth. He should not, however, think himself a friend to the protestant establishment by recommending any measure which could excite the envy or the hatred of the Catholics. He deprecated any attempt which might appear like an inducement to abandon the persuasion in which they had been educated. It would be foolish to endeavour to force the Catholics into the Protestant church; but if this were impracticable, what could be done, but to assist in making them Christians? Not only the policy, but the necessity of such a measure, had been recommended by the duke of Portland to the lord lieutenant of Ireland in 1795, when his grace was secretary for foreign affairs. His lordship then referred to the letter, and proceeded to observe, that as the principle of the institution had been acquiesced in ever since 1795, it was very strange that the present grant should be resisted; for, as gentlemen had acknowledged the principle, it followed that they could not refuse such additional grants as times and circumstances might render necessary, as the operation of that very principle to which they had given their assent. This was the argument arising from their own concession; but in support of the argument he could instance a fact, which must, he was confident, establish the necessity for encouraging home education for the catholic priests of Ireland. He was sorry he had not the document about him then, but the fact was, that Dr. Walsh, a priest of talents, who was appointed head of the college established in Paris for the education of catholic priests, had used every influence, and all means in his power, to induce such of the Irish catholic youth as were in Lisbon for the purpose of their education, to go to his college. He had offered them not only education, but had opened to their view every temptation which he thought most likely to withdraw them from their king and country. On a representation of the matter to the catholic bishops in Ireland, they treated it as it deserved, and denounced exclusion from the faith against any who might be weak enough to fall into the snare laid for their allegiance. This threat had the desired effect. But surely we should not leave his majesty's subjects of any description exposed to the temptations of the enemy; and what could more effectually give us security in the present instance than the establishment of a college for the education of the catholic youth for priesthood? It had been properly stated by his right hon. friend (Mr. Grattan), that the sums granted for Protestant establishments were very considerable; they were so; but what would naturally be the feelings of the Catholics if parliament refused this trifling addition? They were men capable of being roused by neglect or insult as well as others. They should not therefore be refused the protection of the state, and the participation of the advantages of religious education. Did they not contribute by their industry and property to the taxes of the state? Did they contribute nothing to the church establishment? Did they not pay tithes to the Protestant clergy? Did they not, as well as any other description of subjects, contribute to the wealth and security of the empire? This could not be denied. Why then should they be excluded by the house of commons from religious education, or, in other words, from Christianity itself? He really thought the arguments advanced by the right hon. and learned gent. (Mr. Perceval) on this subject, were the most futile he had ever heard from him. He fully agreed with his hon. friend (Mr. Wilberforce), that we had too long neglected to take the situation of Ireland seriously into consideration. He confessed that we were deeply criminal for the part we had acted; but he also hoped that we should begin to discharge the long arrear against us. For his own part, he candidly owned, that he should feel that the proudest and happiest day of his existence when he might be able to set about the work of making up for the time which had been mispent with respect to Ireland. On the whole, if circumstances made it necessary to have the grant larger, he should most cordially support it; of course, he gave his full assent to the resolution now proposed.—After a few words from Mr. May in favour of the grant, the original resolution was then put and carried. The other resolutions were also severally put and carried.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX

TO THE

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES.

VOL. VIII.

PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS.

TABLES AND CALCULATIONS RESPECTING THE PLAN OF FINANCE PROPOSED TO PARLIAMENT IN 1807. See page 564.

THE amounts of the PUBLIC DEBT appearing throughout these calculations, are computed, not on the nominal capital of the debt, but on its money capital, or real value, according to the different prices of the Funds assumed in the respective Tables. Thus, in those Tables which are calculated on the present rate of interest, or 5 per cent., the 3 per cents. are valued at 60; the 4 per cents. at 80; and the 5 per cents. at par: and the whole amount of debt is stated on the result of those different valuations. The Sinking Funds, being in all cases paid in money, are of course not liable to any such distinction between nominal and real value.—It is also necessary to observe, that in the several Tables F. & G.—H. & I. in which the amount of Debt and of Sinking Fund in different years are stated, all those sums are calculated upon a supposition of the operation of this plan; and therefore the amounts in the columns of Sinking Funds express not the total amount to which those funds would have accumulated, if no deduction had been made from them, but the amount as it would stand, after deducting from them those portions of the excesses of the Sinking Fund, above the interest of the unredeemed debt, which are to be made applicable to the public service.

N. B. A small variation will be found to have arisen in the calculations of some of the amounts of the Sinking Funds of the Supplementary Loans, from the circumstance of their having been computed by decimal fractions. But the difference in the results is too small to be of any importance.

LIST OF THE TABLES; WITH THEIR CONTENTS.

I.—TABLES respecting War-Loans.

A.—Shews the amount of the loans which will be charged on the war taxes in each year, and of the portions of the war taxes which will be successively pledged to provide for the interest and sinking funds of such loans.—3 per cents. at 60.

A. 2.—Shews the effect of a six per cent. sinking fund operating in the redemption of debt at 4 per cent. interest.—3 per cents. at 75.

A. 3.—Shews the effect of a seven per cent. sinking fund, operating in the redemption of debt at 3 per cent.—3 per cents. at par.

II.—TABLE shewing the Amount of Supplementary Loans, to provide for the present Expenditure.

B.—Shews the means by which an annual extraordinary expenditure, to the amount of 32,000,000*l.* may be defrayed:—And the respective amounts of the war loans, the supplementary loans, and the unappropriated residue of the war taxes.

III.—TABLE shewing the Difference between Debt created, and Sinking Fund applied in each Year.

B. 2.—Shews the difference between the total amount of the loans to be raised in each year;—and the total amount of the sinking funds of the same year, after deducting from the latter the excesses to be taken from them, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at 60.

B. 3.—Shews the difference between the total amount of debt which was created in each year, and the total amount of the sinking funds applied to the extinction of debt in the same year, from 1793 to 1806, both inclusive.

B. 4.—Shews the difference between the total amount of the loans to be raised in each year, and the total amount of the sinking funds in the same year, after deducting from the latter the excesses to be taken from them, according to the proposed plan. — 3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

B. 5.—Shews the difference between the total amount of the loans to be raised in each year, and the total amount of the sinking funds in the same year, after deducting the excesses to be taken from them, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

B. 6.—Shews at one view the results of tables B. 2.—B. 4.—and B. 5.

IV.—TABLES SHEWING THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST AND SINKING FUND OF SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS, AND THE AMOUNT OF NEW TAXES TO BE RAISED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

C.—Shews the amount of the supplementary loans, and of the interest and sinking fund to be provided for on account of the same in each year; and the amount of new taxes which will be required for that purpose, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at 60.

C. 2.—Shews the amount of the supplementary loans, and the interest and sinking fund to be provided for on account of the same in each year; and the amount of new taxes which will be required for that purpose, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

C. 3.—Shews the amount of the supplementary loans, and the interest, and sinking fund to be provided for on account of the same in each year; and the amount of new taxes which will be required for that purpose, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

C. 4.—Shews at one view the results of tables C.—and C. 3.

V.—TABLES RELATING TO THE EXCESSES OF THE PRESENT SINKING FUND.

D.—Shews the amount of such portions of the excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the present debt, as will be applied in each year, from the commencement of 1817, in the reduction of the amount of new taxes, according to th proposed plan.—3 per cents. at 60.

D. 2.—Shews the amount of such portions of the excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the present debt, as will be applied in each year, from the commencement of 1817, in the reduction of the amount of new taxes, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

D. 3.—Shews the amount of such portions of the excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the present debt, as will be applied in each year, from the commencement of 1817, in the reduction of the amount of new taxes, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

D. 4.—Shews at one view the results of tables D.—D. 2.—and D. 3.

E.—Shews the total amount of the excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the present debt, as they would stand if the whole excesses were deducted as they arise, instead of deducting only the portions of those excesses stated in table D.—3 per cents. at 60.

E. 2.—Shews the total amount of the excesses of the present sinking fund above the interest of the present debt, as they would stand if the whole excesses were deducted as they arise, instead of deducting only the portions of those excesses stated in table D. 2.—3 per. cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

E. 3.—Shews the total amount of the excesses of the present sinking fund, above the interest of the present debt, as they would stand if the whole excesses were deducted as they arise, instead of deducting only the portions of those excesses stated in table D. 3.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

E. 4.—Shews at one view the results of tables E.—E. 2.—and E. 3.

VI. TABLES SHEWING THE AMOUNTS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE DEBTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE SINKING FUNDS.

WAR LOANS.

F.—Shews the total amount of the debt to be charged on the war taxes; and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year.—3 per cents at 60.

F. 2.—Shews the total amount of the debt to be charged on the war taxes; and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

F. 3.—Shews the total amount of the debt to be charged on the war taxes; and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

F. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables F.—F. 2—and F. 3.

SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS.

G.—Shews the total amount of the debt created by supplementary loans, and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year.—3 per cents. at 60.

G. 2.—Shews the total amount of the debt created by supplementary loans, and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year —3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

G. 3.—Shews the total amount of the debt created by supplementary loans, and of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

G. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables G.—G. 2.—and G. 3.

PRESENT DEBT.

H.—Shews the total amount of the present debt, and of the present sinking fund, as it will stand in each year, after deducting from the latter the portions of the excesses above the interest of the debt, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at 60.

H. 2.—Shews the total amount of the present debt, and of the present sinking fund, as it will stand in each year, after deducting from the latter the portions of the excesses above the interest of the debt, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

H. 3.—Shews the total amount of the present debt, and of the present sinking fund, as it will stand in each year, after deducting from the latter the portions of the excesses above the interest of the debt, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

H. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables H.—H. 2.—and H. 3.

ALL THE DEBTS COMBINED.

I.—Shews the combined amount of the war debt (table F.) —the supplementary debt (table G.)—and the present debt (table H.) and of their respective sinking funds in each year.—3 per cents. at 60.

I. 2.—Shews the combined amount of the war debt (table F. 2.)—the supplementary debt (table G. 2.)—and the present debt (table H. 2.)—and of their respective sinking funds in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

I. 3.—Shews the combined amount of the war debt (table F. 3.)—the supplementary debt (table G. 3.)—and the present debt (table H.)—and of their respective sinking fund in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

I. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables I.—I. 2.—and I. 3.

VII.—TABLES SHEWING THE COMPARATIVE AMOUNTS OF NEW TAXES TO BE IMPOSED ACCORDING TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM, AND ACCORDING TO THE PROPOSED PLAN.

K.—Shews the comparative amount of new taxes which would be required annually if the services of each year were provided for according to the present system and according to the proposed plan respectively.—3 per cents. at 60.

K. 2.—Shews the comparative amount of new taxes which would be required annually i the services of each year were provided for according to the present system and the proposed plan respectively.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

K. 3.—Shews the comparative amount of new taxes which would be required annually if the services of each year were provided for according to the present system and according to the proposed plan respectively.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

K. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables K.—K. 2.—and K. 3.

L.—Shews the comparative total amount in any given years, of new taxes which would have been imposed if the service of such year were provided for according to the present system, and according to the proposed plan respectively.—3 per cents. at 60.

L. 2.—Shews the comparative total amounts, in any given year, of new taxes which would have been imposed if the service of each year were provided for according to the present system, and according to the proposed plan respectively.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

L. 3.—Shews the comparative total amounts, in any given year, of the new taxes, which would have been imposed if the service of each year was provided for according to the present system and according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

L. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables L.—L. 2.—and L. 3.

VIII.—MISCELLANEOUS TABLES RESPECTING THE REDEMPTION OF THE PUBLIC DEBTS.

M.—Shews the actual operation of the various sinking funds which have been applied to the extinction of debt since 1786.

N.—Shews what would be the amount

of the old debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in any year for 20 years, according to the present system, and the proportion per cent. which the sinking fund would on that supposition bear to the debt in each year. Also what would be the amount of the whole debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in the same years, according to the proposed plan; and the proportion per cent. which that sinking fund would bear to such debt in each year.—3 per cents. at 60.

N. 2.—Shews what would be the amonnt of the whole debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in any year for 20 years, if 11 millions were borrowed for the service of each year, according to the present system, and the proportion per cent. which the sinking fund would on that supposition bear to the debt in each year. Also, what would be the amount of the whole debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in the same years, according to the proposed plan, and the proportion per cent. which that sinking fund would bear to the debt in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

N. 3.—Shews what would be the amount of the whole debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in any year of 20 years, if 11 millions were borrowed for the service of each year, according to the present system; and the proportion per cent. which the sinking fund would on that supposition bear to the debt in each year. Also, what would be the amount of the whole debt, and the amount of the sinking fund applicable to its extinction, in the same years, according to the proposed plan; and the proportion per cent. which that sinking fund would bear to the debt in each year.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

N. 4.—Shews at one view the results of Tables N.—N. 2.—and N. 3.

O.—Shews the total amount of the money capital of debt which would have been redeemed at any given periods of the continuance of war, for 20 years, if 11 millions were borrowed annually, according to the present system; also, the total amount of money capital of debt which will have been redeemed at the corresponding periods, according to the proposed plan. — 3 per cents. at 60.

O. 2.—Shews the total amount of the money capital of debt which would have been redeemed at any given periods of the continuance of war, for 20 years, if 11 millions were borrowed annually, according to the present system; also, the total amount of money capital of debt which will have been redeemed at the corresponding periods, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

O. 3.—Shews the total amount of the money capital of debt which would have been redeemed at any given periods of the continuance of war, for 20 years, if 11 millions were borrowed annually, according to the present system; also, the total amount of money capital of debt which will have been redeemed at the corresponding periods, according to the proposed plan.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

O. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables O.—O. 2.—and O 3.

P.—Shews the periods at which an amount equal to all future loans to be raised according to the proposed plan, would be redeemed, on various suppositions of the prices of the 3 per cents. stocks, and according to two different modes of application of the sinking fund at the end of those 20 years.

IX.—TABLES RESPECTING THE PERIODS AT WHICH THE WAR TAXES WOULD BE RELEASED, ON DIFFERENT SUPPOSITIONS.

WAR TAXES.

Q.—Shews the amount of war taxes which may be released at the end of any given year after 1815 (supposing peace to take place in any such year) by the application of the excesses of the present sinking fund alone, added to what will fall in by the operation of the revolving series of 14 years. —3 per cents. at 60.

Q. 2.—Shews the amount of war taxes which may be released at the end of any given year after 1815 (supposing peace to take place in any such year) by the application of the excesses of the present sinking fund alone, added to what will fall in by the operation of the revolving series of 14 years.—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 75.

Q. 3.—Shews the amount of war taxes which may be released at the end of any given year after 1815 (supposing peace to take place in any such year) by the application of the excesses of the present sinking fund alone, added to what will fall in by the operation of the revolving series of 14 years. —3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

Q. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables Q.—Q. 2.—and Q. 3.

PROPERTY TAX.

R.—Shews the amount of the war taxes which would be released at the end of any given year, when peace might take place, if the principle of rendering disposable the excess of the sinking fund above the interest of the debt were applied on the return of peace to the debt charged on the war taxes, as well as to the present debt. And in that event shewing how much the property tax would remain pledged at the end of any given year, supposing the other war taxes, exclusive of the property tax, to produce 9,500,000*l.* per annum, and the property tax to produce 11,500,000*l.* so as to complete the 21,000,000*l.*—3 per cents, at 60.

R. 2.—Shews the amount of the war taxes which would be released at the end of any given year when peace might take place, if the principle of rendering disposable the excess of the sinking fund above the interest of the debt were applied on the return of peace to the debt charged on the war taxes as well as to the present debt. And in that event shewing how much of the property tax would remain pledged at the end of any given year, supposing the other war taxes, exclusive of the property tax, to produce 9,500,000*l.* per annum, and the property tax to produce 11,500,000*l.* was to complete the 21,000,000*l.*—3 per cents at various prices, from 60 to 75.

R. 3.—Shews the amount of the war taxes which would be redeemed at the end of any given year when peace might take place, if the principle of rendering disposeable the excess of the sinking fund above the interest of the debt were applied on the return of peace to the debt charged on the war taxes as well as to the present debt. And in that event, shewing how much of the property tax would remain pledged at the end of any given year, supposing the other war taxes, exclusive of the property tax, to produce 9,500,000*l.* per ann.; and the property tax to produce 11,500,000*l.*, so as to complete 21,000,000*l.*—3 per cents. at various prices, from 60 to 100.

R. 4.—Shews at one view the different results of tables R.—R. 2.—and R. 3.

INCOME TAX of 1798.

S.—Shews the amount of debt for which the income tax stood pledged at the time of its Repeal in 1802, and the periods in which that part of the income tax which was applicable to the extinction of the said debt would on the return of peace have extinguished the same; at various prices of stock, viz. at 60, 75, and at par.

TABLE A.

Shewing, The Amount of the LOANS which would be charged in each successive Year upon the WAR TAXES; and the Amount of the WAR TAXES pledged in each successive Year, to provide for the Interest and Sinking Funds of such LOANS.

1. YEAR, Commencing	2. LOAN in each Year upon the Credit of the present War Taxes.	3. WAR TAXES pledged in each Year to provide for the Interest and Sinking Fund of Loan.	4. TOTAL of War Taxes pledged.	5.
	£.	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807	12,000,000	1,200,000	1,200,000	
5 January, 1808	12,000,000	1,200,000	2,400,000	
5 January, 1809	12,000,000	1,200,000	3,600,000	
5 January, 1810	14,000,000	1,400,000	5,000,000	
5 January, 1811	16,000,000	1,600,000	6,600,000	
5 January, 1812	16,000,000	1,600,000	8,200,000	
5 January, 1813	16,000,000	1,600,000	[*a] 9,800,000	
5 January, 1814	16,000,000	1,600,000	11,400,000	
5 January, 1815	16,000,000	1,600,000	13,000,000	
5 January, 1816	16,000,000	1,600,000	14,600,000	
5 January, 1817	16,000,000	1,600,000	16,200,000	
5 January, 1818	16,000,000	1,600,000	17,800,000	
5 January, 1819	16,000,000	1,600,000	19,400,000	
5 January, 1820	16,000,000	1,600,000	21,000,000	
5 January, 1821	12,000,000	[*b] 1,200,000	21,000,000	
5 January, 1822	12,000,000	1,200,000	21,000,000	
5 January, 1823	12,000,000	1,200,000	21,000,000	
5 January, 1824	14,000,000	1,400,400	21,000,000	
5 January, 1825	16,000,000	1,600,000	21,000,000	
5 January, 1826	16,000,000	1,600,000	21,000,000	

[*a] From this Table it appears, that, supposing peace to take place at the end of 7 years from this time, no more than 9,800,000*l.* of the war taxes would then have been mortgaged, and consequently that nearly the whole of the property tax (which is estimated to produce 11½ millions out of the 21 millions) might then be taken off immediately on the conclusion of a peace. It will be shewn in another of these tables, in what mode the discontinuance of the property tax on the return of peace may be provided for, even supposing the war to last beyond these 7 years.

[*b] This sum is the portion of war taxes which had been appropriated to the loan of the first year, and which being set free in 1821 by the redemption of a sum equal to that loan, will then become applicable to the charge of a fresh loan to the like amount. The like observation applies to all the succeeding sums in this column.

TABLE A. 2.

Shewing the Effect of the Operation of a SINKING FUND at Six per Cent. in the Redemption of a Debt of Twelve Millions of Money Capital, (which is the Amount of the first Year's War-Loan, according to the proposed Plan.—The Prices of 3 per Cents. are supposed to be at 75, and consequently the Interest of Money 4 per Cent.

1. YEAR.	2. Amount of Money Capital of Debt at the Commencement of each Year.	3. Amount of Sinking Fund at the Commencement of each Year.	4. Amount of Money Capital of Debt at the Close of each Year.	5.
	£.	£.	£.	
1807	12,000,000	720,000	11,280,000	
1808	11,280,000	748,800	10,531,200	
1809	10,531,200	778,752	9,752,448	
1810	9,752,448	809,902	8,942,546	
1811	8,942,546	842,298	8,100,248	
1812	8,100,248	875,989	7,224,259	
1813	7,224,259	911,028	6,313,231	
1814	6,313,231	947,469	5,365,762	
1815	5,365,762	985,367	4,380,395	
1816	4,380,395	1,024,781	3,355,614	
1817	3,355,614	1,065,772	2,289,842	
1818	2,289,842	1,108,402	1,181,440	
1819	1,181,440	1,152,738 *	28,702 *	

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* The sinking fund in this table is supposed to operate by compound interest at the yearly rate of 4 per cent. But as the sinking fund would be applied quarterly, the capital of debt redeemed, and the progressive amounts of the sinking fund would be greater than the computations in this table represent them; the result of this mode of computation will, however, sufficiently shew that a 6 per cent. sinking fund operating by compound interest at 4 per cent. would redeem its capital in 13 years.

TABLE A. 3.

Shewing the Effect of the Operation of a Sinking Fund of 7 per Cent. in the Redemption of a Debt of Twelve Millions of Money Capital, (which is the Amount of the first Year's War Loan, according to the proposed Plan). The Price of 3 per Cents. is supposed to be at Par, and consequently the Interest Money 3 per Cent.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Amount of Money Capital of Debt, at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of Sinking Fund at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of Money Capital of Debt at the close of each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
1807 . . .	12,000,000	840,000	11,160,000	
1808 . . .	11,160,000	865,200	10,294,800	
1809 . . .	10,294,800	891,156	9,403,644	
1810 . . .	9,403,644	917,890	8,485,754	
1811 . . .	8,485,754	945,426	7,540,328	
1812* . . .	7,540,328	973,788	6,566,540	
1813 . . .	6,566,540	1,003,001	5,563,539	
1814 . . .	5,563,539	1,033,091	4,530,448	
1815 . . .	4,530,448	1,064,083	3,466,365	
1816 . . .	3,466,365	1,096,005	2,370,360	
1817 . . .	2,370,360	1,128,885	1,241,475	
1818 . . .	1,241,475	1,162,751	78,724 *	

* The sinking fund in this table is supposed to operate by compound interest, at the yearly rate of 3 per cent. But as the sinking fund would be applied quarterly, the capital of debt redeemed, and the progressive amounts of the sinking fund, would be greater than the computations in this table represent them; the result of this mode of computation will, however, sufficiently shew, that a 7 per cent. sinking fund, operating by compound interest at 3 per cent., would redeem its capital in about 12 years.

TABLE B. 2.

Shewing the Means by which an Annual extraordinary Expenditure, to the Amount of £. 32,000,000, may be defrayed in each Year.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	LOAN in each Year, upon the Credit of War Taxes.	WAR TAXES not pledged, but remaining applicable to the Service of the Year.*	Supplementary Loans required for the Service of the Year.	TOTAL provided for in each Year.
5 January, 1807 . . .	12,000,000	19,800,000	200,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1808 . . .	12,000,000	18,600,000	14000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1809 . . .	12,000,000	17,400,000	2,600,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1810 . . .	14,000,000	16,000,000	2,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1811 . . .	16,000,000	14,400,000	1,600,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1812 . . .	16,000,000	12,800,000	3,200,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1813 . . .	16,000,000	11,200,000	4,800,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1814 . . .	16,000,000	9,600,000	6,400,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1815 . . .	16,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1816 . . .	16,000,000	6,400,000	9,600,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1817 . . .	16,000,000	4,800,000	11,200,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1818 . . .	16,000,000	3,200,000	12,800,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1819 . . .	16,000,000	1,600,000	14,400,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1820 . . .	16,000,000	Nil.	16,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1821 . . .	12,000,000	Nil.	20,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1822 . . .	12,000,000	Nil.	20,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1823 . . .	12,000,000	Nil.	20,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1824 . . .	14,000,000	Nil.	18,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1825 . . .	16,000,000	Nil.	16,000,000	32,000,000
5 January, 1826 . . .	16,000,000	Nil.	16,000,000	32,000,000

* Note.—For the amount of war-taxes pledged in each year, to provide for interest and sinking fund of the loans charged upon those taxes;—See Table A, column 4.

TABLE B.

Shewing the Total Amount of the Loan in any given Year, according to the proposed Plan; and the Amount of the total Sinking Fund in the same Year: also the Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year. The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of the Loan charged on the War Taxes in each Year.	Amount of the Supplementary Loan in each Year	TOTAL Amount of the Loan in each Year.	TOTAL Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£	£.
5 January, 1807 . .	12,000,000	200,000	12,200,000	8,935,042	3,264,958
5 January, 1808 . .	12,000,000	1,400,000	13,400,000	10,005,126	3,394,874
5 January, 1809 . .	12,000,000	2,600,000	14,600,000	11,148,714	3,451,286
5 January, 1810 . .	14,000,000	2,000,000	16,000,000	12,439,482	3,560,518
5 January, 1811 . .	16,000,000	1,600,000	17,600,000	13,888,120	3,711,880
5 January, 1812 . .	16,000,000	3,200,000	19,200,000	15,435,858	3,764,142
5 January, 1813 . .	16,000,000	4,800,000	20,800,000	17,087,649	3,712,351
5 January, 1814 . .	16,000,000	6,400,000	22,400,000	18,848,697	3,551,303
5 January, 1815 . .	16,000,000	8,000,000	24,000,000	20,724,463	3,275,537
5 January, 1816 . .	16,000,000	9,600,000	25,600,000	22,720,685	2,879,315
5 January, 1817 . .	16,000,000	11,200,000	27,200,000	24,096,718	3,103,282
5 January, 1818 . .	16,000,000	12,800,000	28,800,000	25,461,552	3,338,448
5 January, 1819 . .	16,000,000	14,400,000	30,400,000	26,814,628	3,585,372
5 January, 1820 . .	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	28,155,358	3,844,642
5 January, 1821 . .	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	27,963,124	4,036,876
5 January, 1822 . .	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	27,761,279	4,238,721
5 January, 1823 . .	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	27,549,341	4,450,659
5 January, 1824 . .	14,000,000	18,000,000	32,000,000	27,326,807	4,673,193
5 January, 1825 . .	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	27,093,146	4,906,854
5 January, 1826 . .	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	26,901,360	5,098,640

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* The sums in this column will of course shew how much will be borrowed in each year more than will be paid off in the same year.

TABLE B. 3.

Shewing the Total Amount of the MONEY CAPITAL OF DEBT created in each Year from 1793 to 1806, both inclusive, and the Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund; also, the Difference between the Money Capital of Debt created, and the Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund applied to the Extinction of Debt in each Year.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Money Capital of Debt, created in each Year.	Amount of the Sinking Fund, applied in each Year.	Difference between the Amount of the Money Capital of Debt created, and the Amount of the Sinking Fund applied in each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
1 Feb. 1793, to 1 Feb. 1794.	4,500,000	1,630,615	2,869,385	
1794 to 1795 - - - -	12,907,452	1,872,200	11,035,252	
1795 to 1796 - - - -	19,490,647	2,143,595	17,347,052	
1796 to 1797 - - - -	29,726,797	2,639,724	27,087,073	
1797 to 1798 - - - -	44,029,399	3,352,579	40,676,820	
1798 to 1799 - - - -	15,000,000	3,937,923	11,062,077	
1799 to 1800 - - - -	15,500,000	4,257,547	11,242,453	
1800 to 1801 - - - -	18,500,000	4,578,690	13,921,310	
1801 to 1802 - - - -	34,410,450	5,073,854	29,336,596	
1802 to 1803 - - - -	23,000,000	5,639,500	17,360,500	
1803 to 1804 - - - -	10,000,000	5,970,102	4,029,898	
1804 to 1805 - - - -	10,000,000	6,470,738	3,529,262	
1805 to 1806 - - - -	21,526,699	7,128,078	14,398,621	
1806 to 1807 - - - -	18,000,000	7,773,400	10,226,600	
Total of column 4 - - - - - - - - - £.			214,122,899	
Average of these 14 years - - - - - - - -			15,294,492	
Average of the first 14 years in Table B. 2. - - -			3,459,850	
Difference			11,834,649	

TABLE B. 4.

Shewing, the Total Amount of the LOAN in any given Year, according to the proposed Plan, and the Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund; also the Differences between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund in each Year.—The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807,) at 60; then to rise to 63. 16. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66. 66. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70. 58. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of the Loan charged on the War Taxes in each Year.	Amount of the Supplementary Loan in each Year.	Total Amount of the Loan in each Year.	Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year. *
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807 - -	12,000,000	200,000	12,200,000	8,935,042	3,264,958
1808 - -	12,000,000	1,400,000	13,400,000	10,033,958	3,366,042
1809 - -	12,000,000	2,600,000	14,600,000	11,181,735	3,418,265
1810 - -	14,000,000	2,000,000	16,000,000	12,512,869	3,487,131
1811 - -	16,000,000	1,600,000	17,600,000	13,979,949	3,620,051
1812 - -	16,000,000	3,200,000	19,200,000	15,574,383	3,625,617
1813 - -	16,000,000	4,800,000	20,800,000	17,224,300	3,575,700
1814 - -	16,000,000	6,400,000	22,400,000	19,001,664	3,893,336
1815 - -	16,000,000	8,000,000	24,000,000	20,828,395	3,171,605
1816 - -	16,000,000	9,600,000	25,600,000	22,749,529	2,850,471
1817 - -	16,000,000	11,200,000	27,200,000	24,629,857	2,570,143
1818 - -	16,000,000	12,800,000	28,800,000	26,063,050	2,736,950
1819 - -	16,000,000	14,400,000	30,400,000	27,489,570	2,910,430
1820 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	28,909,151	† 3,090,849
1821 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	28,785,516	3,214,484
1822 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	28,656,935	3,343,065
1823 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	28,523,211	3,476,789
1824 - -	14,000,000	18,000,000	32,000,000	28,384,137	3,615,863
1825 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	28,301,177	3,698,823
1826 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	28,282,707	3,717,293

* The sums in this column will of course show how much would be borrowed in each year, more than would be paid off.

† The average of the 14 years in Table B. 3. is	£.15,294,492
The average of the first 14 years of this Table is . .	3,220,467
Difference . . .	£.12,074,025

TABLE B. 5.

Shewing the Total Amount of the LOAN in any given Year, according to the proposed Plan, and the Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund; also, the Differences between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the corresponding Sinking Fund in each Year. The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807,) at 60; then to rise to 63.66. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71. and so to continue for 2 Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of the Loan charged on the War Taxes in each Year.	Amount of the Supplementary Loan in each Year.	Total Amount of the Loan in each Year	Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund, in each Year.*
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807 - -	12,000,000	200,000	12,200,000	8,935,042	3,264,958
1808 - -	12,000,000	1,400,000	13,400,000	10,063,795	3,336,205
1809 - -	12,000,000	2,600,000	14,600,000	11,314,623	3,285,377
1810 - -	14,000,000	2,000,000	16,000,000	12,690,446	3,309,554
1811 - -	16,000,000	1,600,000	17,600,000	14,179,396	3,420,604
1812 - -	16,000,000	3,200,000	19,200,000	15,823,905	3,376,095
1813 - -	16,000,000	4,800,000	20,800,000	17,472,742	3,327,258
1814 - -	16,000,000	6,400,000	22,400,000	19,268,286	3,131,714
1815 - -	16,000,000	8,000,000	24,000,000	21,046,334	2,953,666
1816 - -	16,000,000	9,600,000	25,600,000	22,893,723	2,706,277
1817 - -	16,000,000	11,200,000	27,200,000	24,812,533	2,387,467
1818 - -	16,000,000	12,800,000	28,800,000	26,292,908	2,507,092
1819 - -	16,000,000	14,400,000	30,400,000	27,769,694	2,630,306
1820 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	29,242,784	†2,757,216
1821 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	29,160,066	2,839,934
1822 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	29,074,866	2,925,134
1823 - -	12,000,000	20,000,000	32,000,000	29,128,504	2,871,496
1824 - -	14,000,000	18,000,000	32,000,000	29,142,690	2,857,310
1825 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	29,095,890	2,904,110
1826 - -	16,000,000	16,000,000	32,000,000	29,065,719	2,934,281

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* The sums in this column will of course shew how much would be borrowed in each year, more than would be paid off.

† The average of the 14 years in Table B. 3. is . . .	£15,294,492
The average of the first 14 years of this Table is . . .	3,028,127
Difference . .	£.12,266,365

TABLE B. 6.

Shewing at one view the different RESULTS of the three Tables, B. 2. B. 4. & B 5.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table B. 2.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table B. 4.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63. 16. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 70.58. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75. and to continue at that price throughout the rest of the period of 20 years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table B. 5.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to par, and to continue at that price throughout the rest of the period of 20 years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.	2d SUPPOSITION.	3d SUPPOSITION.
	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Difference between the Total Amount of the Loan, and the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund in each Year.
	£.	£.	£.
1807	3,264,958	3,264,958	3,264,958
1808	3,394,874	3,366,042	3,336,205
1809	3,451,286	3,418,265	3,285,377
1810	3,560,518	3,487,131	3,309,554
1811	3,711,880	3,620,051	3,420,604
1812	3,764,142	3,625,617	3,376,095
1813	3,712,351	3,575,700	3,327,258
1814	3,551,303	3,398,336	3,131,714
1815	3,275,537	3,171,605	2,953,666
1816	2,879,315	2,850,471	2,706,277
1817	3,103,282	2,570,143	2,387,467
1818	3,338,448	2,736,950	2,507,092
1819	3,585,372	2,910,430	2,630,306
1820	3,844,642	3,090,849	2,757,216
1821	4,036,876	3,214,484	2,839,934
1822	4,238,721	3,343,065	2,925,134
1823	4,450,659	3,476,789	2,871,496
1824	4,673,193	3,615,863	2,857,310
1825	4,906,854	3,698,823	2,904,110
1826	5,098,640	3,717,293	2,934,281

TABLE C.

Shewing the Amount of the Supplementary Loans required in each Year, of two successive Series of ten Years each, commencing with 1807.—Also the Amount of the Interest, and Sinking Fund of 1/60th (or One per Cent. upon the nominal Capital created) to be provided for on account of those Loans.—Also the Effect of the Application of the Expiring Annuities to that Purpose during the first Series, on an Average of Seven Years; *—and the Effect of the Application to the same Purpose, both of the Expiring Annuities, and of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund (according to the Plan now proposed) during the second Series, supposing the 3 per Cents. at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4,	
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of Supplementary Loans required in each Year.	Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year, on account of the Supplementary Loans. †		New Taxes to be imposed in each Year, on an average of 7 Years from 1810, for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the Expiring Annuities be taken in aid of the first 3 Years from 1807, and if both the expiring Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund be applied in like manner to the 2d Series.
5 January 1807 - - -	200,000	13,333		Nil.
5 January 1808 - - -	1,400,000	93,333		Nil.
5 January 1809 - - -	2,600,000	173,333		Nil.
5 January 1810 - - -	2,000,000	133,333	Aver. of last 7 Years, 1st Series.	293,000
5 January 1811 - - -	1,600,000	106,666		293,000
5 January 1812 - - -	3,200,000	213,333		293,000
5 January 1813 - - -	4,800,000	320,000		293,000
5 January 1814 - - -	6,400,000	426,666		293,000
5 January 1815 - - -	8,000,000	533,333		293,000
5 January 1816 - - -	9,600,000	640,000		293,000
5 January 1817 - - -	11,200,000	746,666	10 Years, 2d Series.	Nil.
5 January 1818 - - -	12,800,000	853,333		Nil.
5 January 1819 - - -	14,400,000	960,000		Nil.
5 January 1820 - - -	16,000,000	1,066,666		Nil.
5 January 1821 - - -	20,000,000	1,333,333		Nil.
5 January 1822 - - -	20,000,000	1,333,333		Nil.
5 January 1823 - - -	20,000,000	1,333,333		Nil.
5 January 1824 - - -	18,000,000	1,200,000		Nil.
5 January 1825 - - -	16,000,000	1,066,666		Nil.
5 January 1826 - - -	16,000,000	1,066,666		Nil.

* Note.—The annuities taken into these calculations as expiring within these two successive series of ten years, are as follows, viz. 15,515*l.* which expire in the year 1807.—370,000*l.* being so much of the short annuities as are not pledged for the interest of the deferred stock upon the loan of 1802, and which will expire in 1808.—230,000*l.* imperial annuities which will expire in 1820.—And 67,547*l.* life annuities, granted in William and Mary and Geo. II. which are supposed to have fallen in by the year 1820.

† Note.—It will be obvious that this 3d column will shew the amount of new taxes which must be annually imposed according to the present plan, supposing no aid were derived to it from the expiring annuities, or from the excesses of the sinking fund.—A succeeding Table will shew the much larger amount of taxes which must be annually imposed, if the services of these years were provided for in the ordinary mode.

TABLE C. 2.

Shewing the Amount of the SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS required in each Year of two successive Series, commencing with 1807; and also the Amount of the Interest and Sinking Fund of 1 per Cent. upon the Nominal Capital to be provided for on account of those Loans. Also the Effect of the Application to that Purpose of the Expiring Annuities, and of a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cent. to a 4 per Cent. Fund, during the first Series, on an Average of 7 Years; and the Effect of the Application to the same Purpose, both of the Expiring Annuities and of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund (according to the Plan now proposed) during the second Series.—The Prices of 3 per Cents. supposed to vary in the manner stated in Col. 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4. ‡		5.	
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Corresponding Rate of Interest of Money.	Amount of Supplementary Loans required in each Year.		Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year, on account of the Supplementary Loans.		New Taxes to be imposed in each Year on an Average of Seven Years from 1810, for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the Expired Annuities, and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. to a 4 per Cent. Fund †, be taken in Aid of the first Series, and if both the expired Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund, be applied in like manner in Aid of the Second Series.
1807 - -	60	=5	200,000	First Series 10 Years. ‡	13,333	Average of last 7 Years of 1st Series.	Nil.
1808 - -	63·16	=4¾	1,400,000		88,665		Nil.
1809 - -	- -	- -	2,600,000		164,665		Nil.
1810 - -	66·66	=4½	2,000,000		120,003		230,000
1811 - -	- -	- -	1,600,000		96,002		230,000
1812 - -	70·58	=4¼	3,200,000		181,338		230,000
1813 - -	- -	- -	4,800,000		272,007		230,000
1814 - -	75	=4	6,400,000		341,333		230,000
1815 - -	- -	- -	8,000,000		426,666		230,000
1816 - -	- -	- -	9,600,000		512,000		230,000
1817 - -	- -	- -	11,200,000	Second Series 10 Years.	397,333	10 Years Second Series.	Nil.
1818 - -	- -	- -	12,800,000		682,666		Nil.
1819 - -	- -	- -	14,400,000		768,000		Nil.
1820 - -	- -	- -	16,000,000		853,333		Nil.
1821 - -	- -	- -	20,000,000		1,066,666		Nil.
1822 - -	- -	- -	20,000,000		1,066,666		Nil.
1823 - -	- -	- -	20,000,000		1,066,666		Nil.
1824 - -	- -	- -	18,000,000		960,000		Nil.
1825 - -	- -	- -	16,000,000		853,333		Nil.
1826 - -	- -	- -	16,000,000		853,333		Nil.

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* Note.—The amount of this sum is 480,529*l.*

† Note.—It will be obvious that this 4th column will shew the amount of new taxes which must be annually imposed according to the present plan, supposing no aid were derived to it from the expiring annuities, or from the excesses of the sinking fund.—A succeeding table will shew the much larger amount of taxes which must be annually imposed, if the services of these years were provided for in the ordinary mode.

‡ Note.—The ANNUITIES taken into these calculations as expiring within these two successive series of ten years, are as follows, viz. 15,515*l.* which expire in the year 1807.—370,000*l.* being so much of the short annuities as are not pledged for the interest of the deferred stock upon the loan of 1802, and which will expire in 1808.—230,000*l.* imperial annuities which will expire in 1820.—And 67,547*l.* life annuities, granted in William and Mary and Geo. II. which are supposed to have fallen in by the year 1820.

TABLE C. 3.

Shewing the Amount of the SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS required in each Year, of two successive Series of Ten Years each, commencing with 1807; and also the Amount of the Interest, and Sinking Fund of 1 per Cent. upon the nominal Capital to be provided for on account of those Loans.—Also the Effect of the Application to that purpose of the Expiring Annuities, and of a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. in the first Instance to a 4 per Cent. and afterwards to a three per Cent. Fund, and from the reduction of the 4 per Cents. to a three per Cent. Fund, during the first Series; and the Effect of the Application to the same Purpose, both of the Expiring Annuities* and of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund (according to the Plan now proposed) during the second Series.—The Prices of 3 per Cents. supposed to vary in the manner stated in Col. 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4. †		5.	
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Corresponding Rate of Interest of Money.	Amount of Supplementary Loans required in each Year.		Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year, on account of the Supplementary Loans.		New Taxes to be imposed for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the Expired Annuities, and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. and 4 per Cents. to a 3 per Cent. Fund ‡, be taken in Aid of the first Series, and if both the expired Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund, be applied in like manner in Aid of the Second Series.
1807 - -	60	=5	200,000	First Series of 10 Years.	13,333	1st Series of 10 Years.	Nil.
1808 - -	66·66	=4½	1,400,000		84,00$\frac{1}{0}$		Nil.
1809 - -	- -	- - -	2,600,000		156,00$\frac{2}{0}$		Nil.
1810 - -	75	=4	2,000,000		106,666		Nil.
1811 - -	- -	- -	1,600,000		85,333		Nil.
1812 - -	85.71	=3½	3,200,000		149,33$\frac{3}{3}$		Nil.
1813 - -	- -	- - -	4,800,000		224,00$\frac{4}{0}$		Nil.
1814 - -	Par	=3	6,400,000		256,000		Nil.
1815 - -	The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at Par throughout the rest of this period of 20 Years.		8,000,000		320,000		Nil.
1816 - -			9,600,000		384,000		Nil.
1817 - -			11,200,000	Second Series of 10 Years.	448,000	Second Series of 10 Years.	§275,836
1818 - -			12,800,000		512,000		Nil.
1819 - -			14,400,000		576,000		Nil.
1820 - -			16,000,000		640,000		Nil.
1821 - -			20,000,000		800,000		Nil.
1822 - -			20,000,000		800,000		Nil.
1823 - -			20,000,000		800,000		Nil.
1824 - -			18,000,000		720,000		Nil.
1825 - -			16,000,000		640,000		Nil.
1826 - -			16,000,000		640,000		Nil.

* Note.—The annuities taken into these calculations as expiring within these two successive series of ten years, are as follows, viz. 15,515*l.* which expire in the year 1807.—370,000*l.* being so much of the short annuities as are not pledged for the interest of the deferred stock upon the loan of 1802, and which will expire in 1808.—230,000*l.* imperial annuities which will expire in 1820.—And 67,547*l.* life annuities, granted in William and Mary and Geo. II. which are supposed to have fallen in by the year 1820.

† Note.—It will be obvious that this 4th column will shew the amount of new taxes which must be annually imposed according to the present plan, supposing no aid were derived to it from the expiring annuities, or from the excesses of the sinking fund.—A succeeding Table will shew the much larger amount of taxes which must be annually imposed, if the services of these years were provided for in the ordinary mode.

‡ Note.—The amount of the sum is 1,429,134*l.*

§ Note.—The only Taxes required throughout the whole of these two series of 10 years each, will be in the first year of the second series, (viz. 1817) to the amount above stated.

TABLE C. 4.

Shewing at one view the different RESULTS of the three Tables, C, C. 2, & C. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table C.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table C. 2.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 70.58. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75. and to continue at that price throughout the rest of the period of 20 years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table C. 3.

The 3 per cents. are supposed to coninue for the 1st year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71. and so to continue for two years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to par, and to continue at that price throughout the rest of the period of 20 years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.				3d SUPPOSITION.			
	Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year on account of the Supplementary Loans.		New Taxes to be imposed in each Year, on an Average of 7 Years, from 1810, for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the expiring Annuities be taken in Aid of the First 3 Years from 1807, and if both the Expiring Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund be applied in like manner to the Second Series.		Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year, on account of the Supplementary Loans.		New Taxes to be imposed in each Year on an Average of Seven Years, from 1810, for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the Expired Annuities and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. to a 4 per Cent. Fund be taken in Aid of the First Series, and if both the Expired Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund be applied in like manner in Aid of the Second Series.		Amount of Interest and Sinking Fund to be provided for in each Year on account of the Supplementary Loans.		New Taxes to be imposed for Interest and Sinking Fund of Supplementary Loans, if the Expired Annuities, and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. and 4 per Cents. to a 3 per Cent. Fund be taken in aid of the First Series, and if both the expired Annuities and the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund be applied in like manner in Aid of the Second Series.
	£.		£.		£.		£.		£.		£.
1807	13,333		Nil.	First Series 10 Years.	13,333		Nil.	FirstSeres of 10 Years.	13,33	Sec. Seriesof 10 Yrs.	Nil.
1808	93,333		Nil.		88,665		Nil.		84,000		Nil.
1809	173,333		Nil.		164,665		Nil.		156,000		Nil.
1810	133,333	Aver. of last 7 Yrs. of 1st. Series.	293,000		120,003	Average of last 7 Yrs. of 1st Series.	230,000		106,666		Nil.
1811	106,666		293,000		96.002		230,000		85,333		Nil.
1812	213,333		293,000		181,338		230,000		149,333		Nil.
1813	320,000		293,000		272,007		230,000		224,000		Nil.
1814	426,666		293,000		341,333		230,000		256,000		Nil.
1815	533,333		293,000		426,666		230,000		320,000		Nil.
1816	640,000		293,000		512,000		230,000		384,000		Nil.
1817	746,666	10 Years, 2d Series.	Nil.	Second Series 10 Years.	597,333	10 Years Second Series.	Nil.	Second Series of 10 Yrs.	448,000	Second Series of 10 Yrs.	275,836
1818	853,333		Nil.		682,666		Nil.		512,000		Nil.
1819	960,000		Nil.		768,000		Nil.		576,000		Nil.
1820	1,066,666		Nil.		853,333		Nil.		640,000		Nil.
1821	1,333,333		Nil.		1,066,666		Nil.		800,000		Nil.
1822	1,333,333		Nil.		1,066,666		Nil.		800,000		Nil.
1823	1,333,333		Nil.		1,066,666		Nil.		800,000		Nil.
1824	1,200,000		Nil.		960,000		Nil.		720,000		Nil.
1825	1,066,666		Nil.		853,333		Nil.		640,000		Nil.
1826	1,066,666		Nil.		853,333		Nil.		640,000		Nil.

TABLE D.

Shewing the Amount of such Proportions of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund above the Amount of Interest on Debt Unredeemed, as, from the Commencement of the Year 1817, will be applied in the Reduction of the Amount of New Taxes, which would otherwise be required for Interest and Sinking Funds of Supplementary Loans. The Three per Cents. supposed to continue at Sixty.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Year Commencing	Amount of the Present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting only such Portions of the Excesses above the Interest as will be required in Aid of New Taxes.	The Same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which will thus be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.
5 January, 1816 . .	260,923,615	12,925,211	247,998,404	746,666
5 January, 1817 . .	247,998,404	12,824,805	235,173,599	853,333
5 January, 1818 . .	235,173,599	12,612,712	222,560,887	960,000
5 January, 1819 . .	222,560,887	12,283,347	210,277,540	1,066,666
5 January, 1820 . .	210,277,540	11,830,848	198,446,692	1,333,333
5 January, 1821 . .	198,446,692	11,089,057	187,357,635	1,333,333
5 January, 1822 . .	187,357,635	10,310,176	177,047,459	1,333,333
5 January, 1823 . .	177,047,459	9,492,351	167,555,108	1,200,000
5 January, 1824 . .	167,555,108	8,766,968	158,788,140	1,066,666
5 January, 1825 . .	158,788,140	8,138,650	150,649,490	1,013,108
5 January, 1826 . .	150,649,490	7,532,474	143,117,016	753,247

TABLE D. 2.

Shewing the Amount of such PORTIONS of the EXCESSES of the present Sinking Fund, above the Amount of Interest on Debt Unredeemed, as, from the Commencement of the Year 1817, will be applied in the Reduction of the Amount of New Taxes, which would otherwise be required for Interest and Sinking Funds of Supplementary Loans, supposing the Continuance of the War.

Three per Cent. Stocks are supposed to be at 75=Interest at 4 per Cent. throughout the whole of this Calculation.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting only such Portions of the Excesses above the Interest as will be required in Aid of New Taxes.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which will be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1816	* 329,220,503	12,322,041	316,898,462	138,984	
1817	316,898,462	12,675,938	304,222,524	682,666	
1818	304,222,524	12,500,309	291,722,215	768,000	
1819	291,722,215	12,232,321	279,489,894	853,333	
1820	279,489,894	11,868,280	267,621,614	1,066,666	
1821	267,621,614	11,276,345	256,345,269	1,066,666	
1822	256,345,269	10,660,732	245,684,537	1,066,666	
1823	245,684,537	10,020,495	235,664,042	960,000	
1824	235,664,042	9,461,314	226,202,728	791,657	
1825	226,202,728	9,048,109	217,154,619	723,849	
1826	7,154,619	8,686,184	208,468,435	694,894	

* As the 3 per cents. are supposed in this Table to be at 75, the amount of the money capital of the unredeemed debt, at this period, is of course stated proportionably higher than in Table D. where the 3 per cents, are supposed to be only at 60.

TABLE D. 3.

Shewing the Amount of such PORTIONS of the EXCESSES of the present Sinking Fund, above the Amount of Interest on Debt Unredeemed, as, from the Commencement of the Year 1818, will be applied in the Reduction of the Amount of New Taxes, which would otherwise be required for Interest and Sinking Funds of Supplementary Loans, supposing the Continuance of the War.

Three per Cent. Stocks are supposed to be at Par=Interest at 3 per Cent. throughout the whole of this Calculation.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting only such Portions of the Excesses above the Interest as will be required in Aid of New Taxes.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which will be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1817	* 413,823,358	12,227,554	401,595,804	512,000	
1818	401,595,804	12,082,380	389,513,424	576,000	
1819	389,513,424	11,868,851	377,644,573	640,000	
1820	377,644,573	11,584,916	366,059,657	800,000	
1821	366,059,657	11,132,463	354,927,194	800,000	
1822	354,927,194	10,666,436	344,260,758	658,607	
1823	344,260,758	10,327,822	333,932,936	619,668	
1824	333,932,936	10,017,988	323,914,948	601,079	
1825	323,914,948	9,717,448	314,197,500	583,046	
1826	314,197,500	9,425,925	304,771,575	565,555	

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* As the 3 per cents. are supposed in this Table to be at par; the amount of the money capital of the unredeemed debt, at this period, is of course stated proportionably higher than in Table D, where the 3 per cents. are supposed to be only at 60; or in Table D. 2, where the 3 per Cents. are supposed to be at 75.

TABLE D.4.

Shewing at one view the different RESULTS of the three Tables, D, D 2, and D 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table D.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table D. 2.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 75.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table D. 3.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at Par.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.	2d SUPPOSITION.	3d SUPPOSITION.
	Amount of The Excesses which will be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Amount of The Excesses which will be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Amount of The Excesses which will be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.
	£.	£.	£.
1816	746,666	138,984	
1817	853,333	682,666	512,000
1818	960,000	768,000	576,000
1819	1,066,666	853,333	640,000
1820	1,333,333	1,066,666	800,000
1821	1,333,333	1,066,666	800,000
1822	1,333,333	1,066,666	658,607
1823	1,200,000	960,000	619,668
1824	1,066,666	791,657	601,079
1825	1,013,108	723,849	583,046
1826	753,247	694,894	565,555

TABLE E.

Shewing the Total Amount of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund in each after the Year Year 1816, above the Amount of Interest on the Unredeemed Debt, supposing the whole Excesses to be deducted as they arise *, instead of deducting only the Portions of those Excesses stated in Table D.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Year, Commencing	Amount of the present Debt remaining Unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting as they arise, *the whole* of the Excesses above the Interest of the Debt.	The same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which would on this Supposition, be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
5 January, 1816 . . .	260,923,615	12,925,211	247,998,404	1,171,551
5 January, 1817 . . .	247,998,404	12,399,920	235,598,484	1,239,992
5 January, 1818 . . .	235,598,484	11,779,924	223,818,560	1,177,992
5 January, 1819 . . .	223,818,560	11,190,928	212,627,632	1,119,093
5 January, 1820 . . .	212,627,632	10,631,381	201,996,251	1,063,138
5 January, 1821 . . .	201,996,251	10,099,812	191,896,439	1,009,981
5 January, 1822 . . .	191,896,439	9,594,821	182,301,618	959,482
5 January, 1823 . . .	182,301,618	9,115,080	173,186,538	911,508
5 January, 1824 . . .	173,186,538	8,659,326	164,527,212	865,932
5 January, 1825 . . .	164,527,212	8,226,360	156,300,852	822,636
5 January, 1826 . . .	156,300,852	7,815,042	148,485,810	781,504

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* Note.—This, as well as the preceding Table D, is calculated on a supposition of Three per cents. remaining at 60, during the whole period of these ten years.

The effect of some other suppositions in this respect will appear in other Tables.

TABLE E. 2.

Shewing the Total Amount of the EXCESSES of the present Sinking Fund in each Year after the Year 1816, above the Amount of Interest on the Unredeemed Debt, if the whole Excesses were deducted as they arise, instead of deducting only the Portions of those Excesses stated in Table D 2.

Three Per Cent. Stocks are supposed to be at 75=Interest at Four per Cent. throughout the whole of this Calculation.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting as they arise the whole of the Excesses above the Interest of the Debt.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which would on the above Supposition be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1816 - -	*329,220,503	12,322,041	316,898,462	138,984	
1817 - -	316,898,462	12,675,938	304,222,524	1,014,075	
1818 - -	304,222,524	12,168,900	292,053,624	973,512	
1819 - -	392,053,624	11,682,144	280,371,480	934,570	
1820 - -	280,371,480	11,214,859	269,156,621	897,189	
1821 - -	269,156,621	10,766,264	258,390,357	861,300	
1822 - -	258,390,357	10,335,614	248,054,743	826,849	
1823 - -	248,054,743	9,922,189	238,132,554	793,774	
1824 - -	238,132,554	9,525,302	228,607,252	762,024	
1825 - -	228,607,252	9,144,290	219,462,962	731,543	
1826 - -	219,462,962	8,778,518	210,684,444	702,281	

* See Note to Table D. 2.

TABLE E. 3.

Shewing the Total Amount of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund in each Year after the Year 1816, above the Amount of Interest on the Unredeemed Debt, if the whole Excesses were deducted as they arise, instead of deducting only the Portions of those Excesses stated in Table D. 3.

Three per Cent. Stocks are supposed to be at Par=Interest at 3 per Cent. throughout the whole of this Calculation.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Year.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount in each Year of the present Sinking Fund, deducting as they arise, the whole of the Excesses above the Interest of the Debt.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Excesses which would, on the above Supposition, be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1817	* 413,823,358	12,227,554	401,595,804	546,506	
1818	401,595,804	12,047,874	389,547,930	722,873	
1819	389,547,930	11,686,437	377,861,493	701,186	
1820	377,861,493	11,335,844	366,525,649	680,150	
1821	366,525,649	10,995,769	355,529,880	659,746	
1822	355,529,880	10,665,896	344,863,984	639,953	
1823	344,863,984	10,345,919	334,518,065	620,755	
1824	334,518,065	10,035,541	324,482,524	602,132	
1825	324,482,524	9,734,475	314,748,049	584,068	
1826	314,748,049	9,442,441	305,305,608	566,546	

* See Note to Table D. 3.

TABLE E. 4.

Shewing at one view the different RESULTS of the three Tables, E, E 2, and E 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table E.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table E. 2.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 75.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table E. 3.
The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at Par.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.	2d SUPPOSITION.	3d SUPPOSITION.
	Amount of The Excesses which would, on this Supposition, be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Amount of The Excesses which would, on the above Supposition, be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.	Amount of The Excesses which would, on the above Supposition, be deducted from the Sinking Fund in each Year.
	£.	£.	£.
1816	1,171,551	136,984	
1817	1,239,992	1,014,075	546,506
1818	1,177,992	973,512	722,873
1819	1,119,093	934,570	701,186
1820	1,063,138	897,189	680,150
1821	1,009,981	861,300	659,746
1822	959,482	826,849	639,953
1823	911,508	793,774	620,755
1824	865,932	762,024	602,132
1825	822,636	731,543	584,068
1826	781,504	702,281	566,546

TABLE F.*

Shewing, the Total Amount of the DEBT charged on the War Taxes, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made:—and also the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt. The 3 per Cents. being supposed in this Table, as well as in the Tables G. H. and I. to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of the War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
5 January 1807 - - -	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000	
5 January 1808 - - -	23,400,000	1,230,000	22,170,000	
5 January 1809 - - -	34,170,000	1,891,500	32,278,500	
5 January 1810 - - -	46,278,500	2,686,075	43,592,425	
5 January 1811 - - -	59,592,425	3,620,378	55,972,047	
5 January 1812 - - -	71,972,047	4,601,396	67,370,651	
5 January 1813 - - -	83,370,651	5,631,465	77,739,186	
5 January 1814 - - -	93,739,186	6,713,038	87,026,148	
5 January 1815 - - -	103,026,148	7,848,689	95,177,459	
5 January 1816 - - -	111,177,459	9,041,123	102,136,336	
5 January 1817 - - -	118,136,336	10,293,179	107,843,157	
5 January 1818 - - -	123,843,157	11,607,837	112,235,320	
5 January 1819 - - -	128,235,320	12,988,228	115,247,092	
5 January 1820 - - -	131,247,092	14,437,639	116,809,453	
5 January 1821 - - -	128,309,453	14,559,520	114,249,933	
5 January 1822 - - -	126,249,933	14,687,496	111,562,437	
5 January 1823 - - -	123,562,437	14,821,870	108,740,567	
5 January 1824 - - -	122,740,567	14,862,963	107,877,604	
5 January 1825 - - -	123,877,604	14,806,111	109,071,493	
5 January 1826 - - -	125,071,493	14,746,416	110,325,077	

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* Note.—In this Table, and in the succeeding Tables G. H. and I. the respective sinking funds for the reduction of the respective debts are supposed to operate by compound interest at the yearly rate of five per cent.: but the respective sinking funds are issued to the commissioners quarterly. For this reason, the capitals of debt redeemed, and the progressive amounts of the sinking funds, will be greater than the computations in this and the other Tables G. H. and I. represent them, though not in such a proportion as to make it necessary to embarrass the accounts by taking into consideration the several different rates of interest correspondent to the periodical issues of the sinking funds for the reduction of debt by quarterly payments.

TABLE F. 2.

Shewing, the Total Amount of DEBT charged on the War-Taxes, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made: And also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest Per Cent.	Amount of the Money Capital of War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	References to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.
	£.		£.	£.	£.	
1807	60·	=5	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000	
1808	631·6	=4¾	*a* 24,000,000	1,260,000	22,740,000	
1809	- - -	- - -	34,740,000	1,949,850	32,790,150	
1810	66·66	=4½	*b* 48,611,825	2,812,467	45,799,358	
1811	- - -	- - -	61,799,558	3,819,028	57,980,330	
1812	70·58	=4¼	*c* 77,390,937	4,910,884	72,480,053	
1813	- -	- -	88,480,053	6,039,596	82,440,457	
1814	75·	=4	*d* 103,592,985	7,256,278	96,336,707	
1815	And to continue at that Rate throughout	the rest of this period of 20 years.	112,336,707	8,506,529	103,830,178	
1816			119,830,178	9,806,790	110,023,388	
1817			126,023,388	11,159,061	114,864,327	
1818			130,864,327	12,565,423	118,298,904	
1819			134,298,904	14,028,039	120,270,865	
1820			136,270,865	15,549,160	120,721,705	
1821			132,721,705	15,691,126	117,030,579	
1822			129,030,579	15,838,771	113,191,808	
1823			125,191,808	15,992,321	109,199,487	
1824			123,199,487	16,072,013	107,127,474	
1825			123,127,474	16,074,893	107,052,581	
1826			123,052,581	16,077,888	106,974,693	

YEAR.	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds.	Money Capital increased in consequence of the Rise of the Funds.	
a 1808	11,400,000	12,000,000	3 per Cents. at 63·16
b 1810	32,790,150	34,611,825	3 per Cents. 66.66
c 1112	57,980,330	61,390,937	3 per Cents. 70.58
d 1814	82,440,457	87,592,985	3 per Cents. 75.

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* Note.—In this Table, and in the succeeding Tables G. 2, H. 2, and I. 2, the respective sinking funds for the reduction of the respective debts are supposed to operate by compound interest at the respective yearly rates stated in column 2 of this Table: But the respective sinking funds are issued to the commissioners quarterly. For these reasons the capitals of debt redeemed, and the progressive amounts of the sinking funds, will be greater than the computations in this and the other tables G. 2, H. 2, and I. 2, represent them, though not in such a proportion as to make it necessary to embarrass the accounts by taking into consideration the several different rates of interest correspondent to the periodical issues of the sinking funds for the reduction of debt, by quarterly payments.

TABLE F. 3.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the DEBT charged on the War Taxes, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made: And also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt.—The Prices of Stocks are supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest Per Cent.	Amount of the Money Capital of War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
	£.		£.	£.	£.
1807	60	=5	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000
1808	66.66	=4½	*a* 24,666,666	1,290,000	23,376,666
1809	- -	- -	35,376,666	2,008,050	33,368,616
1810	75	=4	*b* 51,539,693	2,938,412	48,601,281
1811	- -	- -	64,601,281	4,015,948	60,585,333
1812	85.71	=3½	*c* 85,240,380	5,216,585	80,023,795
1813	- -	- -	96,023,795	6,439,165	89,584,630
1814	Par.	=3	*d* 120,515,401	7,784,535	112,730,866
1815	And to continue at that Rate throughout	the rest of this period of 20 years.	128,730,866	9,138,071	119,592,795
1816			135,592,795	10,532,213	125,060,582
1817			141,060,582	11,968,179	129,092,403
1818			145,092,403	13,447,224	131,645,179
1819			147,645,179	14,970,640	132,674,539
1820			148,674,539	16,539,759	132,134,780
1821			144,134,780	16,675,951	127,458,829
1822			139,458,829	16,816,229	122,642,600
1823			134,642,600	16,960,715	117,681,885
1824			131,681,885	17,049,536	114,632,349
1825			130,632,349	17,081,022	113,551,327
1826			129,551,327	17,113,452	112,437,875

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Reference to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.

YEAR.	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds.	Money Capital increased by the Rise of the Funds.	
a 1808	11,400,000	12,666,666	3 per Cents. 66.66.
b 1810	33,368,616	37,539,693	3 per Cents. 75.
c 1812	60,585,333	69,240,380	3 per Cents. 85.71.
d 1814	89,584,630	104,515,401	3 per Cents. at par.

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* Note.—In this Table, and in the succeeding Tables G. 3, H. 3, and I. 3, the respective sinking funds for the reduction of the respective debts are supposed to operate by compound interest at the respective yearly rates stated in column 2 of this Table: but the respective sinking funds are issued to the commissioners quarterly. For these reasons the capitals of debt redeemed, and the progressive amounts of the sinking funds, will be greater than the computations in this and the other Tables G. 3, H. 3, and I. 3, represent them, though not in such a proportion as to make it necessary to embarrass the accounts by taking into consideration the several different rates of interest correspondent to the periodical issues of the sinking funds for the reduction of debt by quarterly payments.

TABLE F. 4.

Shewing at one view the different RESULTS of the three Tables, F, F. 2, and F. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table F.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table F. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to contiuue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION.—Table F. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.			3d SUPPOSITION.		
	Amount of the Money Capital of War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Money Capital of War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.	Amount of the Money Capital of War Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the War Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000	12,000,000	600,000	11,400,000
1808	23,400,000	1,230,000	22,170,000	24,000,000	1,260,000	22,740,000	24,666,666	1,290,000	23,376,666
1809	34,170,000	1,891,500	32,278,500	34,740,000	1,949,850	32,790,150	35,376,666	2,008,050	33,368,616
1810	46,278,500	2,686,075	43,592,425	48,611,825	2,812,467	45,799,358	51,539,693	2,938,412	48,601,281
1811	59.592,425	3,620,378	55,972,047	61,799,358	3,819,028	57,980,330	64,601,281	4,015,948	60,585,333
1812	71,972,047	4,601,396	67,370,651	77,390,937	4,910,884	72,480,053	85,240,380	5,216,585	80,023,795
1813	83,370,651	5,631,465	77,739,186	88,480,053	6,039,596	82,440,457	96,023,795	6,439,165	89,584,630
1814	93,739,186	6,713,038	87,026,148	103,592,985	7,256,278	95,336,707	120,515,401	7,784,535	112,730,866
1815	103,026,148	7,848,689	95,177,459	112,336,707	8,506,529	103,830,178	128,730,866	9,138,071	119,592,795
1816	111,177,459	9,041,123	102,136,336	119,830,178	9,806,790	110,023,388	135,592,795	10,532,213	125,060,582
1817	118,136,336	10,293,179	107,843,157	126,023,388	11,159,061	114,864,327	141,060,582	11,968,179	129,092,403
1818	123,843,157	11,607,837	112,235,320	130,864,327	12,565,423	118,298,904	145,092,403	13,447,224	131,645,179
1819	128,235,320	12,988,228	115,247,092	134,298,904	14,028,039	120,270,865	147,645,179	14,970,640	132,674,539
1820	131,247.092	14,437,639	116,809,453	136,270,865	15,549,160	120,721,705	148,674,539	16,539,759	132,134,780
1821	128,809,453	14,559,520	114,249,933	132,721,705	15,691,126	117,030,579	144,134,780	16,675,951	127,458,829
1822	126,249,933	14,687,496	111,562,437	129,030,579	15,838,771	113,191,808	139,458,829	16,816,229	122,642,600
1823	123,562,437	14,821,870	108,750,567	125,191,808	15,992,321	109,199,487	134,642,600	16,960,715	117,681,885
1824	122,740,567	14,862,963	107,877,604	123,199,487	16,072,013	107,127,474	131,681,885	17,049,536	114,632,349
1825	123,877,604	14,806,111	109,071,493	123,127,474	16,074,893	107,052,581	130,632,349	17,081,022	113,551,327
1826	125,071,493	14,746,416	110,325,077	123,052,581	16,077,888	106,974,693	129,551,327	17,113,452	112,437,875

TABLE G.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the DEBT created by the Supplementary Loans, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made.—And also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807 . .	200,000	3,333	196,666	
5 January, 1808 . .	1,596,666	26,832	1,569,834	
5 January, 1809 . .	4,169,834	71,506	4,098,328	
5 January, 1810 . .	6,098,328	108,414	5,989,914	
5 January, 1811 . .	7,589,914	140,500	7,449,414	
5 January, 1812 . .	10,649,414	200,858	10,448,556	
5 January, 1813 . .	15,248,556	290,900	14,957,656	
5 January, 1814 . .	21,357,656	412,111	20,945,545	
5 January, 1815 . .	28,945,545	566,049	28,379,496	
5 January, 1816 . .	37,979,496	754,351	37,225,145	
5 January, 1817 . .	48,425,145	978,734	47,446,411	
5 January, 1818 . .	60,246,411	1,241,003	59,005,408	
5 January, 1819 . .	73,405,408	1,543,053	71,862,355	
5 January, 1820 . .	87,862,355	1,886,871	85,975,484	
5 January, 1821 . .	105,975,484	2,314,547	103,660,937	
5 January, 1822 . .	123,660,937	2,763,607	120,897,330	
5 January, 1823 . .	140,897,330	3,235,120	137,662,210	
5 January, 1824 . .	155,662,210	3,696,876	151,965,334	
5 January, 1825 . .	167,965,334	4,148,385	163,816,949	
5 January, 1826 . .	170,816,949	4,622,470	175,194,479	

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* See Note to Table F.

TABLE G. 2.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the DEBT created by the SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made: And also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Amount of Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
	£.		£.	£.	£.
1807	60.	=5	200,000	3,333	196,667
1808	63.16	=4¾	*a* 1,607,017	25,664	1,581.353
1809	- - - -		4,181,353	68,048	4,113,305
1810	66.66	=4½	*b* 6,341,821	101,283	6,240,538
1811	- - - -		7,840,538	129,842	7,710,696
1812	70.58	=4¼	*c* 11,364,266	181,022	11,183,244
1813	- - - -		15,983,244	256,722	15,726,522
1814	75.	=4	*d* 23,109,429	352,965	22,756,464
1815	And to continue at that Rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 Years.		30,756,464	473,749	30,282,715
1816			39,882,715	620,698	39,262,017
1817			50,462,017	794,858	49,667,159
1818			62,467,159	997,318	61,469,841
1819			75,869,841	1,229,210	74,640,631
1820			90,640,631	1,491,711	89,148,920
1821			109,148,920	1,818,045	107,330,875
1822			127,330,875	2,157,432	125,173,443
1823			145,173,443	2,510,395	142,663,048
1824			160,663,048	2,850,810	157,812,238
1825			173,812,238	3,178,175	170,634,063
1826			186,634,063	3,518,635	183,115,428

6. Reference to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.

YEAR.	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds.	Money Capital increased in consequence of the Rise of the Funds.	
a 1808	196,667	207,017	3 per Cents. at 63.16
b 1810	4,113,305	4,341,821	3 per Cents. at 66.66
c 1812	7,710,696	8,164,266	3 per Cents. at 70.58
d 1814	15,726,522	16,709,429	3 per Cents. at 75.

* See Note to Table F. 2.

TABLE G. 3. *

Shewing the Total Amount of the DEBT created by the SUPPLEMENTARY LOANS, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, if Peace were then made: And also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in any given Year to the Extinction of such Debt.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Amount of Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
	£.		£.	£.	£.
1807	60.	=5	200,000	3,333	196,667
1808	66.66	=4½	*a* 1,618,518	24,501	1,549,017
1809	- -	- -	4,194,017	64,606	4,129,411
1810	75.	=4	*b* 6,645,587	94,179	6,551,408
1811	- -	- -	8,151,408	119,279	8,032,129
1812	85.71	=3½	*c* 12,379,576	161,385	12,218,191
1313	- -	- -	17,018,191	222,035	16,796,156
1814	Par.	3	*d* 25,995,515	293,806	25,701,709
1815	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 Years.		33,701,709	382,620	33,319,089
1816			42,919,089	490,098	42,428,991
1817			53,628,991	616,800	53,012,191
1818			65,812,191	763,304	65,048,887
1819			79,448,887	930,203	78,518,684
1820			94,518,684	1,118,109	93,400,575
1821			113,400,575	1,351,652	112,048,923
1822			132,048,923	1,592,201	130,456,722
1823			150,456,722	1,839,967	148,616,755
1824			166,616,755	2,075,166	164,541,589
1825			180,541,589	2,297,420	178,244,169
1826			194,244,169	2,526,342	191,717,827

6.

References to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.

YEAR.	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds.	Money Capital increased in consequence of the Rise of the Funds.	
a 1808	196,667	218,518	3 per Cents. at 66.66
b 1810	4,129,411	4,645,587	3 per Cents. at 75
c 1812	8,032,129	9,179,576	3 per Cents. at 85.71
d 1814	16,796,156	19,595,515	3 per Cents. at Par.

* See Note to Table F. 2.

TABLE G. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the three Tables, G, G. 2, and G. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table G.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table G. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table G. 3.——The 3 per Cents are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.			3d SUPPOSITION.		
	Amount of Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.	Amount of Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of the Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.	Amount of Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year, during the Continuance of the War.	Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt, at the Close of each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807.	200,000	3,333	196,666	200,000	3,333	196,667	200,000	3,333	196,667
1808	1,596,666	26,832	1,569,834	1,607,017	25,664	1,581,353	1,618,518	24,501	1,594,017
1809	4,169,834	71,506	4,098,328	4,181,353	68,048	4,113,305	4,194,017	64,606	4,129,411
1810	6,098,328	108,414	5,989,914	6,341,821	101,283	6,240,538	6,645,587	94,179	6,551,408
1811	7,589,914	140,500	7,449,414	7,840,538	129,842	7,710,696	8,151,408	119,279	8,032,129
1812.	10,649,414	200,858	10,448,556	11,364,266	181,022	11,183,244	12,379,576	161,385	12,218,191
1813	15,248,556	290,900	14,957,656	15,983,244	256,722	15,726,522	17,018,191	222,035	16,796,156
1814	21,357,656	412,111	20,945,545	23,109,429	352,965	22,756,464	25,995,515	293,806	25,701,709
1815	28,945,545	566,049	28,379,496	30,756,464	473,749	30,282,715	33,701,709	382,620	33,319,089
1816	37,979,496	754,351	37,225,145	39,882,715	620,698	39,262,017	42,919,089	490,098	42,428,991
1817	48,421,145	978,734	47,446,411	50,462,017	794,858	49,667,159	53,628,991	616,800	53,012,191
1818	60,246,411	1,241,003	59,005,408	62,467,159	997,318	61,469,841	65,812,191	763,304	65,048,887
1819	73,405,408	1,543,053	71,862,355	75,869,841	1,229,210	74,640,631	79,448,887	930,203	78,518,684
1820	87,862,355	1,886,871	85,975,484	90,640,631	1,491,711	89,148,920	94,518,684	1,118,109	93,400,575
1821	105,975,484	2,314,547	103,660,937	109,148,920	1,818,045	107,330,875	113,400,575	1,351,652	112,048,923
1822	123,660,937	2,763,607	120,897,330	127,330,875	2,157,432	125,173,443	132,048,923	1,592,201	130,456,722
1823	140,897,330	3,235,120	137,662,210	145,173,443	2,510,395	142,663,048	150,456,722	1,839,967	148,616,755
1824	155,662,210	3,696,876	151,965,334	160,663,048	2,850,810	157,812,238	166,616,755	2,075,166	164,541,589
1825	167,965,334	4,148,385	163,816,949	173,812,238	3,178,175	170,634,063	180,541,589	2,297,420	178,244,169
1826	179,816,949	4,622,470	175,194,479	186,634,063	3,518,635	183,115,428	194,244,169	2,526,342	191,717,827

TABLE H.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the present DEBT, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year; and also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt; the Portions of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Existing Debt for the Time being, which will be applied in Diminution of the Amount of New Taxes, as by Table D. having been first deducted from such Sinking Fund in each Year.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	Amount of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807	352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013	
5 January, 1808	344,462,013	8,748,294	335,713,719	
5 January, 1809	335,713,719	9,185,708	326,528,011	
5 January, 1810	326,528,011	9,644,993	316,883,018	
5 January, 1811	316,883,018	10,127,242	306,755,776	
5 January, 1812	306,755,776	10,633,604	296,122,172	
5 January, 1813	296,122,172	11,165,284	284,956,888	
5 January, 1814	284,956,888	11,723,548	273,233,340	
5 January, 1815	273,233,340	12,309,725	260,923,615	
5 January, 1816	260,923,615	12,925,211	247,998,404	
5 January, 1817	247,998,404	12,824,805	235,173,599	
5 January, 1818	235,173,599	12,612,712	222,560,887	
5 January, 1819	222,560,887	12,283,347	210,277,540	
5 January, 1820	210,277,540	11,830,848	198,446,692	
5 January, 1821	198,446,692	11,089,057	187,357,635	
5 January, 1822	187,357,635	10,310,176	177,047,459	
5 January, 1823	177,047,459	9,492,351	167,555,108	
5 January, 1824	167,555,108	8,766,968	158,788,140	
5 January, 1825	158,788,140	8,138,650	150,649,490	
5 January, 1826	150,649,490	7,532,474	143,117,016	

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* See Note to Table F.

TABLE H. 2. *

Shewing the Total Amount of the present DEBT as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year: and also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt; the portions of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the existing Debt for the Time being, which will be Applied in Diminution of the Amount of New Taxes, as by Table D. 2., having been first deducted from such Sinking Fund in each Year.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1. YEAR.	2. Price of 3 per Cent. Stock	Price of 4 per Cent. Stock	Rate of Interest per Cent.	3. Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining Unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	4. Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	5. Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
				£.	£.	£.
1807	60.	=80.	=5	a 352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013
1808	63.16	=84.21	=4¾	b 360,062,491	8,748,294	351,314,197
1809	-	-	-	351,314,197	9,163,837	342,150,360
1810	66.66	=88.88	=4½	c 358,489,106	9,599,119	348,889,987
1811	-	-	-	348,889,987	10,031,079	338,858,908
1812	70.58	=94.11	=4¼	d 355,965,141	10,482,477	345,482,664
1813	-	-	-	345,482,664	10,927,982	334,554,682
1814	75	=Par	=4	e 352,461,041	11,392,421	341,068,620
1815	And to continue at that Rate throughout the rest of this Period of 20 Years.			341,068,620	11,848,117	329,220,503
1816				329,220,503	12,322,041	316,898,462
1817				316,898,462	12,675,938	304,222,524
1818				304,222,524	12,500,309	291,722,215
1819				291,722,215	12,232,321	279,489,894
1820				279,489,894	11,868,280	267,621,614
1821				267,621,614	11,276,345	256,345,269
1822				256,345,269	10,660,732	245,684,537
1823				245,684,537	10,020,495	235,664,042
1824				235,664,042	9,461,314	226,202,723
1825				226,202,728	9,048,109	217,154,619
1826				217,154,619	8,686,184	208,468,435

6.

References to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.

YEAR.	Nominal Capital.	Money Capital.	
a 1807	48,052,931	48,052,931	5 Per Cents. at Par.
	46,807,684	37,446,147	4 Per Cents. at 80.
	445,491,074	267,294,644	3 Per Cents. at 60.
		£.352,793,722	
	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds.	Money Capital increased in consequence of the Rise of the Funds.	
b 1808	344,462,013		
	48,052,931	48,052,931	5 Per Cents. at Par.
	£.296,409,082	312,009,560	4 Per Cents. at 84.21 3 Per Cents. at 63·16
		£·360·062·491	
c 1810	342,150,360		
	48,052,931	48,052,931	5 Per Cents. at Par.
	£.294,097,429	310,436,175	4 Per Cents. at 88·88 3 Per Cents. at 66·66
		£.358,489,106	
d 1812	338,858,908		
	48,052,931	48,052,931	5 Per Cents. at Par.
	£.290,805,977	307,912,210	4 Per Cents. at 94·11. 3 Per Cents. at 70·58.
		£.355,965,141	
e 1814	334,554,682		
	48,052,931	48,052,931	5 Per Cents. at Par.
	£.286,501,751	304,408,110	4 Per Cents. at Par. 3 Per Cents. 75.
		£.352,461,014	
f 1814	The 5 Per Cents. being at the commencement of this year reduced to a 4 per cent. Fund, there will be a saving of interest to the amount of - - - - £.480,529.		

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* See Note to Table F 2.

TABLE H. 3.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the present DEBT, as it will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year: and also, the Total Amount of the Sinking Fund applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt; the Portions of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the existing Debt for the Time being, which will be applied in Diminution of the Amount of New Taxes, as by Table D. 3., having been first deducted from such Sinking Fund in each Year.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.			3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Price of 4 per Cent Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining Unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
				£.	£.	£.
1807	60.	=80.	=5	a 352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013
1808	66.66	=88.88	=4½	b 377,396,355	8,748,294	368,648,061
1809	- -	- -	-	368,648,061	9,241,967	359,406,094
1810	75.	=Par.	=4	c 398,325,239	9,657,855	388,667,384
1811	- -	- -	-	388,667,384	10,044,169	378,623,215
1812	85.71	= - -	=3½	d 419,160,729	10,445,935	408,714,794
1813	- -	- -	-	408,714,794	10,811,542	397,903,252
1814	Par.	= - -	=3	e 448,410,358	f 11,189,945	437,220,413
1815	And to continue at that Rate throughout the rest of this Period of 20 Years.			437,220,413	11,525,643	425,694,770
1816				425,694,770	11,871,412	413,823,358
1817				413,823,358	12,227,554	401,595,804
1818				401,595,804	12,082,380	389,513,424
1819				389,513,424	11,868,851	377,644,573
1820				377,644,573	11,584,916	366,059,657
1821				366,059,657	11,132,463	354,927,194
1822				354,927,194	10,666,436	344,260,758
1823				344,260,758	10,327,822	333,932,936
1824				333,932,936	10,017,983	323,914,948
1825				323,914,948	9,717,448	314,197,500
1826				314,197,500	9,425,925	304,771,575

6\.

References to the Effect produced on the Amount of the Money Capital of the Debt, by the Rise of the Funds, in the different Periods here supposed.

YEAR.			
a 1807	Nominal Capital. 48,052,931 46,807,684 445,491,074	Money Capital. 48,052,931 37,446,147 267,294,644 £.352,793,722	5 Per Cent. at Par. 4 Per Cent. at 80. 3 Per Cent. at 60.
b 1808	Money Capital before the Rise of the Funds. 344,462,013 48,052,931 £. 296,409,082	Money Capital increased in consequence of the Rise of the Funds. 48,052,931 329,343,424 £. 377,396,355	5 Per Cent. at Par. 4 Per Cent. at 88.88. 3 Per Cent. at 66.66.
c 1810	359,406,094 48,052,931 £. 311,353,163	48,052,931 350,272,308 £. 398,325,239	5 Per Cent. at Par. 4 Per Cent. at Par, & 3 Per Cent. at 75.
d 1812	378,623,215 94,860,615 £. 283,762,600	94,860,615 324,300,114 £.419,160,729	4 & 5 Per Cents. at Par. 3 Per Cents. at 85.71.
e 1814	397,903,252 94,860,615 £. 303,042,637	94,860,615 353,549,743 £. 448,410,358	4 & 5 Per Cents. at Par. 3 Per Cents. at Par.
f 1810	The 5 Per Cents. being at the commencement of this Year reduced to a 4 per Cent. Fund, there will be a saving of Interest to the Amount of L.480,529.		
1814	The 4 Per Cents. being at the commencement of this Year reduced to a 3 per Cent. Fund, there will be a saving of Interest to the Amount of - L.948,606.		

* See Note to Table F. 3.

TABLE H. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the Three Tables, H, H. 2, & H. 3,

1st SUPPOSITION—Table H.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole Period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table H. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table H 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71; and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.			3d SUPPOSITION.		
	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.	Amount of Money Capital of the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	Amount of the present Sinking Fund at the same Periods.	Amount of Money Capital of the same Debt at the Close of each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013	352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013	352,793,722	8,331,709	344,462,013
1808	344,462,013	8,748,294	335,713,719	360,062,491	8,748,294	351,314,197	377,396,355	8,748,294	368,648,061
1809	335,713,719	9,185,708	326,528,011	351,314,197	9,163,837	342,150,360	368,648,061	9,241,967	359,406,094
1810	326,528,011	9,644,993	316,883,018	358,489,106	9,599,119	348,889,987	398,325,239	9,657,855	388,667,384
1811	316,883,018	10,127,242	306,755,776	348,889,987	10,051,079	338,858,908	388,667,384	10,044,169	378,623,215
1812	306,755,776	10,633,604	296,122,172	355,965,141	10,482,477	345,482,664	419,160,729	10,445,935	408,714,794
1813	296,122,172	11,165,284	284,956,888	345,482,664	10,927,982	334,554,682	408,714,794	10,811,542	397,903,252
1814	284,956,888	11,723,548	273,233,340	352,461,041	11,392,421	341,068,620	448,410,358	11,189,945	437,220,413
1815	273,233,340	12,309,725	260,923,615	341,068,620	11,848,117	329,220,503	437,220,413	11,525,643	425,694,770
1816	260,923,615	12,925,211	247,998,404	329,220,503	12,322,041	316,898,462	425,694,770	11,871,412	413,823,358
1817	247,998,404	12,824,805	235,173,599	316,898,462	12,675,938	304,222,524	413,823,358	12,227,554	401,595,804
1818	235,173,599	12,612,712	222,560,887	304,222,524	12,500,309	291,722,215	401,595,804	12,082,380	389,513,424
1819	222,500,887	12,283,347	210,277,540	291,722,215	12,232,321	279,489,894	389,513,424	11,868,851	377,644,573
1820	210,277,540	11,830,848	198,446,692	279,489,894	11,868,280	267,621,614	377,644,573	11,584,916	366,059,657
1821	198,446,692	11,089,057	187,357,635	267,621,614	11,276,345	256,345,269	366,059,657	11,132,463	354,927,194
1822	187,357,635	10,310,176	177,047,459	256,345,269	10,660,732	245,684,537	354,927,194	10,666,436	344,260,758
1823	177,047,459	9,492,351	167,555,108	245,684,537	10,020,495	235,664,042	344,260,758	10,327,822	333,932,936
1824	167,555,108	8,766,968	158,788,140	235,664,042	9,461,314	226,202,728	333,932,936	10,017,988	323,914,948
1825	158,788,140	8,138,650	150,649,490	226,202,728	9,048,109	217,154,619	323,914,948	9,717,448	314,197,500
1826	150,649,490	7,532,474	143,117,016	217,154,619	8,686,184	208,468,435	314,197,500	9,425,925	304,771,575

TABLE I.*

Shewing the Total Amount of the Three following DEBTS combined, as they will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year; viz.—The Debt charged upon the War Taxes (Table F.); the Debt created by the Supplementary Loans (Table G.); and, the present Debt (Table H.):—And also, the Total Amount in any given Year of all the respective Sinking Funds of the said Debts, the Portions of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund (Table II.) having been first deducted.—The 3 per Cents. supposed to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt remaining Unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.	
	£.	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807 . .	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680	
5 January, 1808 . .	369,458,679	10,005,126	359,453,553	
5 January, 1809 . .	374,053,553	11,148,714	362,904,839	
5 January, 1810 . .	378,904,839	12,439,482	366,465,357	
5 January, 1811 . .	384,065,357	13,888,120	370,177,237	
5 January, 1812 . .	389,377,237	15,435,858	373,941,379	
5 January, 1813 . .	394,741,379	17,087,649	377,653,730	
5 January, 1814 . .	400,053,730	18,848,697	381,205,033	
5 January, 1815 . .	405,205,033	20,724,463	384,480,570	
5 January, 1816 . .	410,080,570	22,720,685	387,359,885	
5 January, 1817 . .	414,559,885	24,096,718	390,463,167	
5 January, 1818 . .	419,263,167	25,461,552	393,801,615	
5 January, 1819 . .	424,201,615	26,814,628	397,386,987	
5 January, 1820 . .	429,386,987	28,155,358	401,231,629	
5 January, 1821 . .	433,231,629	27,963,124	405,268,505	
5 January, 1822 . .	437,268,505	27,761,279	409,507,226	
5 January, 1823 . .	441,507,226	27,549,341	413,957,885	
5 January, 1824 . .	445,957,885	27,326,807	418,631,078	
5 January, 1825 . .	450,631,078	27,093,146	423,537,932	
5 January, 1826 . .	455,537,932	26,901,360	428,636,572	

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* See Note to Table F.

TABLE I. 2. *

Shewing the Total Amount of the Three following Debts combined, as they will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, viz. the Debt charged upon the War Taxes, (Table F. 2.) the Debt created by the Supplementary Loans, (Table G. 2.) and the present Debt (Table H. 2.); and also the Total Amount in any given Year, of all the respective Sinking Funds of the said Debts.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Col. 2. of this Table.

1.	2.			3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Price of 4 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.	
		£.		£.	£.	£.	
1807	60	=80 *	= 5	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680	
1808	63.16	=84.21	=4¾	385,669,508	10,033,958	375,635,550	
1809	- - - - -			390,235,550	11,181,735	379,953,815	
1810	66.66	=88.88	=4½	413,442,752	12,512,869	400,929,883	
1811	- - - - -			418,529,883	13,979,949	404,549,934	
1812	70.53	=94.11	=4¼	444,720,344	15,574,383	429,145,961	
1813	- - - - -			449,945,961	17,224,300	432,721,661	
1814	75	=Par.	—4†	479,163,455	19,001,664	460,151,791	
1815	- - - - -			484,161,791	20,828,395	463,333,396	
1816	- - - - -			488,933,396	22,749,529	466,183,867	
1817	- - - - -			493,383,867	24,629,857	468,754,010	
1818	- - - - -			497,554,010	26,063,050	471,490,960	
1819	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 years.			501,890,960	27,489,570	474,401,390	
1820				506,401,390	28,909,151	477,492,239	
1821				509,492,239	28,785,516	480,706,723	
1822	- - - - -			512,706,723	28,656,935	484,049,788	
1823	- - - - -			516,049,788	28,523,211	487,526,577	
1824	- - - - -			519,526,577	28,384,137	491,142,440	
1825	- - - - -			523,142,440	28,301,177	494,841,263	
1826	- - - - -			526,841,263	28,282,707	498,558,556	

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* The note * *a* to Table H. 2. will shew the manner of reducing the nominal capital of ~~the present~~ debt to a money capital; and the other notes to that Table, and to the Tables F. 2, and G. 2, will shew how the existing debt is affected by the several rises of the funds.

† See note * *f* to Table H. 2, stating the reduction of the 5 per cent. stock to a 4 per cent. stock.

TABLE I. 3. *

Shewing the Total Amount of the Three following Debts combined, as they will stand at the Commencement and Close of any given Year, viz. the Debt charged upon the War Taxes, (Table F. 3.) the Debt created by the Supplementary Loans, (Table G. 3.) and the present Debt (Table H. 3.); and also the Total Amount in any given Year, of all the respective Sinking Funds of the said Debts.—The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.			3.	4.	5.	6.
Year.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Price of 4 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.	
		£.		£.	£.	£.	
1807	60.	=80	=5	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680	
1808	66.66	=88.88	=4½	403,681,539	10,063,795	393,618,744	
1809	-	-	-	408,218,744	11,314,623	396,904,121	
1810	75.	=Par	=4	456,510,519	12,690,446	443,820,073	
1811	-	-	-	461,420,073	14,179,396	447,240,677	
1812	85.71		=3¼	516,780,685	15,823,905	500,956,780	
1813	-	-	-	521,756,780	17,472,742	504,284,038	
1814	Par		=3	594,921,274	19,268,286	575,652,988	
1815	-	-	-	599,652,988	21,046,334	578,606,654	
1816	-	-	-	604,206,654	22,893,723	581,312,931	
1817	-	-	-	608,512,931	24,812,533	583,700,398	
1818	-	-	-	612,500,398	26,292,908	586,207,490	
1819	-	-	-	616,607,490	27,769,694	588,837,796	
1820	-	-	-	620,837,796	29,242,784	591,595,012	
1821	-	-	-	623,595,012	29,160,066	594,434,946	
1822	-	-	-	626,434,946	29,074,866	597,360,080	
1823	-	-	-	629,360,080	29,128,504	600,231,576	
1824	-	-	-	632,231,576	29,142,690	603,088,886	
1825	-	-	-	635,088,886	29,095,890	605,992,996	
1826	-	-	-	637,992,996	29,065,719	608,927,277	

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* The note * *a* to Table H. 3. will shew the manner of reducing the nominal capital of the present debt to a money capital; and the other notes to that Table, and to the Tables F. 3, and G. 3, will shew how the existing debt is affected by the several rises of the funds.

See note * *f* to Table H. 3, stating the reduction of the 5 per cent. stock to a 4 per cent. stock; and the 4 per cent. stock to a 3 per cent. stock.

TABLE I. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the Three Tables, I, I. 2, & I. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table I.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole Period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table I. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table I. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71; and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.			3d SUPPOSITION.		
	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt and the present Debt, remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt and the present Debt, remaining unredeemed at the Commencement of each Year.	The Combined Amount of the Sinking Funds of the War Debt, the Supplementary Debt, and the present Debt, at the same Periods.	The Combined Amount of the same Debts at the Close of each Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680	364,993,722	8,935,042	356,058,680
1808	369,458,679	10,005,126	359,453,553	385,669,508	10,033,958	375,635,550	403,681,539	10,063,795	393,618,744
1809	374,053,556	11,148,714	362,904,839	390,235,550	11,181,735	379,053,815	408,218,744	11,314,623	396,904,121
1810	378,904,839	12,493,482	366,465,357	413,442,752	12,512,869	400,929,883	456,510,519	12,690,446	443,820,073
1811	384,065,357	13,888,120	370,177,237	418,529,883	13,979,949	404,549,934	461,420,073	14,179,396	447,240,677
1812	389,377,237	15,435,858	373,941,379	444,720,344	15,574,383	429,145,961	516,780,685	15,823,905	500,956,780
1813	394,741,379	17,087,649	377,653,730	449,945,961	17,224,300	432,721,661	521,756,780	17,472,742	504,284,038
1814	400,053,730	18,848,697	381,205,033	479,163,455	19,001,664	460,151,791	594,921,274	19,268,286	575,652,988
1815	405,205,033	20,724,463	384,480,570	484,161,791	20,828,395	463,533,396	599,652,988	21,046,334	578,606,654
1816	410,080,570	22,720,685	387,359,885	488,933,396	22,749,529	466,183,867	604,206,654	22,893,723	581,312,931
1817	414,559,885	24,096,718	390,463,167	493,383,867	24,629,857	468,754,010	608,512,931	24,812,533	583,700,398
1818	419,263,167	25,461,552	393,801,615	497,554,010	26,063,050	471,490,960	612,500,398	26,292,908	586,207,490
1819	424,201,615	26,814,628	397,386,987	501,890,960	27,489,570	474,401,390	616,607,490	27,769,694	588,837,796
1820	429,386,987	28,155,358	401,231,629	506,401,390	28,909,151	477,492,239	620,837,796	29,242,784	591,595,012
1821	433,231,629	27,963,124	405,268,505	509,492,239	28,785,516	480,706,723	623,595,012	29,160,066	594,434,946
1822	437,268,505	27,761,279	409,507,226	512,706,723	28,656,935	484,049,788	626,434,946	29,074,866	597,360,080
1823	441,507,226	27,549,341	413,957,885	516,049,788	28,523,211	487,526,577	629,360,080	29,128,504	600,231,576
1824	445,957,885	27,326,807	418,631,078	519,526,577	28,384,137	491,142,440	632,231,576	29,142,690	603,088,886
1825	450,631,078	27,093,146	423,537,932	523,142,440	28,301,177	494,841,263	635,088,886	29,095,890	605,992,996
1826	455,537,932	26,901,360	428,636,572	526,841,263	28,282,707	498,558,556	637,992,996	29,055,719	608,927,277

TABLE K.

Shewing the Comparative Amounts of NEW TAXES which will be required in each Year, according to the Plan in Table C. Column 4, and of New Taxes, which would be required to provide for £.11,000,000. borrowed in every Year, according to the present System, deducting in each Case the expired Annuities from the Taxes which would otherwise be required. The 3 per Cents. being supposed to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.
YEAR, Commencing	TAXES which will be required according to the Plan proposed in Table C. Colum	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.	
	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807 - - - -	Nil.	717,818*	
5 January, 1808 - - - -	Nil.	363,333†	
5 January, 1809 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1810 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1811 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1812 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1813 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1814 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1815 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1816 - - - -	293,000	733,333	
5 January, 1817 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1818 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1819 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1820 - - - -	Nil.	435,786‡	
5 January, 1821 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1822 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1823 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1824 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1825 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	
5 January, 1826 - - - -	Nil.	733,333	

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* This sum, together with 15,515*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 733,333*l.*

† This sum, together with 370,000*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 733,333*l.*

‡ This sum, together with 230,000*l.* imperial annuities falling in this year, and life annuities granted in William and Mary, and George II. supposed to have all fallen in by this time, amounting to 67,547*l.*, make up 733,333*l.*

TABLE K. 2.

Shewing the comparative Amounts of NEW TAXES which will be required in each Year, according to the Plan in Table C. 2. Column 5, and of New Taxes which would be required to provide for £.11,000,000 borrowed in every Year, according to the present System; deducting in each Case the expired Annuities, and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cent. to a 4 per Cent. Fund from the Taxes which would otherwise be required. The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	TAXES which will be required according to the Plan proposed in Table C 2, Column 5.	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.	
	£.		£.	£.	
1807	60	=5	Nil.	717,818 *	
1808	63.16	=4¾	Nil.	326,660 †	
1809	- -	- -	Nil.	696,660	
1810	66.66	=4½	230,000	660,016	
1811	- -	- -	230,000	660,016	
1812	70.58	=4¼	230,000	623,351	
1813	- -	- -	230,000	623,351	
1814	75	=4	230,000	106,137 ‡	
1815	- -	- -	230,000	586,666	
1816	- -	- -	230,000	586,666	
1817	- -	- -	Nil.	586,666	
1818	- -	- -	Nil.	586,666	
1819	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 years.		Nil.	586,666	
1820			Nil.	289,119 §	
1821			Nil.	586,666	
1822			Nil.	586,666	
1823			Nil.	586,666	
1824	- -	- -	Nil.	586,666	
1825	- -	- -	Nil.	586,666	
1826	- -	- -	Nil.	586,666	

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* This sum, together with 15,515*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 733,333*l.*

† This sum, together with 370,000*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 733,333*l.*

‡ This sum, together with 480,529*l.* arising from the reduction of interest on the 5 per cent. stock, supposed to take place this year, make 586,666*l.*

§ This sum, together with 230,000*l.* imperial annuities falling in this year, and life annuities granted in William and Mary, and George II. supposed to have all fallen in by this time, amounting to 67,547*l.* make up 586,666*l.*

TABLE K. 3.

Shewing the comparative Amounts of NEW TAXES which will be required in each Year, according to the Plan in Table C. 3. Column 5, and of New Taxes which would be required to provide for 11,000,000*l.* borrowed in every Year, according to the present System; deducting in each Case the expired Annuities, and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. to a 4 per Cent. Fund, and of the 4 per Cents. to a 3 per Cent. Fund, from the Taxes which would otherwise be required. The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock. Rate of Interest Per Cent.	TAXES which will be required according to the Plan proposed in Table C. 3, Column 5.	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.	
		£.	£.	
1807 - -	60=5	Nil.	* 717,818	
1808 - -	66.66=4½	- - - - -	† 290,000	
1809 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	660,000	
1810 - -	75=4	- - - - -	‡ 106,137	
1811 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	586,666	
1812 - -	85.71=3½	- - - - -	513,333	
1813 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	513,333	
1814 - -	Par =3	- - - - -	‖ Nil.	
1815 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	‖ Nil.	
1816 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	‖ 353,622	
1817 - -	- - - - -	275,836	440,000	
1818 - -	- - - - -	Nil.	440,000	
1819 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1820 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	§ 142,453	
1821 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1822 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1823 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1824 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1825 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	
1826 - -	- - - - -	- - - - -	440,000	

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* This sum, together with 15,515*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 733,333*l.*

† This sum, together with 370,000*l.* annuities falling in this year, make up 660,000*l.*

‡ This sum, together with 480,529*l.* arising from the reduction of interest on the 5 per Cent. stock supposed to take place this year, make 586,666*l.*

‖ The sum of 948,606*l.* arising from the reduction of interest on the 4 per cents. supposed to take place this year, provides for the supplies of 1814 and 1815, and partly for those of 1816.

§ This sum, together with 230,000*l.* imperial annuities falling in this year, and life annuities granted in William and Mary, and George II. supposed to have all fallen in by this time, amounting to 67,547*l.*, make up 440,000*l.*

TABLE K. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the three Tables, K, K. 2, and K. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table K.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table K. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table K. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.		2d SUPPOSITION.		3d SUPPOSITION.	
	TAXES which will be required according to the proposed Plan.	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.	TAXES which will be required according to the proposed Plan.	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.	TAXES which will be required according to the proposed Plan.	TAXES which would be required according to the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	Nil.	717,818	Nil.	717,818	Nil.	717,818
1808	Nil.	363,333	Nil.	326,660	Nil.	290,000
1809	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	696,660	Nil.	660,000
1810	293,000	733,333	230,000	660,016	Nil.	106,137
1811	293,000	733,333	230,000	660,016	Nil.	586,666
1812	293,000	733,333	230,000	623,351	Nil.	513,333
1813	293,000	733,333	230,000	623,351	Nil.	513,333
1814	293,000	733,333	230,000	106,137	Nil.	Nil.
1815	293,000	733,333	230,000	586,666	Nil.	Nil.
1816	293,000	733,333	230,000	586,666	Nil.	353,622
1817	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	275,836	440,000
1818	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1819	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1820	Nil.	435,786	Nil.	289,119	Nil.	142,453
1821	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1822	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1823	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1824	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1825	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000
1826	Nil.	733,333	Nil.	586,666	Nil.	440,000

TABLE L.*

Shewing the Comparative Total Amounts in any given Year, of all the New Taxes which will have been imposed, subsequent to the 5th of January, 1807, according to the Plan proposed in Table C. Column 4:—And of the New Taxes which would have been imposed, supposing £.11,000,000 * to have been borrowed in each Year, according to the present System, deducting in each Case the expiring Annuities from the Taxes which would otherwise have been imposed, as stated in Table K. The 3 per Cents are supposed to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.
Year, Commencing	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which will be imposed subsequently to 1807, according to the Plan proposed, in Table C. Column 4.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.	
	£.	£.	
5 January, 1807	Nil.	717,818	
5 January, 1808	Nil.	1,081,151	
5 January, 1809	Nil.	1,814,484	
5 January, 1810	293,000	2,547,817	
5 January, 1811	586,000	3,281,150	
5 January, 1812	879,000	4,014,483	
5 January, 1813	1,172,000	4,747,816	
5 January, 1814	1,465,000	5,481,149	
5 January, 1815	1,758,000	6,214,482	
5 January, 1816	2,051,000	6,947,815	
5 January, 1817	No New Taxes being required subseqent to the year 1816, the Total will remain the same, during the whole of these years.	7,681,148	
5 January, 1818		8,414,481	
5 January, 1819		9,147,814	
5 January, 1820		9,583,600	
5 January, 1821	. . . . . .	10,316,933	
5 January, 1822	. . . . . .	11,050,266	
5 January, 1823	. . . . . .	11,783,599	
5 January, 1824	. . . . . .	12,516,932	
5 January, 1825	. . . . . .	13,250,265	
5 January, 1826	. . . . . .	13,983,598	

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* This sum of eleven millions loan, added to twenty-one millions of war taxes, would make up the annual sum of thirty-two millions, the same expenditure for which it is proposed to provide by this plan.

TABLE L. 2.

Shewing the comparative Total Amounts in any given Year, of all the NEW TAXES which will have been imposed subsequently to the 5th of January, 1807, according to the Plan proposed in Table C. 2. Column 5:—And of the New Taxes which would have been imposed, supposing £.11,000,000 * to have been borrowed in each Year, according to the present System, deducting in each Case the expiring Annuities and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cent. to a 4 per Cent. Fund from the Taxes which would otherwise have been imposed, as stated in Table K. 2. The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
YEAR.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which will have been imposed subsequently to 1807, according to the Plan proposed in Table C. 2. Column 5.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed, after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.	
	£.		£.	£.	
1807	60.	=5	Nil.	717,818	
1808	63.16	=4¾	Nil.	1,044,478	
1809	- - -	- -	Nil.	1,741,138	
1810	66.66	=4½	230,000	2,401,154	
1811	- - -	- -	460,000	3,061,170	
1812	70.58	=4¼	690,000	3,684,521	
1813	- - -	- -	920,000	4,307,872	
1814	75.	=4	1,150,000	4,414,009	
1815	- -	- -	1,380,000	5,000,675	
1816	- -	- -	1,610,000	5,587,341	
1817	- -	- -	- - - -	6,174,007	
1818	- -	- -	- - - -	6,760,673	
1819			- - - -	7,347,339	
1820	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 years.		As no fresh taxes are required to be imposed in these years, the Total remains the same.	7,636,458	
1821				8,223,124	
1822				8,809,790	
1823	- -	- -		9,396,456	
1824	- -	- -	- - - -	9,983,122	
1825	- -	- -	- - - -	10,569,788	
1826	- -	- -	- - - -	11,156,454	

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* This sum of eleven millions loan, added to twenty-one millions war taxes, would make up the annual sum of thirty-two millions, the same expenditure for which it is proposed to provide by this plan.

TABLE L. 3.

Shewing the comparative Total Amounts in any given Year, of all the New Taxes which will have been imposed subsequently to the 5th of January, 1807, according to the Plan proposed in Table C. 3. Column 5:—And of the New Taxes which would have been imposed, supposing £.11,000,000 * to have been borrowed in each Year, according to the present System, deducting in each Case the expiring Annuities and a Sum arising from the Reduction of the 5 per Cents. to a 4 per Cent. Fund, and of the 4 per Cents. to a 3 per Cent. Fund, from the Taxes which would otherwise have been imposed, as stated in Table K. 3. The Price of Stocks is supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2. of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.
Year.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which will have been imposed subsequently to 1807, according to the Plan proposed in Table C. 3. Column 5.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.	
	£.		£.	£.	
1807	60.	=5	Nil.	717,818	
1808	66.66	=4½	- - - - -	1,007,818	
1809	- - -	- -	- - - - -	1,667,818	
1810	75.	=4	- - - - -	1,773,955	
1811	- - -	- -	- - - - -	2,360,621	
1812	85.71	=3½	- - - - -	2,873,954	
1813	- - -	- -	- - - - -	3,387,287	
1814	Par	=3	- - - - -	3,387,287	
1815	- - -	- - -	- - - - -	3,387,287	
1816	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 years.		- - - - -	3,740,909	
1817	- -	- -	275,836	4,180,909	
1818	- -	- -	As no taxes are required to be imposed in these years, the Total remains the same.	4,620,909	
1819			- - - -	5,060,909	
1820				5,203,362	
1821				5,643,362	
1822				6,083,362	
1823	- -	- -		6,523,362	
1824	- -	- -	- - - -	6,963,362	
1825	- -	- -	- - - -	7,403,362	
1826	- -	- -	- - - -	7,843,362	

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* This sum of eleven millions loan, added to twenty-one millions war taxes, would makeup the annual sum of thirty-two millions, the same expenditure for which it is proposed to provide by this plan.

TABLE L. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the three Tables, L, L. 2, and L. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table L.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table L. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table L. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.		2d SUPPOSITION.		3d SUPPOSITION.	
	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which will be imposed subsequently to 1807, according to the proposed Plan.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes, which will have been imposed, subsequently to 1807, according to the proposed Plan.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which will have been imposed subsequently to 1807, according to the proposed Plan.	Total Amount in any given Year, of Taxes which would have been imposed after 1807, if Loans were raised according to the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	Nil.	717,818	Nil.	717,818	Nil.	717,818
1808	Nil.	1,081,151	Nil.	1,044,478	Nil.	1,007,818
1809	Nil.	1,814,484	Nil.	1,741,138	Nil.	1,667,818
1810	293,000	2,547,817	230,000	2,401,154	Nil.	1,773,955
1811	586,000	3,281,150	460,000	3,061,170	Nil.	2,360,621
1812	879,000	4,014,483	690,000	3,684,521	Nil.	2,873,954
1813	1,172,000	4,747,816	920,000	4,307,872	Nil.	3,387,287
1814	1,465,000	5,481,149	1,150,000	4,414,009	Nil.	3,387,287
1815	1,758,000	6,214,482	1,380,000	5,000,675	Nil.	3,387,287
1816	2,051,000	6,947,815	1,610,000	5,587,341	Nil.	3,740,909
1817	- - - -	7,681,148	- - - -	6,174,007	275,836	4,180,909
1818	- - - -	8,414,481	- - - -	6,760,673	- - - -	4,620,909
1819	As no new Taxes are required to be imposed in these Years, the Total remains the same.	9,147,814	As no new Taxes are required to be imposed in these Years, the Total remains the same.	7,347,339	As no new Taxes are required to be imposed in these Years, the Total remains the same.	5,060,909
1820		9,583,600		7,636,458		5,203,362
1821		10,316,933		8,223,124		5,643,362
1822		11,050,266		8,809,790		6,083,362
1823		11,783,599		9,396,456		6,523,362
1824		12,516,932		9,983,122		6,963,362
1825	- - - -	13,250,265	- - - -	10,569,788	- - - -	7,403,362
1826	- - - -	13,983,598	- - - -	11,156,454	- - - -	7,843,362

TABLE M.

Shewing,—1st, The Effect which the Sinking Fund of £.1,000,000. per annum, established by the Act of 1786, and the annual Sum of £.200,000. added thereto, with the expired Annuities and Accumulations thereof, produced in the Redemption of the Public Debt, up to the Period of the Arrangement established by the Act of 1802.—2dly, The distinct Operation of the respective Sinking Funds of One per Cent. under the Act of 1792, on the nominal Capital of Debt, during the last War.—3dly, The Combined Operation of the different Sinking Funds of 1786 and 1792, from the Period of their being consolidated by the Act of 1802, to the first of November 1806.—And lastly, the distinct Operations of the several Sinking Funds of One per Cent. created for the Liquidation of the Debt incurred since the Commencement of the present War in 1803, and which are subject to the Conditions of the Act of 1792.

1st.

The Amount of the Nominal Capital of Debt existing before 1792, which was redeemed by the Operation of the Sinking Fund under the Act of 1786, was on the 1st February 1802,	£.39,885,308
The Total Amount of that Sinking Fund on the 1st February 1802, was,	2,534,187

2dly.

The Amount of the Nominal Capital of Debt created by all the Loans from the Year 1792 to the close of the last War in 1802, which was redeemed by the Operation of the Sinking Fund of One per Cent. under the Act of 1792, was, on the 1st May 1802,	£.20,738,431
The Total Amount of that Sinking Fund, on the 1st May 1802, was	2,462,103
The Total Amount of all these Sinking Funds, on the 1st August 1802, after their Consolidation, was	5,706,017

3dly.

The Amount of the Nominal Capital of Debt which was redeemed by these Consolidated Sinking Funds, between the 1st February 1802, and the 1st November 1806, was	£.48,374,566
The Amount to which the Consolidated Sinking Funds had arrived on the 1st November 1806, was	7,050,418

4thly.

The several Amounts of the respective Debts created by the Loans made since 1803, inclusive, which have been redeemed by their respective Sinking Funds of One per Cent. on the 1st November 1806, and the several Amounts of the said respective Sinking Funds at the same Period, are as follows, viz.

	Amounts of the Nominal Capital of Debt redeemed 1 Nov. 1806.		Amounts of Sinking Funds on 1 Nov. 1806
Loan of 1803	£.895,024		189,988
—— of 1804	633,202		200,996
—— of 1805	724,589		365,738
—— of 1806			298,800
	£.2,252,815		1,055,522
Add, on account of additional Capitals created by Sums subscribed from 5 per Cents. 1797, into 3 per Cents. in 1805 and 1806	107,350	Add Sinking Fund, on account of this additional Capital created	54,652
	£.2,360,165		£.1,110,174

TABLE N.

Shewing what would be the Amount of the whole PUBLIC DEBT at the Commencement of any given Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually, on the present System, for Twenty Years of War; the Amount of the Sinking Fund which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—Also, shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, raising the Supplies for Twenty Years of War according to the proposed Plan; the combined Amount of all the Sinking Funds which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—The Three per Cents. supposed in both Cases to be at 60.

	Present System.					Proposed Plan.				
1.	2.	3.	4.			5.	6.	7.		
YEAR.	DEBT which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System.	SINKING FUND which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt on the present System, supposing 3 per Cents. at 60.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND, Column 3, bears to the Debt, Column 2.			Combined Debts, viz. War Debt, Supplementary Debt and present Debt, which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Combined SINKING FUND which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt, supposing 3 per Cents. at 60.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND, Column 6, bears to the Debt, Column 5.		
			£.	s.	d.			£.	s.	d.
1807	363,793,722	8,515,042	2.34=2	6	9	364,993,722	8,935,042	2.44=2	8	9
1808	366,278,680	9,124,127	2.49=2	9	9	369,458,679	10,005,126	2.63=2	12	7
1809	368,154,553	9,763,666	2.65=2	13	0	374,053,553	11,148,714	2.98=2	19	7
1810	369,390,887	10,435,182	2.82=2	16	4	378,904,839	12,439,482	3.28=3	5	7
1811	369,955,705	11,140,274	3.01=3	0	2	384,065,357	13,888,120	3.61=3	12	2
1812	369,815,431	11,880,620	3.21=3	4	2	389,377,237	15,435,858	3.96=3	19	4
1813	368,934,811	12,657,984	3.43=3	8	7	394,741,379	17,087,649	4.32=4	6	4
1814	367,276,827	13,474,216	3.66=3	13	2	400,053,730	18,848,697	4.71=4	14	2
1815	364,802,611	14,331,259	3.92=3	18	4	405,205,033	20,724,463	5.11=5	2	2
1816	361,471,352	15,231,154	*a 4.21=4	4	2	410,080,570	22,720,685	*d 5.54=5	10	9
1817	357,240,198	16,176,044	4.52=4	10	4	414,559,885	24,096,718	5.81=5	16	2
1818	352,064,154	17,168,179	4.87=4	17	4	419,263,167	25,461,552	6.07=6	1	4
1819	345,895,975	18,209,920	5.26=5	5	2	424,201,615	26,814,628	6.32=6	6	4
1820	338,686,055	19,303,749	5.69=5	13	9	429,386,987	28,155,358	6.55=6	11	0
1821	330,382,306	20,452,269	6.19=6	3	9	433.231,629	27,963,124	6.45=6	9	0
1822	320,930,037	21,658,215	6.74=6	14	9	437,268,505	27,761,279	6.34=6	6	9
1823	310,271,822	22,924,458	7.38=7	7	7	441,507,226	27,549,341	6.23=6	4	7
1824	298,347,364	24,254,013	*b 8.12=8	2	4	445,957,885	27,326,807	*e 6.12=6	2	4
1825	285,093,351	25,650,046	8.99=8	19	9	450,631,078	27,093,146	6.01=6	0	2
1826	270,443,305	27,115,881	*c 10.02=10	0	4	455,537,932	26,901,360	*f 5.90=5	18	0

* *a* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 4 is - 3.17=3 3 5 pr Ct. (£. s. d.)

* *b* The average of 18 years of column 4 - - - - - - 3.91=3 18 2

* *c* The average of the whole 20 years of column 4 is - - 4.97=4 19 5

* *d* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 7 is - 3.85=3 17 0 pr Ct. (£. s. d.)

* *e* The average of 18 years of column 7, (in which time an amount of debt will have been redeemed by the proposed plan, equal to the whole amount of the present public debt) is - - - - 4.91=4 18 2

* *f* Average of the whole 20 years of column 7 is - - - 5.02=5 0 4

TABLE N. 2.

Shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System, for Twenty Years of War; the Amount of the Sinking Fund which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt. Also shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, raising the Supplies for Twenty Years of War according to the proposed Plan; the combined Amount of all the Sinking Funds which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—The Three per Cents. supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

Present System.						Proposed Plan.		
1.	2.		3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Year.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Debt which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System.	Sinking Fund which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt on the present System.	Proportion per Cent. which the Sinking Fund, Column 4, bears to the Debt, Column 3.	Combined Debts, viz. War Debt, Supplementary Debt, and present Debt, which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Combined Sinking Fund which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the Sinking Fund, Column 7, bears to the Debt, Column 6.
	£.		£.	£.	£. s. d	£.	£.	£. s. d.
1807	60.	=5	363,793,722	8,515,042	2.34=2 6 9	364,993,722	8,935,042	2.44=2 8 9
1808	63.16	=4¾	382,448,456	9,114,954	2.38=2 7 7	385,669,508	10,033,958	2.60=2 12 0
1809	- -	- -	384,333,502	9,722,074	2.52=2 10 4	390,235,550	11,181,735	2.86=2 17 4
1810	66.66	=4½	403,753,566	10,348,888	2.56=2 11 2	413,442,752	12,512,869	3.02=3 0 4
1811	- -	- -	404,404,678	10,979,603	2.71=2 14 2	418,529,883	13,979,949	3.34=3 6 9
1812	70.58	=4¼	424,741,083	11,629,536	2.73=2 14 7	444,720,344	15,574,383	3.50=3 10 0
1813	- -	- -	424,111,547	12,279,642	2.89=2 17 9	449,945,961	17,224,300	3.82=3 16 4
1814	75.	=4	445,568,090	12,948,192	2.90=2 18 0	479,163,455	19,001,664	3.96=3 19 2
1815	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 Years.		443,619,898	13,612,785	3.06=3 1 2	484,161,791	20,828,395	4.30=4 6 0
1816			441,007,113	14,303,962	*a3.24=3 4 9	488,933,396	22,749,529	*d4.65=4 13 0
1817			437,703,151	15,022,786	3.43=3 8 7	493,383,867	24,629,857	4.99=4 19 9
1818			433,680,365	15,770,363	3.63=3 12 7	497,554,010	26,063,050	5.23=5 4 7
1819			428,910,002	16,547,843	3.85=3 17 0	501,890,960	27,489,570	5.47=5 9 4
1820			423,362,159	17,356,422	4.09=4 1 9	506,401,390	28,909,151	5.70=5 14 0
1821			417,005,737	18,197,344	4.36=4 7 2	509,492,239	28,785,516	5.64=5 12 9
1822			409,808,393	19,071,903	4.65=4 13 0	512,706,723	28,656,935	5.58=5 11 7
1823			401,736,490	19,981,445	4.97=4 19 4	516,049,788	28,523,211	5.52=5 10 4
1824			392,755,045	20,927,368	*b5.32=5 6 4	519,526,577	28,384,137	*e5.46=5 9 2
1825			382,827,677	21,911,128	5.72=5 14 4	523,142,440	28,301,177	5.40=5 8 0
1826			371,916,549	22,934,239	*c6.16=6 3 2	526,841,263	28,282,707	*f5.36=5 7 2

	£. s. d.	
* *a* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 5 is - - -	2.73=2 14 7	per Ct.
* *b* The average of 18 years of column 5	3.42=3 8 4	per Ct.
* *c* The average of the whole 20 years of column 5 is - - - - - -	3.67=3 13 4	

	£. s. d.	
**d* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 8 is - -	2.98=2 19 7	per Ct.
**e* The average of 18 years of column 8 is	4.03=4 0 7	
**f* Average of the whole 20 yrs. of col. 8 is	4.17=4 3 4	

☞ The Note *a* to Table H. 2, will shew the manner of reducing the nominal capital of the present debt to a money capital.—And the other notes to that Table will shew the manner of increasing the existing debt upon every rise of the Funds.

TABLE N.

Shewing what would be the Amount of the whole PUBLIC DEBT at the Commencement of any given Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually, on the present System, for Twenty Years of War; the Amount of the Sinking Fund which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—Also, shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, raising the Supplies for Twenty Years of War according to the proposed Plan; the combined Amount of all the Sinking Funds which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—The Three per Cents. supposed in both Cases to be at 60.

	Present System.					Proposed Plan.				
1.	2.	3.	4.			5.	6.	7.		
YEAR.	DEBT which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System.	SINKING FUND which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt on the present System, supposing 3 per Cents. at 60.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND, Column 3, bears to the Debt, Column 2.			Combined Debts, viz. War Debt, Supplementary Debt and present Debt, which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Combined SINKING FUND which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt, supposing 3 per Cents. at 60.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND, Column 6, bears to the Debt, Column 5.		
			£.	s.	d.			£.	s.	d.
1807	363,793,722	8,515,042	2.34=2	6	9	364,993,722	8,935,042	2.44=2	8	9
1808	366,278,680	9,124,127	2.49=2	9	9	369,458,679	10,005,126	2.63=2	12	7
1809	368,154,553	9,763,666	2.65=2	13	0	374,053,553	11,148,714	2.98=2	19	7
1810	369,390,887	10,435,182	2.82=2	16	4	378,904,839	12,439,482	3.28=3	5	7
1811	369,955,705	11,140,274	3.01=3	0	2	384,065,357	13,888,120	3.61=3	12	2
1812	369,815,431	11,880,620	3.21=3	4	2	389,377,237	15,435,858	3.96=3	19	4
1813	368,934,811	12,657,984	3.43=3	8	7	394,741,379	17,087,649	4.32=4	6	4
1814	367,276,827	13,474,216	3.66=3	13	2	400,053,730	18,848,697	4.71=4	14	2
1815	364,802,611	14,331,259	3.92=3	18	4	405,205,033	20,724,463	5.11=5	2	2
1816	361,471,352	15,231,154	*a 4.21=4	4	2	410,080,570	22,720,685	*d 5.54=5	10	9
1817	357,240,198	16,176,044	4.52=4	10	4	414,559,885	24,096,718	5.81=5	16	2
1818	352,064,154	17,168,179	4.87=4	17	4	419,263,167	25,461,552	6.07=6	1	4
1819	345,895,975	18,209,920	5.26=5	5	2	424,201,615	26,814,628	6.32=6	6	4
1820	338,686,055	19,303,749	5.69=5	13	9	429,386,987	28,155,358	6.55=6	11	0
1821	330,382,306	20,452,269	6.19=6	3	9	433,231,629	27,963,124	6.45=6	9	0
1822	320,930,037	21,658,215	6.74=6	14	9	437,268,505	27,761,279	6.34=6	6	9
1823	310,271,822	22,924,458	7.38=7	7	7	441,507,226	27,549,341	6.23=6	4	7
1824	298,347,364	24,254,013	*b 8.12=8	2	4	445,957,885	27,326,807	*e 6.12=6	2	4
1825	285,093,351	25,650,046	8.99=8	19	9	450,631,078	27,093,146	6.01=6	0	2
1826	270,443,305	27,115,881	*c 10.02=10	0	4	455,537,932	26,901,360	*f 5.90=6	18	0

* *a* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 4 is - 3.17=3 3 5 pr Ct. (£. s. d.)

* *b* The average of 18 years of column 4 - - - - - - 3.91=3 18 2

* *c* The average of the whole 20 years of column 4 is - - 4.97=4 19 5

* *d* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 7 is - 3.85=3 17 0 pr Ct. (£. s. d.)

* *e* The average of 18 years of column 7, (in which time an amount of debt will have been redeemed by the proposed plan, equal to the whole amount of the present public debt) is - - - - 4.91=4 18 2

* *f* Average of the whole 20 years of column 7 is - - - 5.02=5 0 4

TABLE N. 2.

Shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System, for Twenty Years of War; the Amount of the Sinking Fund which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt. Also shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, raising the Supplies for Twenty Years of War according to the proposed Plan; the combined Amount of all the Sinking Funds which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt.—The Three per Cents. supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

	Present System.					Proposed Plan.		
1.	2.		3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Year.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Debt which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System.	Sinking Fund which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt on the present System.	Proportion per Cent. which the Sinking Fund, Column 4, bears to the Debt, Column 3.	Combined Debts, viz. War Debt, Supplementary Debt, and present Debt, which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Combined Sinking Fund which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the Sinking Fund, Column 7, bears to the Debt, Column 6.
	£.		£.	£.	£. s. d	£.	£.	£. s. d.
1807	60.	=5	363,793,722	8,515,042	2.34=2 6 9	364,993,722	8,935,042	2.44=2 8 9
1808	63.16	=4¾	382,448,456	9,114,954	2.38=2 7 7	385,669,508	10,033,958	2.60=2 12 0
1809	- -	- -	384,333,502	9,722,074	2.52=2 10 4	390,235,550	11,181,735	2.86=2 17 4
1810	66.66	=4½	403,753,566	10,348,888	2.56=2 11 2	413,442,752	12,512,869	3.02=3 0 4
1811	- -	- -	404,404,678	10,979,603	2.71=2 14 2	418,529,883	13,979,949	3.34=3 6 9
1812	70.58	=4¼	424,741,083	11,629,536	2.73=2 14 7	444,720,344	15,574,383	3.50=3 10 0
1813	- -	- -	424,111,547	12,279,642	2.89=2 17 9	449,945,961	17,224,300	3.82=3 16 4
1814	75.	=4	445,568,090	12,948,192	2.90=2 18 0	479,163,455	19,001,664	3.96=3 19 2
1815	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 Years.		443,619,898	13,612,785	3.06=3 1 2	484,161,791	20,828,395	4.30=4 6 0
1816			441,007,113	14,303,962	*a3.24=3 4 9	468,933,396	22,749,529	*d4.65=4 13 0
1817			437,703,151	15,022,786	3.43=3 8 7	493,383,867	24,629,857	4.99=4 19 9
1818			433,680,365	15,770,363	3.63=3 12 7	497,554,010	26,063,050	5.23=5 4 7
1819			428,910,002	16,547,843	3.85=3 17 0	501,890,960	27,489,570	5.47=5 9 4
1820			423,362,159	17,356,422	4.09=4 1 9	506,401,390	28,909,151	5.70=5 14 0
1821			417,005,737	18,197,344	4.36=4 7 2	509,492,239	28,785,516	5.64=5 12 9
1822			409,808,393	19,071,903	4.65=4 13 0	512,706,723	28,656,935	5.58=5 11 7
1823			401,736,490	19,981,445	4.97=4 19 4	516,049,788	28,523,211	5.52=5 10 4
1824			392,755,045	20,927,368	*b5.32=5 6 4	519,526,577	28,384,137	*e5.46=5 9 2
1825			382,827,677	21,911,128	5.72=5 14 4	523,142,440	28,301,177	5.40=5 8 0
1826			371,916,549	22,934,239	*c6.16=6 3 2	526,841,263	28,282,707	*f5.36=5 7 2

	£. s. d.	
* *a* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 5 is - - -	2.73=2 14 7	per Ct.
* *b* The average of 18 years of column 5	3.42=3 8 4	per Ct.
* *c* The average of the whole 20 years of column 5 is - - - - - -	3.67=3 13 4	
* *d* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 8 is - -	2.98=2 19 7	perCt.
* *e* The average of 18 years of column 8 is	4.03=4 0 7	
* *f* Average of the whole 20 yrs. of col. 8 is	4.17=4 3 4	

☞ The Note *a* to Table H. 2, will shew the manner of reducing the nominal capital of the present debt to a money capital.—And the other notes to that Table will shew the manner of increasing the existing debt upon every rise of the Funds.

TABLE N. 3.

Shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System, for Twenty Years of War; the Amount of the Sinking Fund which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt. Also shewing what would be the Amount of the whole Public Debt at the Commencement of any given Year, raising the Supplies for Twenty Years of War according to the proposed Plan; the combined Amount of all the Sinking Funds which would in that case be applicable to the Extinction of such Debt, and the Proportion per Cent. which that Sinking Fund would bear to that Debt. The Three per Cents. supposed to vary in the manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

			Present System.			Proposed Plan.		
1.	2.		3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	DEBT which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually on the present System.	SINKING FUND which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt on the present System.	Proportion per Cent. which the Sinking Fund, Column 4, bears to the Debt, Column 3,	Combined Debts, viz. War Debt, Supplementary Debt, and present Debt, which would exist at the Commencement of each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Combined SINKING FUND, which would be applicable in each Year to the Extinction of such Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND, Column 7, bears to the Debt, Column 6.
			£.	£.	£. s. d.	£.	£.	£. s. d.
1807	60.	=5	363,793,722	8,515,042	2.34=2 6 9	364,993,722	8,935,042	2.43=2 8 7
1808	66.66	=4½	405,754,088	9,105,794	2.24=2 4 9	403,681,539	10,063,795	2.49=2 9 9
1809	- -	- -	407,648,294	9,680,554	2.37=2 7 4	408,218,744	11,314,623	2.77=2 15 4
1810	75.	=4	458,713,707	10,262,844	2.23=2 4 7	456,510,519	12,690,446	2.77=2 15 4
1811	- -	- -	459,450,863	10,820,023	2.35=2 7 0	461,420,073	14,179,396	3.07=3 1 4
1812	85.71	=3½	523,720,960	11,381,156	2.17=2 3 4	516,780,685	15,823,905	3.06=3 1 2
1813	- -	- -	523,339,804	11,907,829	2.27=2 5 4	521,756,780	17,472,742	3.34=3 6 9
1814	Par	=3	607,658,970	12,434,603	2.04=2 0 9	594,921,274	19,268,286	3.23=3 4 7
1815	- -	- -	606,224,367	12,917,641	2.13=2 2 7	599,652,988	21,046,334	3.5 =3 10 0
1816	- -	- -	604,306,726	13,415,170	*a 2.22=2 4 4	604,206,654	22,893,723	*d 3.78=3 15 7
1817	- -	- -	601,891,556	13,927,625	2.31=2 6 2	608,512,931	24,812,533	4.07=4 1 4
1818	- -	- -	598,963,931	14,455,453	2.41=2 8 2	612,500,398	26,292,908	4.29=4 5 9
1819	- -	- -	595,508,478	14,999,116	2.51=2 10 2	616,607,490	27,769,694	4.5 =4 10 0
1820	- -	- -	591,509,362	15,559,089	2.63=2 12 7	620,837,796	29,242,784	4.71=4 14 2
1821	- -	- -	586,950,273	16,135,861	2.74=2 14 9	623,595,012	29,160,066	4.67=4 13 4
1822	- -	- -	581,814,412	16,729,936	2.87=2 17 4	626,434,946	29,074,866	4.64=4 12 9
1823	- -	- -	576,084,476	17,341,834	3.01=3 0 2	629,360,080	29,128,504	4.62=4 12 4
1824	- -	- -	569,742,642	17,972,089	*b 3.15=3 3 0	632,231,576	29,142,690	*e 4.6 =4 12 0
1825	- -	- -	562,770,553	18,621,251	3.3 =3 6 0	635,088,886	29,095,890	4.58=4 11 7
1826	- -	- -	555,149,302	19,289,888	*c 3.47=3 9 4	637,992,996	29,065,719	*f 4.55=4 11 0

	£. s. d.	
* *a* The average of the 1st series of 10 years of column 5 is - - - -	2.23=2 4 7	per Ct.
* *b* The average of 18 years of col. 5	2.44=2 8 9	per Ct.
* *c* The average of the whole 20 years of column 5 is - - - -	2.53=2 10 7	
* *d* The average of the 1st series of years of column 8 is - - - - - -	3.02=3 0 4	pr Ct.
* *e* The average of 18 years of column 8 is - - - -	3.68=3 13 7	
* *f* Average of the whole 20 years of column 8 is	3.77=3 15 4	

☞ The Note *a* to Table H. 2, will shew the manner of reducing the nominal capital of the present debt to a money capital:—And the other notes to that Table will shew the manner of increasing the existing debt upon every rise of the Funds.

TABLE N. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the Three Tables, N, N. 2, & N. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table N.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table N. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table N. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75, and so to continue for two Years, viz. 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71; and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.		2d SUPPOSITION.		3d SUPPOSITION.	
	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND on the present System, would bear to the Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the proposed SINKING FUND will bear to the Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND on the present System would bear to the Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the proposed SINKING FUND will bear to the Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the SINKING FUND on the present System, would bear to the Debt.	Proportion per Cent. which the proposed SINKING FUND will bear to the Debt.
	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.	£. s. d.
1807	2.34=2 6 9	2.44=2 8 9	2.34=2 6 9	2.44=2 8 9	2.34=2 6 9	2.43=2 8 7
1808	2.49=2 9 9	2.63=2 12 7	2.38=2 7 7	2.60=2 12 6	2.24=2 4 9	2.49=2 9 9
1809	2.65=2 13 0	2.98=2 19 7	2.52=2 10 4	2.86=2 17 4	2.37=2 7 4	2.77=2 15 4
1810	2.82=2 16 4	3.28=3 5 7	2.56=2 11 2	3.02=3 0 4	2.23=2 4 7	2.77=2 15 4
1811	3.01=3 0 2	3.61=3 12 2	2.71=2 14 2	3.34=3 6 9	2.35=2 7 0	3.07=3 1 4
1812	3.21=3 4 2	3.96=3 19 4	2.73=2 14 7	3.50=3 10 0	2.17=2 3 4	3.06=3 1 2
1813	3.43=3 8 7	4.32=4 6 4	2.89=2 17 9	3.82=3 16 4	2.27=2 5 4	3.34=3 6 9
1814	3.66=3 13 2	4.71=4 14 2	2.90=2 18 0	3.96=3 19 2	2.04=2 0 9	3.23=3 4 7
1815	3.92=3 18 4	5.11=5 2 2	3.06=3 1 2	4.30=4 6 0	2.13=2 2 7	3.5 =3 10 0
1816	4.21=4 4 2	5.54=5 10 9	3.24=3 4 9	4.65=4 13 0	2.22=2 4 4	3.78=3 15 7
1817	4.52=4 10 4	5.81=5 16 2	3.43=3 8 7	4.99=4 19 9	2.31=2 6 2	4.07=4 1 4
1818	4.87=4 17 4	6.07=6 1 4	3.63=3 12 7	5.23=5 4 7	2.41=2 8 2	4.29=4 5 9
1819	5.26=5 5 2	6.32=6 6 4	3.85=3 17 0	5.47=5 9 4	2.51=2 10 2	4.5 =4 10 0
1820	5.69=5 13 9	6.55=6 11 0	4.09=4 1 9	5.70=5 14 0	2.63=2 12 7	4.71=4 14 2
1821	6.19=6 3 9	6.45=6 9 0	4.36=4 7 2	5.64=5 12 9	2.74=2 14 9	4.67=4 13 4
1822	6.74=6 14 9	6.34=6 6 9	4.65=4 13 0	5.58=5 11 7	2.87=2 17 4	4.64=4 12 9
1823	7.38=7 7 7	6.23=6 4 7	4.97=4 19 4	5.52=5 10 4	3.01=3 0 2	4.62=4 12 4
1824	8.12=8 2 4	6.12=6 2 4	5.32=5 6 4	5.46=5 9 2	3.15=3 3 0	4.6 =4 12 0
1825	8.99=8 19 9	6.01=6 0 2	5.72=5 14 4	5.40=5 8 0	3.3 =3 6 0	4.58=4 11 7
1826	10.02=10 0 4	5.90=6 18 0	6.16=6 3 2	5.36=5 7 2	3.47=3 9 4	4.55=4 11 0

TABLE O.

Shewing, The Total Amount of Money Capital of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods of the Continuance of War for Twenty Years, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually according to the present System, the Three per Cents. being supposed to continue at 60. And also, the Total Amount of Money Capital of Debt, which will have been redeemed at the corresponding Periods, and in the same Suppositions, according to the proposed Plan.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which would have been redeemed in each Year, according to the present System.	Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which will be redeemed in each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Total Amount of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	Larger Amounts of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods by the proposed Plan, than by the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	8,515,042	8,935,042	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000
1808	9,124,127	10,005,126	17,639,169	18,940,168	1,300,999
1809	9,763,666	11,148,714	27,402,835	30,088,882	2,686,047
1810	10,435,182	12,439,482	37,838,017	42,528,364	4,690,347
1811	11,140,274	13,888,120	48,978,291	56,416,484	7,438,193
1812	11,880,620	15,435,858	60,858,911	71,852,342	10,993,431
1813	12,657,984	17,087,649	73,516,895	88,939,991	15,423,096
1814	13,474,216	18,848,697	86,991,111	107,788,688	20,797,577
1815	14,331,259	20,724,463	101,322,370	128,513,151	27,190,781
1816	15,231,154	22,720,685	116,553,524	151,233,836	34,680,312
1817	16,176,044	24,096,718	132,729,568	175,330,554	42,600,986
1818	17,168,179	25,461,552	149,897,747	200,792,106	50,894,359
1819	18,209,920	26,814,628	168,107,667	227,606,734	59,499,067
1820	19,303,749	28,155,358	187,411,416	255,762,092	68,350,676
1821	20,452,269	27,963,124	207,863,685	283,725,216	75,861,531
1822	21,658,215	27,761,279	229,521,900	311,486,495	81,964,595
1823	22,924,458	27,549,341	252,446,358	339,035,836	86,589,478
1824	24,254,013	27,326,807	276,700,371	*366,362,643	89,662,272
1825	25,650,046	27,093,146	302,350,417	393,455,789	91,105,372
1826	27,115,881	26,901,360	*329,466,298	420,357,149	90,890,851

* The amount of the money capital of the present debt, calculating the Three per Cents. at 60, is 352,793,722*l.* (See Table H.)—It appears, from Columns 4 and 5 of this Table, that, supposing the stocks to continue at that price, an amount equal to the present debt would be redeemed by the proposed plan in 1824; whereas, according to the present system, such an amount would not have been redeemed till the year 1827.

TABLE O. 2.

Shewing, The Total Amount of MONEY CAPITAL of DEBT, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods of the Continuance of War for Twenty Years, if Eleven Millions were borrowed annually according to the present System. The Three per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for 2 Years (1808 and 1809): then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. 1810 and 1811): then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years. And also, the Total Amount of Money Capital of Debt, which will have been redeemed at the corresponding Periods, and on the same Suppositions, according to the proposed Plan.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which would have been redeemed in each Year, according to the present System.	Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which will be redeemed in each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	Total Amount of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	Larger Amounts of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods by the proposed Plan, than by the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	8,515,042	8,935,042	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000
1808	9,114,954	10,033,958	17,629,996	18,969,000	1,339,004
1809	9,722,074	11,181,735	27,352,070	30,150,735	2,798,665
1810	10,348,888	12,512,869	37,700,958	42,663,604	4,962,646
1811	10,979,603	13,979,949	48,680,561	56,643,553	7,962,992
1812	11,629,536	15,574,383	60,310,097	72,217,936	11,907,839
1813	12,279,642	17,224,300	72,589,739	89,442,236	16,852,497
1814	12,948,192	19,001,664	85,537,931	108,443,900	22,905,969
1815	13,612,785	20,828,395	99,150,716	129,272,295	30,121,579
1816	14,303,962	22,749,529	113,454,678	152,021,824	38,567,146
1817	15,022,786	24,629,857	128,477,464	176,651,681	48,174,217
1818	15,770,363	26,063,050	144,247,827	202,714,731	58,466,904
1819	16,547,843	27,489,570	160,795,670	230,204,301	69,403,631
1820	17,356,422	28,909,151	178,152,092	259,113,452	80,961,360
1821	18,197,344	28,785,516	196,349,436	287,898,968	91,549,532
1822	19,071,903	28,656,935	215,421,339	316,555,903	101,134,564
1823	19,981,445	28,523,211	235,402,784	345,079,114	109,676,330
1824	20,927,368	28,384,137	256,330,152	373,463,251	117,133,099
1825	21,911,128	28,301,177	278,241,280	401,764,428	123,523,148
1826	22,934,239	28,282,707	301,175,519	430,047,135	128,871,616

TABLE O. 3.

Shewing the Total Amount of MONEY CAPITAL of DEBT which would have been redeemed at any given periods of the Continuance of War for Twenty Years, if 11 Millions were borrowed annually according to the present System. The Three per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for 2 Years (1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years: And also the Total Amount of Money Capital of Debt which will have been redeemed at the corresponding Periods, and on the same Suppositions according to the proposed Plan.

1. YEAR.	2. Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which would have been redeemed in each Year, according to the present System.	3. Amount of the Money Capital of Debt, which will be redeemed in each Year, according to the proposed Plan.	4. Total Amount of Debt which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	5. Total Amount of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	6. Larger Amounts of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, by the proposed Plan, than by the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807 - -	8,515,042	8,935,042	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000
1808 - -	9,105,794	10,063,795	17,620,836	18,998,837	1,378,001
1809 - -	9,680,554	11,314,623	27,301,390	30,313,460	3,012,070
1810 - -	10,262,844	12,690,446	37,564,234	43,003,906	5,439,672
1811 - -	10,820,023	14,179,396	48,384,257	57,183,302	8,799,045
1812 - -	11,381,156	15,823,905	59,765,413	73,007,207	13,241,794
1813 - -	11,907,829	17,472,742	71,673,242	90,479,949	18,806,707
1814 - -	12,434,603	19,268,286	84,107,845	109,748,235	25,640,390
1815 - -	12,917,641	21,046,334	97,025,486	130,794,569	33,769,083
1816 - -	13,415,170	22,893,723	110,440,656	153,688,292	43,247,636
1817 - -	13,927,625	24,812,533	124,368,281	178,500,825	54,132,544
1818 - -	14,455,453	26,292,908	138,823,734	204,793,733	65,969,999
1819 - -	14,999,116	27,769,694	153,822,850	232,563,427	78,740,577
1820 - -	15,559,089	29,242,784	169,381,939	261,806,211	92,424,272
1821 - -	16,135,861	29,160,066	185,517,800	290,966,277	105,448,477
1822 - -	16,729,936	29,074,866	202,247,736	320,041,143	117,793,407
1823 - -	17,341,834	29,128,504	219,589,570	349,169,647	129,580,077
1824 - -	17,972,089	29,142,690	237,561,659	378,312,337	140,750,678
1825 - -	18,621,251	29,095,890	256,182,910	407,408,227	151,225,317
1826 - -	19,289,888	29,065,719	275,472,098	436,473,946	161,001,148

TABLE O. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the Three Tables, O, O. 2, & O. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table O.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table O. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table O. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years (viz. 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75, and so to continue for two Years (viz. 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71; and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then, (viz. in 1814), to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.			2d SUPPOSITION.			3d SUPPOSITION.		
	Total Amount of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	Larger Amounts of Debt which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods by the proposed Plan, than by the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	Total Amount of Debt which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	Larger Amounts of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods by the proposed Plan than by the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which would have been redeemed at any given Periods, according to the present System.	Total Amount of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods, according to the proposed Plan.	Larger Amounts of Debt, which will have been redeemed at corresponding Periods by the proposed Plan than by the present System.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000	8,515,042	8,935,042	420,000
1808	17,639,169	18,940,168	1,300,999	17,629,996	18,969,000	1,339,004	17,620,836	18,998,837	1,378,001
1809	27,402,835	30,088,882	2,686,047	27,352,070	30,150,735	2,798,665	27,301,390	30,313,460	3,012,070
1810	37,838,017	42,528,364	4,690,347	37,700,958	42,663,604	4,962,646	37,564,254	43,003,906	5,439,672
1811	48,978,291	56,416,484	7,438,193	48,680,561	56,643,553	7,962,992	48,384,257	57,183,302	8,799,045
1812	60,858,911	71,852,342	10,993,431	60,310,097	72,217,936	11,907,839	59,765,413	73,007,207	13,241,794
1813	73,516,895	88,939,991	15,423,096	72,589,739	89,442,236	16,852,497	71,673,242	90,479,949	18,806,707
1814	86,991,111	107,788,688	20,797,577	85,537,931	108,443,900	22,905,969	84,107,845	109,748,235	25,640,390
1815	101,322,370	128,513,151	27,190,781	99,150,716	129,272,295	30,121,579	97,025,486	130,794,569	33,769,083
1816	116,553,524	151,233,836	34,680,312	113,454,678	152,021,824	38,567,146	110,440,656	153,688,292	43,247,636
1817	132,729,568	175,330,554	42,600,986	128,477,464	176,651,681	48,174,217	124,368,281	178,500,825	54,132,544
1818	149,897,747	200,792,106	50,894,359	144,247,827	202,714,731	58,466,904	138,823,734	204,793,733	65,969,999
1819	168,107,667	227,606,734	59,499,067	160,795,670	230,204,301	69,408,631	153,822,850	232,563,427	78,740,577
1820	187,411,416	255,762,092	68,350,676	178,152,092	259,113,452	80,961,360	169,381,939	261,806,211	92,424,272
1821	207,863,685	283,725,216	75,861,531	196,349,436	287,898,968	91,549,532	185,517,800	290,966,277	105,448,477
1822	229,521,900	311,486,495	81,964,595	215,421,339	316,555,903	101,134,564	202,247,736	320,041,143	117,793,407
1823	252,446,358	339,035,836	86,589,478	235,402,784	345,079,114	109,676,330	219,589,570	349,169,647	129,580,077
1824	276,700,371	366,362,643	89,662,272	256,330,152	373,463,251	117,133,099	237,561,659	378,312,337	140,750,678
1825	302,350,417	393,455,789	91,105,372	278,241,280	461,764,428	123,523,148	256,182,910	407,408,227	151,225,317
1826	329,466,298	420,357,149	90,890,851	301,175,519	430,047,135	128,871,616	275,472,798	436,473,946	161,001,148

TABLE P.

Shewing the PERIODS at which an Amount equal to all future Loans to be raised according to the proposed Plan, during the continuance of War for 20 Years, would be redeemed, on various Suppositions of the Prices of The 3 per Cent. Stocks; and according to two different Modes of Application of the Sinking Fund at the end of those 20 Years.

The Sinking Fund of the War Debt and of the present Debt are supposed to be consolidated at the end of 20 Years; and the Excesses of the combined Sinking Funds (see Tables F. & H.) above the Interest of the Combined Debts, are supposed to be placed at the Disposal of Parliament; and the residue of the combined Sinking Fund [Column 2.] to be applied thenceforth in the Redemption of the Combined Debt [Column 1.]; and the Sinking Fund of the Supplementary Debt [Column 4.] to be thenceforth applied in the Redemption of that Debt [Column 3.]

SUPPOSITIONS OF THE PRICES OF 3 PER CENT. STOCKS.	[COLUMN 1.] The combined Amount of the Money Capital of the War Debt, and the present Debt which will remain unredeemed at the Close of the Year 1826.	[COLUMN 2.] Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Combined Debt [Col. 1.] after deducting the Excess above the Interest of those Debts.	[COLUMN 3.] Amount of the Money Capital of the Supplementary Debt, which will remain unredeemed at the Close of the Year 1826.	[COLUMN 4.] Amount of the Sinking Fund of the Debt, [Col. 3.] at the Close of the Year 1826.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
—1st.— Three Per Cents. supposed to be at 60 at the close of the Year 1826, and so to continue	253,442,093	12,672,104	175,194,479	4,853,593
—2d.— Three Per Cents. supposed to be at 60 at the close of the Year 1826, and then to rise to, and continue at, 75	304,789,383	12,672,104	218,993,098	4,853,593
—3d.— Three Per Cents. supposed to be at 60 at the Close of the Year 1826, and then to rise to, and continue at, Par.	359,163,078	12,672,104	291,990,798	4,853,593

	1st Supposition. 3 Per Cents, 60.	2d Supposition. 3 Per Cents, 75.	3d Supposition. 3 Per Cents, Par.	
FIRST.—Application of The Sinking Fund accumulating at *Compound Interest.*				
The Combined Sinking Fund [Col. 2.] will, at Compound Interest, redeem the Combined Debt [Col. 1.] in . .	14 Years	18 Years	24 Years	from the Year 1826.
The Sinking Fund [Col. 4.] of the Supplementary Debt [Col. 3.] will, at *Compound Interest*, redeem that Debt in	21 Years	27 Years	35 Years	
Therefore,				
The Excesses of the combined Sinking Fund, [Col. 2.] might be applied to the public Service for	31 Years (or till 1857)	27 Years (or till 1853)	21 Years (or in 1837)	from 1826; and still the whole Debt [Col. 1.] would be redeemed in 45 years from that period.
And the Excesses of the Supplementary Sinking Fund, [Col. 4.] which will arise in	7 Years (or in 1833)	9 Years (or in 1835)	11 Years (or till 1837)	from 1826;— . . . . might
might be applied to the public Service for	24 Years (or till 1857)	18 Years (or till 1853)	10 Years (or till 1847)	from the said respective Periods in which they will arise; and still the whole Debt [Col. 3.] would be redeemed in 45 years from 1826.
SECONDLY:—Application of The Sinking Fund, NOT at *Compound Interest.*				
The Combined Sinking Fund, [Col. 2.] if applied *not* at *Compound Interest*, but merely in the *purchase of an equal Amount of Debt* in each Year, would redeem the whole of the Debt [Col. 1.] in	20 Years.	24 Years	28 Years	from 1826: Therefore, an amount of Taxes equal to the interest of the Sums redeemed by this Sinking Fund, might be annually set free throughout the whole of those periods.
The Sinking Fund [Col. 4.] of the Supplementary Debt, [Col. 3.] applied in the same manner would redeem that Debt in	36 Years	45 Years	*60 Years	from 1826: And an amount of Taxes equal to the Interest of the Sums redeemed by this Sinking Fund, might, under the 1st and 2d Suppositions, be annually set free throughout the whole of those periods.
Or, Both Sinking Funds [Col. 2 and 4,] might be applied in the Redemption of Debt at *Compound Interest* . . . . for	25 Years (or till 1851)	20 Years (or till 1846)	12 Years (or till 1838)	from 1826: And the Excesses of the Sinking Fund [Col. 2.] above the Interest, might be taken in each Year of those Periods; and the Excesses of the Sinking Fund, [Col. 4.] might be taken in each year of those Periods after such last mentioned Excesses shall arise:—*And* . . . .
Then, Both Sinking Funds might be applied merely in the purchase of an equal Amount of Debt in each Year, and still the whole of the Debts [Col. 1. and 3.] would be redeemed in 45 Years from 1826; and during the last	20 Years	25 Years	33 Years	of those 45 Years, an Amount of Taxes equal to the Interest of the Debt redeemed in each year, might be annually set free.

* *Note.*—Supposing The 3 Per Cents. to be at Par, it will be obvious that this 2d Mode of Application of the Sinking Fund [Col. 4.] would not be in conformity to the Principle of Redemption within 45 Years, established by the Acts of 1792 and 1802; and therefore could not be adopted in that Supposition of the Price of the 3 Per Cents.

TABLE Q *.

Shewing the Amount of WAR TAXES that may be released at the end of any given Year, after the Year 1815, (supposing Peace to take place in any such Year,) by the Application of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund alone, added to what will fall in by the Operation of the revolving Series of Fourteen Years: the 3 per Cents. supposed to continue at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
YEAR, Commencing	Amount of War Taxes which will have been pledged in the previous Years of War.	Amount of War Taxes which will be released in any given Year of Peace, by the Extinction of the Debt created by the Loan of the 14th preceding Year.	Total Excesses of the present Sinking Fund, which may in any given Year of Peace be applied to the Release of the War Taxes.	Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund), in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.
	£.	£.	£.	£.
5 January, 1807 . .	1,200,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	19,800,000
5 January, 1808 . .	2,400,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	18,600,000
5 January, 1809 . .	3,600,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	17,400,000
5 January, 1810 . .	5,000,000	. . .	. . . . . .	16,000,000
5 January, 1811 . .	6,600,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	14,400,000
5 January, 1812 . .	8,200,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	12,800,000
5 January, 1813 . .	9,800,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	11,200,000
5 January, 1814 . .	11,400,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	9,600,000
5 January, 1815 . .	13,000,000	. . . .	. . . . . .	8,000,000
5 January, 1816 . .	14,600,000	. . . .	1,171,551	7,571,551
5 January, 1817 . .	16,200,000	. . . .	1,707,366	6,507,366
5 January, 1818 . .	17,800,000	. . . .	2,115,303	5,315,303
5 January, 1819 . .	19,400,000	. . . . .	2,383,637	3,983,637
5 January, 1820 . .	21,000,000	1,200,000	2,500,056	3,700,056
5 January, 1821 . .	21,000,000	1,200,000	2,275,628	3,475,628
5 January, 1822 . .	21,000,000	1,200,000	1,973,312	3,173,312
5 January, 1823 . .	21,000,000	1,400,000	1,589,213	2,989,213
5 January, 1824 . .	21,000,000	1,600,000	1,265,909	2,865,909
5 January, 1825 . .	21,000,000	1,600,000	1,013,108	2,613,108
5 January, 1826 . .	21,000,000	1,600,000	753,247	2,353,247

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* Note—In this Table, no credit is taken for the annuities which will expire in 1808, and in 1820.

TABLE Q. 2.*

Shewing the Amount of WAR TAXES that may be released at the end of any given Year, after the Year 1815, (supposing Peace to take place in any such Year,) by the Application of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund alone, added to what will fall in by the Operation of the revolving Series of Fourteen Years: the 3 per Cents. supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
YEAR.	Amount of War Taxes which will have been pledged in the previous Years of War.	Amount of War Taxes which will be released, in any given Year of Peace, by the Extinction of the Debt created by the Loan of the 14th preceding Year.	Total Excesses of the present Sinking Fund which may, in any given Year of Peace, be applied to the Release of the War Taxes.	Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund) in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1807	1,200,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	19,800,000	
1808	2,400,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	18,600,000	
1809	3,600,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	17,400,000	
1810	5,000,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	16,000,000	
1811	6,600,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	14,400,000	
1812	8,200,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	12,800,000	
1813	9,800,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	11,200,000	
1814	11,400,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	9,600,000	
1815	13,000,000	. . . . .	. . . . .	8,000,000	
1816	14,600,000	. . . . .	138,984	6,538,984	
1817	16,200,000	. . . . .	1,014,075	5,814,075	
1818	17,800,000	. . . . .	1,331,433	4,531,433	
1819	19,400,000	. . . . .	1,542,018	3,142,018	
1820	21,000,000	1,200,000	1,638,147	2,838,147	
1821	21,000,000	1,200,000	1,473,588	2,673,588	
1822	21,000,000	1,200,000	1,259,780	2,459,780	
1823	21,000,000	1,400,000	994,753	2,394,753	
1824	21,000,000	1,600,000	791,657	2,391,657	
1825	21,000,000	1,600,000	723,849	2,323,849	
1826	21,000,000	1,600,000	694,894	2,294,894	

* Note—In this Table, no credit is taken for the annuities which will expire in 1808, and in 1820; nor for the sum which would arise from the reduction of the 5 per Cent. to a 4 per Cent. Fund.

TABLE Q. 3.*

Shewing the Amount of War Taxes that may be released at the end of any given Year, after the Year 1815, (supposing Peace to take place in any such Year,) by the Application of the Excesses of the present Sinking Fund alone, added to what will fall in by the Operation of the revolving Series of Fourteen Years. The 3 per Cents. supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 66.66. and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for 2 Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the Period of 20 Years.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
Year.	Amount of War Taxes which will have been pledged in the previous Years of War.	Amount of War Taxes which will be released, in any given Year of Peace, by the Extinction of the Debt created by the Loan of the 14th preceding Year.	Total Excesses of the present Sinking Fund, which may, in any given Year of Peace, be applied to the Release of the War Taxes.	Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund), in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.	
	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1807 -	1,200,000	- - - - -	- - - -	19,800,000	
1808 -	2,400,000	- - - - -	- - - -	18,600,000	
1809 -	3,600,000	- - - - -	- - - -	17,400,000	
1810 -	5,000,000	- - - - -	- - - -	16,000,000	
1811 -	6,600,000	- - - - -	- - - -	14,400,000	
1812 -	8,200,000	- - - - -	- - - -	12,800,000	
1813 -	9,800,000	- - - - -	- - - -	11,200,000	
1814 -	11,400,000	- - - - -	- - - -	9,600,000	
1815 -	13,000,000	- - - - -	- - - -	8,000,000	
1816 -	14,600,000	- - - - -	- - - -	6,400,000	
1817 -	16,200,000	- - - - -	546,506	5,346,506	
1818 -	17,800,000	- - - - -	759,449	3,959,449	
1819 -	19,400,000	- - - - -	895,579	2,495,579	
1820 -	21,000,000	1,200,000	950,674	2,150,674	
1821 -	21,000,000	1,200,000	818,621	2,018,621	
1822 -	21,000,000	1,200,000	658,607	1,858,607	
1823 -	21,000,000	1,400,000	619,668	2,019,668	
1824 -	21,000,000	1,600,000	601,079	2,201,079	
1825 -	21,000,000	1,600,000	583,046	2,183,046	
1826 -	21,000,000	1,600,000	565,555	2,165,555	

* Note—In this Table, no credit is taken for the annuities which will expire in 1808 and in 1820; nor for the sums which would arise from the reduction of the 5 to a 4 per Cent. Fund, and afterwards of the 4 to a 3 per Cent. Fund.

TABLE Q. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the three Tables, Q, Q. 2, & Q. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table Q.

The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table Q. 2.

The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, (viz. 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to 75, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table Q. 3.

The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1808 and 1809); then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1810 and 1811); then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years (viz. during 1812 and 1813); and then (viz. in 1814) to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION. Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund) in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.	2d SUPPOSITION. Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund) in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.	3d SUPPOSITION. Total Amount of the War Taxes which may be repealed (both by the Extinction of Debt, and by the Application of the Excesses of the Sinking Fund) in any given Year, if Peace shall then take place.
	£.	£.	£.
1807	19,800,000	19,800,000	19,800,000
1808	18,600,000	18,600,000	18,600,000
1809	17,400,000	17,400,000	17,400,000
1810	16,000,000	16,000,000	16,000,000
1811	14,400,000	14,400,000	14,400,000
1812	12,800,000	12,800,000	12,800,000
1813	11,200,000	11,200,000	11,200,000
1814	9,600,000	9,600,000	9,600,000
1815	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000
1816	7,571,551	6,538,984	6.400,000
1817	6,507,366	5,814,075	5,346,506
1818	5,315,303	4,531,433	3,959,449
1819	3,983,637	3,142,018	2,495,579
1820	3,700,056	2,838,147	2,150,674
1821	3,475,628	2,673,588	2,018,621
1822	3,173,312	2,459,780	1,858,607
1823	2,989,213	2,394,753	2,019,668
1824	2,865,909	2,391,657	2,201,079
1825	2,613,108	2,323,849	2,183,046
1826	2,353,247	2,294,894	2,165,555

TABLE R.

Shewing, the Amount of WAR TAXES which would be released at the End of any given Year, when Peace might take place, if the Principle of rendering disposable the Excess of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Debt were applied, on the return of Peace, to the Debt charged on the War Taxes, as well as to the present Debt; and, in that Event, shewing how much of the Property Tax would remain pledged at the End of any given Year; supposing the other War Taxes, exclusive of the Property Tax, to produce £.9,500,000 per Annum, and the Property Tax to produce £.11,500,000, so as to complete the £.21,000,000.——*3* per Cents. supposed at 60.

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
YEAR.	Excess of Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Debt charged on the War Taxes.	Total Excess of the present Sinking Fund which might, in any given year of Peace, be applied to the Release of the War Taxes.	Total Excess of both Sinking Funds, above the Interest of both Debts.	War Taxes, which would remain pledged after deducting the Excesses.	War Taxes, which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax, taken at £.11,500,000 which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.
	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	£.
1807	60,000	- - -	60,000	1,140,000	19,860,000	Nil.
1808	183,000	- - -	183,000	2,217,000	18,783,000	Nil.
1809	372,150	- - -	372,150	3,227,850	17,772,150	Nil.
1810	640,757	- - -	640,757	4,359,243	16,640,757	Nil.
1811	1,002,794	- - -	1,002,794	5,597,206	15,402,794	Nil.
1812	1,462,933	- - -	1,462,933	6,737,067	14,262,933	Nil.
1813	2,026,079	- - -	2,026,079	7,773,921	13,226,079	Nil.
1814	2,697,382	- - -	2,697,382	8,702,618	12,297,382	Nil.
1815	3,482,251	- - -	3,482,251	9,517,749	11,482,251	Nil.
1816	4,386,363	1,171,551	5,557,914	9,042,086	11,957,914	Nil.
1817	5,415,680	1,707,366	7,123,046	9,076,954	11,923,046	Nil.
1818	6,576,462	2,115,303	8,691,765	9,108,235	11,891,765	Nil.
1819	7,875,285	2,383,637	10,258,922	9,141,078	11,858,922	Nil.
1820	9,319,048	2,500,056	11,819,104	9,180,896	11,819,104	Nil.
1821	9,575,000	2,275,628	11,850,628	9,149,372	11,850,628	Nil.
1822	9,843,749	1,973,312	11,817,061	9,182,939	11,817,068	Nil.
1823	10,125,935	1,589,213	11,715,148	9,284,852	11,715,148	Nil.
1824	10,212,231	1,265,909	11,478,140	9,521,860	11,478,140	21,860
1825	10,092,842	1,013,108	11,105,950	9,894,050	11,105,950	*394,050
1826	9,967,483	753,247	10,720,730	10,279,270	10,720,730	779,270

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* Note.—In this Table, no credit is taken for the Annuities which will expire in 1820; and which would come in aid of this sum.—See note to Table C.

TABLE R. 2.

Shewing, The Amount of War Taxes which would be released at the End of any given Year, when Peace might take place; if the Principle of rendering disposable the Excess of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Debt were applied, on the return of Peace, to the Debt charged on the War Taxes, as well as to the present Debt: And, in that Event, shewing how much of the Property Tax would remain pledged at the End of any given Year; supposing the other War Taxes, exclusive of the Property Tax, to produce £.9,500,000 per Annum, and the Property Tax to produce £.11,500,000, so as to complete the £.21,000,000.——3 Per-Cents. supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

1.	2.		3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
Year.	Price of 3 Per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Excess of Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Debt charged on the War Taxes.	Total Excess of the present Sinking Fund which might, in any given year of Peace, be applied to the release of the War Taxes.	Total Excess of both Sinking Funds above the Interest of both Debts.	War Taxes which would remain pledged after deducting the Excesses.	War Taxes, which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax taken at £.11,500,000 which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.
	£.		£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1807	60.	=5	60,000	- - -	60,000	1,140,000	19,860,000	Nil.
1808	63.16	=4¾	239,700	- - -	239,700	2,160,300	18,839,700	Nil.
1809	- -	- -	484,936	- - -	484,936	3,115,064	17,884,936	Nil.
1810	66.66	=4½	878,057	- - -	878,057	4,121,943	16,878,057	Nil.
1811	- -	- -	1,381,770	- - -	1,381,770	5,218,230	15,781,770	Nil.
1812	70.58	=4½	2,039,194	- - -	2,039,194	6,160,806	14,839,194	Nil.
1813	- -	- -	2,792,559	- - -	2,792,559	7,007,441	12,992,559	Nil.
1814	75.	=4	3,693,061	- - -	3,693,061	7,706,939	13,293,061	Nil.
1815	- - - -		4,693,583	- - -	4,693,583	8,306,417	12,693,583	Nil.
1816	- - -		5,798,126	138,984	5,937,110	8,662,890	12,337,110	Nil.
1817	- - - -		7,010,850	1,014,075	8,024,925	8,175,075	12,824,925	Nil.
1818	And to continue at that rate throughout the rest of this period of 20 years.		8,336,083	1,331,433	9,667,516	8,132,484	12,867,516	Nil.
1819			9,778,326	1,542,018	11,320,344	8,079,656	12,920,344	Nil.
1820			11,342,258	1,638,147	12,980,405	8,019,595	12,980,405	Nil.
1821			11,637,548	1,473,588	13,111,136	7,888,864	13,111,136	Nil.
1822			11,944,649	1,259,780	13,204,429	7,795,571	13,204,429	Nil.
1823			12,264,034	994,753	13,258,787	7,741,213	13,258,787	Nil.
1824	- - - -		12,429,795	791,657	13,221,452	7,778,548	13,221,452	Nil.
1825	- - - -		12,435,785	723,849	13,159,634	7,840,366	13,159,634	Nil.
1826	- - - -		12,442,016	694,894	13,136,910	7,863,090	13,136,910	Nil.

* Note.—In this Table, no credit is taken for the Annuities which will expire in 1808 and in 820; nor for the sum which would arise from the reduction of the 5 to a 4 per-cent. fun

TABLE R. 3.

Shewing, the Amount of WAR TAXES which would be released at the End of any given Year, when Peace might take place; if the Principle, of rendering disposable the Excess of the Sinking Fund above the Interest of the Debt, were applied, on the Return of Peace, to the Debt charged on the War Taxes, as well as to the present Debt: And, in that Event, shewing how much of the Property Tax would remain pledged at the End of any given Year; supposing the other War Taxes, exclusive of the Property Tax, to produce £.9,500,000 per Annum, and the Property Tax to produce £.11,500,000, so as to complete the £.21,000,000.——3 Per-Cents. supposed to vary in the Manner stated in Column 2 of this Table.

YEAR.	Price of 3 per Cent. Stock.	Rate of Interest per Cent.	Excess of SINKING FUND, above the Interest of the Debt charged on the War Taxes.	Total Excess of the present SINKING FUND, which might, in any given Year of Peace, be applied to the release of the War Taxes.	Total Excess of both SINKING FUNDS above the Interest of both Debts.	War Taxes which would remain pledged after deducting the Excesses.	War Taxes which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax, taken at 11,500,000*l.* which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.
			£.	£.	£.	£.	£.	
1807	60.	=5	60,000	- - -	60,000	1,140,000	19,860,000	Nil.
1808	66.66	=4½	296,101	- - -	296,101	2,103,899	18,896,101	Nil.
1809	- -	-	596,825	- - -	596,825	3,003,175	17,996,825	Nil.
1810	75.	=4	1,111,897	- - -	1,111,897	3,888,103	17,111,897	Nil.
1811	- -	-	1,753,172	- - -	1,753,172	4,846,828	16,153,172	Nil.
1812	85.71	=3¼	2,598,333	- - -	2,598,333	5,601,667	15,398,333	Nil.
1813	- -	-	3,529,073	- - -	3,529,073	6,270,927	14,729,073	Nil.
1814	Par	=3	4,636,146	- - -	4,636,146	6,763,854	14,236,146	Nil.
1815	- -	-	5,824,430	- - -	5,824,430	7,175,570	13,824,430	Nil.
1816	- -	-	7,096,362	- - -	7,096,362	7,503,638	13,496,362	Nil.
1817	- -	-	8,454,452	546,506	9,000,958	7,199,042	13,800,958	Nil.
1818	- -	-	9,901,285	759,449	10,660,734	7,139,266	13,860,734	Nil.
1819	- -	-	11,439,523	895,579	12,335,102	7,064,898	13,935,102	Nil.
1820	- -	-	13,071,908	950,674	14,022,582	6,977,418	14,022,582	Nil.
1821	- -	-	13,352,465	818,621	14,171,086	6,828,914	14,171,086	Nil.
1822	- -	-	13,641,437	658,607	14,300,044	6,699,956	14,300,044	Nil.
1823	- -	-	13,939,080	619,668	14,558,748	6,441,252	14,558,748	Nil.
1824	- -	-	14,122,052	01,079	14,723,131	6,276,869	14,723,131	Nil.
1825	- -	-	14,186,913	583,046	14,769,959	6,230,041	14,769,959	Nil.
1826	- -	-	14,253,719	565,555	14,819,274	6,180,726	14,819,274	Nil.

Note.—In this Table, no credit is taken for the Annuities which will expire in 1808 and in 1820, nor for the sums which would arise from the reduction of the 5 to a 4 per-Cent. fund, and afterwards of the 4 to a 3 per-Cent fund.

TABLE R. 4.

Shewing at one View the different RESULTS of the three Tables, R, R. 2, & R. 3.

1st SUPPOSITION—Table R.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue at 60. throughout the whole period of 20 Years.

2d SUPPOSITION—Table R. 2.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 63.16, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 70.58, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to 75. and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

3d SUPPOSITION—Table R. 3.——The 3 per Cents. are supposed to continue for the 1st Year (viz. 1807) at 60.; then to rise to 66.66, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1808 and 1809; then to rise to 75. and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1810 and 1811; then to rise to 85.71, and so to continue for two Years, viz. during 1812 and 1813; and then, viz. in 1814, to rise to Par, and to continue at that Price throughout the rest of the period of 20 Years.

YEAR.	1st SUPPOSITION.		2d SUPPOSITION.		3d SUPPOSITION.	
	War Taxes, which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax, taken at 11,500,000*l.* which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.	War Taxes, which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax, taken at 11,500,000*l.* which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.	War Taxes, which might be released at the End of any given Year.	Amount of the Property Tax, taken at 11,500,000*l.* which would remain pledged at the End of any given Year.
	£.	£.	£.		£.	
1807	19,860,000	Nil.	19,860,000	Nil.	19,860,000	Nil.
1808	18,783,000	Nil.	18,839,700	Nil.	18,896,101	Nil.
1809	17,772,150	Nil.	17,884,936	Nil.	17,996,825	Nil.
1810	16,640,757	Nil.	16,878,057	Nil.	17,111,897	Nil.
1811	15,402,794	Nil.	15,781,770	Nil.	16,153,172	Nil.
1812	14,262,933	Nil.	14,839,194	Nil.	15,398,333	Nil.
1813	13,226,079	Nil.	13,992,559	Nil.	14,729,073	Nil.
1814	12,297,382	Nil.	13,293,061	Nil.	14,236,146	Nil.
1815	11,482,251	Nil.	12,693,583	Nil.	13,824,430	Nil.
1816	11,957,914	Nil.	12,337,110	Nil.	13,496,362	Nil.
1817	11,923,046	Nil.	12,824,925	Nil.	13,800,958	Nil.
1818	11,891,765	Nil.	12,867,516	Nil.	13,860,734	Nil.
1819	11,858,922	Nil.	12,920,344	Nil.	13,935,102	Nil.
1820	11,819,104	Nil.	12,980,405	Nil.	14,022,582	Nil.
1821	11,850,628	Nil.	13,111,136	Nil.	14,171,086	Nil.
1822	11,817,068	Nil.	13,204,429	Nil.	14,300,044	Nil.
1823	11,715,148	Nil.	13,258,787	Nil.	14,558,748	Nil.
1824	11,478,140	21,860	13,221,452	Nil.	14,723,131	Nil.
1825	11,105,950	394,050	13,159,634	Nil.	14,769,959	Nil.
1826	10,720,730	779,270	13,136,910	Nil.	14,819,274	Nil.

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